The starting point of blame games
Before theorizing these blame game pathways, we must first define the conditions that lead blame games to unfold in the first place. Organizational misconduct can remain unidentified and invisible for a long period (
Palmer, 2013;
Pozner, 2008). It may take place but go unnoticed and unreported until stakeholders first spot it and take action (
Greve et al., 2010). For audiences to put pressure on an organization suspected of misconduct, the situation needs to be brought to their attention by constituents or the media through an accusation of misconduct (
Faulkner, 2011;
Greve et al., 2010). Accusations of misconduct can be triggered by different external stakeholders, including the media, governments and consumers (
Barnett, 2014). Whatever the source, evidence of an adverse outcome needs to be visible and salient to potential accusers – consequently forcing them to make a negative causal attribution (
Coombs, 2007a). An accusation of misconduct ‘
is a publicly expressed and perspicuous statement of alleged wrongdoing’ through which ‘
the finger of blame is pointed at the culprit’ (
Faulkner, 2011, p. 7). An accusation is characterized by its ‘in-betweenness’, i.e. the fact that it goes beyond informal grievance in its public and accusatory nature but falls short of a formal charge of wrongdoing by the state (
Faulkner, 2011). It is thus inherently ambiguous. For example, audiences start to make sense of organizational misconduct following the occurrence of seemingly anecdotal events (
Boudes & Laroche, 2009), those anecdotal events serving as accumulating clues that a misconduct might have happened. Crises, more generally, also begin when audiences start to attribute responsibility for an adverse event (
Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015), meaning that an accusation of misconduct may emerge when there is only suspicion of organizational misconduct. Organizations are considered to have agentic power which makes them more likely to be seen as villains rather than eliciting sympathy (
Rai & Diermeier, 2015). Accusers usually have an interest in pointing their finger at an organization for misbehaving (
Barnett, 2014), for example, when the suspected organization directly impacts their activity.
An accusation of misconduct by external stakeholders is thus the starting point for the triggering of blame games in our model. We conceptualize the accusation as a type of discourse in it is own right which opens the discursive space for accused actors to challenge this accusation. The aim of such accusation discourses is to allocate an actor to the discursive position of a perpetrator of wrongdoing. As such, the accusation is:
an event expressed through catchphrases and keywords [which] chronicle, capture, and classify ‘signature elements’, framing and promoting definitions of ‘what happened’, ‘who was involved’, and ‘what went wrong’, shaping the story and providing a theme. It is a symbolic packaging [. . .], a virtuoso exercise in the ‘redescription of behavior in order to transform its moral significance’. (
Faulkner, 2011, p. 16)
The accusation bears the seeds of the blame game. The discursive space that has been opened by this accusation is structured by attributional (
Crocker et al., 1991) and moral ambiguity (
Shadnam & Lawrence, 2011). After an accusation, attributional ambiguity emerges when the suspected organizational misconduct cannot be directly and clearly attributed to the organization (
Coombs & Holladay, 2002). Moral ambiguity materializes when audiences struggle to evaluate whether an organizational behaviour can be clearly categorized as right or wrong (
Greve et al., 2010;
Shadnam & Lawrence, 2011). Transgressions can be judged to be morally ambiguous when they appear excusable, or borderline, from a normative point of view (
Lee & Gailey, 2007). Moral ambiguity enables ‘the construction of vocabularies of evasion – ways to say that the rules do not apply or do not apply to you’ (
Reichman, 1993, p. 82). Ambiguity can trigger a ‘short-circuited logic’ – cognitive shortcuts that lead audiences to precipitate causal attribution (
Smelser, 1963). Most accusations of organizational misconduct are ambiguous, meaning that the guilt of the organization and its members is uncertain and unclear for some time (
Greve et al., 2010).
The endpoint of blame games
Although we have defined the ingredients for the blame game to take place – an accusation of misconduct and the resulting ambiguity – we have not discussed the pathways involved and possible endpoints. In the pathways that we theorize below, we explain how the beginning and the continuation of the blame game depend on the level of existing ambiguity. Indeed, as we will see, the discursive positions taken by suspected organizations and their members are not only affected by but also affect the ensuing ambiguity. We specifically assume that, as the discursive struggle over misconduct unfolds and accused actors take discursive positions to prevent blame, ambiguity will decrease in the longer term.
We understand ambiguity in the discursive struggle to exist from the point of view of audiences. Ambiguity arises following an accusation of misconduct because audiences find it difficult to make sense of the misconduct (
Clemente & Gabbioneta, 2017). The ambiguity decreases as audiences make sense of the accusation, influenced by their consumption of the discourse produced by accused actors. Because ambiguity ‘arises as an information problem’ and is caused by a lack of information (
Ball-Rokeach 1973, p. 379), by definition, any new information will help to reduce the ambiguity (
Green, 2004;
Lee & Gailey, 2007;
Leitch & Davenport, 2007). To interpret blame game discourses, audiences take account of the information they obtain about the misconduct itself and the positions that actors attempt to take in relation to the misconduct with their discourses. In the short run, ambiguity may increase as a result of the blame game, as audiences have to interpret the information provided by the discursive strategies of the accused actors. However, as time goes by, we expect audiences to gradually reduce such ambiguity for two reasons.
First, with each discursive move that the accused actors make, they introduce more information about the misconduct that audiences will use as part of their sensemaking process (
Green, 2004). For example, the discursive strategies of scapegoating and whistleblowing will provide the audiences with additional information (
Johansen et al., 2012). This information will help them to make sense of the moral status of a behaviour (thus reducing the moral ambiguity) and to attribute responsibility to actors (thus reducing attributional ambiguity). Second, the longer the blame game goes on, the more urgently audiences will wish to make sense of the misconduct and settle on an interpretation that resolves the ambiguity (
Ball-Rokeach, 1973). Audiences’ sensemaking will be driven by ‘plausibility rather than accuracy’ and by the need to process the accusation of misconduct in a way that enables them to move on and take action in response (
Weick, 1995, p. 55). Therefore, even if the available information is not sufficient for reaching factual certainty, audiences will eventually settle on interpretations of the misconduct that are plausible, and this becomes increasingly likely the longer blame game goes on. Whether the plausible interpretation that audiences settle on at the end of the blame game is factually correct lies outside the scope of our blame game theory: it is likely that the strategic discourse of accused actors will sometimes be effective in influencing audiences’ sensemaking to a significant extent, leading to plausible interpretations that in some instances do not match the reality of the facts.
Overall, as the blame game unfolds, attributional and moral ambiguity gradually decline (
Green, 2004) and the discursive space for accused actors shrinks. As there is less ambiguity for the accused actors to exploit (
Reichman, 1993), they are prevented from taking discursive positions to depict their role in the suspected misconduct in a favourable way. Accused actors will realize that there is little for them to gain if they continue with the blame game and attempt to avoid taking responsibility. They are therefore less likely to use these discursive strategies. We thus start by formulating the following proposition about the end point of the blame game.
Proposition 1: The blame game continues until ambiguity is too limited for accused actors to discursively challenge an accusation of misconduct.
Pathway A: Blame game in a situation of high moral ambiguity and low attributional ambiguity
The first pathway we theorize starts when the discursive space, following an accusation of misconduct, is structured by high moral ambiguity and low attributional ambiguity. This situation is characterized by the difficulty audiences have in establishing whether the targeted action is morally wrong (
Green, 2004) although there is a visible organizational culprit. In such a situation, the accusation of misconduct can best be challenged by the accused organization on normative grounds. The low level of attributional ambiguity is not conducive to engaging in discursive strategies that attempt to shift blame away from the accused actor (
Leitch & Davenport, 2007). Such strategies will be ineffective because the accuser has been clearly identified and linked to the misbehaviour in the accusing discourses. This could even direct audience attention to the fact that there is relatively little doubt about who the culprit is, meaning that the route of discursively exploiting attributional ambiguity is closed off to the accused actor.
Assessing the available discursive strategies, the accused actor is therefore likely to discount strategies that focus on manipulating conditions of attributional ambiguity. Instead, we might expect the accused actor to create discourses that exploit the relatively high level of moral ambiguity. The most promising discursive strategy will therefore be to counter the accusation by denying that the called-out behaviour was wrongful in the first place. The accused actors, we argue, will produce and formulate arguments denying that the identified behaviour is morally condemnable.
The discursive strategy of denying wrongfulness consists of producing texts which situate the behaviour in question away from the line that separates right and wrong, attempting to draw a clear distinction between that behaviour and truly wrongful behaviours. This strategy might involve emphasizing the legality, the prevalence and the normalcy of the behaviour in the wider institutional context (
Pozner, 2008), as well as explaining the benefits of the behaviour and promising to address some of its drawbacks (
Roulet, 2019,
2020). The discursive position taken here thus relegates the issue of responsibility to the background, blurring the relationship between the accused actor and the potential misconduct. This discursive strategy has the function of making full use of the existing moral ambiguity and avoiding getting caught up in the attribution of responsibility which, due to the low level of attributional ambiguity, provides the accused actors with relatively little discursive leeway. We can therefore formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 2: When moral ambiguity is high and attributional ambiguity is low following an accusation of misconduct, the accused organization is likely to deny the wrongfulness of the behaviour in question.
We previously discussed how many of the practices in the investment banking industry were not seen as morally wrong by field-level actors although they were condemned by the media (
Roulet, 2019). Banks justified large bonuses and risk-taking by showing that those practices were common in the industry and important for recruiting the best and the brightest. They also stressed how their practices conformed with the law. In 2010, Goldman Sachs and one of its employees were accused of securities fraud because the firm had designed a product, called Abacus, which was considered to mislead investors. However, although it settled in court, Goldman Sachs always denied wrongdoing, taking advantage of the moral gray zone with regards to investor and client relationships.
In this first scenario, we can identify two possible next steps. Following proposition 1, we might expect ambiguity to decrease as audiences accept the suspected actor’s arguments that the identified behaviour was not morally wrong (
Green, 2004). In this case, the discursive response of denying wrongfulness will be effective in discarding the accusation by reducing moral ambiguity. The ambiguity will be settled, and the accusation will fizzle out as audiences fail to be convinced of the wrongfulness of the action. The other possibility is that the accused actor’s discursive positioning will not convince the audiences (
Leitch & Davenport, 2007). Accusers might further refine their arguments and reinforce their discursive position to counter the denial of the accused organization. For example, the accusers’ discourses might re-emphasize and reinforce the wrongfulness of the behaviour, e.g. by highlighting distinctions between the law and morality or by calling out the harm that the behaviour has caused. If sufficient moral ambiguity remains at this point, the accused organization could, in turn, again deny wrongfulness. This discursive struggle will continue as moral ambiguity remains sufficiently high, unless audiences settle in between on an interpretation of the behaviour as wrongful or not wrongful.
Pathway B: Blame game in a situation of low moral ambiguity and high attributional ambiguity
In this second pathway, we theorize what happens after an accusation of misconduct when moral ambiguity is low (the behaviour identified by the accuser is perceived as morally wrong) and attributional ambiguity is high (audiences are unclear about who is responsible for the wrongdoing). In this context, accused actors have the opportunity to engage in discursive strategies that shift and deflect blame, taking advantage of the difficulty audiences have in attributing responsibility.
The low level of moral ambiguity in this situation means that discursive strategies which exploit moral ambiguity are unlikely to be effective, as there is already a relatively strong consensus among audiences that the accused organization’s behaviour transgresses the line between right and wrong (
Palmer, 2012). Denying the wrongfulness of the behaviour in this situation could even backfire and exacerbate negative audience evaluations by making the accused actor appear indifferent to conventional moral standards. Therefore, the discursive exploitation of moral ambiguity is impossible in this situation. Instead, the situation is conducive to exploiting the relatively high level of attributional ambiguity that characterizes the discursive space. To deflect blame, accused actors will therefore opt for discursive strategies that rely on attributional ambiguity, producing discourses that deny their responsibility and assign the position of being the perpetrator or chief architect of the misconduct to someone else.
Based on previous work on crisis management (
Coombs, 2007a), we define scapegoating as a critical organizational discursive strategy for shifting blame following an accusation of misconduct with low moral but high attributional ambiguity.
2 In this situation, a clear wrongdoing is made visible but it is still unclear which actors exactly are responsible. This may then trigger efforts by audiences to identify the cause and the source of the organizational wrongdoing, bearing the risk that the finger of blame is pointed at the organization as a whole (
Bonazzi, 1983;
Devers, Dewett, Mishina, & Belsito, 2009). This vulnerability triggers a discursive reaction from the organization (
Girard, 1982). The accused organization will attempt to discursively shift blame, for which the high level of attributional ambiguity provides the necessary discursive opportunity. To do so, the organization will generate discourses that blame individual organizational members in order to shift the blame away from the organization. Individual employees with limited retaliatory power, especially at lower levels of the organization, can become easy targets for this scapegoating (
Djabi & de Longueval, 2020). But high-level executives and even CEOs can also become the target of scapegoating discourses, mainly because they are the most visible to outsiders and naturally seem to hold most of the responsibility (
Gangloff et al., 2016), which makes it easier for audiences to associate them with the misconduct. Thus, we formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 3a: When moral ambiguity is low and attributional ambiguity is high following an accusation of misconduct, the accused organization is likely to engage in scapegoating.
The discursive strategy of scapegoating relies on creating a distinction between the accused organization as a whole and some of its members. The discourse produced attributes responsibility for the misconduct to specific individual members, thus distancing the organization from the accusation. Going back to the case of the Volkswagen emissions scandal, the relatively high attributional ambiguity surrounding the allegation of fraudulent behaviour enabled Volkswagen to scapegoat software engineers as ‘rogue coders’.
3 Because it was hard for external audiences to understand the chain of command, the targeted organization was able to use that attributional ambiguity to its advantage to deflect blame through scapegoating.
While scapegoating is a top-down process for shifting blame from the organization to individual members, we can also expect a similar bottom-up effort by organizational members to shift blame to the organization (
Frandsen & Johansen, 2011). Indeed, individual organizational members can be in an advantageous position to exploit attributional ambiguity and to generate their own discourses attributing responsibility for misconduct to the organization. Information about organizational misconduct will be available within the organization, and the discursive struggle that follows the accusation of misconduct can involve individual employees introducing this information into the discourse and making it available to outside audiences. Organizational members may have direct information and witness the wrongdoing (
Frandsen & Johansen, 2011) and they are thus in a better position to suggest causal attributions of misconduct.
As previously stressed, whistleblowing is an individual discursive strategy that can shift blame away from the individual. Through whistleblowing, members within the accused organization who are at risk of being blamed can position themselves in the discursive space. They can produce arguments that will exonerate them of responsibility and shift the blame to the organization instead, taking advantage of the high level of attributional ambiguity. Therefore, following an accusation of misconduct which might result in scapegoating attempts by the organization, organizational members may pre-empt such a move by whistleblowing. Whistleblowing involves organizational members producing text that shifts the responsibility to the organization as a whole and offers information which is only available to insiders and which in many instances substantiates this attribution of responsibility (
Bonazzi, 1983). This discursive strategy enables members to avoid being blamed by the organization for their responsibility in the wrongdoing (
Westin, 1981) and to avoid future reputational penalties for themselves (
Coombs, 2007b). We theorize that scapegoating can be pre-empted by members of the organization who attempt to produce whistleblowing discourses to exonerate themselves and shift blame.
Proposition 3b: When moral ambiguity is low and attributional ambiguity is high following an accusation of misconduct, members of the accused organization – particularly those that could be held responsible for the misconduct – are likely to blow the whistle.
There are many examples where whistleblowers who revealed misconduct might have been blamed if they had not intervened. In 2013, Laurence do Rego, the chief executive for risk and finance for Ecobank – one of the major banking conglomerates in Africa – revealed the wrongdoing of the chairman and the incoming executive director, pre-empting potential investigation of the entire company by the Nigeria Securities & Exchange Commission. Similarly, in 2010, Cheryl Eckard, quality manager at pharma giant GlaxoSmithKline, exposed several wrongdoings related to the quality of medicines sold by the firm after the Federal Drug Agency had issued relevant warnings. Given their positions within those firms, both executives would have been considered responsible if the wrongdoing had become visible to stakeholders.
We have identified two potential first moves in blame games in situations of high attributional ambiguity and low moral ambiguity which originate from either the organization (scapegoating) or its members (whistleblowing). Both of these discursive strategies can initiate a blame game in this pathway, as the discursive space with high attributional and low moral ambiguity is conducive to either paths. However, because the discursive space for blame games shrinks in the longer term (proposition 1), the actor who makes the first move has a certain advantage. On the other hand, as a strategy, whistleblowing can be very costly to individual members; e.g. it may backfire or require them to leave the organization. Therefore, individual members will only make a first move following an accusation of misconduct if they perceive the risk of organizational scapegoating discourses to be particularly high. We do not formally theorize this mechanism but expect it will depend on the nature of the misconduct accusation: if this accusation initially appears to point relatively more to individual than to organizational responsibility, organizational members are more likely to fear that they will soon be blamed for the potential misconduct by their organization through scapegoating, and are thus more likely to make the first move.
We can expect the discursive strategies of scapegoating and whistleblowing to be met by discursive reactions that target the discourses which started the blame game. Up until now, we have conceptualized whistleblowing as a pre-emptive strategy (proposition 3b): individual actors at risk of being blamed by the organization pre-empt such scapegoating by blowing the whistle (
Butler et al., 2020). However, if scapegoating happens first, whistleblowing will become an individual-level discursive reaction to scapegoating discourses. Scapegoating discourses are generated by the accused organization and aim to shift the blame to the individual. However, members of an organization who are made scapegoats can engage in whistleblowing as a way of producing discourses that respond to this blame-shifting: the texts provided by whistleblowers who react to scapegoating will aim to clarify the link between those whistleblowers and the behaviours attributed to them through scapegoating (
Kenny, 2019). The aim of those discourses will be to answer scapegoating claims and to provide an alternative account of who is responsible for the misconduct, e.g. by using the insider knowledge of the whistleblower to reframe the misconduct as a systemic, organizational problem that goes beyond individual culpability (
Keil, Tiwani, Sainsbury, & Sneha, 2010). We thus theorize that, as a response to scapegoating, organizational members will blow the whistle, shifting the blame back to the organization as a whole:
Proposition 4a: In a continued situation of low moral and high attributional ambiguity, and once they have been targeted by scapegoating discourses, members of the accused organization are likely to blow the whistle to deflect blame.
One example of the discursive reaction of a scapegoat is that of John Schnatter, founder of the American pizza franchise Papa John. He had to resign from his position as chairman in July 2018 after making a racist remark in a conference call and was scapegoated by the firm’s top executives. In the meantime, Schnatter pointed out the company’s problematic organizational culture. In an interview in August, Schnatter talked about ‘rot at the top’ and blamed the company’s problems on the new CEO and the ‘vindictive and controlling’ leadership style of the top executives.
4 This body of discourses illustrates how scapegoated actors respond to blame when attribution is difficult. In a similar case, Jerome Kerviel, after being condemned in the rogue trading affair in 2008, started to denounce the culture of his organization, Société Générale, as a significant driver of misconduct.
Whistleblowing, whether as a pre-emptive discursive strategy or as a response to scapegoating, provides the accusers with more information, potentially reducing attributional ambiguity by enabling them to home in on the responsible party. Whistleblowing discourses thus trigger discursive reactions from the accused organization: the organization has to address the new information introduced by whistleblowing and its implications for the attribution of responsibility. The organizational discourse in response to whistleblowing will, we argue, focus on deflecting the blame, justifying the behaviour of the organization, and delegitimizing the discursive position of the whistleblower. The discursive reaction of the organization is therefore another element of a scapegoating strategy which aims to distance the organization as a whole from the misconduct by continuing to shift the blame to individual members (
Djabi & de Longueval, 2020). This strategy may rely, for example, on attributing blame for the misconduct to the whistleblower and highlighting it as an isolated instance of individual misconduct. Alternatively, it may attack the whistleblower on moral grounds and leverage another, unrelated accusation of misconduct against the whistleblower in order to delegitimize the original whistleblowing claim. Such a discursive reaction will only be effective for the accused organization if the level of attributional ambiguity remains high enough, despite the information that came to light through the whistleblowing. A continuing high level of attributional ambiguity makes it difficult for accusers to clearly identify an individual or organizational culprit and, as a consequence, audiences will continue to struggle to evaluate the validity of organizational and individual discourses.
Proposition 4b: In a situation of continuing low moral and high attributional ambiguity, after organizational members have blown the whistle, the accused organization is likely to engage in scapegoating its members to deflect blame.
In the 2013 whistleblowing case involving Laurence do Rego, Ecobank top executives countered the accusation of the whistleblower by accusing her of not having the qualifications she claimed to have and of taking revenge on the organization.
5 This discursive position aimed to deflect the whistleblowing claim by delegitimizing its source. However, when institutional shareholders and other stakeholders started to investigate the matter, the bank was forced to fire the controversial chief executive and reinstate the whistleblower in her post.
6
Scapegoating and whistleblowing both contribute to furthering the misconduct inquiry as the discourses generated provide new information. This can increase ambiguity in the short run while audiences engage with this new information. However, in the long run, as the blame game unfolds, we can expect this ambiguity to decrease with the emergence of new information. Audiences will use this new information to form plausible links between the misconduct event and accused actors, converging on a definition of the situation that reduces attributional ambiguity (
Ball-Rokeach, 1973). The public availability of this information puts external audiences and internal organizational actors on an equal footing to make causal attributions. At the same time, the scapegoating and whistleblowing discourses generated by the suspected organization and its members become less credible (
Grant et al., 2001): the validity of the discourses which attempt to shift blame is evaluated as they are checked against emerging information. We expect the blame games in this pathway to die out as the discursive space shrinks because of decreasing ambiguity, thereby giving accused actors fewer opportunities to adopt discursive blame-shifting strategies through additional whistleblowing or scapegoating moves.
When Volkswagen tried to blame the emissions scandal on ‘rogue’ software engineers, political and legal stakeholders questioned this accusation. As the scandal unfolded, new information emerged, suggesting that top executives had also known about and concealed the software manipulation.
7 The Volkswagen example illustrates how blame game discourses lose credibility as more information emerges, thereby reducing ambiguity.
Pathway C: Blame game in a situation of high moral ambiguity and high attributional ambiguity
This third pathway unfolds if both moral and attributional ambiguity are high following an accusation of misconduct. In this case, the discursive space appears to offer the broadest range of opportunities for the accused actors to deflect the blame. But the discursive space, while presenting a variety of strategic opportunities, is also uniquely complex. Actors accused of misconduct have two options: they can exploit the high moral ambiguity by engaging in a discursive strategy of denying wrongfulness, or they can exploit the high attributional ambiguity by engaging in discursively shifting blame. However, these choices are not independent of each other, and actors have to consider their interdependency when choosing their first move in this particular blame game scenario.
On the one hand, if actors try to exploit attributional ambiguity and engage in blame-shifting by attributing responsibility to another actor (through scapegoating or whistleblowing), they will forego the option of denying wrongfulness. This problem arises because shifting the blame for a behaviour to another actor, through scapegoating or whistleblowing, implicitly acknowledges the wrongfulness of the said behaviour (
Kent & Boatwright, 2018). If the behaviour were not wrongful, it would not be necessary to point the finger at another actor. Therefore, the discursive exploitation of high attributional ambiguity through blame-shifting simultaneously reduces the existing moral ambiguity and thus restructures the discursive space to preclude subsequent denials of wrongdoing. Therefore, if, in this scenario, accused actors start a blame game with a whistleblowing or scapegoating move, the situation will transition into the blame-shifting dynamics of pathway B.
On the other hand, if actors choose to exploit moral ambiguity and deny wrongfulness, they will leave space for subsequent scapegoating or whistleblowing in case the denial of wrongfulness is unsuccessful. The rationale for such action is that, when denying wrongfulness (
Coombs & Holladay, 2002), actors push the question of responsibility to the background but do not necessarily take responsibility for the behaviour. Accused actors can deny wrongdoing while keeping attributions of responsibility deliberately vague in order to retain discursive leeway in the next step of the blame game, thereby preserving the strategic option of generating scapegoating discourses. In the case of the Abacus scandal, Goldman Sachs denied the wrongfulness of its behaviour as much as it could but ultimately opted to make one of its vice presidents a scapegoat on the path to settling the situation with the Securities & Exchange Commission. Thus, we can conclude that, due to the specific interdependency of high moral and attributional ambiguity in this particular situation, the most rational course of action is for actors to start the blame game by denying wrongfulness, keeping their discursive options open further down the line.
Proposition 5: When moral and attributional ambiguity are both high following an accusation of misconduct, the accused organization is likely to first deny the wrongfulness of the behaviour in question.
This denial of wrongfulness will set off a discursive struggle about the moral status of the behaviour in question, which is eventually likely to settle at a low level of moral ambiguity with audiences interpreting the behaviour either as a misconduct or as a morally acceptable behaviour. In the latter case, the denial of wrongfulness has been successful, and the accusation is neutralized in a similar way to pathway A. However, in the former case, the behaviour is now clearly seen by audiences as misconduct, and the suspected organization still faces the accusation. This new situation is characterized by low moral ambiguity but still by high attributional ambiguity, leaving some room for an attribution of responsibility. Therefore, the accused actors have retained the option of engaging in blame-shifting discursive strategies, and the dynamics of the blame game transition into those of pathway B.