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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 July 2014
A fresh interpretation of King William III's employment of the royal veto provides new insights into the political and constitutional issues of his reign. The veto, or the crown's negative voice as it was called by contemporaries, is a particularly fruitful subject for study in charting the course of politics in seventeenth century England. The employment of the veto offers an accurate barometer for measuring political and constitutional change. It addresses the key issue of sovereignty—who makes law? King or Parliament? It is surprising, therefore, that historians have neglected to examine the implications of William's employment of the veto. As a result, their conclusions about the veto are not supported by a full analysis of the available evidence. What they have overlooked is that a close examination of the bills the king rejected, and of contemporary views of the royal prerogative, demonstrates that underneath the turmoil of Williamite politics lay a stable foundation built on the settlement achieved at the Revolution of 1688/9.
During his brief rule William III rejected a significant number of bills. Between 1692 and 1696 he vetoed five public bills: the Judges, Royal Mines, Triennial, Place, and MP Qualifications Bills. Previous Tudor and Stuart monarchs, with the exception of Queen Elizabeth I, only infrequently invoked the crown's right to refuse legislation. Queen Anne, who followed William to the throne, vetoed only one bill. She was the last monarch to employ this prerogative, although it remains theoretically a legitimate royal power.
A version of this paper was presented at the 1986 Carolinas Symposium on British Studies. I wish to express my appreciation to Professors Lois Schwoerer of George Washington University, Janelle Greenburg of the University of Pittsburgh, Captain Deane Williams of the United States Military Academy, and Donald Horward of Florida State University who read this paper and made helpful suggestions. In addition, this article could not have been written without the kind assistance of the staff of the Folger Library in Washington, D.C.
1 No comprehensive analysis of the veto has been done since Macaulay, Thomas Babington, The History of England From the Accession of James the Second, ed. Firth, C. H., 6 vols. (London, 1913–1915), 5:2137–9, 2420–2, 2619–21Google Scholar. Macaulay, however, repeatedly misread William's intentions in the use of the veto because of his attempt to portray the king, in the whig interpretation of history, as England's first true parliamentary monarch. As a result, Macaulay ignored the political and constitutional conflicts between crown and parliament implied by William's aggressive use of the veto. Ogg, David, England in the Reigns of James II and William III (Oxford, 1955), p. 497Google Scholar simply repeats Macaulay's conclusions.
2 Among these are Anson, William, The Law and Custom of the Constitution, 2 parts (Oxford, 1913), 1:254Google Scholar; Kemp, Betty, Kings and Commons 1660–1832 (London, 1957), pp. 26–7Google Scholar; Hill, Christopher, A Century of Revolution 1603–1714 (Edinburgh, 1961), p. 277CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Turberville, A. S., The House of Lords (Oxford, 1913), p. 240Google Scholar; Plumb, J. H., The Growth of Political Stability in England 1675–1725 (London, 1967), p. 308CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ellis, E. L., “William III and the Politicians,” Britain After the Glorious Revolution, ed. Holmes, Geoffrey (London, 1969), p. 124Google Scholar; Feiling, Keith, History of the Tory Party 1640–1714 (Oxford, 1924), pp. 277, 288–92Google Scholar, and Baxter, Stephen, William III (London, 1962), p. 308Google Scholar. Both Horwitz, Henry, Parliament, Policy and Politics in the Reign of William III (Manchester, 1977), pp. 75–6, 114, 126–7, 177Google Scholar and Rubini, Dennis, Court and Country 1688–1702 (London, 1968), pp. 100–114, 119–120Google Scholar have written comprehensive analyses of the legislative history of William's reign, but have not distinguished anything exceptional about the king's employment of the negative voice. Corinne Comstock Weston and Greenburg, Janelle Renfrow, Subjects and Sovereigns (Cambridge, 1981)Google Scholar, provide an extensive examination of debates over the veto power in the seventeenth century. However, they only briefly address William's reign (see pp. 219–220).
3 In researching this paper I examined material from the Public Records Office, the British Museum, the House of Lords Records Office, and the H.M.C. reports and manuscript collections. In addition, the staff at the National Library of Wales and the University of Cardiff researched on my behalf, the court case of Sir Carbury Price as it related to the Royal Mines Bill. This search uncovered little material not considered by other historians. Therefore, it appears that a deeper understanding of William's employment of the veto can be gained only through a more comprehensive examination of existing evidence.
4 William also vetoed two private bills, see H.M.C., , House of Lords, 1693–5, p. 498Google Scholar, and H.M.C., , House of Lords, 1699–1701, p. 387Google Scholar. Complete copies of these bills are extant in the House of Lords Records Office.
5 An excellent summary of the Militia Bill controversy appears in Schwoerer, Lois G., “The Fittest Subject for a King's Quarrel: An Essay on the Militia Controversy 1641–2,” Journal of British Studies 11 (November 1972): 45–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
6 Husbands, Edward, An Exact Collection of All Remonstrances (London, 1642), p. 268, 289, 363, 705, 707, 708 and 716Google Scholar.
7 See, for example, A Discourse Upon the Questions (n.p., 1642), pp. 14–5Google Scholar; Prynne, William, The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdomes or Second Part (London, 1643), pp. 65–78Google Scholar, and Touching on the Fundamental Lawes (London, 1643), passimGoogle Scholar.
8 This argument most likely evolved from Sir Richard Hutton's judgement in the Ship Money Case in which he suggested a connection between the veto and the coronation oath, see The Arguements of Sir Richard Hutton (London, 1641), p. 32Google Scholar.
9 Pamphleteers discussed the veto in anticipation of Charles II's Restoration. See for example Sheringham, Robert, The Kings Supremacy Asserted (London, 1660), pp. 26, 99–106, 122–5Google Scholar, and Bageshaw, Edward, The Rights of the Crown (London, 1660), pp. 69–85 and 118–122Google Scholar.
10 13 Charles II c.1, Statutes of the Realm, 5:304–5Google Scholar.
11 Weston, and Greenburg, , Subjects, p. 211Google ScholarPubMed, contend that the Treason Act of 1661 by implication rejected the parliamentarian version of “quas vulgus elegerit.” Although the act confirmed the requirement for the royal assent to legislation it did not stipulate when that assent could be rightfully withheld. Therefore, the argument raised by the translation of the oath was not in fact addressed.
12 For example, L'Estrange, Roger, The State and Interest of the Nation (London, 1680), p. 16Google Scholar, defended the crown's veto power. The author of Just and Modest Vindication (London, 1680), p. 3Google Scholar, stated that the veto could be used against an Exclusion Bill. But the pamphlet Three Great Questions (London, 1680), p. 14Google ScholarPubMed, claimed that the king did not have the right to reject such a bill.
13 A few pamphleteers, however, suggested that parliament should address the issue. See Humfrey, John, Advise Before it be too Late (London, 1688), p. 4Google Scholar; Humanum est Errare (London, 1689), p. 6Google Scholar, and Stephens, Edward, Important Questions (London, 1689), pp. 4–5Google Scholar.
14 I William and Mary c.6, S.R., 6:56. There were no recorded discussions on the veto power during the parliamentary debates over the form of the new oath.
15 Kenyon, J. P., Revolution Principles, The Politics of Party 1689–1720 (Cambridge, 1977)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, provides a useful introduction to whig ideology after the Revolution.
16 Cobbett, William, The Parliamentary History of England, 36 vols. (London, 1806–1820), 5:lxxiiGoogle Scholar. For the proliferation of the discussion and advocacy of contract theory during the Revolution see numerous tracts in Collection of State Tracts, 3 vols. (London, 1705–1707), vol.1Google Scholar. Schwoerer, Lois, Declaration of Rights, 1689 (Baltimore, 1981), chaps. 9–13, 16Google Scholar, illustrates the whig advocacy of contract theory during the convention. See also Farr, James and Roberts, Clayton “John Locke on the Glorious Revolution: A Rediscovered Document,” Historical Journal 28 (June 1985): 385–98CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
17 Grey, Anchitell, Debates of the House of Commons, from the Year 1667 to the year 1694, 10 vols. (London, 1763), 10:384Google Scholar.
18 Ibid., pp. 368–9.
19 Sir George Savile recorded a few comments concerning the king's attitude. See, for example, Foxcroft, H. C., Life and Letters of Sir George Savile, 2 vols. (London, 1898), 2:203, 221Google Scholar.
20 H.M.C., , House of Lords, 1692–3, p. 78Google Scholar.
21 Some resentment was, however, noted outside the halls of Westminster. See, Evelyn, John, The Diary of John Evelyn, ed. deBeer, E. S., 6 vols. (Oxford, 1955), 5:90Google Scholar. See also, Von Ranke, Leopold, A History of England, 6 vols. (Oxford, 1875), 6:181Google Scholar, and H.M.C., , Finch M.S.S., 4:441Google Scholar. Other sources were completely silent on the veto. The official London Gazette, for example, on the occasion of each veto noted the bills approved by the king, but made no mention of the bills rejected. See issues Feb. 22–25, 1691/2; Mar. 13–16, 1692/3; Jan. 25–29, 1693/4, and Apr. 9–13, 1696.
22 The salaries established in the bill could not have been the cause for rejection since they were the same as those already being paid by the crown. For example, see salaries assigned in Shaw, W. A. ed., Calender of Treasury Books (London, 1904–1962), 9:part 1:134Google Scholar. Macaulay suggested that the king vetoed the bill because he had not been consulted on the financial provisions before the measure was introduced (History of England, 5:2139Google ScholarPubMed). His conclusion, however, is not based on evidence, but on an assumption concerning parliamentary procedures which were not introduced until the eighteenth century. The manner of judicial appointments would also not have been changed by the bill, since William was already voluntarily appointing judges with a commission stating “as long as they give satisfactory service.” For example, see Shaw, , C.T.B., 9:part 1:86, 111Google Scholar. In the Act of Settlement of 1701 William approved by law the appointment of judges on good behavior, see 12 & 13 William c.2, S.R., 7:637. This act also fixed salaries, but did not regulate judicial fees.
23 Burnet, , History of His Own Time, 6 vols. (Oxford, 1833), 4:154Google Scholar.
24 Judge Rokeby, for example, noted that his fees brought him an annual income of between £378. 19s. and £1063. 18s. 4d, see Holdsworth, , History of English Law, 17 vols. (London, 1903–1972), 1:255Google Scholar. In fact Rokeby in later years lamented his promotion to the King's Bench because profits in that court were not as great as those in the Common Pleas, see A Brief Memoir of Mr. Justice Rokeby, The Surtees Society (London, 1861), 37:57Google Scholar. A near contemporary list of judicial fees is given in The Pratick Part of the Law (London, 1702), Part IIIGoogle ScholarPubMed.
25 Judge Rokeby, for example, had aided William on the eve of the Glorious Revolution by supporting the movement for him in York. See Foss, Edward, A Biographical Dictionary of the Judges of England (London, 1870), p. 564Google Scholar. In addition, William's judges were men of quality who could be retained in office only as long as their rewards provided adequate compensation for their time and their talents.
26 1 William and Mary c.30, S.R., 5:95.
27 5 William and Mary c.6, S.R., 6:446–7, and H.M.C., , House of Lords, 1693–5, p. 334Google Scholar.
28 Thirsk, Joan and Cooper, J. P. eds., Seventeenth Century Economic Documents (Oxford, 1972), pp. 318–20Google Scholar; Stringer, Moses, Opera Mineralia (London, 1713), pp. 245–265Google Scholar; Waller, William, An on the Value of the Mines of the Late Sir Carbury Price (London, 1698)Google Scholar, passim; Jenkins, David, “The Pryse Family of Gogerddan III,” National Library of Wiles Journal 8 (1953–1954): 353–368Google Scholar, and Hunt, R., “Lead Mines of Cardiganshire,” Memoirs of Geological Survey 2 (1862): 645–6Google Scholar. Some discussion of the affair is also given in the Minutes of the Company of Royal Mines. The minutes are on loan to the British Museum manuscript collection.
29 Public Records Office, Privy Council Register, 73:522–3Google Scholar.
30 Public Records Office, Exchequer Out Letters General, 13:235, 261, 282, 288, 408Google Scholar; Journal of the House of Commons, 10:714Google Scholar; Luttrell, Narcissus, The Parliamentary Diary of Narcissus Luttrell, 1691–1693, ed. Horwitz, Henry (Oxford, 1972), p. 261Google Scholar, and Luttrell, Narcissus, A Brief Historical Relation, 6 vols. (Oxford, 1857) 2:255–6, 309Google Scholar.
31 Out Letters, 13:173bGoogle ScholarPubMed and C.J., 10:583, 642.
32 Luttrell, , Diary, pp. 367, 376, 389Google Scholar and C.J., 10:784.
33 Luttrell, , Brief Historical Relation, 3:57Google Scholar.
34 Thirsk, , Economic Documents, p. 320Google Scholar.
35 After Price secured ownership in his mine, Osborne issued a power of attorney dated July 5, 1693 to sell his shares in the mine at not less than £17 a share, see The National Library of Wales, Department of Manuscripts and Records, Gogerddan Collection, 484, and Deeds Collection, 1297.
36 The call for frequent parliaments was included in both the Heads of Grievances and the Bill of Rights, see C.J., 10:17, and 1 William and Mary s.2 c.2, S.R., 6:143.
37 H.M.C., , House of Lords, 1692–3, pp. 299–302Google Scholar.
38 For example, see Rubini, , Court and Country, p. 71Google Scholar, when William prorogued parliament to kill a commission on monitoring court expenditures. Foxcroft, (Life and Letters, 2: 243, 244)Google Scholar notes William's dislike of bills which perished with the dismissal of parliament in January 1689/90. William also spoke against a Hereditary Revenue Bill that died with the prorogation of parliament in May 1690, see Foxcroft, , Life and Letters, 2:252Google Scholar, C.T.B., 9:part 1, xxx–xxxi, and Horwitz, , Parliament, p. 58Google Scholar.
39 Agitation over the king's decision was noted by the following; Burnet, , History, 4:192Google Scholar; Evelyn, , Diary, 5:135Google Scholar; Ranke, , History, 6:212–3Google Scholar, as well as in Parliament the following session, see Grey, , Debates, 10:368–9Google Scholar.
40 In fact the Triennial Bill which William accepted postponed new elections until November 1696. The king eventually decided to move the date of elections up to the fall of 1695 after the allied victory at the seige of Namur when the war was clearly turning in his favor. It was thought that this victory would translate into popular support for the Crown and the election of members of parliament supportive of the war. See, Coxe, William, Private and Original Correspondence of Charles Talbot (London, 1821), pp. 96–7, 103, 105–8Google Scholar.
41 See Grey, , Debates, 10:300, 301, 306–7, 308Google Scholar; Luttrell, , Diary, pp. 406, 407Google Scholar, and H.M.C., , House of Lords, 1692–3, pp. 299, 301Google Scholar.
42 Early in his reign William admitted to George Savile that “while there was a war he should want a parliament.” See Foxcroft, , Life and Letters, 2:223Google Scholar.
43 Luttrell, , Diary, p. 408Google Scholar. See also pp. 405–6, 416.
44 It has been suggested that the “holden” argument was introduced by the court to delay the bill. The opposition, however, considered it important, refusing to concede the point though debate was slowing process on the bill. In the following parliament when the bill was reintroduced, a clause was added to define “holden.” When the court's opposition failed in a vote to have it removed they then joined in voting down the whole bill. Before the bill was thrown out, Lowther even offered the opposition an alternative: “Declare the matter of the negative voice and let the word holden stand.” See Cobbett, , Parliamentary History, 5:787Google Scholar. The argument that the debate over “holden” was simply a court tactic is made by Rubini, Dennis (Court and Country, p. 108)Google Scholar and Frankle, Robert (“Parliament, Crown and Reform, 1689–1701” [Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1970], pp. 176–80)Google Scholar.
45 On the other hand, many of the crown's critics believed that one of the benefits of the Triennial Bill was to limit the effectiveness of the negative voice. See, for example, The Claims of the People of England (London, 1701), p. 40Google ScholarPubMed.
46 H.M.C., , House of Lords, 1692–3, p. 280Google Scholar. See also H.M.C., House of Lords, 1693–5, pp. 330–1.
47 It was raised in the reign of Charles II, see C.J., 9:321, 609, 695–6. It was also discussed in 1688/9, see Kennett, White, A Complete History of England, 3 vols. (London, 1706), 2:546Google Scholar.
48 Macaulay, , History of England, 5:2422Google Scholar.
49 The risks of opposing this popular bill were noted by Burnet, , History, 4:189–90Google Scholar. William's aid was employed previously to help defeat a Place Bill in the House of Lords. See Cruickshanks, Eveline, Hayton, David and Jones, Clyve, “Divisions in the House of Lords on the Transfer of the Crown and Other Issues, 1689–94,” Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 53 (May 1980): 69–73Google Scholar. Some members of the Commons believed the rejection of the Place Bill was more of a conflict between political parties than an issue of crown against parliament. See, for example, the remarks of Lowther, Bertie, and Harley in Cobbett, , Parliamentary History, 5:834Google Scholar. The most cogent analysis of the role of the Place Bill in Williamite politics is given in Hayton, David, “The Reorientation of Place Legislation in England in the 1690s,” Parliaments, Estates and Representation 5 (December 1985): 103–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
50 William was required to appear before Parliament before the end of the session to approve a needed Land Tax Bill. See Horwitz, , Parliament, pp. 126–7Google Scholar, and Journal of the House of Lords, 15:351Google Scholar.
51 Grey, , Debates, 10:380Google Scholar. Grey wrongly titles this section “On the King's Rejecting the Bill for Frequent Parliaments.” See also Cobbett, , Parliamentary History, 5:833Google Scholar. Cobbett in error does not omit the clause discussing the king's knowledge of the constitution from the final draft of the representation. It is interesting to note that all of the arguments used against the veto in the representation, with the exception of the complaint against William's knowledge of the constitution, were foreshadowed by the republican Henry Neville. See Neville, Henry, Plato Redivivus (London, 1681), pp. 125, 129, 130–1, 257–8Google Scholar.
52 Grey, , Debates, 10: 378Google Scholar.
53 Luttrell, , A Brief Historical Relation, 3:260Google Scholar, and Cobbett, , Parliamentary History, 5:834Google Scholar.
54 To illustrate the conservative nature of the representation note that the House deleted a clause which called for a measure of relief suggesting that the king “direct some expedient, whereby your majesty, your parliament and people may reap the fruit designed by this bill,” see Grey, , Debates, 10:381Google Scholar. Deletion removed any pressure on the king to do anything with respect to parliament's complaint.
55 An Honest Commoner's Speech (London, 1494), p. 3Google Scholar; Wildman, John and Hampden, John, An Enquiry or a Discourse Between a Yeoman of Kent and a Knight of a Shire, p. 3Google Scholar. A Dialogue betwixt Whig and Tory (London, 1693), p. ixGoogle Scholar. Ralph attributed the authorship of this tract to Henry Booth. See Ralph, James, The History of England, 2 vols. (London, 1744), 2:476Google Scholar. J. A. Downie attributes it to Overton, Ben in “Ben Overton: An Alternative Author of a Dialogue Betwixt Whig and Tory,” Papers of the Biographical Society of America 70 (1976): 263–71Google Scholar.
56 See Montgomery, James, Great Britain's Just Complaint (London, 1692), p. 52Google Scholar; Lawton, Charlwood, A French Conquest (n.p., 1693), p. 17Google Scholar, and A Short State of our Condition (London, 1693), pp. 2–3Google Scholar; A Reply to the Answer Doctor Welwood has made to King James's Declaration (n.p., 1694), pp. 22–3Google Scholar, and The Price of the Abdication, pp. 7–8.
57 Goldie, Marc, “The Roots of True Whiggism 1688–95,” History of Political Thought 1 (Summer, 1980):228–9Google Scholar, and Monod, Paul, “Jacobitism and Country Principles in the Reign of William III,” Historical Journal 30 (June 1987): 298CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
58 One pro-royalist author felt compelled to defend the king in the face of the Jacobite attacks. He wrote, the king “hath sparingly exercised his prerogative, even in this time of war, when necessity sometimes required it.” See The Protestant Mask (London, 1693), p. 58Google Scholar.
59 In Parliament, this group included men like Walter Yonge, Robert Harley, and Paul Foley. See, for example, their arguments during the debate over the representation. Cobbett, , Parliamentary History, 5:831–9Google Scholar. In the pamphlet literature the men of “revolution principles” were also apparent. See, for example, Booth, Henry, The Works of the Right Honorable Henry late L. Delamar (London, 1694), p. 358Google Scholar, and A Dialogue betwixt Whig & Tory, p. ix, and Wildman and Hampden, An Enquiry, passim.
60 Cobbett, , Parliamentary History, 5:lxvi–lxviiGoogle Scholar.
61 Feiling, , History of the Tory Party, pp. 277, 288–92Google Scholar.
62 An exception to this pattern was William's reluctant approval of the Treason Trials Act and his veto of the MP Qualifications Bill. Here, however, support for the king after the Assassination Plot may have precluded any need for William to tamper with his ministry before the next session of Parliament.
63 A MP Qualifications Bill was introduced in Charles II's reign in 1679. A draft copy of the bill is given in Scott, Walter ed., A Collection of Scarce and Valuable Tracts, 13 vols. (London, 1809–1815), 8:396–8Google Scholar. A pamphlet calling for qualifications, possibly by Anthony Ashley Cooper, earl of Shaftsbury, was published in 1689. See Scott, , A Collection of Scarce and Valuable Tracts, 8:396–403Google Scholar. The issue, however, was not addressed in the grievances presented by the Convention in 1688/9.
64 H.M.C., , House of Lords, 1695–7, pp. 199–201Google Scholar and C.J., 11:460. This conclusion is suggested by Macaulay, , History of England, 5:2620–1Google Scholar. It is supported by the numerous petitions made by London and other towns against this bill and a subsequent MP Qualifications Bill introduced the following year. For example, see H.M.C., House of Lord, 1695, p. 217Google Scholar.
65 While William was considering the bill he was informed that a coinage bill needed his immediate attention, see L.J., 15:731,2, and Luttrell, , A Brief Historical Relation, 4:42Google Scholar.
66 Ibid., pp. 42–3.
67 C.J., 11:556. No doubt the motion's overwhelming rejection was influenced by the wave of popular support of the king in the wake of the Assassination Plot.
68 This is reflected in his acceptance of such acts as the Bill of Rights, the Treason Trials Act, the Disbanding Act and the Irish Land Forfeitures Act. Comments about William's reluctance to pass such bills can be found in Foxcroft, , Life and Letters, 2:217, 223Google Scholar; Horwitz, , Parliament, p. 164Google Scholar; Rezneck, Samuel, “The Statute of 1696, A Pioneer Measure in the Reform of Judicial Procedure in England,” Journal of Modern History 2 (March 1930): 19–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Burnet, , History, 4:440Google Scholar; Kenyon, J. P., Robert Spencer Earl of Sunderland (London, 1958), pp. 315Google Scholar; and Feiling, , History of the Tory Party, pp. 337–9Google Scholar.
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