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Canadian Security Intelligence Service

National Headquarters Building Project

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Assistant Auditor General: David Rattray
Responsible Auditor: Reno Cyr

Introduction

Need for a New Facility

8.10 The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) was created on 16 July 1984, replacing the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Security Service. As part of the transition to a civilian agency, physical separation from the RCMP was considered essential. The accommodation problem was examined in a 1987 Report to the Solicitor General by the Independent Advisory Team on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, entitled "People And Process In Transition", and also known as the Osbaldeston Report.

8.11 The Osbaldeston Report recommended, "An immediate solution to the CSIS accommodation problem must be found, bringing all headquarters functions together in a building that can be adapted to meet the needs of CSIS, both human and technological."

8.12 In 1987, CSIS headquarters was occupying eight separate facilities at six locations scattered throughout the National Capital Region. In addition, its Ottawa Regional Office was located in two separate facilities.

8.13 Compounding the accommodation problem was the need for expanded computer facilities. The CSIS computer centre had been co-located with that of the RCMP. The CSIS electronic data processing requirements were growing and more space was needed, which was not available in that location. The RCMP also wanted to expand its computer operations and needed the space that CSIS was occupying.

8.14 The Treasury Board's approval of the project was based on the understanding that the site and building would be designed to provide sufficient flexibility to accommodate growth for the foreseeable future.

8.15 Cabinet approved the construction of a new headquarters complex for CSIS in September 1988. (See Exhibit 8.1 for the chronology of key project events.)

8.16 CSIS plans in 1989 called for building the national headquarters complex in two phases. Phase I comprised the computing centre and utilities building, targeted for completion in August 1991. Phase II comprised the balance of the complex, to be completed in July 1994.

8.17 In December 1989, the government-imposed construction freeze delayed the start of Phase II. However, as Phase I was already started and considered necessary to maintain essential services, the freeze did not affect it. Subsequent approval was given to start Phase II foundations in November 1991. As a result of the early start of Phase II (five months before the construction freeze expired), the Treasury Board pulled back $1.5 million of inflation allowance.

8.18 During construction of the national headquarters facility, CSIS was subject to the same budget cutbacks experienced by all government departments. The cutbacks resulted in a significant reduction in CSIS headquarters staffing levels, creating unforeseen surplus office space in the new facility. CSIS responded by relocating its Ottawa Regional Office operations into the facility, and adjusting the project scope for special regional needs.

8.19 The building was completed in February 1995, with a gross area of 64,293 square metres and a total project cost of approximately $153.5 million.

National Headquarters Project Objectives

8.20 CSIS identified key objectives for its headquarters facility project ( Exhibit 8.2 ).

Need for Security and Functionality

8.21 CSIS activities revolve around information that, in accordance with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and the Government Security Policy, is accessible only on a "need to know" basis. As a result, office areas must be compartmentalized to a greater extent than is found in typical office buildings. This results in a slightly larger than normal area of office space per occupant. However, the individual offices adhere to the Treasury Board administrative guidelines for office accommodation.

8.22 CSIS required that the concepts used in the design of the complex reflect the need for modularity, flexibility and expandability. Due to the restrictions imposed on the exterior of the building for such essential items as windows, CSIS stated that the complex could incorporate one or more internal courts or atria.

8.23 A requirement of the design was to build flexibility into all space to accommodate organizational changes. An important element in the flexibility requirement was the need to provide for secure data communication services at every work station in the office areas.

8.24 Although CSIS stated that the building should be of a quality similar to that of any national headquarters, security and functionality were its prime objectives for this project. Also specifically mentioned was the requirement to deliver the project on time and within scope and budget.

Observations and Recommendations

8.25 The objective of this audit was to determine whether the constructed national headquarters facility met the CSIS-stated objectives and the Treasury Board approvals, and whether the project was implemented with due regard to economy and efficiency. We examined all the main stages of this major Crown project. Further details on audit objectives, criteria, scope and approach can be found at the end of the chapter in the section "About the Audit" .

Schedule and Costs

8.26 The project was completed within the approved time frame, in February 1995. The original completion target of July 1994, at preliminary project approval, had been revised after the government-imposed construction freeze was expected to delay completion by 17 months. Once work on Phase II had begun, however, the schedule was again brought forward, with a new completion target of September 1995.

Unit cost was appropriate for a special-purpose building
8.27 Based on unaudited final costs, it is estimated that the total project was completed for approximately $500,000 less than the revised budget of $153.5 million. Final costs cannot be determined until all invoices and changes have been verified and settled.

8.28 The unit costs for this building are higher than those for typical office buildings, because of the need for specialized facilities such as wet and dry labs, workshops, and special security requirements and considerations that created extra procedures and costs during the construction phase. In our opinion, however, the unit costs for this project were appropriate. (See Exhibit 8.3 for space allocation.)

Security

The building's security systems are adequate, but "island" site must be maintained
8.29 A primary requirement of this facility is that it be a secure environment. We reviewed the threat and risk assessments, the security recommendations and the security design. We also reviewed the security precautions and measures taken during construction, and interviewed experts in the security field from other government departments. We concluded that the project team took appropriate steps to ensure that the completed facility provides a secure environment for CSIS employees and their activities, without being onerous.

8.30 The security design is integral to the building and has been part of the overall design from the beginning. This approach has minimized the cost of installing additional special security measures. The security system can operate at different levels. Should a situation develop where CSIS would require heightened security, overall or in any part of the building, the system can accommodate such changes. It has also been designed to incorporate new technology easily.

8.31 In our opinion, the nature of the isolated site on which this facility is situated is a key security factor in the design. The site uses physical space surrounding the building as a protective buffer. It is therefore imperative that CSIS ensure the integrity of this "island" site. Should adjacent lands be developed, some of the design precepts would be rendered invalid.

Constructed Space

Program space constructed as authorized
8.32 Our audit examined whether the amount of space constructed is consistent with that authorized by the Treasury Board. We concluded that the program space is consistent with that authorized, but that the gross area significantly exceeds that proposed by CSIS in the preliminary project approval.

8.33 A project is initially defined in terms of its scope, including program space, schedule, and budget. Program space is a value based on the user's statement of requirements, and may be considered the minimum amount of space required for an organization to meet its operational needs. Once approved by the Treasury Board, program space becomes a control point against which performance is measured. For the completed national headquarters building, the program space is consistent with the 38,410 square metres approved by the Treasury Board.

Constructed gross area significantly exceeds plan, but within the original budget
8.34 In the preliminary project approval, the building's planned gross area of 50,836 square metres was calculated by applying a design "net to gross" factor to the program space. The project budget was then determined by multiplying the calculated gross area by the estimated cost per square metre, using industry standards. However, the gross area is not included in the project scope and it is not formally approved or monitored by Treasury Board.

8.35 We noted that the constructed gross area exceeds the originally estimated requirement by over 13,000 square metres. As early as February 1992, the progress reports to the Treasury Board Secretariat were showing a constructed gross area of 64,300 square metres, and we were advised that the final constructed gross area is 64,293 square metres. Part of the increase in the gross area can be accounted for by the unfinished fifth floor (for future expansion) and the Ottawa Region space, both of which were approved after the preliminary project approval. In addition, the original gross area was estimated before the design had been started. However, despite being made aware of this 26 percent increase in gross area, we saw no indication that Treasury Board officials communicated concern to the project leader.

8.36 It is also important to note that the increase of over 13,000 square metres in gross area was accomplished with no increase in the project budget. This major change in the gross area, with no corresponding change in the budget, raises concerns about how project budgets are calculated, since the amount of area built relates directly to the total cost. When such changes are proposed, the assumptions used in estimating the budget should be verified.

A building's gross area needs to be monitored by the Treasury Board
8.37 Using program space, budgets and schedules as the primary means of controlling projects does not guarantee the best value for the taxpayer. Since the gross area is fundamental to the cost of a building, it should also be included as part of the approved project scope. Any proposed changes to the gross area would have to be explained, thereby giving the Treasury Board a more complete understanding of what is happening in the project.

8.38 The Treasury Board Secretariat should review the assumptions used by departments in developing project budgets and the current mechanisms for controlling and monitoring the scope in proposed construction projects.

User Requirements

National headquarters meets users' requirements now and provides for the future ( see photograph )
8.39 Based on interviews with CSIS employees, we are satisfied that the national headquarters facility meets the requirements of its users in day-to-day operations. The building provides a functional workspace and a productive working environment, reflecting the great importance that CSIS placed on functional requirements.

8.40 During February 1989, the initial user program space requirements were subjected to a rigorous analysis by the CSIS project team, using a challenge-review process. This resulted in significantly reduced program space. CSIS stated to the Treasury Board that, as a result of this analysis, the user program space incorporates only those needs that are the minimum acceptable for operational purposes while still adhering to the project objectives.

8.41 The analysis also determined that the reception/dining room, located next to the corporate boardroom, could be eliminated. Despite this recommendation, the reception/dining room space was constructed. Although we did not see a justification of the need for this space as part of the analysis, CSIS has stated that it needed the reception/dining room for entertaining visitors privately.

8.42 The building's design incorporates flexibility for future change. For example, the infrastructure for data and electrical services in each workspace has been designed to allow for future growth. Furthermore, the building's systems have been constructed to be adaptable in a changing technological environment.

8.43 Our audit also assessed whether the facility exceeds user requirements. We concluded that in most cases it does not. We noted that the project team reviewed all requirements for reasonableness and functionality. The design was frozen and changes to user requirements were not allowed after a specified time (an exception is the redesign of the executive suite, which is discussed under "Contracting Process").

8.44 Since the start of construction, CSIS has been subject to government budget cuts and staff reductions. Despite the subsequent relocation of the Ottawa Regional Office activities into the national headquarters facility to utilize some of the excess space created by staff reductions, there remains some underutilized office space. CSIS has advised other agencies that it might have space available. We encourage this action.

8.45 CSIS should conduct a space utilization study to determine how much surplus space is available, and continue to examine alternatives for its efficient use without compromising its security requirements.

Contracting Process

Government contracting regulations and policies were respected
8.46 Public Works and Government Services Canada (Public Works) acted as the contracting authority for the project. We examined a sample of the construction contracts, construction change orders, consultant contracts and fees paid to the Department. Changes are inevitable in any construction project, and a provision for them is always included in a contingency allowance.

8.47 We determined that the contracts and change orders were administered in compliance with the government contracting regulations, and with policies and procedures set out for the project. The changes were justified, based on functional requirements, and generally represented due regard to economy.

Redesign of the sixth floor for $1.4 million to accommodate changes to the executive offices adds limited functional value
8.48 We noted one change, however, that did not represent good value for money. The change was the redesign of the sixth floor, which contained the executive offices, and it took place after other design changes had been frozen. Although the project team had concerns about the cost and the effect on the schedule, it was decided in January 1993 to redesign the sixth floor completely as a result of changes to the location and layout of the executive offices, to make other functional changes and to add doors to a rooftop terrace. In our opinion, this work does not appreciably increase the functionality of the space. We estimate that the work cost approximately $1.4 million to complete. However, it is important to note that no completed work had to be undone as a result of the changes since they were approved before work commenced. This was the only such case that we noted.

CSIS comments: In reference to item 8.48, CSIS remains convinced that the revisions to the sixth floor represent good value. The executive offices are much more accessible in the current arrangement and additional functions were introduced.

Consultant fees nearly doubled
8.49 Consultant fees were estimated in the preliminary project approval to be approximately $8.75 million. Final consultant fees were $15.4 million. Public Works explained to the Treasury Board that the difference was due to the increased use of specialists by CSIS, the delay caused by the construction freeze, higher than anticipated expenses (for example, travel, printing, and translation), additional site supervision, and design changes and studies requested by CSIS.

8.50 The consultant's contract was between Public Works and the architectural firm. Public Works selected the architects using its established evaluation method. Because of the selection method (carried out by a committee) and the lack of documents on file, we are unable to comment on the suitability or fairness of the process. However, we did note the project team's high degree of satisfaction with the architects' work. Proposed base fees were only a minor factor in the selection process and were not negotiated. Public Works informed us that professional fees are now negotiated.

8.51 The preliminary project approval submission estimated that fees and expenses paid to Public Works would be approximately $3.18 million; instead, they were $8.07 million. The increase was explained as being due to the inclusion of seconded staff, the delay caused by the construction freeze, and greater than anticipated project complexity.

8.52 Despite our extensive discussions with officials, it remains unclear to us why the fees were so much higher than original estimates, particularly when other costs were lower than expected. In our opinion, insufficient control was exercised in the management of fees. Had the construction contracts come in at the anticipated amounts, the project could not have incurred these additional expenses without exceeding its budget.

Prepayment of fees contrary to the Financial Administration Act
8.53 We also noted that, in the years 1989-92, prepayment of Public Works fees at year end was made to manage cash better, and to avoid lapsing of appropriations or reprofiling of reference levels of the annual budget (seeking approval of the Treasury Board to move funds into other fiscal years). This prepayment in advance of work was contrary to section 34 of the Financial Administration Act.

Contract form used was inadequate for the purpose
8.54 The contract used was the Public Works standard contract with generic terms and conditions (project-specific details are listed in appendices). Given the size and complexity of this project, we believe it would have been more appropriate to use a contract specifically written for the national headquarters project. For example, under the terms governing site supervision, the contract states that the architect shall "make visits to the site to determine, on an adequate sampling basis, whether the work is in general conformity with the construction documents."

8.55 Site supervision is classified as an additional service and is extra to the basic fee. The contract wording is vague and provides no basis for estimating actual site supervision requirements, especially since "adequate sampling basis" and "general conformity" are not defined. As a result, inadequate provision was made for this function and site supervision costs had to be increased from $1.35 million to $2.32 million.

8.56 We also noted that the Request for Proposal, sent to the architects for the selection process and containing the terms and conditions of engagement, is not referenced in the contract and does not form part of the contract. As an example, clauses for travel expenses shown in the Request for Proposal had limitations and restrictions that were not reflected in the signed contract. Furthermore, we noted that relocation expenses for the consultant were paid. Such payment was not authorized in the contract.

8.57 Public Works and Government Services Canada should ensure that consultant contracts are tailored to the specific project.

8.58 Public Works and Government Services Canada should review all fee payments to determine that they were authorized and appropriate.

Options Analysis and Site Selection

8.59 Public Works carried out an analysis of potential options for meeting the CSIS accommodation requirement. The analysis determined that it would cost more to renovate and add to the Tupper Building than to build a new facility, and it was therefore decided to request approval for a built-for-purpose facility. We did not see any evidence that other existing buildings, either in the Public Works inventory or the private sector, were considered.

Requirements under the government's land transfer policy are unclear
8.60 Once the decision was made to build, six sites were considered. Based on the site selection criteria, the Gloucester site was chosen as the most appropriate.

8.61 The site was acquired in two stages. The original 12.15 hectare (30 acre) site was given to CSIS by another government agency. In return, CSIS paid $300,000 to cover the costs of relocating a microwave tower. Original estimates for this work were $150,000. We were not able to determine if the increase in costs was justified, particularly since the new tower has yet to be constructed.

8.62 Land adjacent to and surrounding the original site was subsequently declared surplus by the other government agency and acquired by CSIS. CSIS was interested in the land to add to and protect the security perimeter around the national headquarters building. Although the Treasury Board submission stated that there would be no financial consideration involved in the land transfer, we noted that CSIS was required to pay an additional $250,000 toward the removal of the tower.

Debate over land transfer results in delays
8.63 We also noted that it took more than four years to effect the land transfer. This delay, and its associated costs, resulted from a debate over whether CSIS should purchase the land from the government. As part of this debate, Public Works had the land evaluated by a private real estate appraiser.

8.64 CSIS argued that, at the time of the transfer of the original parcel of land, the second parcel was under the control of the government. However, once the second parcel was declared surplus, it could be sold. This raised the possibility of construction adjacent to the national headquarters and thus a compromise of the security afforded by the island site. The Treasury Board agreed with CSIS and the transfer of the second land parcel took place. It is not clear why the transfer took so long or what benefit the taxpayer derived from this process.

8.65 The Treasury Board Secretariat should review the transactions relating to the acquisition of the land required for the CSIS headquarters project to determine if they are in compliance with the granted approvals and if there are means to streamline such transactions.

Project Review Process

Reviews of design should be better co-ordinated
8.66 As part of the design process, different groups carried out reviews of the building's design. Preliminary reviews were done by the project team, and CSIS senior management then reviewed the final drawings. The exterior design and landscaping were approved by the National Capital Commission, following review by its Advisory Committee on Design in accordance with the provisions of the National Capital Act . The Public Works Design Review Committee reviewed major aspects of the design, which also included the exterior of the building.

8.67 Public Works defines its role as conducting a peer review of the design. This review is carried out as part of its responsibility as contracting authority with the design consultant.

8.68 The National Capital Commission's role, as defined by its Act, requires the Commission to approve all federal construction in the National Capital region, in terms of the exterior and landscaping elements. In this project, the Commission feels strongly that the approval process positively influenced the design to ensure that it made an appropriate contribution to the Capital. Furthermore, the Commission informs us that it has learned from the experience with the CSIS building and has increased co-ordination and co-operation on many subsequent projects. The Commission also states that since 1990 it has further streamlined its design review process.

8.69 We noted the frustrations experienced by the project team with this review process. There was a general feeling that the process was onerous, and could potentially have resulted in extensive delays with marginal benefits to the project.

8.70 Based on our examination, we noted a significant variance of opinion on the efficiency of the review process. As a result, we will examine the review process in our future audits of major Crown projects.

Life-cycle costing analysis was not done, but a value engineering study identified savings
8.71 Another kind of design review that was performed is usually called value engineering or value management. A value management study was undertaken for each of the two phases of the building project. This is the first such study in a major Crown project that we have noted. The total cost for both studies was approximately $150,000. The suggested improvements were estimated to provide significant savings over the life of the building. For example, main components of the ventilation system were decentralized to each floor, allowing for the installation of a more efficient and flexible air handling system with increased back-up capability.

8.72 Although value management studies are a form of life-cycle costing analysis, full life-cycle costing analyses, as stipulated in the Treasury Board policy for major Crown projects, were not done. Furthermore, in the post-mortem of the value management studies, it was noted that the exercise would have been more effective if life-cycle cost data had been available. The project team stated that, in its opinion, life-cycle costing is not as useful as value management.

8.73 In our experience, life-cycle costing (with the exception of the Department of National Defence) is not done in major capital construction projects . We believe that some form of analysis of the design and major systems should be carried out to ensure best value.

8.74 While we support the concept of project and design review, the Treasury Board Secretariat should examine the use of value management studies versus life-cycle costing studies.

Opportunities for Cost Savings

Greater emphasis on cost-saving opportunities is needed
8.75 The ultimate goal of existing government policies for project management is that budgets not be exceeded. We believe, however, that the realities of the fiscal restraint climate under which we now operate will necessitate a change of thinking on the part of those approving and managing large government expenditures. We have entered a new era in which there is a greater public expectation that governments will exercise every opportunity to achieve cost savings in delivering their programs.

8.76 For this project, CSIS was operating under the approval of a total budget and felt that what it did was within the authority granted. We concur; however, we believe this situation exemplifies the need to clarify what the approval limits really mean. Our audit identified examples of opportunities where, although no authorities or budgets were exceeded, additional funds could have been saved on this project (see paragraph 8.27).

Approved inflation allowance provides a budget cushion
8.77 The revised preliminary project approval in 1991 provided project funding of $129 million in constant dollars and $152 million in current (inflated) dollars. In other words, there was a provision of $23 million for inflation. The provision of an inflation allowance is normal practice for construction projects that take several years to complete. The project budget is first calculated in terms of actual purchasing power of the dollar in the year the budget is approved. Construction costs are estimated based on prevailing prices for materials, labour and consulting fees to arrive at the constant dollar budget. A forecast of the expected rate of inflation over the period of construction is then applied to the constant dollar budget year by year to yield the current dollar budget.

8.78 The actual rate of inflation over the life of the project was much lower than that assumed in preparing the initial project budget. Consequently, the $23 million inflation allowance provided for in the budget was higher than needed. Based on the actual rate of inflation for the period 1989 to 1995, we estimate that the inflation allowance was approximately $10 million to $12 million higher than needed.

8.79 The Treasury Board effectively signalled the notion that the inflation allowance is an "as required" cost element in the project budget, when it recovered $1.5 million from the budget in 1991 because the project was able to begin sooner than anticipated.

8.80 The inflation allowance provided a "cushion" in the budget, and this cushion, in addition to the standard contingency allowances of approximately 10 percent, gave managers an extra degree of flexibility. However, certain elements of the project, particularly consultant fees, were significantly higher than budgeted, and consumed most of the unspent inflation allowance. In some cases, this financial flexibility was used to enhance the functionality of the building, such as the addition of the unfinished fifth floor south and the addition of a conference centre.

8.81 We are not implying that there was no budgetary discipline. For the most part, the project budget was strictly controlled. Attempts to adhere to functional requirements were successful and original budget estimates for the different elements were respected. Additions or changes made were generally based on sound judgment and resulted in good value.

8.82 There are always pressures to enhance the quality of systems and finishes on projects. We noted that, in many cases, design decisions were based on their relative value and how they would affect the budget. The rigorous analysis of all space requirements is a good example. However, the reduced pressure on the budget also led to a "build-to-budget " philosophy. For example, the architects favoured granite panels for the building's exterior cladding. The project team, concerned about the budget, also examined the costs for a brick and precast concrete cladding. When it was determined that granite could be used within the budget, it was decided to proceed without additional study of less expensive alternatives. Without commenting on the aesthetics of either choice, this was a potential opportunity for a cost saving to the taxpayer that was not fully explored.

8.83 The Treasury Board Secretariat should clarify what the project approval means, stress lowest cost and consider incentives to encourage underspending budgets. Departments should be encouraged to identify and implement cost-saving opportunities in their approved projects.

Conclusions

A well-managed project overall with useful lessons learned
8.84 Overall, we consider this project to have been well managed, notwithstanding certain negative findings, especially when compared with other projects we have examined. For example, we noted that many of the problems we have cited in our previous reports did not occur in this project, and there are some useful lessons for other government projects to learn from and consider applying where appropriate. Our interviews with the key project staff identified some factors that contributed to the project's success. ( see photograph )

- approval was obtained to start construction of Phase II foundations five months before the construction freeze expired. This allowed underground work to proceed while ground conditions were favourable; and

- when it became apparent that the completion of drawings for the main construction contract would be delayed, extra work was added to the foundation contract in the form of a change order. Failure to act could have resulted in a work stoppage on site and a loss of momentum.

User's leadership role a key success factor
8.85 We believe that the key to the success of this project was that the user (CSIS) acknowledged accountability and acted appropriately. From the start, CSIS made it clear to all parties involved that this project was its responsibility and would meet CSIS needs. CSIS controlled the project budget and authorized all spending. In addition to establishing a dedicated and qualified project team, CSIS engaged experts to supplement its own expertise. It also reviewed and applied lessons learned from the management of other projects and from our past audit reports.

The Treasury Board Secretariat's comments: The Treasury Board Secretariat concurs with the conclusion in this chapter that this was a well-managed project overall, with a strong project leader and team, in which leadership by the building user was a key success factor. We concur with the recommendation for greater emphasis on cost savings within the overall approved budget. This being said, we note that the approach followed in this project contributed significantly to the strict control of the project budget and, ultimately, to the success of the project itself.


About the Audit

Objectives

The objectives of the audit were to determine whether the constructed national headquarters facility would meet the CSIS-stated objectives and the Treasury Board approvals, and whether the project was implemented with due regard to economy and efficiency.

Criteria

Our audit criteria were derived from our guide for auditing capital asset projects, as well as the appropriate Treasury Board policies and guidelines.

Scope

The audit examined all the major stages of this major Crown project. Specifically, we reviewed the needs definition, the options analysis, the project definition, the design and review process, the contracting process, change orders, project management, environmental assessment, commissioning and post-project evaluation.

Our audit commenced in November 1995 and was completed in March 1996. Given the size and complexity of this project and the limited time available, we did not audit detailed financial records. The post-project evaluation, a requirement for a major Crown project, was in progress but not completed by CSIS at the time of the audit.

The audit did not address the CSIS mandate. However, in acquiring an understanding of the requirements for the facility, we confirmed that they were based on the existing mandate and were appropriate.

Approach

Audit evidence was collected through extensive interviews with the building project staff, and with CSIS staff as users of the building. We reviewed planning documents, submissions to the Treasury Board, project briefs, minutes of the Senior Project Advisory Committee meetings and project management meetings, correspondence, contract documents and annual reports. We inspected the building, from the roof to the basement, including the office space, special purpose space and building services space.

We received a high level of co-operation from the project management team, which included people from CSIS and Public Works and the architects. Members of the general CSIS staff were also very helpful. The level of co-operation is particularly noteworthy given the security considerations relative to CSIS operations and the facility itself.

Audit Team

Edward Wood
Darlene Mulligan
Joe Reperto

For information, please contact Reno Cyr, the responsible auditor.