1st Special Operations Squadron at NKP

602nd Special Operations Squadron at NKP

Operating Location AA (OL-AA) at Da Nang Air Base, South Vietnam

     In September 1970, the wing's 21st Special Operations Squadron (SOS) flew eleven CH-3E helicopters and one, new CH-53 helicopter which arrived at NKP on 8 August. The squadron referred to the large CH-53 as "BUFF," for "big, ugly, fat fellow," and this designation should not be confused with a similar BUFF nickname given to B-52 bombers. The helicopters of the 21 SOS did not participate in TAILWIND because they flew other combat missions in a "big operation," according to the squadron history, to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail in the Bolovens area of Laos.

     The A-1 pilots assigned to the 56 SOW flew four types of combat missions: escort, strike, armed reconnaissance, and search and rescue (SAR). During SAR missions to rescue downed pilots, the wing operated with the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service, which flew the HH-3 "Jolly Green Giant" helicopters. The aircraft carried weapons appropriate for the type of mission flown. For a "strike" operation, for example, the munitions maintenance crews would load high explosive and fragmentation bombs and napalm. In "SAR support," at least one A-1 aircraft on the mission would carry M-47 smoke bombs and weapons with "CS" "riot control" tear gas, for use if warranted. An Air Force history, written by Earl H. Tilford, Jr., and first published in 1980, explained that tear gas was employed on SAR missions:

As the war continued, the North Vietnamese, Viet Cong, and Pathet Lao used increasingly sophisticated weapons and tactics to frustrate rescue efforts. Rescue forces reacted to these challenges by developing new weapons and changing tactics. Tear gas bombs and riot control chemicals were some of the most controversial weapons used to support rescue operations. These weapons included Cluster Bomb Unit (CBU)-19A/B and CBU-30A antipersonnel area denial bombs, which were essentially tear gas bombs.

     The 56 SOW history for April-June 1969 identified the situations when the use of tear gas would be appropriate during SAR operations. The downed pilot himself would be deliberately gassed in some cases:

CBU-19 could be used on enemy gun or troop concentrations when the enemy was not equipped with masks or other protective equipment. In these areas it was more efficient to disable the enemy temporarily than to employ normal weapons. It was most effective in areas of widespread small arms which were normally difficult to locate and silence.

CBU-19 could be used directly on the survivor if the survivor was surrounded, had been captured, or was injured and unable to help himself and was in [im]minent danger from advancing enemy forces.

     The report, "In-Country and Out-Country Strike Operations in Southeast Asia, 1 Jan 65-31 Dec 69," provided the five primary situations when CBU-19 and CBU-30 were employed in South Vietnam:

To deny the enemy his use of base camps, bunkers, tunnels, and caves

In prestrike operations in support of defoliation missions

In SAR operations to prevent the capture of downed aircrews

In offensive combat operations, such as assaults and suppression of small arms fire around helicopter landing zones

In defensive combat operations such as perimeter defense

 

     The 56 SOW history for July-September 1970 referred to "gas birds" and defined them as aircraft carrying CBU-19/CBU-30. Thus, the A-1s of the 56 SOW sometimes carried and delivered CS tear gas munitions.

     The word "incapacitating" was used to describe the CS weapons. The 56 SOW history in July described a SAR mission and mentioned "incapacitating ordnance." Another report, "USAF Search & Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1 Jul 69-31 Dec 70," provided a definition for "CS" in its glossary: "personnel incapacitating agent."

     The CBU-19 gas bomb had been originally designed for helicopters, but within the Air Force, mostly A-1s expended them, and they were little used after 1969. During 1970-1972 the Air Force principally used the CBU-30 tear gas cluster bomb. Both propeller aircraft, A-1s, and jet aircraft, especially F-4s and F-100s, employed the CBU-30, which contained 66 pounds of CS tear gas, while the CBU-19 contained only 14 pounds. The "In-Country and Out-Country Strike Operations" report described the CBU gas munitions:

The CBU-19 chemical cluster was a 130-lb. modified U.S. Army dispenser intended for use on helicopters and consisted of two subclusters fitted to a strongback. Each cluster contained 528 agent-filled canisters; each canister contained an incapacitating chemical, called CS, and a pyrotechnic fuze. Upon ejection from the aircraft, the fuze ignited the CS, disseminating the CS for four to six seconds. This required delivery below 600 feet AGL [above ground level] to insure that the chemical reached the ground. Also, as the cluster had originally been designed for use on helicopters, delivery was restricted to use on the A-1 and A-37 because the cluster could not withstand the airloads encountered on faster aircraft. The CBU-30 consisted of the SUU-13 downward ejection dispenser and 1,280 BLU-39/B23 submunitions, each filled with CS. Upon ejection, a pyrotechnic fuze in each submunition ignited, disseminating the agent into the air. Delivery was restricted to below 600 feet AGL to insure ground coverage. Upon contact with the ground, the submunitions skittered about, disseminating the CS even further. The CBU-30 was compatible with both low and high speed aircraft.

     In the Air Force, CS had replaced the older, less potent CN tear gas. A MACV directive, 28 March 1970, defined CN as a "standard tear agent employed by law enforcement agencies" and CS as "an improved agent developed for military use." The BLU-52 consisted of CS-1, CS in a persistent powdered form, in a 750-lb. fire bomb casing. Because CS-1 tended to cake when wet, an oil-like substance was added to improve its flow qualities, and the improved fill was called CS-2 and the munition was designated BLU-52A. BLU-52s functioned as anti-personnel area denial and interdiction munitions. They only recently were sent to the 56 SOW in September 1970 and caused problems. The Munitions Maintenance Squadron reported: "BLU-52's have arrived and are causing a difficult storage situation because of lack of proper decontaminants. These bombs will be restricted from use."

     The Tilford history provided an account of the use of tear gas which highlights its potency and shows that those who breathed the agent could experience very strong physical reactions. It stated that on 15 February 1969, A-1 Skyraiders flew a SAR mission near the Laos-South Vietnam border and dropped CBU-19s. It continued:

Braving the constant hail of antiaircraft fire, the Skyraiders made the required mile-long run at 300 feet and 220 knots to hit all their targets--enemy antiaircraft gun positions. While the gunners choked, coughed, cried, and retched uncontrollably, a Jolly Green [helicopter] with its crew wearing gas masks swooped in and saved the pilot.

     An Air Force historical CHECO report also included an account of the effects of tear gas. It included a statement from a downed Air Force pilot describing the use of riot control agents (CBU-19, CBU-30, and BLU-52) during his rescue near Ban Phanop in Laos, lasting three-days in December 1969:

They laid it all along the top of the ridge . . .[some of] it hit me . . . I might as well tell you what it feels like when that stuff goes off. I ran into a tree and was wrapped around the tree urinating, defecating, and retching all at the same instant. . .It also made me want to sneeze. It was a beauty to have 500 pounders and everything go off because it would give me a chance to sneeze. . .It goes into effect instantaneously. Physically and mentally you can't control yourself. . .After that everytime I'd come up on the air and ask for Vodka (A-1s carrying CBU-19), as soon as I'd tell them where, how far and the heading, I'd tell them 'Don't get it close to me.'

     The "USAF Search & Rescue Report, 1 Jul 69-31 Dec 70," which covered the time of the TAILWIND Operation, contained illustrations of the A-1 Skyraider carrying its various weapons loads, and for the SAR support configuration it indicated that the A-1 carried two CBU-30 weapons, and they were hung on the right and left "stubs" of the aircraft, which placed them under the right and left wing, immediately next to the fuselage. (See Appendix A) A set of notes dated January 1970, which a 56 SOW A-1 pilot consulted before flying missions, provided a warning: "To dispense CBU-30 consecutively, do not set train position. Instead, set the stub selector switches to SALVO one at a time."

     The employment of tear gas "riot control" weapons in Southeast Asia by the Air Force and Army generated controversy, and appropriate officials in the chain of command authorized each use of the CS air weapon. The Seventh Air Force required regular reports on the exact number of munitions expended during specified time periods. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara issued a key authorization for use of CS in Laos on 20 January 1968 when he sent a memorandum to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stating, "With reference to JCSM 480-67 of 26 August 1967, I approve at this time only so much of the JCSM recommendation as pertains to the use of riot control agent CS in combat aircrew recovery operations in Laos." The MACSOG history which discussed TAILWIND noted, "The authority to use CS/CN gas within the PF [Prairie Fire] AO [area of operations] was held by the US Ambassador to Laos. Its use was considered on a case by case basis and was last utilized to assist in an extraction of an exploitation force on 14 September." This date, 14 September 1970, matches last day of the TAILWIND operation when the team was extracted and the operation ended. A MACV directive 25 December 1971 stated that the use of riot control agents commonly covered "extraction by helicopter of troops, medical evacuees, and downed aircrews."

     The CBU-14 and CBU-25 weapons in the inventory of the 56 SOW deserve special consideration because the wing was discontinuing the use of CBU-14s and receiving CBU-25s in September 1970. Both cluster bomb units used the suspension unit, universal (SUU)-14 dispenser, filled with submunitions. Neither was a chemical munition. The CBU-14 was designed for use against light materiel targets, such as trucks. The CBU-25 was an anti-personnel weapon. The CBU-14s had a high percentage of duds. The 56 SOW history in September 1970 reported:

Other problems included the unforeseen change in ordnance types. When the shipment of CBU-25 arrived, the CBU Storage Area was filled to capacity with CBU-14 leaving no room for storage. The change was due to the characteristics of CBU-14 which sometimes hangs undetonated in trees, providing the enemy with a source of effective antipersonnel munitions for use against friendly troops in the form of booby traps. . . . Due to the late arrival of CBU-25 ordnance (September) follow up action was not available for this report. However, action was expected during October to request removal of CBU-14 from NKP.

     In September the A-1s of the 56 SOW expended both CBU-14 and CBU-25 munitions.

     Also during September 1970, the three units of the 56 SOW which flew the A-1 Skyraiders participated in TAILWIND, and pilots from the wing dropped the CS weapons used during the operation. The call sign of the A-1 pilots from the 1st Special Operations Squadron of the 56 SOW was "Hobo." Their squadron history for September stated:

The [T]ailwind exfil on 13 and 14 September was heavily opposed, but with the help of numerous accurate low-level attacks by A-1s, from both NKP and Danang, the ground team was successfully extracted on the second day. Many Hob[o] pilots were involved in this effort.

     The squadron history for July 1970 referred to CBU-19/CBU-30 "gas birds," but the September history does not specifically state that the unit's aircraft dropped gas during TAILWIND.

     The history of the 602nd Special Operations Squadron did not mention TAILWIND, but interviews confirmed that squadron pilots flew in support of the operation. Among the weapons the squadron used in September were CBU-30s, CBU-14s, and CBU-25s. No CBU-19s were used. The tear gas expenditures for the month consisted of eight CBU-30 tear gas munitions.

     The 56 SOW’s Operating Location AA, stationed at Da Nang, provided a description of its TAILWIND involvement in its September history. The A-1 pilots' call sign was "Spad":

On 11 September the Spads assisted in the infil of a unique long range reconnaissance team. Also on that date, units of the Royal Laotian Government were fighting to interdict Rt 23 in the Laotian panhandle. The reconnaissance team, code name "Tailwind," was three times their normal size and was intent on more than reconnaissance. Scheduled to be a diversion for the Laotian unit, Tailwind on 12 September made contact with the enemy. In response to this contact, the Spads launched 10 sorties to support the tactical emergency which had developed. On these sorties Spad pilots made numerous low altitude passes to .50 calibre and intense small arms and automatic weapons. Strikes were also directed against known mortar positions. By the 13th of September the enemy had definite knowledge he was fighting more than a standard reconnaissance team. An aggressive effort was made to overrun the special forces. The Spads again responded to what had now become a Prairie Fire Emergency by providing twelve sorties. Again low passes and precision delivery repelled hostile forces in their attempt to destroy the friendly team. This lasted throughout the day, and efforts were made to prepare for a first light launch.

On the 14th of September eight sorties were launched on this day to assist in the recovery of this team. The team was safely extracted at 1400 hours on the 14th of September. All total, the Spads provided thirty sorties in support of the "Tailwind." The team reported over 400 KBA [killed by air] and suffered only three lost during its heroic activities.

     Among the munitions the OL-AA expended during the month were CBU-25s. In September 1970 the operating location expended no tear gas weapons. Information in the 56 SOW history indicates that the A-1 Skyraiders which dropped tear gas during TAILWIND, expended CBU-30, not CBU-19, tear gas munitions. Two other sources point to CBU-30 as the gas weapon the A-1s dropped. The computerized Southeast Asia Data Base (SEADAB) reveals that A-1s from NKP expended 6 CBU-30s on 13 September and 6 CBU-30s on 14 September, in the area where the TAILWIND team was located. The 12 CBU-30s used over the two-day period include the 8 CBU-30s specifically listed in the 602 SOS September history. Art Bishop, one of the pilots who dropped the tear gas on the last day of the operation, 14 September, stated that he used CBU-30, and he is certain of the type because he consulted a diary in which he had written CBU-30. The second pilot who dropped the gas bombs, Don Feld, clearly remembered it as tear gas, but could not recall the type of CBU.

     Other USAF tactical air (TACAIR) units and aircraft operating in the part of Laos where the TAILWIND team operated on 11-14 September 1970 were: F-4s and AC-130s from the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), Ubon Air Base, Thailand; F-4s from the 388 TFW, Korat Air Base, Thailand; F-100s, probably from the 35 TFW, Phan Rang Air Base, South Vietnam; F-105s from the 355 TFW, Takhli Air Base, Thailand; AC-119s from the 18 SOS at Da Nang Air Base; and OV-10s from the 504th Tactical Air Support Group at NKP. Most of the unit histories did not mention TAILWIND. One did preserve the letter of congratulations from General Lucius Clay, Jr., Seventh Air Force commander, to the crews of the 8 TFW, for their participation in the operation. Clay singled out for special recognition the pilot and crew of an AC-130 Spectre gunship, call sign Moody 2, from the 16 SOS. SEADAB computerized data did not show any aircraft other than the A-1s from NKP as dropping gas munitions during TAILWIND.

     Among the responsibilities of the 456th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (MMS) of the 56 SOW were those to supply the wing with all required munitions and associated components for combat missions and to support all loading, downloading, arming, and disarming of all wing aircraft requiring munitions. During an interview, the commander of the 456 MMS at the time of TAILWIND, Lt. Col Wilfred N. Turcotte, USAF, retired, stated that the wing had in its inventory tear gas munitions, but no Sarin. The idea of nerve agent munitions at NKP was a "startling concept" to him. The men in his squadron who loaded the weapons on the aircraft did so with no protective gear and often worked in the hot climate "stripped to the waist," wearing shorts or long pants. As commander, he was often on the flight line as munitions were prepared and loaded. He certainly would have known if there was poison Sarin gas in the weapons his men handled. There was none. He would have been notified if Sarin gas was going to be used on a mission. He was never so informed.

     During an interview, the Assistant Maintenance Supervisor of the 456 MMS at the time of TAILWIND, Lt Col Paul C. Spencer, USAF, retired, explained that he had received formal training in identifying and handling munitions of all types, including nerve gas. He said there was no Sarin at NKP. Had there been he certainly would have been aware of it, and he knew how to recognize it. He stated that had he seen any he would have immediately reported it to the Inspector General. At no time while he was in the 56 SOW did he see special protective clothing, masks, rubber aprons, etc. necessary when storing and moving nerve agent munitions. He was familiar with every storage and work area and went through them all. He checked munitions loads daily. The gas munitions at NKP were there for search and rescue (SAR) missions. These weapons were preloaded on trailers so they could quickly be uploaded to the SAR aircraft.

     The officer who assumed command of the 456 MMS on 23 September 1970, nine days after TAILWIND, Col. Donald L. Knight, USAF, retired, stated that the 56 SOW used tear gas on missions, but that he had received no information at all about nerve agent munitions ever being in the 56 SOW inventory of weapons. He never heard anything about Sarin at NKP, and none was in the wing when he commanded the 456 MMS. He described how weapons were preloaded on trailers in the munitions area and driven over to the aircraft where 456 MMS members loaded them onto the aircraft. The only protective equipment he remembered his munitions loaders wearing on the flight line were ear plugs.

     After the TAILWIND operation, General Clay, as commander of the Seventh Air Force, attended a briefing on the mission 11-14 September, given by one of the members of the ground element. The briefer described in detail the combat action the group engaged in while in Laos, and the tactical air power his team relied upon. Clay wrote, "Describing the air support as 'magnificent,' the briefer further stated the mission could not have seen accomplished without the coordinated, accurate air support his forces received."

     Air Force units supported TAILWIND with effective and continuous air power, but at no time during the operation did any Air Force aircraft deliver Sarin nerve gas. The A-1 Skyraiders did expend CBU-30 tear gas, which contributed to the successful extraction of the TAILWIND team.