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UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD  WAR II

The Middle East Theater

THE PERSIAN CORRIDOR
AND AID TO RUSSIA

by

T. H. Vail Motter

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, D. C., 2000

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 52-60791

 

First Printed 1952-CMH Pub 8-1

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Foreword

This volume relates the problems faced by Allies who met in strange lands without the benefit of tested and well co-ordinated policies to govern their diplomatic and military relations. The jealousies and conflicting interests of nations and of government agencies, together with the overlapping of authorities, aggravated an already complex situation. The history here presented seems to make axiomatic the necessity for a single commander in the field who has clear-cut instructions based on long-range plans that have been evolved from past experience and precedent.

Because of its valuable information and acute analysis, this book is essential reading for those faced with the responsibility of future planning in the realms of strategy and its logistical elements. Soldier, diplomat, and financier will find in the following pages a forewarning of the type of problems to be encountered whether in the field of transportation, communications, access to raw materials, the insurance of uninterrupted oil supplies, or in the unpredictable and delicate job of international relations.

Those on the ground struggled with immediate problems not always clearly seen from a distance. Anticipation, planning, and study of history may reduce, if not eliminate, such difficulties in the future.

The author, who holds a Ph.D. from Yale, spent more than two years with the U.S. Army in the Middle East during the war and served for nearly seven years as Chief of the Middle East Section, Office of the Chief of Military History. He has published books and articles in the field of literary and historical scholarship.

Washington, D. C. 
15 December 1951

ORLANDO WARD
Maj. Gen., U. S. A.
Chief of Military History

vii


Preface

No book which takes years to write and another year to bring to publication can hope to keep up with events in Iran. I have therefore dropped a chapter on the postwar years because I could only record in it confused and ever graver incidents without being able, at such close range, to assess their meaning.

Moreover, my purpose has been to tell the story of United States Army activity in the Persian Corridor during the war years 1941-1945. Since the true historical significance of that activity may well prove to be not the success of the aid-to-Russia supply effort-significant as that was to the victory-but the intimate association of the United States with the state of Iran, I have set the Army's story within the larger framework of economic, social, and political factors, without, I hope, taking my eye from the object, which was to show how the Army got there, what it did, and what its activity meant.

I have drawn for primary sources upon official documents and upon interviews and correspondence, and for secondary sources upon narratives prepared during the war at U.S. Army headquarters, Tehran. The location of documents cited in the footnotes may in some instances be ascertained by reference to the Glossary, where designations of collections are explained. The chief of these include the files of headquarters and subheadquarters of the American commands at Tehran and Cairo; and at Washington the files of the War Department General Staff, War Plans and Operations Divisions, the Historical Records Section, Departmental Records Branch, Adjutant General's Office, the Control and International Divisions, Army Service Forces, the Military Intelligence Division, the files of the North Atlantic Division Engineer and of the New York Ordnance Department (both at New York); and at Washington again, the files of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, the Office of the Chief of Transportation, the Department of State, and the Foreign Economic Administration. Smaller selected files assembled by the historical sections at Tehran and Cairo (cited as the Persian Gulf Files and the Middle East Files respectively) have also been heavily drawn upon. I am obliged to the officials of the Historical Section, Cabinet Office, London, for their courtesy in furnishing copies of British documents not available in American files; and to the following civilian contractors who allowed access to the records of their Persian Corridor operations and, through conference and correspondence, supplied valuable information or commentary: Foley Brothers, Inc.; Spencer, White

ix


and Prentis, Inc.; the General Motors Overseas Corporation; the Douglas Aircraft Company; the J. G. White Engineering Corporation; the Bahrain Petroleum Company; and the Bechtel-McCone Company. Specific obligations in these and all other instances are cited in the footnotes.

Many persons, through interviews, correspondence, and memoranda, have supplied information, criticism, and a variety of points of view useful in the highest degree. I am especially grateful to the following: Col. Philip T. Boone, Brig. Gen. Donald P. Booth, Maj. Gen. Donald H. Connolly, Col. L. D. Curtis, Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., Arthur W. DuBois, C. Vaughan Ferguson, John W. Frey, Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, Col. Milford F. Henkel, Philip C. Kidd, James M. Landis, John Lawrence, Col. Albert C. Lieber, Jr., Derwood W. Lockard, Maj. Gen. Russell L. Maxwell, Wallace Murray, Maj. Gen. Clarence S. Ridley, Brig. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Charles H. Sells, Brig. Gen. Don G. Shingler, Col. John B. Stetson, Jr., Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Sweet, Frederick Winant, Edwin M. Wright, T. Cuyler Young, and Brig. Gen. Paul F. Yount.

Most useful of secondary sources were the studies prepared in the Historical Section, Office of Technical Information, Headquarters, Persian Gulf Command, by 1st Lt. Francis J. Lewis, Acting Chief of the Section, and the following noncommissioned officers: Laurence P. Corbett, Ralph W. Kerns, Victor H. Pentlarge, Jr., Ogden C. Reed, Wallace P. Rusterholtz, and George B. Zeigler. They are narratives (cited with their authors' names in the footnotes) totaling a quarter of a million words, written at the level of the operating units. The studies provided information, background, and a reservoir of incident and comment of the sort that does not reach papers produced at the highest levels. Three of these narratives, abridged by Sylvia Josif (Mrs. Harold Josif), provided the starting point for my chapters on port, railway, and trucking operations.

Of help received from members of the Office of the Chief of Military History I particularly mention the expert collaboration in statistical matters of George Powell and the skill, tact, and taste with which Miss Ruth Stout, for two years as my editorial assistant and thereafter as Associate Editor, shepherded the manuscript into print.- Finally, I wish to note that this project was undertaken in 1944 by invitation of Dr. Walter L. Wright, Jr., first Chief Historian of the Army, whose interest continued after he left the Pentagon in 1946 and persisted to his untimely death at Princeton University in 1949.

Washington, D. C. 
15 December 1951

T. H. VAIL MOTTER

x


Contents

Chapter Page
I. EXPERIMENT IN CO-OPERATION 3

Supplying the Soviet War Machine

3

The British and the Americans

7

 Russians and the Americans

19

The Iranians and the Americans

26
II. YEAR OF CONFUSION 28

Wheels Within Wheels

29

Planning and Action

35

The Civilian Contractors

42
III. SIX MONTHS IN IRAQ 44

The Engineer Tasks

44

The Ordnance Program

48

The Mission's Tasks

53

Arrival in Iraq

56

All Change-New Priority

59
IV. INTERLUDE OF THE MISSION TO THE USSR 65

Why and Where?

65

Fifth Wheel

68

Command and Conflict

72

Russia Unvisited

77
V. THE IRANIAN MISSION AND ITS SUCCESSORS 82

Jobs, Geography, and Manpower

82

Unification of the Middle East Missions

95

Militarization of Contract Activities

93
VI. WHARVES, ROADS, AND BARGES 101

Making Bricks Without Straw

101

Barge Assembly at Kuwait

109

Administrative Problems

112

The Contract Terminated

118
VII. AIRCRAFT ASSEMBLY AND DELIVERY 124

Early Plans

124

The Battle of the Backlog

127

Militarization

136
VIII. MOTOR VEHICLE ASSEMBLY AND DELIVERY 139

Plans and Plants

141

Problems and Performance

145
IX. STRENGTHENING IRAN 156

Before World War II

157

Inception of the American Advisory Missions

161

The Ridley and Schwarzkopf Appointments

169
X. NEW JOB, NEW TOOLS: THE SOS PLAN 175

The Midsummer Crisis, 1942

175

Ways and Means

180

The SOS Plan

192

The Plan Approved

198

Unfinished Business

200

Implementing the Plan

206
XI. BLUEPRINT FOR THE MACHINE 212

The Structure of American Headquarters

213

The Districts

222

Evolution of the Persian Gulf Command

226

Division of Responsibility With the British

233
XII. THE MACHINE AT WORK 240

A Bird's-Eye View

240

The Army Takes Over Construction

246

Signal Communications

253

The Command and Air Activities

256

Logistical Support of FRANTIC Mission

258

The Command and Project Lux

260
XIII. THE AIR CORPS TAKES. OVER AIRCRAFT ASSEMBLY 264

The Pressure of the Protocols

264

Manpower, Procedures, and Production

266

Abadan Air Base

270
XIV. THE ARMY TAKES OVER THE TAP'S 274
Plant 274
Problems 277
The End of Operations 281
XV. OIL FOR THE WAR 284
Early Pipeline Projects 285
Increase of Middle East Refinery Capacity-Bahrain 291
Container Plants at Abadan and Bahrain 298
Supply of POL Within the Command 302
Gasoline for Russia 306
XVI. TRUCK TRANSPORT 309
The Preliminaries 310
The Trucks Start Rolling 316
Operations and Obstacles 322
The Score 328
XVII. THE RAILWAY 331
Authority and Responsibility 333
The Power of the Purse 339
The Americans Take Over 346
Men at Work 353
Problems and Solutions 360
The Last Months 375
XVIII. PORT OPERATIONS 379
Evolution of American Responsibility 380
The American Organization and Its Functions 385
The Ports and Their Problems 392
Performance 407
XIX. TARGET ZERO 417
The Process of Contraction 418
Evacuation and Redeployment 425
Liquidation of Property 427
Comparative Score 432
XX. THE U.S. ARMY AND AID TO IRAN 435
The Question of Status 437
Broadening the Directive 447
XXI. THE MILITARY ADVISORY MISSIONS 461
The Contracts 462
The Work of the Missions 464
Priorities and Policy 468
The Question of Continuing the Missions 473
APPENDIXES
A. TABLES 481

1. Cargo Shipped from the Western Hemisphere to the USSR by Route of Delivery, 22 June 1941-20 September 1945

481

2. Cargo Shipped from the Western Hemisphere to Persian Gulf Ports for the USSR, by Type, November1941-May 1945

484

3. Cargo Discharged at American-Operated Ports in the Persian Gulf, January 1943-May 1945

486

4. Supplies Delivered to the USSR through the Persian Corridor, by Type of Transport, 1942-1945

488

5. Freight Hauled by Rail North of Andimeshk, Iran, August 1942May 1945

490
6. Freight Hauled in the Persian Corridor by the Motor Transport Service, 1943-1944 492

7. Number of Vehicles Assembled at Truck Assembly Plants in the Persian Corridor, March 1942-April 1945

494

8. Monthly Output of Assembled Vehicles at Truck Assembly Plant II, Khorramshahr, Iran, 26 January 1943-19 April 1945

495

9.Monthly Output of Assembled Vehicles at Truck Assembly Plant I, Andimeshk, Iran, March 1942-December 1944

496

10. Monthly Deliveries of Aircraft, to the USSR by U.S. Army in the Persian Corridor, 1942-1945

498

11.Aircraft Delivered to the USSR by U.S. Army in the Persian Corridor, by Type, 1942-1945

498

12.Assigned Strength of U.S. Army Forces in the Persian Corridor, 1943-1945 

499

13.Distribution of U.S. Army Civilian Employees in the Persian Corridor, 1943-1945

500
14. Estimated Costs of Constructing Fixed Installations in the Persian Corridor, 1943-1945 501

15. Drum Production at Bahrain, 1944-1945

502
B. CHARTS 502
1.United States Army Forces in the Middle East 502

2.Manpower in U.S. Army Operations in the Persian Corridor,1941-1945

503

3. Aircraft Delivered to the USSR at Abadan, Iran, 1942-1945

504

4. Vehicles Assembled at Truck Assembly Plant I, Andimeshk, Iran,1942-1944

504

5. Vehicles Assembled at Truck Assembly Plant II, Khorramshahr, Iran, 1943-1945

505

6. Freight Hauled in the Persian Corridor by the Motor Transport Service, 1943-1944

505

7. Freight Hauled North of Andimeshk, Iran, on Iranian State Railway,August 1942-May 1945

506

8. Cargo Discharged at American-Operated Ports in the Persian Gulf, January 1943-May 1945

506

9. Discharge and Inland Clearance Operations at Khorramshahr, Iran, August 1942-May 1945

507

10. Discharge and Inland Clearance Operations at Bandar Shahpur,Iran, August 1942 January 1945

507

11. USSR Cargo Landed at Cheybassi, Iraq, July 1943-September 1944

508

12. Cargo Shipped to the USSR from the Western Hemisphere, by Route, 22 June 1941-20 September 1945

508
GLOSSARY 509

Maps

1. Approaches to the Middle East Inside back cover
2. Principal Russian-Aid Routes Inside back cover
3.The Districts, 1942-1945 223
4. American-Operated Routes 314
5. The Ports Inside back cover

Illustrations

Declaration of the Three Powers Regarding Iran

Frontispiece
Iran Aerial Photo of Khorramshahr 392
Iran Aerial Photo of Bandar Shahpur 393

The Frontispiece, supplied by the Department of State, is from the White House files.

The two photos are from the U. S. Air Forces, Department of Defense.


page updated December 2001


 
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