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Brilliant Pebbles

Country:  USA
Basing:  Space

Details

Brilliant Pebbles, the top anti-missile program of the Reagan and the first Bush administrations, was an attempt to deploy a 4,000-satellite constellation in low-Earth orbit that would fire high-velocity, watermelon-sized projectiles at long-range ballistic missiles launched from anywhere in the world. Although the program was eliminated by the Clinton Administration, the concept of Brilliant Pebbles remains among the most effective means of ballistic missile defense.

 

In the early 1980s, scientists Edward Teller, Lowell Wood, and Gregory Canavan began gaming out a new missile defense concept known as “Smart Rocks” at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California. Smart Rocks involved deploying thousands of tiny rocket-propelled canisters in orbit, each capable of ramming itself into an incoming ballistic missile. Following their initial war games, Teller, Wood, and Canavan successfully persuaded President Ronald Reagan that a robust constellation of Smart Rocks interceptors would provide a strong defense against nuclear attack.

 

On March 23, 1983, Reagan announced his bold vision for an impenetrable missile defense shield that would render nuclear warheads impotent and obsolete: “I call upon the scientific community in this country, who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents to the cause of mankind and world peace.” From the very beginning, Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) viewed space-based weapons such as X-ray lasers, chemical lasers, particle-beam weapons, and kinetic kill vehicles as the best way to destroy large numbers of incoming Soviet warheads.

 

Smart Rocks was upgraded in 1988 and renamed “Brilliant Pebbles.” In addition to eliminating incoming nuclear warheads, each component of the 4,000-satellite constellation was designed to protect U.S. space-based assets, attack its Soviet counterparts, or sacrifice itself in a one-time spy mission. The interceptor satellites would be controlled from the ground, but would also have the ability to communicate among themselves and attack their targets autonomously. At a projected cost of $11 billion for the first 1,000 interceptors, Brilliant Pebbles presented a cost-efficient means of countering the Soviet menace.

 

Brilliant Pebbles made significant progress between 1988 and 1990, and received enthusiastic support from the Bush I Administration. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney referred to Brilliant Pebbles as the White House’s “number one project,” and the program received generous funding even as other SDI initiatives were phased out. In March 1990, George Monahan, Director of SDI, announced that Brilliant Pebbles would be the first-deployed U.S. missile defense system. His successor, Henry F. Cooper, streamlined the Brilliant Pebbles contractor team to two companies, TRW-Hughes and Martin Marietta, and lobbied aggressively on Capitol Hill for more funding and support.

 

In 1991, following several years of inner turmoil, the Soviet Union imploded. Despite the end of the Cold War, Brilliant Pebbles remained an essential part of the U.S. missile defense architecture. That same year, computer simulations demonstrated that, if it had been deployed during the Persian Gulf War, Brilliant Pebbles would have shot down every Scud missile launched by Saddam Hussein, including the salvo attack on Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Following the Middle East crisis, Brilliant Pebbles was enhanced to give its interceptors the ability to swoop down into the atmosphere, thus improving its overall effectiveness against Scuds and cruise missiles.

 

In 1993, however, the Clinton Administration delivered a severe blow to U.S. missile defense by systematically eliminating Brilliant Pebbles through a series of budget cuts. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin stated his objective as “taking the star out of Star Wars.” The Administration did more than just that: it slashed missile defense funding across the board and replaced SDI with the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). Yet the technology itself would continue to be tested, for a short time: one year later, NASA launched a deep-space probe known as “Clementine,” which had been built using first-generation Brilliant Pebbles technology. Clementine successfully mapped the entire surface of the Moon. The mission, which cost $80 million, effectively “space qualified” Brilliant Pebbles’ hardware. All the same, no steps were taken by the Clinton Administration to resurrect the program.

 

Brilliant Pebbles remained on the shelf and out of the public eye until 2002, when President George W. Bush withdrew the U.S. from the 1972 ABM Treaty. At first, many believed that Bush II planned to resurrect Brilliant Pebbles, which had been the focus of his father’s anti-missile program. Instead, the Missile Defense Agency (BMDO’s successor) concentrated its efforts on “hit-to-kill” ground-based defenses, such as the 20 interceptors that will be deployed at Fort Greely in Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California in late 2004. Little attention was paid to space-based defenses, although MDA’s Near Field Infrared Experiment (NFIRE), scheduled for launch in the summer of 2004, recently shifted the national debate back to Brilliant Pebbles-like interceptors.

 

In any event, the concept of Brilliant Pebbles remains among the most efficient and cost-effective means of defending the U.S. against nuclear, chemical, and biological warheads.

 

Sources

 

American Foreign Policy Council, Summary of Remarks by Ambassador Henry Cooper, 18 December 2002.
Burns, Robert. “Pentagon Reviving Effort To Build Space-Based Defenses.” Associated Press Newswires, 17 July 2001.
Center for Security Policy.
Cooper, Henry F. “Why Not Space-Based Missile Defense?” The Wall Street Journal, 7 May 2001.
Hackett, James. “Missile Defense Going Astray?” The Washington Times, 29 April 2004.
High Frontier, 2002 Strategic Policy Issue Briefs.
Hoffman, Ian. “Physicists’ War Games Led To Brilliant Space Defense Plan.” Oakland Tribune, 10 September 2002.
Miller, John J. “Our ‘Next Manifest Destiny.’” National Review, 15 July 2002.
Miller, John J. “The High Ground.” National Review, 24 May 2004.
“Reagan’s Vision Of Missile Defense Endures Despite Criticism.” Agence France-Presse, 5 June 2004.
Singer, Saul. “Brilliant Pebbles Now.” The Jerusalem Post, 9 November 2001.
Wall, Robert. “Space-Based Interceptor Gets New Lease On Life.” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 13 August 2001.

IBD on the “Spirit of Reykjavik”

October 11, 2006 :: Investor’s Business Daily :: Analysis

This week marks the twentieth anniversary of President Ronald Reagan’s bold stand against trading missile defense for an arms treaty, writes Investor’s Business Daily in an editorial entitled “Reykjavik Forever.” In October 1986, during a meeting between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, the Soviet premier unexpectedly offered an unprecedented reduction in nuclear weapons. His price was that the U.S. abandon all but the most rudimentary research on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which Reagan had called “a new hope for our children in the 21st century.” According to contemporary accounts, Reagan gathered his papers, stood, and told Gorbachev, “No way.” Criticism and derision followed immediately. U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar compared SDI to France’s disastrous Maginot Line in World War II. In a New York Times op-ed, Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), said “Star Wars is a physical and technological impossibility,” adding that “it is difficult to believe that any other president since World War II would have ignored the opportunity that knocked at Reykjavik.” Claiborne Pell (D-RI), the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, lamented, “This is a sad day for mankind.” Yet as Investor’s Business Daily points out, “history proved the critics all wrong—including the scores of scientists who knew so much better than this simpleton who somehow landed in the White House.” In several years, Gorbachev was gone, and the Soviet Union imploded. At the time of Reagan’s death, Gennady Gerasimov, senior Soviet foreign ministry spokesman admitted that SDI had been “a very successful blackmail.”
        As for SDI, Investor’s Business Daily adds that “today, U.S. interceptor missiles that can stop incoming nuclear warheads in space—Teddy Kennedy’s ‘physical and technological impossibility’—are an operational reality.” This is only partially true. The U.S. has deployed the ground-based midcourse defense system in Alaska and California, which recently intercepted a live target missile. Reagan’s vision for strategic defenses, however, has yet to come. The U.S. has not yet deployed the necessary space-based missile defense assets, such as Brilliant Pebbles, capable of targeting and destroying long-range ballistic missiles in mid-trajectory. Most of the U.S., including the East Coast, remains vulnerable to ballistic missile attack, as does the entire homeland from a ship-launched short range ballistic missile against a coastal city. On the twentieth anniversary of Reykjavik, while celebrating Reagan’s bold stand against trading away missile defense, Americans should also ask when the U.S. will implement the former President’s full vision for the strategic defense of the nation.  (Article, Link) 

Russia Concerned U.S. May Deploy Space-Based Assets

September 26, 2006 :: Defense Daily International :: News

Russian leaders are concerned that the U.S. may deploy space-based missile defense assets, reports Defense Daily International. At a recent symposium hosted by the Henry L. Stimson Center, a Washington DC think tank, analysts noted that Russia could respond by detonating a nuclear weapon in space to create a radiation belt that would render U.S. space-based defenses useless. Such a move would also annihilate functioning of Russian satellites, although Russia has far less to lose. According to retired Russian General Vladimir Dworkin, now senior researcher with the Center for International Security at the Institute for World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Science, Russia’s concerns about lasers in space do not apply to existing components of the multi-layered U.S. missile defense system, such as the Airborne Laser. “We’ve gotten used to it,” Dworkin said. “But if you’re talking about reviving … Star Wars,” perhaps by resurrecting Brilliant Pebbles or developing a laser BMD system, then that “would be a shock” to Russians that they would not easily get used to. The more the U.S. pushes to develop a space-based BMD system, the more sharply Russia would be likely to respond, Dworkin warned. (Link) 

Cooper and Pfaltzgraff on Need for Global, Multi-layered Missile Defense

August 30, 2006 :: The Wall Street Journal :: Analysis

Deployment of a multi-layered missile defense, including space-based systems, should be an urgent U.S. priority, argues Ambassador Henry F. Cooper and Dr. Robert Pfaltzgraff, in the August 28 edition of The Wall Street Journal. Dr. Pfaltzgraff is president of the Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies at Tufts University. Ambassador Cooper was the former director of the Strategic Defense Initiative and chief U.S. negotiator to the Geneva Space and Defense Talks, and is currently chairman of High Frontier, a missile defense advocacy group. Both participated in the Independent Working Group, which recently released the report Missile Defense, the Space Relationship and the 21st Century.
        The authors write: “We should make it virtually impossible for any adversary—rogue states, non-state actors and larger strategic competitors—to influence U.S. decisions, or the course of regional conflicts, by threatening to launch missiles with nuclear weapons against the U.S., its deployed forces or its allies.” The U.S. needs a “continuously ready, global, multilayered system to provide multiple shots at attacking missiles and their warheads in all their phases of flight.” Such defenses would make a missile attack against the U.S. an expensive endeavor, and therefore less attractive for enemies to buy the technologies to overcome them. “The ABM Treaty era showed that it is the absence of defenses, rather than their presence, that encourages the development of offensive technologies.” To accomplish this, the U.S. should complete the ground-based sites in Alaska and California but build no additional ground-based sites. Limited resources would be better spent deploying more effective sea- and space-based missile defense components.
        The U.S. has already invested $80 billion in over 80 Aegis-equipped warships armed with Standard Missile-3 interceptors, which provide an effective defense against cruise missiles. An additional investment of $100 million per ship, they write, would enable these flexible platforms to shoot down ballistic missiles, and thus provide an effective near-term defense capability. For a long-term global defense, the U.S. should invest in space-based systems that can intercept ballistic missiles in all phases of flight. The technology already exists in the form of Brilliant Pebbles, a space-based system developed during the Reagan and first Bush administrations but never completed. Brilliant Pebbles consists of a constellation of lightweight satellites that would release watermelon-sized interceptors into the path of the oncoming missiles and destroy them by impact. Cooper and Pfaltzgraff point out that all key technologies for Brilliant Pebbles were proven by the mid-1990s, and that the more advanced technology of today would provide such a system with even greater capabilities.

        The full text: (More »»») 

Coyle Takes Aim at Brilliant Pebbles

July 26, 2006 :: UPI :: Analysis

Philip Coyle, senior advisor at the Center for Defense Information, was recently quoted in the UPI on the issue of space-based missile defenses and in particular, the Brilliant Pebbles defense system. “The idea was that a small satellite with good brain [sic] that would see enemy missiles and dash off after it, hit it and knock it down,” he said, but noted that such a concept would have required numerous satellites, perhaps as many as 1,000 to be effective. “You can’t have one interceptor parked over North Korea,” he argued. “You need another to take its place.” Coyle also questioned the monetary feasibility of the program. “It would be, by all measures, very expensive. And it’s still problematic as to whether it would work. They’ve been projecting [costs] for at least 20 years and it doesn’t seem to happen.”
        Would Brilliant Pebbles work? Coyle does not mention that Brilliant Pebbles had successfully completed its simulation stage and was ready to move to the proof-of-concept, prototype, and performance testing stages when it was effectively starved of funding as the Clinton administration came to power. Nor does he mention that in 1994 NASA launched a deep-space probe mission known as “Clementine,” constructed with first-generation Brilliant Pebbles hardware. The mission, which cost $80 million, effectively “space-qualified” Brilliant Pebbles technology, even though the missile defense program had already been eliminated.
        Would Brilliant Pebbles be too expensive? The newly released report by the Independent Working Group entitled Missile Defense, the Space Relationship and the Twenty-First Century—the report cited by the UPI piece—puts the total cost of a 1,000-satellite constellation of Brilliant Pebbles at $16 billion, based on the fully approved Defense Acquisition Board plan from 1991. The figure includes the costs of developing, testing, deploying, and operating Brilliant Pebbles over a 20-year period using a low-to-moderate risk, event-driven acquisition schedule. Many would agree that $16 billion dollars is a small price to pay for the protection of the U.S. and its allies from ballistic missile attack and nuclear devastation.  (Article, Link) 

Independent Working Group Issues Major Report on Ballistic Missile Defense

July 21, 2006 :: Analysis

Five years after withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, the United States has so far failed to take advantage of the withdrawal and revive development of specific technologies necessary to make the nation and its allies safe from missile attack. On July 10, The Independent Working Group (IWG) issued a major report outlining the need for more ambitious efforts in ballistic missile defense policy. The report, entitled Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century, advocates the development and deployment of robust missile defense capabilities well beyond the limited ground-based system currently being deployed in Alaska and California. The Claremont Institute is one of eight public policy organizations from around the country co-sponsoring the report. 
        The report recommends that the Pentagon build on the legacy of technologies developed under the Strategic Defense Initiative of the Reagan and first Bush administrations. Sea- and space-based assets should constitute the backbone of a robust, layered U.S. missile defense shield, which ground-based systems should support. Such a shield would be capable of protecting the U.S., its allies, and troops abroad against the threat of a hostile missile attacks from any quarter. The missile threat has only increased in recent years as rogue nations and transnational terrorist organizations attempt to acquire ballistic missile technology and weapons of mass destruction. The report praises the Bush Administration for withdrawing from the 1972 ABM Treaty and beginning modest and limited deployments, but also criticizes the failure to use existing technologies to deploy a more robust system actually capable of defending the United States, our troops, and our allies.
        Changes to sea-based missile defense development programs could be made for approximately $350 million, in three specific areas. The U.S. could demonstrate a space-based missile defense system for some $3-5 billion, and field some 1000 space-based interceptors for an anticipated cost of $16.4 billion. Current expenditures for missile defense total approximately $8 billion per year.
        The Independent Working Group is co-chaired by Dr. Robert Pfaltzgraff, President of the Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) at Tufts University, and by Dr. William R. Van Cleave, Professor Emeritus of the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, and a member of the original U.S. delegation which drafted the 1972 ABM Treaty. Ambassador Henry F. Cooper, who in former roles oversaw both development of missile defense for the U.S. and was chief negotiator to the Geneva Defense and Space Talks, Dr. Robert Jastrow, founding director of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies, and Dr. Lowell Wood, a Physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Commissioner on the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) were among the numerous missile defense, space, and security experts from the scientific, technical, and national security policy communities around the country who are members of the Independent Working Group.
        Members of the Working Group also include Brian T. Kennedy, president of the Claremont Institute, and Thomas Karako, Director of Programs at the Claremont Institute and editor of Missilethreat.com. Sponsors and authors of the IWG report include eight think-tanks headquartered in Washington D.C., California, Alaska, Missouri, Massachusetts, and around the country.
        Further, the experts called on the U.S. to recreate and sustain the scientific and technology base—including the workforce needed—to assure U.S. primacy in space and missile defense. That job would be accomplished by revamping organizational leadership of sea and space based missile defense in the U.S., and directing the National Science Foundation and other government agencies to further emphasize research in space technologies.
        The report was released July 10 in Washington D.C., and will be followed by a series of briefings to the public and governmental officials during 2006 and 2007. 
        “We cannot be complacent about the missile defense program we have with the new threats the U.S. is facing,” said Dr. Robert Pfaltzgraff, co-chair of the Independent Working Group. “We promised ourselves an effective, layered defense with our withdrawal from the ABM treaty. It is now time to put politics aside and use the most effective technologies to make that happen.” (Article, Link) 

Oberg on XS-111 Microsatellite Rendezvous Program

February 7, 2006 :: MSNBC :: News

James Oberg of NBC News analyzes the U.S. Air Force’s Experimental Small Satellite 11 (XS-11) microsatellite, which completed a successful series of orbital rendezvous maneuvers with another satellite in September. The Lockheed Martin-built XSS-11 is a small spacecraft, roughly the size of a dishwasher and weighing only 300 pounds. It is managed by the Air Force Research Laboratory’s “Space Vehicles Directorate Integrated Space Experiments Division” at Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and operated by the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center’s Detachment 12. The XSS-11 was launched aboard a modified Minuteman missile on April 11. It spent the next several months activating and exercising its sensors and guidance computers. The rendezvous exercises took place around the derelict upper stage of the modified missile. Program manager Vernon Baker stated that the XSS-11 made its first approach in late July at a distance of 1.6 km, and has since completed several other approaches, in one case coming as close as half a kilometer. More approaches are planned.
        If future tests are equally successful, the Pentagon hopes to modify the design of the microsatellite for a wide array of space missions. Oberg comments on the potential military applications of the XSS-11:


Two potential military missions in particular are worth considering for follow-on testing. … First, the U.S. needs a means of inspecting its own military satellites for external damage, either from accidental breakdown or from hostile activity, and a small “scout satellite” capable of detaching, flying around and reattaching itself could provide critical insights in diagnosing—or even warding off—such damage.

Secondly, a U.S. spacecraft near a foreign spacecraft could perform a number of highly valuable but entirely passive functions. Aside from a detailed physical inspection with a resolution far better than possible from a distance, an object in such a location would be able to intercept narrow-beam communications—radio, laser beam, whatever—that otherwise might elude ground-based sensors.

Such applications (and a few others that experts would not describe in detail) are of a fundamentally military nature, but are not “weapons” in any practical sense. They are neither illegal nor in any way destabilizing …

        Although not intended for missile defense applications, XSS-11 draws comparison to the deep-space probe “Clementine” that NASA launched in 1994. One year after the Clinton administration ended the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1993, Clementine used hardware that had been intended for the “Brilliant Pebbles” system, the top missile defense priority for the Reagan and Bush administrations. Brilliant Pebbles had been an attempt to deploy a 4,000-satellite constellation in low-Earth orbit that would fire high-velocity projectiles at long-range ballistic missiles launched from anywhere in the world. By “space qualifying” this hardware, Clementine proved that the Brilliant Pebbles technology worked, and that space-based missile defense was not a pie-in-the-sky fantasy as Reagan’s critics had claimed. The XSS-11 microsatellite project proves yet again that the technology for space-based missile defense exists. The XSS-11 rendezvous mission—an orbital maneuver that included locating a specific target and meeting it in space—is similar to the maneuvering required of a space-based interceptor.  (Article, Link) 

Dinerman on Space Weapons and Brilliant Pebbles

May 10, 2005 :: The Space Review :: Analysis

Taylor Dinerman, writing for The Space Review, notes that while the Bush administration has been making headway on a number of salutary missile defense programs, it has not restarted the space-based defenses, such as the Brilliant Pebbles which had been killed by the Clinton administration. Despite this fact, critics of the administration from the left continue to insinuate that space programs are being pursued. In fact, notes Dinerman, the administration is in a very difficult place:


Curiously, Bush has had to take all the political pain involved in withdrawing from the ABM Treaty and building an operational missile defense system without being willing to go all the way and make that system fully effective, or at least as effective as possible given the limits of today’s technology. On this issue it is striking how much more conservative and bold his father’s administration was.

        The potential for Brilliant Pebbles was its ability to intercept missiles while they were still in their boost phase, when they are most vulnerable. The technology was available in the early 1990s, in fact in the 1980s, and it has only improved since:


Since Brilliant Pebbles (BP) was canceled in 1993, the Department of Defense has made some limited progress on technology that is directly applicable to space-based boost phase systems. More important has been the ongoing improvements in computer processing power and in the ability of uncooked thermal imagers to detect targets. A 2005 model of a Brilliant Pebble would be smaller and have a better electronic brain than the 1993 one. Not only that, but there are now cheaper and more reliable in-space propulsion systems, such as pulsed plasma thrusters, which would keep the BPs in orbit and operation for far longer than the older version.
 (More »»») 

Dinerman on Need to Divert KEI Funds to Space-Based Interceptors

January 24, 2005 :: Analysis

Taylor Dinerman writes a fine piece for The Space Review on the need for missile defense budget cuts, if they are indeed to come, to be properly managed. If, as reported, the Missile Defense Agency must cut five billion dollars over the next six years, choices have to be made. Dinerman notes that “press reports indicate they have three choices: cut a little here and a little there, hoping to save all of their ongoing programs; cut the Airborne Laser (ABL); or cut the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI). Sitting outside MDA, the answer is obvious, to wit, kill KEI.”
        Dinerman goes on to recount the difficulties of the KEI design. While boost phase intercept is desirable, doing so with land-based interceptors is quite problematic, since they are very vulnerable to the problem of being in just the right place at just the right time. Dinerman then goes on to support perseverance with the promising sea-based Aegis defenses, as well as the Airborne Laser, but most importantly points to a more fundamental solution yet:


What is needed is to renew work on space-based boost-phase interceptors. The political obstacles are formidable indeed, but the case for Brilliant Pebbles or similar systems is as valid now as it was when the system was canceled by the late Les Aspin with the notorious quip, “I’m going to take the stars out of Star Wars.” Orbiting BPI weapons will not only give the US the capability to shoot down long-range missiles aimed at us but, and more importantly, it could allow the US to smother regional ballistic missile exchanges. Pick your own favorite nuclear missile nightmare scenario, and imagine how it would be changed if both sides found that their rockets were being knocked out of the sky. In a world full of nuclear proliferation, space-based BPI would be the ultimate diplomatic tool.
 (Article, Link) 

Garwin on Missile Defense

October 29, 2004 :: Analysis

Richard Garwin writes in the November edition of the Scientific American on the need for missile defense efforts to be properly directed. He makes a number of good points about the ballistic missile threat, but his opposition to the means by which to meet that threat leaves questions unanswered. First, a summary of his main points: (More »»») 

New Space Defenses: A Return to Brilliant Pebbles?

March 30, 2004 :: ABC News :: News

ABC News describes recent reports that the US is moving toward missile defenses in space, specifically the Missile Defense Agency’s Near Field Infrared Experiment (NFIRE) program, a form of tracking system which may also include an interceptor which could then be directed toward an incoming missile.
        ABC makes far too much of the defensive interceptor’s potential for “weaponizing” space. It is the missiles themselves which have truly weaponized space. Any long range missile, such as those Russia and China have armed with nuclear weapons, would travel through space. Much of a missile’s flight time is spent in space, so the use of space would be used as a platform for defensive systems only makes sense.
        What is not noted by recent coverage of such programs, however, is that such an interceptor, still in the design stage, would appear to resembles the laudable “Brilliant Pebbles” program begun under President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. Brilliant Pebbles consisted of a small, partly autonomous constellation of satellites which would first detect a missile launch, then release a watermelon-sized interceptor which would collide with an oncoming missile fairly early in its travels. Funding for the Brilliant Pebbles program was cut in the early 1990s, under the Clinton administration.
        A renewed interest in the promising program may also be seen in the develoment of other miniaturization technologies. Earlier this year, Lockheed Martin received a contract to develop a Miniature Kill Vehicle (MKV). Unfortunately, such systems are, at best, in only the design stage, and are not being pursued aggresively. ABC’s warning of space weaponization is, therefore, quite misplaced. To the extent that such programs would be pursued pursued, however, it would be all for the better.  (Article, Link) 

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