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The direct file statute does not violate separation of powers. Prosecutorial discretion balanced by the district court's sentencing discretion is not unconstitutional. Flakes v. People, 153 P.3d 427 (Colo. 2007).

No violation of separation of powers existed where secretary of state's assessment of 1% of all gross revenues for games of chance suppliers and manufacturers constituted a fee and not an illegal tax under this article. Bingo Games Supply Co., Inc. v. Meyer, 895 P.2d 1125 (Colo. App. 1995).

Unless under constitutional compulsion by people. The separation of powers concept is extremely important and fundamental to a free system of government. The supreme court is unalterably opposed to any attempt by one branch of the government to assume the power of another. But when the people speak through the amendment of their constitution and assign one branch or the other some duties which are not normally considered to be that of the branch assigned, then because of its devotion to the republican scheme of government, the supreme court is compelled to accept their decision. In re Interrogatories Propounded by Senate Concerning House Bill 1078, 189 Colo. 1, 536 P.2d 308 (1975).

And any exception to distribution of powers must appear in express terms in the constitution; implied exceptions are not sanctioned. Denver Bar Ass'n v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 154 Colo. 273, 391 P.2d 467, 13 A.L.R. 3d 799 (1964).

To determine what is constitutional is not committed exclusively to judicial department; the views of officials of coordinate branches of the government are entitled to consideration. Hudson v. Annear, 101 Colo. 551, 75 P.2d 587 (1938).

And this article applies not less to judicial department than to other departments. Hudson v. Annear, 101 Colo. 551, 75 P.2d 587 (1938).

Doctrine of separation of powers applies with equal force to all three branches of government. People v. Herrera, 183 Colo. 155, 516 P.2d 626 (1973).

Delineation of powers on case-by-case basis. Delineation of the powers of the legislative, judicial, and executive branches usually should be on a case-by-case basis. MacManus v. Love, 179 Colo. 218, 499 P.2d 609 (1972); C.C.C. v. District Court, 188 Colo. 437, 535 P.2d 1117 (1975).

This provision relates to state government and is not to be applied in matters of purely local concern such as the matters pertaining to license of a business within a city and county. Peterson v. McNichols, 128 Colo. 137, 260 P.2d 938 (1953).

Classification includes all public officers of the state. This article divides the powers of the state government into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial. This classification includes all public officers of the state, without regard to their rank or duties. And as the officers composing the legislative and judicial departments are well understood not to include the warden of the penitentiary, or of the reformatory, the commissioner of mines, or of insurance and the like, these must of necessity be classed as executive officers, unless some other provision of the constitution changes or modifies the effect of the language of this article. Parks v. Comm'rs of Soldiers' & Sailors' Home, 22 Colo. 86, 43 P. 542 (1896).

Parole revocation reincarceration is not a new sentence. Since the sentencing power of the judiciary is not implicated, there is no separation of powers violation. People v. Barber, 74 P.3d 444 (Colo. App. 2003).

Applied in Gillette v. Peabody, 19 Colo. App. 356, 75 P. 18 (1904); People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. News-Times Publ'g Co., 35 Colo. 253, 84 P. 912 (1906); People ex rel. Smith v. Crissman, 41 Colo. 450, 92 P. 949 (1907); Post Printing & Publ'g Co. v. Shafroth, 53 Colo. 129, 124 P. 176 (1912); Mulnix v. Elliot, 62 Colo. 46, 156 P. 216 (1916); Parsons v. Parsons, 70 Colo. 154, 198 P. 156 (1921); People ex rel. Setters v. Lee, 72 Colo. 598, 213 P. 583 (1923); Walton v. Walton, 86 Colo. 1, 278 P. 780 (1929); People v. Swena, 88 Colo. 337, 296 P. 271 (1931); Allen v. Bailey, 91 Colo. 260, 14 P.2d 1087 (1932); City & County of Denver v. Lynch, 92 Colo. 102, 18 P.2d 907 (1932); Titus v. Titus, 96 Colo. 191, 41 P.2d 244 (1935); In re Interrogatories of Governor, 97 Colo. 528, 51 P.2d 695 (1935); Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Manley, 99 Colo. 153, 60 P.2d 913 (1936); People ex rel. Rogers v. Letford, 102 Colo. 284, 79 P.2d 274 (1938); Smith-Brooks Printing Co. v. Young, 103 Colo. 199, 85 P.2d 39 (1938); People ex rel. Rogers v. Barksdale, 104 Colo. 1, 87 P.2d 755 (1939); Peterson v. McNichols, 128 Colo. 137, 260 P.2d 938 (1953); People ex rel. Dunbar v. Denver Dist. Court, 129 Colo. 203, 268 P.2d 1098 (1954); In re Senate Bill No. 72, 139 Colo. 371, 339 P.2d 501 (1959); Frankel v. City & County of Denver, 147 Colo. 373, 363 P.2d 1063 (1961); Donnell v. Indus. Comm'n, 149 Colo. 228, 368 P.2d 777 (1962); Specht v. People, 156 Colo. 12, 396 P.2d 838 (1964); Times-Call Publ'g Co. v. Wingfield, 159 Colo. 172, 410 P.2d 511 (1966); Cain v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 159 Colo. 360, 411 P.2d 778 (1966); Jackson v. Colo., 294 F. Supp. 1065 (D. Colo. 1968); Fladung v. City of Boulder, 165 Colo. 244, 438 P.2d 688 (1968); Romero v. Schauer, 386 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1974); Tihonovich v. Williams, 196 Colo. 144, 582 P.2d 1051 (1978); People v. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367, 585 P.2d 275 (1978); Cohen v. State, Dept. of Rev., 197 Colo. 385, 593 P.2d 957 (1979); Gray v. City of Manitou Springs, 43 Colo. App. 60, 598 P.2d 527 (1979); People v. Fierro, 199 Colo. 215, 606 P.2d 1291 (1980); Empire Sav., Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Otero Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 640 P.2d 1151 (Colo. 1982); People v. Thorpe, 641 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1982); People v. Montoya, 647 P.2d 1203 (Colo. 1982); Rathke v. MacFarlane, 648 P.2d 648 (Colo. 1982); Beacom v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 657 P.2d 440 (Colo. 1983).

II. LEGISLATIVE POWERS.

Constitution is limitation on plenary power of general assembly. The constitution is not a grant of power to the general assembly, but the general assembly is invested with plenary power for all the purposes of civil government, and the constitution is but a limitation upon that power. People ex rel. Rhodes v. Fleming, 10 Colo. 553, 16 P. 298 (1887); Colo. State Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Love, 167 Colo. 436, 448 P.2d 624 (1968).

General assembly determines its constitutional duties. The judicial cannot say to the legislative department that it has, or has not, performed its constitutional duties. That the legislative department must determine for itself, independent of either of the other departments of government, by passing such legislation as, in its judgment, the constitution requires. In re Senate Resolution No. 4, 54 Colo. 262, 130 P. 333 (1913).

And general assembly is free to choose any method which is appropriate to reach a proper governmental end. Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 181 Colo. 411, 509 P.2d 1250 (1973).

Legislative power is authority to make laws and to appropriate state funds. MacManus v. Love, 179 Colo. 218, 499 P.2d 609 (1972).

And sovereign power may not be delegated to private citizen to be used for a private purpose, especially where there is no state supervision. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Francis, 134 Colo. 160, 301 P.2d 139 (1956).

Taxation is indisputably legislative prerogative. Gates Rubber Co. v. South Sub. Metro. Recreation & Park Dist., 183 Colo. 222, 516 P.2d 436 (1973).

If a change in the state sales and use tax law is desired, it must be accomplished by the general assembly, for neither the director of revenue nor the supreme court is empowered with taxing authority. Weed v. Occhiato, 175 Colo. 509, 488 P.2d 877 (1971).

Only the general assembly has the power to amend laws and enact taxing statutes. Miller Int'l, Inc. v. State Dept. of Rev., 646 P.2d 341 (Colo. 1982).

But legislative limitation on use of executive funds violative of separation of powers. The governor's veto of footnote 5 of section 2 of the 1971 senate appropriation bill no. 436, which read "5/ Group Health Insurance - These funds shall not be allocated to individual agencies. The Controller shall make payments directly to the insurance carriers on a quarterly or less frequent basis", was proper in that the footnote constituted substantive legislation contrary to § 32 of art. V, Colo. Const., and further constituted an invasion of the separation of powers required by this article. The provision was thus void and unenforceable. MacManus v. Love, C.A. no. C-24520 (D.C. Denver, Colo., filed Nov. 24, 1971).

As is limitation in conflict with state personnel system. The governor's veto of footnote 21a of section 2 of the 1971 senate appropriation bill no. 436, which read "21a/ These moneys are to be used only for contract services and no single recipient is to receive more than $5,000", was proper inasmuch as the provisions of the footnote invaded the separation of powers required by this article in that it attempted to control the salaries of the staff of the council on arts and humanities contrary to the provisions of existing law in which salaries of persons within the classified personnel system of the state depend upon their grade as determined by the state personnel board. The footnote is thus void and unenforceable. MacManus v. Love, C.A. no. C-24520 (D.C. Denver, Colo., filed Nov. 24, 1971).

And federal contributions are not subject of appropriative power of legislature. MacManus v. Love, 179 Colo. 218, 499 P.2d 609 (1972).

A portion of a bill providing that any federal or cash funds received by any agency in excess of the appropriation shall not be expended without additional legislative appropriation violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers by attempting to limit the executive branch in its administration of federal funds to be received by it directly from agencies of the federal government and unconnected with any state appropriations. MacManus v. Love, 179 Colo. 218, 499 P.2d 609 (1972).

The governor's veto of the second sentence of footnote 24 of section 2 of the 1971 senate appropriation bill no. 436, which read "Prior to the establishment of additional Community Mental Health Centers the state authority shall submit to the Joint Budget Committee, for approval, any federal applications which shall require either state matching or state replacement of federal funds", was proper inasmuch as the sentence contained substantive legislation and constituted a violation of the separation of powers required by this article. The sentence was thus void and unenforceable. MacManus v. Love, C.A. no. C-24520 (D.C. Denver, Colo., filed Nov. 24, 1971).

Long bill headnotes violate the separation of powers. Headnotes defining full-time equivalent; health, life, and dental; personal services; short-term disability; lease purchase; leased space; legal services; operating expenses; vehicle lease payments; multiuse network payments; utilities; capital outlay; and purchase of services from computer center violate the separation of powers by intruding on the authority of the executive branch to administer the laws. Colo. Gen. Assembly v. Owens, 136 P.3d 262 (Colo. 2006).

Determination of legislative facts nonreviewable. During the process of the enactment of a law the general assembly is required to pass upon all questions of necessity and expediency connected therewith. The existence of such necessity is a question of fact, which the general assembly in the exercise of its legislative functions must determine; under this article that fact cannot be reviewed, called in question, nor determined by the courts. It is a question of which the general assembly alone is the judge, and, when it determines the fact to exist, its action is final. Van Kleeck v. Ramer, 62 Colo. 4, 156 P. 1108 (1916).

But legislative fact-finding delegable. The power to make a law may not be delegated, but the power to determine a state of facts upon which a law depends may be delegated. Casey v. People, 139 Colo. 89, 336 P.2d 308 (1959); Colo. Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Case, 151 Colo. 235, 380 P.2d 34 (1962); People v. Lepik, 629 P.2d 1080 (Colo. 1981); People v. Gallegos, 644 P.2d 920 (Colo. 1982).

A legislative body may not delegate the power to make a law or define a law, but it may delegate the power to determine some fact or state of things to effectuate the purpose of the law. People ex rel. Dunbar v. Giordano, 173 Colo. 567, 481 P.2d 415 (1971); People v. Willson, 187 Colo. 141, 528 P.2d 1315 (1974).

Power to make law vs. authority to execute. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law; the first cannot be done, but to the latter no valid objection can be made. People ex rel. Dunbar v. Giordano, 173 Colo. 567, 481 P.2d 415 (1971); Dixon v. Zick, 179 Colo. 278, 500 P.2d 130 (1972).

Delegation of power must provide standard. Any delegation of power by the general assembly, to be valid, must provide a primary standard or general rule to be followed in discharging the delegated power. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Francis, 134 Colo. 160, 301 P.2d 139 (1956).

The general assembly may not vest executive officers or bodies with uncontrolled discretion in making rules and regulations and must establish sufficient standards for their guidance. Casey v. People, 139 Colo. 89, 336 P.2d 308 (1959).

Indefiniteness which leaves to officer, court, or jury the determination of standards in a case-by-case process invalidates legislation as being violative of due process, as contravening the mandate that an accused be advised of the nature and cause of the accusation, and as constituting an unlawful delegation of legislative power to courts or enforcement agencies. Dominquez v. City & County of Denver, 147 Colo. 233, 363 P.2d 661 (1961).

The general assembly must prescribe sufficient standards by which the power delegated is to be exercised; otherwise, the delegation of power is invalid as being violative of the separation of powers doctrine. People v. Lepik, 629 P.2d 1080 (Colo. 1981).

Due process of law requires that the general assembly provide sufficiently precise standards to guide a judge and jury in deciding whether a crime has been committed. Failure to do so may well constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. People v. Smith, 638 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1981).

When delegation of power sufficiently detailed. The general assembly does not abdicate its function of making a law by establishing a definite plan or framework for the law's operation when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and the scope of his authority. People ex rel. Dunbar v. Giordano, 173 Colo. 567, 481 P.2d 415 (1971).

Necessity fixes a point beyond which it is unreasonable and impracticable to compel the general assembly to prescribe detailed rules for the purpose of avoiding an unconstitutional delegation of authority. Colo. Polytechnic College v. State Bd. for Community Colleges, 173 Colo. 39, 476 P.2d 38 (1970).

Prosecutorial discretion not unlawful delegation. When a single transaction may violate more than one statutory provision, and perpetrate separate offenses, the fact that a prosecutor has the discretion to prosecute under one or both of two distinct offenses which arise from the single transaction does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. People v. McKenzie, 169 Colo. 521, 458 P.2d 232 (1969).

To allow the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to be subject to judicial oversight would erode the doctrine of the separation of powers. People v. District Court, 632 P.2d 1022 (Colo. 1981).

Criminal prosecutors may exercise uniquely broad discretion in charging offenders, and this broad discretion does not exceed the permissible delegated power of the executive. People v. Gallegos, 644 P.2d 920 (Colo. 1982).

General assembly has plenary power over school districts. The general assembly has plenary powers to determine the number, nature and powers of school districts and their territory; further, that the general assembly may modify or withdraw all such powers as it pleases. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Sch. Planning Comm., 164 Colo. 541, 437 P.2d 787 (1968).

Only general assembly may declare act to be a crime. That precious power cannot be delegated to others not elected by or responsible to the people. Casey v. People, 139 Colo. 89, 336 P.2d 308 (1959).

It is fundamental that the general assembly has the inherent authority to define crimes and to prescribe punishment for criminal violations. People v. Arellano, 185 Colo. 280, 524 P.2d 305 (1974); People v. Lepik, 629 P.2d 1080 (Colo. 1981).

Although the general assembly may not delegate to an administrative agency the power to define criminal conduct, it may authorize the agency to adopt rules carrying criminal sanctions as long as the statutory scheme provides sufficient standards and safeguards to protect against the unreasonable exercise of discretionary power and offers adequate notice of the penalties applicable to a violator. People v. Lowrie, 761 P.2d 778 (Colo. 1988).

And power not delegable. The general assembly cannot constitutionally delegate the power to define crimes to any branch of another state's government, to the federal congress, or to another branch of the state government. People v. Tenorio, 197 Colo. 137, 590 P.2d 952 (1979).

Although the modern tendency may often permit liberal grants of discretion to administrative bodies, the power delegated cannot be expanded to the point where an administrative officer is possessed of unbridled authority to declare conduct criminal. People v. Lepik, 629 P.2d 1080 (Colo. 1981).

Commercial bribery statute, § 18-5-401, does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to private persons to define duty of fidelity. People v. Lee, 717 P.2d 493 (Colo. 1986).

Contraband statute, § 18-8-204, does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power. The statute imposes adequate standards and procedural safeguards because it requires the administrative head of a detention facility to determine whether an item poses or may pose a risk prior to categorizing it as contraband, to find that there is a reasonable probability that an item would pose a threat, and to give notice of what is contraband. Allowing each detention facility to determine what is contraband based on the specific conditions present at each facility does not result in an unlawful delegation of legislative authority. People v. Holmes, 959 P.2d 406 (Colo. 1998).

Just as the general assembly may initially prescribe a penalty for a criminal violation, it may also, in its wisdom, from time to time change and adjust penalties as social necessities may mandate. People v. Arellano, 185 Colo. 280, 524 P.2d 305 (1974).

For the general assembly to legislate on right to jury trial is not violation of this article, since the right to a jury is substantive and not procedural. Hardamon v. Municipal Court, 178 Colo. 271, 497 P.2d 1000 (1972).

Section 17-22.5-403 (9) does not violate separation of powers. The constitution does not provide that sentencing is within the sole province of the judiciary. The general assembly has the power to prescribe punishment and limit the court's sentencing authority. In this case, the general assembly, by enacting subsection (9), simply extended Colorado's parole supervision scheme to provide additional means for successfully reintegrating offenders into the community consistent with public safety. People v. Jackson, 109 P.3d 1017 (Colo. App. 2004).

Power to make evidentiary rules. The general assembly has the power to prescribe new rules, or to revise or alter existing rules of substantive evidence, so long as they do not violate constitutional requirements or deprive any person of constitutional rights. People v. Smith, 182 Colo. 228, 512 P.2d 269 (1973).

And designation of place of confinement of those found guilty of crime is legislative function, and sentence must be pronounced in conformity with the legislative mandate. Tinsley v. Crespin, 137 Colo. 302, 324 P.2d 1033 (1958).

General assembly is powerless to confer executive powers upon judiciary. People v. Herrera, 183 Colo. 155, 516 P.2d 626 (1973).

On legislative powers. This article prohibits the general assembly from delegating a legislative power to the judiciary, and the judiciary in turn from thereafter delegating the judicial power to fix and determine a sentence to the executive department. Specht v. Tinsley, 153 Colo. 235, 385 P.2d 423 (1963).

On judicial duties on other departments. The legislative department is powerless to confer judicial duties upon the officials of other departments. City & County of Denver v. Lynch, 92 Colo. 102, 18 P.2d 907 (1932); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Indus. Comm'n, 650 P.2d 1297 (Colo. App. 1982).

Delegation to private person. Under no circumstances is the general assembly empowered to delegate to a private person for private benefit the power to fix minimum resale prices binding upon parties with no direct contractural relationship; in some cases where the public health, safety, and welfare demands, it might lawfully delegate such power to a public administrative body, provided proper standards to guide and control the actions of such agency are provided in the law. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Francis, 134 Colo. 160, 301 P.2d 139 (1956).

General assembly cannot delegate to any administrative agency "carte blanche" authority to impose sanctions or penalties for violation of the substantive portion of a statute. Colo. Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Case, 151 Colo. 235, 380 P.2d 34 (1962).

Administrative regulation must be within scope and objects of statutory delegation. A regulation issued by an administrative body, in order to be valid, must be within the scope and objects of the statutory delegation of authority which underlies the regulation. Dixon v. Zick, 179 Colo. 278, 500 P.2d 130 (1972).

General assembly may delegate power to promulgate rules and regulations. While the general assembly may not delegate the power to make or define a law, it may delegate the power to promulgate rules and regulations to executive agencies so long as sufficient standards are set forth for the proper exercise of the agency's rule-making function. Colo. Auto & Truck Wreckers Ass'n v. Dept. of Rev., 618 P.2d 646 (Colo. 1980); Americans United for Separation of Church & State Fund, Inc. v. State, 648 P.2d 1072 (Colo. 1982).

Legislative delegation of rulemaking and regulatory authority to an administrative agency must provide both sufficient standards for rational and consistent rulemaking and adequate procedural safeguards for effective judicial review of administrative action. Orsinger Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. Dept. of Hwys., 752 P.2d 55 (Colo. 1988); Partridge v. State, 895 P.2d 1183 (Colo. App. 1995).

The proper focus to determine the validity of delegation of legislative authority should be upon the totality of protection provided by standards and procedural safeguards at both the statutory and administrative levels. Douglas County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 829 P.2d 1303 (Colo. 1992); Partridge v. State, 895 P.2d 1183 (Colo. App. 1995).

Delegation of legislative authority to the department of excise and licenses to adopt rules and conduct hearings on applications to renew liquor licenses is not unconstitutional on the basis that the statute fails to provide sufficient standards for defining "good cause". Squire Restaurant & Lounge v. Denver, 890 P.2d 164 (Colo. App. 1994).

Power to confer upon persons named in general law for incorporation of cities and towns authority to do certain acts therein specified, not being prohibited by the constitution, is not unconstitutional by reason of the delegation of such authority. People ex rel. Rhodes v. Fleming, 10 Colo. 553, 16 P. 298 (1887).

Delegation to municipal corporation constitutional. A delegation by the state of legislative powers to municipal corporations where it finds such to be necessary and appropriate, violates neither the constitution nor any substantive principle of law. Davis v. City & County of Denver, 140 Colo. 30, 342 P.2d 674 (1959).

Cooperation of governmental bodies in joint undertaking does not constitute improper delegation of power. Karsh v. City & County of Denver, 176 Colo. 406, 490 P.2d 936 (1971).

Delegation to commission constitutional. By authorizing a commission to establish the priority of claims for the appropriation of designated ground water, the ground water management act does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers nor constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial powers under this article and § 1 of art. VI, Colo. Const. In re Water Rights, 181 Colo. 395, 510 P.2d 323 (1973).

Permissible delegation of power to appropriate water for environmental purposes. The statutory language in §§ 37-92-102 and 37-92-103 (4) empowering the Colorado water board to appropriate such waters of natural streams and lakes as may be required to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree is not unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, not an impermissible delegation of authority. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 197 Colo. 469, 594 P.2d 570 (1979).

The transfers of funds between executive departments at issue in the case impermissibly infringed on the legislature's plenary power of appropriation. Colo. Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 700 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1985).

Funds received from private corporation were essentially custodial, in that they were required to be used for a purpose approved ultimately by non-state authorities and to be administered in a trusteeship capacity, and were not subject to the legislative appropriation power. Colo. Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 700 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1985).

Federal block grants are subject to appropriation when matching state funds are required, and transfers between block grants are authorized. Colo. Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 738 P.2d 1156 (Colo. 1987).

In evaluating whether certain moneys fall under the powers of the legislative or executive branch, the primary question is whether those moneys constitute general state funds or custodial funds. The general assembly's plenary power over appropriations applies only to state moneys, while the governor retains control over those funds deemed custodial in nature. In re Interrogatories on House Bill 04-1098, 88 P.3d 1196 (Colo. 2004).

Determination of whether certain moneys constitute custodial funds involves consideration of all of the circumstances surrounding the funds, including the source of the funds, the degree of flexibility afforded to the state as to the process by which the funds should be allocated, and the degree of flexibility afforded to the state as to the funds' ultimate purposes. In re Interrogatories on House Bill 04-1098, 88 P.3d 1196 (Colo. 2004).

General assembly could constitutionally exclude funds that cannot fairly be described as custodial from the definition of "custodial moneys". In re Interrogatories on House Bill 04-1098, 88 P.3d 1196 (Colo. 2004).

Section 42-6-134 is not invalid as an improper delegation of legislative authority to the department of revenue. Colo. Auto & Truck Wreckers Ass'n v. Dept. of Rev., 618 P.2d 646 (Colo. 1980).

Legislative act based on public policy not usurpation of court's prerogatives. If a legislative act is based on public policy rather than an attempt to regulate the day-to-day procedural operation of the court, it is not a usurpation of the court's prerogatives. People v. McKenna, 199 Colo. 452, 611 P.2d 574 (1980).

Submission of disputes to binding arbitration is valid. An existing collective bargaining agreement between a city and its employees which requires the submission of disputes to binding arbitration is valid as it does not involve the prohibited delegation of legislative authority. Denver Fire Fighters v. City of Denver, 629 P.2d 1086 (Colo. App. 1980), aff'd, 663 P.2d 1032 (Colo. 1983).

Considering both language of article XXIX (amendment 41) and voters' intent in initiating it, article XXIX is self-executing in that it does not require any further action by the legislature to be effective. A constitutional provision is self-executing when the provision appears to take immediate effect and no further action by the legislature is required to implement the right given. Here, article XXIX can take effect without any further action by the legislature. Its provisions do not merely lay out bare principles without any means of implementation; rather, the article has a built-in mechanism for operation. It provides for the creation of the independent ethics commission (commission) that, once in existence, will be independent of the general assembly and will promulgate necessary rules to implement and enforce gift bans and other ethical standards. There is no indication that voters intended to require further legislative action with respect to article XXIX. To the contrary, voters used initiative process to avoid possibility that general assembly would prevent them from establishing commission that would enforce gift bans against general assembly's members as well as other government employees. Developmental Pathways v. Ritter, 178 P.3d 524 (Colo. 2008).

III. EXECUTIVE POWERS.

Executive must function independently. It is a corollary to the proposition that the judiciary must be independent from the other branches of government that the executive must also function independently within its sphere of operation. Lawson v. Pueblo County, 36 Colo. App. 370, 540 P.2d 1136 (1975).

Duty of executive department is to carry laws into effect. Colo. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. District Court, 138 Colo. 227, 331 P.2d 502 (1958).

The enforcement of statutes and administration thereunder are executive, not legislative, functions. MacManus v. Love, 179 Colo. 218, 499 P.2d 609 (1972).

The authority to promulgate rules for an executive agency resides in departments of government other than the judiciary. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258 (Colo. 1985).

And to administer appropriated funds. In order to fulfill his duty to faithfully execute the laws, the executive has the authority to administer the funds appropriated by the general assembly for programs enacted by the general assembly, and must insure that the general assembly does not administer the appropriation once it has been made. Anderson v. Lamm, 195 Colo. 437, 579 P.2d 620 (1978).

Any inherent authority the executive may have to administer the budget may not normally be invoked to contradict major legislative budget determinations. Colo. Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 700 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1985).

But authority to regulate, by a proper board, does not include authority to legislate. Casey v. People, 139 Colo. 89, 336 P.2d 308 (1959).

Executive officers, boards or commissions may not be authorized by the legislature to promulgate rules and regulations of a strictly and exclusively legislative character. Casey v. People, 139 Colo. 89, 336 P.2d 308 (1959).

Power of governor over legislation by exercise of veto is legislative power. It can only be exercised when clearly authorized by a specific provision of the constitution, not only because this article so requires, but because, being a power in derogation of the general plan of the state government, the language conferring it must be strictly construed. Strong v. People ex rel. Curran, 74 Colo. 283, 220 P. 999 (1923).

The veto power is a limited legislative capability in the executive branch and is an exception to the separation of powers otherwise required by this article. Colo. Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371 (Colo. 1985).

But veto not necessary to invalidate unconstitutional provision. Any footnote violating either this article or § 32 of art. V, Colo. Const., in the 1971 senate appropriation bill no. 436 was void and unenforceable and the governor's act in vetoing was an appropriate act calling attention to the invalid footnote, but such veto was not necessary to invalidate any such footnote. MacManus v. Love, C.A. no. C-24520 (D.C. Denver, Colo., filed Nov. 24, 1971).

Governor could not veto long bill headnotes because the headnotes were not items subject to the governor's line-item veto power. Headnotes defining full-time equivalent; health, life, and dental; personal services; short-term disability; lease purchase; leased space; legal services; operating expenses; vehicle lease payments; multiuse network payments; utilities; capital outlay; and purchase of services from computer center are void, however, because they violate the separation of powers by intruding on the authority of the executive branch to administer the laws. Colo. Gen. Assembly v. Owens, 136 P.3d 262 (Colo. 2006).

Court cannot command governor to perform discretionary act. Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the supreme court cannot and will not command the governor to do any act which lies within his discretionary power. In re Legislative Reapportionment, 150 Colo. 380, 374 P.2d 66 (1962).

Authority of governor to call general assembly into special session is his discretionary prerogative. In re Legislative Reapportionment, 150 Colo. 380, 374 P.2d 66 (1962).

Governor's call for special session is one exception referred to in article. Section 9 of art. IV, Colo. Const., allowing for the governor's call for a special session, is one of the exceptions referred to in this article. People v. McKenna, 199 Colo. 452, 611 P.2d 574 (1980).

Transfer of prisoners proper administrative function. The transfer of convicts from one place of imprisonment to another is not such a judicial act that it cannot be performed by a governor under authority of statute. Tinsley v. Crespin, 137 Colo. 302, 324 P.2d 1033 (1958).

The authority of the governor to transfer inmates of public institutions is properly delegated to him as an administrative duty. Tinsley v. Crespin, 137 Colo. 302, 324 P.2d 1033 (1958).

Executive agency's only avenue for changing judicial rulings with which it is displeased is to obtain appropriate legislative relief. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Indus. Comm'n, 650 P.2d 1297 (Colo. App. 1982).

Consecutive life sentences not unconstitutional. The exercise of the trial court's discretion that the defendant should serve several of his life sentences consecutively is not an unconstitutional interference with the duties of the parole board. People v. Montgomery, 669 P.2d 1387 (Colo. 1983).

Colorado state board of parole is an arm of executive branch of government. In re Question Concerning State Judicial Review, 199 Colo. 463, 610 P.2d 1340 (1980).

Decision of board of parole to grant or deny parole is clearly discretionary since parole is a privilege, and no prisoner is entitled to it as a matter of right. In re Question Concerning State Judicial Review, 199 Colo. 463, 610 P.2d 1340 (1980).

Only when state parole board fails to exercise duties can courts review. It is only when the Colorado state board of parole has failed to exercise its statutory duties that the courts of Colorado have the power to review the board's actions. In re Question Concerning State Judicial Review, 199 Colo. 463, 610 P.2d 1340 (1980).

But § 18-1-410 (1)(f) invades governor's exclusive power to grant commutation after conviction as provided in § 7 of art. IV, Colo. Const., and therefore violates the doctrine of separation of powers embodied in this article. People v. Herrera, 183 Colo. 155, 516 P.2d 626 (1973).

Although Crim. P. 35(a), not violative of executive's power of commutation. As Crim. P. Rule 35(a) which suspends the finality of the conviction for a period of 120 days from the time sentence is imposed, or for 120 days after final disposition on appeal, to allow the filing of a motion for reduction of sentence in the trial court, suspends the concept of finality of a criminal judgment of conviction, the rule does not offend the separation of powers doctrine under this article, nor the executive power of commutation. The court retains jurisdiction during the 120-day period for filing of a motion for reduction of sentence. People v. Smith, 189 Colo. 50, 536 P.2d 820 (1975).

Interference by a court with the authority of the prosecution to dismiss charges once filed may occur only in limited circumstances: (1) When exercising its supervisory authority to dismiss on constitutional grounds (e.g., infringement of defendant's due process rights); (2) when exercising its supervisory authority to protect the integrity of the judicial process (e.g., prosecutorial misconduct that interferes with grand jury's independent function); (3) upon determination that the evidence is insufficient to support prosecution; or (4) when authorized by statute that is consistent with constitutional separation of powers. People v. Renander, 151 P.3d 657 (Colo. App. 2006).

Trial court impermissibly encroached upon the authority vested in the executive branch and violated the separation of powers where court ordered prosecution to reassemble charges filed against defendant, resulting in the dismissal of 11 of the charges. People v. Renander, 151 P.3d 657 (Colo. App. 2006).

IV. JUDICIAL POWERS.

Judicial power of state is vested in courts; the legislative and executive departments are expressly forbidden the right to exercise it. Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 P. 575 (1931).

Judicial powers can only be exercised by those entrusted therewith. The exercise of judicial power comprehends more than the use of perceptive and reflective faculties by which legal conclusions are deduced from the facts. The plenary exercise of power utilizes other attributes. The deliberate assumption of responsibility; the authoritative expression of legal conclusions in declaring the sentence of the law; the pronouncing of judgment in open court in the presence of those affected thereby, so as to bind and control persons and property; the protection, and sometimes loss, of life and liberty, as well as the character and fortunes of individuals; the establishing of precedents affecting cherished rights of persons and property -- all are involved in the exercise of judicial power, and illustrate its importance. Such powers cannot be lawfully exercised, except by those entrusted therewith by the people under the constitution. De Votie v. McGerr, 14 Colo. 577, 23 P. 980 (1890).

Judiciary is but one of three branches of government independent of other two. People v. Martinez, 185 Colo. 187, 523 P.2d 120, aff'd, 185 Colo. 187, 526 P.2d 1325 (1974).

Although dependent upon other branches for necessary expenses. The courts have the inherent power to carry on their functions so that they may operate independently and not become dependent upon or a supplicant of either of the other departments of government, and may incur necessary and reasonable expenses in the performance of their judicial duties and it is the plain ministerial duty of those who control the purse to pay such expenses except only where the amounts are so unreasonable as to affirmatively indicate arbitrary and capricious acts. Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo. 35, 384 P.2d 738 (1963); Pena v. District Court, 681 P.2d 953 (Colo. 1984).

Courts do not unnecessarily interdict actions of another branch of government. Gates Rubber Co. v. South Sub. Metro. Recreation & Park Dist., 183 Colo. 222, 516 P.2d 436 (1973).

As judiciary can no more exercise power constitutionally conferred upon general assembly than can the executive. People v. Herrera, 183 Colo. 155, 516 P.2d 626 (1973).

Court may not order general assembly to adopt, or not adopt any legislation since it would violate separation of powers doctrine. Lucchesi v. State, 807 P.2d 1185 (Colo. App. 1990).

It is improper for judiciary to tell governor how to delegate authority in extradition matters. It is no less improper for the judiciary to tell the governor, once he has delegated his authority, how the delegated authority should be exercised. Steinman v. Caldwell, 628 P.2d 110 (Colo. 1981).

Once governor has granted extradition, court considering release can only decide: (1) Whether the extradition documents on their face are in order; (2) whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state; (3) whether the petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition; and (4) whether the petitioner is a fugitive. Steinman v. Caldwell, 628 P.2d 110 (Colo. 1981).

Judiciary is charged with administration of justice and must be free to perform its functions without restriction or impairment by the acts or conduct of another department. Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo. 35, 384 P.2d 738 (1963).

And courts must be independent, unfettered, and free from directives, influence, or interference from any extraneous source in their responsibilities and duties. Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo. 35, 384 P.2d 738 (1963).

Impartial role. The role of the judiciary, if its integrity is to be maintained, is one of impartiality. People v. Martinez, 185 Colo. 187, 523 P.2d 120, aff'd, 186 Colo. 225, 526 P.2d 1325 (1974).

Assumption of nonjudicial power under pretense of case prohibited. Courts cannot, under the pretense of an actual case, assume powers vested in either the executive or the legislative branches of government. McCroskey v. Gustafson, 638 P.2d 51 (Colo. 1981); Conrad v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662 (Colo. 1982).

Supreme court can give its opinion upon important questions when requested to do so. The same instrument which divides the powers of government into distinct departments has been so amended by the voice of the people as to require the supreme court to give its opinion upon important questions, upon solemn occasions, when required by the governor, the senate or the house of representatives. In re Speakership of House of Representatives, 15 Colo. 520, 25 P. 707 (1890); People ex rel. Elder v. Sours, 31 Colo. 369, 74 P. 167 (1903).

Reapportionment authority constitutionally delegated to supreme court. Amendment no. 9, a proposed constitutional amendment relating to reapportionment on the ballot at the general election held on November 5, 1975, which amendment provides for a commission to promulgate a plan of reapportionment which the supreme court either approves or, in effect, orders modified as required by the court, did not violate the doctrine of separation of powers, since this article provides that no powers belonging to one governmental department shall be exercised by either of the others "except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted", and amendment no. 9 expressly directs and permits this action by the supreme court. In re Interrogatories Propounded by Senate Concerning House Bill 1078, 189 Colo. 1, 536 P.2d 308 (1975).

Supreme court has duty to uphold legislation unless there is no room for doubt as to its violation of constitutional provisions. Mosko v. Dunbar, 135 Colo. 172, 309 P.2d 581 (1957).

As courts may not substitute judgment for that of legislative body. It is not the court's function to approve or disapprove of the wisdom or the lack of wisdom of legislative decisions or desirability of legislative acts. Nor can it substitute judgment for that of the legislative body charged with the duty and responsibility of zoning. Frankel v. City & County of Denver, 147 Colo. 373, 363 P.2d 1063 (1961).

Courts do not substitute their judgment for that of the general assembly. People v. Summit, 183 Colo. 421, 517 P.2d 850 (1974).

When the general assembly defines a crime and sets forth the intent necessary to commit the crime, the courts cannot alter the elements or substitute a different animus or intent. People v. Kanan, 186 Colo. 255, 526 P.2d 1339 (1974).

Any judicial review of decisions by other branches of government is limited to that which is provided by the constitution or laws of this state. In re Question Concerning State Judicial Review, 199 Colo. 463, 610 P.2d 1340 (1980).

The judiciary's avoidance of deciding political questions finds its roots in the Colorado Constitution's provisions separating the powers of state government, and recognizes that certain issues are best left for resolution by the other branches of government, or to be fought out on the hustings and determined by the people at the polls. People ex rel. Tate v. Prevost, 134 P. 129 (Colo. 1913); Colo. Common Cause v. Bledsoe, 810 P.2d 201 (Colo. 1991).

And courts possess no power to nullify by judicial repeal what has been regularly enacted by legislative branch of the government. Indus. Comm'n v. Lindvay, 94 Colo. 531, 31 P.2d 495 (1934).

Determination of constitutionality of statute only when claim timely. A claim that a statute under which an administrative board or department of the executive is proceeding is unconstitutional does not clothe the judiciary with power to interfere with or control such board in advance of its taking final action; such claim may be made only after the board has performed its function. Colo. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. District Court, 138 Colo. 227, 331 P.2d 502 (1958).

The issue of whether the Colorado Constitution's speech-or-debate clause grants legislators absolute immunity from lawsuits was one traditionally within the role of the judiciary to resolve for it is peculiarly the province of the judiciary to interpret the constitution and say what the law is. Colo. Common Cause v. Bledsoe, 810 P.2d 201 (Colo. 1991).

Courts have no jurisdiction to interfere with officers of state whose duties are imposed by statute. Colo. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. District Court, 138 Colo. 227, 331 P.2d 502 (1958).

In deference to the tripartite structure of government, courts recognize that a trial court may not interfere with the officers of the executive branch of government whose duties are imposed by statute. Colo. College v. Heckers, 33 Colo. App. 219, 517 P.2d 419 (1973).

The supreme court cannot enjoin upon officers of the state duties that they do not have under the constitution or prohibit them from exercising duties imposed upon them by the constitution. In re Legislative Reapportionment, 150 Colo. 380, 374 P.2d 66 (1962).

As judicial department cannot interfere with executive department, except where constitutionally permissible. People ex rel. Dunbar v. District Court, 180 Colo. 107, 502 P.2d 420 (1972).

The authority to promulgate rules for an executive agency resides in departments of government other than the judiciary. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258 (Colo. 1985).

Courts do not have jurisdiction to interfere with the executive branch of the government in the performance of its statutory duties. Kort v. Hufnagel, 729 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1986).

A juvenile court, once having committed an individual to the custody of the department of institutions pursuant to statute, may not impose its own conditions on the department's treatment of that individual. McDonnell v. Juvenile Court, 864 P.2d 565 (Colo. 1993).

Prohibition in district court usurps executive authority. The sole object of the writ of prohibition in the district court is to obtain an injunction to restrain a state board from performing its duties. If this should be permitted in a direct proceeding, the result would be to directly subject executive officials to the jurisdiction of the courts when acting within their province, and strip them of their constitutional powers. This is an authority which the judicial department cannot exercise in this manner, for the obvious reason that to concede it would be an assumption that the judicial was of superior authority to the executive department. Colo. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. District Court, 138 Colo. 227, 331 P.2d 502 (1958); People ex rel. Orcutt v. District Court, 167 Colo. 162, 445 P.2d 887 (1968).

Court was without jurisdiction to assess court costs against executive branch of the state, or its officers. State ex rel. Fort Logan Mental Health Center v. Harwood, 34 Colo. App. 213, 524 P.2d 614 (1974).

De novo review of nonjudicial function violates article. If the function performed by an agency is administrative or legislative, and if a court is required to do all over again what the agency has done, the system of review violates this article and the separation of powers doctrine. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Northwest Water Corp., 168 Colo. 154, 451 P.2d 266 (1969).

And supreme court has exclusive power to define and regulate practice of law and to determine the qualifications for admission of persons to practice law, as well as the correlative right to discipline those licensed to practice law. Denver Bar Ass'n v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 154 Colo. 273, 391 P.2d 467 (1964); People v. Buckles, 167 Colo. 64, 453 P.2d 404 (1968).

There is no authority in these respects in legislative or executive departments. Legislation in any of these areas does not add to or detract from the exclusive authority of the supreme court. Denver Bar Ass'n v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 154 Colo. 273, 391 P.2d 467 (1964).

Disqualifying felons from practice of law consistent with power. Section 18-1-105, disqualifying a convicted felon of holding an office of trust or practicing as an attorney, nowise interferes with the exclusive right of the supreme court to determine the rules and regulations which shall govern those seeking admission to the bar. Nor does the statute impinge in any real sense the judicial right to discipline those licensed to practice law. Rather, this is an effort by the general assembly, under its police power, to bar convicted felons from practicing law in the courts. The general assembly has the power to do so, and § 18-1-105 does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. People v. Buckles, 167 Colo. 64, 453 P.2d 404 (1968).

Courts may promulgate and enforce rules of procedure. The courts, charged with the duty of exercising the judicial power, must necessarily possess the means with which to effectually and expeditiously discharge that duty; this duty can be performed and discharged in no other manner than through rules of procedure, and consequently the supreme court is charged with the power and duty of formulating, promulgating, and enforcing such rules of procedure for the trial of actions as it deems necessary and proper for performing its constitutional function. Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 P.575 (1931).

Person denied parole can seek judicial review only as provided by C.R.C.P. 106 (a)(2). In re Question Concerning State Judicial Review, 199 Colo. 463, 610 P.2d 1340 (1980).

The supreme court may promulgate procedural rules. The general assembly is free to fashion substantive rules which reflect policy judgments that may affect procedures in the judicial system. The line that separates a substantive rule from a procedural rule is amorphous; no legal test has been uniformly adopted. J.T. v. O'Rourke ex rel. Tenth Judicial Dist., 651 P.2d 407 (Colo. 1982).

Section 16-5-402 is a substantive statute, is an appropriate subject for legislative action, and does not infringe on the rule making power of the judiciary or the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424 (Colo. 1993).

Supreme court's rule-making authority is described in § 21 of art. VI of this constitution. People v. McKenna, 199 Colo. 452, 611 P.2d 574 (1980).

Constitution grants to supreme court the power to promulgate rules governing court procedure, but the question remains whether a particular rule or statute is procedural or substantive. People v. McKenna, 199 Colo. 452, 611 P.2d 574 (1980).

A statute governing procedural matters in criminal cases which conflicts with a rule promulgated by the supreme court would be a legislative invasion of the court's rule-making powers. Conversely, in substantive matters, a statutory enactment of the legislative branch prevails over a conflicting supreme court rule. People v. Hollis, 670 P.2d 441 (Colo. App. 1983); People v. Prophet, 42 P.3d 61 (Colo. App. 2001).

The test for distinguishing procedural from substantive matters requires an examination of the purpose of the statute: If the purpose is to permit the court to function and function efficiently, the statute must yield to the rule; whereas, if the statute embodies a matter of public policy, the statute controls. People v. Hollis, 670 P.2d 441 (Colo. App. 1983); People v. Prophet, 42 P.3d 61 (Colo. App. 2001).

Section 18-3-408 does not violate the constitutional requirement of separation of powers by interfering with the rule-making power of the court established in § 21 of art. VI of this constitution. People v. Estorga, 200 Colo. 78, 612 P.2d 520 (1980).

Subsection 17-22.5-403 (9) does not violate separation of powers. The constitution does not provide that sentencing is within the sole province of the judiciary. The general assembly has the power to prescribe punishment and limit the court's sentencing authority. In this case, the general assembly, by enacting subsection (9), simply extended Colorado's parole supervision scheme to provide additional means for successfully reintegrating offenders into the community consistent with public safety. People v. Jackson, 109 P.3d 1017 (Colo. App. 2004).

Mandatory sentences for violent crimes do not violate separation of powers doctrine; the judiciary is not granted the absolute right to determine punishment in every case. People v. Childs, 199 Colo. 436, 610 P.2d 101 (1980).

And judiciary may not delegate power to sentence. This article prohibits the general assembly from delegating a legislative power to the judiciary, and the judiciary in turn from thereafter delegating the judicial power to fix and determine a sentence to the executive department. Specht v. Tinsley, 153 Colo. 235, 385 P.2d 423 (1963).

But must confine prisoners where general assembly determines. Designation of place of confinement of those found guilty of crime is a legislative rather than judicial function, and sentences must be pronounced in conformity with the legislative mandate. Tinsley v. Crespin, 137 Colo. 302, 324 P.2d 1033 (1958).

Juvenile courts cannot delegate power to detain to executive branch. The children's code gives the juvenile courts the power to detain 14- and 15-year old children in an adult detention facility, but the court cannot delegate its judicial power to the executive branch. C.C.C. v. District Court, 188 Colo. 437, 535 P.2d 1117 (1975).

Prosecutorial discretion not subject to judicial control. Whether the evidence of witnesses shall be tested by ordinary means of interrogation or by other means, such as requiring a potential witness to submit to a polygraph examination, is a matter of prosecutorial discretion and is not subject to judicial control or direction. People v. District Court, 632 P.2d 1022 (Colo. 1981).

Prosecutorial discretion flows from the doctrine of separation of powers and a prosecutor's charging decision may not be controlled or limited by judicial intervention. People v. Hughes, 946 P.2d 509 (Colo. App. 1997).

Whether constitutionally guaranteed property right can be denied for some justifiable reason is essentially judicial question, and under the doctrine of separation of powers of government it must remain a judicial question. People v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210, 363 P.2d 180 (1961).

Where the plaintiff alleged that mandatory arbitration violates the separation of powers doctrine, the court held that the Colorado mandatory arbitration act does not vest judicial authority in another branch of government and therefore does not violate the provisions of this article. Firelock Inc. v. District Court, 776 P.2d 1090 (Colo. 1989).

Section 22-33-108 (7) violates the constitutional requirement of separation of powers by abrogating the judiciary's power to incarcerate juveniles for contempt of court orders in compulsory school attendance cases. In Interest of J.E.S., 817 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1991).

Probation-like supervision of a defendant by adult diversion program in a district attorney's office was not a violation of separation of powers. Probation is not a necessary function of the judiciary, and there is no constitutional requirement that defendants on deferred judgment be supervised by the judicial branch. People v. Method, 900 P.2d 1282 (Colo. App. 1994).

Because preliminary injunction issued before independent ethics commission (commission) came into existence and before it had opportunity to act in furtherance of article XXIX (amendment 41), plaintiffs failed to present a ripe as-applied constitutional challenge. Relief plaintiffs seek is only available in a successful facial challenge, not in an as-applied challenge. In order for plaintiffs to obtain a declaration that article XXIX is unconstitutional as applied, there must be an actual application or at least a reasonable possibility of enforcement or threat of enforcement. As of the time of suit, the commission was not yet in existence, and it had not yet acted to enforce the gift bans. No enforcement or threat of enforcement of the gift bans had occurred. Therefore, concerns expressed by plaintiffs were merely speculative interpretations of what might occur once commission is operative. As such, district court did not have jurisdiction to grant preliminary injunction. Developmental Pathways v. Ritter, 178 P.3d 524 (Colo. 2008).

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