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The authors would like to acknowledge the comments and suggestions of Candace Greene, Seymour Mandelbaum, and Robert Warren.

Can Cable Keep Its Promise?

Though the promise of cable television may well be realized, the current enthusiasm will be tempered by the difficulties inherent in cabling big cities and the costs of providing services: New York is a case in point.

Few technologies have been the subject of as many hopes and expectations as cable television. If one were to believe its varied advocates, cable TV could carry almost every international sports and cultural event into the home, allow retail shopping from the living room, permit instantaneous referenda on public issues, and assure emergency monitoring of fire and burglar alarms. What more could anyone ask for? With all those dazzling services, cable TV should be the financial hit of the century. And, by all accounts, investment firms believe it is.

New York City was once a pioneer in cable television. In 1970, the City of New York awarded highly sophisticated franchises to two cable operators, Sterling Information Services (now Manhattan Cable Television) and Teleprompter, to wire the borough of Manhattan. Now, more than ten years later, the city is in the process of granting cable franchises for the other four boroughs. Many groups are actively pressing for their piece of the action; jobs for minorities and women, reserved channels for local groups and educational institutions, and video production facilities for community-based programming. Naturally, cable operators competing for franchises are promising virtually all these services and more; in many cases, whatever it takes to get the franchise with little regard for the cost of fulfilling such promises.

It is just possible that the wishful thinking about cable television will come true. But, if experience is any guide, the current enthusiasm about cable TV will be severely tempered by the difficulties inherent in cabling big cities and the cost of providing the wide range of services that are envisioned.

The Early Years

Despite the recent enthusiasm, cable television is not new. Unlike most technological innovations, this one started in small towns during the 1940s where natural features such as mountains interfered with the reception of over-the-air broadcast signals. Originally called "community antenna television systems" (CATV), cable systems deliver programs by using a specialized receiving antenna to pick television signals out of the air. The antenna sends the signal to a central distributing facility where the signal is filtered, amplified, and then transmitted through the coaxial cable to the television sets of subscribers.

Some of the same reception problems occur in cities where tall buildings interfere with color television signals. In many cities, however, cable wires are installed in underground ducts rather than across utility poles thus incurring considerably higher construction costs than those faced in outlying areas.

In addition to providing better reception, the appeal of cable television lies in the following features: 1. the large carrying capacity of the coaxial cable (up to 58 channels on a single cable); 2. the capability to discriminately deliver programming to subscribers and thus charge on a per-channel or per-program basis; 3. the potential for two-way services; and 4. the possibility of providing low-cost access to the television medium. Given this rich potential, it is not surprising that many saw cable as a solution to a variety of problems ranging from education for the homebound to continuous monitoring of residential energy systems.

During the sixties and early seventies, consulting firms and task forces predicted the rapid growth of cable and described the social benefits it would bring forth. Several theorists argued that cable could be used to restructure public services and enhance citizen access to information while others felt that the substantial growth of private, home-based cable services was needed before any of cable's public benefits could be realized. The Sloan Commission on Cable Communications estimated that "By the end of the decade (1980), or perhaps shortly thereafter, cable penetration will be in the general range of 40 to 60 percent, and that in metropolitan areas penetration is likely to be substantially higher." The Ford Foundation established the Cable Television Information Center to assist cities in the franchising process and the National Science Foundation funded several large-scale experiments to evaluate public uses of two-way cable.

Until the mid-1960s, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) considered cable to be outside its jurisdiction. To start a system, a cable operator merely needed to obtain a franchise from the local government, build the physical plant, and solicit subscribers. Revenue was obtained from subscribers who paid initial installation fees and a monthly service charge. In 1966, the FCC assumed jurisdiction over cable TV in response to pressure from broadcasters who saw cable as a threat to their major urban markets. During the next decade, the FCC imposed severe restrictions on the types of programs that cable operators were permitted to transmit. In 1972, the FCC proposed a broad set of requirements for cable systems which had the effect of substantially limiting cable growth.(1) The 1972 rules (many of which were subsequently modified) required local origination programming, dedicated channels for governmental and educational institutions, and two-way capability in cable systems, and set limits on municipal franchise fees.

Prospects for Cable

There are approximately 18 million cable-subscribing homes in the United States today representing about 22 percent of all television households. Until recently, cable systems have been of modest size and technical capability. By 1979, only twelve of the more than 4,000 cable systems in the country had 50,000 or more subscribers. More than 70 percent of those systems had from six to twelve channels; 12 percent had twelve to twenty channels, and only 14 percent carried twenty channels or more.

This situation is about to change significantly. Cities across the country are in the process of granting franchises for the construction of cable systems. Almost all of these systems will have 35 channels or more plus the capability for two-way digital services. In some cities, cable operators are planning to build systems with multiple trunks providing over 100 channels plus two-way video capability. By the end of the decade, approximately 30 percent of all television households are expected to have cable.

The projected growth of cable in urban areas is largely due to recent technological developments such as the use of communications satellites for the transmission of television signals and the deregulation of cable as the result of judicial decisions and policies adopted by the Federal Communications Commission in the late 1970s. The relaxation of federal rules governing cable and the advent of low-cost satellite receiving equipment has led to the emergence of profitable new cable networks and super stations. Today, cable is being marketed as a means to receive more varied programming than is available through traditional broadcast networks, and consumers are showing a remarkable willingness to pay for the additional programming.

Cable in the Marketplace

In contrast to the early seventies, when the driving force behind cable was the belief that it was a technological shortcut to solve urban problems, the basis for cable's growth in the eighties is the capacity of pay TV to cater to the increasing segmentation of American tastes and preferences. Pay cable was first started in 1972 by Home Box Office (HBO), a small firm that got cable operators to show movies on a special cable channel. Home Box Office was subsequently acquired by Time Inc.

After the RCA communications satellite was launched in 1975, it became economically feasible to transmit cable programming by satellite. HBO began distributing its programs by satellite and the FCC subsequently approved the use of low-cost antennas for satellite reception. Soon, competing pay TV programs as well as other non-pay programs (such as religious services and sports events) were being distributed by satellite.

In just five years, from 197510 1980, the number of pay TV subscribers nationwide grew from 265,000 to over 7 million.(2) Cable operators typically split the subscriber revenues with the pay TV programmer. Today, HBO has about 70 percent of the pay cable market, followed by Showtime and The Movie Channel. Each of these pay systems is owned, at least in part, by one of the major cable multi-system operators (MSO). Time Inc., the owner of HBO, also owns American TV and Communications (ATC), the second largest MSO; Showtime is jointly owned by Viacom and Teleprompter, the nation's largest MSO, and The Movie Channel is run by Warner-Amex Cable Communications, the nation's fourth largest MSO.(3) In 1979, more than a third of all cable systems carried pay programming and 40 percent of all subscribers to whom pay TV was available subscribed to it. Today, cable operators are selling packages of cable services as "tiers" which include both pay and non-pay channels at a set fee per tier. Numerous pay TV programming companies have been created, including offshoots of ABC and CBS as well as such entities as the Rockefeller-sponsored RCTV, which has recently purchased exclusive rights to all BBC productions.

The remarkable aspect of pay cable is the fact that it is generating a powerful set of alternatives to the major broadcast networks simply as the result of private sector initiatives without any deliberate public policymaking. As a recent federally-funded report notes, "This expansion of U.S. television, so earnestly sought for so long by many parties concerned with monopoly control of over-the-air TV, and so often urged as the proper destiny of cable, came without extensive government or civic intervention when technology and demonstrated consumer demand provided an economic underpinning."(4) Public Uses

Pay TV's success has far overshadowed the development of community and public uses of cable systems. With the notable exception of the Cable News Network and C-SPAN, the cable-industry-sponsored system for televising congressional sessions, cable's potential as a means to strengthen citizen involvement in public affairs has yet to be fulfilled. Although many cable operators do televise such local events as high school sports, campaign debates, and town meetings, the cable systems with extensive schedules of locally-oriented programs tend to be the exception, not the rule.

Apart from building local support and good will, cable companies have little reason to invest in such community programming since it can't match sports or movies as a revenue producing source. Admittedly, there are a handful of systems such as ATC'S Berks Suburban Cable TV in Reading, Pennsylvania, and Warner-Amex's QUBE in Columbus, Ohio, where cable companies actively foster community-oriented programming. But in most cases, the success of local programming is due to the energy, skill, and resourcefulness of civic groups working with limited funds and technical equipment. Of more importance, perhaps, is the fact that few local governments have taken the initiative to develop uses of cable that can complement their existing methods of service delivery and communication with citizens. Municipal officials have traditionally regarded cable television as a source of revenue or as a way to provide more varied entertainment on television. Most have little understanding of how telecommunications can be used by public agencies and citizens. Moreover, urban bureaucracies, faced with day-to-day brush fires and budgetary cut-backs, are unlikely to invest resources in a technology which seems far-removed from the rigors of administrative life. And cable operators, unlike their more sophisticated counterparts in the telephone company or computer industry, do not aggressively promote the application of cable to public services.

The New York City Experience

New York's experience with cable television reflects the cyclical pattern of cable activity in the nation as a whole. The first local use of cable began in 1961 when Sterling Information Services was authorized by the Board of Estimate to lease underground duct space in Manhattan from the Empire City Subway Company, a subsidiary of New York Telephone. The city gave Sterling permission to provide specialized local public service and commercial programs in the area from 23rd to 86th streets. Sterling established a closed circuit cable service called Teleguide, which carried information about local events as well as UPI news and stock reports to about 40 hotels in that designated area.

Under New York City's governmental structure, cable television fell under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Franchises, an independent office reporting directly to the Board of Estimate, which has authority over commercial uses of public streets, such as bus shelters and private bus lines. In 1965, the Board of Estimate authorized Sterling Information Services and Teleprompter to wire Manhattan and Bronx-CATV Enterprises to wire the Riverdale section of the Bronx. The Bureau of Franchises had previously recommended that Sterling alone be given the franchise for Manhattan, but heavy lobbying by Teleprompter resulted in the carving up of Manhattan into two franchise areas. Sterling got all of Manhattan from the Battery to 79th Street on the West Side and 86th Street on the East Side. Teleprompter was given the area north of those boundaries. The cable systems were to provide clear television signals, and the franchises, which were initially for a two-year period, were subsequently renewed for another two years.

Realizing the potential importance of cable television, the Lindsay administration established an Advisory Task Force on CATV in 1967 headed by Fred Friendly, former president of CBS News and then communications advisor to the Ford Foundation. The Friendly Report, issued in September 1968, recommended that New York be wired for cable, that it could be achieved within two or three years, that the city be divided into from nine to twelve service areas with only one cable system in each service area, and that cable systems reflect state-of-the-art technology (a vague term which is often subject to competing interpretations).

The report also called for the creation of a new Office of Telecommunications reporting directly to the mayor and Board of Estimate. Morris Tarshis, the director of the Bureau of Franchises, served on the task force and prepared a separate statement outlining his views on cable policymaking and suggesting that the proposed Office of Telecommunications be part of the Bureau of Franchises. Two years after the Friendly Report came out, the Board of Estimate granted identical twenty-year franchises to Teleprompter and Sterling Information Services. Those contracts, which were negotiated by Tarshis and then Assistant Corporation Counsel Sheila Mahony, were considered to be the most advanced cable franchises in the nation.

The contracts set forth specific conditions as to the number of channels to be provided and the allocation of channels for use by the cable operator, local citizens, and city government. A free cable outlet was to be installed on each floor of city prisons, reformatories, day care centers, hospitals, police and fire stations, detention centers, and public schools. The city was to receive 5 percent of all subscriber fees and 10 percent of all other receipts. The two systems were to be interconnected on all cable channels specified by the city.

Other provisions included the division of each system into ten subdistricts within four years for the purposes of local programming and the wiring of a production facility designated by the city in each franchise area. Editorial control over the programming on the public access channels was also prohibited. Sterling and Teleprompter were also obligated to match any new city agreements negotiated with other systems with regard to subscriber rates, channel capacity, two-way trans) mission, and city discounts. In the event of noncompliance with any of the major franchise requirements, the city retained the right of cancellation.

Communities across the country and the Federal Communications Commission regarded the New York City franchises as a prototype for future cable regulation. The city's franchises were "grandfathered" under the FCC rules and avoided some of the restrictive policies subsequently proposed by the FCC. In 1971, following Tarshis' recommendation, the Board of Estimate decided to create an Office of Telecommunications within the Bureau of Franchises. Herbert Dordick, a California based-engineer with broad experience in telecommunications, was brought in to head the new office in 1972.

The responsibilities assigned to the Office of Telecommunications included enforcement and regulation of the cable franchises, planning for future cable systems, and development of municipal uses of cable. Handicapped by limited autonomy, Dordick left at the end of 1973 and the job was taken by Leonard Cohen, an engineer who had served under Dordick. The city's elected officials maintained their involvement with cable through an Advisory Committee to the Office of Telecommunications which consisted of eight appointees representing each member of the Board of Estimate. The committee, working without a budget or staff, met on a monthly basis to discuss regulatory and policy issues.

An additional element in the regulatory apparatus was added in 1972 when the State Commission on Cable Television was established. The growing state and federal presence was a response to the new awareness of cable television and the emerging prospects for a "wired nation." The state commission formulated procedures for franchising and requirements for cable construction and programming as well as imposing fees on cable operators.

Cable in Manhattan

Building the Manhattan cable systems turned out to be far more difficult than anyone had foreseen. The Empire City Subway Company objected to leasing additional duct space for cable, claiming that they had to reserve space for maintenance; landlords refused access to cable companies, until state legislation was passed to override them; numerous technical and bureaucratic obstacles further delayed construction. For example, the Building Department had to grant permission for the cable companies to open up streets to lay cable. Despite these impediments, the system expanded its programming and number of subscribers. In 1971, Sterling began cablecasting the home games of the New York Knickerbockers and New York Rangers, and public access programming started on two cable channels.

In 1973, Time Inc. bought Sterling and changed its name to Manhattan Cable Television, Inc., (MCTV). Because of high construction costs and limited subscriber growth both systems operated at a deficit and rate increases were granted in 1974 and 1975 to $9 and then $10 per month. For a short period. Time Inc. tried to sell MCTV but after failing to do so, began to invest substantial resources and installed new management to improve the cable company's operations. Teleprompter, once a leader in the cable industry, developed management problems once its founder, lrving Kahn, left the company. Partially owned by Hughes Aircraft, Teleprompter suffered from corporate neglect for many years and has recently been acquired by Westinghouse Electric Corporation.

Although the original franchises had prohibited pay movies from being shown on cable, they were amended in 1975 so that both systems could carry Home Box Office. In addition, a leased public access channel was opened on MCTV at a rate of S25 per half hour of programming in 1976. Advertising could be sold for programs on this channel at whatever the market would bear. Programs on the two public access channels were and continue to be extremely variable in terms of quality and content. Access programs deal with almost any conceivable subject ranging from video art to neighborhood problems to exotic call-in programs and consumer information on such esoteric topics as the price, quality, and availability of marijuana. Often, it seems that every self-indulgent eccentric in New York is on late night cable. The access programs which receive the most prominence are pornographic: "Midnight Blue," produced by the editors of Screw Magazine and "The Ugly George Show." These programs, which are supported by advertising, have now moved to the leased channel. If cable were to provide an alternative to the conventional broadcast networks, it has certainly done so - at least in the areas of social commentary and pornography.

Surprisingly, the growth of access has occurred in the face of numerous technological and organizational obstacles. For many years there was no program guide listing the schedule of cable programs and word of mouth was the primary way of learning what was on cable. Only Teleprompter had a local production studio as required by the franchise but it was located somewhat inaccessibly in upper Manhattan. Many of the live access programs on MCTV were produced in a private production facility which charged nominal rates but had poor technical facilities.

The cable companies themselves have developed new services. MCTV leases channel space to several banks for data transmission, and a closed circuit security system has been installed on Roosevelt Island. Teleprompter offers a guard channel in those apartment buildings where all of the tenants subscribe to cable, which allows would-be visitors to be seen over television. Until very recently, when the Department of General Services issued a report on institutional uses of cable, the city government has done little to foster municipal uses of cable. The Office of Telecommunications operates on a modest S60,000 annual budget and focuses almost entirely on regulatory issues and subscriber complaints rather than planning or policymaking issues. Programming on the channel designated for city use was initiated in 1977 with funding from MCTV. Since then, a non-profit corporation. Channel L Working Group, Inc., has been created by local citizens to develop community programs and has been supported by MCTV and Teleprompter on a voluntary basis. The Channel L Working Group provides technical assistance for programs featuring government agencies, elected officials, community boards, and non-profit organizations. According to a 1979 survey, 6 percent of cable subscribers regularly watched Channel L (when it only carried three and one-half hours of live programming per week). Channel L currently programs 32 hours of live and taped programming per week.

Until 1979, both cable systems operated at a deficit, and some of the public provisions of the original franchises have yet to be implemented such as subdistricting and a local production studio in the MCTV area. Portions of Manhattan are still not wired, in part because landlords can block passage of cable through their premises if the line is not being used to provide service to a subscriber in their building. This frequently occurs in areas such as SoHo where commercial and industrial structures exist side-by-side with converted residential lofts. Further, cable companies are understandably reluctant to go into unsafe neighborhoods where their trucks and personnel are vulnerable to robbery and theft.

By 1981, the two cable companies in Manhattan had a total of 185,000 subscribers, approximately 25 percent of the 700,000 households in the borough. Teleprompter had 65,000 and MCTV had 120,000. The MCTV franchise area, encompassing the city's central business district and most of the borough's middle and upper income populations has clearly been more favorable than the area covered by Teleprompter. MCTV has also been more aggressive than Teleprompter in developing new services. For example, MCTV carries the Cable News Network while Teleprompter does not. MCTV is expanding its channel capacity from 26 to 35 channels and plans to add new pay services to its current HBO offerings. Further, it is acquiring a mobile van for local program origination and building a production studio.

The Other Boroughs

Once the revenue generating possibilities from pay TV became apparent, the city opened up franchise procedures for Queens, which has more than two million residents. After long negotiations with active Queens community groups, Knickerbocker Communications, Inc. (a subsidiary of ATC) was awarded the franchise for Queens in 1978. An unsuccessful competitor, Orth-O-Vision, challenged the decision in a lawsuit claiming that the city did not follow the Urban Land Use Review Process as required by the revised City Charter. The city's corporation counsel agreed as did the State Supreme Court. The Queens franchise was terminated and the entire franchise process was re-opened.

As the result of the Orth-O-Vision case, cable policymaking temporarily shifted to the City Planning Commission, headed by former Deputy Mayor Herbert Sturz. In early 1980, Sturz engaged the Washington, D.C., law firm of Arnold and Porter (with SI 5,000 from the Markle Foundation) to review the status of the city's cable franchising position. Their report was submitted in March 1980, and in April 1980, the Board of Estimate hired Arnold and Porter to develop a plan for the city's cable franchise process at a cost of $118,000. The two-volume plan, prepared with the assistance of several city agencies, was issued in September 1980 and set forth the technical configuration for future cable systems, the criteria to be used in evaluating franchise proposals, and policies for cable regulation and rate setting. The plan recommended that future cable systems have 70 channels consisting of two subscriber cables as well as an institutional cable linking all public offices and facilities. The basic subscriber package was to consist of 27 channels. The plan estimated that it would take six to eight years to complete cable construction in the city and, pointing to the size and scale of New York, said that "the construction of cable television systems in the city will probably be as, if not more difficult than construction in any other jurisdiction in the United States."

Serious questions have been raised about the use of Arnold and Porter as consultants to the city in its cable franchise process. Morton Hamburg, a prominent communications attorney and columnist for The New York Law Journal, has suggested that public funds would be more wisely spent on strengthening the city's own in-house cable policymaking capacity. In addition, the State Cable Commission severely criticized the Arnold and Porter plan for "an inappropriately conservative attitude towards the service and system design demands that the city should make upon franchises" and urged the city to explore "the possibility of a publicly owned and financed system, leased and privately operated by the cable companies."

In November 1980, the city created a Cable Working Group consisting of representatives of Board of Estimate members and other city agencies to formulate specific franchise requirements and evaluate the nineteen franchise proposals submitted to the city. Without competitive bidding, the firm of Arnold and Porter was engaged to manage and staff this body at a fee of $650,000. The basic issues facing the city now are how many franchises should be granted, to which companies, in what areas, and with what specified services. There are a number of trade-offs between an advanced technological capability and the cost to subscribers.

Shaping the Future

Today, New York is in a superb position to formulate cable policy because it has more than ten years of cable experience to draw upon. Developing the Manhattan systems has demonstrated the limits and potential of municipal regulation, the unanticipated growth of new cable programming, and the possibilities for citizen-generated programming. Unlike other cities. New York is not operating totally in the dark. It has the benefit of first-hand experience in dealing with the complex interplay of technological, economic, and regulatory factors which shape the form of cable. Individuals and organizations rarely get a second chance at the same task. New York has that opportunity and it should remember that a franchise is only a beginning: it's the implementation that counts. In designing and carrying out future cable policies, the city should keep the lessons of the past in mind:

Cable operators have been notorious for overpromising and underperforming. There are no cable systems in the United States today that have 35 channels and full two-way capability; therefore, any advanced cable system will undoubtedly face technical dilemmas and unforeseen problems. Further, it's difficult to build anything in New York, and installing a sophisticated cable system requires skilled labor, access to materials, and patience while waiting for permits and authorizations. The equipment may be on the shelf, but it is not in the streets. Overly optimistic construction timetables should be viewed with caution. Franchises should be awarded on the basis of performance (in New York and other cities), not just promise.

With the deregulation of cable by the FCC, local governments are now pivotal actors in establishing requirements governing cable systems. New York City has a remarkable record of failing to achieve its goals in regulating private sector activities. Just look at our taxicabs, fire codes, and street vendors. Elaborate rules need regulatory personnel, and hiring technically competent people costs money. Politicians aren't likely to spend scarce municipal funds for such regulatory purposes when the public demands more police, sanitation workers, and teachers. Further, municipal regulatory structures may be inappropriate to an evolving technology such as cable. The city should design a self-regulating system, based upon incentive systems and performance standards rather than rules and restrictions.

There are serious constraints on the range of public services that can be provided over cable. In part this is due to the fact that it is unlikely that all New York City households will ever be wired for cable. Cable companies have claimed that it is dangerous to lay cable in some neighborhoods. The residents of these neighborhoods are often those who depend the most on public services. In areas where cable wiring is limited, emphasis should be placed on booking up community facilities and public places. This limitation doesn't mean cable's role in municipal services should be dismissed. Rather, the city should start to use cable for management and administrative functions. The Philadelphia Police Department holds arraignments over closed-circuit cable. Why can't New York use a similar system instead of transporting prisoners back and forth between the courts and detention centers? Data transmission and teleconferencing over cable should also be tried in an effort to improve municipal government productivity.

Use cable for economic and community development. New York's vast number of performing arts groups could provide the critical mass for a cultural programming cable network. Both the city and arts' institutions would benefit if cable served as the impetus for establishing a major video production industry in New York. In addition, local businesses should be encouraged to use cable and perhaps give New York a comparative advantage over other urban areas with regard to communication facilities and information costs. Finally, new immigrant groups, Hispanics, Russians, Asians, and others are a vital element of the city's population but are poorly served by conventional media. These groups are both a valuable resource and untapped market for cable programs.

Channel space should not be allocated all at once. Cable is a dynamic medium; there is simply no way to predict the choice of technologies and pattern of consumer preferences for future cable services. Some observers believe cable will only bring us more movies and sports, others see security and alarm systems as the wave of the future. (It's not clear who would answer these alarms in New York, since the city can't handle the current number of electronically-transmitted alarms it receives.) By the time New York's cable systems are in place, the technology and economics of telecommunications may be dramatically different than they are today. Therefore, the city should reserve some decisions for the future rather than trying to decide everything before the industry has really matured. The development of telecommunications is replete with new technologies that have failed to achieve their intended purposes but rather have performed far more vital functions than those originally conceived: the telephone, at its inception, was to provide transmission of live concerts; few anticipated the demand for people to communicate by voice over long distances. Given the emergence of new technologies which compete with cable, such as low-powered television stations, video disks, direct satellite-to-home televisions, and optical fiber systems, the precise form that cable will take is far from certain.

Ten years ago, there was great euphoria about the public purposes cable television would serve. Today there is a similar aura surrounding the private home-based services of cable. Almost daily, a new venture is formed to develop cable programming or a large media conglomerate acquires a cable company. Advertisers view cable as a means to reach an upscale market. The print media perceive cable as a way to transmit information electronically. And sports and cultural entrepreneurs regard cable as a way to expand their paying audience without significantly higher production costs.

In formulating policies for cable, the experiences of the past should be as much of a guide as our hopes for the future. The history of cable demonstrates that regulations - no matter how well-intended - are difficult to enforce, that public uses of cable are rarely developed by municipalities, that the dynamics of consumer demand for cable are by no means clear, and that public policies should be designed to encourage rather than impede the timely construction of cable systems throughout the city.

 

Endnotes

1. For a superb analysis of the FCC'S cable regulations, see Monroe E. Price, "Requiem For the Wired Nation: Cable Rulemaking at the FCC," Virginia Law Review, April 1975. Vol. 61, no. 3.

2. The subscriber to cable television usually pays a one-time installation fee plus a monthly fee for "basic" service which includes the commercial broadcast channels plus other programming made available by the cable operator. Pay cable refers to an additional fee which the subscriber pays for one or more channels carrying movies, concerts, shows, etc.

3. The data and analysis of pay TV is drawn from a study by Ralph Lee Smith and Raymond B. Gallagher, The Emergence of Pay Cable Television. Final Report. Prepared for the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, July 1980.

4. Ralph Lee Smith and Raymond B. Gallagher, The Emergence of Pay Cable Television. Overview, p. 6.

 

Originally published in New York Affairs
Volume 6, Number 4.
New York University. 1981


(C) 1999 Mitchell Moss