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From Polygyny to Serial Monogamy: A Unified Theory of Marriage Institutions

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  • David De La Croix
  • Fabio Mariani

Abstract

Marriage institutions have changed over time, evolving from polygyny to monogamy, and then to serial monogamy (as defined by divorce and remarriage). We propose a unified theory of such institutional changes, where the dynamics of income distribution are the driving force. We characterize the marriage-market equilibrium in each of the three alternative regimes, and determine which one emerges as a political equilibrium, depending on the state of the economy. In a two-class society, a rise in the share of rich males drives the change from polygyny to monogamy. The introduction of serial monogamy follows from a further rise in the proportion of either rich females or rich males. Monogamy eases the transition to serial monogamy, since it promotes social mobility.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdv001
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Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 82 (2015)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 565-607

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Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:82:y:2015:i:2:p:565-607
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
  • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
  • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification

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  1. Victor Hiller & Magali Recoules, 2010. "Divorce decisions, divorce laws and social norms," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 10046, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  2. Duranton, Gilles & Martin, Philippe & Mayer, Thierry & Mayneris, Florian, 2010. "The Economics of Clusters: Lessons from the French Experience," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199592203, July.
  3. Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, 2007. "Marriage and Divorce: Changes and their Driving Forces," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(2), pages 27-52, Spring.
  4. Francesconi, Marco & Ghiglino, Christian & Perry, Motty, 2013. "On the Origin of the Family," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1028, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  5. Olivetti, Claudia & Petrongolo, Barbara, 2011. "Gender Gaps across Countries and Skills: Supply, Demand and the Industry Structure," IZA Discussion Papers 5935, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Yoram Weiss, 2006. "Divorce, Remarriage, and Welfare: A General Equilibrium Approach," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(2-3), pages 415-426, 04-05.
  7. Edlund, Lena Cecilia & Lagerlöf, Nils-Petter, 2006. "Individual vs. Parental Consent in Marriage: Implications for Intra-Household Resource Allocation and Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 5474, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Mark Bagnoli & Ted Bergstrom, . "Courtship as a Waiting Game," Papers _030, University of Michigan, Department of Economics.
  9. Nils-Petter Lagerlöf, 2005. "Sex, equality, and growth," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 38(3), pages 807-831, August.
  10. Barham, Vicky & Devlin, Rose Anne & Yang, Jie, 2009. "A theory of rational marriage and divorce," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 93-106, January.
  11. Scott Drewianka, 2008. "Divorce law and family formation," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 485-503, April.
  12. Ron J. Lesthaeghe & Lisa Neidert, 2006. "The Second Demographic Transition in the United States: Exception or Textbook Example?," Population and Development Review, The Population Council, Inc., vol. 32(4), pages 669-698.
  13. Anderson, Gary M. & Tollison, Robert D., 1998. "Celestial marriage and earthly rents: Interests and the prohibition of polygamy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 169-181, October.
  14. Korn, Evelyn, 2000. " On the Formation of Family Structures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(3-4), pages 357-72, December.
  15. Fleurbaey,Marc & Maniquet,François, 2011. "A Theory of Fairness and Social Welfare," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521715348, 1.
  16. David G. Schramm, 2006. "Individual and Social Costs of Divorce in Utah," Journal of Family and Economic Issues, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 133-151, April.
  17. Lena Edlund & Nils-Petter Lagerlöf, 2006. "Individual versus Parental Consent in Marriage: Implications for Intra-Household Resource Allocation and Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 304-307, May.
  18. Todd Schoellman & Michèle Tertilt, 2006. "Marriage Laws and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 295-298, May.
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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. The evolution of marriage over history
    by nawmsayn in ZeeConomics on 2014-12-21 11:12:08

RePEc Biblio mentions

As found on the RePEc Biblio, the curated bibliography for Economics:
  1. > Demographic Economics > The Economics of Polygamy
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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Cited by:

  1. Edlund, Lena & Ku, Hyejin, 2011. "The African Slave Trade and the Curious Case of General Polygyny," MPRA Paper 52735, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Dec 2013.
  2. Sadettin Citci, 2014. "The rise of monogamy," SERIEs, Spanish Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 377-397, November.
  3. BAUDIN, Thomas & DE LA CROIX, David & GOBBI, Paula, 2012. "DINKs, DEWKs & Co. Marriage, fertility and childlessness in the United States," CORE Discussion Papers 2012051, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Grossbard, Shoshana, 2014. "Sex Ratios, Polygyny, and the Value of Women in Marriage: A Beckerian Approach," IZA Discussion Papers 8728, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. James Fenske, 2012. "African Polygamy: Past and Present," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2012-20, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  6. WUNSCH, Guillaume & MOUCHART, Michel & RUSSO, Federica, 2012. "Functions and mechanisms in structural-modelling explanations," CORE Discussion Papers 2012056, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. Thomas BAUDIN & David de la CROIX & Paula GOBBI, 2015. "Development Policies when Accounting for the Extensive Margin of Fertility," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2015003, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  8. Hiller, Victor & Recoules, Magali, 2013. "Changes in divorce patterns: Culture and the law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 77-87.

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