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Research on Autocratic Regimes
Divide et Impera
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Elite management is crucially important for the political survival of rulers. Felix Bethke studies how African rulers manage to stay in power for several decades. By FELIX BETHKE



Translated by Christine Crawford and Felix Bethke.

African rulers dominate the current list of longest ruling heads of states in the world. There are six heads of state from the African continent in the top ten and the number one position is also occupied by an African ruler: Paul Biya from Cameroon has been in power for 39 years.1 In contrast to the long tenure of some African rulers, in other African states, leadership changes quite frequently. According to Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne,2 there have been 145 attempted coups in total in Africa, between 1950 and 2010. Almost half of these attempted coups were successful, which means that the respective ruler was deposed.

Elite management and political survival  
Political and military elites represent a major threat to the political survival of African rulers. In order to govern, every ruler needs viziers and allies to implement policies. However, the people who share power with the rulers also possess the capacity and opportunity to depose them.

To depose a ruler by regular or irregular means, the elites have to coordinate and join forces. A critical mass of allies is needed to drive an incumbent ruler out of office. Therefore, I conceptualized political survival as a coordination game, where multiple members of the political and military elite have to cooperate, in order to successfully depose the ruler. Due to the coordination issue amongst the elites, the ruler is in a position where he can strategically foster mistrust and uncertainty between them. The ruler can engage in a strategy of "Divide et Impera", where he uses elite management in the form of cabinet reshuffles and military purges, to create coordination problems between potential rivals.

Observers of African politics often use the concept "Divide et Impera", to describe the strategic elite management of African rulers. The journalist Blaine Harden, described the elite management of Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire) as follows:
"Conventional wisdom in Kinshasa says that besides Mobutu and his family, only 80 people in the country count. At any one time, 20 of them are ministers, 20 are exiles, 20 are in jail and 20 are ambassadors. Every three months, the music stops and Mobutu forces everyone to change chairs."

The situation under Mobutu is described as a "game of musical chairs". Elite management in the form of "Divide et Impera" can be pursued in many different ways. When the ruler regularly changes members of the cabinet and the military leadership, the elites do not have time to accumulate resources and create a reliable coalition. The elite's networks break down and distrust and insecurity spreads amongst members. Furthermore, through the establishment of large cabinets with many ministers, a ruler can ensure that individuals cannot accumulate much power, but can compete against other elites for scarce resources. Additionally, the more people in the government, the more complicated it becomes to establish a coalition of trusted plotters needed to successfully depose the ruler.

From these assumptions, the following empirical implications can be derived, which have been tested using an empirical analysis:
1) African rulers adjust their elite management according to the perceived dangers of a coup.

2) Cabinet reshuffles, large cabinets and purges of the military command, foster the political survival of African rulers.

Results of the empirical analysis
To evaluate these claims, I mainly used statistical methods that are usually applied to medical science. These methods can easily be applied to political data, i.e. the political survival of rulers is the subject of the analysis, instead of the medical survival of patients. For the empirical analysis, I compiled a dataset, which combines data on elite management with data on the tenure of African rulers, from 1960 to 2005.3

I tested whether African rulers reacted to conspiracies and coup attempts with cabinet reshuffles and military purges. The results show that African rulers did indeed worry about their subordinates becoming too powerful, and they responded to plots by reshuffling their viziers. After an attempted coup or conspiracy, the probability of a cabinet reshuffle was 50% higher than usual. However, my dissertation provides robust evidence regarding the reshuffling of the political elite. No robust pattern can be identified within the military elites.

The results of the statistical analysis show that cabinet reshuffles and the establishment of large cabinets, are effective political tools for fostering the survival of incumbent rulers.


However, the strategy to reshuffle the political elite proves to be quite effective. The results of the statistical analysis show that cabinet reshuffles and the establishment of large cabinets, are effective political tools for fostering the survival of incumbent rulers. African rulers could reduce the risk of being deposed by 40%, if they regularly exchanged members of their cabinet. Additionally, the results indicate that rulers who established large cabinets had a lower risk of leaving office. However, with regard to the military elite, the results were again inconsistent. the results were again inconsistent for the military elite. It remains unclear if purges of the military command have any effect on the political survival of African rulers.

Discussion of the results    
The dissertation shows that dynamic factors like elite management are very important for the political survival of African rulers. African rulers deliberately tried to weaken their followers in the government, fearing that they would have the power to coordinate and overthrow them. To prevent this, African rulers reshuffled and divided power within their cabinets and elite management, to discourage cooperative deposition attempts. Rulers who used such a strategy, substantially improved their chances of survival in political office.

Regarding the inconsistent results of military purges, a possible explanation is that the military in many African countries is so powerful, that rulers cannot influence the soldiers' ability to exercise a coup, as requested by the elite. 



[1] A constantly updated list of the 50 heads of state with the longest tenure is provided at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_current_longest_ruling_non-royal_national_leaders, 28.03.2015.
[2] Powell, Jonathan M.; Thyne, Clayton L.: Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010: A new dataset, in: Journal of Peace Research, Oslo 2011, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 249–259, URL: http://www.uky.edu/~clthyn2/powell-thyne-JPR-2011.pdf, 28.03.2015.
[3] The thesis focuses on sub-Saharan Africa, which stands for the heads of state in the area of the continent of Africa that lies south of the Sahara Desert.


15.03.2015
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