Islam and Indigenous Populations in Australia and New Zealand1 Helena Onnudottir University of Western Sydney Adam Possamai University of Western Sydney Bryan Turner University of Western Sydney Religious conversion can be a lengthy process, comprising at times elements of personal awareness, religious awakening, private interests and public, external pressures. Religious conversion is frequently seen as life-changing for the individual convert – a matter of both personal growth and spiritual enlightenment - but conversion can also be perceived as a phenomenon which might reveal some forms of deeply engrained social and political inequality and discrimination. Furthermore, conversion among disempowered groups - which might be perceived as ‘political’ in nature - does more than impact on the personal identity of the converts; it can also lead to growing unrest among the dominant section of society, among the governing bodies of a nation, even among the religious community the converts seek entry to. Such ‘unrest’ is easily detected in recent discourses on conversion to Islam, commonly raising expressions of disbelief and scepticism - especially regarding conversion among white, middle-class Westerners - but at times adding elements of fear, or even panic, as such conversion takes place among individuals and groups which are already living on the fringes of society, i.e. those who are socio-economically disadvantage, including (migrant) minorities and Indigenous peoples. Conversion to Islam among disadvantaged peoples takes place across the globe, within both Western and non-Western societies (Turner, 2009; van der Veer, 1996). Some cases of conversion cause significantly greater interest than others. The main focus of this chapter is on conversion to Islam among Indigenous peoples. However, as this type of conversion has only recently attracted public and media interest: we wish to develop an analytical framework by reference to a case study of religious conversion among another minority group: the Dalits of India. In February1981, hundreds of Hindus in the village of Meenakshipuram in India collectively converted to Islam deciding “to embrace Islam as a protest against their continued oppression at the hands of the dominant ‘upper’ castes in the village” (Sikand 2004: 121). These converts belonged to the lowest of the Hindu castes (without varna, sometimes classified as outside the caste system), collectively known as the ‘Untouchables’, self-identifying as ‘Dalits’ or ‘oppressed’ and currently constituting some 13% of the total Indian population (Kalam 1984; Kettani 2010). Any mass conversion to Islam, especially where a Muslim identity might have negative consequences, might appear counterintuitive. Muslims in India form the largest minority in India, where they have since 1947 been periodically subjected to political oppression, receive little state support and 1 The team would like to thank Elena Knox for the invaluable contribution as a research assistant to this Chapter. 1 are commonly considered “socially and economically backward” (Mistry 2005: 400). Consequently, what might be the reason(s) for some Dalits to forego the minimal state support they are entitled to as Hindus and become members of a minority group which might be considered at a further disadvantage than the lowest of castes? There is one prevailing explanation given by converts - especially in cases of mass conversion - an escape from the narrow confines of the stratification set in place by traditional social structures in India (Kalam 1984: 161). For a Dalit convert, the abandonment of Hinduism marks the end of a life governed by rigid social stratification ingrained in Hinduism, and the adoption of a Muslim identity delivers the promise of the egalitarian ideology of Islam. Conversion for Dalits involves a change in social and legal status that is driven by material and instrumental reasons (Sikand 2004). The mass conversion in Meenakshipuram was not an isolated case. There are regular reports in the (Indian) media describing these collective conversions to Islam (as well as other major religions, such as Christianity and Buddhism) (e.g. Milligazette 2002, BBC 2006 & 2007). However, religious conversion (to Islam) in India might not be as common or extensive as these media reports indicate. India is a secular, democratic state, the constitution of which recognises religious freedom and ascribes special rights to religious minorities, but religious conversion during the last half century has in practice met with political and legislative obstruction. On top of active exclusion of non-Hindus from various services and privileges provided by the state (such as educational and work opportunities), a number of Indian states have introduced ‘anticonversion laws’ that make it hard for people to leave Hinduism (Suleman 2010). Furthermore, in the context of rising conflict between Muslims and Hindus in certain parts of India, questions might be raised about the willingness of Muslims to welcome Dalits (or other Hindus) into their folds (Kannan and Gros 2002). In short, it appears that social, political and legislative factors all work against religious conversion in India. Evidently, conversion to Islam among subordinate groups needs a carefully constructed sociological explanation that can accommodate both individual and collective dimensions. India, as a state where “religious passion is always undercurrent and emotions are valued more than reason...” (Suleman 2010: 128) calls for a specific sociological lens, which allows for all the particular elements embedded in the socio-cultural, political and legal histories of the groups involved. Any analysis of religious conversions – conversions driven by voluntary personal choices and those arising out of social and economic constraints – need clear political and social contexts in order to provide an understanding of these diverse elements. ‘Untouchability’, formally outlawed in India, still determines the place of Dalits in Indian society. As such, the term is central in analysing conversion to Islam on the Indian sub-continent. However, we wish to transfer our focus - geographically further south, analytically towards Indigenous peoples - drawing attention to recent claims about conversion to Islam among Indigenous peoples in Australia and New Zealand. Our key analytical term is ‘Indigeneity’, our sociological concerns are raised by political dimensions and social processes involved in religious conversion and our intellectual curiosity is stimulated by the actions of the state towards conversion and converts. Claims about the growth of Islam and the nature and rate of conversion to Islam overlap, but they are still two separate topics. Our intention is to include both in our discussion. We do not attempt to provide any general theory establishing some causal 2 link between rising conversion rates and the growth of Islam. However, we explore numerical data to uncover a number of factors which appear consistently to be associated with conversion (to Islam) among various minority groups (in a Western context). This chapter utilises information on Indigenous religious identification in the Australia and New Zealander 2001-2006 censuses. It explores variations in religious affiliation, and has a specific focus on public claims about growth in Islam among Indigenous populations. Furthermore, in light of this quantitative information, we reflect on the reasons that may influence religious conversion to Islam among Indigenous peoples and Maori and the responses and concerns raised by both the public and various agencies of the state. Our specific focus will be on Aboriginal Australians, Maori and Pacific Islanders within both New Zealand and Australia; hence the context will have a Western socio-political flavour and a Southern geographical gaze; ‘Islam and Indigenous populations in the West’. ‘Islam in the West’. Islam has a long history in ‘the West’- according to some reaching back to the days of the Prophet (Roy 2004) – a history which is interpreted and portrayed in various ways. In his analysis of Orientalism, Edward Said (1978) claims that the mere use of the term ‘Islam’, results in overgeneralised, homogenising and counterproductive representation of diverse Islamic worlds; Orientalism is a “Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (p. 3). The same claim can be made about many other terms used in this chapter. The terms ‘Aboriginal’ and ‘Maori’, even the terms ‘Indigenous’ and ‘Dalit’, are problematic, but, especially since 9/11, current global political and public discourses about Islam have produced an even more intensely prejudicial images about Islam. Following Said’s argument, these images and representations are the products of the West, but, for the discussion in this chapter we are less concerned with any binary division between East and West and more concerned to understand the processes of globalisation which both maintain and challenge these constructs. Michael Humphrey (2001: 33) draws on Robert Hefner (1999) when he talks about the “porous pluralism of late modernity” – resulting from globalisation of mass societies – as the structuring dynamics or shaping elements of ‘Islam in the West’ (also Huntington 1996). ‘Islam in the West’ is structured as a static obstruction to western secular nation-states. However Humphrey’s specific focus is on ‘Islam in Australia’, outlining how under the guise, or perhaps illusion, of ‘multiculturalism’ (as based on the secular ideals of late modernity) Islam as a religion and the Shari’a as a legal system are seen as a threat to the sovereignty of the nation-state. The traditional basis for dialectical arguments about the ‘clashes’ between the entities of ‘Islam’ and the ‘West’ have, according to Humphrey, vanished as the pluralising effects of globalisation continually shift the meanings of traditions and even the powers of the (secular) state. Hence, we can expect the traditional oppositions between Islam and the West to crumble. The final reflection on the debate on the term ‘Islam’ – in the context of ‘Islam in the West’ – are produced by Olivier Roy. Roy, like Said, claims that the term ‘Islam’ is used today to give unity to a complex assemblage of conduct, demands, and identities that really become meaningful only when they are considered laterally, either in relation 3 to other similar attitudes without religious reference points or, on the contrary, in relation to similar behaviour in other religions. Islam is thus turned into an essence, as though it has become the invariant that determines attitudes in very different contexts (2007: 88). Whether ‘Islam’ is described as an essence, construct, obstruction and/or an invariant, apparently the sources of these constructs lie not only within ‘the West’, but originate, resonate and regulate on both local and global levels; the dynamics are numerous and the contexts diverse. This social and political complexity reverberates through a number of ethnographic studies into conversion to Islam outside traditionally Muslim countries; James Beckford (1985) has argued that there is clearly a need to produce more sophisticated sociological approaches to religious conversion. Tina Jensen (2006) produces an interesting account of converts to Islam in a predominantly Lutheran Protestant Denmark. While Jensen concentrated on individual conversion and religiosity, some of her findings correspond nicely with Humphrey’s claims regarding the effects of pluralism, and Roy’s on the need for lateral thinking. Jensen claims that religiosity among converts is demonstrated on the one hand in yearning for unity and belonging…and…an inclination toward privacy, individualism, autonomy, and eclecticism… On the other hand…yearning for unity and belonging, the invocation of order, and the desire for authority and continuity of tradition (2006: 655). Danish converts to Islam face many dilemmas, ranging from the need to legitimise their status as ‘new Muslims’ (in the eyes of friends and family, as well as other (born) Muslims), to negotiating their (Muslim) identity, autonomy and belonging between the persistent constructs of ‘static traditions’ and ‘progressive modernity’. Danish converts might not be classified as disempowered or social outcasts, but their conversion involves both religious/spiritual components, as well as a political ones. Islam might be coming ‘de-territorialised’ and the fragmenting forces of globalisation might be creating grounds for ‘imagined identities’ (Roy 2004: 3), but the dominant images of Muslims, still locate Islam as alien to the western world (Gest, 2010). ‘Islam in the West’ is attracting growing interest and debate, most employing negative images of Islam and arguments about the threat to state sovereignty. Much of this debate is the result of increased transnational migration (mainly based on migration of Muslims to ‘the West’) and is driven by claims regarding the rapid demographic growth of Muslims. Conversely, the ‘growth of Islam’ has become a subject of popular public, political and academic debates (Roy 2004). Claims about the number of Muslims and the growth of Islam are the product of special interests and they are as a result difficult to either challenge or confirm. From the social scientific point of view, some sources are obviously considered more reliable than others. For example, the PEW Report, Mapping the Global Muslim Population (2009), claims to be both the largest and the most reliable demographic study of the size and distribution of the world’s Muslim population. In a study of more than 200 countries, the PEW Report found that there are 1.57 billion Muslims of all ages living in the world today, representing 23% of an estimated 2009 world population of 6.8 billion. 4 While Muslims are found on all five inhabited continents, more than 60% of the global Muslim population is in Asia and about 20% is in the Middle East and North Africa. More than 300 million Muslims, or one-fifth of the world’s Muslim population, live in countries where Islam is not the majority religion (2009: 1). This report provides a reliable estimate of the number and geographical distribution of the world‘s Muslim population. Some of these estimates produce unsuspected outcomes – for example India accounts for over 160 millions of the 300 million Muslims who do not live in countries where Islam is the majority religion. German Muslims (some four million) outnumber those in Lebanon and about one-fifth of the world‘s Muslims live as religious minorities in their home countries. However, it falls short of providing information on the debate about the rate of the growth of Islam globally. Subsequently, when the aim is to reflect on conversion as a key factor in the growing numbers of Muslims, we need to look for additional sources. In a recent publication ‘World Muslim Population 1950-2020‘, Hussain Kettani provides important sources and offers a thought-provoking prediction about the growth of the Muslim population. According to Kettani, “the percentage of the World Muslim population with respect to the total World population has increased steadily from 15% in 1870, to 17% in 1950, to 26% by 2020, to 34% by 2070“ (2010: 127). While Kettani‘s sources are “the latest available census and reliable estimates” (p. 127), he recognises the numerous problems associated with the veracity of both census and survey information; such as the absence of inclusion of ethnic and religious minorities. Data on religious identity are typically problematic because in many societies people are reluctant to define themselves in religious terms for fear of reprisals. Kettani’s prediction for ‘the South’ (Oceania) are that, while the Muslim population will increase in absolute terms, it will decrease as a percentage on a global scale - from 0.28 percentage of the world population in 2010 to 0.25 percentage in 2020 – but the Muslim ratio will remain the same (0.03) (p. 166). Given the focus of this chapter, Kettani’s predictions for the Muslim populations of Australia and New Zealand in this timeframe are that, despite the growth in actual numbers, the percentages of the population – 1.71% for Australia and 0.90% for New Zealand – will not change. Kettani’s claims raise two matters of analytical concern for this chapter. Firstly, while the Annual Population Growth Rates (APGR) for both Australia and New Zealand has fallen quite dramatically during the last five decades, the percentage of the Muslim population has grown steadily. Much of this growth has occurred through immigration, but claims about growth due to conversion to Islam are still very persistent. Secondly, despite this gradual, but significant growth among the Muslim populations in Australia and New Zealand, Kettani’s predictions for the next decade do not indicate continued growth. In 2006, 36,072 people identified themselves with Islam in the New Zealand census, which is an increase of 8.82% from the previous census, and in Australia, 340,392 people defined themselves as Muslim, which is a growth of 3.88% from the 2001 census, Kettani’s predictions indicate reduction in this growth during the next decade, but, corresponding to a certain degree to changes in APGRs in both countries. Still, the growth of the Muslim populations in both countries is calculated as above the APGRs. Admittedly, Kettani’s estimates for the demographic situation after 2010 are computer generated figures and there is no reliable way to evaluate them. Nevertheless, these lead one to question claims about ‘growth of 5 Islam’, especially growth through conversion. Subsequently, considering the claims about the growth of ‘Islam in the West’, through a narrow focus on parts of Oceania the Indigenous, Maori and Pacific Islander populations of Australia and New Zealand - some light might be thrown on these claims. Given the distinct status of these populations (especially Indigenous peoples in Australia and Maori in New Zealand) and the fact that few people in these population have Muslim ancestry by which we mean Aboriginal descendants from the ‘Afghans’ (Onnudottir, Possamai and Turner 2010), a close inspection of changes in religious affiliation among these populations would provide some insight into conversion to Islam (as well as other religions). Is conversion taking place among a specific population and, if so, what might be the reasons behind these conversions? Indigenous Populations and Religion in Australia and New Zealand: an analysis of the 2001-2006 censuses. When comparing and contrasting the Australian and New Zealand census findings, one must be aware of some technical difficulties. In Australia, the census questionnaire only allows for the choice of one religion, thereby preventing people from claiming to adhere to multiple faiths in a synchronic way. By contrast in New Zealand, citizens are allowed to claim multiple religious identities at the same time. For this reason, when dealing with percentages across these censuses, for the Australian case, one has to understand the percentage in terms of people’s distribution, and in New Zealand, in terms of answers’ distribution. This is the reason why some of the columns from the New Zealand census are above 100%. It is when comparing and contrasting the growth rate that the comparison between these two types of censuses will be the most statistically sound. <Insert Table 1 here> Among the Maori in New Zealand, as described in Table 1, we can observe that the two main 2006 religious groups are Christians (43.35%) and ‘no religious’ (34.26%). While Christianity is in declined (- 1.62) compared to the 2001 census and the ‘no religions’ are growing (+ 27.33%), the most successful expansion has been for Muslims (+ 51.05%), followed by the Maori religion (+ 25.54). The most dramatic decline between 2001 and 2006 occurred in the Baha’i faith (-24.39%). For Pacific Islanders in the same country, we find that Christianity (75.19%) and ‘no religion’ (13.1%) are also the largest categories, although the proportion of Christians is significantly stronger than for Maori, and the ‘no religion’ smaller. It is of interest to note that the growth rate of the ‘no religion’ category for Pacific Islanders is higher (+ 36.77%) than for the Maori (+ 27.33%). In terms of growth, we find significant evidence of growth for Muslims (+ 87.43%) followed by Hindus (+ 64%). The percentage of Christians among the whole New Zealand population is 54.2%, which shows that Pacific Islanders (75.19%) tend to be more Christian than the general population, and the Maori (43.35%) less so. The ‘no religion’ category represents 34.6% of the whole population, and the Maori (34.26%) are close to this national trend but not Pacific Islanders (13.1%) who show stronger signs of religious vitality. With regards to Islam, 0.9% of the whole New Zealand population indicated 6 their affiliation with this religion, and we find that although there is a consequent growth of Maori and Pacific Islanders within Islam, it still represents less than 0.9%% of their respective populations; as Maori (0.19%) and Pacific Islanders (0.4%) are under-represented compared to the overall population. <Insert Table 2 here> The Maori in Australia should be regarded as a migrant group from New Zealand rather than an Indigenous population as such. However, interesting observations can be drawn from the 2006 census. As in New Zealand, the two largest religious groups are Christians (58.33%) and the ‘no religious’ one (28.67%). This migrant group is more Christian and less likely to define themselves as ‘no religion’ than in its country of origin. With regards to the growth rate between 2001 and 2006, Islam is again showing clear evidence of significant growth (+54.12%) which is slightly higher than in New Zealand (+ 51.05%). We find the same trends among the Pacific Islanders in Australia as in New Zealand with regards to Christianity and the ‘no religion’ category. They also tend to be more Christian (83.77%) and less likely to opt for ‘no religion’ (5.47%), than Maori in Australia. However, contrary to what we have found so far, we have a positive growth rate for Christianity (+13.65%) and a decrease for Islam (-8.99%). It must be noted here – and discussed further in the final section - that while the Pacific Islander populations in both New Zealand and Australia, have experienced various legislative barriers and obstacles in their transmigratory endeavours, the New Zealand state has proven to be more inclusive and welcoming to most Pacific Islander nationalities in recent decades than the Australian state. Consequently, the level of differences between the 2001 and 2006 Australian census regarding Pacific Islanders, might be explained by rapid changes in the makeup of the Pacific Islander population in Australia (Lee 2009). For Indigenous Australians we find the same trend for the Christian group (63.87%) and the ‘no religion’ category (20.57%) than the other Indigenous sub-groups, and it is among the Muslim population from this sub-group that we find the highest growth rate in Australia among the Indigenous populations (+62.38%) (See Onnudottir, Possamai and Turner 2010 for an explanation). The total percentage of Christians among the Australian population is 63.9%. As in the New Zealand case, in Australia, the Pacific Islanders are over-represented in this category (83.77%) and the Maori (58.33%) under-represented. The Christian Aborigines (63.87%) are on par with the overall Christian population. The overall ‘no religion’ category (18.6%) in Australia is less than in New Zealand (34.6%), and we find that the no religious Aborigines (20.57%) and Maori (28.67%) are higher than the Australian general population. Pacific Islanders, on the other hand, follow the New Zealand trend in being under-represented (5.47%). With regards to Islam, 1.7% of the overall Australian population is Muslim, which is higher than the Muslim Aboriginal (0.22%) and Maori (0.28%) figures. However, even if the Pacific Islander population is going through a decrease of its Muslim population, its percentage (1.68%) is close to the national average. 7 In conclusion, we find that there is evidence for the growth of Islam among Aborigines and Maori in Australia, but a decline among Pacific Islanders. However, contrary to New Zealand, the Muslim Pacific Islanders population is quite high in Australia compared to the national average. Contrary to the Maori and the Aborigines, Pacific Islanders are far less likely to define themselves as having ‘no religion’ and far more likely to define themselves as Christian. With regards to this growth, one should be more circumspect when examining the statistics more closely. Even if there is a 63% growth rate of Islam among Aborigines in Australia, there is also a growth rate of 11% of the Indigenous population on the census from 2001 to 2006. With an impressive growth rate of 87.43% among the Muslim Pacific Islanders in New Zealand, we have to factor a growth rate of 15% of the overall sub-population as well. The same applies to the growth rate of Maori in New Zealand in the Muslim population (51.05%) to be factored with the growth rate of all Maori in New Zealand (7%). For the sake of clarity and consistency, the remainder of this chapter will focus on the analysis of the three religious groups which have already been considered. < Insert Table 3 here > Looking at the age factor in New Zealand, we can find in Table 3 some interesting results. For both the Pacific Islanders (61.1%) and the Maori (55.44%), the 0 to 19 years old category is over-represented for the ‘no religion’ category, and the 20 to 39 years old one for the Muslim faith (40.06% and 40.11%). From 40 years of age, both populations are underrepresented in the ‘no religion’ category (8.38% and 11.3%). It appears that Indigenous New Zealanders from generation Y (persons born during the 1980s and 1990s) is more likely to be ‘no religion’, generation X (persons born during the 1960s and 1970s) is more likely to define themselves as Muslim, and Baby boomers are more likely to be Christians. < Insert Table 4 here > With regards to the Australian context in Table 4, we find that individuals under 19 years of age are over-represented among the Indigenous population for the ‘no religion’ category (56.97%), whereas for the Pacific Islanders and the Maori, it is from the 20 to 39 years old category (41% and 42.34%). Turning to Islam, the trend is also different. The Maori are over-represented in the under 19 years of age category (58.77%), whereas for the Indigenous and Pacific Islanders, it is in the 20 to 39 years old category (35.74% and 38.77%). For Christianity, all three populations are overrepresented among individuals who are over 40 years of age Compared to New Zealand, we also find that Christianity is more likely to be followed by older generations. For the ‘no religion’, the large majority is found in the 0<39 years old category. Of interest here, whereas Islam tends to be located in majority in the 20<39 years old category among all sub-groups across Australia and New Zealand, only the Maori (0<19 years old) in Australia offer an exception. < Insert Table 5 here > 8 With regards to gender, Table 5 indicates that among Pacific Islanders (54%) and Maori (61%) in New Zealand, Islam is overly dominated by males. < Insert Table 6 here > In Australia, as reflected in Table 6, on the other hand, the Muslim Maori are more likely to be female (70%), while the Aboriginal Muslims are more likely to be male (58%). The male Pacific Islanders are slightly over-represented (56%) in the ‘no religion’ category We find here again an exception with regards to Maori in Australia. Not only do Australian Muslim Maori tend to be from generation Y (rather than X), they also tend to be female. < Insert Table 7 here > The Maori in New Zealand, as described in Table 7, are overall less urbanised (64.67%) than Pacific Islanders (92.05%). Maori Muslims are overly urban (76.19%), whereas Pacific Islanders who are from a ‘no religion’ category are less urbanised (84.72%) than the Christian and Muslim groups. < Insert Table 8 here > In table 8, again, we can see that the Maori are overly from a Muslim urban background (83.97% of Maori Muslims compared to the overall percentage of Maori, 78.17%). And the ‘no religion’ category among Pacific Islanders is also less urban in character (80.27%) than its average (86.94%). However, whereas Pacific Islanders from a Muslim faith in New Zealand tend to be found in a mainly urban location (91.9% of them in a main urban area, while 92.05% of the whole population live in the same area), in Australia, the concentration of them in the same urban environment is much stronger (96.89% of all Muslim Pacific Islanders compared to 86.94% for the whole sub-population). < Insert Table 9 here > Tables 7 and 8 demonstrate that Islam is more an urban phenomenon for both Maori and Pacific Islanders in comparison to their overall population. In Australia, Table 9 indicates that Muslim Aborigines are over-proportionally an urban phenomenon. 63.27% of Aboriginal Muslims live in a major city in Australia compared to 32.37% of the overall Aboriginal population. In conclusion, drawing on the information in these tables for the three focus Muslim populations, Islam appears to be growing among generation X, the great majority of Indigenous Muslims are urban, and Muslim identity is more likely to be male than female. The exception to this trend is found among Maori in Australia, where Islam is stronger among generation Y and females. However, one should note that Muslim Maori in Australia are in very small number (131 people) and one should wonder about its statistical significance. Finally, although Pacific Islanders in Australia comprise a definite proportion of Muslims, it is the only Muslim sub-group in decline. 9 The reasons for this decline cannot be fully established. Potential explanations might be found in the fluctuating nature of large sections of transmigratory Pacific Islander groups, the socio-political situations in their homelands and the fact that these groups hold no claims to indigeneity in either Australia or New Zealand. Similarly, the reasons for the growing numbers of Muslims among the Maori and Aboriginal populations are not easily determined. Hence, considering that Muslim identity as a birthright tends to be the exception rather than the rule, conversion appears to be a prominent factor and as such needs to be explored on both individual and societal levels; what might be the causes and reasons behind conversion to Islam among the focus populations? What is the sociological significant of conversion? The Sociological Significance of Conversion It can be argued that “(private) religious identities typically assume (public) political significance, and hence states, in an era of increasing securitization, seek to survey and control religious expressions of collective membership” (Turner, 2009: 18). Turner’s specific focus was on Asia - the part of the world with the greatest number and proportion of the world’s Muslims - but his observations regarding the role of the state also apply in the southern hemisphere. While the monitoring of Aboriginal people by the state has been a constant aspect of colonial history, the extent of such surveillance and its impact on their lives differs (historically) between Australia and New Zealand (Havemann 1999). It is not the purpose of this chapter to outline in any detail the relationship between the Australian and New Zealand states and their Indigenous, Maori and Pacific Islander populations. Such relationships are multidimensional, complex and fluid. This chapter does not claim that conversion to Islam among Aboriginal Australians and Maori is solely a response to the oppressive controlling mechanisms of the state. As we have already indicated in the first part of this chapter, the growth of Islam in general and conversion to Islam in particular are causing concern among the public in both Western and non-Western societies. Our study of these three populations provides an insight into the scale of this conversion to Islam through our statistical information and allow for some mature reflection on the nature of religious conversion and the reaction of the state. The following text provides a context for the statistical information we have gathered, utilising similarities and differences - with a specific focus on official (population) policies (towards specific groups of people) – to seek explanations behind conversion to Islam. While the secular constitutions of both societies support freedom of religion, this principle is not always reflected in public debate. The political dimensions of religion, and hence conversion, in Australia and New Zealand are obviously influenced by a colonial Christian legacy. However, the religions and the spiritualities of the Indigenous and Maori populations have survived in both societies, but their historical and socio-political contexts differ somewhat. Multiculturalism became a official public policy in Australia in 1978 in seeking to address “the consequences of diversity in the interests of the individual and society as a whole. It recognises, accepts, respects and celebrates our [Australian] cultural diversity” (Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2010: np.). In this context, all social groups (should) have equal rights and recognition. However, there are specific considerations, immunities and policies – many controversial - for Indigenous peoples. Hence, Aboriginal people in Australia have equal, but at times special, statuses 10 compared to other Australians. In New Zealand, since the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi, Biculturalism has defined race relations. It has weathered decades of public debate on the implementation of multiculturalism and frames an equal partnership and political dialogue between Maori and Pakeha (New Zealanders of European, especially British descent) (Clarke 2006). Other groups in New Zealand, such as the Pacific Islanders, still receive scant attention in public and academic debates (Hill 2010). The principal similarity between New Zealand and Australia is simply that the dominant (majority) population is largely homogenous in terms of a white, Christian cultural community. Despite legal guaranties of equal rights and freedom, especially liberty of conscience, the legacy of British settlement still has a significant influence on values, traditions and culture including religion. Both societies have clearly identified elites despite the legacy (especially in Australia) of a ‘fair go’ for everybody in ‘the lucky country’. It is absolutely essential to emphasise the historical and cultural specificity of these societies whilst discussing Islam among the Indigenous, Maori and Pacific Islander populations. The analysis must take account of the significance of the unique features of these white-settler societies in any analysis of the contemporary status and place of the Indigenous/Maori populations. The factors we address here – none are exclusive and some are overlapping – are both social and political in nature: matters of inclusion and exclusion; matters of distinctiveness and self-determination; matters of resistance through (re-)alliance. One of the basic questions addressed in this chapter is to what extent are claims about a growth of Islam among Indigenous peoples sound? Or, are these merely public anxieties that are fuelled by media interests? The previous section demonstrated the growth of Islam in all Indigenous categories, except for the Pacific Islanders in Australia. This growth of Islam has also to be seen within the growth of the Indigenous population in the census. Nonetheless, there is statistical indication of significant growth in the numbers of Muslims among the focus populations; populations which are not traditionally Muslims, indicating rising levels of growth through conversion. According to our numbers, Islam is the fastest growing religion amongst the Maori populations. It should be pointed out that while we use the term ‘Maori’ in our discussion, the term itself is “an omnibus term for the tangata whenua (people of the land) deployed in settler discourse” (Havemann 1999: 6). Hence, a reference to a ‘Maori community’ or a ‘Maori population’ obscures the reality of between 36 and 43 iwi (distinct tribal groups) representing different cultural and political identities (competitive) among all the ‘Maori’ in New Zealand. There is occasional political tension between the iwis, but Maori – constituting 12,9% of the total population demonstrate a uniform front towards any external threats to their rights; for instance Maori have opposed a formal policy of multiculturalism, fearing negative effects on their distinctive recognition under a biculturalism (Clark 2006). A fear of the loss of this distinctiveness might be one of the reasons behind conversion among Maori. In some cases the reasons behind conversion reach further than a fear of ‘loss of place/rights’. Te Amorangi Izhaq Kireka-Whaanga - the leader of the Aotearoa Maori Muslim Association (AMMA) and recently ranked by the Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre (RISSC) in Jordan among the 500 most influential Muslims in the world (Indian Weekender Online 2010) - claims that Islam provides the perfect vehicle for the quest for Maori sovereignty (tino rangatiratanga). Kireka-Whaanga statements 11 take on strong militant overtones, expressing disenchantment with various aspects of New Zealand (Western) society such as the ongoing colonial oppression, dominant Western values and empty promises of Christianity - even comparing this quest to a form of jihad (Hume 2004). The inclusion of the term ‘jihad’ in Kireka-Whaanga accounts is nothing unique. The term ‘jihad’, like ‘terrorism’, appears frequently in political and public discourse on conversion to Islam among Aboriginal Australians and Maori, indicating the strong impact of global media on all matters to do with ‘Islam in the West’. These terms conjure up militant images, and strong association with dominant forms of violent masculinity, which in itself might prove attractive to young Maori and Aboriginal men, seeking a place in society. Indigenous Australians – 2.3% of the population according to the 2006 Census experience similar assumptions regarding their cultural homogeneity, but their distinct powers differ from those of Maori. While Indigenous Australians hold special rights to: “a distinct status and culture…the right to self-determination…the right to land” (HREOC 2010) actual social, political and economic power are limited, and have through time been undermined by various policies and legislation (e.g. Attwood 2003; Attwood and Markus 1999; Reynolds 1998) As with the Maori population, Islam appears to be on the rise among Indigenous Australia, following the same trends according to age, gender and location (the exception found among Maori women in Australia). Furthermore, the images produced in the media and attached to Aboriginal converts to Islam, mirror the same negative depictions for Maori; the image is young, black, and (mostly) male. Our findings for Pacific Islanders in Australia did not correspond closely to our findings for the other groups when it came to growth in Islam among the other populations. Our main intention for including Pacific Islanders was to establish a basis for a comparative component based on Indigeneity and religious affiliations. We have no absolute conclusion regarding the reasons behind this decrease, but areas of interest might lie within a focus on the state and population policies. As stated before, Pacific Islanders have a long history in both New Zealand and Australia, and have long been sought as cheap labour (Lee 2009). Australia implemented the Pacific Islander Act (1901) in order to monitor and control the numbers of Pacific Islander migrants and has maintained firm regulation on the migration of Pacific Islanders to Australia. New Zealand’s policies towards Pacific Islanders are more complex than that of Australia, but demonstrate more openness and acceptance to many Pacific Islander groups (Clarke 2006). Consequently, while Pacific Islanders do not experience the same rights and place as the Indigenous populations of New Zealand, this population is more fluid, especially in Australia, which might explain some of our findings. Our data indicate growth in Muslim conversions among young males among both Maori and Aboriginal Australians, but there is only limited anecdotal support for a causal relationship between political alienation and conversion to Islam. Another important element when it comes to explaining this growth in conversion lies with increased urbanisation among both Maori and Aboriginal Australians (Morgan 2006). The sociological importance of this urbanisation is twofold: the authority of ancestral traditions are challenged by ideas of modernity and the move to urban settings frequently results in social marginality (at least more apparent social marginality). The former factor immediately raises loud voices of loss of traditions and rejection of 12 Western values and traditions. The latter adds claims to lack of willingness to become engaged in modern, Western society, hence, imposing outsider status and threats to the state. Furthermore, in the course of increased urbanisation among Indigenous peoples in the West and the strong likelihood of social marginality, the majority of urbanliving Indigenous peoples come into close contact with other socially marginal groups, among them Muslims in the West. Such association between Australian Muslims and Australian Aborigines (on the fringes of society) is not a new phenomenon (see Onnudottir, Possamai and Turner 2010), but the last two decades have seen Muslims in both New Zealand and Australia experiencing increasing levels of negative public attitudes and perceptions (Humphrey 2001).Consequently, the media portrayal of ‘Islam in the West’, yet again confirms the ‘outsider’ status of the Muslim and the problematic place of Islam in Western societies. At the same time, the close encounter between traditional Muslim populations and some Indigenous peoples, combined with the powerful discourses about Islam as a global force resisting Western values and traditions, might very realistically be a factor to consider whilst analysing conversion to Islam; the ‘utilities of conversion’ must be one element in all reflection on the topic, where “…conversion…can involve collective agency to change national and international circumstances” (Turner 2009: 29). Conversion to Islam might not be seen as intensifying social marginality, it might rather be seen as arriving in (for some even a return to) a kindred community. Hence, one possible explanation for growing conversion to Islam might have its roots in the inevitable outcomes of progressive, Western modernity. Indigenous peoples, especially young Indigenous males who frequently find themselves on the margins of society, choose – not unlike a Dalit leaving Hinduism - to ‘leave the West’, seeking the support and collective membership of a Global community namely membership of the Islamic Ummah. Stuart Hall and Sarat Maharaj (2001) claim that “…it seems to be absolutely dead central to society that both multiculturalism and racism are increasing at one and the same time” (p. 49). Hence, Ummah might be the answer to Indigenous peoples escaping the negative features of urban society where they experience poverty, discrimination and exclusion. Ummah might offer an opportunity to “make all things new” (Turner 2009: 19). Furthermore, due to the nature of Islam, which looks towards the past as well as the present and embraces and values ancestral traditions, the Ummah might provide for a place and structure for those escaping Western materialism and modernity. However, it must be acknowledged that as this is only one possible explanation behind the conversion to Islam among Maori and Aboriginal Australians, it does certainly not touch on all the different elements which come together to shape and impact on society. Our findings point clearly to the need for a sociological engagement with this topic within a comparative and historical framework. Australian and New Zealand Indigenous converts to Islam – minority populations in Western societies – might have more in common with Danish converts, the members of a white, majority population, than commonly assumed. Similarly, Dalit converts in India – a population with very limited rights and recognition in its homeland – might share many of the aspirations of New Zealand and Australian Indigenous converts. Political dynamics, spiritual quests and individual (group) advancement are but a few common elements among these groups. At the same time, we also recognise the need to take in differences. Indigenous peoples have a special socio-political and legal status, one which impacts on both local and global levels, defining relations (with the state, with the rest of 13 society and with a chosen religious community) and, at times, impacting on political and legal institutions. These are but a few of the issues that further enquiry into the sociology of conversion would need to consider. References: Attwood, B. (2003) Rights for Aborigines, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2003. Attwood, B. and A. Markus (1999) 'The Fight for Aboriginal Rights', in Robert Manne (ed.), The Australian Century: Political Struggle in the Building of a Nation, Text Publishing, Melbourne, pp. 264-92. BBC (2006) ‘Dalits in conversion ceremony’, 14 October, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6050408.stm BBC (2007) ‘Mass Dalit conversion in Mubai’, 27 May, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6695695.stm Beckford, J. (1985) Cult Controversies, London: Tavistock Publications. Clarke, I. (2006) ‘Essentialising Islam: Multiculturalism and Islamic Politics in New Zealand’, New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies 8, 2 (December, 2006), pp. 69-96. Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2010) http://www.immi.gov.au/media/factsheets/06evolution.htm Gest, J. (2010) Apart: Alienated and Engaged Muslims in the West, New York: Columbia University Press. Hall, S. and S. Maharaj (2001) Annotations: Modernity and Differences No. 6, London: Iniva Publication. Havemann, P. (ed.) (1999) Indigenous Peoples’ Rights: in Australia, Canada & New Zealand, Auckland: Oxford University Press. Hefner, R. (1999) ‘Multiple Modernities; Christianity, Islam and Hinduism in a Globalizing Age’ Annual Review of Anthropology, 27, pp. 83 – 104. Hill, R. S. (2010) ‘Fitting Multiculturalism Into Biculturalism: Maori–Pasifika Relations In New Zealand From The 1960s’, Ethnochistory 57, 2, pp. 291 – 319. HREOC (2010) Australian Human Rights Commission http://www.hreoc.gov.au/social_justice/index.html Hume, T. (2004) ‘Disenchanted Maori find spiritual crutch in Islam’ Sunday Star-Times, Wellington, New Zealand, 17 Oct., np. Humphrey, M. (2001) ‘An Australian Islam? Religion in the Multicultural City’, Muslim communities in Australia, Sydney: UNSW Press, pp. 33 – 52. 14 Huntington, S. P. (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster. Indian Weekender Online Tuesday, August 10, 2010 http://www.indianweekender.co.nz/Pages/ArticleDetails/7/1350/New-Zealand/NZ-pairamong-500-top-Muslims-in-world Jensen, T. (2006) ‘Religious Authority and Autonomy Intertwined: The Case of Converts to Islam in Denmark’, The Muslim World, 96, 4, pp. 643 – 660. Kalam, M. A. (1984) ‘Why the Harijan Convert To Islam Views Reservations with Reservation’¸ South Asia Research, 4, pp. 152 – 167. Kannan, M. & F. Gros (2002) ‘Tamil Dalits in Search of Literature’, South Asia Research, 22, 1, pp. 21 – 42. Kettani, H. (2010) ‘World Muslim Population: 1950 – 2020’, International Journal of Environmental Science and Development (IJESD), 1, 2, pp. 127-170. Lee, H. (2009) ‘Pacific Migration and Transnationalism: Historical Perspectives’ Migration and Transnationalism: Pacific Perspectives, (eds.) Helen Lee and Steve Tupai Francis, Acton: ANU E Press, pp. 7 – 41. Milligazette (2002) ‘Dalits convert to Islam, Buddhism and Christianity, 28 October, 2002, http://www.milligazette.com/dailyupdate/20021028.htm Mistry, M. (2005) ‘Muslims in India: A demographic and socio-economic profile’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 25, 3, pp. 399-422. Morgan, G. (2006) Unsettled Places: Aboriginal People and Urbanisation in New South Wales, Kent Town, South Australia: Wakefield Press. Onnudottir, H., A. Possamai, and B. Turner (2010) ‘Islam: A New Religious Vehicle for Aboriginal Self-Empowerment in Australia?’ International Journal for the Study of New Religions 1,1, pp. 49-73. PEW Report (2009) MAPPING THE GLOBAL MUSLIM POPULATION A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’ Muslim Population, October 2009. http://pewforum.org/Muslim/Mapping-the-Global-Muslim-Population.aspx Reynolds, H. (1998) “Sovereignty”, Citizenship and Indigenous Australians: Changing Conceptions and Possibilities, (eds.) Nicolas Peterson and Will Sanders, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, pp. 208 – 215. Roy, O. (2004 [2002]) Globalized Islam: the Search for a New Ummah (The Ceri Series in Comparative Politics and International Studies), London: Hurst. Roy, O. (2007) Secularism confronts Islam (transl. George Holoch), New York: Columbia University Press. 15 Said, E. W. (1978) Orientalism, New York: Vintage Books. Sikand, Y. (2004) Muslims in India since 1947: Islamic perspectives on inter-faith relations, London: RoutledgeCurzon. Suleman, S. (2010) ‘Freedom of Religion and Anti Conversion Laws in India: An Overview’ ILI Law Review, 1, 1, pp. 106 – 128. Turner, B. (2009) ‘Evangelism, the state and subjectivity’, (eds.) Julius Bautista, Francis Khek Gee Lim, Christianity and the State in Asia Complicity and Conflict, London; New York: Routledge, pp. 18 – 35. van der Veer, P. (ed) (1996) Conversion to Modernities. The Globalization of Christianity, New York: Routledge. 16 TABLES Table 1: Religious affiliation of Pacific Islanders and Mäori in New Zealand 2001-2006 2006 Pacific Islanders Mäori Number Number % % 2001 Pacific Islanders Mäori Number Number % % Pacific Mäori Islanders Growth (%) 2001-2006 +35.12 +25.54 Mäori Religion Baha’i 150 0.06 2,286 0.40 111 0.05 1,821 0.35 600 0.23 354 0.06 456 0.20 468 0.09 +31.58 -24.39 Buddhist 582 0.22 1,839 0.33 606 0.26 1,683 0.32 -3.96 +9.27 Christian 199,983 75.19 245,052 43.35 178,923 77.19 249,075 47.33 +11.77 -1.62 Mäori Christian Hindu 3,315 1.25 58,779 10.40 2,529 1.09 58,143 11.05 +31.08 +1.09 861 0.32 816 0.14 525 0.23 837 0.16 +64.00 -2.51 Islam/ 1,074 0.40 1,074 0.19 573 0.25 711 0.14 +87.43 +51.05 Muslim Other 1,245 0.47 5,094 0.90 1,059 0.46 4,377 0.83 +17.56 +16.38 Religions No 34,830 13.10 193,683 34.26 25,467 10.99 152,115 28.90 +36.77 +27.33 Religion Object to 12,603 4.74 45,522 8.05 11,049 4.77 40,509 7.70 +14.06 +12.38 Answering Total 249,435 93.78 530,625 93.86 218,472 94.25 495,219 94.10 +14.17 +7.15 People Specifying One or More Religious Affiliations (incl. No Religion and Object) Not 17,445 6.56 36,312 6.42 14,442 6.23 34,038 6.47 +20.79 +6.68 Elsewhere Included* Total 265,974 (100.00) 565,329 (100.00) 231,801 (100.00) 526,281 (100.00) +14.74 +7.42 People Total 272,688 102.52 590,761 104.50 235,740 101.70 543,777 103.32 Answers Source: Statistics New Zealand. (Cells in this table have been randomly adjusted to avoid the release of confidential data.) * Comprises: Religion Unidentifiable, Response Outside Scope, Not Stated 17 Table 2: Religious affiliation of Indigenous Australians, Pacific Islanders and Mäori in Australia 2001-2006 2006 Indigenous Number Pacific Islanders % Number Mäori % 2001 Indigenous Number % Number Pacific Islanders % Number Mäori % GROWTH Indigenous Number % Mäori Pacific Islanders % % % Aboriginal Traditional Religion Baha’i 5,209 1.14 11 0.01 0 0 5,015 1.22 9 0.01 12 0.03 +3.87 +22.22 -100.00 160 0.04 133 0.18 25 0.05 126 0.03 165 0.25 24 0.05 +26.98 -19.39 +4.17 Buddhism 1,423 0.31 110 0.15 123 0.26 1,245 0.30 134 0.20 141 0.30 +14.30 -17.91 -12.77 290,619 63.87 62,745 83.77 27,708 58.33 282,697 68.95 55,209 83.40 29,285 62.13 +2.80 +13.65 -5.39 118 0.03 2,378 3.17 8 0.02 156 0.04 2,066 3.12 36 0.08 -24.36 +15.10 -77.78 Islam 1,010 0.22 1,256 1.68 131 0.28 622 0.15 1,380 2.08 85 0.18 +62.38 -8.99 +54.12 Other Religion No Religion 5,753 1.26 759 1.01 779 1.64 10,601 2.59 1,628 2.46 1,814 3.85 -45.73 -53.38 -57.06 93,591 20.57 4,100 5.47 13,619 28.67 65,070 15.87 2,830 4.27 10,567 22.42 +43.83 +44.88 +28.88 Not Stated 57,141 12.56 3,407 4.56 5,107 10.75 44,470 10.85 2,780 4.21 5,171 10.96 +28.49 +22.55 -1.24 455,024 100.00 74,899 100.00 47,500 100.00 410,002 100.00 66,201 100.00 47,135 100.00 +10.98 +13.14 +0.77 Christianity Hinduism Total Source: ABS. (Cells in this table have been randomly adjusted to avoid the release of confidential data.) 18 Table 3: Religion per age of Pacific Islanders and Mäori in New Zealand 2006 (Percentages) 0 <19 yrs Christian Islam/Muslim No Religion Total 20 < 39 yrs 40 < 59 yrs 60 < yrs Total Pacific Islanders 44.54 28.88 19.61 6.97 100.00 Mäori 38.80 25.12 25.89 10.19 100.00 Pacific Islanders 37.26 40.06 18.77 3.91 100.00 Mäori 38.17 40.11 18.67 3.05 100.0 Pacific Islanders 61.10 29.33 8.38 1.19 100.00 Mäori 55.44 32.01 11.3 1.25 100.00 Pacific Islanders 48.13 28.51 17.46 5.90 100.00 Mäori 45.72 28.12 19.81 6.35 100.00 Source: Statistics New Zealand. (Cells in this table have been randomly adjusted to avoid the release of confidential data.) * Comprises: Religion Unidentifiable, Response Outside Scope, Not Stated Table 4: Religion per age of Indigenous Australians, Pacific Islanders and Mäori in Australia 2006 (Percentages) 019 yrs Christianity Islam No Religion Total Population < 20 < 39 yrs 40 < 59 yrs 60 < yrs Total Indigenous 45.84 27.69 20.06 6.41 100.00 Pacific Islanders 38.61 31.71 24.24 5.44 100.00 Mäori 30.80 33.23 30.27 5.70 100.00 Indigenous 41.09 35.74 17.92 5.25 100.00 Pacific Islanders 28.58 38.77 26.84 5.81 100.00 Mäori 58.77 25.95 12.98 2.30 100.00 Indigenous 56.97 28.87 11.86 2.30 100.00 Pacific Islanders 40.19 41.00 16.32 2.49 100.00 Mäori 38.84 42.34 17.11 1.71 100.00 Indigenous 48.27 28.72 17.72 5.29 100.00 Pacific Islanders 38.30 32.69 23.77 5.24 100.00 Mäori 33.89 36.46 25.49 4.16 100.00 Source: ABS. (Cells in this table have been randomly adjusted to avoid the release of confidential data.) 19 Table 5: Religion per sex of Pacific Islanders and Mäori in New Zealand 2006 MALE Number Christian Islam/Muslim No Religion Total Pacific Islanders Mäori FEMALE % Number % TOTAL Number % 96,468 48 103,518 52 199,983 100 112,032 46 133,017 54 245,052 100 Pacific Islanders Mäori 579 54 492 46 1,074 100 657 61 417 39 1,074 100 Pacific Islanders Mäori 18,255 52 16,578 48 34,830 100 97,755 50 95,928 50 193,683 100 Pacific Islanders Mäori 131,007 49 134,964 51 265,974 100 274,860 49 290,466 51 565,329 100 Source: Statistics New Zealand. (Cells in this table have been randomly adjusted to avoid the release of confidential data.) * Comprises: Religion Unidentifiable, Response Outside Scope, Not Stated Table 6: Religion per sex of Indigenous Australians, Pacific Islanders and Mäori in Australia 2006 (Percentages) Christianity Islam No Religion Total Population MALE FEMALE TOTAL Indigenous 47 53 100 Pacific Islanders Mäori 48 52 100 49 51 100 Indigenous 58 42 100 Pacific Islanders Mäori 48 52 100 30 70 100 Indigenous 52 48 100 Pacific Islanders Mäori 56 44 100 54 46 100 Indigenous 49 51 100 Pacific Islanders Mäori 49 51 100 51 49 100 Source: ABS. (Cells in this table have been randomly adjusted to avoid the release of confidential data.) 20 Table 7: Religion per location of Pacific Islanders and Mäori in New Zealand 2006 (Percentages) Christian Islam/Muslim No Religion Total 2.60 Minor Urban Area 1.75 0.39 1.41 Other (Inland Water, Inlet and Oceanic) 0.00 64.97 6.67 12.45 3.32 12.58 0.01 100.00 Pacific Islanders Mäori 91.90 2.79 3.07 0.84 1.40 0 100.00 76.19 2.80 9.80 1.40 9.81 0 100.00 Pacific Islanders Mäori 84.72 4.38 5.39 1.02 4.49 0 100.00 66.69 7.23 11.95 2.81 11.31 0.01 100.00 Pacific Islanders Mäori 92.05 2.95 2.48 0.52 2.00 0.00 100.00 64.67 6.94 12.83 3.26 12.29 0.01 100.00 Pacific Islanders Mäori Main Urban Area 93.85 Secondary Urban Area Rural Centre Other Rural Total 100.00 Source: Statistics New Zealand. (Cells in this table have been randomly adjusted to avoid the release of confidential data.) * Comprises: Religion Unidentifiable, Response Outside Scope, Not Stated 21 Table 8: Religion per location of Pacific Islanders and Mäori in Australia 2006 (Percentages) Christianity Islam No Religion Total Population Major Urban Other Urban Bounded Locality Rural Balance Migratory Total Pacific 86.97 10.07 1.04 1.88 0.04 100.00 Mäori 79.13 15.33 1.50 4.04 0 100.00 Pacific 96.89 2.15 0 0.96 0 100.00 Mäori 83.97 11.45 0 4.58 0 100.00 Pacific 80.27 14.80 0.80 3.98 0.15 100.00 Mäori 76.92 17.00 1.42 4.58 0.08 100.00 Pacific 86.94 9.96 1.03 2.02 0.05 100.00 Mäori 78.17 16.13 1.55 4.13 0.02 100.00 Source: ABS. (Cells in this table have been randomly adjusted to avoid the release of confidential data.) Table 9: Religion per location of Indigenous peoples of Australia 2006 (Percentages) No Usual Address Major Cities of Australia Inner Regional Australia Outer Regional Australia Remote Australia Very Remote Australia Migratory Christianity 30.56 21.75 22.37 9.62 15.44 0.01 0.25 100.00 Islam 63.27 14.26 11.98 4.75 4.46 0 1.28 100.00 No Religion 38.19 22.87 20.25 6.56 11.68 0.01 0.44 100.00 Total Population 32.37 21.83 21.68 8.66 15.11 0.01 0.34 100.00 Source: ABS. (Cells in this table have been randomly adjusted to avoid the release of confidential data.) 22 Total