GeorGe Cassar Defending a Mediterranean island outpost of the Spanish Empire – the case of Malta The Maltese archipelago, collectively known as Malta, has a long history of possession and colonisation running from prehistoric times till the attainment of political independence in 1964. One such long period of domination is that of the Aragonese who captured the Maltese islands in 1283 following a hard-fought sea battle won by the renowned Admiral Roger di Lauria.1 The battle, fought in Malta’s grand harbour in June of that year, was instrumental in wrestling the island from Angevin rule and facilitated the joining of Malta to the other Sicilian lands which now fell under the domination of Peter III of Aragon (I of Sicily).2 In fact, following that crucial naval battle, it was the turn of the castrum maris – the solitary guardian of the Maltese harbour and which was still in Angevin hands – to fall to the Aragonese Manfredi Lancia. With this latest victory the takeover of the island was completed.3 This castle (which would later become Fort St Angelo) at the tip of one of the numerous peninsulas jutting out into the Grand Harbour, had been described as a truly royal and highly armed fortiication, and was at this time considered to be a precious gem on the Sicilian ring.4 The year 1283 marked the irst of many centuries yet to follow during which the Spanish Crown extensively exploited the Maltese islands for its political and strategic exigencies while substantially conceding to the locals much less in return. The islanders had little choice but to abide by their Spanish rulers’ whims and pleasures. The period of Spanish domination, generally exercised through the viceroys of Sicily, culminated in the donation made by Holy Roman Emperor Charles V (who was also King Charles I of Spain), to the Order of St John and which came into effect in 1530. At that point, the history of the islands takes a fresh turning with Malta being gradually transformed from an insigniicant colonial backwater into a most respected, renowned and sought after country in the Mediterranean region. For it was during the domination of the Hospitallers that Malta was converted into one of the most fortiied islands to be reckoned with. The Aragonese and their rule As Malta joined the other Aragonese territorial possessions it also became intrinsically entwined in the day-to-day endeavours of that kingdom. Yet, Malta’s situation emerges as somewhat conlicting considering that, while the archipelago was deemed important to retain, at the same time little effort was exerted by the Spanish Crown to strengthen and effectively protect it from attack or invasion, assaults which could potentially wrest the islands from Aragon. Moreover, when problems in the Kingdom arose, Malta generally came out the worse off. One of the very irst instances which put this trend in evidence developed in 1292. With the death of King Peter III, according to his own wish, his possessions were divided between two of his sons. While Alfonso III (1285-1291) took Aragon, his brother James II (1285-1295) was given Sicily and its islands. James, however, soon took over the Crown of The territories held by the Aragonese crown in 1441 in the Mediterranean region which included the Maltese islands Sacra Militia Issue no. 13 - 2014 59 Aragon when Alfonso died. At this point the Sicilians lord to the next. Sometimes, after the Maltese protested expressed their fervent wish to their king that he may and pleaded, the king would reintegrate the islands into conirm his commitment not to forfeit their island to the Regio Demanio by conceding some privileges to the Angevins who still controlled the neighbouring the locals.9 This see-saw like situation was typical of Naples and the southern Italian peninsula. James the period of Spanish domination of Malta. complied, and reiterated that not only would he hold on to Sicily but would also want to extend this claim Close to the turn of the fifteenth century, that is on Malta, Pantelleria, the in 1397, King Martin I Lipari Islands and Tunis.5 of Sicily, also known as To substantiate this royal ‘the Younger’ (and whose declaration, James gave father, Martin ‘the Elder’, orders for the defences was King of Aragon), while of Malta to be reinforced granting the Maltese some while the defence of privileges, he took from the castrum maris was them in return much more. entrusted to his brother In fact, not only did he not provide any defences for Frederick.6 Unknown to the Maltese islands but, all, covert dealings were underway between James to the contrary, he obliged the islanders to contribute of Aragon and Charles of towards equipping the Anjou, facilitated through naval and land forces the efforts of the newly which he was preparing. elected Pope Boniface The locals were also to VIII, for a deal which pay ive per cent of all the included the concession booty from the corsairing of Sicily and Malta as activities carried out by a fief to the Angevins them, which money was in exchange of the fiefs normally used to support of Sardinia and Corsica the Maltese treasury and which would be taken over give employment to the by the Aragonese. As the majority of the locals. And dealing became known, King Martin I ‘the Younger’ to add insult to injury the the Sicilians reacted in a bout of nationalistic fervour. They thus deposed their Maltese were also to build and maintain a galley from king, James, and crowned his brother Frederick as their own pockets for the defence of their island, and their new king.7 Thus also the Maltese, by implication, which would come to cost around 200 golden uncie. now came to owe their allegiance to Frederick III. Yet This was an expense which the local population could James, not prepared to accept this affront, ordered his ill afford; though the Maltese could not really refuse if leet to attack Pantelleria and then go on to take Malta. they wanted to see a resurgence of Aragonese authority Thus, the Maltese experienced their irst negative over the neighbouring waters – which by that time had taste of Aragonese actions when the invading leet plummeted. Thus, the only way to alleviate the burden disembarked its men, who swooped on the villages, was to move a plea to the Royal Court, which in turn burning them and seizing the locals; while those who conceded to a downsizing of the contribution to 50 managed to escape from the ire and the plunder were golden uncie.10 then tortured in prison.8 This was the price the Maltese paid for siding with Frederick. They could not defend The islands could not really enjoy political stability as themselves; and no one was there to protect them from different kings operated different policies and acted the incursions and the violence of assailers. The island according to necessities, opportunities, circumstances was open to attack and each time the inhabitants would and exigencies. This, the Maltese tried to mitigate invariably have to pay a heavy price in human lives, through periodic delegations and requests to the animal stock, the destruction of crops, and the loss viceroys in Sicily under whose authority Malta was of property. The Maltese islands were largely treated placed, and who were the representatives of the as objects of merchandise. In fact, the Spanish kings Crown of Aragon. With regard to the incolumity of the regularly relegated Malta to the status of a iefdom, Maltese archipelago which was under constant threat of with the archipelago changing hands from one feudal Muslim piratical attacks and incursions, one recurrent 60 Sacra Militia Issue no. 13 - 2014 Aragonese Crown to help them in this pressing need. One of these requests was forwarded to King Alfonso V ‘the Magniicent’ via a delegation which presented this plea to the viceroy in Sicily in 1418.12 The Maltese petition was accepted and taxes were levied on wine, on the Malta-Gozo ferryboat service, and on money borrowing, amongst others, with the funds collected being earmarked to inance the much-needed tower on Comino. However, as usually happened during the Spanish period, promises were broken without much effort, and this instance was no exception – the funds accumulated were in fact diverted to Alfonso’s Mediterranean expansion and Comino would remain a pirates’ haven for another couple of centuries.13 King Alfonso V request was that for the curtailment of the practice by many locals of paying money to the regal authorities in exchange for an exemption of obligatory guard duties around the coast. One such instance was that of 1416 made to Viceroy John. Each year there would be between 150 and 200 exemptions and this practice crippled any effective defence of the Maltese islands while opening them further to severe plundering forays which not only resulted in looted and destroyed villages but caused many inhabitants to be taken into slavery by the invaders. Besides, the castrum maris, the only defensive structure guarding Malta’s grand harbour and considered the key to the archipelago, needed repairs and new equipment if this was to become an effective and worthy fortiication.11 The neglect in the defences of the archipelago was most manifest on the smaller island of Comino which is situated between the two bigger islands of Malta and Gozo. This was a nest for pirates as these regularly took shelter within its coves with their ships without fear of reprisals. The Maltese knew that to fortify this island was indispensible and they thus turned to the Sacra Militia Issue no. 13 - 2014 The Maltese continued to hope for better outcomes, even though, realistically, little could be assumed. Experience indicated, and on-going events repeatedly conirmed, that Malta was nothing more than a pawn in the hands of the Spanish kings. A classical case was the Gonsalvo Monroy episode which took the Maltese to the verge of sedition when they rebelled against this feudal lord who had acquired the Maltese islands from the previous feudal lord, Antonio Cardona, for 30,000 lorins. This situation showed that though the Crown had promised to keep the Maltese islands within the Regio Demanio, all these pledges went up in smoke in 1421 when Alfonso granted the islands to Cardona, his Viceroy in Sicily, against the said sum of money that the King desperately needed to support his military campaign against Naples. Cardona soon got his money back when, four weeks later Malta was transferred to the Castilian Monroy for the identical amount of money that had been previously paid to the King.14 The islanders had thus once again been abandoned to their sorts as was conirmed when the island of Gozo was attacked for the nth time by a Moorish force in The Castrum Maris in the Middle Ages, according to a design by Dr Stephen C. Spiteri 61 1419, in which assault many islanders were taken into captivity, and then in 1422 when the island of Malta was attacked twice.15 Monroy’s soldiers had done nothing to defend the locals and this inertia primed the anger of the Gozitans who rose in rebellion in 1425. With the feudal lord turning to the king for help to bring the rebels back in line, the Maltese council assured their sovereign that it was doing all it could to bring back order. However, it also underscored the fact that there were grievances that needed to be addressed by the Crown. An evident explosive situation was brewing and while King Alfonso needed to act, he continued to procrastinate. The spirit of rebellion soon crossed the channel and spread among the population of Malta with the inhabitants blockading Monroy’s wife and his followers in the castrum maris. For their actions the Maltese were declared outlaws by Monroy who at this time occupied the position of Admiral of Sicily and was one of the important barons of the Reign. The Maltese through their Universitas turned to the Crown in a plea to the king to permit them to redeem their country by paying back the 30,000 lorins, while beseeching him to grant their fervent wish of being reintegrated within the Regio Demanio. This request was accepted and by 1428 the Maltese could once again consider themselves full subjects of the King of Spain. Not only that, but St Paul galloping on a white horse with Mdina in the background - a painting by Mattia Preti in the Cathedral of Mdina commemorating the 1429 Muslin raid on Malta and the belief by the Maltese in his intervention to save the island 62 Alfonso also highlighted this reinstatement by calling Malta Gioiello Eccellente (jewel of the highest order) while Malta’s capital city became known as Notabile (notable, worthy).16 As was perhaps to be expected, while the foreign forces in Malta did not exert themselves unduly to protect the inhabitants of these islands, they did, on the other hand, prepare themselves well to protect the masters of this ief and their property. This comes out clearly from a list of the armaments which were found in the castrum maris and which emerges from the inventories of 1429. Thus the fort at the heart of the Grand Harbour, under the command of the castellan who was in charge of the soldiers of the lords of Malta, had seven bombards, 20 steel bows, 15 wooden bows, 480 kg of rice, 400 kg of cheese, wood, cord, ropes and medicines.17 Documents show that in 1398 the castrum has a garrison compliment of one castellan, one vice-castellan, 20 Catalan soldiers, 10 Sicilian or Maltese soldiers and another 40 Maltese living in the castle; with the number luctuating along the following century.18 However, this was a drop in the ocean when one considers the amplitude of the persistent threat faced by the Maltese islands, not least due to their proximity to the Barbary Coast. As has been observed, the defensive means which Malta possessed where never proportionate to the dangers it faced and the only element which could make up for this deiciency was the courage of its inhabitants.19 And one case in point was the 1429 Muslim attack led by Kaid Ridavan who laid siege to the Maltese capital city of Mdina and was on the verge of taking it when he abandoned the attack. Malta had suffered much during this invasion by the Moorish leet and the inhabitants had to endure many sacriices.20 It may be that the city of Malta did not fall, only because it could offer a realistic level of resistance due to its relatively strong fortiied enceinte which had been upgraded and reinforced along the years.21 On the other hand the whole landscape of the Maltese islands, trampled by around 18,000 troops that poured out of the 70 galleys on which they were transported, was left in a pitiful state in the wake of their re-embarkation. Many people ended up in captivity and only those whose family could muster enough money for a ransom would eventually manage to return to their homeland, while the money paid to buy back their freedom drained any inancial assets Malta had possessed. It is also doubtful how many of the poorer villagers did in fact ever see their birthplace again, and much of the land remained uncultivated for long years given that about a third of the population that worked it till that fateful year of 1429, were lost forever. The defences were now even worse than they had already been and inevitably yet more uncertainty crept among the inhabitants.22 Sacra Militia Issue no. 13 - 2014 An etching depicting the Ottoman attack on the city of Tripoli which was under the Order of St John and which was lost in 1551 For Malta, life in the Early Renaissance continued with little variation, and was generally broken only by more Moorish attacks in regular and relentless waves. Maltese petitions to the Sicilian viceroys, as representatives of the Spanish Crown, were also as consistently regular as the razzias and the many other calamities that hit the archipelago devastating both life and property. Then, in the third decade of the 16th century, a centuries-old familiar decision was about to be taken by yet another Spanish King. With the decision taken in 1524 and materialising in 1530, Charles I – who was at the same time Holy Roman Emperor Charles V – Malta’s future was about to change. The Order of St John takes over Malta The monastic warrior Order of the Hospitallers had been ruling Rhodes since 1309. Then, in 1522, after a six-month siege, the Knights of St John lost their island home to the Ottoman Turkish forces of Suleiman I ‘the Magniicent’. Defeated and demoralised, they had to move out. For years the brethren roamed the European continent missing a permanent home base which they could call their Convent. While visiting monarchs all over the continent, one deputation visited the Court of Charles V who made an offer which could provide the Religion with a stable place from where it could rebuild itself. His proposition was that the Order would take Sacra Militia Issue no. 13 - 2014 the city and fortress of Tripoli on the Barbary Coast together with the islands of Malta and Gozo with all the dependencies, territories and jurisdictions that belonged to them. All this, the Knights could enjoy as a perpetual ief on condition that the Grand Master (binding also all his successors) swore loyalty to His Majesty and all the future rulers of the Kingdom of Sicily. The sign of homage would be the annual presentation of one falcon on All Saints Day; but there were also many other stiff conditions which were seen as shackles to the Order’s freedom of ruling these territories without interference. Furthermore, giving them Tripoli to administer and defend – an area in the middle of hostile Muslim territory – was a responsibility way beyond the Order’s means at that weak point of its existence.23 The Order procrastinated but did not refuse the offer. They also asked Pope Clement to intervene on their behalf so that Charles might alleviate some of the binding conditions he had imposed with his offer – which, one may say, was more to the beneit of the Spanish Crown than to the Order itself. By passing on Malta to others, the Spanish kings were thus continuing to play their centuries-old win-win game of keeping Malta within their realm without having to pay for its upkeep and protection, yet resting their minds that there was a trusted vassal administering their property.24 63 the new capital city of Valletta). Together with the city, town and castle mentioned, about 40 small villages and hamlets provided dwellings for the 12,000 inhabitants, most of whom were poor as the barren land did not yield much produce. According to the commissioners what redeemed this island were the numerous good inlets and ports which could serve the Order’s leet, and it was thus for this reason that they opined that the Emperor’s offer was not to be outright discarded.25 Grand Master L’Isle Adam who took over the Maltese island with the Donation of Charles V Not knowing exactly what to do, and with their minds still on their beloved Rhodes to which the Order dreamt it would someday return, a commission was sent to review the offered territories and draw a report for the Grand Master and his Council. It is interesting to examine what was written in this report, as it reveals what the Spanish were going to be ‘losing’ and the legacy they would be passing on to the Hospitallers after more than 200 years of direct Spanish/Sicilian domination. On disembarking in Malta, the commissioners described it as “one continued rock of sandy stone”. Water was scarce and had to be collected in cisterns; the soil was very shallow with cereals having to be imported as these did not grow on the island, while there was an abundance of igs, melons and other fruits. The main exports were honey, cumin and cotton while wood was very scarce and the locals lit their ires with cow dung and wild thistle. Regarding the capital city of Mdina, the commissioners noted that this was sited on a hill in the middle of the island and was rather dificult to reach as all the terrain around it was rocky. The defences of the city practically consisted of a defensive wall with a few towers erected to give protection to the gates. The only other fortiication was the castrum maris also known as the castle of St Angelo, which was situated in Malta’s main port, and overlooked a town called the Borgo. The principal harbour of the island was split into two havens by a peninsula (which would later on become the site for 64 With the observations on the main island of Malta complete, they then hopped over to the smaller sister island of Gozo. The commissioners noted that Gozo did not possess a proper port, and that it was surrounded by craggy rocks and shelves. There, 5,000 inhabitants lived and the soil was more fertile than that of Malta. The people were spread all over the island while for their protection they had built a castle on the top of a hill which, however, was badly fortiied and of no real defensive value. Yet, the commissioners’ advice to the Council of the Order was that it would not make sense accepting Malta but not also Gozo. The latter was too geographically close; were an enemy to land on Gozo and use it as a base this could prove quite harmful to Malta. The report also spoke about the town and castle of Tripoli. In the opinion of the commissioners, to hold and defend it would simply be a futile effort.26 Having all the details in hand, the Order’s Council had now to deliberate on what to do next; a Hobson’s choice really, as there was no other place available. Up till the Donation was made oficial, the Order had managed to get some concessions which made the taking over of Malta, Gozo and Tripoli a little more bearable and respectable for the Knights. The Donation of 1530 declared that these territories were given “in perpetuo Feudo, nobile, libero, e franco”. Also, the annual falcon which was to be presented to the King of Sicily, would be “in segno di vera riconoscenza” of the ief. These developments, together with some other concessions and the pressing need for a permanent home, induced the Order into deciding in favour of the donation being offered by Charles V. Of course they would have preferred to keep Tripoli out of the bargain but the royal donor was unbending on this point and nothing better could by extracted.27 This was the irst stage in the Order’s domination of the Maltese islands which stretched for 268 years. As one author put it: “The knights eventually settled at Malta, at that time a nearly desert island. They made it the seat of their Order and fortiied it. Its central position in the Mediterranean made it a stronghold of the utmost importance.”28 Work on the existing fortifications started as soon as the Order took Malta, and even before Sacra Militia Issue no. 13 - 2014 Grand Master L’Isle Adam had set foot on the island, when an advanced party of masons and carpenters was sent to patch up the harbour castle29 which at some point began to bear the oficial name of St Angelo. It is known that in the inner castrum there had existed a chapel dedicated to that saint in the proximity of a round tower which Sicilian documents indicate as the Tower of St Angelo.30 On disembarking in Malta, the Grand Master and his Order brought with them a big dilemma and which persisted for many years. The question was very straight and direct: How much should the Knights invest in an island that was considered by the Order to be a temporary base? With their minds and hearts still in Rhodes, this emerged as a licit quandary, and to which no Knight had, at that particular moment, a solution. Thus, till 1565, all fortiications and defences taken up were more or less for the sake of momentary needs rather than for a permanent and far-seeking objective. The Order decided that it made more sense for their actual needs – such as keeping an eye on their leet – to take up residence in the old fort of St Angelo and its attached town or borgo.31 The fort was therefore strengthened enough to make it decently defendable while buildings in the town were adapted to the administrative and everyday needs of the confreres. A defensive ditch was dug between the fort and the town and then deepened a few years after, while a new bastion was erected.32 The town was also renovated with the construction of seven auberges for the different langues of the Order.33 The city of Malta, Mdina, too received some initial attention and a new land front was designed with pentagonal bastions34 so as to provide it with a feasible chance of defence though nothing of the sort was done to the Gozo castello, alterations which had to wait till late in the sixteenth century when a new land front defensive structure was provided.35 With doing little the Knights were however inviting trouble. They were now in Malta and their presence would sooner or later attract attacks by their longtime enemies ordered from the Barbary Coast and the Ottoman Sultan. One such assault came in 1551 when a Turkish invading party jointly commanded by Sinan Pasha and Turgut Reis disembarked 10,000 men to be contrasted by a local force of 800 men. Though there was no comparison in strength between the invaders and the defenders, yet the Turkish commanders did not feel comfortable risking their troops as these feared that a stiffer defence may be in the ofing and did not want to risk being cut off from their leet anchored in one of the harbours. They thus re-embarked and attacked the sister island of Gozo instead. Here they found no resistance worth the name as the castle was defensibly ineffective and could not realistically resist such a strong force. The outcome was that practically all the inhabitants of the island were taken into slavery.36 This was a clear indication that without strong defences, Malta could not resist such incursions. Yet, with the Order still generally bonded to its beloved Rhodes and the hope that it would, one day, go back there, the inal decision to settle in Malta and invest all their energy and money to create a strong base and establish a stable Convent was kept in abeyance. They did however decide on building a key fort at the tip of the Sciberras peninsula which could thus provide some protection to the mouths of the grand harbour and the small harbour (known as Marsamxett). The new fortiication was the star-shaped Fort St Elmo whose irst stone was laid in 1552.37 The turning point in the Order’s mindset came in 1565 with yet another Turkish incursion. This momentous event inally caused the Order to relect and decide. The Ottoman attack on Malta, known locally as the The medieval walls of the main town of Gozo known as the Cittadella which was attacked by Muslim forces in 1551 and which had little defensive potential Sacra Militia Issue no. 13 - 2014 65 Great Siege, was no hit and run affair. It was neither a two or three-day expedition. It was a fully blown four-month siege with all the requisites to make it a battle to the last man. Both sides knew the stakes – with the Maltese side realising full well that if Malta was lost, this would mean that Europe would become vulnerable to an Ottoman attack via Sicily. The siege was bloody, dirty, and ruthless. Nothing different may be expected from war and the Great Siege of Malta was no exception. It was a clash of religions; and a standoff that had been long coming. It was the Turk against the Knight; the Muslim Sultan Suleiman against the Christian Grand Master Jean de Valette. In the end, the Order and its allies came out the victors and with the positive outcome Europe, its people and their monarchs breathed a sigh of relief and lauded Malta for its heroism.38 The victory, a veritable feat considering the odds, raised the Order’s status in Europe among both Catholics and Protestants and gave it that boost of morale it needed to put behind it once and for all the defeat at Rhodes.39 Psychologically, the confreres led by de Valette could now face their reality. Propped by its victory and newly found self-conidence, the Hospitaller Order decided to take up permanent residence in Malta and to underscore this decision and seal it, the Grand Master decided to build a new fortiied city on Mount Sciberras – the long-identiied site on the tongue of land which split the port of Malta into two harbours.40 The new city (it was known as Città Nuova to distinguish it from Mdina which became Città Vecchia) which was built combined defensive strength with architectural beauty. So much so that observers and writers would laud it for both its qualities.41 It was undoubtedly considered to be a very respectable fortiication, or as one author would put it “Questa Cittá è una delle meglio fortiicate di tutta l’Europa, contribuito avendovi egualmente la Natura, e l’Arte a renderla tale; e difesa viene all’intorno da parecchi gran Bastioni…”.42 Designed by the Italian military engineer Francesco Laparelli and embellished by the Maltese Giloramo Cassar and many others, Valletta became the epitome of all Malta. It was from 1566 that the Order embarked on a relentless project of buildings and fortiications with the objective of virtually turning the island of Malta into one complete and impregnable fortress while also keeping it architecturally inline with continental Europe. Having a strong Malta, it was hoped, would deter any further Ottoman attack and the periodic incursions by their Barbary Coast allies. It had from early been recognised, as stated in Spanish oficial documents of the time, that any Muslim attempt to conquer the stronghold of Malta would not be an easy task because the invading forces would have irst needed to overcome the new city fortress and this was likely to cause them the loss of many men, time and munitions.43 The more so with the many other fortiied towns, fortresses, towers, batteries, and the rest of the fortiications which were added during the years that the Order would remain in the Maltese islands (till 1798). Added to the static A moment during the Great Siege of Malta of 1565 according to Matteo Perez d’Aleccio 66 Sacra Militia Issue no. 13 - 2014 defensive structures, the Order also made eficient use of its advanced line of defences. This consisted of a small but expert fleet which was highly mobile and skillfully manoeuvred; a veritable war machine dreaded by all those who had to confront it. The naval units were well-known for their audacity and effective results – an added asset to an already nearly impregnable island-fortress.44 Matteo Perez d’Aleccio’s artistic reportage of the building of the However, things new city for Malta which was named Valletta were changing in the Mediterranean region. Many countries that had been sworn enemies for centuries were slowly turning into commercial and trading allies. This trend, dictated by new political and economic realities and exigencies, went back to the 1530s when a peace treaty was signed between the French king and the Turkish sultan and which was regularly renewed. The Barbary States George Cassar is Senior Lecturer in the Institute and many countries in Europe soon followed suit and for Tourism, Travel and Culture (ITTC) of the this meant that hostility between once archenemies University of Malta. He is a historical sociologist gradually faded out with attacks from Muslims on 45 whose main research interests include the History Christian territories becoming evermore rare. This and Sociology of Education; the Pedagogy of systematically isolated Hospitaller Malta from a sizable Heritage, Heritage Interpretation, the History part of the Christian world in that few were seeking of History Teaching; the Study of the Order of to ight or attack Turkish and Muslim shipping with St John (SMOM); the History and Culture of cooperation becoming the order of the day. The Order Malta; Heritage and Culture; Cultural Tourism; now needed to ind other raisons d’être if it were to and, the Culture and Sociology of Food. He is the continue to exist in a meaningful way. Malta had by the author or editor of numerous books and academic eighteenth century become nearly impenetrable but the journals, and has published numerous papers in former eternal enemies were now too much focussed journals and chapters in books related to his areas on other activities to even dream of attacking the small of interest. Comm. Dr Cassar is a member of the island in the middle of the Mediterranean. Other powers Research Coordinating Committee of the V.18 were now eyeing and vying for a foothold and these – Valletta European Capital of Culture 2018 – were all from the European fold. representing the University of Malta. The Grand Master of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta In 1798 the irst serious and fatal assault for many conferred on him the award of ‘Commendatore years took place on the island, and it came from pro Merito Melitensi’. Revolutionary France, but that is a new historical page. Notes and references 1 F.M, Pagano, Istoria dell’regno di Napoli, ii (Palermo, 1835), 359. 2 F. Capecelatro, ‘Dell’istoria della città e regno di Napoli detto di Sicilia’, Biblioteca Enciclopedica Italiana, XV (Milano, 1831), 564. 3 P. Sardina, ‘Lancia (Lanza) Manfredi’, Dizionario Biograico degli Italiani, 63 (2004), Treccani.it Enciclopedia Italiana, available at: http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/manfredi-lancia_(Dizionario_Biograico)/ (accessed 12 Jan 2014). Sacra Militia Issue no. 13 - 2014 67 4 R. Muntaner, Cronache catalane del secolo XIII e XIV; una di Raimondo Muntaner, l’altra di Bernardo d’Esclot, transl. in Italian by F. Mois̀ (Firenze, 1843), 244. 5 F. Giunta, ‘Sicilia e Tunisi nei secoli XIV e XV’, Medioevo Mediterraneo: saggi storici (Palermo, 1954), 153, in A.P. Vella, Storja ta’ Malta, i (Malta, 1974), 119. 6 G. Ninfa, Malta nel periodo degli Aragonesi (1282-1416), Doc. IV, 1292, in Vella, 119. 7 F. Savelli, ‘Il meridione d’Italia – Angioino e Aragonese’ (2012), available at: http://cronologia.leonardo.it/umanita/slavi/ cap109c.htm (accessed 12 Jan 2014). 8 R. Valentini, ‘La sopravvivenza della Universitas Melivetana ino alla cessazione delle infeudazioni dell’isola’, Archivio Storico di Malta, vii/1 (1935-36), 42. 9 See details of feudal lords and regal concessions in, P. de Jove y Hevia, Indagaciones acerca de la Dominación de España en Malta de 1285 a 1530: Con inserción de documentos auténticos y en su mayor parte inéditos (Madrid, 1863). 10 R. Valentini, ‘Gli ultimi re Aragonesi ed i primi Castigliani a Malta’, Archivio Storico di Malta, vii/4 (1935-36), 411-2. 11 Ibid., 431-2; Vella, 128. 12 For the original document see, S. Giambruno and L. Genuardi, Capitoli inediti delle città demaniali di Sicilia approvati sino al 1458 (Palermo, 1918), 382-9. See also, Vella, 129. 13 G.A. Vassallo, Storia di Malta (Malta, 1854), 117. 14 G. Wettinger, ‘The pawning of Malta to Monroy’, Melita Historica, vii/3 (1978), 265-283. 15 A. Mifsud, ‘Le franchigie costituzionali alfonsiane e l’invasione dei Mori del 1429 nella compilazione della storia di Malta’, Archivium Melitense, iii/8 (1918-1919), 312. 16 G.F. Abela, Della Descrittione di Malta isola nel mare siciliano con le sue antichità, ed altre notitie (Malta, 1647), 288-90. 17 H. Bresc, ‘The ‘Secrezia’ and the Royal Patrimony’, A.T. Luttrell (ed.), Medieval Malta: Studies on Malta before the Knights (London, 1975), 140. 18 S. Fiorini, ‘Id-Dejma, il-Maħras and the defence of the Maltese Islands in the late medieval and early modern times’, Sacra Militia, 2 (2003), 25. 19 Vassallo, 218, 219, 238. 20 Mifsud, (1918-1919), 321. 21 S.C. Spiteri, ‘The ‘Castellu di la Chitati’ the medieval castle of the walled town of Mdina’, ARX – online journal of military architecture, 1-4 (2004-7), 3-11, available at: http://www.militaryarchitecture.com/Arx/arx1_4_2008.pdf (accessed 21 Jan 2014). 22 C. Dalli, Malta: The Medieval Millenium (Malta, 2006), 235-6. 23 G. Bosio, Dell’Istoria della Sacra Religione et ill.ma Militia di San Giovanni Gierosolimitano, iii (Rome, 1602), 26-7. 24 Vella, 185-6. 25 Abbe de Vertot, The History of the Knights of Malta, ii (London, 1728), 18-9. 26 Ibid., 19. 27 Bosio, 80-1. 28 Lord Eversley, The Turkish Empire: its growth and decay (London, 1917), 118. 29 S.C. Spiteri, Fortresses of the Cross (Malta, 1994), 262. 30 Ibid., 291. 31 A. Hoppen, The Fortiication of Malta by the Order of St John (Edinburgh, 1979), 24. 32 Q. Hughes & C. Thake, Malta: The Baroque Island (Malta, 2003), 49. 33 Ibid., 51. 34 Ibid., 54. 35 Ibid., 55. 36 G. Cassar, ‘The suffering of the innocent: wartime violence and the common people – the case of the Great Siege of Malta of 1565’, History Research, 3/2 (2013), 81. 37 Spiteri, (1994), 345-6. 38 For the various aspects of the Great Siege of Malta cf., G. Cassar (ed.), The Great Siege 1565: Separating fact from iction (Malta, 2005). For a plea to all the European powers in support of Malta after the 1565 Siege cf., G. Bugeja, Invocazione di Malta (Una poesia del XVI secolo) (Malta, 2000); G. Bugeja, ‘The Great Siege of 1565 and Giano Pelusio’s Ad proceres Christianos cohortatio’, G. Cassar (ed.), From the Great Siege to the Battle of Lepanto: the life and times of Malta and the Order of St John 1565-1571 (Malta, 2011), 1-44. 39 H. Nicholson, The Knights Hospitaller (Woodbridge, 2001), 124. 40 G. Cassar, ‘Jean de la Valette and Pietro de Monte: two grand masters, one mission’, in G. Cassar (ed.), From the Great Siege to the Battle of Lepanto: the life and times of Malta and the Order of St John 1565-1571 (Malta, 2011), 176-7. 41 For a summary of appreciations see, A. Ganado, Valletta Città Nuova: A map history (1566-1600) (Malta, 2003), 463-6. 42 G. Albrizzi, Lo stato presente di tutti i paesi, e popoli del mondo naturale, politico, e morale, con nuove osservazioni e corresioni degli antichi e moderni viaggiatori, xxiv (Venice, 1762), 173. 43 Archivo General de Simanca, Estado, 1144, leg. 218, in F. Menchetti, Architects and Knights; Italian inluence in Malta during the Late Renaissance (Malta, 2013), 78. 44 See for example, J. Muscat & A. Cuschieri, Naval activities of the Knights of St John 1530-1798 (Malta, 2002), ch. IV. 45 Hoppen, 156-7. 68 Sacra Militia Issue no. 13 - 2014