This article was downloaded by: [Monash University] On: 15 January 2010 Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 907058005] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 3741 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Commonwealth & Comparative Politics Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713720447 Politics of federal intervention in Malaysia, with reference to Sarawak, Sabah and Kelantan James Chin a a Middlesex University, London To cite this Article Chin, James(1997) 'Politics of federal intervention in Malaysia, with reference to Sarawak, Sabah and Kelantan', Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 35: 2, 96 — 120 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/14662049708447747 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14662049708447747 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. Politics of Federal Intervention in Malaysia, With Reference to Sarawak, Sabah and Kelantan JAMES CHIN Federalism as practised in Malaysia has received surprisingly little attention in the literature of comparative politics. Crouch's important new study of Malaysian government and politics, for example, has virtually nothing to say on the subject.1 As for those who have examined Malaysian federalism, they do not agree on how to characterise it. Most of them have argued that Malaysia is not a true federation because the centre, the federal government, holds too much power and dominates the political system to such a degree that it can decide the survival of individual state governments. However, these observers have come to this conclusion after examining certain aspects of federalism only: for example, Shafruddin looks at the federal government's use of its financial power to dominate the states in Peninsular Malaysia;2 Milne and Mauzy take a structural, legal-institutional approach,3 while Puthucheary, Loh and Kahn look at federalism indirectly through the rise of Kadazan nationalism in Sabah.4 Means, in contrast, takes the view that, while federal domination of the states has increased, nevertheless 'the states have retained substantial powers and remained vigorous and autonomous components of the political system'.5 None of the studies cited above looked at federal-state relations in both Peninsular and East Malaysia, nor is there any discussion on the types of federal intervention. I will argue below that intervention by Kuala Lumpur has not come suddenly but that there are three distinct types: 'mildintervention', whereby the federal authorities usually co-opt local leaders; 'mid-intervention', a more direct approach; and 'direct-intervention' or direct rule by Kuala Lumpur through a declaration of a state of emergency. This article will try to dissect the three types involved in Kuala Lumpur's attempt to control and dominate the states. The source of confrontation and regionalism and the pre-conditions for Kuala Lumpur's intervention will James Chin, Middlesex University, London Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Vol.35, No.2 (July 1997), pp.96-120 PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON POLITICS OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN MALAYSIA 97 also be discussed. We shall do this by examining federal intervention in three states which have had a notable history of confrontations with Kuala Lumpur: Kelantan in Peninsular Malaysia, and Sabah and Sarawak in East Malaysia. Although the centre-state relationships of these states can be considered exceptions to the norm, some general conclusions about the types of federal interventions can be learnt from their experiences.6 BRIEF BACKGROUND Malaysia is a federation of 13 states (11 in Peninsular Malaysia and two in Borneo, commonly referred to as East Malaysia). Each individual state has its own legislative assembly as well as elected representatives to the federal parliament. In theory, the state retains autonomy in local government, religion and land matters while the federal government deals with issues like foreign policy, defence and education. However, in practice the federal government has assumed many more powers. The Malaysian Federation, formed in 1963, initially included the island of Singapore, making Malaysia a 14-state federation. However, the independent-minded Lee Kuan Yew moved to expand his Chinese-based political party, the People's Action Party (PAP), from Singapore into Malaya and push for a genuine multi-racial Malaysian federation. This was unacceptable to the Malayan politicians. The Malay-based United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), the dominant party in control of the federal government, feared that Lee's push for a 'Malaysian Malaysia' would mean an erosion of Malay political dominance. UMNO's partner, the Chinesebased Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), was afraid that Lee's PAP would challenge it amongst its own Chinese constituents. The MCA was the main Chinese-based political party in the Peninsula, a position similar to Lee's People's Action Party (PAP) in Singapore. In such circumstances, Tunku Abdul Rahman, the premier at the time, decided that Singapore must leave the Federation. In 1965, Singapore was expelled from the Malaysian Federation and became an independent island state. Singapore's expulsion rekindled fears about the stability of the whole federation. More importantly, the Singapore affair strengthened the hand of the centralists in Kuala Lumpur, who argued that early and strong intervention was the only way to prevent further break-up of the federation. Since then, the federal government has intervened strongly at various times in other Malaysian states perceived to be too independent or to be harbouring a sense of regionalism and 'states' rights'. Feelings of regionalism are most evident in the East Malaysian states of Sarawak and Sabah and in the Peninsular state of Kelantan. This paper will thus concentrate on the experiences of these three states. 98 THE JOURNAL OF COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS SARAWAK AND SABAH'S ENTRY INTO MALAYSIA In Sabah and Sarawak there is far more ethnic diversity than in Peninsular Malaysia, where essentially there are only three ethnic groups, Malay (about 53 per cent), Chinese (35 per cent) and Indians (ten per cent). In Sarawak, for example, there are about 27 ethnic groups and in Sabah about 35 groups. However, for political purposes, the relevant groups in Sarawak are the Dayaks (about 40 per cent), Malay, Melanau and other Muslims (25 per cent) and the Chinese (30 per cent). In Sabah, the major groups are the Kadazan-Dusuns (about 40 per cent), Malay and other indigenous Muslims (30 per cent) and the Chinese (25 per cent). This complex ethnic mix gives rise to less than clear-cut political party alignments, unlike in the Peninsula where, generally speaking, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and Parti Islam Malaysia (PAS) represent the Malays and Muslims, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan) represent the Chinese and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) the Indians. In 1961, when Tunku Abdul Rahman first announced his plan for a 'Mighty Malaysia Plan', a Malaysian federation consisting of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, Brunei and Sarawak, little support could be found in the Bornean states. Sabah leaders like Donald Stephens (later Mohammad Fuad Stephens) rejected the proposed federation, as he envisaged a 'Borneo' federation of Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei instead. The first priority of A.M. Azahari from Parti Rakyat Brunei (Brunei People's Party or PRB) was to capture political power in Brunei, but he was probably in favour of the Borneo federation. Sarawak leaders were also unenthusiastic about the proposal and preferred the Borneo federation proposal, In July 1961, Ong Kee Hui from the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP) met with A.M. Azahari and Donald Stephens in Jesselton (now Kota Kinabalu) to discuss Tunku's proposal. After this meeting the three leaders, calling themselves the United Front, issued a joint statement informing the British government that Tunku's 'Mighty Malaysia Plan' was 'totally unacceptable to the people of the three territories'.7 The Federation succeeded in incorporating Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak (but not Brunei) because of the pressure exerted by the British.8 Once the British had decided to withdraw from the Southeast Asian region (the 'East of Suez' policy), they wanted to create a federation of their colonies with as little fuss as possible. Thus, they approved of Tunku Abdul Rahman's Malaysia proposal. It meant the British could withdraw within a year or two and only one new state, Malaysia, would be fonned instead of the many new states that would emerge if independence were to be granted separately to North Borneo (as Sabah was called then), Singapore, Sarawak POLITICS OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN MALAYSIA 99 and Brunei. Tunku Abdul Rahman played his part by hosting a series of visits by Sarawak and Sabah political leaders. Tunku, with Lee Kuan Yew's help, easily won over Sabah's Stephens and some Sarawak leaders. All the pro-Malaysia politicians from Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak then set up the Malaysian Solidarity Consultative Committee (MSCC) to drum up support for the Malaysia Proposal. Between August 1961 and February 1962 the MSCC held four meetings, in Jesselton, Kuching, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. At these meetings the two Bornean delegations asked that safeguards relating to issues like religion, administration and development be included in the new Malaysian Constitution. The MSCC also recommended that a commission of inquiry be set up to ascertain the views of the people of Sarawak and Sabah on the proposed Malaysia Federation. The Commission, headed by Lord Cobbold, a former governor of the Bank of England, had four members. The two appointees of the Malayan government were Wong Pow Nee, who was the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) Chief Minister of Penang, and Mohammad Ghazali bin Shafie, who was Permanent Secretary to the Malayan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The British side also appointed two members: Anthony Abell, the former Governor of Sarawak, and David Watherston, the former British Chief Secretary of Malaya.9 When the Commission arrived in Sarawak, it was met by protesters demanding independence for Sarawak first. However, the Commission encountered calmer waters in Sabah, chiefly due to Stephens' influence. In mid-August 1962, the Cobbold Commission released its report which concluded that one-third of the population in Sabah and Sarawak were unconditionally in favour of Malaysia, one third in favour subject to certain conditions and guarantees and one third opposed to it. An observer argued that the Cobbold Commission could only come up with a pro-Malaysia finding as its members were selected on this basis.10 In August 1962, the British and Malayan governments decided to form an Inter-Government Committee (IGC), together with representatives from Sabah and Sarawak, to work out constitutional safeguards for the Bornean states in the Federation. Twenty meetings were held, and four months later the IGC report was ready. The main features of these safeguards, known as the Twenty Points, were:11 (a) Islam's status as a national religion was not applicable to Sarawak and Sabah. While there was no objection to Islam being the national religion of Malaysia there should be no State religion in Sabah and Sarawak, and the provisions relating to Islam in the present Constitution of Malaya would not apply to Sabah and Sarawak. 100 THE JOURNAL OF COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS (b) Immigration control was vested in the state governments of Sabah and Sarawak. (c) Borneanisation of the civil service should proceed as quickly as possible although British officers would remain in the public service until their places could be taken by suitably local qualified people. (d) No amendments or modification of the safeguards granted under the Twenty Points could be made by the federal government without the agreement of the Sabah and Sarawak state governments. (e) There would be no right to secede from the Federation. (f) The indigenous peoples of both Sarawak and Sabah shall enjoy the same 'special' rights given to the Malay community in Malaya. (g) Sabah and Sarawak were to be given a high degree of autonomy over their financial affairs. They would retain control of their own finance, development expenditure and tariff. Meanwhile, in early 1963, Sarawak and Sabah held state-wide elections. The 'Malaysia' proposal was not an issue in Sabah, but in Sarawak the SUPP campaigned against the proposal. SUPP narrowly lost the election to the pro-Malaysia Sarawak Alliance, which was backed by the colonial authorities.12 In the midst of all this, Indonesia launched her policy of konfrontasi against the formation of Malaysia. The Philippines, which had a longstanding claim on Sabah, asked the United Nations (UN) to send in a factfinding mission. The UN Malaysia Mission promptly visited Sarawak and Sabah, and its report was issued on 14 September by U. Thant, the UN Secretary General." The report concluded that the majority of people in North Borneo and Sarawak were in favour of joining Malaysia. The mission found 'little evidence of articulate and organized opposition to the Federation',14 even though when it visited Kuching and Sibu it had been met by large demonstrations and riots.15 The UN team also stated that the 1963 elections were conducted 'freely and impartially', with the concept of Malaysia 'a major issue'. It also found that 'allegations of bias against the authorities organizing and administering the elections, in so far as they were directly related to the Malaysia issue, were not in the opinion of the Mission adequately supported'. On 16 September 1963, Sarawak and Sabah officially became members of the Malaysian federation.16 It is clear that, from the outset, the Malaysian federation was formed with limited discussion among the peoples of Sarawak and Sabah (other than the small elite consulted by the British) and without wide support. Open expressions of dissent were found in Sarawak while the Sabah elites were won over by guarantees contained in the Twenty Points. POLITICS OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN MALAYSIA 101 SARAWAK'S EXPERIENCES Crisis of 1966 In 1966, the Sarawak Alliance government under Stephen Kalong Ningkan, from the Sarawak National Party (SNAP), fell as a direct result of federal government intervention. A year earlier, Ningkan had ignored local Malay and Melanau political opposition over legislation on land tenure. During the acrimonious debate on the legislation which would make land available to non-natives, Ningkan's political enemies sought Kuala Lumpur's help to topple the Ningkan administration. Kuala Lumpur was sympathetic to protests against Ningkan as he had previously irritated the federal government by sticking strictly to the Twenty Points and refusing many federal government requests to speed up the usage of the Malay national language, and not promoting more natives to replace the expatriates in the civil service. By May 1966, Ningkan's opponents had mustered enough votes in the Council Negri (Sarawak Legislative Assembly) to unseat the Chief Minister. Tunku then demanded Ningkan's resignation, citing Article 7(1) of the Sarawak Constitution. This specifies that the Chief Minister must resign if he ceases to command the majority of Council Negri members. Ningkan naturally refused to go, and Tunku dispatched the federal Minister of Home Affairs, the Inspector General of Police and the Federal AttorneyGeneral to the Sarawak capital, Kuching. The federal leaders persuaded the state Governor to use his reserve powers to dismiss Ningkan and appoint a weak politician, Tawi Sli, as Chief Minister. Tawi Sli signalled his profederal leanings by visiting Kuala Lumpur almost immediately. Instead of accepting his 'dismissal', Ningkan sought redress through the High Court, which found that he had been unconstitutionally replaced; Ningkan argued that the Governor did not have the powers to remove a sitting Chief Minister until a proper no-confidence motion has been passed in the Council Negri. Before Ningkan could be reinstated, Kuala Lumpur declared a state of emergency17 in Sarawak, and amended the federal and Sarawak constitutions. The amendment gave the Governor powers to call for a special sitting of the Council Negri; one was quickly called and a vote of no confidence was passed in the Council Negri, thus ending Ningkan's term as Chief Minister. This time, Ningkan was out, legally. Kuala Lumpur's role in this affair was widely resented by the majority native Dayak population as well as by the Chinese community. Ningkan's party, the Sarawak National Party (SNAP), from then onwards until the mid-1970s used the campaign theme 'Sarawak for the Sarawakians'. This was in direct response to the federal government's intervention in the Ningkan affair and anti-federalism became popular and reinforced the sense of regionalism in Sarawak.18 102 THE JOURNAL OF COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS 7970 Coalition Government In May 1969, serious race riots broke out in Peninsular Malaysia after a general election. The whole nation was placed under a state of emergency and all elections were suspended. In Sarawak, the elections were postponed until July 1970. When the results were announced, it was clear that no party could hope to rule Sarawak alone: the Federal-backed Malay/Melanau Parti Bumiputera had 12 seats; the opposition Iban-based SNAP and Chinesebased SUPP also had 12 seats each while the Iban-based Pesaka party had eight. Twenty-five seats were needed to form a simple majority so a coalition was inevitable. Although SNAP and SUPP were much more compatible in terms of political outlook, SUPP threw its support behind Bumiputera. The then deputy premier of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak, had made it clear that the federal government would not lift the state of emergency unless Parti Bumiputera were part of the next state coalition government. The federal government wanted Parti Bumiputera because it was seen as a pro-federal party. Party leader Abdul Rahman Yakub had served in the federal cabinet as Minister of Education and had pushed through legislation promoting the use of the Malay language. Also the federal government did not want SNAP and Stephen Kalong Ningkan coming back into power. It was Tun Razak's explicit threat that secured the Bumiputera-SUPP Sarawak coalition government in 1970." This decisive federal intervention has ensured that Parti Bumiputera remained part of the state ruling coalition since 1970. Since then there has not been any serious intervention by Kuala Lumpur in Sarawak affairs. This was primarily due to two reasons. First, the Melanau-led state government of Abdul Rahman Yakub was installed with the help of the federal government and thus he was 'one of their own'. Rahman himself was careful not to raise anti-federal sentiments. Abdul Taib Mahmud, Rahman's nephew, who took over the Sarawak chief ministership in 1981 has maintained this policy of not antagonising the federal government overtly. Like his predecessor, Taib spent more than a decade as a federal minister and thus knew all the UMNO federal leaders intimately. This has resulted in an official 'hands-off' approach taken by the federal leadership towards the political leadership in Sarawak. This was illustrated in 1993. When the federal government banned the use of satellite dishes by individual Malaysians, many Sarawakians took it as another unwarranted federal edict. Many in Sarawak and Sabah had for some time been using satellite dishes, acquired from across the border in Kalimantan, Indonesia. The pro-establishment Sarawak Tribune devoted entire pages to angry letters demanding the right to view programmes beamed from other POLITICS OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN MALAYSIA 103 countries. The Sarawak state government even protested to the federal government in private. In a compromise, the ban was not reversed but no real action was taken by the federal authorities against individual owners in Sarawak. Second, the Sarawak leadership saw what happened to Sabah in 1990 when the federal government (read UMNO) moved in when challenged by the anti-federal state governing party, Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) (more later). This made the political elites in Sarawak more cautious about overt anti-federal sentiments. The Sabah example merely reinforced the lesson learnt early in the mid-1960s when the federal government took direct action to get rid of Ningkan. SABAH'S EXPERIENCES The Rise and Fall of Mustapha In the first decade of Sabah's independence, Sabah politics was dominated by two men: Mustapha Harun and Muhammad (Donald) Fuad Stephens. Stephens represented the Kadazan-Dusuns, the largest native group in Sabah, while Mustapha represented the Muslims. When the Sabah Alliance formed the first post-independent government in 1963, Stephens became the Chief Minister and Mustapha took the post of Governor. Both tried to dominated the state administration, and their political fight paralysed the state government. Under the Sabah state constitution, the Governor had to sign or give his assent to enactments passed by the Sabah Legislative Assembly. On many occasions, such assents were held up, causing administrative delays. Mustapha also began to campaign in Kuala Lumpur for Stephen's removal. By this time, in 1965, Stephens had increasingly asserted a strong states' rights stand, especially over the federal government's emphasis on the Islamic faith and meddling in the appointment of state officials. In order to break the political impasse between Stephens and Mustapha, and to bring Stephens into line, the federal government made Stephens the Federal Minister for Sabah Affairs. Peter Lo was appointed interim Chief Minister until 1967, when Mustapha became Chief Minister. In an ironic twist, Stephens became the Governor. Mustapha's rule can best be described as dictatorial and authoritarian. He ruled Sabah more or less as his personal fiefdom. Using patronage politics, he neutralised Stephens politically and even managed to convert him to Islam. Mustapha began to spend considerable time overseas and regularly detained his opponents illegally during elections. At first, federal leaders tolerated Mustapha's jet-setting and dictatorial ways, as his right- 104 THE JOURNAL OF COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS hand man was Syed Kechik, a Peninsular Malay businessman with excellent UMNO connections. In fact, Syed Kechik was sent in by senior federal UMNO figures to help Mustapha to rule. Although Syed Kechik held no political post, he was the main administrator for the state while Mustapha was away.20 This state of affairs lasted until 1975, when reports surfaced that Mustapha was contemplating Sabah's secession with himself installed as its sultan.21 Federal intervention was swift - Harris Salleh, one of Mustapha's vice-presidents in the ruling United Sabah National Organisation (USNO), was openly assisted by the federal government in the formation of a new party named Bersatu Rakyat Jelata Sabah, or simply Berjaya. The federal government also encouraged Stephens to resign from the governorship to lead Berjaya. In the April 1976 state election, USNO was decisively defeated and Stephens became Chief Minister. Tragically, Stephens died in a plane crash a year later and was succeeded by Harris Salleh. Harris Salleh's Fall in 1985 Harris Salleh in turn, like Mustapha, became increasingly dictatorial. What made matters worse was the popular perception that he was 'too federal'. Perhaps because of the considerable federal backing he received, Harris Salleh ignored internal grumbling from his own back-benchers and went ahead with the decision to transfer the sovereignty of Labuan Island, a small island off the western coast of Sabah, to Kuala Lumpur, without any real compensation.22 Harris also began an active campaign to convert the Kadazan-Dusun, the largest ethnic grouping in Sabah, to Islam. Many Kadazan-Dusuns were told that the only way to get government help with development projects was to convert to Islam. This mirrored what Mustapha had done previously and had caused great resentment among the mainly Christian and animist Kadazan-Dusuns. Sabahans saw forced Islamisation as a breach of the Twenty Points' guarantee that all religions in Sabah would be protected. The influx of Muslim Filipinos into Sabah from the early 1980s amplified anti-federal sentiments, especially as many were able to obtain Malaysian identity cards, a sign of citizenship. Since immigration officers and security were under the purview of the federal government, many Sabahans blamed Kuala Lumpur. The Kadazan-Dusun also felt discriminated against in civil service jobs.23 They blamed Harris for an influx of federal officers into Sabah, which they argued was contrary to the Twenty Points, which states clearly ('Borneanisation of the civil service') that Sabah natives should be actively promoted in the bureaucracy. Against this background, Joseph Pairin Kitingan, a former Berjaya minister, emerged as the huguan siou (paramount chief) of the Kadazan. He POLITICS OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN MALAYSIA 105 set up Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS or Sabah Unity Party) just weeks before a snap election was called by Harris Salleh in 1985. An assertion by federal leaders that they would 'sink or swim' with Berjaya caused a further antifederal backlash against Salleh's party.24 PBS won 25 of the 48 seats in the election on a Sabah-rights platform but Mustapha and Harris were able to pressurise the Governor to swear Mustapha in as the Chief Minister.25 Interestingly, to the federal government's credit, Kuala Lumpur intervened on the side of PBS. Musa Hitam, the then Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, publicly declared that the federal government would recognise Pairin as the people's choice. A day later, Pairin was sworn in. Musa Hitam's intervention, however, must not be seen as a reversal of the federal government's interventionist policies. Rather, the intervention was an attempt at damage limitation. The federal government knew that it would incite further anti-federal feelings if it backed Mustapha and Harris, who clearly had lost the support of the Sabah voters. Moreover, PBS had made it clear that it wanted to join the UMNOled federal ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional (BN or National Front) and was willing to work with federal leaders, albeit with more emphasis on states' rights.26 Almost immediately after PBS took power, there was a series of explosions in Kota Kinabalu, Sabah's capital. It was widely accepted that USNO and Berjaya elements were behind the bombings, with the tacit approval of certain UMNO factions in Kuala Lumpur. The rationale was simple: with a security breakdown, the federal government would have to declare a state of emergency and rule Sabah directly, thus usurping the power of the PBS government. Behind the scenes, the federal government applied pressure on Pairin to form a coalition government with Mustapha. Pairin refused and instead called an election in May 1986. This time the PBS increased its majority in the Dewan Undangan Negri (State Legislative Assembly)from 26 to 35 of the 48 seats.27 The federal BN government had little choice but to accept the new PBS administration, at least for the time being. UMNO's Entry and Pairin's Fall in 1994 The uneasy relationship between the UMNO-led federal government and the PBS-led state government was to manifest itself again just before the 1990 parliamentary election. Although PBS had joined BN in 1986, relations remained cool between UMNO and PBS. PBS's strong states' rights stand was misconstrued by UMNO as its attempt to incite anti-federal and secession sentiments among the Sabah people. The federal government was especially enraged by the 1986 PBS manifesto, which had called for a review of the 'Twenty Points' arguing that the federal government had 106 THE JOURNAL OF COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS broken many of the guarantees.28 The anti-federal perception was reinforced when PBS pulled out of the BN just days before the 1990 parliamentary election and threw its support behind Prime Minister Mahathir's political arch-rival, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah. PBS had decided to back Razaleigh when the latter promised to review the 'Twenty Points' if he should win the election. Unfortunately for PBS, Razaleigh failed and Mahathir's BN easily won the election. Mahathir immediately announced that UMNO (hitherto confined to the Peninsula) would spread its wings and set up branches in Sabah to challenge PBS directly. The Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) soon followed UMNO's lead. Although development funds were not cut off by the federal government to the opposition PBS state government, the method of delivery changed. Previously, federal development funds had been channelled through the state government. But with the state under opposition PBS control, federal funds were only released through federal offices based in Sabah.29 The federal government also froze several large infrastructure projects, which caused a downturn in the Sabah economy. The people of Sabah were told that the deterioration of the state economy was due to the poor relations between Kuala Lumpur and Kota Kinabalu. This 'political recession'30 could only be corrected, it was explained, if and when BN assumed control of the state again. Additionally, a group of Sabahans, the most prominent of which was Jeffrey Kitingan, younger brother of Pairin, was detained in 1990 under the Internal Security Act (ISA) for an alleged plot to take Sabah out of Malaysia. Pairin himself was charged with corruption. All these actions were seen by many Sabahans as harassment by the federal government and an attempt to 'colonise' Sabah. When state elections were called in February 1994, anti-fedeTal sentiment remained high among the Sabah voters. Various attempts by the federal government to bring about a negotiated settlement between PBS and the federal government failed when Pairin refused to step down, one of the key conditions placed by Kuala Lumpur. Even the release of Jeffrey Kitingan, just before the election, was not seen by many Sabahans as a concession by the federal authorities but rather as an overt attempt to use him to persuade Pairin to give up his confrontation with the centre. In the 1994 election, Kuala Lumpur mobilised all its massive resources to ensure a BN victory. A new political party, Sabah Progressive Party (SAPP), led by PBS dissidents, was registered in record time.31 Other minor Sabah-based BN parties like the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Angkatan Keadilan Rakyat Bersatu (AKAR) received unusually large financial allocations to fight PBS, despite the fact that their electoral support POLITICS OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN MALAYSIA 107 was flimsy and questionable. PBS subsequently won narrowly. PBS took 25 seats while the remaining 23 were won by the BN (UMNO 18; SAPP 3; LDP 1; AKAR 1). Almost immediately, the BN used a mixture of financial and coercive measures to bring about defections from PBS. All the defectors either joined existing BN component parties or formed new parties with the declared intention of joining the ruling BN. Within a month, Pairin had lost his majority and a new UMNO-led state government was in place.32 In short, in East Malaysia, the general source of discontent among the people of both states can largely be traced to fear of 'colonisation' by Peninsular Malaysians. Besides the fact that Sabah and Sarawak are physically divided from the Peninsula by a sea, their demographic situation is vastly different from the Peninsula. In these two states, the tribal groups (the Dayaks in Sarawak and the Kadazan-Dusuns in Sabah) constitute the largest segment of the population in their respective states. The Chinese population in both states is also significant. In Sarawak, they make up about 30 per cent of the population, in Sabah about 25 per cent. The Malays/Muslims in both states (about 25 per cent in Sarawak and 40 per cent in Sabah) cannot hope to rule without the support of at least one of these communities. The fear among the non-Malay, non-Muslim majority is that they will be overwhelmed politically by the Peninsular Malaysians if they are not careful in their dealings with Kuala Lumpur. The strictly communal and religious pattern of politics in the Peninsula does not appeal to either state, where multi-racial parties are the norm and where religious tolerance is still high. All this is in contrast to the Peninsula, where political parties are almost exclusively divided along racial lines and where Islam is highly politicised. The complex political racial calculations are compounded by the fact that the local Sabah and Sarawak Malay and Muslim communities do not necessarily support UMNO's brand of Malay politics based on Malay nationalism and Islam. The fear among the Sabah/Sarawak Malay population that they will be subjugated by Peninsular Malays means that regional sentiments are often stronger than religious or kinship ties. The general perception among the people in both states is that the federation has benefited the Peninsular Malaysians more, especially in economic terms. A recent study suggests that these perceptions are grounded in economic reality.33 Since 1963, the study argued, there is a net transfer of resources away from Sabah and Sarawak to the Peninsula. The study also confirmed that the federal government's decision to pay only five per cent of oil revenue for oil found off the coast of Sabah and Sarawak has led to a massive relocation of oil revenue towards the Peninsula despite the fact that Sabah and Sarawak are the least developed states in the federation. 108 THE JOURNAL OF COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS The promise of extra development funds to help bring Sabah and Sarawak up to a par with the peninsula has not happened. The study concluded that, in development terms, Sabah and Sarawak are worse off since federation.34 KELANTAN'S EXPERIENCES Early Intervention and PAS's Membership in BN The state of Kelantan is located on the East Coast of the Malay peninsula. It has always been a closed society, where local traditions and Islam played a major influence in its politics. Even before independence, the Kelantanese saw themselves as 'different' from other Peninsular Malays; the Kelantanese speak a distinct dialect which is incomprehensible to Malays outside the state and interpret Islam much more strictly than their counterparts on the West coast.35 The Kelantanese also have a unique Malay culture and have since historic times been very parochial in their dealings with Malays from other states. The population of Kelantan is overwhelmingly Malay (more than 95 per cent) and traditionally political contests here have always been between the moderate or secular Muslims, represented by UMNO, and fundamentalist Muslims, represented by Parti Sa-Islam Malaysia (PAS) (previously called the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PMIP)) who openly advocate the creation of an Islamic state in Malaysia.36 In the 1959 election, PMIP won in the religiously conservative east coast states of Trengganu and Kelantan. Two years later, in 1961, the federal alliance government, the predecessor of the BN, managed to topple the Trengganu state government.37 With Tregganu safely back in friendly hands, the federal UMNO moved on to Kelantan. In Kelantan, UMNO, having failed to win back the state in the 1964 election, launched a massive campaign to win back the state in the 1969 election. The federal government earlier tried to bring down the government by freezing the development allocation to Kelantan, citing PMIP's financial mismanagement as the excuse. In the 1969 campaign, spearheaded by Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, UMNO promised a massive $500 million special development allocation if PMIP were defeated. The Kelantan voters, however, deemed the money a bribe and thus increased their anti-federal sentiments. PMIP easily won the state again.38 . Before the federal government could do anything further, race riots broke out in Kuala Lumpur and the whole country was placed under a state of emergency. All state governments were suspended and the federal government assumed direct rule over all the states in the Malaysian federation. All political activity was banned until 1972. Under such circumstances, Parti Islam Malaysia (PAS), the new name adopted by PMIP POLITICS OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN MALAYSIA 109 leader Mohammad Asri Haji Muda, had little choice but to co-operate with UMNO. While federal UMNO leaders could politically reach out to PAS's supporters under the guise of 'government business', PAS officials were denied the same privileges under the ban. Under pressure, Mohammad Asri brought PAS into BN just prior to the 1974 election. As part of the ruling BN coalition, PAS won the state of Kelantan. PAS's reluctant membership in the BN can be seen in the fact that the leadership was questioned on this issue at every PAS party convention and calls were made for PAS to leave the BN from 1974 onwards. The strongest opposition to PAS's BN membership came from its Kelantan branch, which complained that UMNO was 'un-Islamic' because it supported a secular state, while PAS's platform was the establishment of an Islamic state in Malaysia. The unhappiness felt by the Kelantan PAS was further exacerbated when Tun Abdul Razak overrode PAS's nomination for the Kelantan chief ministership and hand-picked Mohammad Nasir instead, just after the 1974 election. A year later, during the PAS General Assembly, the Kelantan Branch state liaison committee, which held strong states' rights views, launched an open attempt to get rid of both party leader Asri and Chief Minister Nasir, citing their pro-federal views. This attempt failed when Razak, now the Prime Minister, successfully intervened by refusing to sack Nasir, causing further anti-federal feelings.39 PAS's Downfall In September 1977, the PAS Kelantan state liaison committee, acting on complaints from 20 of its 21 state assemblymen, gave an ultimatum to Nasir to resign or be thrown out of office. Nasir turned immediately to UMNO (as mentioned, he was appointed through the insistence of Tun Razak). With federal support, Nasir refused to resign. However, PAS went ahead and expelled him from the party and at the same time introduced a noconfidence motion against him in the Kelantan state legislature. UMNO and Nasir's supporters in PAS then staged rallies in support of the beleaguered Chief Minister, which led to riots in and around the state capital, Kota Baru. Seizing the opportunity, the federal government imposed emergency rule in Kelantan from November 1977. PAS was then kicked out of the BN in December. In early 1978, the federal government suddenly lifted emergency rule and scheduled a snap state election in 16 days. Public rallies were banned and other restrictions were placed on campaigns, measures which favoured the ruling BN and created problems for PAS. Meanwhile, the top Kelantan federal UMNO leader, Tengku Razaleigh, encouraged Nasir to form a new political party, Barisan Jumaah Islamiah Malaysia Bersatu (Berjasa), which attracted PAS dissidents and Nasir's supporters. 110 THE JOURNAL OF COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS With massive federal support and a short campaign period, UMNO and Berjasa easily overwhelmed PAS. PAS not only lost the state government but only managed to retain two seats.40 1990 Election and PAS's Comeback The anti-federal sentiments in Kelantan were to manifest themselves again in 1990, 12 years after the fall of the PAS state government in 1978. However, the circumstances were very different. Early in 1987, Tengku Razaleigh, a member of the Kelantan royal household, openly challenged Mahathir for UMNO's presidency. When Razaleigh lost by a narrow margin, he left UMNO and formed Semangat 46 (Spirit of 46 or S46). Razaleigh had received substantial support from Kelantan UMNO members during his challenge because he was a Kelantanese. Razaleigh had played a key role in UMNO's rise in Kelantan by persuading the voters there that the federal UMNO government was not out to dominate them. The fact that Razaleigh, a fellow Kelantanese, held senior cabinet positions in ministries such as finance and trade and industry helped blunt the anti-Kuala Lumpur slant. Now with Razaleigh out in the cold politically, a major portion of Kelantan UMNO supporters left with him and joined S46. When the 1990 general election was called, the Kelantanese voters rallied behind Razaleigh and PAS, which had now formed an electoral coalition. The coalition allowed S46 to tap into the significant Islamic vote held by PAS. PAS was eager to collaborate with S46 for the same reason; it knew that it could not win Kelantan alone based on the Islamic vote, it needed the S46's secular-Muslim vote as well. With the open support of the Sultan of Kelantan, who happened to be Razaleigh's nephew, Kelantan UMNO never really stood a chance since it was seen as a tool of the federal government. In other words, the opposition coalition held the winning formula - regionalism and Islam. Semangat 46 and PAS went on to win all the state seats in Kelantan in 1990. That this performance was not duplicated in the neighbouring state of Trengganu suggests that regional sentiment was the decisive factor in Kelantan, and not religion (Islam). Since the defeat of UMNO, the federal government has attempted to create a parallel administration in Kelantan. Most federal development projects are now channelled through federal officers in order to bypass the state officials. Despite a forced 'political recession', the Kelantanese voters re-elected PAS in the 1995 parliamentary election.41 THE VIEW FROM KUALA LUMPUR Thus far, we have seen the reaction and outcomes of federal interventions at the state level. What is the view of the federal leaders, some of whom are, POLITICS OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN MALAYSIA 111 after all, from the three states mentioned above? In general terms, the federal leaders dislike intervening in state affairs. In peninsular Malaysia, federal UMNO officials expect their state counterparts to deal with local issues with minimum fuss. Because some UMNO figures are both state and federal leaders, it is usually quite easy to keep issues from turning from state to anti-federal. In the case of Kelantan, the federal UMNO leadership recognises the fact that the state is unique, with its own peculiar style and customs. If there is a potential problem in Kelantan, the UMNO leadership will usually ask the Kelantanese UMNO to solve it first. If this is not possible, federal leaders from Kelantan are given the federal mandate to defuse the situation. Federal UMNO leaders will only intervene as the last resort. The general view among the federal leadership is that while they accept the fact that Kelantan might have special distinct features, these should not be used as excuses to reinforce regionalism or parochialism. Rather, for federal leaders, the integrity of the Malaysian federation is the overriding priority. Moreover, the federal leaders argue that no states should be given any special rights, a strong state identity or autonomy as it will only undermine the federation as a whole. In essence, the federal leadership sees Kuala Lumpur as the only arbitrator capable of looking at nationwide interests compared to parochial interests espoused in the state capitals. The federal leadership also argues that the uneven development among the states and issues like security requires the federal government to impose a certain amount of unpalatable decisions over the states for the good of the entire nation. Essentially the same approach is taken by the federal leadership towards Sabah and Sarawak although the demographic differences and the physical divide are seen as 'difficulties' to be overcome rather than 'hindrances'. However, when compared to Kelantan, the federal government is even more reluctant to embroil itself in local Sabah or Sarawak politics, as it knows that the physical divide of the South China Sea means that the possibility of Sabah and Sarawak breaking away from the federation is much more feasible. There is also a fear among the top federal UMNO leadership that intervention is necessary to prevent another 'Singapore'. In 1965, as mentioned earlier, Singapore was thrown out of the Malaysian federation despite the fact that there was (and is) no right of succession according to the Malaysian Constitution. One reason was Lee Kuan Yew's strong appeal to the Malayan Chinese community to back his People's Action Party (PAP).42 The forced departure of Singapore led to a split within UMNO as some felt that Tunku Abdul Rahman should not have allowed Singapore to leave the federation and should have imposed direct rule from Kuala 112 THE JOURNAL OF COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS Lumpur instead. There is fear that there is the potential for Sabahans, Sarawakians or the Kelantanese to head down the independence path as Singapore did in 1965 if the centre does not take steps to stop or impede the growth of strong, separatist identity. Since independence, the federal government has taken several steps to try to stem the anti-federal sentiments in Kelantan, Sabah and Sarawak. A large number of students of these three states have been awarded scholarships to study in other states in order to 'integrate' them. Civil servants from these three states are also regularly seconded to the federal government and vice versa.43 How these measures have alleviated regional sentiments is difficult to assess, although it can be argued that it has not made any real difference. As we have seen from the Sabah example, the Kadazan resent Peninsular Malaysians who settle in Sabah and whom they see as their economic competitors and also as a threat to their religion and culture. This situation is probably true of the indigenous Dayaks in Sarawak. In Kelantan, the federal government plans are probably seen as a back-door entry to try to 'secularise' Islam as practised by the Kelantanese and dilute the unique Kelantanese culture. The federal government, also has a Department of National Unity (DNU), whose brief is to promote unity among the different ethnic groups. The DNU has in the past specially tried to 'integrate' Sabah and Sarawak through various schemes, including student exchanges and using the mass media (especially radio and television) to promote nationalism. Unfortunately, the DNU has not been very successful in using radio and television as the approach taken does not take into account local differences.44 Moreover, in Sabah and Sarawak, the local press are more popular than the national press and the local press tend to concentrate on local news and issues, thus reinforcing parochialism. There are, however, several positive signs. Economic integration, although still in its infancy, has seen many successful Sabah and Sarawak businesses moving into Peninsular Malaysia and vice versa. Economic glue can be a powerful glue for integration. How it will help politically to glue East and Peninsular Malaysia is still unclear. THE THREE TYPES OF INTERVENTION From the experiences of the three states discussed above, it is clear that federal intervention comes when voters turn against the federal ruling coalition (BN) and UMNO in particular. Federal intervention also comes when states challenge the federal government on 'states rights' issues. For the individual states, the past record on confrontation with the POLITICS OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN MALAYSIA 113 federal government is poor. In most cases, federal intervention has produced Kuala Lumpur's desired outcomes. Even in cases where the states-rightists have won, for example, after PBS victories in Sabah in 1985 and 1986, relentless pressure was applied to force PBS to form a coalition government with a BN component party, in this case The United Sabah United Organisation (USNO). Although this did not happen, PBS's subsequent admission into the BN ensured the same result - a state government within the BN coalition government. For those who do not yield to federal pressure, as in Kelantan's case and more recently in Sabah, there is a heavy price to pay. Development funds often dry up the moment an opposition party takes state power. Funds are instead channelled through federal agencies to ensure that the people know their source. This 'stick and carrot' approach is amplified during elections, when voters in opposition states are told that their vote will produce either 'development' or 'stagnation'. Sometimes this works, sometimes it does not. Federal intervention usually takes three forms or types. It should be understood here that the three types proposed are not ladder-like, rather they should be seen as an escalation of federal interference, from mild intervention in the first type to direct intervernation in the third type. Some political crises, such as the Sarawak Crisis in 1966, are of the third type, while what happended in Kelantan in 1978 can be regarded as a federal intervention of the first type. In the first type, what I call 'mild intervention', the federal authorities usually co-opt local leaders who are willing to adopt BN's style of politics. A good example is in Sabah. As mentioned, in 1975 the Malaysian premier Tun Abdul Razak was behind the removal of Mustapha. Harris Salleh and Fuad Stephens were co-opted by the federal government to form Berjaya, which beat Mustapha's USNO in the polls. Another example can be found during the 1978 Kelantan crisis, when the federal leaders co-opted Nasir and Asri to form Berjasa, which helped UMNO to recapture power. The second type of federal intervention, 'mid-intervention', usually takes a more direct approach. Again Sabah illustrates the pattern. When Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) pulled out of BN in 1990, UMNO went into Sabah and established party branches. This second phase of more direct intervention usually occurs when local BN representatives are incapable of handling the situation. In the case of Sabah, USNO was a spent force by 1990 and Kuala Lumpur saw no point in trying to resuscitate USNO politically to fight PBS. A 'political recession' can be classified as midintervention. Another weapon used by the federal authorities is the Internal Security Act (ISA), which allows for indefinite detention without trial. This has been used in all three states.45 Another form of mid-intervention 114 THE JOURNAL OF COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS happened just after the 1994 Sabah state election, when BN used financial rewards to entice several newly elected PBS assemblymen to defect. The third type, 'direct intervention' (or last resort), is direct rule by Kuala Lumpur through a declaration of a state of emergency. In an extreme case, the federal government has amended the Constitution to guarantee that power is vested in Kuala Lumpur. However, direct rule is sparingly used and only after the first two types of intervention have not been successful. Sarawak suffered such an intervention 1966, when the federal authorities amended the federal constitution and imposed emergency rule when it saw no other choice following Ningkan's reinstatement by the courts. Kuala Lumpur had first tried to use locals to get rid of Ningkan. In 1970, the threat that emergency direct rule would not be lifted was used to secure a coalition government between the pro-federal Parti Bumiputera and the opposition SUPP. Emergency powers were used again, for a short period, in 1978 during the Kelantan Crisis. Since then, the federal government has not resorted to this form of intervention, although it could have done so during the bombing campaign in Sabah after the 1985 election. Since independence in 1957 (1963 for Sabah and Sarawak), Kuala Lumpur has centralised and assumed more and more power over the states. The federal government's ability to amend the federal constitution (as it did during the 1966 Sarawak crisis) and fiscal control has meant that states fighting Kuala Lumpur do so on an uneven playing field, with the odds stacked against the state.46 In Kelantan, the source of regionalism appears to be the distinct Kelantanese character rooted in Islam and the fear of being 'colonised' by Kuala Lumpur. As mentioned, PAS's claim that the federal government was un-Islamic because it refused to set up an Islamic state had some sympathy among the deeply religious Kelantanese. Moreover, as mentioned, due to their culture, the Kelantanese always saw themselves as 'different' from other Peninsular Malays. Thus there is widespread suspicion that Kuala Lumpur wants to eliminate the special Kelantanese character through UMNO. However, this accusation was manageable as long as UMNO Kelantanese leaders were able to convince the Kelantanese voters that their key presence in the UMNO hierarchy and the federal government meant that Kelantan's interests would be protected. However, all fell apart when Tengku Razaleigh, the top Kelantanese UMNO official, left UMNO with substantial UMNO members from Kelantan. In the case of the Bornean states, the problem of federalism is compounded by the fact that Sabah and Sarawak are demographically different and are physically separated from the Peninsula by the South China Sea. The Malays are a minority in both Sarawak and Sabah. Their path to federation, as mentioned, was not smooth. Intervention by Kuala POLITICS OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN MALAYSIA 115 Lumpur in Sarawak (1966 and 1970) and in Sabah (1976, 1985 and 1994) has increased regional sentiments among the populace who fear 'colonisation' by Kuala Lumpur. While many of these fears may be unjustified, their saliency at elections means that opposition politicians will find it hard to resist capitalising on them. As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, Means47 takes the view that individual states have retained substantial powers and are largely autonomous. As shown above, this situation is only valid if the states do not challenge the centre head-on on core issues like UMNO/BN dominance of the political system, security, states' rights, religion or any aspect of Malaysian federalism. In essence, these are the issues that once breached, especially in the public arena, will almost certainly invoke federal intervention.48 Both Kelantan and Sabah have raised these issues with the result that heavy federal pressure is brought to bear. In contrast, the Sarawak political elites do not raise these questions openly and thus are able to operate with a high degree of autonomy in the state. There is little doubt that state autonomy is contingent upon the states toeing the federal line on the core issues mentioned. PROSPECTS In the foreseeable future, the trend will be for Kuala Lumpur to hold all the cards while the states become weaker. Kuala Lumpur controls access to development funds and the security forces and has the constitutional power to impose direct rule through a declaration of a 'state of emergency'. Kuala Lumpur also has the ability to use amendments to the federal constitution to remove a state government. Since independence in 1957, the Barisan Nasional (and its predecessor the Malayan Alliance) has never lost its twothirds majority in the federal parliament, the minimum requirement for a successful amendment. As we have seen in the 1966 crisis in Sarawak, the federal government used a constitutional amendment retrospectively to remove a state government. PAS will find it harder and harder to develop the state economically and maintain electoral support the longer it stays in opposition. The federal government has the time and resources to wait for PAS's demise at the next polls. The common view is that, ultimately, PAS will lose its grip on Kelantan as Kuala Lumpur imposes a 'political recession'. The recent inroads made by UMNO in Kelantan reinforce this view; in the 1995 election, UMNO was able to win eight state seats, a notable performance given that UMNO was totally defeated in 1990. UMNO's ability to recapture Kelantan increased significantly when it was able to force Razaleigh to dissolve Semangat 46 and rejoin UMNO. 116 THE JOURNAL OF COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS In the case of East Malaysia, it is more difficult to predict the future. Given the fluidity of politics in Sabah, UMNO Sabah's gain in the 1994 state election could evaporate if its leaders are seen to be keen on pleasing Kuala Lumpur. Religion has an added significance in Sabah because of the large number of illegal Filipino Muslims who are widely believed to have been allowed into Sabah so that they could vote for UMNO.49 Kuala Lumpur has paid a heavy political price for federal intervention, especially for the establishment of UMNO branches in Sabah. Anti-federal feelings run high and deep and will remain so for the foreseeable future. For example, PBS won all the Kadazan-Dusun constituencies and nearly 50 per cent of the popular vote in the 1995 parliamentary elections.50 In Sarawak, the situation is similarly uncertain. The fear among Sarawak politicians is that UMNO might export its Muslim-Malay brand of politics to a state where most of the tribespeople are non-Muslims and where ethnic Chinese form about one-third of the population. Since the early 1970s, UMNO and its allies have basically taken a 'hands-off' approach. However, this status quo is only likely to last as long as the Sarawak BN coalition is in control and does not challenge UMNO's domination of the federal BN. Sabah's ruling PBS made this crucial mistake in 1990 (pulling out of the BN and supporting the opposition) with the result that UMNO has now gained a firm foothold in Sabah politics. With the Sarawak BN clearly in control, in the short term there is little likelihood that UMNO will spread into Sarawak. As long as the federal authorities, especially UMNO, do not overtly step into local political issues, the ruling federal BN need not fear serious anti-federal sentiments at the grassroots level. Ironically, the Sarawak Melanau political elite also shared the fears of a political environment similar to Peninsular Malaysia's; Malay purists would argue that Melanau-Muslims cannot hold Sarawak's highest political office. This would cost the Melanau-Muslims their pre-eminent position in Sarawak's economic and political sphere. The other main political actor, the Dayak, also shares this fear as a Peninsular Malaysian style of politics would spell the end of their dream of putting an Iban/Dayak leader back in the chief ministership. It is this common fear that has ensured that all the major political protagonists in Sarawak do not incite anti-federal sentiments too far, and thus do not give an excuse for UMNO to come into Sarawak.5' In the long run, however, the issue of separation will come up again. The physical divide between the Peninsular and the Bornean states means that Sabah and Sarawak may eventually demand their independence. Regional sentiments in the long run may lead to calls for self-determination. It is too early to speculate now on the forms it will take. Kelantan, due to its geographical position, is unlikely to be able to break free. In the immediate uncertainty, one thing remains clear: the federal POLITICS OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN MALAYSIA 117 government will not allow these two Bornean states to secede from the federation. And any moves in that direction will bring the full weight of the federal government security apparatus to bear.52 NOTES 1. Harold Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). 2. B.H. Shafruddin, The Federal Factor in the Government and Politics of Peninsular Malaysia (Singapore: Oxford University Press: 1987). 3. R.S. Milne and D.K. Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1978), 101-22. Milne and Mauzy's work is perhaps the most comprehensive among all the works cited here. However, their examination of the federal-state relationship was largely confined to the 1960s and early 1970s, the formative period of the federation. 4. Marvis Puthucheary, Federalism at the Crossroads: The 1985 Election in Sabah and their Implications for the Federal-State Relations (Kuala Lumpur: ISIS Malaysia, 1985); Francis Loh Kok Wah, 'Modernisation, Cultural Revival and Counter-Hegemony: The Kadazans of Sabah in the 1980s', in Joel Kahn and Francis Loh Kok Wah (eds.), Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia (Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen & Unwin, 1992), 225-53; and Audrey Kahin, 'Crisis on the Periphery: The Rift Between Kuala Lumpur and Sabah', Pacific Affairs, 65, 1 (Spring 1992), 41. 5. See G.P. Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1991), 296. 6. Anti-federal sentiments in other states are not as strong as in Kelantan, Sabah and Sarawak for reasons that will be outlined later. In general, the other Malay states do not have a culture or a language that is as unique as Kelantan's. UMNO is also well entrenched in all the peninsula Malay states with the exception of Kelantan and Trengganu. Moreover, in the early years of independence, other Malay states did not openly confront Kuala Lumpur, unlike Kelantan, which only clashed with the federal government in 1959, two years after independence. Sabah and Sarawak are not only physically divided from the peninsula but their indigenous peoples and cultures are totally different. 7. Sarawak Tribune, 11 July 1961. 8. Brunei pulled out of the federation when the Brunei Sultan demanded to be the first Yang diPertuan Agong (King) of the proposed Malaysian federation. The Sultans in the Malayan states refused this request. 9. Government of Malaya, Report of the Commission of Enquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1962) hereafter refereed to as Cobbold Report. 10. James P. Ongkili, Borneo Response to Malaysia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), 67. 11. Government of Malaya, Malaysia Report of the Inter-governmental Committee, 1962 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1963). 12. For details on the 1963 election in Sarawak, see Ung-Ho Chin, Chinese Politics in Sarawak: A Study of the Sarawak United People's Party (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1996); and M.B. Leigh, Rising Moon: Political Change in Sarawak (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1974). 13. See Sarawak Tribune, 16 Sept. 1963. 14. Government of Malaya, United Nations Malaysia Mission Report (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1963). The mission was led by Lawrence Michelmore, a US national. 15. See Sarawak Tribune, 17, 28 Aug. 1963. 16. For details on Sabah and Sarawak's path into Malaysia, see R.S. Milne and K.J. Ratnam, Malaysia - New States in a New Nation: Political Development of Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia (London: Frank Cass, 1974); and Margaret Clark Roff, The Politics of Belonging: 118 THE JOURNAL OF COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS Political Change in Sabah and Sarawak (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974). 17. In Malaysia, a 'state of emergency' imposed on a state means the suspension of the state government, state legislature, civil rights and direct rule from Kuala Lumpur. 18. See Paul Kadang ak. Dinggat, 'The Sarawak National Party and the Interpretations of its Nationalism' (unpublished MA thesis, University of British Columbia, 1979). 19. Interview with Ong Kee Hui, SUPP leader, July 1993. See also Chin, Chinese Politics in Sarawak, ch. 6. 20. See B. Ross-Larson, The Politics of Federalism: Syed Kechik in East Malaysia (Singapore: Bruce Ross-Larson, 1976). 21. See Ed Hunter, Misdeeds of Tun Mustapha (Hong Kong: Ed Hunter, 1976); and R. Tilman, 'Mustapha's Sabah 1968-1975', Asian Survey, 16, 6 (June 1976), 495-509. 22. When the city of Kuala Lumpur and its surrounding areas were transferred from Selangor to the federal government, the Selangor state government received millions in compensation. In contrast, when Labuan was transferred to the federal government, the Sabah government received only a token sum. 23. A succinct account of Kadazans' grudges against the Harris and the federal governments can be found in Francis Loh Kok Wah, 'Modernisation, Cultural Revival and CounterHegemony: The Kadazans of Sabah in the 1980s', in Joel Kahn and Francis Loh Kok Wah (eds.), Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia (Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen & Unwin, 1992), 225-53; and Audrey Kahin, 'Crisis on the Periphery: The Rift between Kuala Lumpur and Sabah', Pacific Affairs, 65, 1 (Spring 1992), 41. 24. Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 May 1985. 25. Although Mustapha and Harris were from different parties and fought each other in the election, their opposition to Pairin's appointment as Chief Minister forced them into an alliance of convenience. 26. For details on the 1985 elections, see K.T. Kalimuthu, 'The Sabah State Election of April 1985', Asian Survey, 26, 7 (July 1986), 815-37; and Puthucheary, Federalism at the Crossroads. 27. PBS actually won only 25 seats. However, a PASOK elected representative defected to PBS immediately after the election. He had publicly declared during the campaign that he would side with PBS, thus it could be said that he won on PBS support. 28. PBS's grouses with the federal government and Twenty Points can be found in Joseph Pairin Kitingan, 'Territorial Integration: A Personal View', in Bonding of a Nation: Federalism and Territorial Integration in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: ISIS, 1986), 10-18; and Herman Luping, 'The Formation of Malaysian Revisited', in J.G. Kitingan and M.J. Ongkili (eds.), Sabah: 25 Years Later (Kota Kinabalu: IDS Sabah, 1989), 1-60. 29. Personal communication from a Sabah politician, March 1994. 30. 'Political recession' is a term used by Sabahans to mean the federal government's active economic marginalisation of Sabah when PBS went into the opposition. Since 1990, Sabah's economic growth has consistently been below the national average and locals blame the federal government for scaring away foreign investment as well as not releasing or delaying development funds requested by the PBS state government. 31. In Malaysia, it is usually a very difficult and long process to register a political party without being affiliated with the ruling BN coalition. The Registrar of Societies, which deals with applications for political parties, reports directly to the federal Home Minister, Mahathir. Mahathir is also Prime Minister and head of the BN coalition. 32. For details on the 1994 Sabah election, see James Chin, 'Sabah Election of 1994: End of Kadazan Unity', Asian Survey, 38, 10 (1994), 904-15. 33. Chong Hui Wee, Sabah and Sarawak in the Malaysian Economy (Kuala Lumpur: INSAN, 1995). 34. Wee, Sabah and Sarawak, Ch.6. 35. For details, see William Roff (ed.), Kelantan: Religion, Society, and Politics in a Malay State (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974); and Manning Nash, Peasant Citizens: Politics, Religion, and Modernization in Kelantan, Malaysia (Athens: Ohio University, Center for International Studies, 1974). POLITICS OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN MALAYSIA 119 36. UMNO argues that it is unrealistic to create an Islamic state in Malaysia as about 40 per cent of the population are non-Muslim. UMNO also believes that under the British Westminster system of government inherited by Malaysia, a separation of state and religion is essential. PAS, on the other hand, argues that non-Muslims can live quite happily in a Muslim state and, moreover, it is every Muslim's 'duty' to help create an Islamic state. 37. Two PMIP state assemblymen defected to UMNO and when the Sultan of Trengganu refused the PMIP state government's request to hold a snap election, the government fell in late October. The then Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Razak, played a key role here. The federal government kept up the pressure on PMIP when several of its leaders, including party president, Burhanuddin Al-Helmy, were detained for allegedly supporting Sukarno during Indonesia's konfrontasi with Malaysia, which further weakened the party. 38. A detailed account of why UMNO failed in Kelantan can be found in Clive Kessler, Islam and Politics in a Malay State: Kelantan 1838-1969 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978). See also Roff (ed.), Kelantan; and Nash, Peasant Citizens. 39. Kessler, Islam and Politics. Traditionally in Peninsula states where the BN is the ruling coalition, the Prime Minister, who is also the chairman of BN, nominates the Chief Minister of the state. 40. See Alias Mohammad, PAS' Platform: Development and Change 1958-1986 (Petaling Jaya: Gateway, 1994); and Rokiah Talib, Politik dan Isu Ekonomi di Kelantan: Satu Kajian Sosio Ekonomi (Political and Economic Issues in Kelantan: A Socio-economic Analysis) (Petaling Jaya: Gateway, 1994). 41. In October 1996, Semangat 46 was dissolved and Razaleigh and his supporters went back into UMNO. Many S46 members, who were former senior UMNO officials, backed the move because they wanted the lucrative economic patronage bestowed by UMNO. Additionally, S46 and PAS fell apart over PAS's attempt to pass a state constitutional amendment to curtail the power of the Kelantan Sultan, Razaleigh's nephew. This does not mean that the former Kelantanese S46 members are any less anti-federal as the move back into UMNO was due to (a) financial rewards and (b) local dispute between PAS and S46. 42. The reasons for Singapore's expulsion are complex. For details on the separation see Nordin Sophiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1974). 43. The state civil service in these three states are still under state control. Federal plans to integrate them into the federal civil service have met with strong resistance. The federal government has not forced this issue because the independent state civil services are not perceived as a direct threat to the integrity of the federation. Thus far, the federal government has used a 'back-door' approach, by bringing in federal legislation which takes state responsibilities away from the state bureaucracy and moves them to the federal bureaucracy. For example, in the case of Sabah and Sarawak, the federal government has taken over responsibilities for education. Before, education in these two states came under state control as provided for under the 20 points. 44. For example, 'national unity' advertisements on television tend to portray the nation as having only three ethnic groups: Malays, Chinese and Indians. This peninsula bias has led to the PBS government demanding a separate television station for Sabah since coming into power in 1985. As expected, the federal government rejected this demand, fearing that it will reinforce regionalism. The PAS-led Kelantanese state government have also tried to set up a separate radio station although, again like Sabah, it was stopped by the federal government. 45. However, it must be stated here that ISA was more often used against BN's political opponents rather than opponents who were preaching secession from the federation. 46. Kuala Lumpur's increasing control of financial matters is discussed in detail by Shafruddin, Federal Factor. 47. Means, Malaysian Politics. 48. In my interviews with several Sarawak and Sabah BN politicians, they said it was possible to raise the sensitive states' rights 'as long as it is done in private'. Thus, it would appear that BN political elites can air their views as long as it is done in a tightly controlled environment within the ruling coalition. It is almost certain that this avenue is not available to opposition politicians. 120 THE JOURNAL OF COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS 49. Although it is impossible to ascertain the exact number of such voters (estimates ranged from 300,000 to 500,000), their open presence in mainly Kadazan-majority constituencies made Islamisation into an important electoral issue. In the 1994 and 1995 polls, the FilipinoMuslim vote for UMNO was the deciding factor (in UMNO's favour) in marginal constituencies. See 'The Shadow Life of Filipinos in Sabah', Asiaweek, 30 April 1994; and James Chin, 'Back to Square One: The 1995 General Election in Sabah and Sarawak', Borneo Research Bulletin, 27 (1996). 50. See New Straits Times, 26 April 1995. For details, see James Chin, 'Back to Square One'. 51. Personal communications from interviews with politicians in Sarawak, June-Aug. 1993. 52. It is common knowledge that the majority of army and other security personnel based in an opposition held state like Kelantan and in Sabah and Sarawak do not come from the local region. Moreover, the federal government can always resort to detention without trial under the Internal Security Act (ISA).