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Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 2014 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2014.922350 Beyond the ‘String of Pearls’: is there really a Sino-Indian security dilemma in the Indian Ocean? David Brewster * Visiting Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies, Centre, Australian National University, NSW, Australia The article will ask whether Sino-Indian strategic competition in the Indian Ocean should be properly understood through the lens of a security dilemma. It examines the strategic positions of India and China in the Indian Ocean and concludes that India has an overwhelming strategic advantage that China cannot realistically mitigate in the foreseeable future. This advantage precludes any real security dilemma arising between them. In fact, both China and India have good reasons to keep strategic competition under control while they each broaden their regional influence. Keywords: India; China; strategic competition; Indian Ocean; security dilemma China is becoming an ever-more important factor in the strategic balance of the Indian Ocean and is increasingly cutting across India’s strategic ambitions in the region. Many commentators see China as aggressively expanding its influence in the Indian Ocean as a prelude to building a significant military presence. According to this narrative, China’s offensive actions are creating a security dilemma for India and others that could lead to naval rivalry and an arms race in the region. This article will look at the concept of the security dilemma before examining whether such a dilemma exists in the Indian Ocean. It will discuss India’s strategic position and then examine China’s strategic imperatives and vulnerabilities in the region. The article will conclude that India’s overwhelming strategic advantages in the Indian Ocean preclude any real security dilemma arising. In fact, despite tensions in the relationship, it is in the interests of both China and India to mitigate rivalry in the maritime sphere. What is a security dilemma? The security dilemma forms a basic part of our thinking about international relations. The idea was first articulated by the international relations scholar John H. Herz, who observed that attempts by states to look after their security needs tend, regardless of intention, to increase insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and measures of others as potentially threatening (Herz, 1950). This idea holds an important position in several different traditions in international relations thinking, if in somewhat different ways. So-called offensive realists such as John Mearsheimer argue *Email: dhbrewster@bigpond.com © 2014 Indian Ocean Research Group 2 D. Brewster that the security dilemma is inescapable because anarchy encourages all states to always increase their own power at the expense of others (Mearsheimer, 2001). Defensive realists such as Stephen Walt claim that a security dilemma will arise in some circumstances because states will always try to maximise their own security and are distrustful of other states’ intentions (Walt, 1987). Constructivists such as Alexander Wendt focus on the subjective element, arguing that security dilemmas arise due to intersubjective under-standings where states assume the worst about each other’s intentions (Wendt, 1992, p. 397). But if a security dilemma can arise because of state behaviour or perceptions why is it more intense in some circumstances than others? Robert Jervis sets out four simple scenarios to describe conditions under which a security dilemma will arise in differing degrees. According to Jervis, the key to understanding the intensity of the security dilemma is how easily it is for others to distinguish between offensive and defensive behaviour and the relative advantage of offence and defence in the given circumstances (Jervis, 1978). These scenarios are: first, when offensive and defensive behaviour are not distinguishable but offence has a strategic advantage, then the environment is ‘doubly dangerous’ and the security dilemma is very intense. Status quo states will behave in an aggressive manner and the possibility of an arms race will arise; second, where offensive and defensive behaviour are not distinguishable but defence has a strategic advantage, then the security dilemma will be intense. In this situation, a state might be able to increase its security without being a threat to other states and without endangering the security of other states; third, where offensive and defensive behaviour are distinguish-able but offence has a strategic advantage, then the security dilemma is not intense. Although the environment is relative safe, offensive behaviour has an advantage that might result in aggression at some future time; and fourth, where offensive and defensive behaviour are distinguishable and defence has a strategic advantage, the environment is ‘doubly safe’ and the security dilemma has little or no intensity. According to Jervis, a state might build its military capability for defensive purposes which other states might interpret as offensive; this may result in those other states taking an aggressive stance, which in turn may lead to an arms race. The security dilemma might also force states to form new alliances especially if it is perceived that offensive behaviour holds a strategic advantage over defence. How might these concepts apply to India and China in the Indian Ocean? There is considerable strategic competition or even rivalry between India and China in several dimensions and theatres, including on their Himalayan border, in relation to Pakistan and elsewhere in South Asia and in the Indian Ocean. Many analysts claim that a Sino-Indian security dilemma exists or is arising in the Indian Ocean (Athwal, 2008; Garver, 2002; Holslag, 2009; Mohan, 2012). The idea has even become part of political rhetoric, when, for example, political leaders talk of a ‘Malacca Dilemma’ or a ‘Hormuz Dilemma’ to describe the vulnerability of their sea lines of communication across the Indian Ocean. The popular ‘String of Pearls’ narrative also reflects these perceptions. It posits that China’s interests in various port and other infrastructure projects in the Indian Ocean region are strategic in nature, creating a potential threat for India. This article will look at Chinese and Indian strategic imperatives in the Indian Ocean and the ‘String of Pearls’ narrative before returning to the question of a security dilemma.