What price neutrality?

SWEDEN and Finland stopped being neutral years ago. They both participate in NATO exercises, commit troops to its rapid-reaction force, took part in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, joined the fight in Afghanistan and, in the case of Sweden, even got involved in the 2011 air war in Libya.

The two Nordic countries are thus more willing participants in the transatlantic alliance than several full members (Germany refused to have anything to do with Libya). Yet they do not enjoy the biggest benefits of NATO: a seat at the decision-making table and the protection afforded by Article 5, the clause that defines an attack on one as an attack on all. This did not matter much when Russia was a “partner” and neutrality, or rather non-alignment, was a badge of national identity. But Vladimir Putin’s aggression towards Ukraine is forcing a reassessment.

This is especially true in Finland, once part of the Russian empire. Alexander Stubb, who is about to take over as prime minister, made clear his wish to push for NATO membership with the aim of “maximising Finland’s national security”. He was elected this week as leader of the conservative Kokoomus party, succeeding Jyrki Katainen, who is moving to the European Commission. Nothing will happen immediately, as the current five-party coalition excludes moves towards NATO. But Mr Stubb said the country needed a “comprehensive debate” after next April’s general election and, if he wins, he seems determined to lead it.

Russia is snarling. Sergei Markov, a senior political adviser to Mr Putin, said Finland risked triggering the third world war. “Anti-Semitism started world war two. Russophobia can start a third world war. Finland is one of the most Russophobic countries in Europe, after Sweden, Poland and the Baltic countries.” In a country that gave rise to the term “Finlandisation”, the enforced neutering of foreign policy by the Soviet Union during the cold war, Mr Stubb is going further than his predecessors. Public opinion is ambiguous. Polls find most Finns against joining the alliance, but they would agree to if the country’s leaders advocated it.

The trouble is that Finland’s leaders are themselves divided. The Social Democrats are opposed. Aspects of foreign and defence policy, particularly relations with Russia, are in the hands of the president, Sauli Niinisto, who has tempered his past support for NATO. He is arguing instead for the idea of more defence co-operation in the European Union, whose Lisbon treaty includes a commitment that, if any member comes under “armed aggression”, EU members “shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power”. But how much could anyone trust promises from a body that struggles even to meet its modest commitment to have two “battle groups” of about 1,500 men ready for deployment at short notice?

The climate would change if Sweden, the Nordic “big brother”, moved towards NATO. Sweden is increasing defence spending. Its 2009 “solidarity declaration” says Sweden will “not be passive” if an EU or Nordic country is attacked. Its foreign minister, Carl Bildt, has been very active in the Ukraine crisis, as one of the prime advocates of a close partnership between the EU and Ukraine. But despite some debate about NATO membership, a recent parliamentary commission report shied away from the issue. And the centre-right government, more favourable to NATO than the centre-left, is expected to lose an election in September.

For now, Sweden and Finland are seeking more integration among Nordic countries. Much has been achieved in joint training and logistics. But most of the easy gains from peacetime co-operation have been made. The hard part (what to do in wartime) remains clouded by the fact that two (Norway and Denmark) are NATO members and the rest are not. The lack of clarity makes for uncertainty on NATO’s northern flank. The defence of the ex-Soviet Baltic states, too long ignored for fear of upsetting Russia, has become a conundrum for NATO military planners. The Baltic trio are a plausible flashpoint, given sizeable Russian minorities in two of them, and they are also the hardest allies to defend. Small, thinly populated and (barring Estonia) spending pitiful amounts for their own defence, the Baltics are entirely within range of Russian anti-aircraft and air-to-ground missiles. How far would Sweden and Finland go to protect them?

Karlis Neretnieks, a Swedish former general, argues that the problem would worsen if Russia were to invade (or just “borrow” temporarily) some of the Baltic islands to deploy their missiles, thereby threatening the whole Baltic Sea, and much of southern Sweden besides. Indeed, Sweden has just deployed troops and planes to the island of Gotland. Finland, for its part, is treaty-bound not to militarise the Aland Islands, an archipelago at the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia.

Hug them tighter

Sweden and Finland want to be as close and interoperable as possible with NATO, without being members; NATO has sought to embrace them as closely as possible, and is drawing up new privileges, without granting them decision-making rights. It is time to consummate the relationship. Uncertainty gives Russia scope for mischief-making. Finnish and Swedish membership would enhance security by turning the Baltic into a NATO lake.

Might Russia throw a dangerous hissy fit? It is telling that Sweden’s semi-neutrality did not prevent Russian bombers last year from staging a mock attack (it was NATO planes, not Swedish ones, that scrambled to meet them). The Swedish chief of staff subsequently declared that his forces could defend only a small part of the country against Russian attack, for a week at best. NATO bluntly told Sweden that, without being a full member, it could not expect the allies to come to its defence. Russian belligerence only strengthens the case for NATO membership.

^{Economist.com/blogs/charlemagne}