Entitlement failure
In the late 20th century the work of the Indian economist Amartya Sen led to a major reorientation in the study of famines. In works such as Poverty and Famines (1981), Sen challenged the prevailing “FAD hypothesis,” the assumption that total food-availability decline (FAD) is the central cause of all famines. Sen argued that the more proximate cause is so-called “entitlement failure,” which can occur even when there is no decline in aggregate food production.
According to Sen, in every society each person can be thought of as having an “entitlement” to all possible combinations of the goods and services to which he has access. An entitlement is a collection of alternative bundles of goods and services from which the person in question is free to choose. A resident of a homeless shelter, for example, may have an entitlement consisting of exactly one bundle: a tray of food and a ration of clothes. But a cotton farmer, who grows sack-loads of cotton each year, can keep the cotton or sell it and buy various combinations of other goods. All these options constitute his particular entitlement.
A person’s entitlement can change for a number of reasons—for example, variations in the prices of goods and services, the implementation of new rationing rules, infestations of a farmer’s crops by pests, or the disruption of food-distribution channels by war. These examples demonstrate how some segments of the population can perish because of hunger despite there being no overall shortfall in food production. If, because of an international glut, the price of cotton collapses in a given year, a village of cotton growers can suddenly find that their entitlements of food have failed, and they can face starvation.
A good example of an entitlement-based famine without a commensurate shortfall in food production is the Bengal famine of 1943, which happens to be one of the most intensively studied famines. Although food production did fall slightly in 1943 compared with previous years, it was still 13 percent higher than in 1941, when there was no famine. One phenomenon that did distinguish the year 1943 was inflation, a common consequence of war. Yet, amid rising commodity prices, the wages paid to agricultural labourers stagnated. Between 1939 and 1943, food grain prices rose by more than 300 percent, slightly outstripping the rate of inflation, whereas the wages of agricultural labourers rose by only 30 percent. Agricultural labourers, as a class, were badly hit, which resulted in many deaths. Yet, even as rural Bengal was being ravaged by famine, the West Bengal capital city, Calcutta (now Kolkata), was hardly affected. Research has shown that famine-related deaths in Calcutta occurred primarily among migrants who had come from the villages in search of food and alms.
The role of policy
Many factors can contribute to entitlement failure. For example, slight imbalances in production can lead to large increases or declines in price. But government policies can also cause entitlement failures. It can be argued, for example, that the Bangladesh famine of 1974, which was precipitated by the effects of widespread flooding, would have been less severe if the state’s food-rationing system had not been in place. The rationing system was flawed because it provided subsidized rationed food to only the country’s urban population. In 1974, despite higher-than-usual rice production, there was a slight shortage of per capita food availability, because the United States temporarily halted routine food aid over its objections to Bangladesh’s trade with Cuba. If the shortage had been shared out across the country, there would have been little hardship. But the rationing system kept the supplies of food in the urban centres, thereby affecting the entitlements of rural Bangladeshis and ultimately causing famine and some one million deaths.
During the Ethiopian famine of 1973, the country’s overall food productivity did not decline—in other words, according to the FAD hypothesis, there should not have been a famine. Yet, in the province of Wollo and to a lesser extent in Tigray, residents suffered famine exacerbated by entitlement failures that were made worse by the poor system of transport between regions.
A less proximate cause of famines can be the nature of a country’s political system. As Sen pointed out, democracy serves as a natural bulwark against famines. In a democratic system coupled with a free press, the occurrence of a famine will inevitably reduce the popularity of the government; thus, the fear of being voted out of power motivates democratic governments to take measures to prevent or at least mitigate famines. In the western Indian state of Maharashtra, for example, droughts in the early 1970s severely affected a large area with a population of about 20 million. The resulting food shortages would have caused a famine if the government had not intervened by delivering food (from buffer stocks) and initiating massive employment-relief programs. Although there was a small rise in mortality, there were no recorded “starvation deaths.” In contrast, it is arguable that the catastrophic kind of famine that occurred in China in 1959–61 could not have happened in a democratic country. Chinese censorship prevented the world (and the Chinese people themselves) from understanding the enormity of the famine until well after the tragedy had occurred. Even decades later, mortality statistics continued to be disputed.
It should be noted that statistics on famine mortality are always difficult to establish, because, contrary to a widely held view, in most famines only a small proportion of deaths are the direct result of starvation. The chief cause of death is usually disease, which can continue long after the famine has officially ended. In the Bengal famine, for example, deaths from starvation occurred between the critical months of March and November 1943, but the overall death rate did not peak until later—in the period from December 1943 through December 1944, when most deaths were caused by cholera, malaria, and smallpox.
Prevention and control
In order to be effective, policies designed to prevent or control famines must be based on a sound understanding of the relationship between markets and food shortages. According to two traditional but opposing views, food markets exacerbate food shortages and therefore should be carefully controlled, or they naturally alleviate food shortages and therefore should be completely unhindered. Both views are flawed: both have caused governments to act in ways that made famines worse. In many cases, for example, the first reaction of governments has been to prevent the movement of food between regions, since such activity is frequently associated with speculation and profiteering. Yet this restriction on trade reduces the inflow of food into famine-affected regions, despite the fact that scarcity will have driven up food prices—a consequence that typically attracts more suppliers wishing to sell. The reduced flow of food caused by trade limitations may well contribute to more suffering and starvation. The aim should therefore be not to curb profits by restricting trade but to maximize the flow of food to the regions and population groups hardest hit by shortages.
Equally faulty, however, is the view that problems will be resolved if the market is left fully to its own devices. It is based on the assumption that those who need food badly will be prepared to pay higher prices; if there is no government intervention, therefore, food will reach those who need it most. This argument makes the fatal mistake of presuming that all people have the same income. In reality, when people panic about food shortages, the wealthier in society tend to hoard food for themselves, thereby driving up food prices to levels beyond what the poor are able to afford.
Contemporary research has shown that famines are best prevented and controlled when markets are allowed to function but when governments also intervene in appropriate ways. Private traders should be permitted to move food into affected regions; at the same time, governments should shore up the buying power of the poor through direct relief or employment-relief (food-for-work or cash-for-work) programs.
There is continuing debate about whether relief is better provided in the form of food or cash. The answer is not obvious. Some have argued that if equivalent amounts of food and cash are being compared, then from the point of view of survival it does not matter which is given. In most cases, however, the answer depends on how well the relief system works or on how broadly it covers the population it is supposed to help. A cash-based program makes sense only if steps are taken to ensure that all those affected by the food shortage obtain relief. This is especially important in view of the fact that the wide distribution of cash will be likely to cause food prices in the affected region to rise. In the most acute situations of famine, therefore, it is usually far more effective to give relief in the form of food.
Kaushik Basu