India can hold but not deter China: Lt Gen (retd) JFR Jacob in conversation with Gen (retd) Ved Prakash Malik

As Chief of Staff (CoS) of the Kolkata-based Eastern Army Command, Lt Gen (retired) Jacob Farj Rafael Jacob, 88, was one of the architects of a decisive victory that created Bangladesh during the 1971 India-Pakistan war. General (retired) Ved Prakash Malik, 72, was Chief of Army Staff (CoAS) during the 1999 Kargil conflict where Pakistani intruders were forced out of the heights they had occupied in Jammu and Kashmir. Two generals who fought two of India's last and very different wars sat down with India Deputy Editor Sandeep Unnithan in New Delhi to analyse the Army of today, the need for political clarity and to be apolitical, the challenges of infrastructure and modernisation it faces from the military might of China. Can today's Indian Army fight the wars of tomorrow?

India Today (IT): Is the Indian Army a dinosaur?

General (retired) JFR Jacob (JFR): Basically, the Indian Army has not changed from the Second World War. To me it is still a World War 2 army. There has been no re-organisation. The only regiment which has been reorganized is the artillery. The army lacks mobility as it is basically defence oriented. It has the Maginot influence. You know Sergent Maginot in World War I, who later on became the French Defence Minister. He built what was called the Maginot Line. We, in India rely on fixed defences. It is not right. The army needs mobility as mobility wins wars. You need to be mobile to be able to react and that is what our army needs to develop.

General (retired) Ved Prakash Malik (VPM): The strategic environment is always dynamic. The kind of war we fought in '62 is not the kind of war that he (General Jacob) had to fight in '71 or I had to fight in 1999 because the geopolitics and geostrategics of the region changes. There are new technological developments. And the political leadership has a different kind of mind-set in these circumstances. He is right; today we have been shorn of mobility that is required.

IT: Do you agree that we are beset with a Maginot Line fixation?

VPM: Not quite. There is a reason. Today, the political leadership is not prepared to lose an inch of ground and that is the reason in 1999, at Kargil, we were not permitted to go across anywhere. Look, you can throw them out but don't cross the line of control. Why? Because nobody in this country was prepared to lose an inch of ground. When you have that kind of a mind-set then mobility suffers which, yes, from the army's point of view is important, but then you have to change your strategies.

IT: So the army is a victim of this 'not lose an inch of territory' political mind-set?

VPM: That is true. Because when you are only defending yourself and not made capable politically, as well as in terms of your armament, options of going across and hurting the adversary lessen and then you are handicapped

IT: Is the army's 'Cold Start' doctrine a reaction to this defensive mind-set?

VPM: No, that is because our mobilisation used to take long. Conflicts these days come at short notice, therefore there has been a requirement for some time that you need to react faster because you will have a war for 10-15 days and if you are not able to mobilise faster, you will have a problem. So, the so-called 'Cold Start' which some chiefs say it is there, some say it isn't. All it means is that we can mobilize faster. That is a strategic requirement.

IT: How would Cold Start' have helped you during the '71 War?

JFR: We are relying too much on ditch-cum-bund defences in Punjab. That is not a line that can withstand. We need reserves. Defences are only to determine where the thrust is and give us time. Getting us ready to prepare ourselves. Once the breach has been made, you need reserves, you need movement. Fortunately, things have changed. The basic nature of war that is taught to us (in India) is defence. That is wrong. The basic principle of war is attack. The basic operation of war is the offensive. Let me emphasise this. Today our organisations are based on defence. We have a four-company battalion. The Americans, Russians have three companies. I've seen many attacks during World War 2. They've all been not more than a company attack. A Commanding Officer cannot handle more than a single company attack. One, that is all. I've never seen a two-company attack. If attack is the basic percept of war, then our organisations should reflect this. I feel we should go in for re-organisation. The Russians have ten tanks per squadron. We have 12 tanks. The only people who have re-organised are the gunners, who have gone from eight-gun batteries to six-gun batteries. We need to streamline the manpower and raise more units. What you save, raise more regiments and battalions from that. The other thing I've been keen on is guns. In the '71 war we had 13 pounders. In WW2 our 25 pounders weren't much use against the Japanese. We went to the extent of getting 7.2 inch howitzers that fired a 200 pound shell at the Japanese bunkers. The other point I want to stress is the concept of neutralisation, which we have inherited from the British. We don't need neutralisation, we need destruction.

IT: An area which perhaps wasn't as important in the 1940s and 1960s when you were commissioned, Counter-Insurgency Operations (CI Ops). Did you ever envisage hundreds and thousands of army men deployed in CI Ops?

JFR: Mrs Gandhi had guts, she knew what to do. When the situation went out control in West Bengal, General Manekshaw turned up with the defence secretary telling me to break the Naxal revolt. I said, it's a police job. He said the police can't do it. He said 'it's an order'. I said, ok, you give me an order, I will do it. But I need more troops, which he gave me. We broke the Naxals but we never learnt our lessons. The Naxal revolt was born out of economic and social reasons, we never addressed that. He (General Malik) was with me when we broke the Naga insurrection in the 1960s. Unfortunately, internal security has become so prominent in recent years; the government has been using the army again and again. It's definitely not desirable. That kind of situation is not good for the country or for the army men who are deployed. Because after some time people get used to the army restrictions, then there is a certain amount of alienation that takes place and sometimes when there are aberrations and you have people turning against the army. In any case, it affects the army man's thinking, training. So, I would not advise that the army be kept in IS duties for long and unfortunately today 15-20 per cent of the army is deployed on such fronts. RR, AR you can say whatever; not desirable for the army. The government should train the police forces so that they can rely on them for internal security situations, so that they don't have to rely on the army as often as they do. If the police and paramilitary were more efficient, the stress on the army will lessen and the army can focus on it's core competency, which is not IS. I'm very pro-CRPF, they're very good people. The problem is that, say like in Sumatra, we were ambushed several times but we moved tactically, we had a main body, an advance guard, we were able to deploy and break the ambush. Unfortunately, the CRPF sends columns into the jungle, which does nothing. The tactics in Nagaland is to find, fix them and apprehend them. We did this when you were there (General Malik)...in Nagaland, Mokuchong. You must surround; unless you surround, they get out. The only question is; are we giving them the leadership and the training required for the kind of environment we are sending them to.

IT: How important is clarity of directive from the political leadership?

VPM: If your political aim and any desired aims are made clear to you then your strategy, your political aim, your tactics, everything flows from it. But if the initial direction is not given correctly then you have a big problem, look at the 1962 war; you gave the military directions for which they were not prepared. They were not prepared for this kind of an operation in mountain warfare. We had reduced their strength, we had not looked after the leadership and they had not been equipped with arms and ammunition. Today, things are much better and today, like in 1999, political directions are quite clear. Terms of reference, whether we liked it or not that was a different matter, it was given, it was followed and there was continuous interaction between the military leadership and the political leadership, not the bureaucracy. As a result, we stuck to the aims that were given. We modified our operational plans in a manner to achieve the objectives that were given, both from the military and political points.

JFR: I was lucky. We had two leaders, Indira Gandhi who had guts, who was determined and who never wavered. We had Jagjivan Ram, who was brilliant. I worked with him. The man had such a keen brain. He got all the material we needed to fight the war. These leaders were pragmatic. I don't know about the leaders today. Our junior officers were magnificent. I didn't have any training in World War 2, I went into the battlefield. These guys are brilliant, they're tough and motivated. They're far better trained than I ever was. Our officers are good, our men are good. Our young officers are brilliant and that's a constant factor in all wars. The clarity you need from the political leadership.
You must have a proper grand strategy from where we can derive a military strategy. Wherever there was disharmony, wherever there was no clarity, we've had a problem. Yes, 1962 was an embarrassment but if you look at the conflicts we've had to face, except for 1962 we have never had a problem. Now that war is being analysed. The kind of atmosphere that was created was not conducive back then.

IT: Are we better prepared to tackle China?

VPM: We are certainly much better prepared. Today both countries have nuclear weapons that create a threshold. The only problem is that we have not created adequate infrastructure along the border which can enable the armed forces to do both, manoeuvre and defence.

JFR: I've had a lot of interaction with the defence minister. After a lot of interaction he agreed to raise more divisions. The point is that the Chinese can induct over 30,000 troops in two weeks. We need more troops. I'm not saying you need a strike force to go into Tibet. My point is you need reserves. In war, unless you have reserves, you cannot fight a war. We need mobile troops in case we make a breakthrough. We need that and we haven't got that in the east.

VPM: And to use these additional troops, you need infrastructure on the ground. Till you get the infrastructure it is futile.

IT: Do you think infrastructure is the biggest cause for concern?

VPM: Yes. I would also like to stress what General Jacob said, we need the 155 mm howitzers. In the mountains you require a much larger density of guns to be able to have destructive capability. We were lucky we didn't have an all-out war, so we were able to concentrate all our guns during Kargil in that area. At the moment we haven't been able to buy anything after Bofors. Bofors guns are required; you require better surveillance, satellite imagery. Today the strategic environment is dynamic, so you have to be prepared for cyber war too. Or else your command and control will be immobilised. You have to be prepared for space imagery.

IT: Is the army adequately equipped?

VPM: I would say they are much much better off. But as I said, if you have to prevent a war, you have to have more equipment. At the moment we are in a position to fight the war but we are not in a position to prevent a war if the Chinese want it.

JFR: Gen Montgomery made a mistake, he substituted flexibility. We lack mobility. In this mountainous terrain, we need to move troops. We need helicopters. We need mobility, mobility, mobility. We need more troops in the North-East and Ladakh. I'm not saying go into Tibet but if there is an incursion, we need to break it.

IT: Helicopters are an area of concern?

VPM: The division must have rapid deployment capability. This means they must have helicopters integral to the force so that you can mobilise them at a fast-pace. The new divisions need to be re-organised in a manner so that they have greater mobility within the formations.

JFR: We need to rethink mobility. You cannot deal with incursions if you have static defences. You need to have at least three more divisions and an armoured division in the North-East. We don't have this at the moment. We can hold the Chinese, there's no question about that; but we don't have enough local offensive operations.

VPM: Whatever we raise now, it must be capable of addressing the threats.

IT: You mentioned that the army is stuck in time? Does it call for a re-organisation of the army?

VPM: I don't agree with it, entirely. Yes, we may not have changed, but we are seeing a change. One admits it is not as fast as one would like to see it because our complete modernization programme moves at an absolute snail's pace. Sometimes it doesn't move at all. Now unless that happens, how do you change the army? Unless we are able to modernise ourselves and keep pace with the new strategic environment, you will have the impression that we are a standstill. But there are people who are thinking, there are some aspects which are being looked into, just that they are being looked in slightly slowly.

IT: How serious is the officer shortage within the army?

JFR: Today we can get jawans. Not a problem. But we need more officers. The Israelis have a saying, 'follow me'. We need leaders. Our officers have proved to be brilliant leaders. Under General Malik, we did a magnificent job in Kargil with the young officers. But unfortunately, we don't have enough officers. It is a crying need. We need enough officers. Our boys are excellent but we don't have enough of them.

VPM: It is the young officers, the junior leaders who win the war. Any amount of planning that you do, it is finally the young officers who win the battles and finally the war, for you. Today, we don't have them in adequate numbers.

IT: Why is that so?

VPM: There you require a complete overhaul of your terms of service. The pace of promotion is much slower. By the time an officer becomes a Brigadier or a Major General, he has already passed three-fourths of his service or even more sometimes. I became a CO with 14 years of service. General Jacob became a CO much younger. And as a result, you get more time in each rank. Brigadier, Lt General, Major General. You get more time to learn. So the complete terms of service must be changed in a manner that you make service more attractive and secondly, you have enough incentive within the service so the young officer doesn't feel like leaving.

IT: Are scams responsible for this?

VPM: Those (officers) are bad examples. We don't need such examples at all. If it is happening, they ought to be punished, which is what is happening. They aren't getting away with it. Only that today you get to know more because the media is covering it. Not a bad thing because if they are getting caught, you should know about it. Don't forget, no other profession asks a subordinate to go and face a bullet. So the camaraderie, the trust, has got to be the best. But if you look at the large strength of the army, I don't think they are affecting the intake into the army.

JFR: I don't want to dig up dirt. The other point you raised. I was promoted on the battlefield to a Major, in three years, superseding several British officers. In my time, Thimayya was a Lt Colonel. We were all in the Arakan. I stayed a Major for 11 years when I came back to India and I thought I was going to retire. Fortunately, they decided to raise new artillery regiments. I had taken part in an exercise. Sam Manekshaw asked me to take part. It was called 'Plan 100'. It was to reduce the Indian Army to 100,000. This was in 1950. They wanted to reduce the Indian Army to smaller than what it was in the East India Company days. So what can you expect? So basically, things are much better now. That Plan 100 went into the wastepaper basket. Fortunately, things are much different now. We need an army to defend on two fronts, against Pakistan and China. Unless we have that, we are in great trouble.

IT: Do you see an increase politicisation of the army?

VPM: The basic ethos of the army has been apolitical. We may have had one or two people running to the political leadership for their promotions, but by and large, the army has been apolitical. People like General Jacob and Field Marshal Cariappa established the apolitical ethos in the army. I also give credit to the political leadership of that time who kept away from the army. Democratic institutions grew in size, but none of them tried to influence the army, as far as politics were concerned. That is how it continues.

IT: Has the gulf between the political and military leadership widened as a result of this?

VPM: That is the way we have structured our higher defence organisation over the years and you have put the bureaucrats in the middle. This attitude, that you must go through me. During the war, we interact much closer, but during peace, that distance is being created. That is not desirable. One would like to see greater professional interaction between the political and military leadership.

JFR: The problem with the bureaucracy is that they feel they are the government. They are government servants. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet are the government. Babus are not government. They feel they want to run things. I had problems before on this one in various fields. In my time we had problems in Kolkata, but they were sorted out.

VPM: It doesn't happen during crisis situations or conflicts. The problem occurs during peacetime. In peace, you are preparing for war. It is important there. Otherwise, practically, there is absolutely no problem, but then it is too late. Yes, they were very sensitive to our needs. We used to work together, all of us. Nobody checked my hands. But then it is too late a stage, you cannot equip an army in two days. You have to do it in peacetime. We have five year defence plans. If you neglect them, you will face serious problems in war.

IT: What about the debate over removing the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA)?

JFR: The state governments today have not been able to solve the problem. It is because of that the central government is involved. Unless there is central direction, this problem of Naxalism will get worse.

VPM: Look at the states affected by the Maoist problem. There are so many states. You have problems between the states and states and Centre. Unless you are able to coordinate intelligence activity, you will have a problem. You have to reframe rules even if it requires modifying the constitution, so that you have one political direction. Today, the Centre is not able to push a solution because of the states.

IT: Do you see it inevitable that the army will once again get dragged into solving the Naxal problem?

VPM: I hope not. If you have to solve the problem, you have to send in the army. Whether the present government in the Centre has the will, I don't know?

IT: Is that desirable?

VPM: It's not desirable. We have a responsibility, we should not be pushed into it before we have used all options against the Maoists. So you have your paramilitary forces. Let us try and make them effective, occasionally you can use the army. But I would not advise you to push more and more people from the army into tackling Maoists. It is going to take more and more time. There are two aspects of the Maoist problem. There is development and the military solution. One cannot work without the other, let me assure you that. So when we are taking any military action, you must also carry out development. Most of the problem is among the tribals and unless you are able to look after their welfare and morale, their socio-economics, you will continue to have this problem.

JFR: In 1969 the Maoist problem had spread from a thatched village, Naxalbari. The problem today is how we are going to solve this problem or let it go on and on and on. Let me quote a conversation with Sam Manekshaw and Govind Narayan, the then defence secretary. They said, the police are not able to do it, the situation is out of control. They said, Mrs Gandhi has said that the army will break the Naxals. I said, give it to me in writing. They said, 'no writing.' Then Narain turned up and said not only no in writing, but no publicity and no records.

IT:Can the army operate without AFSPA?

JFR: In West Bengal there was no AFSPA. But if the army is operating, you need protection. They are giving their lives. You need AFSPA to give them protection. The AFSPA doesn't apply to Naxal areas but in certain areas of the North-East and Kashmir.

VPM: If you want to use army effectively as it should be, you should have AFSPA. But the basic premise must be there. Because if you don't do it, you may land up in a situation where a younger officer will tell his senior officer 'I won't do it.' You need the legal authority. Where is the legal authority? A younger officer may challenge the orders he is given on the grounds of illegality.

IT: Is the Indian Army more humane than other armies?

VPM: Definitely. I have gone through our record of all the armies and surprisingly the people who make the most noises about violations by the Indian Army - the Pakistan army, the US - they have violated human rights much much more than the Indian Army. Because it is ingrained in our training. The problem is when you have deployed such a larger number for so long, there are bound to be some aberrations.

JFR: I served British battalions in Sumatra. I witnessed a massacre committed by the South Wales Borderers in Sumatra. They fired on unarmed people coming out of a train. I tried to stop it. I complained in the division. I was told to withdraw my complaint. I refused it. We are a very good army, not involved in atrocities. We are a very well disciplined army and I am very proud to have served for 37 years in it.

VPM: Our rules of engagement are quite different. In the whole world today, we would have the best rules of engagement. We are considered the best peacekeepers in the world when it comes to the United Nations. So in that respect we are much better than any army, as far as human rights is concerned.

IT: Should the Indian Army withdraw from Siachen?

JFR: For me the place that is important, not so much the heights, is the Karakoram pass. I went there in 1964. I found a Chinese flag on our side. It is imperative that we hold the Karakorum pass otherwise the Chinese will link up with the Pakistanis.

VPM: You can hold the Karakoram pass only if you remain deployed along the Saltoro ridge. There was a time when I would say if the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) is delineated then we would be able to withdraw behind it. Today, I don't say that and I don't recommend vacating the Siachen glacier because now it is not only a problem between India and Pakistan. It is also a problem with the Chinese who are occupying the Shaksgam valley and they have also come into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. With this kind of changes at the strategic level, we can't withdraw from the glacier.

JFR: The Chinese are in Gilgit and are making a railroad. They are already there in strength.

VPM: It makes no sense to withdraw from it. Unless they vacate or not come in a large numbers that they are in now. You cannot have the Chinese and the Pakistan army working together in an area which you are asked to vacate.

IT: Does Pakistan occupy too much mind space in the Indian strategic mind-set?

JFR: I don't think Pakistan is the problem. Pakistan and China combined would be the problem. Today, the Chinese want to take control of the whole of the northern territories. The Karakoram railroad will be extended to Gwadar. The Chinese will be on both sides, the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. The Chinese are already on Ramree Island in Myanmar. The runway is 3000 metres. I landed there in 1944. We made a PSP strip. They have now constructed a metalled runway.

IT: The Chinese say these inroads into Pakistan are part of their economic strategy for developing their eastern provinces.

JFR: the Chinese say that, but they are nibbling away at territory.

VPM: The Karakoram highway is more for economic reasons. But that makes no sense when you are looking at thinly populated areas like the Shaksgam valley and the northern areas. The only thing is, they want to draw the boundary to the Karakoram pass which is not acceptable to us. It was neither planned nor considered and that would be a wrong thing to do, for us. We have always said that from point 1842, the line goes northwards...we didn't say it goes north-east to the Karakoram pass.

IT: Is the government aware of the army's sensitivities on Siachen?

VPM: Yes, during my time they were and I hope this dialogue has been continuing.

IT: What is it about the army that we produce so many beauty queens and film actors?

JFR: I'm very keen on that, I'm a bachelor. I knew Parveen Babi.

VPM: General Jacob had his reasons for that and as a bachelor, those are valid. But I think the credit for the way these girls have blossomed goes to the kind of upbringing and growth in the army. We create an atmosphere where these boys and girls can use their talent. That is the main reason.

JFR: I want to appeal to the people. You have a fine army, it has served you well. There are aberrations but there are aberrations everywhere, but do support the army. We cannot do without your support. Please, please support the army. It is a wonderful army. Don't keep nit-picking. Thank you and Jai Hind.