In CNBC's `India Tonight' programme broadcast on April 30,Karan Thapar presented an interview withLieutenant-General J.F.R. Jacob, who was Chief of Staff of the Indian Army's Eastern Command during the Bangladesh campaign of 1971, in the context of the Government's decision to give Field Marshal S.H.F.J. Manekshaw back pay for the period since his retirement more than 36 years ago. There is a particular focus here on his role, as well as General Jacob's role, in the Bangladesh campaign. This is an edited version of the transcript:
Karan Thapar: Recently the Government gave Field Marshal Manekshaw a cheque for Rs.1.6 crore in lieu of the salary he should have received as Field Marshal over the last 36 years. In 1971 when he was made Field Marshal, was he treated fairly or shabbily?
General Jacob: I think the Government was less than generous. He went out on a pension of Rs.1,300 that was Rs.100 more than [that of] the Chief [of the Army Staff]... [He] told me he had... [met] Mrs. Gandhi and asked to be made Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, which she declined. Instead she offered him the high commissionership in one of the Commonwealth countries, and he was very upset.
In fact, when Manekshaw visited Calcutta after retirement by then you were the Army Commander in Calcutta he didn't even have a car and you put one at his disposal. But Jagjivan Ram, Defence Minister, ticked you off for that.
Yes, he did.
Your association with Manekshaw goes back to 1950 when he was a Brigadier and DMO [Director of Military Operations] and you were a Major attached to General Staff in Delhi. He used to consult you a lot in those days, didn't he?
Yes, I used to go fairly often to his house. He was generous and hospitable to me and he used to discuss matters with me. You see, Sam unfortunately had a very short experience of war. He was wounded in the early stages of war; unfortunately he was not able to command a battalion, so he used to call me in for discussions.
You next served with Manekshaw in 1961. He was at that time the Commandant of the Staff College at Wellington and you were a member of the teaching staff. At the time Manekshaw was accused of anti-national activities and a court of inquiry was appointed to investigate the matter. And you were asked to give evidence.
That's correct, I was rung up by General Kaul, offered anything if I gave evidence. I refused to give evidence. It's not my wont and my character to give evidence against my boss. I refused.
But were you, in refusing to give evidence, protecting Manekshaw?
I consider that is not done for me to give evidence against my boss. Had I done so, it would have caused difficulties for Manekshaw.
In other words, you are saying had you given evidence, had you spoken about things you knew of instead of being exonerated as Manekshaw was, he could have been found guilty?
I don't think so. All I can say is, he might have created some problem.
At the time, if I recall correctly, the speculation was that Manekshaw had the habit of talking loosely. People say that he would go around referring to Indians dismissively as natives and that in public frequently, sitting at Wellington Club, he would criticise politicians like V.K. Krishna Menon, or General Kaul. You were honorary secretary of the Wellington Club. Was there some credibility to these stories?
I can't comment on that.
Let's come to the 1971 war, for which Manekshaw is best known. At that time you were Chief of Staff, Eastern Command. It is widely believed that Manekshaw stood up to pressure from politicians and as a result military action was delayed from April 1971 to December. But that's not the real truth, is it?
Well, put [it] this way, he did ring me three times in early April to move to Bangladesh. I refused, I gave him reasons... I told him, look, we are mountain divisions. We don't have a single bridge. There are large numbers of rivers between us to cross. We don't have transport. The monsoon is about to break. And international penal [action] will not let you move. So these are the reasons we cannot move. I told him: [I'm] afraid it's not possible at this stage.
Two things: first of all, the reasons you had and obviously they were good reasons for not moving in April were reasons he had never thought of or appreciated as the Army chief.
I can't comment on what he thought.
But clearly that follows that he was pushing you to move in, he rung you three times, was irritated by your refusal.
But his people in Delhi pushed him.
Secondly, you also pointed out to him that if the Army moved in April, it would have been disastrous?
Yes, it would have been, because we [would have] got bogged down.
So the truth is, people say Manekshaw stood up to political pressure and delayed military action from April to December. The full truth is that he did this because the Eastern Command stood up to him on three separate occasions, otherwise he might have agreed to the pressure he was under.
Yes, maybe after he got our advice he went to the Cabinet and told them `No.'
Let's now come to the war plan... As Chief of Staff, Eastern Command, you sent your version of the plan to Delhi in May. What was the strategy that plan was based upon?
We assessed that to win a war we had to take Dhaka. Dhaka was the geo-strategic heart of East Pakistan. No campaign would have been complete without it.
In August, Manekshaw came to Calcutta where the Eastern Command has its headquarters, where you were Chief of Staff. He came with [his] own war plan. How different was that to yours?
It was very, very different. The orders that come with him, which he read out with his DMO, K.K. Singh, were: You will take Khulna and Chittagong these are the entry points and territory...
I gathered [that] at that meeting in Calcutta there was a sort of acrimonious exchange of opinions. You fairly forcefully pointed out to Manekshaw that not taking Dhaka, not focussing on Dhaka, was a serious mistake. How did he react to your views?
He was very upset... He said, don't you see if we take Khulna and Chittagong the war will be over? I said I didn't see how that could happen.
At that point he turned to General Aurora, who was there and who was your boss and army commander. And what did he say to General Aurora?
Don't you agree? Yes, sir, I entirely agree, said General Aurora.
So the nub of this is that ultimately when India went to war in December, it went to war with a war plan which completely ignored Dhaka?
That's correct. That was the recommendation given to the Government by Manekshaw.
Let's jump to the weeks immediately before the military action in December... Manekshaw refused to give you troops to tackle Dhaka because he refused to make Dhaka a part of the war plan. You moved three brigades from the Chinese border for this purpose. What did he say when he found out?
He was furious. And you see... I told... Gill who was the DMO... it was done between us... and [he] agreed with me to take Dhaka. Manekshaw was not informed of the move of these brigades and he was absolutely furious with Gill. He told him that he would... and that the brigades would move back at once.
But the brigades didn't move back.
I spoke to Gill and we had a long chat and I said I cannot move these brigades back... I expected that I would be given permission once the war started... but permission was denied for five days... I requested every day for their deployment but they were not cleared to move in by Manekshaw until December 8.
Had you got that permission five days earlier, could you have taken Dhaka five days earlier?
We would not have taken Dhaka, but would have surely speeded up the fall of Dhaka.
Am I right in believing that when war began by December 2-3-4, the plan was to go for Khulna and Chittagong, but you ignored it and instead you went straight to Dhaka, which you always believed was the right thing to do?
That's correct.
Let's jump the story to December 13. At that point in time, the Indian Army had bypassed towns like Rangpur, Dinajpur and Sylhet and had reached the gates of Dhaka. Which meant that you were virtually at the doorstep of the capital, but you had no major towns under your control except for Jessore and Comilla which the Pakistanis had evacuated and you had occupied.
Yes.
At this point in time, [there] was a great fear that India might be forced to accept a ceasefire and that if that happened [would be left] without major towns under its control?... The U.N. was in session, and if that had happened without any major town under its control the ceasefire would be very disadvantageous to India...
Entirely.
General Manekshaw sent you an order, copied to the Corps Commanders, asking you to capture all the bypassed towns. How did you respond to that order?
Except Dhaka. Dhaka was not mentioned.
So he wanted all the towns that had been bypassed to be captured, but once again ignored Dhaka?
No mention was made whatsoever. You can't capture a town, it takes a long time...
So you therefore ignored his orders?
Well, there is an example in history. Horatio Nelson putting the telescope to his blind eye.
So had General Manekshaw's signal of December 13 been accepted, that could have endangered India's great victory?
Well, I put it differently that it would have delayed the proceedings.
You haven't got the credit for the surrender that you organised almost single-handedly. Has history been unfair to you?
No, I'm not commenting on that... I as a soldier did my duties, that's not my concern.
Today you have cast Gen, Manekshaw, Field Marshal Manekshaw as he is, in a very different light to the way we've got used to thinking of him. You have suggested that the orders that he gave, particularly on changing the direction of military strategy, were wrong. You also suggested things about him when he was in his earlier post at Wellington that people will find hard to believe. You want to retract any other things you said?
Listen, I have not suggested anything. You asked me questions and I have answered them to the best of my ability... I stand by what I said... all the things [relating to] the order for the operation are in Army Headquarters.
(For a detailed version of the edited transcript log on to >www.hindu.com/nic/karan-gen-jacob.htm )
