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William Hasker

    William Hasker

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    • William Hasker (Ph.D. Edinburgh), is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Huntington University, where he taught from ... more edit
    ABSTRACT
    David Ciocchi has charged that ‘open’ or free-will theism is religiously inadequate. This is it is because it is unable to affirm the ‘presumption of divine intervention in response to petitionary prayer’ (PDI), a presumption Ciocchi... more
    David Ciocchi has charged that ‘open’ or free-will theism is religiously inadequate. This is it is because it is unable to affirm the ‘presumption of divine intervention in response to petitionary prayer’ (PDI), a presumption Ciocchi claims is implicit in the religious practice of ordinary Christian believers. I argue that PDI and Ciocchi's other assumptions concerning prayer are too strong, and would upon reflection be rejected by most believers. On the other hand, God as conceived by free-will theism has extensive resources for answering petitionary prayers, including prayers whose fulfilment depends on the free responses of other persons.
    This chapter defends Social Trinitarianism (ST) by responding to some of Dale Tuggy's criticisms. After describing Tuggy's primary objections in some detail, it challenges some of the methodological assumptions that seem to... more
    This chapter defends Social Trinitarianism (ST) by responding to some of Dale Tuggy's criticisms. After describing Tuggy's primary objections in some detail, it challenges some of the methodological assumptions that seem to motivate Tuggy's concerns and engages Tuggy's claim that ST would amount to a case of malevolent divine deception. By taking seriously the concept of ‘progressive revelation’, and the development of doctrine, it concludes that Tuggy's main problem with Social Trinitarianism is more illusory than substantial.
    It is beyond question that most ordinary religious believers would find talk about God as having beliefs strange, puzzling, and objectionable. God doesn't believe things, he knows them, and if some philosophers, overlooking or... more
    It is beyond question that most ordinary religious believers would find talk about God as having beliefs strange, puzzling, and objectionable. God doesn't believe things, he knows them, and if some philosophers, overlooking or ignoring this obvious point, still speak of God as having beliefs – well, that says something about those philosophers!Recently this view of the ordinary believer has received help from an unexpected source, namely William P. Alston, who in his paper, ‘Does God Have Beliefs?’ makes a strong case for a negative answer to its title question. To be sure, Alston's reasons for this conclusion are rather more complex than those we have attributed to the ordinary believer; he specifically eschews a ‘cheap way of winning a victory’ by means of the claim that knowledge excludes belief by conceptual necessity (p. 292). Nevertheless, by a longer train of reasoning he comes to the same conclusion, and since this reasoning involves a new and more adequate conception of divine knowledge, and additionally solves two outstanding problems in thedoctrine of omniscience (the foreknowledge problem, and the problem of divine knowledge of propositions containing essential indexicals), the trip is well worth taking.
    The doctrine of the creation of the universe by God is common to the monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam; reflection on creation has been most extensively developed within the Christian tradition. Creation is by a... more
    The doctrine of the creation of the universe by God is common to the monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam; reflection on creation has been most extensively developed within the Christian tradition. Creation is by a single supreme God, not a group of deities, and is an ‘absolute’ creation (creation ex nihilo, ‘out of nothing’) rather than being either a ‘making’ out of previously existing material or an ‘emanation’ (outflow) from God’s own nature. Creation, furthermore, is a free act on God’s part; he has no ‘need’ to create but has done so out of love and generosity. He not only created the universe ‘in the beginning’, but he sustains (‘conserves’) it by his power at each moment of its existence; without God’s support it would instantly collapse into nothingness. It is controversial whether the belief in divine creation receives support from contemporary cosmology, as seen in the ‘Big Bang’ theory.
    This chapter presents a model of the Incarnation developed on the basis of the Na’vi avatars of the science fiction movie Avatar. The model does not address the metaphysics of the Incarnation; rather, its main concern is with the... more
    This chapter presents a model of the Incarnation developed on the basis of the Na’vi avatars of the science fiction movie Avatar. The model does not address the metaphysics of the Incarnation; rather, its main concern is with the consciousness of Jesus Christ, the incarnate Son. “One-sphere models,” in which the Son while incarnate has a single sphere of consciousness, are examined and found to be unsatisfactory. The avatar model is a “two-sphere model,” in which there exist distinct spheres of consciousness for the divine nature and the human nature, similar to the “two minds” view proposed by Thomas Morris. It is argued that this does not amount to Nestorianism. The possibility of a single person with multiple spheres of consciousness is defended by comparison with the psychological “split-brain” and “multiple personality” phenomena; this way of understanding those phenomena is defended against a contrary view expounded by Tim Bayne.

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