Merold Westphal

This article explores how the "Masters of Suspicion" can be used for understanding discipleship. From this, it queries into expanding this canon of masters to include decolonial thinkers. Resultantly, this article explores potential contributions to the life of faith from thinkers such as Achille Mbembe and Ngugi Wa Thiong'o. To situate its argument, the article engages Merold Westphal, who articulates a form of Christian discipleship through a hermeneutics of suspicion which he calls 'Atheism for Lent.' This article first explores how Westphal provides religious persons with a structure to engage postmodern critique, which entails a brief exploration of Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche's potential contribution to discipleship. The article will then engage Westphal's framework within an African context, extending his appropriation of suspicious critique to engage decolonial thought. This article concludes by proposing an expansion of the canonical Masters of Suspicion to include the likes of Ngugi Wa Thiong'o and Achille Mbembe, amongst others. The upshot of this is threefold: first, it valorizes the notion that a suspicious critique of religion can aid discipleship; second, it provides more pathways for decolonization to enter into religious discourses; finally, it pushes Westphal's concept of "Atheism for Lent" beyond a Western context and into one that embraces new forms of suspicion. R e s u m o O artigo explora como os "Mestres da Suspeita" podem ser usados para compreender o discipulado e, a partir daí, procura expandir esse cânone de mestres para incluir pensadores decoloniais. Consequentemente, são abordados potenciais contribuições para a vida de fé de pensadores, como Achille Mbembe e Ngugi Wa Thiong'o. Para situar o seu argumento, o artigo envolve Merold Westphal, que articula uma forma de discipulado cristão por meio de uma hermenêutica de suspeita, a qual ele chama de 'Ateísmo para a Quaresma'. Primeiramente, analisa-se como Westphal fornece às pessoas religiosas uma estrutura para se envolverem na crítica pós-moderna, o que implica uma breve exploração da potencial contribuição de Freud, de Marx, e de Nietzsche para o discipulado. Depois, a estrutura de Westphal é engajada num contexto africano, alargando a sua apropriação da crítica da suspeita para envolver o pensamento decolonial. Na conclusão, é proposta uma expansão dos mestres canônicos da Suspeita para incluir pessoas como Ngugi Wa Thiong'o e Achille Mbembe, entre outros. O resultado disso é triplo: primeiro, valorizar a noção de que a crítica da suspeita sobre a religião pode ajudar ao discipulado; segundo, proporcionar mais percursos analíticos de decolonização a serem introduzidos nos discursos religiosos; finalmente, projetar o conceito de Westphal de "Ateísmo para a Quaresma" para além de um contexto ocidental e para um que abrace novas formas de suspeita. Palavras-chave: Decolonização. Teologia da libertação. Merold Westphal. Ngugi Wa Thiong'o. Teologia pastoral. Filosofia da religião.

In his 2008 selection of poems András Visky unified his biographical trauma (of being departed to the Romanian Gulag in the age of 2) and the traumatic "event" of faith in the sense of the derridian "secret". Just like the secret of Abraham walking up to the Moria, the event is born in the decentralising act of prayer and simultanously turns our attention to the aporia of faith and of language.

Akár a Mória hegyére baktató Ábrahám esetében, az esemény az ént decentralizáló ima pozíciójában születik meg, és egyszerre fordítja tekintetünket a hit és a nyelv apóriái felé.

Merold Westphal wrote the book Suspicion & Faith (1998) to explain that although modern atheists used the hermeneutics of suspicion to critique religious motives, their arguments can aid Christians in a devotional form of self-examination. Westphal claimed that the 'masters of suspicion' often utilized a deeply biblical logic that is reminiscent of the prophetic polemics against false religion. In this article, the author adds to these reflections by pointing to the Adversary from the Book of Job as one who embodies the hermeneutics of suspicion. The author contends that, like the critiques of modern atheists, the Adversary's question 'Does Job fear God for nothing?' (1:9b) can serve as a tool for self-examination and moral development. The Book of Job shows how he asks critical questions about Job's motives for religious piety by taking advantage of the logical groundwork of the prologue. This dialogue highlights the significance of Job's integrity and his commitment to virtue without the need for incentive, but at the same time, it also encourages readers to doubt his motives through a pattern of doubt that is integral to the narrative. The first section of this article examines Suspicion & Faith and discusses its approach to modern atheism. Then, in the second section, the author engages in an exegetical analysis of Job 1-2, with special attention to the prologue's logical groundwork and motif of doubt. The article concludes with a theological reflection on how the hermeneutics of suspicion can augment Christian practice.

Merold Westphal is considered to be one of the preeminent Continental philosophers of religion, and his articulation of faith as the task of a lifetime has become a touchstone in contemporary debates concerning faith’s relationship to reason. Westphal articulates the task of faith through the biblical commandment of loving and serving God and one’s neighbor over and above oneself. The following work seeks to explore how this concept should incline his readers to treat him more as a Protestant theologian than as a philosopher of religion. The focus of this argument consists in showing how Westphal’s thought is always oriented toward guiding and serving one who has faith, thus revealing the pastoral intent behind his thinking. By reading Merold Westphal’s philosophy as a theology, one can see that it is a powerful articulation of an American Evangelical faith that has rarely been understood in a systematic or fundamental context. By establishing Westphal as a voice of this theology, Protestant theology finds an understanding of its fastest growing denomination and, in turn, Catholic theology finds a new ecumenical dialogue partner concerning the issues of apologetics and faith’s relationship to ethics and responsibility.

This article takes up the onto-theological critique of metaphysics and questions whether onto-theology is not something to evade or overcome, but is inevitable. Consequently, it furthers the exploration of onto-theology by asking, if it is inevitable, then what comes after onto-theology? For the past half-century, onto-theology has been a central concern for philosophy, particularly in phenomenology where one sees a theological turn in order to understand and incorporate what might be beyond, or within, consciousness that does not readily appear to the self. In this turn, one often sees philosophers (and theologians) attempt to craft a post-metaphysical understanding. Resultantly, many of these philosophers herald what I call the 'end of everything,' often due to their onto-theological character: from the 'end' of philosophy of religion, to the 'end' of metaphysics, to the 'end' of theology. However, when investigating their findings, one often sees these concepts arise from the grave, perhaps showing that some onto-theological construction is inevitable. This paper proceeds by first giving a brief overview of the philosophers Jean-Luc Nancy, Richard Kearney, John Caputo, and Merold Westphal to propose how onto-theology is still an issue for their philosophies by revealing a necessary link between ontology and empirical reality. It then builds off of this proposal through the work of Joeri Schrijvers to show what might lie ahead of philosophy (and philosophy of religion in particular), arguing that if onto-theology is inevitable then philosophy should turn further into theology to explore how theology deals with this inevitability on an empirical basis. Basically, since theology always already accepts being in default (through concepts like original sin), then how does it help believers cope with this inevitability and how does it focus upon the empirical reality of this ontological gesture. Finally, this paper investigates the work of Colby Dickinson in order to solidify this finding into a programmatic, philosophical framework. Martin Heidegger's critique of the onto-theological constitution of metaphysics has, in a sense, stultified thinkers on how to either present a pathway that evades it altogether or nevertheless overcomes it through reconceptualizing traditional concepts such as transcendence and immanence. 1 After these various attempts, an emerging consensus is that perhaps lapsing into onto-theology is an inevitable result of employing these philosophical concepts within the world itself; lifting these ideas off of the paper, as it were, and attempting to use them in real, day-today life. Resultantly, whereas this critique sparked the kindling of philosophy's renewed engagement with theology's fundamental conceptions of God and the divine, perhaps philosophy must turn further into theology to see what comes after onto-theology. In this article, I will modestly propose that, once onto-theology is accepted 1 I use this text as my primary understanding of Heidegger's formulation of onto-theology, for a strong summary of onto-theology's pervasiveness and proliferation (

Merold Westphal's new publication, Kierkegaard's Concept of Faith, gives us an opportunity to explore the many ways in which Kierkegaard has influenced Westphal's thinking as a whole. This present contribution seeks to show how Kierkegaard helps Westphal discover a concept of faith which holds no 'reasonable' foundation as it is entirely dependent upon two diierent aspects of revelation in tension with each other. Moreover, faith is seen as a willing assent by the believer, and thus it becomes a task and not merely a proposition to behold or to which one's life conforms. In addition to explicating this notion of faith within his work, this present contribution seeks to situate this faith within Westphal's philosophy of religion, showing how it is integral to Westphal's entire project. Westphal's most recent text, Kierkegaard's Concept of Faith, is an astounding text which explores how Kierkegaard develops his notion of faith through three pseudonyms (Johannes Silentio, Johannes Climacus, and Anti-Climacus) and their respective texts. The work itself is scholarly and sticks closely to the texts. While he does show in various places how Kierkegaard's concept of faith relates to contemporary issues in philosophy and theology, such as the critique of onto-theology, Westphal displays great restraint by never furthering these points beyond pointing toward how Kierkegaard's concepts are still relevant. However,

This article inquires into Merold Westphal’s attempts to overcome onto-theology in the works, Overcoming Onto-Theology and Transcendence and Self-Transcendence. In so doing, this inquiry employs the critiques John Caputo has levied against Westphal’s thinking in order to reveal that Westphal’s philosophy is deeply eschatological and can be better read as a fundamental theology. As a fundamental theology, Westphal’s work also reveals itself to have important pastoral implications for a Protestant faith which can lead to stronger dialogue to Catholic systematic theology, particularly on issues such as pneumatology and soteriology.

This is my first conference presentation from 1995.  I defend Merold Westphal, my mentor at Fordham University, who has developed a hermeneutics of suspicion the purpose of which was to try to bring the noetic effect of the fall  to bear on our epistemology (knowing abilities). 
"In a 1991 article, Alvin Plantinga mentioned that the effect of sin upon the cognitive faculties is a curious but important question for epistemology.  Coincidentally, that same year, Merold Westphal's essay, "Taking St. Paul Seriously: Sin as an Epistemic Category" appeared.  Westphal's article dealt with the noetic effects of sin upon our cognitive faculties,  just what Plantinga had ordered.  Since then, Westphal has written other pieces, including his book, Suspicion and Faith, trying to demonstrate the similarities between Marx, Nietzsche and Freud's hermeneutics of suspicion and Paul's suspicion of sin.  However, Westphal's work has received little notice from the Reformed Epistemology camp, and William Hasker rejected Westphal's project as fiedeistic and destructive.
  Westphal's project deserves a better hearing than it has received.  His work provides helpful bridges of thought between Christian and atheist philosophers, social and epistemological philosophers, and analytic and continental, (even postmodern) philosophers.  The purpose of this essay is to promote Westphal's central claim in the above-mentioned articles, namely, that "for the Christian philosopher, sin should be an essential epistemological category..."  First, I will lay out Westphal's project.  Second, I will respond to William Hasker's objections (which I take to be typical objections) to Westphal's project.  And Third, I will conclude with a few comments about skepticism and the doing of epistemology.

Continental philosophers of religion and the theologians who engage with them have recently began to blur the lines between the disciplines of philosophy and theology. This is particularly true after the so-called " theological turn " in phenomenology. I argue for an appreciation of their approaches but will also express that these explorations must remain interdisciplinary. Far too often philosophers and theologians alike appropriate freely within their interdisciplinary research with little regard for the presuppositions and methodologies latent within their appropriations. This article will demonstrate these appropriations through an exploration of Merold Westphal and Richard Kearney's use of hermeneutical phenomenology, and will claim that their use of this methodology falls upon two distinct discourses, a theological one for Westphal and a philosophical one for Kearney. The upshot of this exploration is an argument for a renewal of methodological restraint when appropriating from other disciplines and a respect for the difference between academic disciplines.

Merold Westphal’s method often consists in recontextualizing, or appropriating, various sources in order to either make his own argument or to make other’s arguments seem self-evident. This method is especially noteworthy in his use of Aufhebung, a term which he initially discovers in his early work on Hegel. Westphal will eventually appropriate this term and, as this article will show, utilize it throughout his other academic works, particularly in his reading of Kierkegaard, for many an ‘anti-dialectical’ thinker. This article further explores Westphal’s use of the term in order to reveal that his utilization of the term extends beyond Hegel’s own original intention and that, in doing so, Westphal creates something quite unique and separate from the term itself: a ‘Westphalian Aufhebung.’

The following is a flyer for my upcoming publication with Indiana University Press. For those who are interested, please contact me for a author discount code.

Merold Westphal is considered to be one of the preeminent Continental philosophers of religion. His articulation of faith as the task of a lifetime has become a touchstone in contemporary debates concerning faith's relationship to reason. As Justin Sands explores his philosophy, he illuminates how Westphal’s concept of faith reveals the pastoral, theological intent behind his thinking. Sands sees Westphal's philosophy as a powerful articulation of Protestant theology, but one that is in ecumenical dialogue with questions concerning apologetics and faith's relationship to ethics and responsibility, a more Catholic point of view. By bringing out these features in Westphal's philosophy, Sands intends to find core philosophical methodologies as well as a passable bridge for philosophers to cross over into theological discourses.

In his article, "Ontos and Theos: A Case for Neo-Ontotheology," Jim Hanson argues for a re-examination of onto-theology and its importance to theology. This article responds critically to his understanding of what onto-theology is and is not through exploring the concept of onto-theology and giving a case study of postmodern thoughts overcoming of this metaphysical problem. The goal of this exercise is to show that, while Jim Hanson is correct that we need some form of understanding God, his case for neo-onto-theology does not eschew any of the problems/critiques that postmodern scholarship has against a metaphysics staked in the ground of onto-theology.

Often, liberation theology's preferential option for the poor is pushed aside within theological discourses as being too specific, too focused on social problems, to function as a viable theology for the Church as a whole. Through this line of reasoning, many often see liberation theology as something that can remind Christians of their need to help others, but it cannot become the foundation for a sustainable belief system. In response to this, I claim that a liberation theology can be viable for daily life of all persons and this article explores this argument through the work of Merold Westphal, who's philosophical theology founds a style of liberation theology that is directed at the middle class – in his context the Amer-ican middle class. This article explores the ways in which liberation theology can work as a general, programmatic theology for all within the Church, which not only empowers those at the margins but society as a whole.

Merold Westphal’s method often consists in recontextualizing, or appropriating, various sources in order to either make his own argument or to make other’s arguments seem self-evident. This method is especially noteworthy in his use of Aufhebung, a term which he initially discovers in his early work on Hegel. Westphal will eventually appropriate this term and, as this article will show, utilize it throughout his other academic works, particularly in his reading of Kierkegaard, for many an ‘anti-dialectical’ thinker. This article further explores Westphal’s use of the term in order to reveal that his utilization of the term extends beyond Hegel’s own original intention and that, in doing so, Westphal creates something quite unique and separate from the term itself: a ‘Westphalian Aufhebung.’

Merold Westphal is considered to be one of the preeminent Continental philosophers of religion, and his articulation of faith as the task of a lifetime has become a touchstone in contemporary debates concerning faith’s relationship to reason. Westphal articulates the task of faith through the biblical commandment of loving and serving God and one’s neighbor over and above oneself. The following work seeks to explore how this concept should incline his readers to treat him more as a Protestant theologian than as a philosopher of religion. The focus of this argument consists in showing how Westphal’s thought is always oriented toward guiding and serving one who has faith, thus revealing the pastoral intent behind his thinking. By reading Merold Westphal’s philosophy as a theology, one can see that it is a powerful articulation of an American Evangelical faith that has rarely been understood in a systematic or fundamental context. By establishing Westphal as a voice of this theology, Protestant theology finds an understanding of its fastest growing denomination and, in turn, Catholic theology finds a new ecumenical dialogue partner concerning the issues of apologetics and faith’s relationship to ethics and responsibility.

Justin Sands. Reasoning from Faith: Fundamental Theology in Merold Westphal’s Philosophy of Religion. Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Religion. Bloomington IN and Indianapolis IN: Indiana University Press, 2018. xii + 298 pp. $35.00. ISBN 978-0-253-03193-8.

On the naive reading, “radical social constructivism” would be the result of “deconstructing” science. Science would simply be a contingent construction in accordance with social determinants. However, postmodernism does not necessarily abandon fidelity to the objects of thought. Merold Westphal's Derridean philosophy of religion emphasizes that even theology need not eliminate the transcendence of the divine other. By drawing an analogy between natural and supernatural transcendence, I argue that science is similarly called to responsibility in the encounter with that which lies outside its horizon of expectation. Science's rational autonomy is overcome by the heteronomy of realities that precede it. Understanding species as homeostatic property clusters is an example of nonessentialist, postmodern, and scientific realism. Science is still a vehicle for encountering natural alterity, thus decentering the relativism thought to characterize postmodernism. However, natural science must not attempt to place the whole of being at human disposal if it is to fulfill the potential of Westphal's philosophy of religion.