Identity Paradoxes: How Senior Managers and Employees Negotiate Similarity and Distinctiveness Tensions over Time

StatePol is the primary law enforcement body operating across a major Australian state and comprises central investigative and intelligence departments as well as several regional divisions. Within StatePol, the Department is tasked with investigating crimes of a serious and organized nature.

The Department itself provides a highly suitable setting for the empirical inquiry. The Department’s law enforcement activity historically was delivered through squads dedicated to solving crime types such as arson, fraud, homicide, drugs and motor vehicle theft. Investigators would often spend a number of years in a squad but over time there were growing concerns at the Department about its ability to deal with the increased workload of serious crimes (e.g., homicides and aggravated violence) while preventing crime groups operating across multiple crime types from impacting the community. Consequently, it decided to embark on a process of organizational change to achieve flexibility and better utilization of investigative expertise through the creation of a multi-skilled generalist workforce in which all investigators became similar. Changes of this type affected prevailing senses of similarity–distinctiveness amongst employees. As such, the Department has characteristics of special interest to this research consistent with theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989).

The project commenced in early 2009 with preliminary discussions and documentary analysis for the purposes of familiarization with changes at the Department, its priorities, structure and processes. From March to June 2009 30 interviews at multiple levels of the organization were conducted, comprising senior management, workgroup (squad) members and managers of support functions. While interviews were voluntary, the mix of squads was deliberately chosen to ensure representation from groups of different types, based on the familiarization phase. Squads varied in terms of level of workload, duration of investigations and type of investigations.

Squads also varied in terms of their perceived status within the organization. There was broad consensus across squads that those investigating violent crimes against the person (e.g., homicide, armed crime, sex crimes) were of high status because they needed particular skills for quick resolution and had a significant impact on the victim. Of lesser status were squads investigating Fraud, Drugs and E-crime, which involved complicated work over long periods of time and were seen typically as less important and/or less time-pressured because they involved loss of property not personal injury. Interviewees were targeted to ensure representation from both high- and low-status squads.

Interviews focused on the Department’s priorities and goals, the environment it faced and the organizational changes enacted. These interviews were designed to allow participants to discuss freely the issues, challenges, and tensions they encountered in the re-envisioned organization. Interview data was triangulated with both the earlier documentary analysis and in-depth observations of management forums between October 2009 and July 2010. While observations at squad level meetings also occurred, data collection proved difficult due to the sensitivity of the operational matters being discussed by squads.

To conclude data collection, a final set of 20 interviews was conducted from June to August 2011. These were designed to elicit any issues, challenges and tensions that manifested in the pursuit of organizational priorities, along with responses to these tensions. Interviewee selection was again on the basis of ensuring representation across senior manager and squad levels as well as across workgroups of different status. Throughout the various phases, documents that provided data on issues and challenges faced by organizational participants and responses were collected and analysed. Table 2 provides summary statistics about the documents collected and interviews conducted.

The analysis process proceeded as a series of iterations between data and coding categories contained in NVivo software and relevant literature. Initial readings of the data indicated the presence of tensions comprising elements that were opposing yet somehow related. This led to a closer engagement with the literature on paradox through a sequential process of reading, coding, data write-up and reflection. In this process it became clearer that organizational members expressing concerns about tensions were, in many instances, talking about how they perceived themselves, how others perceived them and what they (and others) did as a result. Considering the concepts of ‘identity regulation’, ‘tension’ and ‘identity work’ to hold analytical promise, I used them as sensitizing devices (Blumer, 1969) in a process of inductive coding where coded categories were generated and theory and data were gradually integrated (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).

Through this process I was able to identify two main categories of identity regulation that manifested in the data (‘regulating affiliation’ and ‘regulating values and motives’). These are supported in the literature as ways in which organizational elites might define identities for members (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002). A specific manifestation of the similarity versus distinctiveness tension was also evident, referring to the value and emphasis placed on generalist versus specialist investigative skills and expertise respectively. Initiatives to create multi-skilled generalist investigators were seen by employees as attempts to make them relatively similar across the organization. Conversely, acknowledgement of specialist skills and expertise allowed individuals to be distinctive. I subsequently used the label ‘generalist–specialist’ to refer to this particular manifestation of the similarity–distinctiveness identity tension. Finally, given my focus on how this tension influences identity construction I considered identity work in which individuals engaged as they constructed their self-identity. Table 3 presents the final coding structure used.

As a final step, I juxtaposed the actions of both senior managers and employees (squad members) against the different categories of responses to paradoxical tensions discussed earlier in the article and presented in Table 1. These were classified into the response category that best described them and are discussed as such at the end of each sub-section of the case study results.

An independent coder was used to code a random sample of data to the final set of first-order concept nodes in NVivo. The few instances of different categorization were resolved through discussion between the two coders. While this adds some rigour to the data analysis process, the resulting empirical analysis nevertheless represents my own understandings and interpretations only of the identity construction process that unfolded at the Department based on the data collected.

The longitudinal data is presented in two phases, 2006–2008 and 2009–2011. These depict two distinctive periods at the Department in terms of identity regulation, identity tensions and identity work, although there are some common themes across both. Through the analysis process it also became clear that the manifestation of the similarity–distinctiveness tension amongst squad members depended on whether they were part of high- or low-status squads. Consequently, the presentation of results focuses on common patterns in individual-level enactments of the similarity–distinctiveness tension that was found in the data, with verbatim quotes identifying whether the respondent is a senior manager, member of a high-status (HS) squad or low-status (LS) squad

In mid-2006 the senior management of the Department decided that changes were required to help it deal with serious and organized crime more effectively. Internal research on serious and organized crime indicated that gangs no longer confined themselves to particular crime types (e.g., armed crime, drugs, or fraud). The Department also faced a rapid increase in the level of serious and organized crime, placing pressures on the Department’s limited investigative resources and its ability to respond to crime. These workload demands could vary across the organization. While some squads could be overloaded others might have spare capacity. The Department consequently embarked on a change process to help it combat serious and organized crime. Notions of a more flexible organization were central to this, where investigative expertise could be ‘spread’ across different areas dynamically with anyone individual capable of investigating diverse crimes. In changing the organization, claims about investigator identity were enacted through identity regulation targeting affiliation and values and motives.

Senior managers sought to create a stronger investigator commitment to the entire organization, with investigators working on any crime types that senior management required. This involved changes to the employment contracts of investigators. Previously, positions were advertised as belonging to a particular squad and an investigator could stay at that squad for lengthy periods. Now, investigator positions were generic and senior managers decided where investigators were placed. This meant that investigators had no guarantee as to where they worked and what type of crime they investigated.

Concurrently, senior managers introduced a new annual workgroup review process where they made decisions on whether new squads were required, whether existing squads were justified in terms of need and to which squads each investigator in the Department would be allocated. This new process created the prospect of annual change in squad membership, reinforcing an individual affiliation to the Department rather than a specific squad. This was aimed at creating the generalist investigator now required at the Department:

So what’s the difference between going to a homicide or an armed robbery? The same sort of principles apply, you are a jack of all trades. But one thing I did see over a period of time was … people become very much one dimensional and they couldn’t handle change. [Senior Manager]

Senior managers also influenced the values and motives of those within squads. They enacted discursive claims about the role of the squad members in various ‘leadership forums’ and meetings with individual squads. Helping others across the organization was a constant theme in these discussions:

It’s trying to get squad members to look across a bit more … what comes with that is more generosity of spirit. So, understanding that, if someone’s got a big problem over there, maybe the smart thing to do is to not worry about your small problem over here and maybe get over there and help out with that big problem. [Head of the Department]

Changing the organization and identity regulation were thus interwoven. Senior managers saw the Department as requiring generalist investigators to achieve much needed flexibility. Through identity regulation involving affiliation to the broader organization and values and motives oriented towards helping others senior managers engaged in claims about investigator identity oriented to the multi-skilled generalist, where all investigators were to be similar. I label their approach to paradox as selection in prioritizing similarity over distinctiveness.

As the front-line for combating crime, investigators had first-hand experience of an increasing, albeit volatile, workload and criminals working across multiple crime types and were aware of the challenges it posed to the Department. However, different reactions emerged to senior managers’ identity regulation.

One reaction pattern manifested amongst individual investigators in high-status squads. These employees acknowledged similarities with their colleagues across the Department, using labels such as ‘major crime’ and emphasizing their background as ‘detectives’. These had positive connotations, indicating the significance of the work being done (versus petty crime, for example) and the quality of the individuals that did them (all investigators had been through detective training). Yet, individuals saw themselves also as separate from others, and interpreted senior managers’ regulation of investigator identity as a threat to this. Specifically, investigators at high-status squads saw the privileging of the ‘generalist’ investigator as devaluing their specialized skills and extensive experience:

I see myself like a heart surgeon who’s getting on in years but who is actually still operating but training the person beside me … and that’s an argument that I often have with senior management about rotations. I can provide a better service by having experience. [Member, HS]

For investigators in these high-status squads, valued aspects of identity were caught up in their interest in, and experience of, investigating a particular crime type. The suppression of distinctiveness caused negative emotion for many:

Maybe in 10 years’ time we will perhaps perceive ourselves in that way, that we are just professional investigators going where we need to go at that particular time. But now, there’s still much feeling that I’m an armed crime detective. So … I think there’s going to be some heartache to come. [Member, HS]

Squad members voiced concerns about the devaluation of specialization to senior management through various feedback forums and in face-to-face conversations, highlighting the value of specialization for the organization, often referring to actual or hypothetical crimes that were important and where success might not be achieved without specialist investigators. The example provided by this investigator is illustrative:

I’ve said to the Senior Manager, ‘You’ve been here. If your son is bashed to death tonight, tell me this … do you want someone with experience from this office [squad]?’ He’s replied ‘I want experienced investigators’. I’ve replied ‘Well, you’ve answered your question. Why would you move me? Why would you move that person?’ [Member, HS]

In contrast, investigators at squads of perceived lower status did not exhibit the same reactions. They also acknowledged differences in terms of the work they performed and the skillsets required. However, unlike their counterparts at high-status squads, these distinct attributes were described in undesirable ways:

What you need for investigators that are working in the fraud environment is an orientation to fraud. By that I mean a preparedness to actually engage with this complex environment … It’s not necessarily as flashy and by that I mean it doesn’t get the same high profile as some of the other areas. [Member, LS]

Investigators at low-status squads supported the regulation of identity in their interactions with senior management. Rather than causing anxiety, they saw senior managers’ identity regulation and promotion of the ‘generalist’ investigator as offering valuable experiences working on the main priorities of the organization:

The realities are you’ve got to work in other areas and I’ve never resisted that because there are two good things about it. People get experience doing something different and, you know, there’s an operational necessity that you’ve got to get people to work on the main priorities. [Member, LS]

Underpinning this support was a view that senior managers’ regulation of identity recognized existing similarities in investigators regardless of crime type being investigated. Even as they acknowledged differences in status, these individuals accentuated similarities with their high-status colleagues in expressing agreement with the notion of the generalist investigator. This from an investigator at the drugs squad:

Homicide is seen as the pinnacle for detectives, people want to go there. Whereas other areas like drugs, no-one wants to go there … Senior management want everyone to be multi-skilled. So I can go to a murder, I can go to a rape, I can go to an armed robbery. It’s not really rocket science, policing … You have a crime, you have an offender or a suspect, and we work with the same tools. [Investigator, LS]

Investigators at high-status squads can be described as engaging in an opposition approach to paradox, enacting identity distinctiveness to counter senior managers’ privileging of similarity. They saw themselves as valued specialists with extensive experience in important crime types. Distinctiveness through specialization was important for this group of investigators and acted as a counterpoint to the generalist investigator identity that senior managers sought to impose across the organization. In contrast, investigators at low-status squads supported the prioritization of similarity over distinctiveness. Their identity work accentuated similarities across investigators, with senior managers’ identity regulation seen as recognizing these equivalences while also providing valued investigative experiences beyond their low-status squad. Senior managers were thus faced with different responses to their privileging of similarity over distinctiveness.

Confronted with these diverse patterns of identity work, senior managers acknowledged the role that expertise played in solving important or more complicated crimes. The nature of these crimes coupled with the identity work of high-status investigators caused senior managers to revisit their regulation of employee identity:

We had a lot of experts who said, ‘We don’t get recognised as experts. We’re not asking for extra money, we’re just looking for that recognition’ … So one of the things we [senior managers] did was say, ‘Well, let’s not throw the baby out with the bathwater here.’ [Senior Manager]

However, rather than alter the ways in which they privileged the generalist investigator identity, senior management developed an alternative arrangement to recognize specialization. ‘Specialist Communities of Practice’ were created whereby investigators could attain ‘subject matter expert’ (SME) designation in particular crime types, providing they met defined criteria relating to the types of experience they had acquired to date (e.g., investigating particularly violent crimes or constructing particularly complex affidavits). SMEs were provided with opportunities to share their knowledge through internal workshops and funded conference attendances. These forms of recognition were new for those at the Department. Furthermore, those with SME status could assist squads where demand for that skillset exceeded existing capacity although senior management were clear that this could not be guaranteed. In this way, specialization could influence the future crimes that individuals investigated.

This recognition of specialization also provided benefits for those interested in generalizing. Previously, the only way to gain knowledge in a crime type was through time in role. With the Specialist Community of Practice, best practice guidelines were developed that were seen as an important resource for those unfamiliar with a crime type, thereby allowing them to investigate a greater spectrum of crimes more effectively. The Senior Manager who had responsibility for the Specialist Community of Practice expanded on this benefit:

The good thing is that there’s a legacy for our experts. You know, they can point to this [guidelines] and they can say, ‘Well, look, this is something I’ve really contributed [to]’, but then they become a source for all investigators in our organization. And that’s something we never had in the past. [Senior Manager]

Towards the end of period one, a number of squad members at high-status groups indicated they had acquired, or were in pursuit of, SME status. Those in senior roles within a practice would often refer to SME status when describing themselves. The Senior Manager responsible for the Specialist Community of Practice also saw significant employee interest in specialist designation. It appeared that management’s response had addressed concerns about the loss of distinctiveness, resolving in part the tension between the generalist and specialist investigator identity:

Nowadays whenever I run an SME session formally it’s always a packed house. And the good thing is it’s because people have become really attuned to it, and they realise that there is a means of actually, developing yourself as a specialist still within the Department. [Senior Manager]

Evidence thus indicated that the conflict between similarity (generalist) and distinctiveness (specialist) had been transcended. Both generalization as well as specialization were seen as important in the Department and were achieved through different arrangements operating in parallel. All investigators would be similar as multi-skilled generalists for the purposes of annual rotations, while distinctive specialist expertise would be recognized through an official SME designation and associated benefits in terms of status and funding. These two arrangements also intersected insofar as SME status influenced investigators’ allocation to crime types. Finally, synergy benefits from this reframing had also been obtained from specialists documenting their knowledge in best practice guidelines, which affirmed their status and allowed others to generalize and expand into different crime types. I label the re-regulation response of senior managers as a reframing paradox approach based on these observations.

Figure 1 summarizes the dynamics that manifested in period 1 of the case study, comprising identity regulation by senior managers and identity work by squads as tensions between similarity and distinctiveness were negotiated and reframed. While both similarity and distinctiveness had been accommodated, further challenges were to arise.

From the latter half of 2009 senior management began introducing additional changes to deal with the unpredictable criminal environment. Sizeable fluctuations in the level and significance of crime threats posed demands for flexibility beyond what the annual workgroup review process could provide. In response, senior managers began to rotate investigators on a short-term basis (typically a few months although sometimes longer) across workgroups to balance resources. This was to allow for the staffing of new groups set up to deal with emerging and pressing crime themes, as well as resourcing of existing squads perceived to have higher priority needs than others. This practice amplified the Department-centric investigator affiliation brought about by senior managers in the previous period. However, where previously squad allocations were determined on an annual basis through the workgroup review process, now personnel could be rotated to a different squad or to a newly created taskforce as and when necessary throughout the year.

In addition, senior management sought to enable fast responses to crimes that happened overnight. A trial commenced at the start of 2009 as a result of experiences where multiple crimes of a particular type occurred and the relevant squad did not have the capacity to respond. This trial required each squad to have a certain proportion of its members’ on-call overnight for the entire Department rather than for the squad only, as had been the previous practice. Implemented as an ongoing process in mid-2009, these on-call members comprised a ‘Crime Response Team’ that was mobilized if other squads could not service a crime reported at night that required an immediate response. Squad members did not shift to a different squad or group but helped out others.

This change built upon the values and motives that senior managers had sought to construct through their previous regulation of investigator identity. In this case, assisting squads on an overnight basis was another means by which investigators would help others in the organization with more pressing needs. Collectively both the enhanced personnel rotation and Crime Response Team emphasized similarity across all investigators – as generalists they would work on any crime type as required and help out others in need across the organization. As in the previous period, a selection approach to the similarity–distinctiveness paradox was enacted through identity regulation. Again diverse reactions from investigators ensued.

The changes introduced called into question the reframing of the generalist–specialist achieved in the previous period. Investigators in high-status squads exhibited renewed concerns about a devaluation of their expertise and a threat to valued distinctiveness. These concerns manifested in two main ways.

First, investigators at high-status squads saw the acceleration of rotations across workgroups beyond the annual review process as a threat to the ability to acquire SME designation. Acquiring organizational recognition of distinctiveness was both difficult as well as less meaningful:

If we look at rotating people … no-one will actually make the Subject Matter Expert status, or assuming that they do, they’ll hold the Subject Matter Expert status for such a limited time in position you’ll probably argue, what the hell was it worth getting there for? There seems to be a few tensions around some of our thinking. [Member, HS]

Second, they saw the ‘Crime Response Team’ as contradicting senior management’s previous acknowledgement of specialization’s value. Recall that senior managers had described SME designations as potentially informing not only future workgroup rotations but also the type of work with which an investigator might be tasked when helping out other squads. The Crime Response Team was a symbol of the opposite, a team of people from any background investigating any type of crime, albeit those occurring overnight only. Investigators at high-status squads openly voiced disapproval of this change and its identity regulation effects:

I think there is a lack of appreciation for specialisation. You’ve got [senior managers] pushing the specialist community of practice. But you cannot on one hand be acknowledging that we’ve got these specialist capabilities and specialist needs for this type of investigation. And then we are going to respond it with someone who has got no knowledge or no expertise in that particular type of crime, which the Crime Response Team is. [Member, HS]

Consequently, investigators at high-status squads engaged in a pattern of identity work that reaffirmed the value of their distinctive specialist skills and experience, with the target of this identity work the newly implemented Crime Response Team process. Members of high-status squads voiced concerns about the Crime Response Team not being able to guarantee that its members would have operational experience in the type of crime to which they were responding. Stories about mistakes made by the Crime Response Team were circulated amongst squads and brought up in discussions about this team of generalists. Indeed, members of high-status squads would openly acknowledge that they avoided using the Crime Response Team on the basis of its negative identity attributes:

You get a higgledy piggledy bunch of people coming from all over the place at different times that most members that I have spoken to pretty much avoiding calling the Crime Response Team out unless they really are stretched. [Member, HS]

This identity work impacted members at low-status squads. Investigators at low-status squads had seen positives in the Crime Response Team as it provided an opportunity to work alongside their higher-status counterparts. However, the identity work of high-status investigators when engaging the Crime Response Team reinforced distinctions rather than facilitating a greater sense of similarity:

What I’ve found is the callouts I’ve had and they include homicides … you got there initially, but you’re just doing a small aspect of it. In the last case even though it’s a good job and it would be a good job to work with the Homicide Squad my role is to take the witness back to a station and take a three hour statement from him … It’s not really what I would call a quality part of the investigation. [Member, LS]

In summary, investigators at high-status squads had again evidenced an opposition approach to the similarity–distinctiveness paradox as they engaged in identity work through either not using the Crime Response Team or using it in particular ways to emphasize differences between themselves and investigators from low-status squads. For low-status investigators this meant a valued opportunity to do similar work to and alongside their high-status counterparts remained unfulfilled.

With identity work and re-assertions of distinctiveness resulting in an under-utilization of the Crime Response Team, senior managers sought to redesign how the process would operate. However, for these senior managers, this was not due to a problem with the notion of the generalist investigator but guaranteeing a minimum level of expertise. Changes were subsequently made to the Crime Response Team to balance the requirement for generalized resource mobilization with a level of specialized expertise. The refined approach saw teams still drawn from diverse backgrounds, but organized under four crime types – armed offences, homicides, sexual offences, and ‘other’ serious crimes, the first three staffed by personnel with expertise and experience in a particular area but supported by others drawn from across the Department. The ‘other’ serious crime team was also to be resourced with investigators from across the Department. In this way generalist skills were to be blended together with specialist expertise.

While the redesigned Crime Response Team had only been in operation for a short period of time (prior to conclusion of data collection), there were positive reactions to it from high-status investigators. In particular, they saw the Crime Response Team as recognizing the importance of specialist skills and expertise:

I think with the recent improvements of Crime Response Team, there seems to be a little improvement. At least you’ve got separate crews on-call for different types of incidents. Before … you might have got called out to a shooting matter with an E-Crime, Fraud Squad and with a Drug Squad member. And you may not have that expertise I suppose. [Member, HS]

However, the extent to which the new arrangements would allow low-status investigators to realize opportunities to operate like their high-status counterparts would be contingent on the latter’s willingness to embrace the claim that all investigators were similar in nature. Also, by the end of data collection, senior managers had not addressed broader concerns by high-status investigators about the intensified rotations and impacts on SME status and recognition of specialization. Interviews amongst senior managers indicated a preference to move on rather than re-examine how distinctive specialists could be recognized and accommodated within the Department:

I think we just kept coming back to the building blocks instead of building on it … We really need to stop and say to our members, ‘This is where we’ve come from and this is where we are now and this is where we’re going to in the future and you need to come with us.’ [Senior Manager]

Thus by the end of period 2 senior managers had implemented an approach to the similarity–distinctiveness approach that is best described as an integration approach, albeit limited to the operation of the Crime Response Team only, Here, the role of specialist investigators was to be combined with generalists, with the structure and staffing simultaneously reflecting specialized expertise in particular crime types working alongside generalists. Figure 2 represents visually the dynamics that manifested in this period of the case study in terms of identity regulation and identity work by senior managers and squad investigators respectively.

The study’s main contribution is to reveal how senior managers and employees negotiate similarity–distinctiveness paradoxes in employee identity as an emergent and cyclical process of identity regulation and heterogeneous identity work. Figure 3 presents these using letters A to C to depict particular cycles of identity regulation and identity work.

In Figure 3, labels A1 and A2 both refer to identity regulation that affects how employees see their similarity to, and distinctiveness from, others, with the latter focusing on re-regulation initiated in response to the identity work of employees. In the case study, A1 involved identity regulation that selected similarity over distinctiveness at the start of both periods. Here senior managers emphasized a generalist investigator identity by targeting employee affiliation and values and motives. Although this took place as part of major change in period 1 of the case study, it manifested through less significant changes in period 2. Identity regulation that affects prevailing senses of similarity–distinctiveness can also occur as part of ongoing interactions between organizational participants, consistent with the perspective on ‘organizational becoming’ that sees organizations as enacted through micro-interactions amongst actors in their everyday work (Thomas, Sargent, & Hardy, 2011; Tsoukas & Chia, 2002).

Where identity regulation affects prevailing senses of similarity–distinctiveness employees engage in identity work contingent on their pre-existing sense of balance between similarity and distinctiveness. Labels B and C in Figure 3 illustrate this. Identity research points out that the search for balance between similarity and distinctiveness shapes individuals’ identity construction but also that these opposing forces vary dynamically in their salience contingent on existing levels of satiation (Brewer, 1991; Kreiner et al., 2006; Leonardelli et al., 2010). I argue that this helps to explain the diverse reactions that manifested at the Department.

Case study observations indicate that high-status investigators felt a sense of balance between similarity and distinctiveness prior to the change process. They described similarities and affiliation to other investigators positively when explaining how they all investigated ‘major crime’ and were ‘detectives’. Simultaneously they highlighted the importance of their distinctiveness. Accordingly, high-status investigators sought to maintain their sense of balance between similarity and distinctiveness by emphasizing the element they considered to be suppressed, here asserting distinctiveness, as illustrated by label B in Figure 3.

In contrast, low-status investigators distinguished themselves from their high-status colleagues in negative terms when explaining that they were not ‘high profile’ nor worked on ‘main priorities’. They welcomed new opportunities to work amongst high-status investigators and be seen in similar ways. These observations indicate a sense of imbalance prior to the change process. The identity work of low-status investigators sought to develop balance by gaining greater similarity to their higher-status colleagues, and is depicted by Label C in Figure 3.

Here the possibility of interacting identity motives must be considered. Identity research suggests that while similarity and distinctiveness motivations operate independently of self-esteem motivations, the extent to which individuals derive self-esteem from being similar or distinctive may influence the extent to which they become attached to these aspects of their identity (Brewer et al., 1993; Lynn & Snyder, 2002). Self-esteem and similarity–distinctiveness motivations can interact. It is thus possible that the actions of investigators in the Department were not only shaped by their similarity–distinctiveness motivations but also by self-esteem drivers. However, identity research is not conclusive on how identity motives inter-relate (Vignoles et al., 2006). Future paradox research should thus investigate how organizational participants’ identity work to enact similarity and distinctiveness relative to others might interact with self-esteem motives.

Finally, label A2 indicates that senior managers may engage in identity re-regulation in response to the identity work of employees. At the Department, this took the form of senior managers’ reframing and integration responses based on the opposition of high-status investigators in period 1 and period 2 respectively. Importantly, the extent to which all organizational participants engage in strategic or defensive approaches to the similarity–distinctiveness identity paradox as they engage in identity regulation, re-regulation or identity work shapes the extent to which further negotiations are likely to occur. Identity regulation or re-regulation that allows employees to maintain, restore or gain balance between similarity and distinctiveness in identity mitigates against further cycles of identity work.

However, as the case study illustrates, balance is difficult to achieve for all employees. Regulating identity in terms of this paradox requires attention to how different groups or individuals stake claims for identity similarity and distinctiveness. The heterogeneity in employees’ identity work to either restore pre-existing balance in similarity–distinctiveness or seek this from a position of imbalance is significant.

Achieving both similarity and distinctiveness is also difficult to sustain over time. At the Department, additional identity regulation effects in period 2 that manifested through heightened personnel rotations and the Crime Response Team called into question the reframing of the similarity–distinctiveness paradox that occurred in the previous period and caused further cycles of identity work and re-regulation. Strategic responses are at risk of unravelling and require ongoing attention over time because paradoxical tensions are never fully ‘solved’ (Ashcraft & Trethewey, 2004; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Such explanations contrast with studies that emphasize mid-course adjustments as resolving identity distinctiveness concerns (e.g., Huy, 2011) as well as broader studies on organizational change and identity construction that describe a relatively linear process comprising distinct stages of dis- or deidentification followed by re-identification (e.g., Chreim, 2002; Fiol, 2002). Future longitudinal research is required to examine how organizational actors maintain virtuous cycles over time to and the factors that might enable this.

A second contribution of the study is to highlight how defensive approaches to paradox may lead to positive outcomes. Paradox research highlights the importance of paradoxical cognition, comprising individuals comprehending tensions in ‘both/and’ rather than ‘either/or’ terms and how this allows strategic approaches to paradox (Smith & Lewis, 2011; Smith & Tushman, 2005). Studies on identity paradoxes also highlight the important role that senior managers play in enabling employees to accept paradoxical tensions in identity (Besharov, 2014; Jarzabkowski et al., 2013). Throughout this study, senior managers displayed a preference for similar generalist investigators rather than distinctive specialists. Indeed, senior managers and high-status investigators did not evidence a ‘both/and’ position, instead selecting similarity and distinctiveness respectively. In spite of these defensive stances their interaction yielded ‘both/and’ outcomes. The reframing approach that created the SME designation in period one is illustrative, creating new ways to recognize and reward specialization without compromising the importance of the generalist investigator for the organization. This approach also generated new transfers of knowledge from specialists to less experienced personnel, enabling the latter to multi-skill and generalize.

Here the study adds to prior research on identity paradoxes as well as studies on the similarity–distinctiveness tension specifically. Previous studies on identity paradoxes show how lateral conflict between groups of employees selecting one side of a hybrid organization’s dual mission allows the organization to oscillate between both sides of the tension over time, but this requires tacit reciprocity and egalitarian power sharing arrangements (Ashforth & Reingen, 2014). Studies specifically on the similarity–distinctiveness tension find that senior managers adjusting to accommodate prevailing notions of identity distinctiveness is contingent on their ability to empathize with employees or their ambivalence (Langley et al., 2012; see also Huy, 2011). The current study builds on both sets of studies by highlighting the importance of organizational participants being able to make strong claims about the value of the identity paradox element they favour – in this case similarity or distinctiveness – for the organization’s future.

The ability of senior managers and high-status investigators to make strong claims was a significant influence in the period 1 reframing and period 2 integration. The identity regulation of the former claimed that similar multi-skilled generalists would provide required flexibility, the identity work of the latter asserted that distinctive specialists were necessary for solving important crimes. Indeed, it was the ability of high-status investigators to connect their distinctiveness to organizational effectiveness that provided the impetus for senior managers to move from their selection approach to consider how both elements of the tension could be achieved. Thus organizational participants may be able to achieve positive outcomes even if they favour one side of identity paradoxes, such as the tension between similarity and distinctiveness; to do so they must confront and engage with equally strong claims by proponents for the other element. This becomes especially important in situations where senior managers themselves engage in selection approaches to paradox, for employees then have to make a strong case in a power sharing context that is likely to be unequal.

However, there are also inherent dangers to this iterative oppositional approach. In period two senior management responded to the identity work of high-status investigators by integrating both generalization and specialization in the redesign of the Crime Response Team. This integrative response, while useful, crystallized around the particular issue upon which the identity work had centered. The underlying problematization of period one’s reframing was left unaddressed with senior managers indicating a need to ‘move on’. Further research could examine how organizational participants adopting defensive postures to paradox arrive at ‘both/and’ thinking through their interactions with others and the conditions that are most conducive for this.

Also, accommodating the concerns of low-status investigators was less evident in the case study, with senior managers’ promulgation of similarity driven primarily by their concerns for flexibility rather than the identity needs of employees. This highlights the challenge of enabling multiple and potentially competing claims for distinctiveness and similarity across the organization, especially when they become problematized through situations such as major change. Future studies should thus examine contexts where senior managers have to choose more explicitly between competing enactments of identity paradox by employees and the role that power plays in these confrontational dynamics (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013).

Organizations are inherently paradoxical. Organizational leaders must not see the opposition of others as resistance but allow others voice and space to engage in generative dialogue and ‘facilitative resistance’ (Thomas et al., 2011) such that both employee similarity and distinctiveness might be attained.

In addition, both senior managers and employees must focus on enabling others to live with identity paradoxes. This involves creating nuanced understandings of the diverse forces that are shaping the organization and meta-communication, whereby organizational participants reflect and describe the tensions they face in an attempt to work through potential anxiety and double-binds (Ashcraft & Trethewey, 2004), a process similar to the ‘sparring’ described by Lüscher and Lewis (2008). At the Department, the creation by senior managers of discursive spaces between high- and low-status investigators might have allowed each to comprehend the value of the other gaining similarity and losing distinctiveness respectively, potentially allowing alternative ways of unlocking synergy through pursuit of both paradox elements. Investigators themselves might have initiated such actions. Organizational leaders and employees not only have to be capable of engaging in strategic approaches to paradox, they must also enable others to do the same.

The limitations of this study should also be acknowledged. First, the single case study approach and the nature of the case organization impose limits on generalization. Future research needs to examine the applicability of the dynamics depicted in Figure 3 for situations where identity regulation emphasizes distinctiveness rather than similarity as observed at the Department. Figure 3 also excludes situations where employees experiencing similarity–distinctiveness imbalance confront an organizational change that regulates their identity towards further imbalance. Although I did not encounter these situations it is likely that they exist in other settings. Future research needs to investigate how such individuals respond through identity work and the nature of re-regulation responses that subsequently occur.

Second, any case study must have a start date and end date for data collection. It is possible that the recollections of interviewees in period one overlooked some specifics of the identity regulation and work that manifested in this period while further reactions to the period two integrative responses may have manifested beyond those described here. Also, due to my eventual interest in concerns about identity it is possible that other categories of paradox (see Smith & Lewis, 2011) manifested at the Department that were interwoven with the identity paradox I describe, especially given the potential for their interrelatedness (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013; Lüscher & Lewis, 2008). This is an inevitable consequence of my decision to foreground the similarity–distinctiveness identity paradox and how it manifested in the data. While other explanations for the identity tension manifestation may exist I consider this risk to be mitigated through the use of triangulation in data sources, the data analysis approach used and the longitudinal research design employed.