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Stefano Guzzini
This reply to the Symposium on Stefano Guzzini (ed.) The return of geopolitics in Europe?, answers the criticisms by John Agnew, Jeffrey Checkel, Dan Deudney and Jennifer Mitzen. It justifies (1) its specific definition and critique of... more
This reply to the Symposium on Stefano Guzzini (ed.) The return of geopolitics in Europe?, answers the criticisms by John Agnew, Jeffrey Checkel, Dan Deudney and Jennifer Mitzen. It justifies (1) its specific definition and critique of geopolitics as a theory – and not just a foreign policy strategy; (2) its proposed interpretivist process tracing; (3) the role of mechanisms in constructivist theorizing and foreign policy theory; and (4) its usage of non-Humean causality in the analysis of multiple parallel processes and their interaction. At the same time, it develops the logic of the book’s main mechanism of foreign policy identity crisis reduction.
forthcoming in Xavier Guillaume and Pinar Bilgin, eds, Routledge Handbook of International Political Sociology, Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2017.
Can be downloaded through URL.
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This is the Working Paper version of a chapter contribution to a four volume project entitled Richard Ned Lebow: A Pioneer in International Relations Theory, History, Philosophy and Psychology, ed. By Hans Günther Brauch (Heidelberg:... more
This is the Working Paper version of a chapter contribution to a four volume project entitled Richard Ned Lebow: A Pioneer in International Relations Theory, History, Philosophy and Psychology, ed. By Hans Günther Brauch (Heidelberg: Springer; New York: Dordrecht, 2016),
Rather than imposing an external grid on Lebow’s work, the chapter develops Lebow’s position out of his research. The guiding inspiration for the chapter is Lebow’s impatience with any argument which says that “things had to come” as they did (when wars break out), or “this cannot happen” (such as the peaceful end of the Cold War). Instead, Lebow would look for the incongruities in personal decisions, the unintended effects of human interactions, and the unexpected twists that history can take.
This basic stance produces a central tension that defines his approach to science. On the one hand, such an emphasis on the contingent and the non-deterministic would make him skeptical of attempts to reduce the human world to behaviorist explanations; instead, the specifically ‘human’ and ‘social’ pushes his interest towards historical explanations and the philosophical underpinnings of such indeterminacy. On the other hand, there is no doubt that he wishes to stay within a “social science”, albeit more “humanistically” conceived, if by this we refer to both the ethical ideal of humanism and the analytical ideal which looks for a more holistic understanding of knowledge. To put it briefly: Lebow is unwilling to give up the search for some form of regularity only because many have pushed it beyond what the ontology of the social world can bear.
The first section of the chapter follows Lebow in his attempts to open up theoretical black boxes which, according to him, allow for the pernicious analytical shortcuts that construct such inevitability in the first place. This will also inform his theoretical predisposition to combine the study of cognitive processes, the role of motives and motivational explanations, and intersubjective identity processes. A second section will then show how these ontological and theoretical dispositions translate into a philosophy of science that eschews both determinism and pure contingency at the same time. His social science is historical and interpretivist, but also endorses a form of (singular) causation.
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Rather than offering a survey of different conceptualizations of power, which have been well discussed elsewhere, the chapter shows the crucial importance of conceptual analysis both for the critique and development of theory and as an... more
Rather than offering a survey of different conceptualizations of power, which have been well discussed elsewhere, the chapter shows the crucial importance of conceptual analysis both for the critique and development of theory and as an empirical analysis of the performance nature of power analysis. In doing so, the discussion points to the analytical benefits and limits of taking a concept’s theoretical and political contexts seriously.
The chapter proceeds in three parts. The first section will tackle how to understand or define a concept. Far from being a purely semantic exercise or a simple instrumental step in the operationalization of variables, I look at concepts from their context-specific usage, including our theoretical languages. Applied to the concept of power, I look at how the two overarching domains of power analysis, political theory and explanatory theory, can help us map the different concepts of the power family.
The second section looks at the role the concept of power plays in our theoretical languages and shows how conceptual analysis can be used for the analysis and critique of theories. It does so by addressing a paradox. On the one hand, concepts derive their specific meaning from the theoretical and meta-theoretical context in which they are embedded. On the other hand, meanings travel across the multitude of theoretical contexts. This can produce situations in which a concept considered central is, however, not best served by keeping it within the theoretical context in which it is predominantly applied. Also, importing conceptualizations from other theoretical contexts may not work because it produces contradictions within receiving theoretical contexts. Applied to the concept of power, I will use the mapping of power concepts of the first section for a theoretical critique of realism, a theory that is often identified with the analysis of power.
The third and final section focuses on the role of power in political discourse(s) and shows how the concept of power becomes itself the object of empirical analysis. This is a central issue for conceptual history in its different forms, but also for performative analyses of discursive practices, and hence the ‘political (critical) approach’ outlined in the introduction to this volume. . Power is performative in that it mobilizes ideas of agency and responsibility. It politicizes issues, since action and change are now deemed possible. Moreover, given that we have no objective measure of power, but practitioners need to assume one to attribute status and recognition, a part of international politics can be understood as the ongoing negotiation about who has the right to define and what is part of the definition of power. This struggle over the ‘right’ definition of power, as used by practitioners, is part and parcel of power politics.
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This article analyses the trajectory of Benjamin J Cohen’s work by focusing on his ongoing concern with the nature and governance of world order. It does so by playing out his debt to realism and to Keynesianism. In a first moment, Cohen... more
This article analyses the trajectory of Benjamin J Cohen’s work by focusing on his ongoing concern with the nature and governance of world order. It does so by playing out his debt to realism and to Keynesianism. In a first moment, Cohen criticises the economic determinism of dependency scholarship, while turning to political realism, and then to possible Keynesian co-operation under anarchy: agents have the power to affect positive change. Later, Cohen the disillusioned Keynesian, watching how the possible reform of financial markets is marginalised by politicians and academics alike, shifts his analysis to more structural aspects of governance
or rule that affect actors’ preferences. I draw two conclusions. First, in this shift towards theorising the global political order away from steering capacity towards impersonal rule and bias, Cohen also questions the very setup of the theories with which we deal with that world – only to see that this very inspiration of original IPE is abandoned in the course of the ongoing ‘professionalisation’ of IPE as practised in the United States. Second, his analysis seems to incorporate a warning. The underlying grand question is nothing less than the bargain between capitalism and liberal democracy as we know it, since the present system undermines equality before the law – money trumps equal political rights – and undermines democratic accountability. One of the main achievements of the post-war Keynesian turn was the reappropriation of political space from anti-democratic forces. Therefore, the decline of Keynesianism could provoke a Polanyian nightmare in which the ‘double movement’ by which the laissez-faire is answered by moves to protect society does not strengthen democracies, as in earlier times of ‘embedded liberalism’, but undermines them instead.
The Bush administration’s foreign policy hitherto suffers from a neglect of diplomacy. It has emphasised a strategy that combines unilateral and re-militarising elements. Security is conceived of in terms of a gated community writ large.... more
The Bush administration’s foreign policy hitherto suffers from a neglect of diplomacy. It has emphasised a strategy that combines unilateral and re-militarising elements. Security is conceived of in terms of a gated community writ large. Diplomacy is downgraded to alliance-building (conveniently misnamed multilateralism) for a policy already decided. Other countries are sheer objects, not subjects, within US foreign
policy. The conception of order in international society is stripped of substantial components of justice or legitimacy, to which the US would accept being subjected itself. In short, there is a tendency to repeat the US cold war strategy which reversed Clausewitz, that is, where politics becomes the prolongation of war with other means. The article consciously bases its critique mainly on realist writers, simply to show that
the present US foreign policy is debatable even in realist terms.
The article takes a stance in the Weber reception which tries to see him mainly as a forerunner of an empirical social science and a causal conception of power as in the Dahlian tradition. It will argue and confirm Raymond Aron’s take... more
The article takes a stance in the Weber reception which tries to see him mainly as a forerunner of an empirical social science and a causal conception of power as in the Dahlian tradition. It will argue and confirm Raymond Aron’s take that, to the contrary, his social science is profoundly imbued by philosophical aims: ‘This interpretation of the relation between science and politics leads to a certain philosophy which at the time was not yet called “existential[ist]”, but which belongs to this current so named today.’ Hence, rather than only seeing his sociology as a way to demarcate the specificity of the social investigation from both normative theory and the natural sciences – which it certainly did – the following article follows those who see his methodological and sociological decisions as part of a political and ethical endeavour.
The Working Paper provides a dual historisation of ‘securitisation’, i.e. of the origins of the Copenhagen School in terms of its direct world historical context and of the historical origins of the specific bias in our political... more
The Working Paper provides a dual historisation of ‘securitisation’, i.e. of the origins of the Copenhagen School in terms of its direct world historical context and of the historical origins of the specific bias in our political discourse which is prompted by security discourses. Born almost as a rationalisation of German Ostpolitik, and hence with desecuritisation, the Copenhagen School understood the speech act less as a kind of conspiratorial or elite manipulation than as the manifold processes that give prominence to the discourse of security (the reversal of Clausewitz) in public debate or diminish it, as in the processes of desecuritisation. This means that I see ‘securitisation’ not in the ‘act’ of those ‘speaking’ security, but in the possibly unintended and unconscious de-/mobilisation of the inherent logic, or grammar, of the discourse of security.
This begs the question, however, of where the discourse of security would have gained its inherent logic from. It is here where a second necessary historicisation has to take place, not about the context of the theory itself, but about the content of its central concept. The Copenhagen School has been criticised for being basically still too conventional or realist in its reading of security, being connected to exceptional measures, done by foreign-policy elites, etc. But just as the increasing number of security sectors indicates, this is not to be understood as the ‘essence’ of security, but rather as the effect of a historical development in which certain actors have traditionally come to be authorised to talk and effect war and peace in a ‘realist’ way. This implies that, by reifying a historical moment into a general framework of analysis, securitisation theory may indeed help to reproduce such an understanding, although it does not need to.  In return, it implies, however, that if a different understanding of security (beyond the raison d’État) appears and becomes shared, the Copenhagen School will also have to adapt. Its conceptualisation is historically bound.
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International Relations theory is being squeezed between two sides. On the one hand, the world of practitioners and attached experts often perceive International Relations theory as misleading if it does not correspond to practical... more
International Relations theory is being squeezed between two sides. On the one hand, the world of practitioners and attached experts often perceive International Relations theory as misleading if it does not correspond to practical knowledge, and redundant when it does. The academic study of international relations can and should not be anything beyond the capacity to provide political judgement which comes through reflection on the historical experience of practitioners. On the other hand, and within its disciplinary confines, International Relations theory is reduced to a particular type of
empirical theory with increasing resistance to further self-reflection. Instead, this article argues that neither reduction is viable. Reducing theory to practical knowledge runs
into self-contradictions; reducing theorizing to its empirical mode underestimates the constitutive function of theories, the role of concepts, and hence the variety of necessary modes of theorizing. I present this twofold claim in steps of increasing reflexivity in International Relations theory and propose four modes of theorizing: normative, metatheoretical, ontological/constitutive and empirical.
Kratochwil stands out as one of those very few thinkers in international relations (IR) whose work tries to understand the implications of thinking assumptions about ontology, social theory, and scientific discovery (and, indeed, ethics)... more
Kratochwil stands out as one of those very few thinkers in international relations (IR) whose work tries to understand the implications of thinking assumptions about ontology, social theory, and scientific discovery (and, indeed, ethics) in
parallel. The present article reconstructs the thought of Friedrich Kratochwil to exemplify the necessary coherence of thought from politics to science to ethics, a project which is truly important for the development of theorising in IR. And at the same time, it uses this reconstruction of his multi-layered coherence for portraying a significantly different understanding of a central thinker in IR. For my
reconstruction presents this very quest for coherence as Kratochwil’s underlying theme and the role of practice as the bridge between the different layers of his theorising. As a result, for him, there cannot be Realpolitik without politics, theory without reflexivity, science without judgement, or ethics without a humanist sense of responsibility.
he article seeks to offer a way forward in discussions about the status of securitization theory. In my reading, this debate has been inhibited by the difficulty of finding an appropriate version of ‘understanding/explanation’ that would... more
he article seeks to offer a way forward in discussions about the status of securitization theory. In my reading, this debate has been inhibited by the difficulty of finding an appropriate version of ‘understanding/explanation’ that would be consistent with the meta-theoretical commitments of a post-structuralist theory.
By leaving ‘explanation’ and/or all versions of causality to the positivist other, the Copenhagen School also left its own explanatory status often implicit, or only negatively defined. Instead, the present article claims that the explanatory theory used in securitization research de facto relies on causal mechanisms that are nonpositivistically conceived. Using the appropriate methodological literature renders this explanatory
status explicit, exposing the theory’s non-positivist causality and thus, hopefully, enhancing its empirical theory.
The present article argues that the discipline of international relations is bound to repeat its rounds of debates about realism as long as the underlying dynamic intrinsic to the realist tradition is not understood. Whereas present... more
The present article argues that the discipline of international relations is bound to repeat its rounds of debates about realism as long as the underlying dynamic intrinsic to the realist tradition is not understood. Whereas present debates tend to criticize contemporary realists for going astray (an unhappy conjuncture, as it were), this article claims that
there exists a systematic theoretical problem with the way realist theorizing has developed within international relations,
and consisting of two fundamental dilemmas. The first or ‘identity dilemma’, the choice between distinctiveness and determinacy, results from the characteristics of the central concept ‘power’ — realists either keep a distinct and single
micro–macro link through concepts of power/influence which provides indeterminate explanations or they improve their explanations, but must do so by relaxing their assumptions, thereby losing distinctiveness. The second or ‘conservative
dilemma’, the choice between tradition and justification,
results from the fact that realism is a form of practical
knowledge, which needs some form of justification other than the recourse to mere tradition. Hence, realists either update the practical knowledge of a shared diplomatic culture while losing scientific credibility or, reaching for logical persuasiveness, cast their maxims in a scientific mould which distorts the realist tradition. Realism in international relations
is fated to return to these dilemmas until it abandons its
own identity as derived from the ‘first debate’ between realism
and idealism. By doing so, however, it would be free to join a series of metatheoretical and theoretical research avenues which it has so far left to other schools of thought.
Entries on 'Power and International Politics', 'Constructivist view of power in International Relations', 'Relational power', 'Fungibility of power resources'
The origin of this conceptual analysis lies in a basic puzzle. How did power analysis increasingly turn from a defense to a critique of realism? I shall argue that the turn from realism to neorealism, with its consequent reliance on... more
The origin of this conceptual analysis lies in a basic puzzle. How did power analysis increasingly turn from a defense to a critique of realism? I shall argue that the turn from realism to neorealism, with its consequent reliance on
economic methodology, in fact diminished the substantial range of the original concept of power. This article will contend that taking power analysis seriously leads beyond neorealism.
Some recent studies by authors dissatisfied with neorealism have attempted to widen the power concept to include what has been called structural power. Their common claim is that the focus on strategic interaction or the bargaining
level of analysis does not capture important power phenomena. I shall argue that these notions of structural power involve three distinct meanings, of which
only one can be shown to be compatible with the interactionist choice-theoretical power concept that underlies the neorealist approach.
Finally, this essay claims  that none of  the structural power concepts is able to provide both a comprehensive and a coherent power analysis, either because it still omits particular power phenomena or because it overloads the concept of power. Instead of pursuing the track of continuously widening the concept, this article will propose a pair or dyad of concepts. The word "power" will be
reserved as an agent concept, and the term "governance" will represent effects not due to a particular agent, whether individual or collective. More generally, I shall use the term "power analysis" to encompass both concepts and to deal
with the link between power and international governance.
Several analysts have explained the end of the postwar political system in Italy as an effect of the end of the Cold War. Deprived of the anti-communist glue, Italians were, so the story goes, finally free to replace the corrupted regime.... more
Several analysts have explained the end of the postwar political system in Italy as an effect of the end of the Cold War. Deprived of the anti-communist glue, Italians were, so the story goes, finally free to replace the corrupted regime. The present article argues instead that the recent changes should be seen as the effect of transnational and societal dynamics on modern welfare states that have upset the consociational/clientelistic bargain on which Italy's domestic political economy rested. The success of the judiciary campaign mani pulite (‘clean hands’) has been triggered by the concomitant financial crisis of the state, its parties and principal Italian industries which undermined the major actors' ability to uphold their clientelistic systems.  Such a thesis presupposes a methodological shift away from simple ‘outside-in’ explanations. It focuses instead on the interaction between different transnational and/or societal self-sustaining networks whose borders need not necessarily coincide with state borders. In the present context of rampant globalization, the inner development and linkage between the party system, the welfare state, organized crime and the Italian version of capitalism are analysed as the main articulations of the overt/covert order upon which the Italian postwar social contract rested. As long as the basic problems of this con- tract remain unsolved, as for instance the insufficient distinction between the political and economic sphere or the systematic application of double standards, it seems premature to talk about a Second Italian Republic.
In order to avoid both theoretically eclectic and redundant approaches to constructivism, this article proposes one possible and coherent reconstruction of constructivism understood as a reflexive meta-theory. This reconstruction starts by... more
In order to avoid both theoretically eclectic and redundant approaches to constructivism, this article proposes one possible and coherent reconstruction of constructivism understood as a reflexive meta-theory. This reconstruction starts by taking seriously the double sociological and interpretivist turn of the social sciences. Based on ‘double
hermeneutics’, constructivism is perhaps best understood by distinguishing its position on the level of observation, the level of action proper, and the relationship between these two levels. On the basis of this distinction, the article argues
that constructivism is epistemologically about the social construction of knowledge and ontologically about
the construction of social reality. It furthermore asks us to
combine a social theory of knowledge with an intersubjective, not an individualist, theory of action. Finally, the analysis of power is central to understanding the reflexive link between the two levels of observation and action. The argument is embedded in a contextualization where constructivism
is seen as inspired by ‘reflexive modernity’, as well as more
directly by the end of the Cold War.
Como forma de evitar tanto abordagens teoricamente ecléticas, quanto abordagens teoricamente redundantes, este artigo propõe uma reconstrução possível e coerente do construtivismo, entendido como uma metateoria reflexiva. Esta... more
Como forma de evitar tanto abordagens teoricamente ecléticas, quanto abordagens teoricamente redundantes, este artigo propõe uma reconstrução possível e coerente do construtivismo, entendido como uma metateoria reflexiva. Esta reconstrução começa levando a sério a dupla virada sociológica e interpretivista nas ciências sociais. Baseado na “dupla hermenêutica”, o construtivismo pode ser mais bem compreendido distinguindose sua postura quanto ao nível da observação, quanto ao nível da ação
propriamente dita e quanto à relação entre esses dois níveis. Com base nessa distinção, o artigo argumenta que o construtivismo trata, do ponto de vista epistemológico, sobre a construção social do conhecimento e, do ponto de vista ontológico, sobre a construção da realidade social. Além disso, o construtivismo demanda a combinação de uma teoria social do conhecimento com uma teoria
intersubjetivista da ação, em detrimento de uma teoria individualista da ação. Finalmente, a análise do poder é central para compreender a ligação reflexiva que se estabelece entre os níveis da observação e da ação. Este argumento está inserido numa contextualização na qual o construtivismo é inspirado pela “modernidade reflexiva” e, mais diretamente, pelo fim da Guerra Fria.
... Law, Rights and Politics Developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS Rein Mullerson The Logic of Internationalism Coercion and accommodation Kjell Goldmann Russia and the Idea of Europe A study in identity and International Relations... more
... Law, Rights and Politics Developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS Rein Mullerson The Logic of Internationalism Coercion and accommodation Kjell Goldmann Russia and the Idea of Europe A study in identity and International Relations IverB. Neumann The Future of ...
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Alexander Wendt's Quantum Mind and Social Science hypothesizes that all intentional phenomena, including both psychological and social facts, are macroscopic quantum mechanical processes. Whether right or wrong, the suggestion... more
Alexander Wendt's Quantum Mind and Social Science hypothesizes that all intentional phenomena, including both psychological and social facts, are macroscopic quantum mechanical processes. Whether right or wrong, the suggestion highlights the fact that the social sciences, including IR, have until very recently never systematically discussed the potential relevance to our work of the quantum revolution a century ago. According to Wendt, that has left social scientists today – positivists and interpretivists alike – operating from an implicit and impoverished 19th century worldview that cannot accommodate important facts about human subjectivity. This symposium features critiques of Wendt's vision from multiple perspectives and a response, for one of the first airings of the classical-quantum debate in an IR context.
The article takes a stance in the Weber reception which tries to see him mainly as a forerunnerof an empirical social science and a causal conception of power as in the Dahlian tradition.It will argue and confirm Raymond Aron’s take that,... more
The article takes a stance in the Weber reception which tries to see him mainly as a forerunnerof an empirical social science and a causal conception of power as in the Dahlian tradition.It will argue and confirm Raymond Aron’s take that, to the contrary, his social scienceis profoundly imbued by philosophical aims: ‘This interpretation of the relation betweenscience and politics leads to a certain philosophy which at the time was not yet called“existential[ist]”, but which belongs to this current so named today.’ Hence, rather than onlyseeing his sociology as a way to demarcate the specificity of the social investigation fromboth normative theory and the natural sciences –which it certainly did – the following articlefollows those who see his methodological and sociological decisions as part of a political andethical endeavour.
This Working Paper provides a dual historisation of ‘securitisation’, i.e. of the origins of the Copenhagen School in terms of its direct world historical context and of the historical origins of the specific bias in our political... more
This Working Paper provides a dual historisation of ‘securitisation’, i.e. of the origins of the Copenhagen School in terms of its direct world historical context and of the historical origins of the specific bias in our political discourse which is prompted by security discourses. Born almost as a rationalisation of German Ostpolitik, and hence with desecuritisation, the Copenhagen School understood the speech act less as a kind of conspiratorial or elite manipulation than as the manifold processes that give prominence to the discourse of security (the reversal of Clausewitz) in public debate or diminish it, as in the processes of desecuritisation. This means that I see ‘securitisation’ not in the ‘act’ of those ‘speaking’ security, but in the possibly unintended and unconscious de-/mobilisation of the inherent logic, or grammar, of the discourse of security.This begs the question, however, of where the discourse of security would have gained its inherent logic from. It is here whe...
‘The Cold War is what we make of it’ : when peace research meets constructivism in International Relations
This article addresses the call made by the ISA Sapphire panel to focus on “the opportunities and the challenges of theory-building in interdisciplinary scholarship.” The article focuses on the multiple anxieties that exist in the... more
This article addresses the call made by the ISA Sapphire panel to focus on “the opportunities and the challenges of theory-building in interdisciplinary scholarship.” The article focuses on the multiple anxieties that exist in the discipline of IR, its departmental subalternity, its fragmentation of content, its methodological diversity, and its hybrid constitution of practical and observational knowledge. However, rather than arguing for any restriction, the article pleads for these anxieties to be embraced and for IR to be treated as a privileged space in which to integrate that knowledge. It invites scholars to link three distinct yet important domains of IR theorizing: the philosophical, the explanatory, and the practical. It invites the discipline to see the three domains as equally fundamental for its identity. Using Morgenthau's theory of power as a foil, the article shows the need to think about these three domains of theorizing concomitantly, despite the difficulties in...
This reply to the Symposium on Stefano Guzzini (ed.) The return of geopolitics in Europe?, answers the criticisms by John Agnew, Jeffrey Checkel, Dan Deudney and Jennifer Mitzen. It justifies (1) its specific definition and critique of... more
This reply to the Symposium on Stefano Guzzini (ed.) The return of geopolitics in Europe?, answers the criticisms by John Agnew, Jeffrey Checkel, Dan Deudney and Jennifer Mitzen. It justifies (1) its specific definition and critique of geopolitics as a theory – and not just a foreign policy strategy; (2) its proposed interpretivist process tracing; (3) the role of mechanisms in constructivist theorizing and foreign policy theory; and (4) its usage of non-Humean causality in the analysis of multiple parallel processes and their interaction. At the same time, it develops the logic of the book’s main mechanism of foreign policy identity crisis reduction.
This chapter shows that current IR (International Relations) theorizing finds liberal order a difficult topic. It confirms the concern voiced at the beginning of the volume that the IR academy in its use of liberalism as a label for... more
This chapter shows that current IR (International Relations) theorizing finds liberal order a difficult topic. It confirms the concern voiced at the beginning of the volume that the IR academy in its use of liberalism as a label for theorizing the international has at once endowed liberal internationalism with more idealism than it can rightfully claim whilst at the same time has shorn liberalism of its normative and value-based foundations. It suggests that, paradoxically, when going back to ‘liberal basics’, some versions of realism are in fact based upon a specific vision of politics, which gives rise to liberal order. Liberal orders are not, and cannot be based on an ahistorical ‘view from nowhere’, but have to face an ever-changing historical setting. As result the philosophy cannot provide a final foundation, but nor can liberals — or for that matter realists — do without it.
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One of the great appeals of securitization theory, and a major reason for its success, has been its usefulness as a tool for empirical research: an analytic framework capable of practical application. However, the development of... more
One of the great appeals of securitization theory, and a major reason for its success, has been its usefulness as a tool for empirical research: an analytic framework capable of practical application. However, the development of securitization has raised several criticisms, the most important of which concern the nature of securitization theory. In fact, the appropriate methods, the research puzzles and type of evidence accepted all derive to a great extent from the kind of theory scholars bequeath their faith to. This Forum addresses the following questions: What type of theory (if any) is securitization? How many kinds of theories of securitization do we have? How can the differences between theories of securitization be drawn? What is the status of exceptionalism within securitization theories, and what difference does it make to their understandings of the relationship between security and politics? Finally, if securitization commands that leaders act now before it is too late, ...
The article seeks to offer a way forward in discussions about the status of securitization theory. In my reading, this debate has been inhibited by the difficulty of finding an appropriate version of ‘understanding/explanation’ that would... more
The article seeks to offer a way forward in discussions about the status of securitization theory. In my reading, this debate has been inhibited by the difficulty of finding an appropriate version of ‘understanding/explanation’ that would be consistent with the meta-theoretical commitments of a post-structuralist theory. By leaving ‘explanation’ and/or all versions of causality to the positivist other, the Copenhagen School also left its own explanatory status often implicit, or only negatively defined. Instead, the present article claims that the explanatory theory used in securitization research de facto relies on causal mechanisms that are non-positivistically conceived. Using the appropriate methodological literature renders this explanatory status explicit, exposing the theory’s non-positivist causality and thus, hopefully, enhancing its empirical theory.
The Bush administration's foreign policy hitherto suffers from a neglect of diplomacy. It has emphasised a strategy that combines unilateral and re-militarising elements. Security is conceived of in terms of a gated community writ... more
The Bush administration's foreign policy hitherto suffers from a neglect of diplomacy. It has emphasised a strategy that combines unilateral and re-militarising elements. Security is conceived of in terms of a gated community writ large. Diplomacy is downgraded to alliance-building (conveniently misnamed multilateralism) for a policy already decided. Other countries are sheer objects, not subjects, within US foreign policy. The conception of order in international society is stripped of substantial components of justice or legitimacy, to which the US would accept being subjected itself. In short, there is a tendency to repeat the US cold war strategy which reversed Clausewitz, that is, where politics becomes the prolongation of war with other means. The article consciously bases its critique mainly on realist writers, simply to show that the present US foreign policy is debatable even in realist terms.
The present article argues that the discipline of international relations is bound to repeat its rounds of debates about realism as long as the underlying dynamic intrinsic to the realist tradition is not understood. Whereas present... more
The present article argues that the discipline of international relations is bound to repeat its rounds of debates about realism as long as the underlying dynamic intrinsic to the realist tradition is not understood. Whereas present debates tend to criticize contemporary realists for going astray (an unhappy conjuncture, as it were), this article claims that there exists a systematic theoretical problem with the way realist theorizing has developed within international relations, and consisting of two fundamental dilemmas. The first or ‘identity dilemma’, the choice between distinctiveness and determinacy, results from the characteristics of the central concept ‘power’ — realists either keep a distinct and single micro–macro link through concepts of power/influence which provides indeterminate explanations or they improve their explanations, but must do so by relaxing their assumptions, thereby losing distinctiveness. The second or ‘conservative dilemma’, the choice between traditio...
International Relations theory is being squeezed between two sides. On the one hand, the world of practitioners and attached experts often perceive International Relations theory as misleading if it does not correspond to practical... more
International Relations theory is being squeezed between two sides. On the one hand, the world of practitioners and attached experts often perceive International Relations theory as misleading if it does not correspond to practical knowledge, and redundant when it does. The academic study of international relations can and should not be anything beyond the capacity to provide political judgement which comes through reflection on the historical experience of practitioners. On the other hand, and within its disciplinary confines, International Relations theory is reduced to a particular type of empirical theory with increasing resistance to further self-reflection. Instead, this article argues that neither reduction is viable. Reducing theory to practical knowledge runs into self-contradictions; reducing theorizing to its empirical mode underestimates the constitutive function of theories, the role of concepts, and hence the variety of necessary modes of theorizing. I present this two...
In order to avoid both theoretically eclectic and redundant approaches to constructivism, this article proposes one possible and coherent reconstruction of constructivism understood as a reflexive meta-theory. This reconstruction starts... more
In order to avoid both theoretically eclectic and redundant approaches to constructivism, this article proposes one possible and coherent reconstruction of constructivism understood as a reflexive meta-theory. This reconstruction starts by taking seriously the double sociological and interpretivist turn of the social sciences. Based on `double hermeneutics', constructivism is perhaps best understood by distinguishing its position on the level of observation, the level of action proper, and the relationship between these two levels. On the basis of this distinction, the article argues that constructivism is epistemologically about the social construction of knowledge and ontologically about the construction of social reality. It furthermore asks us to combine a social theory of knowledge with an intersubjective, not an individualist, theory of action. Finally, the analysis of power is central to understanding the reflexive link between the two levels of observation and action. Th...
Ned Lebow’s work is not primarily driven by the philosophy of science. And although he is obviously interested in as clean a control of empirical findings as possible, methods primarily follow the needs of his empirical and theoretical... more
Ned Lebow’s work is not primarily driven by the philosophy of science. And although he is obviously interested in as clean a control of empirical findings as possible, methods primarily follow the needs of his empirical and theoretical problematiques and not the other way round. When he looks for coherence between his theory and meta-theory, he is driven by politics, ethics and political philosophy.
With just two major parties, a social-democratic Democratici di Sinistra (Democrats of the Left - DS) and a smaller (Euro) communist Partito di Rifondazione Comunista (Party of the Communist Refoundation - PRC), the political landscape of... more
With just two major parties, a social-democratic Democratici di Sinistra (Democrats of the Left - DS) and a smaller (Euro) communist Partito di Rifondazione Comunista (Party of the Communist Refoundation - PRC), the political landscape of the Italian left looks more familiar to the outsider today than ever before. True, there had been two parties before. Yet, unique in western Europe, the Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party- PCI) often appealed to twice as many voters as the Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party - PSI). Moreover, neither was initially a member of the Socialist International. Here Italy was represented by asplinter group of the PSI, the Partito Social-Democratico Italiano (Italian Social Democratic Party - PSDI) which lacked some of the major attributes of social-democratic parties in Western Europe (e.g. privileged link to trade unions, mass organizations).
... also found in the analysis of Arnold Wolfers (1984, 106) who declared that “differences in purpose for which power is sought … account for some of the ... The approaches are different but also share two basic ideas: that the... more
... also found in the analysis of Arnold Wolfers (1984, 106) who declared that “differences in purpose for which power is sought … account for some of the ... The approaches are different but also share two basic ideas: that the interaction of ... Realism and Foreign Policy Analysis 17 ...
(The article is a revised version of EUI Working Paper SPS 1994/12.) http://hdl.handle.net/1814/254
Como forma de evitar tanto abordagens teoricamente ecleticas, quanto abordagens teoricamente redundantes, este artigo propoe uma reconstrucao possivel e coerente do construtivismo, entendido como uma metateoria reflexiva. Esta... more
Como forma de evitar tanto abordagens teoricamente ecleticas, quanto abordagens teoricamente redundantes, este artigo propoe uma reconstrucao possivel e coerente do construtivismo, entendido como uma metateoria reflexiva. Esta reconstrucao comeca levando a serio a dupla virada sociologica e interpretivista nas ciencias sociais. Baseado na “dupla hermeneutica”, o construtivismo pode ser mais bem compreendido distinguindo-se sua postura quanto ao nivel da observacao, quanto ao nivel da acao propriamente dita e quanto a relacao entre esses dois niveis. Com base nessa distincao, o artigo argumenta que o construtivismo trata, do ponto de vista epistemologico, sobre a construcao social do conhecimento e, do ponto de vista ontologico, sobre a construcao da realidade social. Alem disso, o construtivismo demanda a combinacao de uma teoria social do conhecimento com uma teoria intersubjetivista da acao, em detrimento de uma teoria individualista da acao. Finalmente, a analise do poder e central para compreender a ligacao reflexiva que se estabelece entre os niveis da observacao e da acao. Este argumento esta inserido numa contextualizacao na qual o construtivismo e inspirado pela “modernidade reflexiva” e, mais diretamente, pelo fim da Guerra Fria
(Based on parts of Chapter 5 of the author's EUI PhD Thesis, 1994.) http://hdl.handle.net/1814/5139
It has indeed become a much harder world to understand. The sudden collapse of the Soviet system in 1989 sent out shock-waves that changed the world both radically and rapidly. Any student of International Relations who started a course... more
It has indeed become a much harder world to understand. The sudden collapse of the Soviet system in 1989 sent out shock-waves that changed the world both radically and rapidly. Any student of International Relations who started a course in that year — for instance anyone who came to do graduate work with Susan Strange at the Badia Fiesolana — was confronted, even before the first year was over, by an apparently totally transformed global system. As we shall see, the transformation was in fact only partial, but meanwhile the new situation was hard to make sense of. Was this the best of worlds, as the Cold War gave way to a blurring of East and West in new patterns of cooperation? Or was it the worst of worlds, as the break-up of old structures unleashed chaos and bloodshed in the Balkans and further East, and as NATO forces found themselves involved in an ‘out of area’ conflict more lethal and destructive than forty years’ worth of ‘in-area’ crises put together? One of the underlying realities, which has increasingly struck us during the planning and editing of this book, is that the problems of the post-Cold War world may be divided, at least roughly, between those issues where the transformation of the old East-West conflict has removed an encrusted ‘overlay’ which made progress difficult or impossible, and those — mainly in regions remote from the former East-West ‘central balance’ — where the existing problems, of poverty, under-development, and ethnic or other conflicts, continue essentially in their previous form (Buzan et al., 1990, pp. 15–16).
A social theory for international relations : an appraisal of Alexander Wendt’s theoretical and disciplinary synthesis
In the context of the present sociological turn in International Relations, this paper aims at relating theoretical discussions in International Relations to Niklas Luhmann’s social theory. It proposes a dialogue through the analysis of... more
In the context of the present sociological turn in International Relations, this paper aims at relating theoretical discussions in International Relations to Niklas Luhmann’s social theory. It proposes a dialogue through the analysis of power in Luhmann’s theory, a concept which is often considered central in IR theorising. Given the frequently tautological use of power in social theory (and in particular in IR), many social theorists have tried to circumscribe the role of power in their theories. But Niklas Luhmann is one of the few non-individualist theoreticians who ends up having a very reduced role for power in his social theory. This marginalisation of power in Luhmann’s theory, so the argument of the paper, is the result of two theoretical decisions made together in his move to autopoiesis. First, Luhmann links power to one and only one social system, politics. Second, the political systems is considered equal to others, and hence the theory allows for a very different conceptualisation of hierarchy or stratification, one in which power as such plays little role. Such a marginalisation is, however, not innocent. Whereas there are ample examples in IR of how one can fruitfully use his communicative concept, his autopoietic theory displays a perhaps unnecessarily technocratic and conservative bias. For the concept of power functions as an indicator of ‘the art of the possible’ and of responsibility. By defining power and politics as narrowly as he does, by its radical anti-‘humanism’, Luhmann’s theory defines issues out of the reach of agency and politics and, by the same token, de-legitimates many attempts to question the status quo. A sketchy comparison with other post-structuralist social theories (Foucault and Bourdieu) sketches alternatives to such an approach.
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