"Security theatre" update

By The Economist | WASHINGTON DC

LONGTIME "security theatre" critic James Fallows has lost his patience. In a recent post, Mr Fallows, who writes for the Atlantic, calls America's Transportation Security Administration "an experiment that desperately needs to be rethought." What pushed Mr Fallows over the edge? He says, "the last straw comes from Patrick Smith, of the always-excellent 'Ask the Pilot' site on Salon, who asks pointedly whether the intrusive and expensive TSA checklines are doing any good at all."

Mr Smith's column is a blockbuster. He argues that "The TSA wastes a lot of time and money on an inefficient fight against the wrong enemy":

The novelty of the Sept. 11 attacks notwithstanding, the primary threat to commercial planes is, was and shall remain the smuggling aboard of explosives, which is what happened on Pan Am 103. The bomb came onboard in a suitcase. The hijack paradigm changed forever on 9/11, rendering the inflight takeover concept unworkable for a terrorist.

In any case, and in spite of the Transportation Security Administration's best efforts, there are limitless ways to sneak knives and other dangerous materials past guards; not to mention, a deadly weapon can be fashioned from just about anything, including plenty of materials found on airplanes. (I'll point out that even maximum-security prisons are unable to eliminate knives and contraband.) Yet whether by virtue of incompetence or willful ignorance, TSA continues to waste untold time and untold millions of dollars on a tedious, zero-tolerance fixation with blades and sharps. This does nothing to make us safer, and in fact draws security resources away from worthy pursuits.

Yes, TSA scans most bags for explosives. Mandates were put in place after 9/11 that have greatly increased the percentage of bags that are run through high-tech detectors, with a goal of screening all of them. But eight years later, screening is still not fully comprehensive. It does not yet include 100 percent of luggage and cargo, and procedures remain inadequate at many overseas airports from which thousands of U.S.-registered jetliners depart each week.

Neither is there widespread screening for explosive materials that somebody can carry on his or her person. Good luck getting a hobby knife through a concourse checkpoint, while a pocket full of Semtex is unlikely to be noticed.

I have long been a proponent of the idea that the true grunt work of keeping criminals away from airplanes takes place well offstage. It is the duty of law enforcement and intelligence agencies, not the duty of front-line guards at an airport. And I concede that a devoted adversary will almost always find a means of skirting whatever preventive measures are in place.

There is a level of inherent risk that we simply must learn to accept. But, if we are going to have an airport security apparatus, and if we are going to devote millions of tax dollars to the cause of thwarting attacks, can we please do it smartly and at least improve our odds?

Am I the only one who finds it maddening, and even a little scary, that we can't get this right? Is it not a national disgrace that TSA should spend its time confiscating butter knives from uniformed pilots rather than focusing on deadly threats with a long historical precedent?

You should read the whole piece. But no, Mr Smith: you're not the only one who finds it "maddening, and even a little scary, that we can't get this right."