

The Falklands War: The Bluff Cove Disaster

Robert S. Bolia

GIVEN THE Falkland Islands' location, one would expect an invasion or defense would require joint operations, an expectation that was certainly borne out when Argentina invaded the Islands in 1982 and the United Kingdom dispatched a joint task force to reclaim them a week later. The Falklands War involved a number of joint operations by the British task force, many of them highly successful, including amphibious landings, naval gunfire support of infantry operations, and the insertion of Special Forces by helicopter and ship. One of the less successful joint operations was the amphibious landing of the Welsh Guards on 8 June 1982 at Fitzroy, in which failures in jointness were in part responsible for the ensuing disaster.

Relations between the Royal Navy and the British Army (represented by the newly formed 5 Brigade) were strained—at best. Many believed the Army had inserted itself into the war only to accrue its share of glory, despite being unprepared for amphibious operations in the South Atlantic's winter weather.

Commodore Michael Clapp, who had overseen the nearly flawless landings of 3 Commando Brigade, was especially critical: "What I did not appreciate . . . was the lack of understanding of joint operations by the Army Brigade . . . nor the near nonexistent communications that were to dog that brigade. The blame for much of this inefficiency should not be laid at the door of [Brigadier] Tony Wilson [commander of 5 Brigade] and his staff. Delaying the dispatch of these reinforcements on the assumption that any plan to recapture the Falkland

Islands was bound to fail suggests that the Army staff did not want to be part of that presumed disaster in the first place. Also, when the Brigade was dispatched it was without two of its three original major maneuver units, and it had no logistic back-up and little significant training—certainly none in joint Navy/Army or amphibious operations. That they were to fight and not garrison in one of the most complicated of military roles in a sub-Antarctic winter must have been a disagreeable surprise to the Army staff."¹

Perhaps 5 Brigade's soldiers' behavior on board the transports in San Carlos Water colored Clapp's view. They became notorious for lack of order and discipline and their penchant for stealing other sailors' personal belongings.² One Army officer said, "The Navy [is] well used to having the Royal Marines and other Green Beret-wearing members of Commando Forces on board. They therefore assumed the Welsh Guards would be the same—if not something similar. However, it had rapidly become clear even to the saltiest of sailors that the Welsh Guards were nothing like as well prepared as they needed to be. After confusions and difficulties, [the commander of] *Intrepid* had put the soldiers ashore, only to be recalled back to pick them up again. This entailed quite a bit of work, with the LCMs [landing craft, mechanized] ferrying the troops back on board, and much disruption of a ship that was difficult to operate under normal circumstances. The sailors were shocked at the condition of the Welsh Guards when they returned after just a night or so ashore—wet, filthy, miserable—and obviously ineffective. Their yardstick was the Royal Marines, who come back on board after arduous exercises in good

See also Bolia's review of John Wilsey's H Jones VC: The Life and Death of an Unusual Hero, page 82.—Editor

order, even if they do leave muddy boot prints throughout the nice, clean ship.”³

The lack of discipline and amphibious training in the Army and a dearth of communications led to friendly-fire casualties. The first such incident occurred on the night of 5 June, when HMS *Cardiff* mistakenly shot down one of 5 Brigade’s Gazelle helicopters. Four factors contributed to this unfortunate accident:

- Unaccustomed to operating with the Royal Navy, 5 Brigade did not have a naval liaison officer attached.

- The brigade failed to signal the flight to Major General Jeremy Moore’s headquarters so the Royal Navy could be informed.

- Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward failed to inform either Moore or Clapp that *Cardiff* had set up an “ambush” for Argentine C-130 transport aircraft making nightly runs to and from the mainland.

- Gazelle’s identification, friend or foe, was turned off because the device negatively interacted with other onboard electronics. *Cardiff* picked up the Gazelle on radar and, based on its speed and direction, assumed it was one of the C-130s. Not expecting friendly aircraft in his area, *Cardiff*’s captain ordered the Sea Dart missile crew to shoot down the aircraft.⁴

Poor coordination and cooperation between the British Army and the Royal Navy also led to enemy-inflicted casualties that might otherwise have been avoided. Nowhere is this more evident than in the events leading up to the Argentine bombing of LSLs [landing ships, logistic] *Sir Galahad* and *Sir Tristram*.

The problems began before 5 Brigade arrived in the Falklands. While en route, 3 Commando Brigade landed at San Carlos to consolidate positions. A week later, 3 Parachute Battalion and 45 Commando Brigade marched toward Stanley, while 2 Battalion, the Parachute Regiment [2 Para], marched south to assault Argentine positions at Goose Green.⁵ By 31 May, the day before 5 Brigade disembarked at San Carlos, three 3 Commando Brigade battalions were at Mount Kent within 15 miles of the capital. Of the remaining two battalions, 2 Para was still at Goose Green, cleaning up after having defeated and captured the Argentine force; 40 Commando was dug in at San Carlos, ready to defend the beachhead if necessary.

This left Moore with a decision to make. Should he move the remaining 3 Commando Brigade units forward, leaving 5 Brigade to guard the beachhead

and act as a reserve, or should he open up an axis of advance along the south coast of East Falkland, sending 5 Brigade to take up positions on the right flank, before making the final push to Stanley?

Sound military reasons existed for the former approach. A well-practiced unit, 3 Commando Brigade had trained together for years.⁶ Its soldiers and marines were better acclimated to the weather conditions in the Falklands as a result of their longer tenure in theater and from years of training in Norway. They were also positioned forward and ready to fight; indeed, 2 Para had already proven itself in combat at Goose Green.

While legitimate military reasons existed for opening a southern axis of advance, Moore’s decision seems to have been largely political. On the passage south, Wilson, 5 Brigade’s commander, pressed Moore to consider the southern option. According to one Royal Marine staff officer, Wilson was “obsessed with the fear that Julian Thompson [3 Commando Brigade commander] would win the war before his men could do anything.”⁷ While any brigade commander would have a natural desire to demonstrate his brigade’s effectiveness in combat, Wilson’s desire in this case weighed more heavily on Moore than it perhaps should have. As a Royal Marine general, he felt acutely that he should not show undue favoritism toward the Marines. By giving Wilson his southern axis, Moore perhaps hoped he was giving the Army an equal chance for glory.⁸

When Moore sanctioned the southern thrust, he expected 5 Brigade to disembark at San Carlos, march south to Goose Green, then “yomp” east across the south coast, moving into position on the right flank of 3 Commando Brigade in the hills outside Stanley. Instead, 2 Para (under 5 Brigade’s operational control) “hijacked” a Chinook helicopter and leaped forward to Fitzroy Settlement and Bluff Cove without first notifying Moore, but with Wilson’s approval. Wilson then presented the action to Moore as a *fait accompli*.⁹

Although daring and successful, 2 Para’s dash was not sound from a military viewpoint. The battalion, which had moved about 55 kilometers ahead of the next nearest 5 Brigade unit, had no artillery or air support and no means of immediate reinforcement. The battalion was isolated, and any Argentine attempt to take advantage of this isolation could have been disastrous. Indeed, their landing at Fitzroy was almost the cause of a blue-on-blue incident when they were spotted by a Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre observation post. According to



(Left) Deck crew aboard the HMS *Hermes* load Sidewinder missiles onto a Harrier jump jet. (Above) Argentine Skyhawk light attack bombers of the type that doomed *Sir Galahad*.

Lance-Corporal Steve Nicoll of 7 Counter-Insurgency Squadron, “Calculating co-ordinates for a fire mission on the troops, who were bunched and in the open, I opened up communications in the clear, seeking confirmation of friendly forces movement to prevent any loss of reporting time. Cadre HQ [Headquarters] at Teal Inlet, collocated with the 3 Commando Brigade HQ, confirmed there should be no friendly troops to our front. After several questions and answers to confirm details, the fire mission was accepted. . . . We were waiting for the executive order of ‘Three rounds fire for effect.’ Precisely at this point the cloud cover opened a ‘window’ and we saw the easily recognized figure of a Scout helicopter with British markings. It all unfolded in a few very brief seconds—the radio handset was already poised and the command ‘Check, check, check,’ confirmed sighting of a Scout helicopter. It still wasn’t clear if all the activity could be attributed to the British but it was apparent that we had been very close to bringing down fire on our own side.”¹⁰

The leap forward by 2 Para exasperated Moore. On the one hand he could not recall 2 Para without appearing to favor the Royal Marines, while on the other hand, appearing to be slow to advance. At the same time, he could not easily reinforce the parachute battalion; there were not enough helicopters to move the rest of the brigade and its equipment by air, and Army units were ill suited to marching in the Falklands. The only choice was to move them by sea.¹¹

Transport by sea was probably the fastest way to move a brigade from San Carlos to Fitzroy, but because of the proximity to Stanley and the lack of adequate air defense, far from the safest. The easiest way to accomplish such a movement would

have been to use one of the two LPDs [landing platform, dock], either *Fearless* or *Intrepid*, but Fleet Headquarters at Northwood, United Kingdom, had forbidden using these high-value assets for this purpose. *Intrepid* sailed halfway between the two points, where the Scots Guards transferred to LCUs [landing craft, utility] to carry them the rest of the way, allowing *Intrepid* to be back under a protective air defense umbrella at San Carlos before daylight.

Transferring the Scots Guards went off reasonably well, but communication problems existed between 5 Brigade and the Royal Navy and between the Carrier Battle Group and the Commander, Amphibious Warfare. These failures nearly led to more blue-on-blue incidents. One occurred when *Cardiff* and *Yarmouth* nearly fired on the LCUs because their commanders had not been informed of the presence of friendly forces. In the other incident, 2 Para had not been informed of the Scots Guards arrival, and when the Guards appeared, 29 Battery, thinking the Guards were Argentineans attempting an amphibious operation, trained their guns on the Guards.¹²

The Navy planned to use the same tactic to move the Welsh Guards to Bluff Cove, using *Fearless* instead of *Intrepid*. This time, two of *Fearless*’s LCUs, preloaded with the Guards’ heavy equipment, were ready to sail when they reached Elephant Island, where they rendezvoused with two of *Intrepid*’s LCUs, which had remained at Bluff Cove after having deposited the Guards there the previous night. The two remaining Welsh Guard rifle companies were to embark in these LCUs and follow the others to Bluff Cove. However, when *Fearless* arrived at the rendezvous point, no LCUs were to be found.¹³

Communications between *Fearless* and 5 Brigade were so poor it was impossible to find out what had happened to the LCUs, but a decision had to be made as to what to do with the troops and equipment. After some discussion, the command decided to sail the two LCUs immediately and return the following night to land the remaining two rifle companies.¹⁴ The landing of the heavy equipment came off without incident, but a new signal from Northwood prohibited the use of the LPDs without hauling a large escort.¹⁵ A new plan was needed.

Navy commanders soon decided the Welsh Guards would go aboard *Sir Galahad*, which had been scheduled to take a Rapier surface-to-air missile battery and a field hospital to Fitzroy. This should not have been a problem. There was plenty of room for the Welsh Guards and had *Sir Galahad* left San Carlos by dusk it should have been able to deposit the Rapiers and the field hospital at Fitzroy and the Welsh Guards at Bluff Cove and still be back at San Carlos before dawn. Unfortunately, because of a number of communications problems, the field hospital took 6 hours to load, and the LSL was not ready to sail until 5 hours after dusk. The captain requested permission to defer until the following night, but his superiors ordered him to go anyway. The only concession they made was to allow him to go to Fitzroy rather than Bluff Cove. The commander did not tell him what to do with the Welsh Guards, and the captain did not tell the Welsh Guards the ship was not going to Bluff Cove.¹⁶

The change in destination did not become apparent until *Sir Galahad* arrived off Fitzroy at 0650 the following morning: "Nobody is going to Bluff Cove," said Royal Marine Major Ewen Southby-Tailyour, "unless they walk."¹⁷ The Welsh Guards were to disembark at Fitzroy and march the 5 miles overland to Bluff Cove. The majors commanding the two Guards companies refused. Southby-Tailyour, senior in rank to both officers, gave them a direct order to disembark. They still refused.

Another potential solution was to load as many of the Guards as possible into the one available landing craft and sail them to Bluff Cove as quickly as possible. This option was accepted, but its execution was delayed because the LCU's loading ramp



A British Sea King helicopter ferries supplies as the *Sir Tristram* and *Fearless* ride at anchor within the Port San Carlos defensive screen.

Royal Navy

was damaged. By the time the Guards disembarked, *Sir Galahad* and another LSL, *Sir Tristram*, had been anchored at Port Pleasant, off Fitzroy, for 5 hours.

Needless to say, the Argentines in the hills around Stanley had noticed the Guards.¹⁸ This would not have been much of a problem the previous day; the Falklands had been beset by bad weather for days, leaving the Argentine Air Force unable to fly. However, on the 8th the weather began to clear, and although isolated cloudbursts were predicted, it was reasonable weather in which to attempt a raid.¹⁹ Thus, when a forward observation post reported British ships at Port Pleasant, it was not long before the Air Force issued orders to attack.²⁰

Eight Argentine A-4B Skyhawks, four from each Dogos (Bulldogs) and Mastines (Mastiffs) squadron, flew from Río Gallegos loaded with three 250-kilogram (kg) bombs each. Six Dagggers, three Perros (Dogs), and three Gatos (Cats) left from the airbase at Río Grande similarly laden and led by a Learjet which provided navigation information. The 14 attack aircraft—a number that shrank to 10 when three Skyhawks and one Dagger were unable to continue because of mechanical or refueling problems—were preceded by four Mirages from Río Gallegos to draw off the Harrier's combat air patrol (CAP) to allow the Skyhawks and Dagggers to attack the ships anchored in Bahía Agradable unmolested.²¹

To keep pace with the slower Learjet, the five Dagggers kept changing their heading as they zig-zagged through the sky between Río Grande and the Malvinas. As they approached the islands, they descended to just above the ocean to prevent British



A British Harrier flies low over the *Sir Galahad* before it was fatally attacked by Argentine Skyhawks.

Royal Navy

radar detection, and the Learjet returned to base. The Perros and Gatos then had to find and attack their targets.

As it happened, the Daggery never arrived at Port Pleasant. As they approached the bay they spotted *Plymouth*, which had sailed from San Carlos to bombard Argentine positions in the hills outside Stanley, and decided to attack it instead of the LSLs. Four bombs struck the ship, but the altitude from which they were dropped was too low, and they failed to fuze and explode. Still, it was a successful attack. The ship was significantly damaged, four crewmembers were injured, and all the Daggery returned safely.²²

The British claim *Plymouth* survived the war, but at least one Argentine source, written well after the war, reports it as having been sunk.²³ Another Argentine account suggests the Daggery sank *Yarmouth*, and the same day an accidental Harrier attack sank *Plymouth* in Falkland Sound.²⁴

Although the Daggery never reached Port Pleasant, the Skyhawks did. Three of the Skyhawks, including those of the two flight leaders, could not refuel and had to return to Río Gallegos. Five remaining planes formed a single squadron and flew in low over East Falkland, taking small arms fire from the Scots Guards as they passed Fitzroy and Bluff Cove. They then turned back and attacked the LSLs moving out to sea. The lead Skyhawk hit *Sir Galahad* with two bombs, both of which exploded. The second plane's bombs went long, but the third found its mark, dropping another 250-kg bomb into the ship. Seeing the explosions, the other two

Skyhawks dropped their bombs on the nearby *Sir Tristram*. All five Skyhawks made it safely back to the mainland.²⁵

Where were British air defenses? For all intents and purposes, there were none. LPDs *Fearless* and *Intrepid*, forbidden by Northwood from participating in the operation, mounted four Seacat surface-to-air missile systems and two 40-millimeter (mm) Bofors guns, but the LSLs had only the Bofors.²⁶ The Mirages had drawn off the Harrier CAP, so the CAP had no chance of intercepting or pursuing the Skyhawks.²⁷ As if this were not bad enough, the Rapier battery was not working properly.

Rapier was a surface-to-air missile system designed for point defense against low-flying aircraft and should have been effective against the Skyhawks. Unfortunately, the launchers the detachment had brought to Fitzroy and quickly set up were faulty and would not fire. Before they embarked on the LSL, the soldiers knew two of the four launchers had problems, but Rapiers were available in limited numbers, and the defense of the San Carlos anchorage was deemed more important than Fitzroy's defense. One "cloudpuncher" said, "I pressed the fire button but nothing happened. I had to sit there and watch *Sir Galahad* explode like watching a movie, only it was real. It was the most sickening moment of my young life."²⁸

HMS *Exeter* broadcast air raid warning "red" a few minutes before the attack, but neither LSL heard the warning.²⁹ The only warning the sailors and Welsh Guards received was when they saw the planes coming in. Nothing could be done to prevent

the subsequent carnage. The explosions that rocked *Sir Galahad* ignited stores of fuel and ammunition, creating an inferno that left 48 dead and more than a hundred wounded, many severely burned. Casualties on *Sir Tristram* were fewer because the ship was mostly empty, but both vessels were immediately abandoned. The heroic assistance of four Sea Kings and one Wessex helicopter prevented further loss of life. It was by far the costliest day of the war for the British, and it was not over.³⁰

The Argentines sent out two more flights of four Skyhawks. The first flight caused no British casualties, and all four Skyhawks were damaged by small arms fire and just made it back to the mainland. The second flight was more successful, but it lost three of the Skyhawks. During the skirmish, two planes attacked a lone LCU ferrying 5 Brigade's communications equipment through Choiseul Sound, sinking it, killing six of the men aboard, and destroying brigade radios. Despite this success, two Harriers shot down three of the four Skyhawks with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.³¹

In spite of the tragic loss of life, the disaster at Fitzroy was more a wake-up call than a setback for British forces. *Sir Galahad* and the LCU were lost along with ammunition and some communications equipment. The debacle delayed the attack on Stanley by 2 days, primarily so two 40 Commando companies could augment the Welsh Guards.³² But the battle did not affect the war's outcome, and tragically, it might easily have been prevented.

The weather, of course, was an issue. If the skies had not cleared, the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) would never have launched the attack in the first place. That Clapp did not receive the weather reports from Fitzroy was certainly an issue.

The Royal Navy's lack of an airborne early warning (AEW) capability was also important. Indeed, the presence of AEW aircraft in theater might have been sufficient to deter the FAA from making the attack in the first place and would certainly have changed the outcome for *Sir Galahad*, *Sheffield*, *Coventry*, and *Atlantic Conveyor*.

Poor communications were a major problem. A lack of communication of flight plans led to the accidental shutdown of the *Gazelle*, and poor real-time communications led to *Sir Galahad*'s failure to receive the air raid warning, leaving those aboard *Fearless* without knowledge of the LCUs' locations. Another factor was that 5 Brigade moved its combat troops forward in advance of any logistic units. This not only contributed to the disaster, it

led to a lack of situational awareness at brigade and division headquarters aboard *Fearless* after the bombing.

Service parochialism also contributed to events. If Moore had ordered 2 Para back to Goose Green in the first place, 5 Brigade would have been walking across East Falkland, just as the Royal Marines had, and the attack would never have happened. Also, had the Welsh Guard's officers listened to the Navy's advice, they would have disembarked at Fitzroy immediately instead of waiting to be taken to Bluff Cove, a wait which cost many lives.

The lack of a joint force commander in theater was another contributor to the disaster. Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse commanded the task force from a joint headquarters at Northwood. The chain of command arrangement led to miscommunications, misunderstandings, and frustrations. Clapp was a one-star officer while Moore and Woodward were two-star officers, a situation that left Woodward believing he was in the chain of command between Fieldhouse at the top and Clapp at the bottom. Woodward's perspective seems to have significantly colored Fieldhouse's views at Northwood.³³

Decisions such as not using the LPDs without large escorts might not have been made had a local commander been able to discuss such issues with the task group commander. With hindsight, it is clear that had *Fearless* been allowed to go all the way to Fitzroy, the Welsh Guards could have been offloaded there, or at Bluff Cove, on the night of 6-7 June—before the weather cleared and before daylight.

No blame was ever officially attached to any commander, although Woodward and Clapp revisited the issue years later in a literary duel. Woodward criticized Clapp for using the LSLs against his advice.³⁴ Clapp blamed Woodward for the lack of a Harrier CAP on station. One of the British carriers, HMS *Hermes*, was off having her boilers cleaned at the time of the attack. According to Clapp, this left critical gaps in Harrier coverage.³⁵

Laying the blame on 5 Brigade is more typical because it is remembered more for being bombed than for its infantry combat. To some extent, 5 Brigade should be held responsible, but to a larger extent, the problem was that 5 Brigade was in a situation for which it had not prepared. Max Hastings points out, "The muddles and problems that beset 5 Brigade occurred in many other places and at many other times during the campaign; the disappearance of the Harrier CAP . . . minutes before

the air attack; the lack of naval escort; the failure of an air-raid warning to reach the men on *Galahad*; the delay in setting up Rapiere; the collapse of schedules; the breakdown of liaison. . . . The most difficult failure to excuse is that of communication—the ignorance of so many senior officers about what troops were [doing] where and when.”³⁶

After the war, a senior officer said events proved “the things we did on the basis of well-tryed and proven formations worked, and the ad hoc arrangements turned out much less happily. Joint-service liaison and staff work left much to be desired. From beginning to end, 5 Brigade [was the victim] of ‘ad hocery’ [sic].”³⁷

The real problem was not 5 Brigade per se, but the fact it probably should not have been there in the first place. Inadequate joint force command structure, poor communications, service parochialism, and a lack of joint exercises—hence joint planning—leading up to the Falklands conflict caused the unsuccessful offloading of the Welsh Guard at Fitzroy. These problems, exacerbated by the lack of AEW, led directly to the loss of 56 British lives on *Sir Tristram*, *Sir Galahad*, and

an LCU on 8 June 1982.

A modified SH-3 Sea King helicopter served in an AEW capacity. Since British carriers only operated with helicopters or vertical takeoff and landing aircraft, the E-2C Hawkeye was not an option. Seven Royal Air Force E-3D Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) platforms later augmented the British AEW capability.³⁸

Joint integration was more difficult. The British responded by implementing the “fully unified Defense Policy and Operational Staff.”³⁹ This action was amplified by the overturning of the 1981 *Defence Review*.⁴⁰ The review had suggested the Royal Navy no longer required carriers because the RAF could provide fleet defense anywhere in the world. The review also suggested that amphibious vehicles like *Fearless* and *Intrepid* were unnecessary because UK forces would never again have to make an opposed amphibious landing.⁴¹ Clearly, the conflict in the Falklands proved both assumptions erroneous. The move toward jointness as detailed in the new defense policy has paid many dividends, including improved jointness in Operation Desert Storm and subsequent joint and coalition operations.⁴² **MR**

NOTES

1. Michael Clapp and Ewen Southby-Tailyour, *Amphibious Assault Falklands: The Battle of San Carlos Water* (London: Orion, 1996), 286.
2. Hugh McManners, *Falklands Commando* (London: HarperCollins, 2002), 222-23.
3. *Ibid.*, 222.
4. Martin Middlebrook, *The Falklands War, 1982* (London: Penguin, 2001), 299-300; Nicholas van der Bijl and David Aldea, *5th Infantry Brigade in the Falklands 1982* (Barnsley, UK: Leo Cooper, 2003), 101, 104-105.
5. Because all the Chinook helicopters in the theater except one had gone down when the *Atlantic Conveyor* sank on 25 May; 3 Commando had to march overland to its objectives. Julian Thompson, *No Picnic* (London: Cassell and Co., 2000), 69. A “commando” is the Royal Marine version of a battalion.
6. The two parachute battalions were late additions and Army, not Marine, units. Both were originally from 5 Infantry Brigade. However, they had little difficulty in adapting to fighting with the Royal Marines.
7. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands* (London: Pan Books, 1997), 308.
8. *Ibid.*; Middlebrook, *The Falklands War*, 396. Moore’s actions seem a bit short-sighted. Despite 3 Commando nominally being a Marine brigade in the Falklands War, two of its five combat battalions came from the British Army. Indeed, 2 Para, an Army unit, fought the only land battle before Moore arrived in theater. There was no shortage of Army participation.
9. Middlebrook, *The Falklands War*, 296-98, 396; Hastings and Jenkins, 309-11; Clapp and Southby-Tailyour, 286.
10. Van der Bijl and Aldea, 77-79.
11. *Ibid.*, 92; Hastings and Jenkins, 312.
12. Van der Bijl and Aldea, 107-109.
13. *Ibid.*, 113; Clapp and Southby-Tailyour, 307.
14. *Ibid.*, 307-308.
15. Hastings and Jenkins, 313-14.
16. Middlebrook, *The Falklands War*, 301-302.
17. Clapp and Southby-Tailyour.
18. Middlebrook, *The Falklands War*, 302-303; Van der Bijl and Aldea, 128-29; Charles Bremner, “The Sinking of *Sir Galahad*, 8 June,” in *Above All, Courage: Personal Stories from the Falklands War*, ed. Max Arthur (London: Cassell and Co., 2002), 129-31; B.H. Andrada, *Guerra aérea en las Malvinas* [Aerial warfare in the Malvinas] (Buenos Aires: Emecé Editores, 1983), 204.
19. Rubén O. Moro, *La Guerra Inaudita: Historia del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur* [The unheard war: history of the conflict in the South Atlantic] (Buenos Aires: Editorial Pleamar, 1985), 460. It should be noted that Clapp had not been receiving weather reports from

- Fitzroy so was not aware of the clearing weather when he allowed *Sir Galahad* to sail. See Van der Bijl and Aldea, 127.
20. *Ibid.*; Andrada, 203-204.
21. Andrada, 204, 208-209; Moro, 462-63; Middlebrook, *The Fight for the Malvinas: The Argentine Forces in the Falklands War* (London: Viking, 1989), 211-12.
22. Middlebrook, *The Fight for the Malvinas*, 212.
23. Andrada, 211.
24. Moro, 463-64.
25. Middlebrook, *The Fight for the Malvinas*, 212-14.
26. Derek Oakley, *The Falklands Military Machine* (Staplehurst, UK: Spellmount, 1989), 34-35.
27. Middlebrook, *The Fight for the Malvinas*, 212; James S. Corum, “Argentine Air Power in the Falklands War: An Operational View,” *Air & Space Power Journal* (Fall 2002): 76.
28. Van der Bijl and Aldea, 119-20; Tony McNally, *Cloudpunchers* (Gwynedd, Wales, UK: Pharaoh Press, no date given).
29. Clapp and Southby-Tailyour, 319.
30. Middlebrook, *Fight for the Malvinas*, 214; Oakley, 151.
31. *Ibid.*, 214; Clapp and Southby-Tailyour, 320-21.
32. Oakley, 73.
33. Van der Bijl and Aldea, 94.
34. Sandy Woodward with Patrick Robinson, *One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 323.
35. Clapp and Southby-Tailyour, 312. The withdrawal of *Hermes* was not the sole cause of the gap in Harrier coverage. There had also been a mishap at the landing strip at East Falkland that prevented the Harriers from taking off. See Van der Bijl and Aldea, 129-30.
36. Hastings and Jenkins, 322.
37. *Ibid.*, 361-62.
38. Edwin Leigh Armistead, *AWACS and Hawkeyes: The Complete History of Airborne Early Warning Aircraft* (St. Paul, MN: MBI Publishing, 2002), 131-41.
39. Roger A. Beaumont, *Joint Military Operations: A Short History* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 163.
40. Sir John Nott was appointed Secretary of State for Defence in 1981. His 1981 *Defence Review* called for disposal of older Navy assets to switch resources to new weapons systems.
41. Oakley, 22; Hastings and Jenkins, 24-25.
42. General Sir Peter de la Billière, Commander-in-Chief of British Forces in Operation Desert Storm, provides excellent discussions of joint command issues in *Storm Command: A Personal Account of the Gulf War* (London: Harper-Collins, 1992).

Robert S. Bolia is currently at the Collaborative Interfaces Branch of the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. He received a B.A. from Wright State University and an M.A. from the American Military University. His article “Israel and the War of Attrition” appeared in the March-April 2004 issue of Military Review.