Amphibious Assault on the Falklands

The Battle of San Carlos Water

Pen and Sword Books Ltd

Contents

The Cyclone Strikes

There must be a beginning of any great matter, but the continuing unto the end until it be thoroughly finished yields the true glory.

DRAKE in the Elizabeth Bonaventure riding at Sagres, May 17, 1587, to Sir Francis (later Lord) Walsyngham

For me it was a particularly inauspicious start to a campaign that was to become of world interest.

On 2 April, 1982, I was in my tenth month as the Commodore Amphibious Warfare (COMAW) and had returned the evening before from an intensive recce of Denmark and Schleswig Holstein for a forthcoming series of amphibious exercises.

At about five o'clock that morning I was shaken by a rather grumpy hall-porter of Portsmouth Royal Naval Barracks wardroom: "There is a telephone call from some Major Yeoman, Sir.'

Guy Yeoman was the Royal Corps of Transport major on my staff and a man with an engaging grin, known as 'Roger So Far' because of his idiosyncratic radio procedures. I asked whether the signal that he told me was waiting in my office at Fort Southwick (an old Palmerston fort guarding the eastward, landward flank of Portsmouth) was so important that I should forgo the planned haircut that morning. He replied, 'No, Sir. There is plenty of time for that.' I returned to bed. Drake and his bowls die hard!

On my arrival the signalmen and staff officers seemed preoccupied. There was no sign of any signals let alone the one that might have needed my prompt and early attention. While I waited for my staff to bring me up-to-date Rear-Admiral Derek Reffell (then Flag Officer Third Flotilla - FOF 3 - and my immediate superior) put his head round the door. 'You're looking very relaxed. Have you any idea what is going on?' I replied, 'No, I am waiting for my signals, Sir.' Whereupon, and much to my surprise, he rushed off to collect them himself. When he returned the reason for the alarm was clear: one or them was the one for which I had been shaken early that morning. Among many items it was clear that a Task Force of two CVSs (aircraft carriers) and one LPD (assault ship) escorted by at least four DD/FF (destroyers and frigates) and appropriate support were being brought to immediate notice for operations. The force would be required to transport three Commando Groups and the Commando Brigade Headquarters with combat and logistic back-up to the South Atlantic.

The Ministry of Defence (Army) was requested to make at least two LSLs available as soon as possible. The provision of additional lift from ships taken up from trade was being investigated urgently.

More escorts and supporting RFAs from the returning Springtrain group were to be despatched towards the South Atlantic, but were not to go so fast that they arrived in the area of interest before meeting up with those ships sailing from the United Kingdom.

Clearly something major was afoot as this was a Ministry of Defence Signal addressed to the Commander-in-Chief Fleet (CinC Fleet) at Northwood. The Falkland Islands were not mentioned but the newspapers were reporting stories. There was no formal command structure nor clear aim but by reading between the lines the Admiral's and my imagination had plenty of scope for intelligent guesswork. He, of course, knew more.

Having given me time to absorb the bare facts contained in the MOD's signal Admiral Reffell returned to ask what my plans were: I replied that it might be best if I went to my offices in the Royal Marines Barracks, Stonehouse, Plymouth, where I would be closer to the Royal Marines. But, on the other hand, if as expected, he was to be involved directly in charge at sea he might prefer it if I stayed closer to him at Fort Southwick.

Some of my staff were still in Denmark, but others with me had flown direct to the West Country from Gatwick. I had returned to Fort Southwick to brief the Admiral on our recce for exercises in the Baltic approaches over the next few years.

Sending my driver, Leading Airman Park, ahead to Plymouth with the staff car a helicopter was ordered for later in the day. This gave me time to talk to Admiral Reffell who had much greater amphibious experience. He had already been the Commodore Amphibious Warfare but at a vital time in its 'new' existence for he had been appointed with the express purpose of regenerating the post some three years after its disbandment. He had also commanded the Commando Carrier HMS Bulwark and was well known by the Royal Marines, knowing many of them personally. I liked working for him very much and found him delightful, calm and intelligent and by using those attributes that morning he helped me dissect and choose the essential questions we needed to have answered: we also speculated how the operation might develop.

During my months as COMAW I had witnessed one amphibious exercise in Norway and commanded two more, one in the Baltic and, only weeks before, one in north Norway. I knew enough about amphibious warfare to have one or two bees in my bonnet, but also to realize how very small my experience and grasp of the subject was.

My main concern was that over the years the Royal Navy had been required to develop operations in support of SACLANT protecting Atlantic convoys and seeking submarines but, as a result, it was ill-equipped for operations in the fjords and close to the Baltic coastline. Neither the amphibious ships nor their escorting frigates were fitted with radars suitable for operating near land masses and we had few point-defence weapons capable of deterring an air attack. Both were available if the cash could be found for them. The Royal Navy had developed excellent weapon systems but these were designed to take on the long-range Russian missiles we then saw being launched against carrier groups and convoys. What was lacking were 'close-in' weapons for a warship stationed inshore that were capable of dealing with conventional bomb- rocket- and machine-gun-equipped aircraft.

Most of the frigates were therefore equipped for offshore operation with very limited inshore close-range capability making it vital for any amphibious ship to have a modicum of self-defence. Thus my first task on 2 April was to ask the staff of the Commander-in-Chief to ensure that the LSLs (which I knew had circular mountings on either bow) should have 40mm Bofors fitted. I telephoned the Fleet Warfare Officer, Commander Gordon-Lennox, who said that he had no idea where Bofors could be found but promised to see what he could do. He also made an interesting comment which I repeat, not to 'tease' the Commander but to highlight the difficulty in dragging a peacetime fleet to war. Gordon-Lennox told me that CinC Fleet had made the point already that we were to go to sea as equipped, "For had not the Royal Navy always made the claim that it was ready to fight at all times". I pointed out quickly that these were not Royal Navy ships but were in fact a slightly obscure form of Royal Fleet Auxiliary. He took my point and was as good as his word, but it took time.

My next concern was for mine counter-measures. If I was to take my Amphibious Task Group eight thousand miles to the Falklands I needed to know whether a sufficient force of mine-sweepers and mine-hunters were to accompany me. If not then should I simply have to accept the risk and was this really acceptable to CinC? Their speed of advance was similar to that of the LSLs but their sea keeping-capability was less and certainly their advance appearance in the landing area would destroy all hope of surprise. To achieve success a mine-clearing operation has to take several days.

I contacted the Fleet Mine Warfare Officer to be asked, cheerfully, what it was I required and he would do his best to achieve it. I told him that since he was the expert he should tell me: he did, by suggesting that it was early days and perhaps I was taking the whole thing too seriously. 'Perhaps I am,' I said, but I thought he would agree that the moment I sailed my bluff might be called and it was prudent, therefore, to at least have thought through the problem before arriving in a minefield. Agreeing, he asked for time to think and rang back a few minutes later to state that there was apparently no intention to send mine counter-measure vessels but what did I think of taking some mine clearance divers. Since I knew nothing about clearance divers the question was passed back firmly to him. Within the hour Lieutenant-Commander Dutton of the Fleet Clearance Diving Team 1(FCDT 1) appeared, rather cautiously I thought at the time, with his Fleet Chief, FCPO Fellows. Brian Dutton made it clear that he did not believe that all this apparent turmoil would lead anywhere. He was at the end of a long and remarkable career and had obviously seen much of it before. He did not believe that the campaign would need his services. However, as the Fleet Chief left, he said, "Leave it to me, Sir." The next I knew was that FCDTs 1and 3 were embarked and that, a little later, FCDT 2 had been formed from among the Saturation Diving Trials Team at HMS Vernon ready to sail in the Stena Seaspread. They were all to be invaluable in both mine clearance and bomb disposal.

A call was then made to Flag Officer Sea Training to see if he could send me a small team of damage control specialists (NBCD) to train up ships' companies on passage. I very much wanted to train any LSLs and merchant ships that might be with us in damage control in particular, but was concerned that an amphibious operation is an ideal target for chemical warfare. Nuclear did not bear thinking about and I doubted if the Argentinians would go that far, if indeed they had the ability, but it could never be ruled out. It was already evident that the use or merchant ships was likely: we had been practising with them on exercises.

There were a host of other supporting requirements and information we needed. We wanted a photographic interpreter, patrol reports from earlier Royal Marines detachments in the Falklands, Flag Officer Sea Training's reports on Argentinian ships that had been through his hands; scrambling nets for merchant Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT) and I wanted 'gridded' maps and charts for Naval Gunfire Support (NGS).

I was told that the Royal Yacht was being brought to five days notice as a hospital ship and that HMS Intrepid could, if needed, be brought back into service in about ten to twelve days but there was absolutely no intention of going that far - much too expensive!

Having covered the essentials, I jotted down a few more queries: the first was what naval support would be needed on a merchant ship. I knew that Captain Tony Barrati, RNR, had prepared a paper on the staffing and equipment needs of Naval Parties in merchant ships that were taken up from trade and therefore labelled rather ungraciously 'STUFT'. In the recent Spring exercise in Norway he had reported to me that he had three young RNR lieutenants in various ships and asked what could he do with them. I had been concerned for some time by a view, held within the Royal Navy, that operating merchant ships created little problem. There were good procedures laid down that those ships who carried the NATO flag were allowed to be employed in convoys, as had always been traditionally done. These procedures were very different from those used between NATO warships and I wanted to operate them, and manoeuvre them in close quarters, like naval ships and for this they were ill-equipped and lacked experience. Tony Barrati agreed to look at the problem and make his report, but I had not yet seen it.

We also needed to provide small arms and defence for these merchant ships. We pressured the Fleet staff for small arms and, particularly, for 20mm Oerlikons, 7.62mm general purpose machine guns; even Bren guns and Lewis guns would do. These should be issued to every ship likely to join the Amphibious Task Group to provide them with a slightly better defence than they had at the moment. Again the Fleet Warfare Officer agreed to do his best. Also on my list of requirements were sandbags and flack-mats: we had used flack-mats during the Indonesian confrontation and if they did not have any real effect they certainly gave confidence to gun crews and that was important.

The bees in my bonnet had reduced their buzzing and I was pleased that the morning had not been wasted. As I waited for the helicopter, and then flew west, I went over the broader aspects of amphibious operations as I understood them and wondered if, as a result of such a mental review, I would still find myself concerned at the small size of my staff for anything more than set-piece NATO operations and what I should or could do about it. It was a process that was to be repeated in every spare moment over the next few weeks.

Admiral Ramsay, who was perhaps the most experienced British Admiral in amphibious operations, while clearly considering operations concerning divisions and armies, wrote a piece which is fundamental to most amphibious operations, even if they are of brigade level or smaller, whether an assault, raid or diversion. It read, 'A combined operation is but the opening under particular circumstances of a purely army battle. It is the function of the navy and the air to help the army establish a base or bases on the hostile coast, from which the military plan to gain the objective must be developed. It is upon the army plan for the fulfilment of its object that the combined plan must depend ... Once the army have decided how they wish to fight the land battle, it is necessary to examine how the troops can be put ashore to give effect to the army plan. In general it is the responsibility of the navy to land the army as they require, but as the plan develops, naval considerations will rise which must be discussed and agreed upon." Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher had a little earlier put it more succinctly and typically: 'The British Army should be a projectile to be fired by the Navy'!

British experience showed that the execution of an agreed combined-joint army/navy-amphibious (take your choice) operation should be in the hands of the navy. American practice in the Pacific was built largely on the ideas developed by men such as Rear Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten who was for a time in charge of British Combined Operations. The Americans' experience of massive amphibious assaults on Pacific islands confirmed the command arrangements which were finally written down in a NATO publication entitled Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) 8. The British had until recently had their own Joint Tactical Publication (JTP) series but these had lapsed and their bible on this type of amphibious operation was now ATP 8. Differences in description are largely semantic but 'amphibious' had come to mean a joint army/navy operation launched solely by seaborne forces. Admiral Ramsay's Operation Overlord was therefore technically not an amphibious operation but a very complex combined operation. The Falklands Campaign was clearly to be a combined operation with all three services contributing what they best could. Within the campaign there would be an amphibious operation and because of the geography of the Islands there was never likely to be a 'purely army battle'.

The reason why it was agreed that the execution of an amphibious operation should be in naval hands becomes reasonably obvious when one considers that the ships must not only reach but also off-load their precious cargoes at the correct point of disembarkation safely. Protection for these stages can only be provided by the navy, or, if close to shore bases, an airforce. To achieve this one must assume that the naval operation is under good control and has a reasonable hope of success. If it is not, then obviously a landing is at too great a risk and must be abandoned. This is a naval decision. The landing force, who may or may not be opposed on the beaches, will also need to decide on the risk of their success if the naval decision is that the operation can continue as far as they, the navy, are concerned. The landing force may also need time to match up with their equipment, organize in unfamiliar territory; only when the landing force commander is happy to take full responsibility for his own forces and no longer be supported by sea is it fair to expect him to go it alone. The relationship between the Amphibious Task Group Commander (CATF) and his Landing Force Commander (CLF) has to be extremely good if misunderstandings and confusion are to be avoided.

The practice had developed, therefore, that planning an amphibious operation would be carried out jointly with co-equal authority to either Service. This developed further to ensure that both the landing force commander and naval commander were of equal rank and in the same ship. There had been a number of unfortunate incidents, mainly where the naval commander was senior to the landing force commander and had chosen to rush off chasing enemy ships (a job he very probably understood better and enjoyed more!), while cheerfully taking 'his soldier' with him to see some action. The troops meanwhile were landed, if not leaderless, at least without their appointed leader. It was neither popular nor wise!

Because the execution of an amphibious operation remains a naval responsibility, assets such as the Special Boat Section (SBS) (Royal Marines trained in beach reconnaissance), the support helicopters and the landing craft are all under the CATF's naval operational control (OPCON) until the CLF is ready to be cast off when some or all of them could be transferred to his military control.