




HM Government

CONTEST

The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism

June 2018



CONTEST

The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism

Presented to Parliament
by the Secretary of State for the Home Department
by Command of Her Majesty

June 2018

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ISBN 978-1-5286-0209-9

CCS0218929798

06/18

Printed on paper containing 75% recycled fibre content minimum

Printed in the UK by the APS Group on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office

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Foreword by the Prime Minister



Last year's horrific attacks on London and Manchester served as a stark reminder of the continued threat that terrorism poses, both to our people and to our way of life.

Whether inspired by Islamist extremism, the far right, or the situation in Northern Ireland, the overarching goal of individual terrorists and the groups that support them is the same – to inflict harm, to inspire fear and, in so doing, look to undermine the very fabric of our society.

They cannot and will not be allowed to succeed.

Following the Government's publication of its last Counter Terrorism Strategy in 2011, we have taken comprehensive action to address risks both in the UK and abroad. With its help, the police and security services have foiled 25 Islamist plots since June 2013, and four extreme right wing terror plots in the past year alone.

For all its successes, in the years since the Strategy was implemented the threat we face from terrorism has not stood still. The war in Syria, which was in its infancy when the last Strategy was published, has created both a haven and a training ground for British and foreign terrorists. UK citizens have been targeted in attacks overseas, for example in Sousse in 2015. Even the nature of attacks has changed, with vehicles increasingly used as weapons with which to kill and maim innocent people.

In the wake of the attacks in London and Manchester I pledged a comprehensive review of our approach to counter terrorism to ensure it was working as effectively as possible. This new Strategy is the result of that review: building on progress made since 2011 and evolving to counter new and emerging threats, to reflect the changing situation around the world, and to learn lessons from the tragic attacks in the UK over the past year.

Because the threat we face is large and multi-faceted, this Strategy has a much greater focus on systemic co-ordination across the public sector. By linking up not just the intelligence agencies but also local authorities, health providers and many others, it will make it harder than ever for terrorists and those who support them to plan and carry out attacks.

This joined-up approach – uniting Government, the wider public sector and individuals around a common goal of preventing terrorism – mirrors the public's response to the terrorist atrocities we witnessed last year. In the days and weeks after the attacks I was proud of the way the country came together in defiance of those who would drive us apart.

Our refusal to be defeated by terrorism is our greatest asset in the fight against it. But to be truly effective it must be twinned with practical measures to prevent extremism, to pursue those who would do us harm, to protect our country against attack and to be properly prepared should the worst happen.

This Strategy will provide the police, security services and others with the support and direction they need to do just that.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'T. May', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Rt Hon Theresa May MP
Prime Minister

Foreword by the Home Secretary



The first duty of the government, and my highest priority as Home Secretary, is to protect the public. The attacks of last year shocked us all. But instead of tearing our society apart, they merely strengthened our resolve and commitment to our shared values. This strategy sets out how this government will continue to respond to the serious and evolving threat posed by terrorism in a manner that preserves our way of life.

Terrorists' ambition is to divide us – to drive a wedge between people of different backgrounds. Recently, we have seen Daesh take advantage of political instability and conflict to gain a foothold in Syria and Iraq. Despite action by a global coalition to reduce its territory and infrastructure, Daesh's actions and propaganda mean it remains the most significant terrorist threat we face today. That said, Al Qa'ida continues to pose a persistent threat to the West and domestically we also face an increasing threat from extreme right-wing terrorism as well as a persistent risk from Northern Ireland related terrorism. The threat we face is multifaceted, diverse and evolving.

The stark reality is that it will never be possible to stop every attack. We do not live in a surveillance state and nor do we want to. Our response must therefore continue to be proportionate, inclusive and subject to strong oversight. By working together, with the police, security and intelligence agencies, the private and public sectors, civil society, international partners, and of course the public, we will make sure that terrorists cannot and will not change our way of life.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'S. Javid'.

Rt Hon Sajid Javid MP
Home Secretary



Executive Summary

1 Our response to counter-terrorism is built on an approach that unites the public and private sectors, communities, citizens and overseas partners around the single purpose to leave no safe space for terrorists to recruit or act. Our strategy, CONTEST, is the framework that enables us to organise this work to counter all forms of terrorism. CONTEST's overarching aim remains to reduce the risk to the UK and its citizens and interests overseas from terrorism, so that our people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.¹

Strategic context

2 The threat from terrorism, globally and in the UK, is higher than when we last published CONTEST in 2011. The UK is facing a number of different and enduring terrorist threats. The increased threat has mainly been caused by the rise of Daesh² and the creation of its cult-like "Caliphate", combined with the persistent threat from Al Qa'ida. Daesh has been constrained militarily by the actions of a global coalition in which the UK is playing a leading role, which has eroded most of its territory and severely degraded its central propaganda apparatus. But Daesh's ability to direct, enable and inspire attacks still represents the most significant global terrorist threat, including to the UK and our people and interests overseas. Daesh's methods are already being copied by new and established terror groups.

3 Using pernicious, divisive messaging and amplifying perceived grievances, Daesh and Al Qa'ida exploit the internet to promote warped alternative narratives, urging extremists within our own communities to subvert our way of life through simple, brutal violence. They deem anyone who does not share their rejectionist views as a legitimate target and any method of murder acceptable. They cynically groom the vulnerable and the young to join their movement, inspiring people within our own communities to commit senseless acts of violence. The recent attacks across Europe and the UK have also served to highlight the diversity and accessibility of methods by which individuals who are vulnerable to these radicalising messages can commit attacks.

1 This strategy replaces the previous CONTEST and supersedes the Prevent Strategy, both published in 2011.

2 Also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL.

4 This has had a profound effect on the threat to the UK, seen so starkly through the attacks in 2017. The current UK National Threat Level is SEVERE, meaning an attack is highly likely.³ Islamist terrorism⁴ is the foremost terrorist threat to the UK. Extreme right-wing terrorism is a growing threat. In December 2016, the then Home Secretary proscribed the first extreme right-wing group, National Action, under the Terrorism Act 2000. The Government took further action in September 2017, proscribing Scottish Dawn and National Socialist Anti-Capitalist Action as aliases of National Action. Northern Ireland related terrorism remains a serious threat, particularly in Northern Ireland itself.

5 In 2017, we saw a significant shift in the terrorist threat to the UK, with five attacks in London and Manchester that led to the deaths of 36 innocent people and injured many more. We responded decisively, rapidly adapting our priorities and capabilities, to break the momentum of these attacks. Since last year's Westminster attack, the police and the security and intelligence agencies have successfully foiled a further 12 Islamist plots, and since 2017, have disrupted four extreme right-wing plots.

6 However, we will not always be successful in stopping attacks. Most future terrorist plots in the UK will employ simple methods that can be developed with ease and at speed. Terrorists still have the intent to also mount complex, potentially more destructive attacks, probably targeting crowded places or the global aviation system. The general availability and use of encrypted communications allows terrorists to disguise their plans better.

7 Terrorists have not, cannot and will not change our way of life. In accordance with our guiding principles, we will continue to respond systematically and proportionately but with increased transparency and oversight to assure the public of their privacy as well as their public safety.

Our response

8 This updated and strengthened CONTEST strategy reflects the findings of a fundamental review of all aspects of counter-terrorism, to ensure we have the best response to the heightened threat in coming years. The review found CONTEST to be well-organised and comprehensive and that we should update our approach within the tried and tested strategic framework of four 'P' work strands:

- Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.
- Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks.
- Protect: to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack.
- Prepare: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack.

9 However, the review concluded that a change in our approach within this framework would increase our ability to counter the shift in threat. This will include a step-change in our domestic investigative capabilities through implementing the recommendations of MI5 and CT Policing's Operational Improvement Review.

3 Threat levels continue to be set independently by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC).

4 We define Islamist terrorism as acts of terrorism perpetrated or inspired by politico-religiously motivated groups or individuals who support and use violence as means to establish their interpretation of an Islamic society. In the UK context, the Islamist terrorist threat comes overwhelmingly from Salafi-Jihadi movements, which are inherently violent. We recognise that Islamism describes a spectrum of movements that hold a variety of views on the use of violence; some are conditional in their view on the use of violence and others are explicit in their rejection of it.

10 We will **disrupt terrorist threats in the UK earlier** to take account of the scale of the threat and the speed at which plots are now developing. New counter-terrorism legislation will underpin our approach, ensuring the police and Crown Prosecution Service have the powers they need to enable intervention at an earlier stage in investigations, leading to prosecutions for terrorism offences, backed up by longer prison sentences and stronger management of terrorist offenders after their release.

11 Last year's attacks in London and Manchester highlighted both the challenge of detecting individuals who may be inspired to commit terrorist acts in the UK, and the pace at which plots can move to acts of violence. This places a renewed importance on our understanding of those individuals who are vulnerable to radicalisation or who are (or have been) of interest to the police and the security and intelligence agencies due to their possible links to terrorist-related activities, but who are not currently the subject of any active investigations. We will **share information more widely and support more local interventions with individuals in our own communities who are being groomed or incited to commit or support acts of terrorism**. New multi-agency approaches at the local level – initially in London, the West Midlands and Greater Manchester – will enable MI5 and Counter-Terrorism Policing to share more information with a broader range of partners, including government departments, Devolved Administrations, and local authorities. By alerting a greater number of agencies to individuals of potential concern, we will improve our ability to assess the risk they pose whilst also being able to bring to bear a broader, larger set of local interventions, including to safeguard those at risk of radicalisation or to ensure those who have supported or been involved in terrorist-related activities disengage.

12 We will seek a more **integrated relationship with the private sector** both to better protect our economic infrastructure and to scale our ability to tackle terrorism. We will jointly with industry improve security at venues in the UK, gain faster alerts to suspicious purchases and design out vulnerabilities in our infrastructure or in products that terrorists exploit. We will take robust action to ensure there are no safe places for terrorists online, and ensure we have the critical access we need to information on their communications. We will seek more investment in technologies that automatically identify and remove terrorist content before it is accessible to all.

13 We will prioritise strengthening the **resilience of local communities** to terrorism as they are at the forefront of our response, in particular those where the threat from terrorism and radicalisation is highest. Our support to **British citizens affected by terrorism** at home and overseas remains a top priority.

14 **Overseas** we remain committed to the Global Coalition's campaign against Daesh, to remove its control of territory, degrade further its media capabilities and disrupt key senior leaders and networks. We are also committed to efforts to degrade Al Qa'ida and its affiliates. We will take the lead on international efforts to improve counter-terrorism globally, through **Ministerially-led campaigns on aviation security and preventing terrorist use of the internet**. Terrorism also threatens British businesses operating globally and broader UK interests in stability, prosperity, governance, human rights and development work. Alongside our duty to protect British citizens is a strong determination to protect UK businesses and their assets.

15 Our four 'P' national work strands will coalesce into a single local or overseas response as we focus on improving frontline integration of our capabilities and people. Over the next three years we will take forward the following priorities under each work strand:

Prevent

16 To safeguard and support those vulnerable to radicalisation, to stop them from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism, we will:

- Focus our activity and resources in those locations where the threat from terrorism and radicalisation is highest.
- Expand our Desistance and Disengagement Programme with an immediate aim over the next 12 months to more than double the number of individuals receiving rehabilitative interventions.
- Develop a series of multi-agency pilots to trial methods to improve our understanding of those at risk of involvement in terrorism and enable earlier intervention.
- Focus our online activity on preventing the dissemination of terrorist material and building strong counter-terrorist narratives in order to ensure there are no safe places for terrorists online.
- Build stronger partnerships with communities, civil society groups, public sector institutions and industry to improve Prevent delivery.
- Re-enforce safeguarding at the heart of Prevent to ensure our communities and families are not exploited or groomed into following a path of violent extremism.

Pursue

17 To stop terrorist attacks happening in this country and against UK interests overseas we will:

- Implement a step-change in our domestic investigative capabilities through implementing the recommendations of MI5 and CT Policing's Operational Improvement Review.
- Introduce new counter-terrorism legislation to disrupt terrorist threats in the UK earlier, taking account of the scale of the threat and the speed at which plots are now developing.
- As set out in in the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, we are recruiting and training over 1,900 additional staff across the security and intelligence agencies.
- Develop a series of multi-agency pilots to trial ways to improve information sharing and enrich our understanding of the threat at the local level, including of closed and closing subjects of interest⁵.
- Bring foreign fighters to justice in accordance with due legal process if there is evidence that crimes have been committed, regardless of their nationality.
- Maintain our use of enhanced legislative tools to target and disrupt terrorist finance.
- Ensure we maintain our global reach to disrupt those that directly threaten the UK or UK interests.
- Ensure strong independent oversight of our counter-terrorism work, including publishing annual reports by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, the Biometrics Commissioner and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.

5 These are individuals who have previously been investigated by Counter-Terrorism Policing and MI5, a small proportion of whom may at some stage present again a terrorism threat.

Protect

18 To strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack in the UK or against our interests overseas, and so reduce our vulnerability, we will:

- Collate and analyse greater volumes of high quality data to enhance our ability to target known and previously unknown persons and goods of potential counter-terrorism concern.
- Maintain the UK at the forefront of developing world leading screening and detection technologies at the border, including behavioural detection, new detection techniques, data analytics and machine learning.
- Target the insider threat by strengthening information-sharing about those working in sensitive environments in airports, to ensure that persons of concern do not have access to restricted environments.
- Further strengthen security and resilience across the UK's transport network and other parts of our critical national infrastructure that keep our country running and provide essential services.
- Work in partnership with the aviation industry and international partners to deliver robust and sustainable aviation security in the UK and overseas.
- Improve security at crowded places through closer, more effective working with a wider range of local authority and private sector responsible partners.
- Enhance capabilities to detect terrorist activity involving Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE) material and their precursors and to control and safeguard these materials.

Prepare

19 To mitigate the impact of a terrorist incident, by bringing any attack to an end rapidly and recovering from it, we will:

- Maintain our investment in the capabilities of the emergency services in order to deliver a coordinated and effective response to terrorist attacks.
- Ensure the UK is resilient and ready to respond in a proportionate and effective manner to a wide range of CBRNE threats.
- Fully embed the Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Principles across the emergency services by 2020, to ensure that they can work together effectively in response to a terrorist attack.
- Regularly test and exercise the multi-agency capabilities required to respond to, and recover from, a wide range of terrorist attacks.
- Improve support arrangements for victims of terrorism to ensure a comprehensive and coordinated response.

20 Terrorists know no boundaries and what they do overseas manifests itself in the UK. We will prioritise our efforts in areas of highest risk to British people and interests, whilst maintaining our ability to reach and disrupt those who would seek to harm directly the UK and our interests. Given the increasingly dispersed nature of the threat, we will focus well-targeted capability building to help partners tackle shared threats and build their resilience. We will ensure UK citizens are aware of risks overseas and know how to react if they are involved

in an incident. We will respond quickly to support UK victims. We have also put particular emphasis on raising global aviation security standards and tackling terrorist use of the internet as these global risks affect our security daily and directly.

21 We expect the threat to diversify and evolve as it has done in recent years. We will continually assess the effectiveness of our actions, and be flexible in adapting our approach. This will involve piloting more and different approaches and systematic scenario planning against future threats.

22 We have taken a three year horizon for this new CONTEST. Aggregated together, our comprehensive strategic framework, our present formidable range of capabilities funded by spending more than £2 billion per year, combined with the new priorities, approach and planned new capabilities set out below, will ensure the UK's response to the heightened threat is effective in reducing the risk from terrorism to the UK and our citizens, communities, businesses and interests, at home and overseas.

Introduction

23 This is the fourth published version of the United Kingdom's counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. This strategy sets out how we, the UK Government, will continue to reduce the risk to the UK and its citizens and interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.⁶

24 This new strategy sets out the changing terrorist threat that we now face and how our counter-terrorism approach is evolving to meet that threat.

25 It builds on the 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS) and Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), which identified terrorism as one of the highest priority risks to the United Kingdom, and set out our vision for an integrated, whole of government approach to countering terrorism, using capabilities across security, defence, diplomacy and development. In 2018, the report of the National Security Capability Review (NSCR) found CONTEST to be a well-organised and comprehensive response to terrorism, with strengths in terms of powers, resources, reach and resilience.

26 Our new strategy also reflects the lessons from the attacks in London and Manchester in 2017 that claimed the lives of 36 innocent people. We have seen a shift in threat. MI5 and Counter-Terrorism Policing have foiled 25 Islamist plots since June 2013, 12 of which have been since March 2017, and since 2017 have disrupted four extreme right-wing plots. They are currently handling over 500 live investigations, involving some 3,000 individuals. The timescale for individuals moving from radicalisation to carrying out an attack can be rapid, making plots hard to detect and disrupt. Whilst our actions seek to reduce the risk from terrorism, we will not be able to stop all attacks.

27 This updated and strengthened version of CONTEST continues with the tried and tested strategic framework of four work strands: Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare. An in-depth review of our counter-terrorism approach found that this structure remains effective and continues to guide the planning and the work of many agencies and departments in the UK.

28 The purpose of Prevent and Pursue is to reduce the threats we face; the purpose of Protect and Prepare work is to reduce our vulnerabilities; together these four areas of work seek to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence. That remains our aim.

6 This strategy replaces the previous CONTEST and supersedes the Prevent Strategy, both published in 2011.

29 Publication of this revised strategy reflects the Government's commitment to transparency. While it is not always possible to be open about the specific threats we face or our response to them, we want to increase the amount of information that is available to the public on these issues.

30 The Home Secretary has responsibility for CONTEST and is supported by the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office. Other Secretaries of State also have responsibility for elements of the strategy. OSCT has led work to produce this strategy, with contributions from other Government Departments, Devolved Administrations, the police and the security and intelligence agencies, the private sector, academics and community leaders.

31 Part One of this document sets out the current threat from terrorism to the UK and our interests overseas and describes the strategic factors that are shaping the threats we face.

32 Part Two explains our strategic framework for countering terrorism and the four 'P' work strands as well as overseas and cross-cutting work that supports our counter-terrorism effort across the system. For each work strand we set out the objectives for the next three years, a description of programmes that will enable us to achieve those objectives and the delivery commitments to 2021.

33 Part Three of this document describes the implementation of the strategy in the UK and overseas and our relationships with key partners and institutions. This includes details on governance and funding as well as how we will measure the impact of the strategy.

Part 1: Strategic context

The threat from terrorism

34 This section sets out the global threat from terrorism, including its ideologies and methodologies, and highlights the activities of the two largest Islamist terrorist groups, Daesh and Al Qa'ida. It illustrates the impact of this global threat to the UK, including the five attacks which took place in 2017, as well as the growing threat from extreme right-wing terrorism and the threat to British citizens and interests overseas. The section ends with an assessment of the future terrorist threat.

The global threat from terrorism


35 When CONTEST was last published in 2011, we assessed that the global threat from terrorism was shifting. Al Qa'ida, while still capable of terrorist attacks in the UK, had become a weaker force than at any time since 2001. We predicted that Al Qa'ida's senior leadership would find it increasingly difficult to operate, but that its affiliates and like-minded groups would continue to take advantage of fragile states and aspire to attack western interests. These 2011 assessments have proved largely correct. However, we did not predict the rapid rise of Daesh, or the impact it would have on global terrorism.

36 Daesh exploited political fragility and civil war to control large swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq, proclaiming a so-called "Caliphate" in 2014, brutally oppressing the local population and exacerbating a major humanitarian crisis. In doing so, Daesh mobilised a new movement of terrorists globally to join the group or act in its name.

37 Islamist terrorism accounts for the largest proportion of terrorist attacks globally, with most carried out by Daesh, Al Qa'ida and their respective affiliates. Most of their victims are Muslims. Global attacks and deaths from terrorism rose from 2003, accelerated in recent years by the Syrian conflict. Deaths peaked in 2014 and fell 22% by 2016.⁷ Numerous terrorist organisations exist globally. A list of all terrorist organisations or groups proscribed under UK law, and the criteria for proscription, is published on www.gov.uk.⁸

7 Global Terrorism Database. Figures for 2017 available later in 2018.

8 The current (December 2017) list is available to view at: www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/670599/20171222_Proscription.pdf

Fig. 1.1: Deaths from Terrorism, 2000–2016

Source: START GTD, IEP calculations

38 Since the start of 2015, there have been 49 Islamist terrorist attacks in continental Europe – 11 in 2015, 19 in 2016, and 19 in 2017. Approximately half of these attacks have targeted France, although attacks have taken place throughout Western Europe.

Terrorist ideology

39 The existence of a broadly consistent set of ideas and narratives is an important factor in motivating terrorist groups of all kinds, including Daesh, Al Qa'ida and extreme right-wing organisations. Their propaganda also inspires individuals who maintain no formal affiliation with a particular group. Although individuals may also be attracted to terrorist groups for social, cultural, material, psychological and other reasons, ideology remains a strong driver.

40 Daesh and Al Qa'ida have a common ideological (and operational) lineage. Their shared ideological anchor is Salafi-Jihadism, a violent hybrid ideology, cherry-picking from a broad range of religious and political influences. Both groups hold in common an absolute rejection of democracy, personal liberty and human rights, as well as a commitment to restoring a self-proclaimed "Caliphate" and establishing a brutal and literalist interpretation of sharia law. They hold the West and its allies responsible for the suppression of Islam and oppression of Sunni Muslims around the world. Meanwhile, whilst Daesh claims to represent Islam, it uses atrocities – including beheadings, crucifixions, murdering children, slavery and rape – as weapons, including against Muslims. Daesh and Al Qa'ida have woven the war in Syria, and the wider humanitarian crisis, into their core narratives, propagating a sense of injustice that presents the action or inaction of international actors as part of a wider and ongoing religious conflict between the West and Sunni Islam.

41 In the UK and Europe, extreme right-wing groups, including neo-Nazis, seek to exploit any anxieties around globalisation, conflict and migration (including any which they are able to link to the Syria conflict) in an attempt to broaden their appeal. These groups may vary considerably in their rhetoric, but they share the racist view that minority communities are harming the interests of a "native" population. The ideologies and narratives perpetuated by Islamist and extreme right-wing groups have at times reinforced and even mutually benefited each other.

Terrorist methodologies

42 In addition to the increasing number of potential terrorists and plots, we have seen a diversification in the nature of the threat, as groups and individuals continue to innovate and share information about methodologies. In the UK and overseas, terrorists are likely to continue to target crowded places, in order to maximise the number of casualties.

43 The attacks across Europe since 2015 and the series of attacks in the UK in 2017 have used highly accessible, simple methodologies. These may have inspired and mobilised some who had believed previously that an attack would be beyond their capabilities or resources. The first mass casualty attack using a vehicle as a weapon in Europe took place in July 2016 in Nice, France, killing 86 people and injuring more than 200. Since then, further significant vehicle attacks have also been carried out in the UK, Germany, Sweden, Spain and France. Vehicle or bladed weapon attacks (including a combination of the two) remain the most likely methods for attacks in the UK.

44 Some terrorists have the intent and capability to conduct more complex attacks. Daesh's attempt to target a passenger aircraft flying from Australia⁹ in July 2017 shows that the global aviation system remains a totemic target for terrorists worldwide. The threat to aviation will continue to evolve and diversify. Daesh has tested and used chemical weapons on the battlefield in Syria and Iraq. Some individuals inspired by Daesh and Al Qa'ida are capable of constructing chemical or explosive devices, and others may seek to acquire materials and expertise for biological or radiological weapons. The threat from cyber terrorism may increase in the future, but the current technical capability of terrorists is judged to be low.

45 Daesh has previously demonstrated an ability to direct large-scale, mass casualty attacks in Europe, as seen in the November 2015 attacks in Paris, the Brussels airport and metro system attacks of March 2016, and the Ataturk Airport attack of June 2016. However, terrorists face a greater challenge in crossing the UK border as well as the low availability of illegal firearms in the UK. There are a range of law enforcement measures in place to detect and prevent extremists travelling to and from the UK.

46 Three of the five attacks in the UK in 2017 were carried out by lone actors: Westminster Bridge; Finsbury Park; and Parsons Green. Lone actors can be associates or members of a terrorist network who are acting autonomously, or may be unconnected to any network, but have been influenced by terrorist or extremist propaganda. Attacks by lone actors, including mass-casualty attacks, have increased in recent years,¹⁰ and can be hard to detect and disrupt; especially as the timescale from radicalisation to carrying out an attack can be rapid.

Daesh

47 Daesh currently poses the most significant terrorist threat globally, as well as to the UK and our people and interests overseas. Although international military pressure has significantly eroded its territory and has degraded its ability to organise and direct external

9 Four suspects were arrested by Australian Federal Police on 29 July 2017 in Sydney on suspicion of an Islamist inspired plot to plant a bomb on an Etihad Airways flight departing Sydney on 15 July 2017. Two have since been charged with terrorism-related offences.

10 Also see Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), *Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series No. 4, Lone-Actor Terrorism Analysis Paper*. Online at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_analysis_paper.pdf

attacks from Syria and Iraq, the group still has many followers, affiliate branches¹¹, ample resources, battlefield-tested capabilities, and the ability to direct, enable and inspire attacks across the world.

48 Daesh's initial state-building narrative persuaded thousands of people, including women and families, to travel to Syria from around the world, including from Europe and North Africa. This includes around 900 people of national security concern from the UK. Of these, approximately 20% have been killed while overseas, and around 40% have returned to the UK. The majority of those who have returned did so in the earlier stages of the conflict, and were investigated on their return. Only a very small number of travellers have returned in the last two years, and most of those have been women with young children. Managing the risks from travellers combines interventions from our Prevent and Pursue work strands. Our comprehensive response to the risks posed by Syria travellers is described below in the Pursue section.

49 Daesh's media and propaganda capability has been significantly degraded. But its shift to a narrative of victimhood and seeking to weaponise people in their communities, rather than encouraging them to travel to the "Caliphate", has led to a self-sustaining network of Daesh supporters who create and share unofficial motivational and instructional material online, and celebrate and encourage lone actor attacks. This has increased the reach and potential threat these groups pose, but has also led to a lack of clarity around the origin and motivation of acts perpetrated in their names. Throughout 2017, attacks were claimed opportunistically by Daesh in cases where the exact affiliation of the perpetrators remains ambiguous.

Al Qa'ida

50 Despite the death of Usama Bin Laden in 2011, its degraded capability, and restricted opportunity to plan attacks, Al Qa'ida is a potent and resilient global threat with the long-term intent and capability to attack the UK and other countries. It has focused its strategy on the long term. In the interim, Al Qa'ida has sought, in the main, to involve itself in local struggles, with the aim of diminishing western influence and developing the desire for Islamist rule in local populations.

51 Al Qa'ida's senior leadership has been reduced to a small group of senior figures located in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border area. However, it has well-established affiliated branches in Afghanistan, the Middle East and Africa and strong links with extremist groups in Syria and Iraq. The most significant of these is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formed in January 2017. HTS comprises around 12,500 fighters, and whilst primarily focused on the domestic conflict in Syria, shares Al Qa'ida's vision of global jihad and retains a long-term intent to attack the West.

11 These affiliates include: "Daesh Libya", "Daesh Sinai", Boko Haram, "Daesh in the Arabian Peninsula", "Daesh Khorasan Province", "Daesh in Yemen", "Daesh in the Northern Caucasus" and "Daesh in Algeria". There are also networks sympathetic to Daesh but not formally recognized as affiliates such as those based in the Philippines and Bangladesh. Some branches are new entities; others were formed from existing regional groups that have pledged allegiance to Daesh. Currently, they remain committed to Daesh, despite its military destruction in Syria and Iraq. Daesh branches have carried out attacks of varying sophistication and severity in recent years, targeting regional western interests, local populations and the internal state security apparatus.

52 Al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has a sophisticated explosives capability and has come close to conducting mass casualty attacks against western civil aviation on three occasions.¹² The group's ability to exploit permissive online operating spaces has made it one of the leading sources of Al Qa'ida propaganda, including English language magazines. Media releases from Al Qa'ida and its affiliates do not achieve the frequency or resonance of Daesh's output. They highlight the activities of their regional affiliates, attempt to inspire others to the cause of global jihad, and advocate attacks against western targets.

The threat from terrorism in the UK

53 The UK faces several different terrorist threats. The threat from Islamist terrorism remains the foremost and most significant. Extreme right-wing terrorism is a growing threat, and in 2016 we proscribed an extreme right-wing terrorist group, National Action, for the first time. Northern Ireland related terrorism remains a serious threat, particularly in Northern Ireland itself.

54 Currently, most Islamist terrorism in the UK is connected with Daesh. Its narrative has emerged as the main extremist ideology behind radicalisation in the UK. For example, Al Muhajiroun is a proscribed terrorist organisation that became re-energised in the UK following Daesh's declaration of a "Caliphate" in Syria and Iraq, publishing an online oath of allegiance to Daesh and encouraging its members to travel to Syria and Iraq. Al Qa'ida continues to attempt to attract and inspire UK nationals to act in support of their global agenda. British nationals fighting with Al Qa'ida pose a specific threat due to their linkages to the UK.

55 The global context, in particular the declaration of the "Caliphate", has had a profound effect on the threat to the UK in recent years. The 2015 National Security Risk Assessment identified terrorism as a tier one risk, and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) recognised that the volume and scale of the threat in the UK and overseas was increasing, and that its nature had changed.¹³

56 The threat to the UK from terrorism is higher than when CONTEST was last published in 2011. In August 2014, The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) raised the UK National Threat Level to SEVERE, meaning a terrorist attack in the UK is highly likely. This reflected the emerging threat from Syria-based individuals linked to Al Qa'ida and Daesh. The threat level has remained at SEVERE since, mainly due to the continuing threat from Daesh and Daesh-inspired terrorists, except when it was raised to CRITICAL – meaning an attack is expected imminently – following the Manchester and Parsons Green attacks in 2017.

57 2017 saw a shift in the nature of the terrorist threat to the UK. Between 2011 and 2016, there were four terrorist attacks in Great Britain, each targeting a single individual. The Westminster attack in March 2017 was the first to cause multiple fatalities in the UK since 2005. The five attacks in London and Manchester in 2017 killed 36 people. Five victims died in an attack on Westminster Bridge and the Houses of Parliament, 22 at the Manchester

12 On 25 December 2009, Nigerian national Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate an explosive device hidden in his underwear in order to attack an international flight from Amsterdam to Detroit. The attack failed when the explosive failed to detonate fully, leaving him with significant burns to his hands, legs and genitals. He is currently serving a 50 year sentence in the US. In 2010, AQAP attempted to attack flights to the US using explosive devices concealed within printer cartridges. The plot was disrupted following an intelligence lead and the explosive devices recovered. In 2012, an AQ-AP plot to attack a US-bound flight using an explosive device – again concealed within underwear – was disrupted in an intelligence-led operation.


13 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, available online at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478936/52309_Cm_9161_NSS_SD_Review_PRINT_only.pdf

Arena, eight at London Bridge and Borough Market, and one at Finsbury Park. Many more were injured, including in an attack at Parsons Green. Whilst we aim to reduce the risk from all forms of terrorism, we will not be able to prevent all attacks.

58 The shift in threat is also demonstrated by the number of potential attacks disrupted by MI5 and Counter-Terrorism Policing. They have foiled 25 Islamist plots since June 2013, 12 of which have been since March 2017, and four extreme right-wing plots have been disrupted since 2017.

59 The number of arrests for terrorism-related offences¹⁴ has risen steadily since 2010. Between 2010 and 2017 there were 2,029 terrorism arrests in Great Britain.¹⁵ 412 of those were made in the year ending December 2017, representing the highest annual number since data collection began. This figure is driven in part by investigations by the security and intelligence agencies and law enforcement in the aftermath of the five terrorist attacks in 2017. As of March 2018, they were handling over 500 live investigations, involving some 3,000 individuals. The volume of recorded intelligence leads being managed jointly between MI5 and Counter-Terrorism Policing has more than doubled over the last 12 months. The vast majority of operational effort is devoted to the risk from Islamist terrorism.

Fig. 1.2: Arrests and Proceedings for Terrorism-Related Offences¹⁶



Source: National Counter-Terrorism Police Operations Centre (NCTPOC) and Crown Prosecution Service Counter-Terrorism Division

14 The statutory definition of terrorism is contained in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000. It specifies that terrorism is the use or threat of action which is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation, or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and which is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. The action used or threatened must involve serious violence against a person, serious damage to property, endangering a person's life, creating a serious risk to public health or safety, or the intention to interfere with or seriously disrupt an electronic system.

15 Data from year ending 31 December 2017.

16 This graph shows from December 2009 to December 2017: the number of persons arrested for terrorism-related offences; and the number of persons proceeded against by the Crown Prosecution Service for terrorism-related offences, by outcome. Official statistics available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-quarterly-update-to-december-2017>

60 In addition, there are more than 20,000 individuals who have previously been investigated by Counter-Terrorism Policing and MI5, a small proportion of whom may at some stage present again a terrorism threat. These are known as closed subjects of interest.

Extreme right-wing terrorism

61 The threat from the extreme right wing has evolved in recent years and is growing. In the past five years, four terrorist attacks in the UK were carried out by lone actors motivated to varying degrees by extreme right-wing ideologies.

62 Before 2014, extreme right-wing activity was confined to small, established groups with an older membership, which promoted anti-immigration and white supremacist views but presented a very low risk to national security. The emergence of National Action in 2014 increased community tensions and the risk of disorder. In December 2016, the then Home Secretary proscribed National Action under the Terrorism Act 2000. Since then, 27 individuals have been arrested on suspicion of being a member of the group, 15 of whom have been charged with terrorism offences. Other UK-based extreme right-wing groups also advocate the use of violence.

63 Beyond the extreme right-wing threat, there are a number of other groups and individuals that carry out criminal acts to achieve political goals. They may be motivated by animal rights, the extreme left-wing or environmental issues. None of these groups are currently assessed as posing a national security threat, but there remains the possibility that may change, and that a counter-terrorism response could be required in the future.

Northern Ireland related terrorism (NIRT)

64 NIRT remains a serious threat, particularly in Northern Ireland. Despite the significant political progress in Northern Ireland in the last twenty years, some dissident republican terrorist groups continue to carry out terrorist attacks. The threat level from NIRT in Northern Ireland is SEVERE, indicating an attack is highly likely. In Great Britain, the threat level relating to NIRT is MODERATE, meaning an attack is possible, but not likely.

65 Following the Belfast Agreement in 1998, most Northern Ireland terrorist groups agreed a ceasefire and subsequently decommissioned their weapons. Violent dissident republican groups do not represent mainstream opinion across Northern Ireland, and support for them and their actions is low. However, violent dissident republican terrorist groups continue to carry out terrorist attacks.

66 Between 2011 and 2017, there were 127 national security attacks in Northern Ireland, mainly targeting the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), prison officers and the Armed Forces. Dissident republicans were responsible for the deaths of one police officer and two prison officers between 2011 and 2017. The PSNI officer was murdered by an under-vehicle explosives attack in April 2011, and the prison officers were killed in a close-range drive-by shooting attack in November 2012 and as a result of an under-vehicle explosives attack in March 2016. The reckless nature of these attacks also put members of the public at serious risk.

Threats to UK citizens and interests overseas

67 UK citizens, embassies and interests overseas remain an attractive terrorist target. Since 2011, 63 UK nationals have been killed in terrorist attacks overseas¹⁷ – more than in the UK. Terrorism also threatens British businesses operating globally and broader UK interests in stability, prosperity, governance, human rights and development work.

68 Tourist sites are a target. Significant numbers of UK tourists travel to regions where Daesh or Al Qa'ida affiliates operate. The murder of 38 people, including 30 British nationals, in Sousse, Tunisia in June 2015, was the greatest loss of British lives in a terrorist incident since the 7 July 2005 London bombings. This followed the attack on the Bardo Museum in January 2015, also in Tunisia, in which 21 people were killed, including a British national. In addition to tourists, other UK nationals have been kidnapped and killed by terrorist groups overseas, including Daesh and Al Qa'ida-affiliated groups.

The future terrorist threat

69 We expect the threat from Islamist terrorism to remain at its current, heightened level for at least the next two years, and that it may increase further. We assess the threat from extreme right-wing terrorism is growing. The threat from terrorism is constantly evolving. Globally, terrorist groups and networks of all ideologies continue to develop organically, exploiting social media, technology and science to further their aims and ambitions.

70 We will continue to track and anticipate developments in the threat over the next two years, but it is not feasible to make accurate long-term forecasts. However, we will focus on tracking: drivers of the threat – including ideology and radicalisation; enablers of the threat – including permissive environments and access to exploitable technology; and the counter-terrorism capabilities and actions of other countries; to determine future possible scenarios.

17 In Afghanistan, Algeria, Belgium, France, Israel, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen.

Strategic factors

71 This section explains three key factors terrorists exploit: the proliferation of extremist attitudes, which fragment and divide communities; conflict, instability and poor governance, which create the permissive environments where terrorists can thrive; and developments in technology, which provide the means for terrorists to operate undetected, together with the global reach to inspire their atrocities.

72 We respond to these factors through other policies and capabilities, nationally and internationally, not just through CONTEST. This is long-term work, but integral to the successful reduction of the operating space of terrorists in the UK and overseas.

Extremism

73 Many aspects of Al Qa'ida and Daesh's ideologies are also shared by Islamist extremist organisations operating in the UK and elsewhere. There is no precise line between what we have described above as terrorist ideology, and what we consider extremist ideology. Some Islamist extremist organisations are also Salafist in orientation, while others are associated with different radical Islamist movements.

74 Extremists of all kinds use malevolent narratives to justify behaviour that contradicts and undermines the values that are the foundation of our society. If left unchallenged, these narratives fragment and divide our communities. We protect the values of our society – the rule of law, individual liberty, democracy, mutual respect, tolerance and understanding of different faiths and beliefs – by tackling extremism in all its forms.

75 The Prevent programme counters terrorist ideologies specifically by tackling the causes of radicalisation, as described in the Prevent section of this strategy. We recognise that radicalisation is a complex process for individuals, and that there is no single factor at work. Counter-radicalisation forms one part of a wider effort to counter broader extremist messages and behaviours. We have an effective Counter-Extremism Strategy to protect our communities from the wider social harms beyond terrorism caused by extremism. This includes tackling the promotion of hatred, the erosion of women's rights, the spread of intolerance, and the isolation of communities.¹⁸ We judge that communities which do not or cannot participate in civic society are more likely to be vulnerable to radicalisation. A successful integration strategy is therefore important to counter-terrorism. We published our new Integrated Communities Strategy for consultation in March 2018.¹⁹

Conflict and instability

76 Conflict-affected and fragile states, such as Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia, Syria or Yemen, present permissive environments that terrorist groups exploit. In these environments, terrorists can gain access to weapons and resources, control territory in which they can recruit and oppress local populations, set up training camps and media centres, and plan and prepare for attacks. In some cases, terrorist organisations may gain support by providing stability, security and governance, where no other exists because of corruption or state fragility. Political violence by governments, political exclusion and group grievances are drivers of terrorism.

18 Our Counter-Extremism Strategy was published in 2015 and commits the Government to addressing all the broader harms that extremism can cause, not just where it may lead to terrorism. To varying degrees, responsibility for counter-extremism is devolved in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and each Devolved Administration has its own approach in the areas devolved to them.

19 Online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/integrated-communities-strategy-green-paper>

77 We will work to address these root causes of terrorism and other national security problems by helping to tackle conflict, marginalisation, discrimination and human rights abuses through our development programmes, integrated with wider diplomatic and defence efforts.

Developments in technology

78 Evolving technology creates new challenges, risks and opportunities in fighting terrorism. Terrorists use new technologies, like digital communications and unmanned aerial vehicles, to plan and execute attacks, and tend to adopt them at the same pace as society as a whole. For terror groups, the internet is now firmly established as a key medium for the distribution of propaganda, radicalisation of sympathisers and preparation of attacks.

79 Evolving technology, including more widespread use of the internet and ever-more internet-connected devices, stronger encryption and cryptocurrencies, will continue to create challenges in fighting terrorism. Data will be more dispersed, localised and anonymised, and increasingly accessible from anywhere globally. But there will be as great opportunities. Developments in artificial intelligence will allow us to filter and identify crucial information faster than ever. Virtual or augmented reality gives counter-terrorism teams the opportunity to plan for a wide variety of scenarios in a safe environment. We will have new technologies that enhance our detection and screening capabilities, for example at borders, airports and crowded places. Quantum computing, along with other cutting-edge innovations, has the potential to dramatically change and enhance our counter-terror operational capabilities. For example, the power of quantum computing can be combined with artificial intelligence to improve the speed at which large datasets can be sorted and mined for key information that would be of benefit to law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

80 In January 2018, the Prime Minister delivered a speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, which emphasised the need for technology companies to do more in stepping up to their responsibilities for dealing with harmful and illegal online activity. The Prime Minister also discussed the importance of partnerships and cross-industry responses to tackle online terrorist content. We will work across government and industry to maintain the advantage as terrorist groups seek to adopt new technologies, building upon our constructive partnerships with industry groups and standards bodies. We are intent on taking robust action to ensure there are no safe places for terrorists online, through improved partnerships with the private sector and Communications Service Providers, in particular. We will also bring forward online safety legislation at the earliest opportunity.

Part 2: Our Response

81 Part One describes the terrorist threat to the UK. Part Two explains our strategy, detailing the work strands that together comprise our response domestically and overseas.

CONTEST: the UK's response to terrorism

82 This strategy continues to address all forms of terrorism.²⁰ Its overarching aim remains largely unchanged from the 2011 published version; we judge that it remains wholly valid to guide our activity over the next three years. Within this framework, we will continue to learn and adapt our approach and priorities to meet the changing threat.

The aim of CONTEST is to reduce the risk to the UK and its citizens and interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.

Learning lessons

83 This new CONTEST strategy is the result of a fundamental review of all aspects of counter-terrorism, to ensure we have the best response to the heightened threat from terrorism, seen so starkly through the attacks in London and Manchester during 2017 and the lessons we have learned from them.

²⁰ CONTEST addresses all forms of terrorism that affect the UK and our interests overseas, with the exception of Northern Ireland related terrorism in Northern Ireland, which is the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

Learning lessons from the 2017 attacks

Our review of CONTEST has taken account of reviews and lessons learned exercises over the last nine months undertaken by government departments, Counter-Terrorism Policing, the security and intelligence agencies and Parliament. These include detailed internal reviews by MI5 and the Police of the attacks in London and Manchester between March and June 2017 and an overarching Operational Improvement Review (OIR), which identifies operational changes that should improve the future performance of MI5 and the police. The then Home Secretary commissioned the former Independent Reviewer of Counter-Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson QC, to provide independent assurance of these MI5 and police reviews.

In the internal reviews and OIR, MI5 and Counter-Terrorism Policing conclude that they could not find any key moments where different decisions would have made it likely that they could have stopped any of the attacks. However, they do make more than a hundred recommendations for change. The recommendations fall into four categories: (1) improved use of data to enhance MI5 and Counter-Terrorism Policing's ability to detect activity of concern; (2) piloting new models for managing the risks posed by closed and closing subjects of interest involving greater multi-agency working at a local level; (3) a new approach to domestic extremism; and (4) detailed and technical changes to improve existing counter-terrorism processes.

David Anderson QC's report was published on 5 December 2017. He concluded that the reviews had been carried out in an "impressively thorough and fair" manner and he endorsed – so far as he felt qualified to do so – the conclusions and recommendations, noting that MI5 and Counter-Terrorism Policing got a great deal right. The Home Office is working closely with the police and MI5 to ensure the recommendations are implemented in full. David Anderson QC will conduct a stocktake of implementation and report back in January 2019.²¹


Framework

84 This review found that CONTEST is a well-organised and comprehensive risk reduction framework. We coordinate well between government departments and agencies, and with international and private sector partners, to achieve our objectives. Cooperation between the police and the security and intelligence agencies is exceptionally good by international standards. Our response has strengths in terms of powers, resources, reach and resilience and is proportionate. These strengths enabled the Government, the police and the security and intelligence agencies to break the momentum of recent attacks.

85 The CONTEST framework comprising Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare work strands, remains an effective way to organise our counter-terrorism actions. Each of these connected work strands reduces an element of the risk from terrorism (intent, capability, vulnerability and impact), and collectively they provide a balanced and comprehensive end-to-end response to the threat we face.

21 www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/664682/Attacks_in_London_and_Manchester_Open_Report.pdf

Fig. 2.1: CONTEST's Risk Reduction Model



Priorities

86 The recent attacks and associated reviews have highlighted the continual importance of learning and adapting our approach to address the changing threat.

87 This means domestically we must deliver a much greater effect at a **local level**, both in terms of earlier disruptions to address the speed at which planning moves to an attack, and at a greater scale than before. This will require us to **share information** and **data** with a much wider set of partners, providing counter-terrorism expertise to target better our local interventions. To do this, we will test more **innovative** approaches more often, whilst continually seeking opportunities to exploit the advancements in **technology** that will improve the effectiveness of our response. Overseas, we will continue to support our international partners build the capabilities they need to respond effectively at a local level.

88 We will **disrupt terrorist threats in the UK earlier** to take account of the shift in the threat and the speed at which plots are now developing. New counter-terrorism legislation will underpin our approach, ensuring the police and Crown Prosecution Service have the powers they need to enable intervention at an earlier stage in investigations, leading to prosecutions for terrorism offences, backed up by longer prison sentences and stronger management of terrorist offenders after their release. In addition, JTAC and MI5 will have greater involvement in the assessment and investigation of extreme right-wing terrorism.

89 We will **share information more widely and support more local interventions with individuals in communities being groomed or incited to commit or support acts of terrorism**. The Operational Improvement Review and lessons learned exercises following the attacks in 2017 made a number of recommendations to improve our local response. Building on these recommendations, we are developing our counter-terrorism operating

model by piloting new multi-agency approaches in London, the West Midlands and Greater Manchester. MI5 and Counter-Terrorism Policing will share information with a broader range of partners, including government departments, Devolved Administrations, and local authorities. By alerting a greater number of agencies with better information about the local threat, we will improve the breadth and scale of interventions that help safeguard those at risk of radicalisation and ensure those who have supported or been involved in terrorist-related activities disengage.

90 We will seek a more **integrated relationship with the private sector** both to better protect our economic infrastructure and to scale our ability to tackle serious and organised crime and terrorism. We will jointly with industry improve security at venues in the UK, gain faster alerts to suspicious purchases and design out vulnerabilities in our infrastructure or in products that terrorists exploit.

91 As part of this approach, we will place a renewed emphasis on our **engagement with Communications Service Providers**, recognising the internet has been a key way for radicalisers to communicate their propaganda, and for terrorists to plot attacks. We will take robust action to ensure there are no safe places for terrorists to spread their propaganda online and to ensure we have the critical access we need to information on their communications. We will build on our constructive relationship with the tech industry to seek more investment in technologies that automatically identify and remove terrorist content before it is accessible to all, and learn from our work to tackle other illegal and harmful content, such as child sexual exploitation, where we have already made progress. However, we won't shy away from action, as shown by HMG's announcement on 20 May 2018 to bring forward online safety legislation at the earliest opportunity.

92 We will continue to improve the **resilience of our communities** to terrorism, with a particular focus on those where the threat from terrorism and radicalisation is highest. We will enhance a shared understanding and response to local radicalisation. This will be supported by our Prevent work alongside wider Government efforts to counter-extremism and promote integration. As part of this approach, our support to **British citizens affected by terrorism** at home and overseas remains a priority. We established the cross-Government Victims of Terrorism Unit in March 2017 to ensure support to victims, witnesses, and bereaved families is effective, comprehensive and coordinated. We called on the Unit's expertise during the 2017 attacks, and have since been working extensively with local partners and national organisations to learn lessons and make improvements.

93 **Overseas**, we will continue to use the full range of our diplomatic, development, economic, defence and intelligence networks to the address threats at source. We remain committed to the Global Coalition's campaign against Daesh, to remove its control of territory, degrade its media capabilities and disrupt key senior leaders and networks. We are also committed to efforts to degrade Al Qa'ida and its affiliates. We will support **capability building** to ensure our international partners have the effective local responses they need to tackle the threat in their regions. But we will also take the lead on international efforts to improve specific aspects of counter-terrorism globally, through **Ministerially-led campaigns on aviation security and preventing terrorist use of the internet**. To allow us to respond rapidly to emerging risks, we will create a new cadre of experts who can be deployed when and where they are needed to provide additional expertise overseas, to help partners build capability at a local level.

Working across the 'P' work strands

94 The shift in the nature of the terrorist threat has led to a deeper consideration of the links and touch-points between the four 'P' work strands of CONTEST. We recognise our capabilities and resources need to be increasingly interconnected, working across the 'P' work strands to ensure we are generating the maximum impact to help prevent, detect and disrupt terrorist attacks, and where attacks do get through, to limit the impact and recover swiftly. The links between the Prevent and Pursue work strands are particularly important, and can be seen clearly in our approaches to managing the risks from terrorist travellers and prisoners, and to multi-agency working. As shown in the diagram below, our Prevent work to rehabilitate and reintegrate those who have already engaged in terrorism complements Pursue work to stop terrorist attacks happening in the UK and overseas.

Fig. 2.2: Shows the link between Prevent and Pursue objectives



Guiding principles

95 We will ensure our response reflects our guiding principles of **proportionality**, **flexibility** and **inclusivity**. Terrorists attack us to create fear, to take revenge for real and perceived grievances, and to influence public opinion. We will respond proportionately and in a way that does not undermine our aim to enable people to live freely and with confidence.²² The threat from terrorism will not go away and we may not always be successful in stopping attacks, but terrorists cannot and will not change our way of life. Strong **accountability** will underpin our approach.

96 We will ensure our investments represent **value for money** and establish sustainable capabilities over the long term that are prioritised and proven. The 2015 NSS and SDSR set out the Government's vision for a secure and prosperous UK with global reach and influence. To achieve this, we committed to increase government spending on counter-terrorism by 30% in real terms over the course of this Spending Review period.²³ Since the SDSR, we have increased the resources for Counter-Terrorism Policing and the security and intelligence agencies, increased investment in aviation security and in digital surveillance, made additional investments in our Armed Forces' counter-terrorism capabilities, and have significantly increased our global network of counter-terrorism and counter-extremism experts.

97 Our response will be delivered in **collaboration** with others. The UK has leading capabilities and expertise in security, the delivery of justice, and the fight against crime and terrorism. International cooperation on security takes place on a regular basis at multiple levels, including: with Five Eyes partners (the US Australia, Canada, New Zealand); bilaterally with EU Member States and other countries; at the European Union (EU) level; and through non-EU multilateral fora such as the United Nations (UN), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). With threats evolving faster than ever before, it is in the clear interest of the UK and all its allies to sustain the closest possible cooperation in tackling terrorism, organised crime and other threats to national security, now and into the future.

98 We will continue to play a **leading international role** in countering terrorism during and following the UK's exit from the EU. We will seek to maintain deep and close cooperation with European partners on law enforcement and security matters and, in some areas, including at the border, we will identify and take forward new opportunities to strengthen our security.

22 L. Richardson, *What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Terrorist Threat* (London: John Murray, 2006); R. English, *Terrorism: How to Respond* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); M. Sageman, *Misunderstanding Terrorism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017).

23 www.gov.uk/government/news/government-publishes-strategic-defence-and-security-review

Prevent

99 The **purpose** of Prevent is at its heart to safeguard and support vulnerable people to stop them from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. Our Prevent work also extends to supporting the rehabilitation and disengagement of those already involved in terrorism. Prevent works in a similar way to programmes designed to safeguard people from gangs, drug abuse, and physical and sexual abuse. Success means an enhanced response to tackle the causes of radicalisation, in communities and online; continued effective support to those who are vulnerable to radicalisation; and disengagement from terrorist activities by those already engaged in or supporters of terrorism.

Prevent objectives

100 The **objectives** of Prevent are to:

- Tackle the causes of radicalisation and respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism.
- Safeguard and support those most at risk of radicalisation through early intervention, identifying them and offering support.
- Enable those who have already engaged in terrorism to disengage and rehabilitate.

Fig 2.3 Important achievements of the Prevent programme



Capabilities and commitments


101 The Prevent programme depends on leadership and delivery through a wide network of partners – with communities, civil society organisations, public sector institutions including local authorities, schools and universities, health organisations, police, prisons and probation, and the private sector.

102 Prevent delivery is underpinned by our understanding of the threat and radicalisation process, by assessments of the threat picture in local areas, and through continuous **research and evaluation.**

Prevent Delivery Model

The Prevent delivery model sets out how we tackle the causes and risk factors that can lead an individual to become radicalised, support those who are at risk of radicalisation through early intervention and rehabilitate those who have already engaged with terrorism.

Fig: 2.4 The Prevent Delivery Model



Source: Home Office

103 Government and academic research has consistently indicated that there is no single socio-demographic profile of a terrorist in the UK, and no single pathway, or ‘conveyor belt’, leading to involvement in terrorism. Terrorists come from a broad range of backgrounds and appear to become involved in different ways and for differing reasons. Few of those who are drawn into terrorism have a deep knowledge of faith. While no single factor will cause someone to become involved in terrorism, several factors can converge to create the conditions under which radicalisation can occur. These include background factors, aspects of someone’s personal circumstances, which might make them vulnerable to radicalisers, such as being involved in criminal activity; initial influences, peoples, ideas or experiences that influence an individual towards supporting a terrorist movement; and an ideological opening, or receptiveness to extremist ideology.

104 Most individuals experiencing this combination of factors will not go on to become involved in terrorism because there are protective factors that prevent them from doing so. These range from having no opportunity to develop extremist contacts, to having other more important priorities in their lives (such as a family, career or community involvement). A small number of people who lack these protective factors may become radicalised. In these circumstances, a range of social and ideological influences can combine to intensify commitment to a terrorist cause, and provide opportunities for them to act.

105 We ensure that all aspects of our work are properly monitored and evaluated to inform decision-making and future developments of work programmes. We engage with academics and leading experts in the UK and overseas to ensure that our programmes are based on the best available evidence. We have collaborated with a range of research organisations to evaluate projects in communities, have engaged with academics to improve our understanding of how terrorists use the internet to radicalise vulnerable individuals, and to inform how we can most effectively disrupt terrorist activity online.

106 Our work to tackle the causes of radicalisation and safeguard vulnerable people is having an impact. However, the shift in the nature of the terrorist threat demands a change in response.

107 Over the next three years, we will:

- Focus our activity and resources in those locations where the threat from terrorism and radicalisation is highest.
- Expand our Desistance and Disengagement Programme with an immediate aim over the next 12 months to more than double the number of individuals receiving rehabilitative interventions.
- Develop a series of multi-agency pilots to trial methods to improve our understanding of those at risk of involvement in terrorism and enable earlier intervention.
- Focus our online activity on preventing the dissemination of terrorist material and building strong counter-terrorist narratives in order to ensure there are no safe places for terrorists online.
- Build stronger partnerships with communities, civil society groups, public sector institutions and industry to improve Prevent delivery.
- Re-enforce safeguarding at the heart of Prevent to ensure our communities and families are not exploited or groomed into following a path of violent extremism.

Objective 1: Tackling the causes of radicalisation

108 Success over the next three years will mean that communities are more aware of and resilient to terrorist narratives, with responses tailored to local risks and that there are no safe places for terrorists online. Strong partnership working with communities, civil society groups, public sector institutions and industry is critical to tackling the causes of radicalisation and galvanise the rejection of terrorist narratives, both in local communities and online.

Communities

109 The cornerstone of Prevent is our local work with communities and civil society organisations. We support civil society organisations across the country to deliver a wide range of projects working with schools, families and in local communities to build their awareness of the risks of radicalisation, their resilience to terrorist narratives and propaganda, and to help them know what to do if they have concerns that someone may have been

radicalised. We support these groups to develop bespoke projects, best suited to tackle the threat from radicalisation in local communities, based on our collective analysis of the local threat picture in priority areas.

110 As part of building stronger community resilience we have been working to increase the diversity, capability and sustainability of our network of civil society organisations. We support small organisations, which have grown out of grassroots. We help some of these to develop a regional footprint by providing expert training and support on business management, while also working with some larger, more established charities.

Case study: London Tigers

London Tigers was founded over 30 years ago, by members of the South Asian community in London. Since then, the organisation has expanded to run youth development projects across the city, using sport as vehicle to reach out to young people, provide positive pathways and facilitate meaningful opportunities. Prevent has worked with London Tigers for several years, funding their 'Building Community Resilience' programme.

The project works with young people from hard-to-reach communities to build their resilience to radicalisation. In 2016/17 Building Community Resilience supported 1,078 young people that could be vulnerable to gangs, drugs or radicalisation.

London Tigers deliver activities designed to create an environment in which difficult issues can be discussed openly. They also run workshops aiming to challenge extremist narratives, including on theological grounds and to build critical thinking skills. They aim to build future community leaders who can continue to challenge extremism among their peers.

For individuals identified as most vulnerable to radicalisation, London Tigers also offer one-to-one interventions, helping improve recipients' critical thinking skills and deconstruct terrorist narratives.

Online

111 The internet is a powerful tool which terrorists exploit to radicalise, groom and recruit vulnerable individuals, and to incite and enable terrorist attacks. Terrorist groups make extensive use of different online platforms to communicate with thousands of individuals, spreading their pernicious ideology and propaganda. Our response is twofold: working with civil society groups to build their ability to challenge and counter-terrorist narratives online, and taking robust action to ensure there are no safe places for terrorists online by preventing the dissemination of online terrorist content.

112 Civil society groups provide credible voices to counter radicalising and extremist narratives. Our Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) helps these groups to amplify their voices both in communities and online. RICU brings together our civil society partners with industry experts to provide them with the digital and communications support they need to deliver their own campaigns. This support can include creative advice, production capabilities, website building, media training and public relations support.

Preventing terrorist use of the internet

The UK is at the forefront of the battle to tackle terrorist content online, working with the police, industry and international partners to swiftly remove such material from the internet. We set up the Police Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU), which has secured the removal of over 300,000 pieces of terrorist content from the internet by working with industry, and informed the design of Europol's EU Internet Referral Unit. Preventing terrorist use of the internet will be a Ministerially-led, global campaign that forms part of our overseas counter-terrorism approach, including through military disruption of terrorist media operations overseas.

To meet the pace and scale of the spread of terrorist propaganda online, we have been working with Communications Service Providers (CSPs) to improve their response to terrorist content on their platforms. Following the Westminster attack in March 2017, the then Home Secretary convened a roundtable with major industry players, including Facebook, Twitter, Google, and Microsoft, to see what more could be done to tackle terrorist content online. This led to the major companies setting up the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) – an international, industry-led forum to tackle terrorist content online. The then Home Secretary pressed the companies to do more to respond to the threat of terrorist content online, and to increase the use of technology to automate the detection and removal of content.

We want to see the GIFCT leading the cross-industry response, which includes removing content within one hour of upload, securing the prevention of re-uploads, and ultimately preventing new content being made available to users in the first place. We are encouraging CSPs through the GIFCT to develop and deploy technology which automatically identifies and removes online terrorist-related content. This problem does not only manifest itself on the largest platforms. The GIFCT is engaging smaller platforms and companies, many of whom do not have the capacity to respond to these threats themselves, and has assisted them to apply these new technological advances.

Objective 2: Early intervention: safeguarding and supporting those most at risk of radicalisation by identifying them and offering support.

113 Our aim is that all parts of the statutory system can address the risks of radicalisation appropriately, with the continued provision of the right timely support for those at risk of being drawn into terrorism. Over the next three years, we will provide Prevent training to a further one million people and work to increase the number of referrals that come from communities and friends and family. We will ensure all frontline practitioners understand the risk of radicalisation and know what to do if someone has concerns. We will embed our approach in core Government and local authority safeguarding systems and processes.

Prevent duty

114 We introduced the Prevent statutory duty through the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. The duty requires local authorities, schools, colleges, higher education institutions, health bodies, prisons and probation, and the police to consider the need to safeguard people from being drawn into terrorism. It sits alongside long-established duties on professionals to safeguard vulnerable people from exploitation from a range of other harms such as drugs, gangs and physical and sexual exploitation. The duty is designed to help ensure that vulnerable individuals who are at risk of radicalisation are supported as they would be under

other safeguarding processes. Prevent training has been completed over one million times. This training includes our Workshops to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP) and Prevent e-learning packages, which include case studies relating to both extreme right-wing and Islamist radicalisation, and provide information on support and safeguarding mechanisms.

Local authorities

115 Delivery of Prevent is locally led, and driven by analysis of the threat in communities. Local authorities are among the most vital partners in our network. The Prevent duty requires local authorities to establish or make use of existing multi-agency groups to assess the local picture, coordinate activity and to put in place arrangements to monitor the impact of safeguarding work. In priority areas where the risk of radicalisation is assessed as being highest, Prevent coordinators employed by local authorities build partnerships in communities, oversee the delivery of local action plans to respond to the risk of radicalisation, and work with partners to embed safeguarding activity in statutory services including social care, health and education. We have also been piloting a new approach where local authorities take a greater role in running our Channel programme (described in detail below), bringing the process more into line with common safeguarding procedures.

Health

116 Health workers and social care staff are the heart of safeguarding. We work closely with health professionals to ensure they have the information and guidance they need to respond appropriately to the risks of radicalisation.

117 While no links have been established between mental disorder and group-based terrorism, terrorists who act alone may be more likely to have a background that includes mental ill health. We worked with NHS England and the Royal College of Psychiatrists to develop guidance to ensure that those who have mental health issues and are at risk of radicalisation will be able to access the mental health support and treatment they need. This includes developing guidance and training for mental health professionals to improve identification of, and support to, those at risk of radicalisation. We are also establishing new ways of working to ensure that mental health professionals can work alongside Counter-Terrorism Policing officers, to manage those at risk of radicalisation with known or suspected mental health difficulties and disorders. Importantly, we make no assumption that an individual who carries out terrorist acts is suffering mental ill health, nor that someone with poor mental health is likely to carry out a terrorist act.

Education

118 Protecting pupils and students from radicalisation is part of the wider safeguarding duties of teachers, tutors and academics. The Prevent duty requires education providers to have clear policies in place to safeguard students and build their resilience to radicalisation in schools, further and higher education institutions. The network of Prevent Education Officers plays a key role in supporting schools in priority areas and informing the development of policy and practice nationally. We also fund regional coordinators to support the higher and further education sector and health bodies, reflecting the vital role the education sector plays in safeguarding vulnerable people against radicalisation.

Guidance available to education bodies

To support schools, the Department for Education and Home Office jointly developed a website called “Educate Against Hate” providing teachers, school leaders and parents with guidance and support they need to protect children from radicalisation and extremism.²⁴ The website also includes advice on how to keep children safe from extremist influences online. Prevent for Further Education and Training (hosted and run by Education and Training Foundation) supports the Further Education sector and Safe Campus Communities (hosted by Universities UK) supports the higher education sector.²⁵

119 The Prevent statutory duty does not restrict debate or free speech in schools, colleges and universities. Moreover, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act explicitly sets out that, alongside the duty, “a specified authority must have particular regard to the duty to ensure freedom of speech.” Our schools, colleges and universities should be places in which children and young people can understand and discuss sensitive topics. Encouraging free speech and open debate is one of our most powerful tools in promoting critical thinking and preventing terrorist and extremist narratives taking hold.

Police

120 The police play a critical role in delivering Prevent, developing local partnerships and bringing together a wide range of organisations in communities to support the local delivery of projects to protect individuals from radicalisation. The police provide specialist support and capabilities to manage risk and disrupt those who are of interest to the authorities due to their extremist views, or who have links to those engaged in terrorism-related activity.

121 The police ensure that Prevent is embedded into all aspects of policing, including patrol, neighbourhood and safeguarding functions. Police officers often come into contact with vulnerable people in society, including those linked to counter-terrorism investigations, and are therefore well placed to identify those who are vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism and refer them on to appropriate support. The police are also uniquely placed to engage and where appropriate disrupt radicalising activity, in partnership with other agencies, and using the full range of their powers and resources.

Prevent referrals

122 If a member of the public or a frontline worker has a concern about an individual who they think might be vulnerable to radicalisation, they can refer them for appropriate support or intervention. Referrals from the general public can be made to their local authority or local police force. We encourage public sector staff to use their existing safeguarding mechanisms in the first place to deal with such concerns, which can often be managed informally and without onward referral. We will do more to increase the proportion of referrals that come from communities and friends and families of vulnerable individuals – people who are often the first to have concerns.


123 All referrals are received by the police to consider whether the individual in question is already under investigation, if there is a genuine vulnerability and if that vulnerability is related to terrorism. Referrals are confidential. In many cases, no further action is required, or the vulnerability is assessed as not related to radicalisation and an onward referral is made for

24 Online at: <http://educateagainsthate.com/>

25 Online at: <http://preventforfeandtraining.org.uk/>

other support as needed. Information on individuals referred to Prevent is only ever shared in accordance with data protection legislation. Like any safeguarding mechanism, if information emerges from the Channel process that a person poses a threat to themselves or others, that information will be shared appropriately with relevant partners, including the police, to enable appropriate intervention to take place to prevent harm.

Fig. 2.5: The referral process into Channel



Channel

124 If an individual is assessed to be vulnerable to radicalisation, they may be offered support through the Channel programme in England and Wales²⁶, or the Prevent Professional Concerns (PPC) programme in Scotland. These are multi-agency programmes designed to safeguard and support vulnerable individuals at risks of being drawn into terrorism. Channel is run in every local authority in England and Wales and addresses all types of extremism, including extreme right-wing and Islamist-related.

125 For those referrals where the police assess that there is a risk of radicalisation, a Channel panel – which is chaired by the local authority and made up of representatives from different safeguarding areas including health, education and the police – will meet to discuss each case and carefully assess the extent of the potential vulnerability of the individual. Sometimes the person does not need any help at all, and the referral is closed. In other cases the panel will offer the individual a support package tailored to their needs. Support could

26 Prevent is delivered through devolved services within the Welsh Government

include assistance with education or employment, health support or ideological mentoring to provide vulnerable individuals with the skills to protect themselves from being drawn into terrorism-related activity or supporting terrorism.

126 Participation in Channel is **entirely voluntary**. People who do not consent to receive support through Channel, or who decide to leave the programme before the Channel panel decides they are ready, may be offered alternative forms of support by the local authority or other providers, and any terrorist risk is managed by the police.

127 In 2016/17, a total of 6,093 individuals were referred to Prevent. Of these, 45% were signposted to alternative support, 36% required no further action and 19% were discussed at Channel panels. 332 people received Channel support following a Channel panel and 79% of these left the process having been assessed as posing no further terrorist-related concerns. In March 2018, we published, for the second time, statistics on individuals who receive support from the Channel programme.²⁷ We plan to publish these statistics annually as part of wider efforts to increase the transparency of Prevent delivery.

Case Studies²⁸

Callum's teacher became aware of his involvement in promoting the far-right on Facebook

Callum was a teenager whose teacher became aware of his involvement in promoting a far-right Facebook page, which had upset another student. He had been invited to “secret” group meetings connected to football games. Without family influence around he was getting attention and social support through his involvement in this group. He said he didn’t have a problem with most people – just Muslims: Muslims were not like “us”. He said he’d watch them all “doing their Sharia law.” Through the Channel process, the school worked with the police, social care and a local youth group to support him through challenging the ideology he had developed, providing him with careers advice, and connecting him to an ethnically diverse local youth group. His confidence grew, as did the bond with his family. He dismissed the ideology that he had connected himself to and realises he had been heading down the wrong path.

Yusuf was seen handing out leaflets promoting a website containing extremist, homophobic and violent material

Yusuf was at University and was aged 24 when a university staff member saw him handing out leaflets which, it turned out, were promoting a website containing extremist, homophobic and violent material. She got in touch with the university Prevent coordinator who contacted the police. Yusuf was spoken to by student services and police, who felt that he was at risk of being drawn into terrorism. Yusuf had become befriended by older radicalised men through late night discussions and weekend meetings and started to identify with extremist ideology, but he was confused. Yusuf began to move away from extremism after receiving chaplaincy and psychological support through Channel. He has now successfully completed his studies.

27 <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-statistics>

28 The case studies are real and the names of the individuals have been changed to protect their privacy.

Objective 3: Rehabilitation: enabling those who have already engaged in terrorism to disengage and rehabilitate

128 The shift in the nature of the terrorist threat, as shown by the 2017 attacks, has led to a deeper consideration of the links and touch-points between Prevent and other elements of the counter-terrorism system, notably Pursue. As a result, we are increasing the emphasis on this third objective, which aims to reduce re-offending and improve the reintegration of those already engaged in terrorism or who support it. Through the piloting of new multi-agency approaches, our response to the threat of extremism and radicalisation in prisons, the development of the new Desistance and Disengagement Programme, and our work with returners from conflict zones such as Syria and Iraq (described in the Pursue section), we are working to reduce the risk from terrorism through rehabilitation and reintegration. Success over the next three years will mean more people are disengaged and rehabilitated from terrorism. For example, the Desistance and Disengagement Programme will aim to more than double its current capacity to accommodate up to 230 individuals over the next 12 months.

Desistance and Disengagement Programme

129 The Desistance and Disengagement Programme (DDP) is a new element of our Prevent work. The programme has been running in pilot through 2017, focusing on people subject to court approved conditions, including all terrorism and terrorism-related offenders on probation licence, as well as those on Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs) and those who have returned from conflict zones in Syria or Iraq and are subject to Temporary Exclusion Orders (TEOs). Where mandated for individuals subject to TEOs, TPIMs or probation requirements, non-compliance could lead to the possibility of being charged for breach of conditions or being recalled to prison.

130 The DDP reflects increasing collaboration across different elements of the counter-terrorism system, notably Prevent and Pursue. Through the DDP, we provide a range of intensive tailored interventions and practical support, designed to tackle the drivers of radicalisation around universal needs for identity, self-esteem, meaning and purpose; as well as to address personal grievances that the extremist narrative has exacerbated. Support could include mentoring, psychological support, theological and ideological advice. We are working with academics to inform development of the DDP.

Managing risks from terrorist offenders

Prisons are unique environments in which individuals may be vulnerable to extremists. In April 2017, the Home Office and Ministry of Justice established a joint unit to strengthen our response to the threat of extremism and terrorism in prisons and among those on probation. In England and Wales (separate arrangements are in place in Scotland), approximately 700 prisoners are managed at any one time who have been identified as engaged in terrorism or extremism, or about whom there are extremism concerns. This involves dealing with a wide range of offenders, from highly motivated terrorists and organised criminals convicted of extremely serious offences, to those with mental health issues or other vulnerabilities. We identify the risk and needs of each offender of concern both in prison and on probation and provide a range of interventions, from psychological support and mentoring to education provision.

All those convicted of terrorism-related offences are managed as part of a multi-agency case management process. This process, informed by law enforcement assessments, enables the risk that this cohort presents to be managed proactively. For those offenders that pose the most significant risk of radicalisation of other prisoners, Her Majesty's Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) has introduced two specialist Separation Centres at HMP Frankland and HMP Full Sutton. These centres help safeguard the mainstream prison population. In addition, the National Prisons Intelligence Coordination Centre (NPICC), launched in November 2015, continues to improve our understanding of the risk terrorist offenders pose while in prison and upon release.

Terrorist offenders on probation are managed according to both the risk they pose to the public and their rehabilitative needs. All are managed through the Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA), led by National Probation Service (NPS) and police, with input from prisons, regional police-led Counter-Terrorism Units and other public service partners. Probation puts in place a range of interventions to rehabilitate and manage the risk posed by terrorist offenders. All terrorist offenders in prisons and subject to probation requirements may be required to attend interventions as part of the DDP.

Multi-agency working

David Anderson QC's report on the 2017 attacks, and the underlying MI5 and Counter-Terrorism Policing reviews recommended that information on those who are (or have been) of interest to the police and the security and intelligence agencies, given their possible involvement in terrorist related activities, be shared with a greater range of partners with the aim of preventing similar attacks in the future. In response, we are establishing pilots in London, the West Midlands and Greater Manchester to test a new multi-agency approach that brings together national, regional and local partners with the common aim of improving our understanding of the risk and enabling early, effective local intervention.

Multi-agency centre pilots

Last year's attacks in London and Manchester highlighted both the challenge of detecting individuals who may be inspired to commit terrorist acts in the UK, and the pace at which plots can move to acts of violence. This places a renewed importance on our understanding of those individuals who are vulnerable to radicalisation or who are (or have been) of interest to the police and the security and intelligence agencies due to their possible links to terrorist-related activities, but who may not be currently the subject of any active investigations. Responding to this changing threat requires a new approach, one that combines improved intelligence sharing with a more effective local approach that allows effective early interventions to protect the public.

MI5, Counter-Terrorism Policing and the Home Office are establishing a series of Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) pilots to trial a new domestic operational model that addresses this shift in threat. The MAC pilots will test multi-agency approaches, at both national and local level, trialling different ways of sharing information with a broader range of partners, including government departments and local authorities, to enrich the UK's overall understanding of the risk we face. By alerting a greater number of agencies with better information about the local threat, we will improve the breadth and scale of interventions that both help safeguard those who are at risk of radicalisation and work to ensure those who have supported or been involved in terrorist related activities disengage.

Looking beyond the threat posed by individuals, the pilots also provide an opportunity to enhance our activities locally within the Prepare and Protect work strands, using an improved understanding of the local threat picture, to allow improvements in public protection and local emergency response.

Throughout the pilots there will be a spirit of experimentation and rigorous evaluation, designed to drive an innovative approach that addresses the challenges we now face.

Pursue

131 The **purpose** of our Pursue work is to stop terrorist attacks happening in this country and against UK interests overseas. Conviction in court and imprisonment is the most effective way to stop and deter terrorists and deliver justice for their victims. Success therefore means that the police and prosecuting authorities are able to detect, investigate and then secure convictions in terrorist cases, or otherwise disrupt terrorist activity.

132 A strong independent oversight regime is in place to reassure the public that the significant powers and capabilities available to the police and the security and intelligence agencies are used proportionately and appropriately.

Pursue objectives

133 The **objectives** of Pursue are to:

- Detect and understand terrorist activity.
- Investigate terrorist activity.
- Disrupt terrorist activity, including through prosecutions.

Capabilities and commitments

134 Successful Pursue counter-terrorism work is underpinned by the very close partnerships between Counter-Terrorism Policing and the security and intelligence agencies and, overseas, with the Armed Forces. We have developed and continue to strengthen a network of police-led Counter-Terrorism Units based around the UK, which bring together in one place the resources necessary to detect and investigate terrorist activity. Following the 2015 SDSR, we invested further in the counter-terrorism capabilities of these organisations and we will continue to ensure they have the resources needed to deal with the shift in the terrorist threat.

135 We are already investing £1.4 billion in new counter-terrorism capabilities for the security and intelligence agencies as part of our SDSR commitments. This will allow the recruitment of 1,900 officers to support our national security effort. To meet the recent change in threat, which has seen a 30% increase in the number of active investigations²⁹, the Government has allocated an additional £50m funding to Counter-Terrorism Policing in 2018/19, in addition to up to £28m in 2017/18 to meet the immediate costs of responding to the terrorist attacks in London and Manchester.

136 Counter-Terrorism Policing and the security and intelligence agencies have a range of tactical and technical capabilities at their disposal to disrupt terrorist activity, including covert human intelligence sources, surveillance assets and the lawful intercept of communications. In addition to these capabilities, we also use a wide range of tools to constrain the ability of terrorists to act, for example working to proscribe organisations, freeze and seize their financial assets, and break up networks and associations in prison. All these capabilities are used in accordance with the law and involve careful consideration of the necessity and proportionality of their use commensurate to the terrorism threat.

137 We will continue to ensure that the capabilities the police and the security and intelligence agencies use to keep the country safe are underpinned by a robust legal framework. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 ensures that law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies have the powers they need to detect, investigate and disrupt crime

29 <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/home-affairs-committee/policing-for-the-future/oral/71956.html>

including terrorist attacks, subject to strict safeguards and oversight. The Act consolidated existing investigatory powers. It also created one new power allowing for the ability to require the retention of Internet Connection Records.

138 The Investigatory Powers Act also maintains existing powers in relation to encryption. Encryption is at the heart of the digital economy, helping to support the security and privacy of law-abiding citizens as they do their banking online, transfer files and send messages instantaneously across the globe. However there is a particular problem with terrorists and criminals abusing end-to-end encrypted services. We do not want unfettered access to communications, but we must ensure our agencies are able to access the information they need to keep us safe.

139 The Act provides for an obligation to be imposed on a telecommunications operator to maintain the capability to remove encryption or provide data in an intelligible form when they are served with a warrant, notice or authorisation. Such an obligation may only be imposed where it is necessary and proportionate, and must be authorised by both a Secretary of State and a Judicial Commissioner. We expect the importance of tackling the challenges posed by encryption to grow and we are committed to working with industry to ensure law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies can access the data and communications they need to prevent terrorist attacks and to tackle crime.

140 Over the next three years, we will:

- Implement a step-change in our domestic investigative capabilities through implementing the recommendations of MI5 and CT Policing's Operational Improvement Review.
- Introduce new counter-terrorism legislation to disrupt terrorist threats in the UK earlier, taking account of the scale of the threat and the speed at which plots are now developing.
- As set out in the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, we are recruiting and training over 1,900 additional staff across the security and intelligence agencies.
- Develop a series of multi-agency pilots to trial ways to improve information sharing and enrich our understanding of the threat at the local level, including of closed and closing subjects of interest.³⁰
- Bring foreign fighters to justice in accordance with due legal process if there is evidence that crimes have been committed, regardless of their nationality.
- Maintain our use of enhanced legislative tools to target and disrupt terrorist finance.
- Ensure we maintain our global reach to disrupt those that directly threaten the UK or UK interests.
- Ensure strong independent oversight of our counter-terrorism work, including publishing annual reports by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, the Biometrics Commissioner and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.

30 These are individuals who have previously been investigated by Counter-Terrorism Policing and MI5, a small proportion of whom may at some stage present again a terrorism threat.

Objective 1: Detect and understand terrorist activity

141 Our primary Pursue objective in stopping terrorist attacks is to effectively discover and then identify terrorist threats to the UK and our interests. Our ability to detect and understand that activity is crucial to keeping the public safe. This section outlines the ways we will continue to do this over the next three years.

142 Success over the next three years will mean the police, security and intelligence agencies are better able to detect terrorist activity (including individuals of national security concern to the UK who are overseas), and we have reduced the space for terrorists to operate through improved operational working at the local level and closing off terrorist funding.

143 We and the police and the security and intelligence agencies will continue to develop capabilities to ensure we can collect and analyse terrorist communications and their use of digital media in order to detect threats. This investment will be done in partnership and in accordance with the requirements of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 for acquiring, holding and using such information.

144 We will enhance our capability to detect new and emerging threats through long-term investment in data analysis tools and information-sharing systems across the Counter-Terrorism Policing network and the security and intelligence agencies, for example databases and computer networks. This includes a transformed approach to the management of intelligence within Counter-Terrorism Policing and with partners, further protecting the public from harm. The multi-agency pilot work described in the Prevent section above will also enrich the UK's intelligence picture and improve our understanding of the risk we face, allowing the police and security and intelligence agencies to detect earlier patterns and trends in terrorist activity, creating opportunities for earlier investigation and disruption.

145 To ensure our detection capability is effective, we are improving our ability to acquire and use data to confidently identify new threats. We will do this in two ways: by better pooling data held by the police, security and intelligence agencies, and other public sector partners, for example using bulk data sets; and by increasing our cooperation with the private sector where data held by external organisations may assist with the detection and prevention of terrorist-related activity, such as the purchase of explosive precursors. Where access to this data generates new intelligence leads we will develop strategies, technical solutions and improved processes to manage them in the context of already high volumes of threat reporting.

146 At the border, Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 permits specially trained police officers to stop and question (and when necessary, detain and search), without suspicion, any individual travelling through a port of entry or the border area, to determine whether that person appears to be someone who is or has been involved in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. More detail on the use of Schedule 7 powers is provided in the Protect section.

147 The Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce (JMLIT) was set up in 2015 to create an environment in which the financial sector, Government and law enforcement can exchange and analyse information and intelligence to better detect the movement of terrorist funds. Increasing collaboration between Government and the private sector in this way helps protect the UK from terrorism and its effects. Within the JMLIT, the Terrorist Finance Experts Group was established to support the exchange and analysis of terrorist finance information. Comprised of members from Government, law enforcement and the financial sector, the Group will support thematic pieces of work in order to better understand the typologies and

methodologies that support the financing of terrorism. JMLIT members have also provided support for counter-terrorism investigations, including the investigations into the terrorist attacks in Manchester and London last year.

148 There is also a significant role for the general public in detecting and preventing terrorism. Counter-Terrorism Policing's ACT (Action Counters Terrorism) public communications campaign seeks to encourage citizens to look out for suspicious activity and behaviour and report it to the police. The first ACT campaign led to a 55% increase in calls to the police Anti-Terrorist Hotline and increased levels of awareness of what to look out for. Further campaigns under the ACT banner will be delivered in the coming years. Effective communication can also help to reduce the likely success of terrorist activity and help to reduce the legitimacy and impact of attacks on society.

Objective 2: Investigate terrorist activity

149 Once terrorist activity has been detected and understood, the police and security and intelligence agencies will investigate that activity to determine the nature and severity of the threat posed to the public. The ways in which we will continue to meet this objective are covered in the following section.

150 The security and intelligence agencies and Counter-Terrorism Policing are implementing more than 100 recommendations made by their Operational Improvement Review. This work includes making improvements to the use of data to enhance their ability to detect activity of concern, and testing new approaches in the acquisition, sharing and analysis of data. The new multi-agency operational approach being piloted (see Multi-agency working box on page 42) will also help to reduce the risks posed by closed and closing subjects of interest.³¹

151 The specialist Counter-Terrorism Policing National Digital Exploitation Service (NDES) was established in 2016 to address the growing challenge facing the police to provide the digital evidence required to secure convictions for the most dangerous terrorists. The typical terrorist investigation involves approximately ten terabytes of material, only a fraction of which can currently be assessed before a decision is required on whether or not to charge an individual. The NDES will continue to improve the technical support provided to operational staff, with a programme being established to develop new digital intelligence and evidence capabilities.

152 Many of the skills, resources, data, and analytical abilities that Government and law enforcement need to prevent terrorist attacks are increasingly owned by the private sector. We will therefore prioritise our collaboration with private sector companies, improving shared understanding of the threat and the requirements of relevant UK legislation, whilst being clear what we need from them in order to protect the public. For example, we will continue to work closely with Communications Service Providers in the UK and overseas to intercept the communications of terrorist suspects. Such cooperation is underpinned by a strict authorisation and oversight regime under the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. We will also continue to work with the private sector to develop innovative digital forensic techniques that keep pace with advances in digital technology.

153 Terrorists, particularly overseas, depend on financial flows to fund attacks, sustain their networks and recruit new members. Depriving terrorists of funds is therefore one mechanism to impede their operations. Efforts to counter serious and organised crime, including criminal finance, money laundering and identity fraud, have a clear benefit in helping to investigate and disrupt terrorism. We will continue to act against fundraising for terrorist organisations

31 Individuals who are no longer under active investigation by the security and intelligence agencies.

and terrorist financing, including by freezing terrorists' assets, working closely with the finance sector. The UK's most recent National Risk Assessment of the risks and vulnerabilities to the UK of money laundering and terrorist financing was published in November 2017.³²

154 Our Action Plan for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist finance was published in April 2016.³³ This programme of work represents the most significant change to our anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist finance investigation regimes in over a decade. The Criminal Finances Act 2017 (CFA) gives law enforcement agencies and partners new powers to investigate and disrupt terrorist financing, money laundering and criminal finance. It enhances the ability of the UK's regulated sector to share information when there are suspicions of involvement in these crimes. The CFA also amends the Terrorism Act 2000 to create the role of Counter-Terrorism Financial Investigator. This enables Counter-Terrorism Policing to make better use of their workforce by extending certain financial investigative powers, previously reserved for constables, to civilian financial investigators.

155 In addition, the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 provides a framework for allowing, where appropriate, sanctions currently implemented through the EU to take effect in the UK. This includes counter-terrorism sanctions. It also provides for the UK to exercise sanctions powers autonomously, replacing the powers contained in the Terrorist Asset Freezing etc. Act 2010.

156 The attacks in Manchester and Parsons Green in 2017 demonstrated that home-made explosives are a weapon of choice for terrorists. We have developed world-class forensic laboratories, which provide the police with the necessary capabilities to analyse evidence associated with a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosive (CBRNE) event and ensure we can bring to justice those involved in terrorism. We will continue to invest in these capabilities to ensure the scientific and forensic expertise is sustained and made available through the National Network of Laboratories, Conventional Forensic Analysis Capability, and the Forensic Explosive Laboratory. Our capabilities to detect and disrupt CBRNE terrorist activity are described in the Protect section below.

157 The nature of terrorist activities means our Pursue activity involves work both domestically and overseas. Further detail of our overseas disruption activity is described in the Overseas section.

Objective 3: Disrupt terrorist activity, including through prosecutions

158 Disruption of terrorist activity before an attack can be carried out in the UK or against our citizens and interests overseas is the collective outcome of all of our Pursue work. This section outlines the many ways which we will continue to disrupt terrorist activity, and in particular where there is sufficient evidence to support a prosecution for terrorism offences how the police and Crown Prosecution Service work together to disrupt terrorist activity using the full power of the law.

159 Success over the next three years will mean we maintain the increased levels of disruption of terrorist operations in line with the anticipated heightened threat, ultimately reducing it. This will require capabilities and partnerships that can act at pace. We want individuals and groups to be deterred from attack planning given the high chance of failure and prosecution. We aim over the next three years to deliver an increased number of

32 Online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-risk-assessment-of-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-2017>

33 Online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/action-plan-for-anti-money-laundering-and-counter-terrorist-finance>

prosecutions against terrorists in line with the growth in the threat, with operational partners and the prosecuting authorities having the necessary capabilities to build evidence during investigations to secure convictions. We will also develop a broad and deep public-private partnership to enable us to track and disrupt terrorist finances, building on the Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce (JMLIT). This will include reform of the Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) regime to counter criminal financing, to reduce tick-box compliance and enable us collectively to focus on the highest threats.

Legal Powers

160 We have a range of legal tools to disrupt those who engage in terrorism-related activity. Legislation provides for various terrorism offences in the Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Acts of 2000, 2006, 2008 and 2015. In addition, the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 provides the Home Secretary with a mechanism for dealing with terrorist suspects who we cannot prosecute or deport. The Government has also legislated to freeze and where appropriate forfeit the assets of terrorists in the Terrorist Asset Freezing etc Act 2010, and the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. In addition to the offences found in these Acts, the police and Crown Prosecution Service will continue to investigate and prosecute terrorists, where appropriate, for other criminal offences to effectively disrupt their activity.

161 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 introduces a range of measures to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of police forces. A new offence for breach of pre-charge bail conditions related to travel in terrorism-related cases was created. The Act also enhances powers to allow for the retention of biometrics data where a person has a previous conviction overseas for any offence, as well as within the UK. It also improves police powers by creating a power of entry to premises to seize passports that have been cancelled under the Royal Prerogative public interest criteria, in relation to national security.

162 We will continue to review counter-terrorism legislation and, in line with the shift in the threat and operating environment, we intend to introduce new counter-terrorism legislation in Parliament. This legislation will seek to amend existing terrorism legislation to enable earlier disruption using investigations, longer prison sentences and stronger management of terrorist offenders following their release. It will also include measures to update current legislation to capture terrorist conduct in the modern digital age.

163 We will also continue to use our proscription powers against terrorist organisations that engage in acts of terrorism and those which unlawfully glorify terrorism committed by others. Proscription makes membership and support for proscribed organisations illegal, and supports other disruptive activities including immigration disruptions. Our latest list of the groups and their reasons for proscription are publicly available.³⁴ In total, 88 terrorist organisations are currently proscribed in the UK, 14 of them with links to Northern Ireland.

Prosecuting terrorists and securing convictions


164 We consider the police and prosecuting authorities' ability to secure convictions in terrorist cases an important measure of success in stopping acts of terrorism. In the year ending 31 December 2017, the Crown Prosecution Service conducted 86 trials for

34 Online at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/612076/20170503_Proscription.pdf

terrorism-related offences in England and Wales, an increase of 39% from the previous year. Of the 86 persons proceeded against, 90% were convicted. In the remaining eight cases the defendant was acquitted.³⁵

165 We will ensure the Crown Prosecution Service and the judiciary have the capacity to manage the increase in counter-terrorism prosecutions and civil litigation, which we anticipate as a result of the increased threat and the action we are taking to disrupt terrorists. The Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service will also continue to review capacity in Scotland.

Fig 2.6: Terrorism-related arrests and outcomes, year ending 30 December 2017



Source: Home Office. Excludes convictions that were later quashed on appeal

Terrorist travellers

166 Our comprehensive approach to managing the risks posed by terrorist travellers demonstrates the links between our Prevent and Pursue work strands and how Pursue capabilities combine to fulfil our objectives to detect, investigate and disrupt terrorist activities.

167 More than 900 individuals of national security concern from the UK have travelled to engage with the conflict in Syria. Of these, approximately 20% have been killed whilst overseas and around 40% have returned to the UK. The majority of those who have returned, did so in the earlier stages of the conflict, and were investigated on their return. A significant proportion of these individuals are assessed as no longer being of national security concern.

168 Many of the most dangerous individuals remain overseas. They may have received training, indoctrination, and expanded their network of terrorist contacts, and therefore pose significant challenges for the security and intelligence agencies and for law enforcement. These individuals remain a significant threat to the UK and our interests overseas.

35 Online at: www.gov.uk/government/statistics/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-quarterly-update-to-december-2017. This data is based on the trial completion date and is not directly comparable to the prosecutions data in Fig. 2.4

169 We stop individuals suspected of wishing to engage in terrorism from travelling overseas to Syria and Iraq. This crucial work includes, amongst others, police officers, social workers and education professionals. Since 2015, around 100 children have been safeguarded by the courts from being taken to conflict areas in Syria and Iraq. Through our role in the Global Coalition to defeat Daesh, and our close work with the UN and partners including the Government of Turkey, we manage the threat from people travelling to and returning from the Syrian conflict zone. Work by the security and intelligence agencies to penetrate terrorist groups overseas has enabled us – working with our partners – to disrupt and detain individuals planning to return from Syria to the UK and Europe to carry out attacks, including in third countries to which they travel.

170 We use the full range of capabilities available to disrupt and manage the return of individuals from the conflict zone. Where appropriate, we will also use nationality and immigration powers to deprive individuals of their British citizenship and to exclude foreign nationals from the UK whose presence here would not be conducive to the public good. The Government introduced the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act in 2015 in response to the growing trend of UK nationals travelling overseas to engage in terrorism. Through this Act we introduced further measures that disrupt the ability of people to travel abroad, and to return to the UK, including the lawful temporary seizure of passports at the border, and the introduction of Temporary Exclusion Orders (TEOs). These powers support important police capabilities to manage the risk from potential travellers and are operationally vital.³⁶

171 Individuals who have travelled to the conflict zone must expect to be investigated by the police to determine if they have committed criminal offences and to ensure that they do not pose a threat to our national security. There have already been high profile prosecutions of individuals who have returned from the conflict zone.

Syria returners illustrative example

In 2015, a British woman travels to join Daesh. In 2017 the individual flees Daesh-held territory with a new born baby and they make their way to Turkey. On arrival in Turkey the mother and the child are detained for entering the country illegally.

Following the mother's detention the British authorities are notified. DNA testing of the child is conducted to establish their entitlement to a British passport. Given that the mother has lived in Daesh-held territory, the Home Secretary and a judge approve the use of a Temporary Exclusion Order (TEO) to manage her return to the UK. The TEO allows us to specify the route of return to the UK and to impose obligations upon the individual once they return to help protect members of the public from a risk of terrorism.

The mother and her child are subsequently deported to the UK from Turkey via the route specified by the TEO. On arrival in the UK the police launch an investigation into the woman's activities in Syria to determine whether any crimes have been committed. If there is evidence that a crime has been committed then the mother will be charged and the Crown Prosecution Service will conduct criminal proceedings. If there is no evidence of criminality, the mother is assisted in reintegrating into society, for example, by requiring her to attend a series of sessions with a specially trained de-radicalisation mentor. In the meantime the mother is also obliged – as part of her TEO – to report regularly to a police

36 HM Government Transparency Report 2017: Disruptive and Investigatory Powers 2017, online at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/593668/58597_Cm_9420_Transparency_report_web.pdf

station and to notify the Home Office of any change of address. The local authority is involved to ensure that the child is not at immediate risk and appropriate measures are put in place to help safeguard the child's welfare.

172 Only a very small number of travellers have returned in the last two years and most of those have been women with young children. Managing the risks from travellers combines interventions from our Prevent and Pursue work strands. We use the expertise built up through Prevent to mitigate the risk they may pose by challenging their views or tailoring our response as appropriate. This can include mandating attendance on the Desistance and Disengagement Programme. Many will be subject to post-traumatic stress, which may impact their future behaviour if not addressed. Children may meet statutory thresholds for social care, or new born children may have experienced poor care after being born in Daesh controlled territory. In order to ensure that their needs and risks are addressed, the Home Office and Department for Education have been working with local authorities and external organisations to ensure support is available to local authorities dealing with this small number of returning families, including that suitable advocates are available for children to act in their best interest and ensure there are responsible adults engaged in their lives.

Strong independent oversight

173 Underpinning everything that we do to meet our Pursue objectives are several layers of robust and independent oversight, ensuring that the powers and capabilities at our disposal remain proportionate and necessary, providing the public confidence in how they are used and how they can be challenged. This section outlines those layers of oversight in more detail.

174 The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (IRTL) provides a robust challenge to the Government and police, and vigorous independent oversight to ensure that the legislation is fair, proportionate and effective. The former Independent Reviewer, David Anderson QC, handed over his responsibilities to Max Hill QC who took up the role on 1 March 2017. In his final annual report, Mr Anderson concluded that “the overall picture seems to me to be one of appropriately strong laws, responsibly implemented and keenly scrutinised by Parliament and by the courts”.³⁷ In his first report as IRTL, published in January 2018, Max Hill QC has continued to review how our counter-terrorism laws are applied and has made several recommendations that the Government is currently reviewing.

175 An important element of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 was to merge the previous functions of the Interception of Communications Commissioner, the Intelligence Services Commissioner and the Chief Surveillance Commissioner, into a single Investigatory Powers Commissioner. Properly resourced and supported by Judicial Commissioners, technical and legal experts, and administrative staff, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner will provide enhanced oversight of the exercise of investigatory powers covered by the Act. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner, Sir Adrian Fulford, formally took on oversight responsibilities on 1 September 2017. The final annual reports of the previous Commissioners were published on 20 December 2017.³⁸

37 Online at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-terrorism-acts-in-2015

38 Online at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/report-of-the-interception-of-communications-commissioner-annual-report-2016 www.gov.uk/government/publications/report-of-the-intelligence-services-commissioner-for-2016 www.gov.uk/government/publications/office-of-surveillance-commissioners-annual-report-2016

176 The Investigatory Powers Tribunal is a judicial body independent of government. It is presided over by a senior judge and its members include judges and senior QCs from throughout the UK. The Tribunal provides a right of redress for anyone who believes they have been a victim of unlawful action by a public authority improperly using covert investigative techniques. The Tribunal is also the appropriate forum to consider complaints about any “conduct” by or on behalf of MI5, SIS and GCHQ as well as claims alleging the infringement of human rights. It will continue to perform these important functions. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 strengthened the provisions governing the Tribunal by providing a new right of appeal from decisions and determinations of the Tribunal in circumstances where there is a point of law that raises an important point of principle or practice, or where there is some other compelling reason for allowing an appeal. The Government is currently taking forward work to facilitate bringing into force the right of appeal provisions; we expect this to be completed later in 2018.

177 The Government and law enforcement agencies will continue to engage with civil society, in particular with charities that deliver aid to fragile and conflict affected countries, to ensure that their oversight and compliance regimes fulfill their obligations under counter-terrorism legislation while they carry out their important functions in delivering humanitarian relief.

178 We will continue to support the work of the Biometrics Commissioner who oversees the retention of biometric data by the police for national security reasons, to ensure that this is in accordance with the law.

179 The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament will continue to provide Parliamentary oversight of the intelligence and security activities of the Government, including the security and intelligence agencies.

180 We will also continue to publish an annual Government Transparency Report, to ensure that the public can access a comprehensive guide to the full range of disruptive and investigatory powers used to disrupt national security threats in the UK.

Protect

181 The **purpose** of our Protect work is to keep the public safe by strengthening our protection against a terrorist attack in the UK or against our interests overseas, and so reduce our vulnerability. We aim to have an effective multi-layered defence to protect against an attack, reducing illicit access to the material needed for an attack including increasing the timeliness of suspicious transaction reports, whilst also protecting the UK's public spaces, transport and infrastructure that are most at risk of attack, and making full use of our powers and capabilities at the border.

182 Success over the next three years will mean that our partnerships with industry provide faster data sharing. We are both working to design out threats, including using science-based and technological solutions to remove or mitigate risk in a range of sectors. We have both put in place the ability to scale our work to meet the changing threat, including overseas and at the local level. Our awareness raising means the public are alert to the threat and, together with technology advancements, we have effectively raised standards of security across the UK's crowded places. The UK has driven up new global standards on aviation.

Protect objectives

183 The **objectives** of Protect are to:

- Detect and deal with suspected terrorists and harmful materials at the border.
- Reduce the risk to and improve the resilience of global aviation, other transport sectors and critical national infrastructure most at risk to terror attack.
- Reduce the vulnerability of crowded places, specific vulnerable groups, and high profile individuals.
- Detect and prevent terrorist access to and use of materials of concern, knowledge and information that could be used to conduct attacks.

Capabilities and commitments

184 The UK has world-leading capabilities to protect people and places from terrorism. At the border, the UK conducts checks to identify individuals of interest and has developed the use of biometric visas, advance passenger information and the Authority to Carry (“No Fly”) scheme, to prevent individuals of concern travelling to the UK. The border is a unique intervention point. We carry out 100% checks on passengers arriving at the border on scheduled services from outside of the Common Travel Area (CTA) in order to identify any criminal, security and immigration concerns. All law enforcement agencies work closely together and have powers of intervention through Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000.

185 Government assures the security of flights in, from and to the UK through ensuring a complex system of complementary and overlapping security measures is in place. In the UK, we ensure that airports have world-class technologies and procedures to identify attempts to bring dangerous items onto aircraft. Overseas, we work with partners to assure, and where necessary, improve security standards at airports. We keep these measures under continuous review to ensure that they are effective and proportionate. The Armed Forces also play a vital role in the UK's aviation security. RAF aircraft can be launched in minutes to intercept any unidentified or unauthorised aircraft compromising UK airspace.

186 We also work with industry across a range of transport sectors and other critical national infrastructure to keep the public safe. Numbers of armed officers patrolling stations and trains have increased. We have well-established security and resilience programmes in place to

protect our Critical National Infrastructure. Police Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers based in every police region provide specialised security advice and guidance to the owners of crowded places and event operators. We have legislation to ensure the security of substances that could be used to conduct attacks and capabilities to detect terrorist activity.

187 In response to attacks in 2017, the Government has provided additional funding to the police to increase the National Barrier Asset (NBA), which is made up of a range of Hostile Vehicle Mitigation equipment, security fences and gates that enable temporary physical protection of sites from vehicle attacks.

188 Over the next three years, we will:

- Collate and analyse greater volumes of high quality data to enhance our ability to target known and previously unknown persons and goods of potential counter-terrorism concern.
- Maintain the UK at the forefront of developing world leading screening and detection technologies at the border, including behavioural detection, new detection techniques, data analytics and machine learning.
- Target the insider threat by strengthening information-sharing about those working in sensitive environments in airports, to ensure that persons of concern do not have access to restricted environments.
- Further strengthen security and resilience across the UK's transport network and other parts of our critical national infrastructure that keep our country running and provide essential services.
- Work in partnership with the aviation industry and international partners to deliver robust and sustainable aviation security in the UK and overseas.
- Improve security at crowded places through closer, more effective working with a wider range of local authority and private sector responsible partners.
- Enhance capabilities to detect terrorist activity involving Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE) material and their precursors and to control and safeguard these materials.

Objective 1: Detect and deal with suspected terrorists and harmful materials at the border

189 The border starts overseas, including checks and interventions in advance of travel, as well as at the physical border and in country. Success over the next three years will mean that we continue to develop new capabilities and approaches to meet forecasts of increasing volumes of passengers and goods crossing the border, with a focus on prevention and data-led upstream new detection technologies.

Using passenger and freight data

190 More and better data about passengers and freight will improve the accuracy and timeliness of our interventions at the border. Passenger and freight data on all routes to and from the UK, which is provided by the aviation, maritime and rail sectors. We will improve this data and upgrade our analysis systems to meet future demand, improving interoperability between systems and our ability to process increased volumes of information. We will improve how our targeting capabilities work with those deployed by our priority international partners. We will expand the use of biometric technologies to increase identity assurance, and through robust verification processes, increase our ability to identify those using false or fraudulently obtained documents.

Aviation Passenger Data

We process passenger and freight data provided before arrival in or departure from the UK to identify and intercept potential threats and to safeguard vulnerable individuals.

Advance passenger information (API) is now received from carriers for all scheduled aviation routes to and from the UK, other than within the Common Travel Area. This enables checks against to take place at the National Border Targeting Centre prior to travel, to identify individuals and travel documents of concern and where necessary prevent the individual from travelling, and for contingencies to be put in place to resolve the situation if they do manage to board.

Passenger Name Records (PNR) data information collated by companies to process travel reservations, helps law enforcement and the Security and intelligence agencies to target and identify individuals who may be travelling for terrorism-related purposes and put appropriate interventions in place. Processing of information about freight consignments before they arrive in or depart from the UK enables Border Force, working with Counter-Terrorism Policing, to effectively target vehicles, containers or parcels for examination whilst facilitating the movement of all other freight through the border.

Biometrics are distinctive, measureable human characteristics that are unique to an individual. In controlled conditions and as part of layered checks, biometrics can provide a far more reliable means of fixing and verifying identity than using biographical data alone. Examples of biometrics include fingerprints, facial recognition and retina scanning.

191 Our border checks are made against the widest range of domestic and international watchlists and are kept under constant review. But we need to disrupt the threat earlier, further upstream, where we can. This means ensuring other countries have the right information can take appropriate action by stopping individuals associated with terrorism at the border. We have increased the amount of information we share with trusted partners and multilateral bodies (including the Schengen Information System, Europol and Interpol) and work internationally to support other countries to develop their own border security capabilities. For example, the UK is one of the highest users and contributors to the Interpol Stolen and Lost Travel Document Database.

192 The UK is part of the CTA with Ireland, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, reflecting our close historical ties. This arrangement will be maintained after the UK exits the EU. The UK will continue to work closely with Ireland and the Crown Dependencies to further improve security at the external border of the CTA. The UK is not part of the Schengen border-free zone and maintains its own border checks, retaining the right to check all arrivals, including EU citizens from continental Europe. As we leave the European Union, we will continue to explore options with EU partners for strengthening UK border security.

193 As highlighted in our recently published Anti-Corruption Strategy, even where controls are strong they can be deliberately undermined by corruption.³⁹ Whilst use of corrupt insiders is particularly prevalent amongst Organised Crime Groups, recent attacks on aviation (for example the Daallo Airlines attack in Mogadishu⁴⁰) demonstrate how terrorist groups may use corrupt officials to facilitate an aviation attack. Law enforcement agencies will strengthen

39 Online at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/667221/6_3323_Anti-Corruption_Strategy_WEB.pdf

40 On 2 February 2016, an explosion occurred on a Daallo Airlines flight after take-off from Mogadishu. The flight returned to the airport safely with one fatality reported.

measures to detect and deter those who use corruption, collusion and coercion at our airports and ports including by strengthening the way information about those working in sensitive environments in airports is collected and shared.

Law enforcement at the border

194 All law enforcement agencies work together to deliver the UK's border security objectives. Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (Schedule 7) helps protect the public by allowing specially trained police officers to stop and question and, when necessary, detain and search individuals travelling through ports, airports, international rail stations or the border area.⁴¹ The purpose of the questioning is to determine whether that person appears to be someone who is, or has been, involved in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. The use of Schedule 7 is based on the current terrorist threat to the UK and the intelligence underpinning the threat assessment. Certain travel routes are therefore given greater focus, in line with that assessment. The Schedule 7 power also extends to examining goods to determine whether they have been used in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.⁴²

195 We will secure further the cargo environment. In 2018 Border Force will deploy a new freight targeting system. We are also exploring greater use of data analytics to improve our interventions at the border, and how we can better use cargo data to support aviation security (see section on the aviation sector below).

Detection at the border

196 We are strengthening the UK's Radiological and Nuclear (RN) deterrence and detection capability at the border (Cyclamen). We are refreshing its technology and operating model, and continue to develop and deploy other enhanced innovative detection technologies, including mobile systems.

197 As part of our efforts to prevent criminals bringing illegal firearms into the UK, we are improving our firearms detection capability at the border through a two phase technical programme to enhance the automatic threat detection technology available. This programme is also designed to stimulate private sector innovation to test novel ways to detect firearms entering the UK illegally.

Objective 2. Reduce the risk to and improve the resilience of global aviation, other transport sectors and critical national infrastructure most at risk to terror attack

198 The level of threat we face and our response to it varies across each of these sectors. Success over the next three years will involve reducing the potential for terrorism to cause disruption to the infrastructure and essential services upon which the UK relies to safeguard the economy and for the public to go safely about their business. In partnership with the aviation industry, we will protect aircraft flying to and from the UK, and ensure an overall improvement internationally in the implementation of aviation security standards. We will have

41 Statistics on the operation of Schedule 7 powers are published by the Home Office on a quarterly basis. Full statistical releases on the operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 are available at www.gov.uk/government/collections/counter-terrorism-statistics

42 In the year ending 30 September 2017, over 300 million passengers travelled through UK ports and a total of 16,919 persons were examined under Schedule 7 in Great Britain, a fall of 22% on the previous year. This continues the more effective use of the power in recent years, and reflects the increased availability of travel data and better targeting techniques, alongside additional safeguards introduced in the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. *Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes, and stop and search, Great Britain, quarterly update to June 2016*. Available online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-quarterly-update-to-june-2017>

in place the right measures to protect maritime ports and raise international maritime security standards to protect British ships, crew and passengers. We will have continued to manage the risk to land transport networks in the light of changes in the scale and nature of the threat, whilst keeping transport moving. We will have embedded our new regulations for domestic and international rail into industry practice and will have used new technologies to manage risks further, as well as continuing to promote public vigilance and awareness.

Aviation sector

199 The global aviation system continues to be a totemic target for terrorists, as evidenced by the disrupted 2017 Australia plot⁴³. Terrorists will continue to try and evade our security measures and devote resource to creating new methodologies and technologies to that end.

200 Since 2015, the Government has doubled its spending on improving and assuring the security of flights to the UK from countries around the world. Through our Global Aviation Security Assessment Programme, led by the Department for Transport, we have successfully worked to improve the standard of aviation security in a number of important locations overseas. But safety comes first and we reserve the right to take decisive action, in exceptional circumstances, which can include stopping flights from high risk locations if we deem it necessary. In March 2017, we judged there to be a heightened threat to aviation in a number of locations and introduced additional security measures. We do not take such decisions lightly given the imposition on the travelling public and we review them regularly. The UK's new national Aviation Strategy, due for publication in 2019, will outline how we plan to take a comprehensive view of aviation security challenges and opportunities to ensure we keep pace with the threats from global terrorism, as well as the challenges posed by the rapid pace of development in the global aviation system.

201 The Home Office and Department for Transport launched the Future Aviation Security Solutions (FASS) programme in 2016. This formed one part of a 2015 SDR commitment to double spending on aviation security. FASS has funding of £25.5 million over five years to deliver a step change in aviation security by investing in innovative science and technology that will prevent illegal weapons, explosives and other threats from being taken onto aircraft. The FASS programme aims to invest in early stage technology as well as support novel products through all stages of development. Approximately £6m has already been committed to projects through a variety of funding competitions. This has accelerated research into technologies such as machine learning algorithms, quantum imaging and new approaches to vapour detection into aviation security, with the aim of enhancing security, reducing the burden on airport operations and improving passenger experience.

202 We will continue to work in partnership with the aviation industry and international partners to expand our use of data-led risk assessments to target additional security screening for inbound and outbound passengers and cargo. We have also taken additional action to improve air cargo security in response to the attempted attack on aviation in Australia in 2017. We are exploring the utility of data-led approaches to target additional security scrutiny of some cargo with industry and international partners.

203 The robust security measures put in place by the UK can be compromised if the security provision of other countries falls short. If all countries meet their international obligations, aviation will be a harder target for terrorists. Using our global leadership we will continue to campaign with our international partners to raise global standards and capabilities

⁴³ Four suspects were arrested by Australian Federal Police on 29 July 2017 in Sydney on suspicion of an Islamist inspired plot to plant a bomb on an Etihad Airways flight departing Sydney on 15 July 2017. Two have since been charged with terrorism-related offences.

(see section on global campaigns in the Overseas section). The UK was instrumental in securing the first UN Security Council resolution on aviation security in September 2016 (UNSCR 2309), and a subsequent resolution (UNSCR 2396 in December 2017) aimed at countering terrorist threats, including through strengthened aviation and border security. We have worked closely with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to assist them in developing a global aviation security plan to deliver the commitments in the resolution.

Other transport sectors

204 The rail sector remains an attractive target for terrorists. Following the 2015 attempted attack on a train in France, a range of measures were introduced to improve responses to security incidents on trains, including enhancing interoperability between the police and British Transport Police, improving the access of emergency services to the London Underground, and developing targeted public communications campaigns. The response to an attack on a train has been tested in a series of national multi-agency exercises, including as part of the Tier One (National and Ministerial) Exercise RED KITE in 2016. We work with the French authorities and the emergency services to ensure security in the Channel Tunnel is robust. This was tested in January 2018 during the annual UK-France safety exercise.

205 In light of the changing threat, in 2017 the Department for Transport also updated security regulations for the domestic and international heavy railways network. Working with the rail industry, the Department for Transport and Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) developed and enacted the national awareness campaign “See it. Say it. Sorted.” to encourage public vigilance and reporting of suspicious activities and/or items to the British Transport Police (BTP). BTP has expanded its capabilities, including increasing the number of armed officers patrolling stations and trains and creating new specialist operations units in Manchester and Birmingham.

206 We have updated our security guidance to the bus and coach sector, and will also conduct a major refresh of our light rail security guidance, commencing in 2018 with a view to implementing new guidance by early 2020. We will continue to work with design teams across the rail sector to ensure that security measures are factored into new infrastructure. We will further develop our security awareness campaigns, and will continue to explore how technology developments can help us to mitigate security risks, in areas such as screening methods and techniques, and we will continue to work with partners across Government to consider the potential of behavioural analysis.

207 The Government will also address vulnerabilities in the maritime sector. Around 95% of British trade in goods by weight were moved by sea in 2016, so it is important that we also work with ports that are key export hubs to the UK, both to protect British shipping and seafarers using those ports, and to safeguard the UK economy. We will continue to ensure that the port sector implements focused, proportionate measures to prevent acts of terrorism on board ships and at UK maritime ports. The Department for Transport will continue with a programme of research into new and emerging technologies and disruptive effects to ensure that ports continue to have the right measures in place to mitigate the threat from terrorism.

208 The Home Office and Department for Transport, working closely with cross-Government and operational partners, coordinate work to protect against a maritime terrorist attack. A range of security measures are in place to protect passengers and cargo, and we regularly exercise our tactical response to a maritime terrorist attack. With the then Home Secretary's approval, French authorities deployed armed sea marshals on a number of cross-Channel

ferries. This has taken place since December 2016. This programme, as well as a range of other security measures, will form part of the UK-France Maritime Counter-Terrorism Agreement, which is being developed for agreement in 2018.

Critical national infrastructure

209 Our critical national infrastructure (CNI) includes facilities, systems, sites, property, information, people, networks and processes that are needed to keep the UK running and provide the essential services upon which we rely. It also includes infrastructure which, if disrupted, could have a significant impact on our national security or the functioning of the state. We categorise CNI into thirteen 'critical sectors'.⁴⁴ Protection of our CNI against significant risks, including terrorism, remains a Government priority.

210 We have well established security and resilience programmes in place to protect our CNI. Lead government departments produce annual Sector Security and Resilience Plans⁴⁵ for each critical sector. The plans identify the key infrastructure in those sectors, describe the most significant risks, and set out arrangements for protecting against, and responding to, those risks.

211 CPNI provides advice on physical and personnel security to CNI organisations, aimed at reducing our vulnerability to terrorism and other significant threats. Similarly, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) focuses on reducing the cyber security risks to the UK, working with businesses and individuals to provide authoritative and coherent cyber security advice and cyber incident management, underpinned by world class research and innovation. The NCSC works very closely with law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies to help prevent, disrupt and investigate cybercrime and other cyber related threats. In November 2016 we published a five year National Cyber Security Strategy, which defines our vision and ambition for the future: a UK that is secure and resilient to cyber threats, prosperous and confident in the digital world.⁴⁶

212 As our CNI is mainly owned and operated by the private sector and is linked to wider international networks and supply chains, it is essential that we continue to work in partnership with the private sector and through international collaboration in order to continuously improve its security and resilience.

Objective 3: Reduce the vulnerability of crowded places, specific vulnerable groups, and high profile individuals

Protecting crowded places

213 As the 2017 attacks demonstrated, crowded places present attractive targets for terrorists. Subsequently disrupted plots and intelligence assessments suggest this will continue to be the case. The police constantly review our national approach to protective security in light of changes in threat. Following attacks in 2017, existing approaches were reviewed and revised and a number of changes made. Success over the next three years will mean that we have provided higher quality user friendly guidance on threat methodologies and their mitigation to those responsible for crowded places (mostly owned by the private sector) and engaged more responsible authorities to achieve effective and consistent security

44 The UK's critical national infrastructure sectors are: Chemicals; Civil Nuclear; Communications (comprising Telecommunications, Internet, Broadcast and Post); Defence; Emergency Services (comprising Police, Fire and Rescue Services, Ambulance and HM Coastguard); Energy; Finance, Food; Government; Health; Space; Transport; and Water & Sewerage.

45 Online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/sector-resilience-plans>

46 Online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-cyber-security-strategy-2016-to-2021>

outcomes to an appropriate and proportionate level. Where vulnerabilities remain, we will have developed new technologies, such as a variety of proportionate and cost-effective high footfall screening measures to help protect crowded places from mass-casualty attacks.

214 Police Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSAs) based in every police region provide bespoke security guidance to the owners and operators of crowded places, and deliver terrorism awareness training to hundreds of thousands of staff and managers annually to help them understand the threat, improve their security stance and report suspicious activity. Tailored security and awareness advice is also available online.⁴⁷ Further work to improve security includes our joint industry partnership through the Joint Security and Resilience Centre (JSARC) and also with the Security Industry Authority. For significant new builds and redevelopments, CTSAs and CPNI engage at the concept design phase so that effective security measures are considered as early as possible.

215 Within Northern Ireland, Wales, and Scotland protective security advice is provided respectively by the Police Service of Northern Ireland, the Welsh Extremism and Counter-Terrorism Unit (WECTU), and Police Scotland officers, using the guidance of the police National Counter-Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO).

216 Recently terrorists have used vehicles, including HGVs and hire vehicles to attack crowds in a number of places including the UK, Europe, the USA, Canada and Israel. Hostile Vehicle Mitigation measures (including from the expanded National Barrier Asset deployable temporary protective security barriers) have been put in place across the country to protect the public at major events, in big cities, at transport nodes and on some bridges. The Department for Transport, the Police, CPNI and the Home Office are further enhancing protection against this threat, including work to develop more deployable permanent and socketed barriers to protect against vehicle-borne attacks, more cost effective and deployable temporary barriers for one-off events protection, work with the vehicle hire and haulage industries on measures to improve counter-terrorism security awareness through training and best practice guidance and to understand where new and emerging technologies (e.g. vehicle immobilisation devices) can be developed to further mitigate the threat.

217 We will need to do more, in light of the shift in terrorist methodology and the very large number of sites where people congregate in the UK. We are currently considering the development of more and better communication to crowded places owners, operators and responsible authorities, how we can better engage these stakeholders to achieve effective security outcomes, and if required, potential legislative measures.

47 Online at <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/act-awareness-elearning>

Case study – Partnership with Pool Re

The insurance industry has the potential to shape behaviour and improve safety, security and resilience, including helping to promote security-minded behaviours in areas where there is less regulation. The Home Office works closely with insurance providers to explore areas where they might support our counter-terrorism objectives.

Pool Reinsurance Company (Pool Re) is an excellent example of a public-private partnership set up specifically to mitigate the financial impact of a terrorist attack.

Pool Re and the police have worked together to develop the Loss Mitigation Credit: a discount on insurance premiums for businesses implementing the Government's accredited Protective Security Improvement Activity. This benefits both businesses and security.

218 “Designing-in” counter-terrorism protective security measures from the outset of new developments (and significant refurbishments) throughout the development process can provide proportionate security measures for those who use and visit crowded places, without impinging on the needs of local businesses or functionality of the public space. It is more cost effective to “design-in” protective security measures from the outset of a scheme, and, by engaging with all interested stakeholders, this process can ensure measures work together, do not displace vulnerabilities elsewhere in a new build, and offers wider business continuity and crime prevention benefits.

219 High-profile people who may be targeted by terrorists are provided with protective security measures, depending on an assessment of the level of threat. We will continue to ensure that these measures remain efficient, cost effective and proportionate.

Objective 4: Detect and prevent terrorist access to and use of materials of concern, knowledge and information that could be used to conduct attacks

220 Many of the substances that can be used to conduct attacks have widespread legitimate uses. Success over the next three years will mean that we reduce the availability of the most concerning materials without unnecessarily impacting on people's ability to go about their lives freely and with confidence. It will also mean faster and smarter capabilities for detecting suspicious transactions.

221 The Home Office uses a range of policy interventions to prevent access by terrorists to materials of concern. These include legislation to ensure the security of substances in their legitimate use or sale; chemical disposal schemes; voluntary codes for businesses to secure supply chains; and capabilities to detect suspicious transactions. Decisions on interventions are informed by the availability of materials; the likely effectiveness of control measures; the potential impact on personal freedoms; and possible unintended consequences such as displacement to more harmful substances or methods of attack.

222 We will continue to work with industry and retailers to design out the threat through developing commercially viable safer alternatives for legitimately used products containing materials of concern, improve processes to increase greater awareness and to control access to, or notify sales of, material that could be used to commit acts of terrorism. The UK has a regime that requires members of the public who want to acquire, possess or use explosives

precursors or poisons for legitimate use to hold a licence.⁴⁸ Businesses who sell or supply such chemicals must report suspicious transactions and significant losses and thefts to enable early detection and disruption of terrorist attack plots. This regulatory regime has led to prosecutions and prevented attacks using explosive precursors. We will continue to work with retailers and law enforcement to ensure that the legislation operates effectively and will keep under review the substances that require a licence and the controls around them.

223 The production and storage of radiological and nuclear materials by states is subject to strict international controls and protective security regimes, including the protection and security of civil nuclear sites. The UK seeks to reduce threats from radiological and nuclear weapons through the Global Threat Reduction Programme, a UK-led international counter proliferation programme. The UK plays a leading role in the US-Russian co-chaired Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, providing expertise and assistance to build international capacity to detect and respond to radiological and nuclear terrorism threats. The UK provides expertise and assistance to states to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (April 2004), which imposes binding obligations to take measures to prevent non-State actors from acquiring, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems.

224 While a terrorist attack using biological materials is assessed as unlikely, work to prevent such an attack from occurring, and to mitigate its impact if it does, is a constant. Important parts of this work are reflected in the UK Biological Security Strategy, which will be published in 2018. The strategy is co-sponsored by the Home Office, the Department of Health and Social Care, and the Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs. It draws together for the first time all of the work that takes place across Government to protect the UK and its interests from significant biological risks, for example significant outbreaks of disease, whether these occur naturally or as the result of an accidental or deliberate release of hazardous biological material. UK efforts to address deliberate threats overseas include an International Biological Security Programme, which works to improve biosecurity and biosafety where there is limited capability or potential vulnerability.

225 In addition to delivering improvements to our radiological and nuclear border detection and deterrence system (Cyclamen), we will invest in cutting-edge detection systems that can be flexibly deployed in a range of environments as part of a layered approach. We will deliver this through investment in modern systems, informed by the latest science and technology research and international collaboration.

226 We will continue to enhance our existing explosives detection capabilities, such as explosives detection dogs and screening technologies, to enable earlier detection of terrorist activity. This will include using existing detection capabilities in a wider range of spaces for a broader range of purposes and exploring options for adding new detection capabilities to our existing cadre. We will also deliver greater assurance of detection performance, through greater standardisation and accreditation.

48 Online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/supplying-explosives-precursors/supplying-explosives-precursors-and-poison>

Prepare

227 The **purpose** of our Prepare work is to save lives, reduce harm and aid recovery quickly in the event of a terrorist attack. This includes ensuring we have a rapid response to end any attack and that we minimise the impact on local communities and those affected by the attack. We aim to deliver effective, fast and coordinated responses at the national, devolved and local levels across the UK.

Prepare objectives

228 The **objectives** of Prepare are to:

- Deliver a coordinated multi-agency response to all types of terrorist attacks.
- Ensure that the UK has a full range of capabilities to respond to current and future threats.
- Minimise the impact of terrorist attacks on people, services and communities.

Capabilities and commitments

229 The UK approach to preparing for civil emergencies (including terrorist attacks) is to build and maintain generic capabilities applicable for use, as a whole or in combination, in any eventuality. For a terrorist attack we have additional specialist national capabilities.

230 The emergency services have trained specialists to deal with terrorist incidents – including armed officers supported by specialist fire and ambulance teams. They also have skills and equipment to deal with an attack using a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) device. These specialists were used to life saving effect in 2017 with armed officers arriving on scene and taking swift action at terrorist incidents within a matter of minutes. More recently, they have used their specialist chemicals knowledge to respond to the events in Salisbury. The UK has tried and tested arrangements for military support to the police and other emergency responders. Those arrangements are exercised and reviewed frequently and are part the result of the formal contingency plan, Operation TEMPERER, which enables the police to call upon large-scale military assistance, as they did twice in 2017. This allowed police armed officers to be freed up from static protection duties to support investigations. The cross-Government Victims of Terrorism Unit (VTU) worked with each area affected by terrorist attacks in 2017 and with national organisations to ensure that victims, witnesses, and bereaved families received quick, effective, coordinated support.

231 We work closely and collaboratively with Local Resilience Forums (LRFs), that bring together the full range of local partners to plan and prepare for localised incidents and large-scale emergencies. LRFs are integral in the local response to and recovery from a terrorist attack and we frequently test their plans and capabilities as part of the National CT Exercise Programme. We also work with the mayors' offices in London and Manchester: through the London CONTEST Board and as participants in the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum.

232 We work closely with the Devolved Administrations on our Prepare response as many of the key delivery activities have been devolved (such as the coordination of the emergency services in Scotland). The Devolved Administrations are also responsible for supporting the devolved services in their areas that deal with the wider consequence management and recovery issues after an attack.

233 Over the next three years, we will:

- Maintain our investment in the capabilities of the emergency services in order to deliver a coordinated and effective response to terrorist attacks.
- Ensure the UK is resilient and ready to respond in a proportionate and effective manner to a wide range of CBRNE threats.
- Fully embed the Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Principles across the emergency services by 2020, to ensure that they can work together effectively in response to a terrorist attack.
- Regularly test and exercise the multi-agency capabilities required to respond to, and recover from, a wide range of terrorist attacks.
- Improve support arrangements for victims of terrorism to ensure a comprehensive and coordinated response.

Objective 1: Deliver a coordinated multi-agency response to all types of terrorist attacks

234 Over the next three years we will improve our ability to save lives and reduce harm, by: thorough risk-based planning informed by rigorous national risk assessments; improving the way responders work together in a crisis; and identifying and correcting gaps in our response capabilities.

235 The National Risk Assessment (NRA) provides a comprehensive, bi-annual assessment of the most significant risks of civil emergencies to the UK mainland in the next five years.⁴⁹ It informs contingency planning, prioritisation and capability building at both the national and local level. The most recent NRA greatly improved the quantity and clarity of information available to local planners and responders regarding potential terrorist attacks, helping to make the UK safer and more secure. The related National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) assesses risks to the UK and our interests overseas. It is used to inform strategic decisions about our defence, resilience, foreign and security priorities. The 2015 NSRA identified terrorism as a tier one risk.

236 The Resilience Capabilities Programme ensures the key generic capabilities needed to respond to and recover from emergencies of all kinds, including terrorist attacks, are in place. This includes the interoperability of emergency services, the ability to handle mass casualties, and the rapid restoration of key services such as power and transport. To more effectively mitigate the impact of terrorist attacks, the programme is providing a better understanding of national capabilities and how they interact, contributing to enhanced standards for the response community. They will enable more effective and timely response, and recovery.

Objective 2: Ensure that the UK has a full range of capabilities to respond to current and future threats

237 Over the next three years we will measure success by how we anticipate and build capabilities required to meet the threat, whilst ensuring that the emergency services and other responders have what they need to provide an effective response.

49 The NRA is a classified assessment, but high level information on the risks identified publicly available through the National Risk Register. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-risk-register-of-civil-emergencies-2017-edition>

The Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Principles

238 The Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Principles (JESIP) were established in 2012 to ensure that the emergency services can work together effectively in response to a major incident. JESIP is the largest joint training programme ever completed by the emergency services, with the initial programme training over 12,000 police, fire and ambulance personnel. Since then, several other multi-agency training packages have been delivered and local resilience partners are also increasingly adopting the JESIP principles. This will help to ensure that the response to major incidents is truly multi-agency across both emergency services and local authorities.

239 The guiding principle of JESIP is continuous improvement. Live play exercises have been used to test and embed a joint doctrine, and a new national learning system has been introduced to improve the way emergency services identify and apply learning from incidents and exercises. While the multi-agency response to the attacks in London and Manchester in 2017 demonstrated that JESIP has become a critical element of the emergency services response to a major incident, we will undertake further work to refine and improve how it is applied. We expect JESIP to be fully embedded across the emergency services by 2020, including the adoption of JESIP into all local doctrine and training and exercise plans and a formalised local process for identifying and sharing multi-agency lessons nationally.

Responding to a large-scale firearms attack

240 We have developed a strong, police-led capability to respond to large-scale attacks throughout UK. Under these arrangements, armed police officers will bring an attack to an end, supported by specialist fire and ambulance teams trained to manage casualties in higher risk environments. If requested, the Armed Forces can deploy specialist military capabilities in support. Interoperability between niche military assets and police firearms teams is well-developed, regularly tested in training and exercises and proved successful and effective in responding to incidents in 2017.

241 Following the Paris attacks in 2015, we provided an additional £144m to fund an additional 1,000 armed police officers in England and Wales. Some police forces also uplifted their armed capability outside of this programme, including Police Scotland. This investment has already increased the number of police Armed Response Vehicles (ARVs) and Counter-Terrorism Specialist Firearms Officers (CTSFOs) available to respond to critical incidents. These officers responded to all of the attacks in 2017 and brought the London Bridge attack to a swift conclusion. The first phase of the uplift is complete, with an additional 41 ARVs and around 650 armed officers now available. The next phase – an increase in CTSFOs – is expected to be completed in late-2018.

Responding to, and recovering from, a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) attack

242 The National Risk Assessment identifies terrorist attacks involving CBRN as one of the highest impact risks to the UK. These risks require additional contingency planning and specialist capabilities.

243 A major CBRN incident would engage a wide range of government assets and local partners. The CBRN(e)⁵⁰ Operational Response Framework contains the strategic direction for a comprehensive CBRN response. It is informed by advances in scientific and technical evidence, underpinned by JESIP interoperability principles, and provides a flexible, effective and proportionate response.

244 The implementation of the Operational Response Framework has been in place since 2014. We will update it in 2018 to incorporate improvements in capability already delivered and advances in scientific understanding. Science and technology and international collaboration inform the requirements of the Framework. We test and assure using the National Counter-Terrorism Exercise Programme and emergency services assurance programmes.

245 Our response consists of four core elements. First, the Initial Operational Response (IOR), involves first responders from the emergency services who will safely deliver lifesaving activities. More than 150,000 of the UK's 190,000 first responders have been trained in IOR procedures since 2016. We will work to ensure that the IOR becomes part of the emergency services continuous professional development programmes. In the vital first minutes of an attack it is critical that as many people know how to safely assist those directly affected by attacks to minimise potential injury or loss of life. The second element is more than 7,000 CBRN specialists within the emergency services, trained and equipped to provide critical lifesaving activities including decontamination and the provision of urgent medical attention at the scene, as well as support the criminal investigation within a contaminated environment. We will ensure that these numbers are maintained and trained and equipped to the highest standards.

246 The initial and specialist response is supported by the third element of coordinated scientific and technical support by four government agencies: the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) for chemical, biological, radiological or explosive events; the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) for nuclear events; Met Office for how climate will impact on the event; and, Public Health England (PHE) for more general health issues. Scientific advice is fundamental to maintaining responder safety, selecting decontamination procedures, determining medical treatment and informing recovery. Lack of timely advice would seriously impact on our decision making ability. We will further enhance existing mechanisms by more regularly testing and exercising them with the emergency services to ensure.

247 The fourth element is the recovery phase, coordinated by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs in England, and supported by the Devolved Administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales to rapidly and efficiently return the site of an incident to use. The Government Decontamination Service would work with local resilience partners in this restoration to identify and contract with the private sector providers who will deliver the recovery activities. We will continue to exercise this capability with the relevant bodies.

248 The highest impact risks in the NRA are of a terrorist attack using biological agents or a nuclear device. These risks require contingency planning and capabilities going beyond those that are needed for most kinds of emergency. The likelihood of terrorists obtaining effective mass impact biological agents or a functioning nuclear device remains low, but the impact of an effective attack would be so high that we judge full preparations must be made for them. We will continue to strengthen specific capabilities that enable us to mitigate these impacts focusing on those measures that would be likely to have the greatest effect. These include the

50 The (e) reflects explosives as a means of distributing the contaminant rather than as a weapon in itself.

early detection of illicit importations of radiological and nuclear (RN) materials by Cyclamen and the deployment of innovative mobile RN detection and search capabilities at the border and inland. Wherever possible these capabilities will be developed for application beyond RN, so they can be deployed for other kinds of emergencies.

Military support

249 There are well established procedures for the provision of military support to the police and other emergency responders. This includes specific capabilities such as bomb disposal. These arrangements are kept under review. Operation TEMPERER enables up to 10,000 military personnel to be deployed, within 12 to 96 hours, in support of the police in the UK, and to assist the civil authorities. The plan is designed to be scalable to meet the requirements of the police based on the terrorist threat at any given time. Elements of support has been deployed twice following the 2017 Manchester and Parsons Green attacks. We will continue to regularly exercise this capability.

250 The Armed Forces and government science organisations maintain specialist capabilities and expertise to support the emergency services where necessary in the event of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosive (CBRNE) incidents. These capabilities are deployable across the UK and are able to locate, identify, render safe, and dispose of CBRN or explosive devices.

National Counter-Terrorism Exercise Programme

251 The National Counter-Terrorism Exercise Programme tests whether government departments, the emergency services, military and other public agencies are sufficiently prepared to respond to terrorist attacks both domestically and overseas. We deliver a programme of national, regional and local exercises each year.

252 In choosing which exercises to run we draw from the National Risk Assessment, as well as lessons learned from previous attacks (in the UK and overseas) and emerging risks or vulnerabilities. We use a variety of exercise types focusing not only on the immediate response to an attack, but increasingly on the challenges faced by emergency services, the NHS, and local authorities in the subsequent days, weeks and months. Exercises are delivered at all levels: from specialist to the local level, but also including at least one major national live-play exercise every year during which Ministers exercise Government decision-making at the highest level, along with the operation of the Government's crisis response committee, COBR. In October 2017, national exercise BORDER REIVER tested our response to a cross-border terrorist attack across Scotland and the North of England.

253 We will develop the exercise programme to further improve our national response to, and recovery from, terrorist attacks. This will include a greater focus on identifying emerging risks and vulnerabilities and testing the multi-agency response to them, to ensure the UK has the capability, capacity and doctrine to respond effectively to all types of attacks. We will also increase our exercising of consequence management structures to ensure the emergency services, NHS and local authorities work effectively together after an attack, at the national and local level.

Objective 3: Minimise the impact of terrorist attacks on people, services and communities

254 Over the next three years we will measure success by how quickly and effectively individuals, communities and businesses are able to recover, with the support they need, from terrorist attacks.

Supporting those affected by terrorism

255 Helping British citizens affected by terrorism at home and overseas is a top priority for the Government. We established the cross-Government Victims of Terrorism Unit (VTU) in March 2017 to accelerate and broaden support to victims, witnesses, and bereaved families. Through this unit, government agencies and partners work together to ensure that British citizens affected by terrorist attacks receive the support they need.⁵¹

256 After each of the 2017 terrorist attacks, the VTU worked directly with local authority areas, police, regional and national support organisations to ensure that everyone affected by the attacks received effective, comprehensive and coordinated support. This included: sharing best practice approaches and reaching out to other countries for their guidance around similar events; setting up comprehensive webpages signposting victims to support services; ensuring that payments from charitable funds did not affect benefits payments or Council Tax support; working with key third-sector organisations to provide a collective service to those affected; and facilitating effective data sharing practices. Each attack affected victims and their communities in different ways, and we have worked to identify and rapidly resolve gaps in the overall support package each time.

257 The VTU has continued to drive and deliver systemic improvements across government and support services for victims of these, and any future, terrorist attacks. There are areas we need to improve, learning from 2017. We will work with civil society partners to agree a framework for how they work together after a terrorist attack, to ensure support to victims is coordinated. We will ensure more effective sharing of data between first responders, the NHS and local authorities after an attack (as well as with business and the voluntary sector if needed). We will help local authorities to increase their planning and preparedness for a terrorist attack, to ensure those affected receive the support they need as quickly as possible.

Engaging with the public and industry on countering terrorism

258 The public and the private sector play a critical role in disrupting terrorist activities, through being vigilant and reporting suspicious behaviour and unattended items to the authorities. The public should be alert, but not alarmed.

259 The police “Run, Hide, Tell” campaign provides practical advice for the public on what to do in the event of a terrorist attack.⁵² Specific strands of the campaign have targeted different audiences, including young people and UK holiday makers travelling overseas. Since it was launched publicly in December 2015 the campaign has reached at least 25 million people, and most recent research shows that 26% of the UK public show spontaneous awareness of the “Run, Hide, Tell” advice, suggesting high levels of awareness of what to do in the event of an attack. During an attack, the authorities will provide as much information and advice as possible. We are currently considering the development of more and better communication to

51 The Victims of Terrorism Unit website provides information on a variety of support available, including helplines, NHS mental health support, support for children, parents or teachers, compensation and charitable funds: <https://victimsofterrorism.campaign.gov.uk>

52 Online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/stay-safe-film>

crowded places' owners, operators and responsible authorities, how we can better engage these stakeholders to achieve effective security outcomes, in particular rapid life-saving self-help capabilities to supplement the emergency services.

260 Advice and guidance for the private sector is available online, including on how to handle bomb threats.⁵³ It is vital that it continues to develop and test contingency plans, business continuity plans and communications plans to ensure they can respond to any major incident that could affect their business, staff or customers. These plans should consider how private security staff can guide the public to safety during an attack. There is significant value in local businesses coordinating their plans within a neighbourhood, and also building links with local public services to understand their priorities and operational procedures, and how best to interact with them.

53 Online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/bomb-threats-guidance>

Overseas

261 Terrorists know no boundaries. They promote and plan attacks beyond the borders of countries they are located in, increasingly enabled by ease of movement and communication. What they do overseas manifests itself in the UK. Our overseas approach to countering terrorism is global but completely integrated with our domestic approach. It involves working with an increasingly broad range of partners, especially as Daesh disperses under military pressure from its strongholds in Syria and Iraq.

262 Our **purpose** overseas is to reduce the risk back to the UK, and to British interests overseas, whilst ensuring we work with partners in a human rights compliant manner.

263 We intend over the next three years to prioritise our efforts in areas of highest risk to British people and interests, whilst maintaining our ability to reach and disrupt those who would seek to harm directly the UK and our interests. Given the increasingly dispersed nature of the threat, we will focus well-targeted capability building to help partners tackle shared threats and build their resilience. We will ensure UK citizens are aware of risks overseas and know how to react if they are involved in an incident. We will respond quickly to support UK victims. We have also put particular emphasis on raising global aviation security standards and tackling terrorist use of the internet as these global risks affect our security daily and directly. Given the continued increase in violent extremism globally, we will invest in our ability to anticipate the next waves of terrorist threat, to allow us to adapt our approach in time to meet it.

Overseas priorities

264 Our overseas **priorities** are to:

- Illuminate and disrupt planned attacks directed at the UK and our people or interests overseas.
- Reduce terrorist capability.
- Weaken the drivers of terrorism.
- Protect against and mitigate the impact of attacks.

Capabilities and commitments

265 Following the 2015 SDSR we have increased our global reach through investment in the capabilities of our counter-terrorism police, the security and intelligence agencies, and our Special Forces. Over the Spending Review period, we are investing an additional £1.4 billion in the security and intelligence agencies and £2 billion in UK Special Forces. Our global diplomatic network works with a wide array of countries to deal with shared threats, including through UN agreements on countering terrorism that provide a clear global mandate for action. Since 2015, this has been augmented by an FCO-led Counter-Terrorism and Extremism Network, doubling to some 200 the number of officers working with priority countries in Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Counter-Terrorism Policing also now operates in over 90 countries.

266 The Armed Forces have played a leading role in the Global Coalition against Daesh that has eroded its territory, access to resources and constrained its ability to organise and direct external attacks from Syria and Iraq. Through overseas defence activity, they also enhance our understanding and influence, and build military counter-terrorism capacity to tackle key challenges.

267 The Counter-Terrorism Programme Fund, which supports capacity building in countries where the risk to the UK and its interests overseas is high, will increase to £31.5m in 2019/20. The key areas for investment are counter-terrorism investigations and prosecutions, protective security around key sites, and quick and effective response to a terrorist incident. We have more than doubled our spending on aviation security around the world, with more British experts able to act overseas, working side-by-side with host nations in the most vulnerable locations.

268 British business trades globally. Alongside our duty to protect British citizens is a strong determination to protect UK businesses and their assets. Our investment in the police and security and intelligence agencies has enabled us to work alongside host countries to deliver CONTEST abroad. We shall continue to invest in these networks.

269 We now bring together expertise from across government in the Joint International Counter-Terrorism Unit (JICTU), a joint Home Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office unit launched in April 2016, which provides strategic direction to our work overseas.

270 Over the next three years we will:

- Extend our ability to illuminate threats, groups and methodologies, and target our response where there is a direct threat to the UK and its interests.
- Lead international efforts to reduce global risks through a series of Ministerially-led campaigns on areas including aviation security and preventing terrorist use of the internet.
- Create a new flexible cadre of UK experts who can be deployed when and where they are needed to provide additional rapid expertise overseas.
- Counter terrorist narratives through further strengthening both our own strategic communications work and that of key partners.
- Build a deep and collaborative partnership on counter-terrorism with our European partners to promote security both in the UK and across Europe as we leave the European Union.
- Continue to improve UK Government systems for responding to terrorist incidents overseas.
- Step up our ability to deliver end-to-end degradation of terrorist groups and networks overseas.

Global campaigns

271 There are areas of particular concern where the solution is concerted and large-scale action is needed across the international community to raise standards of protection. We are well placed to drive such work given our extensive global network of partnerships and alliances – both with individual states and multilaterally – as well as our acknowledged expertise. We will conduct Ministerially-led campaigns, initially on aviation security and preventing terrorist use of the internet.

Aviation security

272 The UK remains at the forefront of leading efforts internationally to raise global aviation standards. In September 2016 the UK was instrumental in securing UN Security Council Resolution 2309 to drive a common global standard for aviation security. This is a welcome step forward, but we recognise that the continued diversification of the global threat requires us to use our position of leadership to build further momentum.

273 We have already worked closely with the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) to assist them in developing a global action plan to improve compliance with international aviation security obligations. We have lobbied international partners hard to lend their support to this plan.

274 We are now working to build on this early success. Over the next three years we will develop a global campaign jointly led by the Home, Foreign and Transport Secretaries. We will work with ICAO, industry, and bilateral partners to deliver both long term sustainable change and more immediate short term improvements in aviation security. More detail on the UK's approach to aviation security can be found in the Protect section.

Preventing terrorist use of the internet

275 The work of the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) based in the Home Office, and the Global Coalition Against Daesh Communications Cell, based in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, has positioned the UK at the forefront of the battle against terrorist propaganda, including specifically online terrorist content. Working with international partners, we continue to push industry to take a more proactive approach to terrorist content on their platforms.

276 We have since used global platforms to hold industry to account on the delivery of our ambitions. At the UN General Assembly in September 2017 the Prime Minister held an event, together with President Macron of France, Prime Minister Gentiloni of Italy and representatives of the Global Internet Forum to Counter-Terrorism (GIFCT)⁵⁴, where she called for industry to go further and faster in automating the detection and removal of terrorist content online. At that event industry committed to a range of measures to tackle terrorist use of open platforms. The subsequent G7 Interior Ministers' meeting discussed with industry the specifics of what the GIFCT would seek to deliver and set out collective G7 expectations.

277 We have built on the success of UNGA with a global campaign, led by the former Home Secretary, to encourage Communications Service Providers to invest in technologies to automatically identify and remove content. This includes working multilaterally and bilaterally with international partners, for example the US. In February 2018 the then Home Secretary visited the US West Coast with Secretary of Homeland Security Nielsen to hold meetings with senior representatives of Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and Google, and discuss the progress being made by the GIFCT, and the steps they are taking to safeguard their platforms and users from terrorists.

278 We will continue to use bilateral and multilateral fora to build support and maintain momentum between like-minded nations, focusing on building a global consensus to leverage industry to do more. We will continue to build broader global support behind work with the GIFCT through Five Eyes (UK, US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand) Ministerial meetings, the EU Internet Forum and the UN General Assembly. We will also agree greater cooperation with like-minded Commonwealth partners to agree international norms and minimum standards on preventing terrorist use of the internet.

Priority 1: Illuminate and disrupt planned attacks

279 A large proportion of terrorist plots that have targeted the UK in recent years have had an international link or have begun overseas. Counter-terrorism investigations need to be followed wherever they lead. Successful disruption and prosecution of terrorists depends on

54 The UK, through the Home Secretary, was instrumental in setting up the GIFCT. See the box on preventing terrorist use of the internet in the Prevent section.

effective international collaboration that is underpinned by the rule of law and human rights. This includes information sharing with our allies and exchange of investigative best practice to counter the threat. Success over the next three years will mean effectively disrupting attack planning against the UK and UK interests – working in close collaboration with international allies.

280 We will continue to develop our global reach and insight through working within the Five Eyes relationship with the US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, where our ability to develop and use shared capabilities and burden share amplifies and scales our collective ability to act. We have also built stronger security and intelligence sharing relationships with European allies to respond to the increased, shared threat we have faced. This activity, at an unprecedented pace and scale of collaboration, is disrupting attack planning within Europe and the UK. We will continue to expand and strengthen this collaboration as we negotiate the UK's exit from the EU and thereafter.

281 We will continue to work with foreign partners to develop criminal justice systems better able to deal with terrorism effectively and in line with human rights standards. As set out by then Foreign Secretary William Hague in 2013, Justice and Human Rights Partnerships have supported the development of human rights compliant criminal justice in countries critical to our counter-terrorism efforts, enabling more effective terrorist prosecutions and, in the process, facilitating the development of operational relationships between the UK and host countries.

282 The Consolidated Guidance, first published by the government in July 2010, sets out how our intelligence services should approach interviewing detainees held by other countries overseas and the passing and receipt of intelligence relating to detainees. The independent Investigatory Powers Commissioner oversees and reviews its application and publishes an annual report.⁵⁵ The Government stands firmly against torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. We do not condone it, nor do we ask others to do it on our behalf.

283 We are clear that where we identify an imminent threat to the UK, which could include a terrorist threat, we will take lawful action to address it. Lethal force would only be used as a last resort when all other options have been exhausted, and we would always do so in accordance with international law and report to Parliament after we have done so.

Priority 2: Reducing terrorist intent and capability

284 Daesh used its control of territory in Syria and Iraq to train operatives, plan and execute attacks, seize resources, launch propaganda campaigns and exploit and abuse local populations. A key part of our overall approach is proactively degrading and weakening such key terrorist structures and enablers which help drive the direct threat to us. In order to protect UK citizens at home and abroad, we are continuing to play a leading part in a Global Coalition of 75 members to defeat Daesh in Syria and Iraq.

285 We are countering its ideological narrative, disrupting its sources of revenue, and using our military capabilities to tackle the threat from Daesh, working in support of the Government of Iraq and partner forces in Syria. The Global Coalition Counter-Daesh Communications Cell is a UK-led initiative that delivers both strategic communication effects against Daesh, and partner capability building in this field. Support to external partnerships has amplified the reach and impact of the international community's efforts to counter Daesh propaganda. Our collective efforts show Daesh has failed to establish a state, prevail on the battlefield or represent Sunni Muslims.

⁵⁵ Online at: <https://www.ipco.org.uk/>

286 The UK has deployed around 1,400 military personnel to the region in support of counter-Daesh operations. Almost 600 of these are deployed to Iraq, where they have trained more than 72,000 members of the Iraqi Security Forces. We have launched over 1,680 air strikes, second only to the US, and we provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support to our Coalition partners. Coalition military action has undermined Daesh's finance. Coalition air strikes have destroyed more than 3,500 enemy targets and more than 25 cash storage sites.

287 Coalition operations in support of local forces on the ground have contributed to the liberation of more than 98% of the territory Daesh once occupied across Iraq and Syria. We are therefore working to secure Daesh's lasting defeat by working with legitimate local authorities to ensure a stable, prosperous and united future for affected communities in both Syria and Iraq.

Fighting Daesh online

Daesh have used strategic communications, social media and messaging apps more effectively than any previous terrorist group in order to spread their terrorist narratives and radicalise. To combat this, GCHQ have worked in partnership with the Ministry of Defence to conduct a major offensive cyber campaign against Daesh. These operations have made a significant contribution to coalition efforts to suppress Daesh propaganda, hindered their ability to coordinate attacks, and protected Coalition forces on the battlefield.

288 In line with the humanitarian imperative, we have committed £2.46 billion since the start of the conflict in Syria, our largest ever response to a single humanitarian crisis. We are at the forefront of the international humanitarian response and continue to demand full and sustained humanitarian access in order to deliver much-needed aid to those in need. To date, the UK has committed £237.5 million in humanitarian aid to Iraq. We have helped provide food to a quarter of a million people, shelter to 325,000 people, and we have brought water and crucial hygiene facilities to nearly a million people.

289 Efforts to tackle other groups are not as large-scale as the campaign against Daesh in Syria and Iraq, but are important to constrain the influence and capabilities of Daesh, Al Qa'ida and their affiliates. For example, Al Qa'ida affiliate al-Shabaab poses the greatest terrorist threat to Somalia and the Horn of Africa region. We are supporting and developing the capabilities of Somali security forces both directly and through the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). The UK also works closely with Somalia in a range of counter-terrorism and counter-terrorism related projects.

290 Increasing capacity of partners reduces terrorists' capability to act or have effect. We focus on developing counter-terrorism capacity and capability in key countries where the risk to British people and interests is highest – in particular across the Middle East, Asia and Africa. We will continue to use the Counter-Terrorism Programme Fund, which increases to £31.5m in 2019/20, to design and implement programmes with partner countries to address their needs and reduce shared risks, be that by strengthening security around aviation or resorts, improving their response to terrorist attacks, countering radicalisation or building their ability to detect, disrupt and prosecute terrorists in a professional and human rights compliant manner. We work across the international community to coordinate support and prevent

duplication, including with key multilateral organisations such as the UN, EU, G7, Global Counter-Terrorism Forum and Counter-Daesh Coalition. A good example of such co-ordination has been the work in Tunisia since the 2015 Sousse attacks (see Case Study box).

Case Study: Tunisia

Following the terrorist attacks in Bardo and Sousse in 2015, the UK was instrumental in establishing the “G7+ process” to ensure coordination between counter-terrorism donors and help Tunisia to streamline offers of international assistance. Through the G7+ process the UK has chaired the working group to support the Tunisians in increasing security and protection of tourist areas and co-chaired the working group on improving aviation security. UK assistance has been wide ranging, including: working with the Tunisian government in developing their approach to countering terrorist recruitment and radicalisation; improving the protective security of tourist sites; increasing Tunisian ability to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents; improving security at Tunisia’s international airports and ports; increasing the security of Tunisia’s border with Libya and increasing Tunisia’s capacity to gather evidence and prosecute terrorist suspects. Improvements in Tunisia’s counter-terrorism capabilities have reduced the risks to British nationals from terrorism allowing the FCO travel advice for Tunisia, amended in July 2017, to no longer advise against travel to most of the country.

Priority 3: Weakening the drivers of terrorism

291 We will work with governments, civil society and the international community to weaken political, sectarian, ideological and economic drivers of terrorism, helping to reduce the permissive environments terrorist networks exploit. This is long-term work to provide long-term sustainable solutions to reducing levels of terrorism.

292 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office uses its global reach to build alliances, strengthen the rules-based order, and promote our values and interests, including through extensive work on human rights and good governance. Our conflict prevention, stability, and international development work complements our counter-terrorism strategy. Through the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, the UK spends over £1bn a year to build peace and stability. The Department for International Development (DFID) has committed to spend at least 50% of its budget in fragile states and regions to help tackle the underlying drivers of instability. In 2016-17, DFID spent close to £1.6bn in bilateral aid programming in priority countries including Afghanistan, Iraq, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria and Yemen. It has also made a long-term commitment to building deeper and more enduring development partnerships with other countries in the Middle East, including Jordan and Lebanon.

293 The UK actively supports the UN’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (PVE), a comprehensive framework to establish a ‘whole of government’ ‘whole of society’ approach.⁵⁶ We work with partners, including governments, the United Nations Development Programme, the Commonwealth, the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum and the Hedayah Centre, which through UK-UAE support, launched a Task Force to support the development and implementation of National Action Plans to prevent and counter violent extremism.

294 Within this framework, we have made targeted interventions in coordination with host governments across the Middle East, North and sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Europe. These include prison reform to reduce the risk of radicalisation in inmate populations;

⁵⁶ Online at: https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/sites/www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/files/plan_action.pdf

community policing programmes in high-risk communities and educational programmes to build resilience in vulnerable young populations, institutions, civil society and the media to deliver long term preventative outcomes.

Priority 4: Protect against and mitigate the impact of attacks overseas

295 Despite our best efforts in weakening drivers of terrorism, reducing terrorist capability and disrupting planned attacks, there will continue to be terrorist attacks overseas in which British nationals will be involved. Given this we need to work with overseas partners to support them in strengthening protective security around UK nationals and improving attack response during an incident. Success over the next three years will mean that, in multiple key locations overseas, there is strengthened security around British nationals and an improved attack response from the local authorities that saves lives. At the same time we will continue to use our world leading travel advice and UK crisis response to both inform British nationals of risks and support them during terrorist incidents.

296 Following the 2015 attack in Sousse, we significantly expanded our work overseas to increase our understanding of priority countries' protective capabilities and work with them to help improve them where necessary. These are long-term programmes but we are already seeing tangible impact, such as in Tunisia. We work with partners in Europe, the US and regionally to share the burden and expand our reach. We will extend the breadth and depth of this work and develop closer relationships with partners, including industry, to help deliver security improvements. A specialist team – the Joint Overseas Protect and Prepare Unit – was established in 2015 to deliver this work. Its counter-terrorism awareness training has already reached 23,000 UK travel company staff worldwide and its International 'Run, Hide, Tell' film has received over 400,000 hits online.

297 We are also increasing our overseas counter-terrorism work in the maritime sector, including work to raise maritime security standards at ports in priority countries.

Fig 2.7: The Run, Hide, Tell film, that has received over 400,000 hits online



Source: Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Travel Advice

298 The responsibility for the safety and security of British nationals overseas rests with the governments of the countries they are in. However, their capability and capacity to do so can vary significantly, and in many cases has been severely tested by the scale and nature of the local terrorist threat.

299 Helping people understand the risks in countries to which they travel is a key part of our work: the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Travel Advice online had nearly 47 million hits in 2017. This advice highlights terrorist threats to British nationals overseas so they can make informed decisions about their travel. Where the risks are sufficiently grave, we will continue to advise against travel.

300 The UK has a world-renowned system for responding to terrorist incidents overseas in which British nationals are involved. This involves detailed crisis management planning; the use of specialist resources, such as Rapid Deployment Teams; the deployment of police to support investigations in the aftermath of an attack; and hostage and crisis negotiation experts. We will continue to test and improve our systems for responding to incidents overseas, including through regular exercising – a recent Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack crisis exercise in Nigeria included 350 participants – and maintaining our specialist kidnap negotiation and hostage rescue capabilities.

301 The UK Government does not pay ransoms or make substantive concessions to terrorist hostage takers. Ransom payments to terrorists are illegal under UK and international law as a terrorist finance offence. We have encouraged international partners to follow our lead, including through the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2368 of 20 July 2017, the G7 Foreign Ministers' Joint Communiqué of April 2017 and G7 Leaders' Declaration of May 2016.

Cross-cutting responses

302 The Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare work strands, and our programmes within these work strands that are directed overseas, are cross-cutting in their approaches. This section explains broader government responses to extremism, integration, and crime, which are relevant to our CONTEST strategy, as well as specific work on data and science, technology, analysis and research which underpins our counter-terrorism work.

Countering extremism

303 Alongside a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy we have an effective Counter-Extremism Strategy to tackle the promotion of hatred, the erosion of women's rights, the spread of intolerance, and the isolation of communities. We believe it is essential to protect the values of our society – the rule of law, individual liberty, democracy, mutual respect, tolerance and understanding of different faiths and beliefs – by tackling extremism in all its forms, including far-right extremism, which causes significant social harm in our communities.⁵⁷

304 In 2015, we published the Counter-Extremism Strategy. The strategy is based around four pillars:

- i. Countering extremist ideology by making sure every part of Government is taking action to confront extremist narratives that run contrary to our shared values.
- ii. Actively supporting mainstream voices especially in our faith communities and civil society.
- iii. Disrupting the most harmful extremists using all of the tools available to us and prosecuting those who break the law.
- iv. Building more cohesive communities by tackling segregation and feelings of alienation, which can provide fertile ground for extremist messages.

305 Government, local statutory partners and communities all play important roles in challenging extremism and building stronger communities that are resilient to terrorist and extremist radicalisation. Since the strategy was published we have grown a network of over 160 civil society groups through our Building a Stronger Britain Together programme. We have also taken steps to protect our public institutions from the threat extremism poses and published a Hate Crime Action Plan, alongside £3.4 million of funding for protective security measures for faith institutions.

306 In March 2018, the Prime Minister announced the appointment of Sara Khan as the new lead Commissioner for Countering Extremism.⁵⁸ The Commission has a clear remit to support the Government, the public sector, civil and wider society to identify and challenge all forms of extremism. It will provide the Government with impartial, external advice on the tools, policies and approaches needed to tackle extremism. It will also support the public sector, communities and civil society to confront extremism wherever it exists, and promote fundamental, pluralistic British values.

57 Our Counter-Extremism Strategy was published in 2015 and commits the Government to addressing all the broader harms that extremism can cause, not just where it may lead to terrorism. To varying degrees, responsibility for counter-extremism is devolved in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and each Devolved Administration has its own approach in the areas devolved to them. Online at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470088/51859_Cm9148_Accessible.pdf.

58 Online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/sara-khan-to-lead-commission-for-countering-extremism>

307 Initially, the Commission will widely and openly enter a discussion about extremism and Britain's values with individuals from all areas of society, independently selecting who it will engage with. It will also produce a strategic assessment of the threat extremism presents as well as the current response and, in this initial phase, will also advise on the Commission's future structures and work programmes.

Integration

308 In January 2018, we published our new Integrated Communities Strategy for consultation.⁵⁹ The goal of the strategy is to build strong integrated communities where people – whatever their background – live, work, learn and socialise together, based on shared rights, responsibilities and opportunities.

309 A successful integration strategy is important in its own right. It is also important to counter-terrorism, and to Prevent in particular, because there is an association between support for terrorist violence and a rejection of a strong and integrated society. We judge that communities who do not or cannot participate in civic society are more likely to be vulnerable to radicalisation.

Data

310 One of the most far-reaching findings of reviews into the 2017 terrorist attacks in the UK, including the Operational Improvement Review overseen by David Anderson QC, is the critical importance of effectively managing, sharing and analysing a large and growing amount of relevant data. As the number of people associated with terrorism in the UK increases, effective and proportionate data exploitation will become ever more important in making decisions and when and how we take action.

311 As part of CONTEST we will deliver a step change in how we share, analyse and exploit data across the counter-terrorism community. There will be a new strategic approach to acquiring, sharing and analysing data, as well as increased cooperation with the private sector, particularly where companies hold data that might flag emerging risks, such as the acquisition of chemical or explosive precursors or terrorist content online. There will be more robust and transparent guidelines covering security, proportionality and legality, and we will use and protect the data we have appropriately.

312 To keep pace with the increase in the availability of data and advances in data analytics, we will move towards a new model of shared investment in innovation across CONTEST partners. This will include working with academia and industry, and with international allies, to be at the forefront of experimentation and trialling of new developments in data analytics which can then be scaled-up for the wider national security community. It will also include protecting the UK through anticipating and addressing use by our adversaries of data technologies.

313 To ensure that we have access to the right expertise in data science and analytics, we will invest in skills. This will include: developing partnerships with leading academic institutions, technology companies and other partners, to train and retain the future pipeline of specialist data scientists, systems architects and data analysts; as well as to develop the skills base of policy makers and operational partners to ensure they are data-literate and able to make intelligent use of analytical insight.

59 Online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/integrated-communities-strategy-green-paper>. Integration is devolved so the new strategy will only cover England. Scotland has a New Scots refugee integration strategy – first published in 2014 and refreshed in collaboration with partners in January 2018.

314 As the Prime Minister referenced in her speech to the World Economic Forum in January 2018, we have only just seen the beginning of what artificial intelligence can achieve. This potential must be underwritten by establishing the rules and standards that can make the most of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in a responsible way. We have launched the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation, sponsored by DCMS, to work with international partners to build a common framework for the safe and innovative deployment of AI.

Science, technology, analysis and research

315 Science, technology, analysis and research (STAR) underpin counter-terrorism work. The 2015 SDSR recognised the importance of UK's position as a global leader in many areas of science for our security. SDSR committed Ministry of Defence to invest at least 1.2% of the defence budget on science and technology. The integration of the Home Office's Centre for Applied Science and Technology into the MOD's Defence Science and Technology Laboratories (Dstl) will strengthen these vital capabilities at the heart of UK's defence and security.

316 Our aim is to continue to access the STAR we need to identify and reduce threats, to underpin evidence-based decisions, and to exploit opportunities to reduce the risk from terrorism. For example, we are using world-class expertise to: automatically identify terrorist material online and issue a take-down notice; and to understand the latest CBRN threats, applying this knowledge to enhance our protection at the border, to help our first responders react quickly and effectively and to prevent terrorist access to CBRN materials.

317 We will continue to ensure investment in counter-terrorism STAR and report to the NSC on an annual basis the achievements of the CONTEST STAR community. The Home Office will lead development and coordination of a cross-government STAR strategy for counter-terrorism, and continue to work with wider government STAR processes to share information and best practice. The strategy will seek to focus resources around shared requirements, for example, the Future Aviation Security Solutions (FASS) Programme and a focus on securing crowded places. Through these cross-government structures, we will focus on data science innovation and skills, understanding and predicting terrorist innovation (e.g. through behavioural science), and, threat agnostic detection to develop and adapt systems that are capable of detecting multiple threats.

318 We will strengthen participation in international collaborative research programmes, where we can share costs and drive development of STAR to mutual benefit. In doing so, we will explore further cooperation with Australia, Canada and New Zealand, in addition to our very strong partnerships with the US and France. We will also enhance collaboration with academia and the private sector to ensure we can access and exploit the most advanced technology, advice and solutions for counter-terrorism. The Innovation and Research InSight Unit (IRIS) – a joint Ministry of Defence and Home Office unit – is one example of how we are already working with academia and industry to ensure that threats and opportunities are communicated to defence and security policy makers.

319 To encourage a flourishing and innovative science base, with a diverse pipeline of skills, we will actively promote the role of STAR in countering terrorism by working with professional and industrial bodies, as well as Chief Scientific Advisers and the Government Office of Science. We will also use an annual HMG Security STAR information event and themed events, as well as the Security and Policing Event organised by the Joint Security and Resilience Centre (JSaRC), to engage directly with academics and the private sector to encourage them to help tackle the security challenges facing the UK.

320 Wherever possible, we will co-design our approach on cross-cutting issues with the private sector, including building joint platforms for taking the work forward. JSaRC is a collaboration between and staffed by both Government and the security industry that drives innovation. JSaRC is the operational arm of the Security and Resilience Partnership and is supported by RISC (an inclusive alliance of UK security and resilience organisations). It also brings commercial benefits for our partners by encouraging growth opportunities in the security sector; shaping a market space in which small, medium and large companies are able to understand immediate and long term priorities.

Terrorism and wider policing

321 The response to the 2017 terrorist attacks underlined the importance of collaboration between all law enforcement and security agencies, including the sharing of people, intelligence, specialist capabilities and facilities. Following the attacks, the National Crime Agency (NCA) provided additional capacity to Counter-Terrorism Policing. Local policing forms a critical link between Counter-Terrorism Policing and local communities, manages many of the multi-agency partnerships, which are at the core of our approach to risk management, and delivers specialised support services for counter-terrorism operations, such as firearms and air support. Local policing is critical in detecting and frustrating emergent threats and mitigating any attacks.

322 Counter-Terrorism Policing, the NCA and National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) are implementing a counter-terrorism and serious and organised crime collaboration strategy. We have identified key priorities for joint working in important areas such as prisons, intelligence, firearms and borders, and will also provide a mechanism for new initiatives in areas such as digital, cyber, intelligence and surveillance. For example, we have established a dedicated unit to ensure we have the right intelligence, detection and enforcement capabilities and reduce the ability for terrorists and criminals to access firearms.

323 We have also seen, at the Scottish Crime Campus and elsewhere, that the co-location of law enforcement agencies responsible for tackling terrorism and serious and organised crime can drive closer collaboration, and deliver better value for money. The Home Office has invested in projects including a bespoke facility in South Wales. We will continue to identify and support further opportunities for increasing co-location across the country.



Part 3: Implementation

324 This section describes how we will ensure the effective implementation of CONTEST, including governance and oversight, funding and performance.

Governance and oversight

Ministerial responsibilities

325 The National Security Council (NSC), chaired by the Prime Minister, will continue to oversee CONTEST, taking regular reports on its progress, considering emerging risks, reviewing the collective impact of our counter-terrorism work, and agreeing our response and resources accordingly.

326 The Home Secretary is responsible for the overall coordination of the Government's counter-terrorism response, has oversight of MI5 and the National Crime Agency and is accountable for the activities of the police service in England and Wales, including Counter-Terrorism Policing. The Home Secretary is accountable to Parliament, which scrutinises the work of the Government.

327 The Foreign Secretary is responsible for UK foreign policy and Government activity overseas, including international elements of CONTEST. The Foreign Secretary has oversight of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and is accountable to Parliament for their activities.

328 The Chancellor is responsible for the implementation of terrorist asset freezes, both domestic and international.

329 The Defence Secretary is responsible for the Armed Forces and Defence's contribution to counter-terrorism.

330 The Transport Secretary is responsible for transport security policy and leads on security arrangements for land, aviation and maritime transport in Great Britain to mitigate the risk from terrorism to the transport system and travelling public. The Digital Secretary leads the Government's relations with the tech industry, including Communications Service Providers, while also overseeing the development of the Digital Charter as part of efforts to make the UK the safest place in the world to be online.

Oversight

331 The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament has, in broad terms, oversight of the security and intelligence activities of the UK. Additionally, the Home Affairs Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Treasury Committee provide additional Parliamentary oversight of the expenditure, administration and policy of the Home Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and HM Treasury respectively.

332 The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation provides robust challenge to the Government and police, and independent oversight to ensure that legislation is fair and effective. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner provides independent oversight of the investigatory work of the secret intelligence agencies.

333 Oversight, scrutiny and transparency of our counter-terrorism work is world-leading, and includes the reports we publish, the involvement of independent judges who review government agencies' use of intrusive powers and government applications for TEOs and TPIMs, an independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, and accountability to Parliament. We will continue to engage extensively with the public, civil society, academia and Parliament, and through community outreach. We aim to listen and respond to improve our approach to keeping the public safe.

Devolved Administrations

334 Counter-terrorism – like all issues of national security – is a reserved matter, meaning that powers related to counter-terrorism are retained by the UK Parliament. However, many of the local delivery mechanisms are devolved in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.

335 Since 2011, the UK Government and the Devolved Administrations have worked together with a shared recognition of the threat posed across the UK by terrorism and a shared strategic response. This close collaboration ensures that we are collectively able to fulfil the objectives of CONTEST across the UK.

336 The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland is responsible for the strategic response to Northern Ireland related terrorism in Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland Office coordinates this response working with partners including the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), MI5, the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland, as well as government departments and law enforcement agencies in Ireland.

Departmental coordination

337 At official level, counter-terrorism is overseen by a Senior Responsible Owner (SRO): the Director General of the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office. The Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism leads on supporting the Home Secretary and the SRO in developing, coordinating and implementing CONTEST. It also enables oversight of MI5 and Counter-Terrorism Policing; and coordinates the response to counter-terrorism related crises.

338 Our approach to combatting terrorism is constantly managed and monitored. The SRO chairs a National Security Strategic Implementation Group for counter-terrorism, which brings together senior operational and policy leaders from across Government, the Devolved Administrations, the police and the security and intelligence agencies. Each of the four 'P' work strands within CONTEST also has governance that coordinates activity and tracks relevant objectives, and the International CONTEST Group coordinates our approach to overseas counter-terrorism.

Overseas territories

339 As outlined in the 2012 White Paper *The Overseas Territories: Security, Success and Sustainability*, the UK Government is committed to working in partnership with the Overseas Territories to tackle threats arising from international terrorism. Although the Governors of the Overseas Territories are responsible for their counter-terrorism responses, the UK Government will support and collaborate with them where necessary to develop counter-terrorism strategies, and subsequent capability building and planning, through the relevant Government Departments.

People and culture

340 Our people and culture are integral to the success of counter-terrorism strategy, policy, and operations. Effective counter-terrorism requires recruiting, training, and retaining high-calibre people in all areas and ensuring they work well together. It is also contingent on understanding, listening to, and working in partnership with individuals, groups, and communities with a range of backgrounds and characteristics, including gender, ethnicity, religion, and social background. The 2015 SDSR established a security and defence diversity network. Its work has complemented other departmental and civil service-wide efforts to ensure that all those who work on national security, including counter-terrorism, are aware that diversity and inclusion is critical to how we work. We will improve external engagement and internal representation among those who work on counter-terrorism. We will proactively embed more inclusive approaches throughout our work, including encouraging constructive challenge and different ways of thinking, and improving our resilience, to help us better respond to the complex threats that we face.

Funding

341 In the 2015 Budget, the government committed to protecting cross-government counter-terrorism spend of more than £2 billion per year. This spending was reviewed and tested within the 2015 SDSR to identify efficiencies for reinvestment and to ensure it reflects our highest counter-terrorism priorities. On top of that, the Government will spend 30% more overall in real terms on key counter-terrorism capabilities over the Spending Review period. Together, this will mean:

- Investment in new counter-terrorism capabilities for the security and intelligence agencies worth £1.4 billion to enable them to investigate, analyse and help disrupt terrorist plots.
- £2 billion of new investment in the capability of UK Special Forces, which allows us to strike terrorists wherever they are in the world.
- £500 million of additional investment in the Home Office to protect UK citizens from terrorist threats, including: a real terms increase to the Counter-Terrorism Policing Grant; a new National Digital Exploitation Service to analyse the growing volumes of seized media for evidence and intelligence leads; an increased number of specialist firearms officers; improved intelligence and threat detection at the border; and increased efforts to counter the poisonous ideologies that feed terrorism and extremism.

342 In light of the changing threat picture, and the five attacks in London and Manchester, the Government has allocated additional funding to Counter-Terrorism Policing. In 2017-18, funding for Counter-Terrorism Policing was £707m, which included £32m to support an uplift in armed policing. An additional up to £28m was provided in-year to meet the immediate costs of responding to the terrorist attacks. In 2018-19, funding for Counter-Terrorism Policing will increase, by £50m, to £757m.

343 The Government also provided funding to support victims of the Manchester terrorist attack and to meet costs placed on Manchester's emergency services, City Council and health and social care providers. New funding announced in 2018⁶⁰ included:

- Over £9 million for policing, in addition to the support provided through funding for Counter-Terrorism Policing.
- Over £1 million to support the important work of the We Love Manchester Emergency Fund, in partnership with the British Red Cross.
- £451,000 for social care costs.
- £2.6 million for a mental health hub – in addition to £53,800 for psychological support.
- An £80,000 hardship fund for small businesses affected by the attack.
- Full coroner and inquest costs.

344 In order to meet the challenge of an increasingly complex and changing threat picture, we have established a Counter-Terrorism Accelerator Fund to respond to emerging threats and risks more quickly and to introduce innovative and transformational approaches to counter the terrorist threat. The fund, worth £25m per annum, has been generated through a reprioritisation of existing counter-terrorism spending and is funding innovative projects in 2018/19.

60 Press release available online: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-sets-out-24-million-for-greater-manchester-following-2017-terror-attack>

Performance

345 CONTEST is monitored against a set of key performance indicators, supplemented by the detailed evaluation of specific programmes. We have developed a performance framework that draws together, the range of evidence used across government to monitor delivery, and evaluate success, of the UK's overseas and domestic counter-terrorism response.

346 The data collected in the framework will be used to monitor progress towards the CONTEST strategic objectives and to make informed decisions about the most effective, efficient way to spend Government resources on counter-terrorism and achieve value for money. We intend to improve performance and management data across the system to improve our decision-making and agility. We are committed to publishing data where security requirements allow. We will continue to publish an annual report on our counter-terrorism work.



Annex: Roles and responsibilities

Cabinet Office. The Cabinet Office supports the work of the National Security Council through the National Security Secretariat, which also has oversight of the Single Intelligence Account. The Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) is the Government's crisis response mechanism for terrorist attacks. The Cabinet Office's Joint Intelligence Committee sets strategic intelligence gathering priorities and delivers strategic intelligence assessments.

The Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) sits within the National Security Secretariat of the Cabinet Office and leads cross-government work on parts of the Prepare portfolio. CCS produces the National Risk Assessment and other cross-government risk products, which incorporate threat information from the intelligence agencies and inform emergency planning and preparedness. It also leads the Resilience Capabilities Programme, a cross-Whitehall initiative that oversees the strategic development and maintenance of the standard capabilities required for any crisis response. In addition to broader planning, CCS works with OSCT on specific programmes preparing for the UK's highest impact terror threats, which require bespoke contingency planning and capabilities. CCS leads on recovery from a terrorist attack.

Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI). CPNI is the national technical authority for physical and personnel protective security measures; it works closely with the National Cyber Security Centre, which leads on cyber security advice. CPNI develops and delivers advice and guidance aimed at reducing vulnerability to terrorism and other threats, underpinned by an extensive programme of research, development, testing and evaluation. CPNI engages directly with businesses and organisations across the national infrastructure, whilst also working with the National Counter-Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) and the Counter-Terrorism Security Adviser (CTSA) network to support the operators of crowded places.

Counter-Terrorism Policing. Counter-Terrorism Policing is the primary means for disrupting terrorist related activity in the UK, a significant contributor to international disruptions, and a core vehicle for the delivery of preventative and protective activity. It consists of a network of operational units based regionally across the UK with a headquarters providing specialised national and international capabilities. Counter-Terrorism Policing leads the police contribution to CONTEST across all four work strands. Comprising around 7,000 police officers and staff across the UK, and a significant presence overseas.

In addition to significant proactive operational work, Counter-Terrorism Policing can be mobilised in response to single or multiple terrorist incidents, surging and flexing resources across the UK in accordance to where the threat is greatest. Forces collaborate through this operating model and Chief Officers vest authority in both the National Lead for Counter-

Terrorism (routinely the Assistant Commissioner in the Metropolitan Police for Specialist Operations) and the Senior National Coordinator, who have strategic and operational oversight of Counter-Terrorism Policing.

This construct runs under a legally binding collaboration agreement signed by the nine Lead Force Chief Constables and their respective Police and Crime Commissioners. This ensures that Counter-Terrorism Policing can operate as a single entity whilst anchored and connected to the local communities they serve. Like the rest of policing it is overseen by the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) under its Counter-Terrorism Coordination Committee.

The police contribute to all four work strands of CONTEST.

Pursue: Counter-Terrorism Policing, working jointly with MI5, collects and develops intelligence, runs counter-terrorism investigations and disrupts terrorist activity through arrests and, through the CPS, prosecutions.

Prevent: Amongst other activities, Counter-Terrorism Policing works with local forces to safeguard individuals and communities vulnerable to radicalisation. It supports Local Authorities and other partners in delivering their statutory duty under PREVENT. Along with local forces, Counter-Terrorism Policing disrupts those who seek to radicalise.

Protect: Counter-Terrorism Policing delivers protective security for the public, places, Royalty and VIPs. National Counter-Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) are responsible for developing specific guidance and support a network of about 190 counter-terrorism security advisors (CTSAs) nationally, who deliver protective security advice and guidance for high profile locations in the private and public sectors.

Prepare: Counter-Terrorism Policing delivers specialist response capabilities, such as firearms, to protect the public in the event of a terrorist attack and assures these through testing and exercising.

Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). CPS is responsible for prosecuting criminal cases, including terrorism related cases, investigated by the police in England and Wales. The CPS provides early investigative advice to the police, makes the charging decisions and prosecutes accused individuals. In Scotland, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of crime.

Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl). Dstl is the UK's leading Government agency in applying Science and Technology (S&T) to the defence and security of the UK. Dstl brings together the defence and security S&T community, including industry, academia, wider Government and international partners, to provide sensitive and specialist S&T services to MOD and wider Government.

Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS). BEIS contributes to Protect and Prepare as the lead government department for energy, chemicals and civil nuclear sectors. It is responsible for setting the policy direction to ensure the protection of energy (electricity, gas, oil) supplies and sites and chemical sites and civil nuclear sites and materials, from all risks, including terrorist attack. BEIS also delivers the Global Threat Reduction Programme, to secure radiological and nuclear material internationally.

Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). DCMS leads across government to make the UK the safest place in the world to be online. This includes leading for HMG in tackling harmful activity online. The department is also responsible for the overall HMG relationship with the tech industry, including Communications Service Providers. DCMS also leads on the Digital Charter.

Department for Education (DfE). DfE is responsible for work to ensure that young people are protected from the risk of radicalisation in schools, further education providers and higher education institutions. The department has an important role in supporting institutions to implement Prevent and aspects of Protect and Prepare by helping to ensure that the educational estate is secure and that effective crisis response arrangements are in place.

Department for Exiting European Union (DExEU). DExEU leads on negotiations to develop a deep and special partnership taking in both economic and security cooperation to fight crime and terrorism and uphold justice across Europe.

Department of Health & Social Care (DHSC). DHSC is responsible for the health sector's contribution to CONTEST. This includes maintaining and building our capability to respond to mass casualty incidents, including Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear events; and the implementation of the Prevent duty in the health sector.

Department for International Development (DFID). The UK plays a leading role in promoting global development efforts through supporting the Global Goals for sustainable development. Our assistance focuses on improving peace, security and governance; equality of opportunity for girls and women; access to basic services for the poorest; and building resilience to crises and responding to disasters when they occur. In doing so, the UK's development assistance makes a significant contribution to our long-term national security. Tackling fragility and building stability overseas means tackling the root causes of many of the challenges that we face including terrorism. DFID spends at least 50% of its budget on fragile states and regions, including those most directly linked to our national security, in South Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

Department for Transport (DfT). DfT leads UK land, aviation and maritime transport security policy both in the UK and in respect of UK transport entities operating abroad. This includes setting and enforcing the protective standards that operators of railways and trains, airports and aircraft and ports and ships in the UK and abroad are required to comply with (with regards to the compliance of standards in the aviation sector in the UK, this process is assured and enforced by the Civil Aviation Authority). DfT works with the transport industry, law enforcement agencies and the security agencies, to ensure that risks are understood and that mitigation measures are targeted, proportionate and practicable.

Devolved Administrations. The Devolved Administrations are responsible in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales for the functions which have been devolved to them according to their different devolution settlements. Counter-terrorism is a reserved matter, but many of the local delivery mechanisms, such as policing and justice in Scotland and Northern Ireland, and health, education and local government in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are devolved. It should also be noted that Scotland and Northern Ireland are separate legal jurisdictions from England and Wales, and Scotland operates a different system of law. In Scotland, the Lord Advocate has primacy for the investigation and prosecution of all crime and deaths that occur in Scotland, including acts of terrorism with the police being subject to the direction of the relevant prosecutor and, in the context of a major incident, this would involve personal direction by the Lord Advocate. The Devolved Administrations are responsible for aspects of Prevent, aspects of protection of crowded places and for wider consequence management following an attack.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The FCO and its overseas Counter-Terrorism and Extremism Network leads on the delivery internationally of the Government's counter-terrorism and counter-extremism strategies, and on overseas threat and crisis response, including Travel Advice to UK citizens. It also hosts the cross-Government Counter-Daesh

Task Force that ensures cohesion across the Government of activity to counter Daesh in Syria and Iraq. The Foreign Secretary is responsible for UK foreign policy and Government activity overseas, including international elements of CONTEST. The Foreign Secretary has oversight of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and is accountable to Parliament for their activities through the Intelligence and Security Committee.

Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). GCHQ has two missions – Signals Intelligence (known as SIGINT) and Information Assurance (IA). SIGINT work provides vital information to support government policy-making and operations in the fields of national security, military operations, law enforcement and economic well-being.

Government Office for Science (GO-Science). GO-Science ensures that government policies and decisions are informed by the best scientific evidence and strategic long-term thinking. It is headed by the Government Chief Scientific Adviser, whose role is to advise the Prime Minister and cabinet. GO-Science works with CONTEST to ensure it is underpinned by robust science.

Home Office. The Home Secretary has responsibility for CONTEST. The Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office leads on supporting the Home Secretary in developing, coordinating and implementing CONTEST. It also enables oversight of MI5 and Counter-Terrorism Policing; and coordinates the response to CT related crises.

OSCT leads on the management and delivery of the Prevent programme, in partnership with Counter-Terrorism Police, and local, national and civil society delivery partners. Through the Research, Information and Communications Unit, it supports civil society groups to deliver strategic counter-narrative communications.

On Pursue, OSCT owns the policy and oversees the exercise of a suite of disruptive counter-terrorism powers, including proscription and Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs), and immigration powers for counter-terrorism effect, such as exclusion and deprivation. It owns the overall policy for countering terrorist finance and manages the proscription regime for the UK. OSCT also develops, implements (as appropriate) and reviews CT legislation.

OSCT is responsible for overseeing cross-government work on Protect. It manages the policy for protection of people and places, including the protection of Royalty and VIPs, sites of critical national importance, security at crowded places and access to hazardous substances. It also coordinates border and aviation security with police, Border Force, Department for Transport and Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

On Prepare, OSCT manages the Government's plans for responding to a terrorist incident, including by running the National CT Exercises Programme. It is responsible for ensuring the Government's preparedness for the highest impact terrorism-related risks in the National Risk Assessment, including marauding terrorism firearms attacks (MTFA) and a range of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear scenarios. OSCT also owns the CT Science and Technology programme, which seeks to identify innovative science and technology solutions in support of CONTEST.

Through Border Force, UK Visas and Immigration, Immigration Enforcement and Her Majesty's Passport Office, the Home Office is responsible for border security, with police support.

HM Treasury (HMT). HMT agrees counter-terrorism funding and budgetary protections with Departments during spending reviews, approving in year adjustments to CT spending and the design and final funding arrangements for the new Counter-Terrorism Accelerator Fund. Also it works with the Cabinet Office and Home Office on the annual counter-terrorism mapping exercise and counter-terrorism performance. The Treasury owns the Government's relationship with Pool Re – the reinsurance organisation which insures against acts of Terrorism when designated by the Government.

The Treasury leads the UK delegation to the Financial Action Task Force and is the UK POC for the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme. HMT owns the implementation of financial sanctions and terrorist asset freezes, owns the legislation and implementation process for domestic terrorist asset freezes, and co-owns the UK's Counter-Terrorist Finance Strategy. FCO leads on submitting designation proposals for Daesh and ISIL listings at the UN.

The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) helps to ensure that financial sanctions are properly understood, implemented and enforced in the United Kingdom (including all UN, EU and UK CT sanctions). OFSI owns the implementation and review process for the consideration of new designations for the UK domestic counter-terrorism sanctions regime (the Terrorist Asset Freezing Act).

Joint International Counter-Terrorism Unit (JICTU). JICTU was established in April 2016, in line with a commitment made in the 2015 NSS/SDSR. The unit is the strategic centre for UK counter-terrorism work overseas, bringing together the expertise of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Home Office and other Departments. It develops cross-government strategies for overseas counter-terrorism work; oversees expanded funds for support and capacity building work abroad; and leads our counter-terrorism agenda internationally. The unit reports to the Home and Foreign Secretaries.

Joint Overseas Protect and Prepare Team (JOPP). JOPP is a joint Home Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office unit that builds relationships with other Governments, helping them strengthen protective security in key overseas locations, increasing the Government's understanding of local capability to protect British tourists, and responding quickly and effectively to terrorist attacks and then works to reduce the risk by working collaboratively with host states to improve their capabilities.

Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC). JTAC is the UK's centre for the all-source analysis and assessment of international terrorism. JTAC sets threat levels and issues analytical reporting to government departments and agencies.

Local Authorities. With their wide ranging responsibilities and democratic accountability, local authorities are vital to CONTEST work. Local authorities should engage in multi-agency work to agree risk and coordinate CONTEST activity. They should also use the existing counter-terrorism local profiles (CTLPs) in every region to assess individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism.

Ministry of Defence (MOD). The MOD contributes to CONTEST using its military capability. It supports Pursue through its capability to disrupt terrorist groups overseas, such as Daesh in Syria and Iraq, as well as through counter-terrorism capacity building for partner nations, and support to overseas law enforcement and security agencies. Its support for conflict prevention work also contributes to CONTEST objectives. In the event of a terrorist attack that exceeds the capability or immediate capacity of the UK civilian response, the MOD could provide support to Prepare through Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA).

Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG). MHCLG sets the overarching framework for local government. Local authorities have an important role in implementing Prevent, in partnership with other agencies and civil society groups and aspects of Protect and Prepare, including protective security of infrastructure and crowded places and local resilience. The Ministry helps local areas prepare for, respond to, and recover from emergencies, and provides Government liaison officers as the link between local responders and COBR.

MI5. MI5's mission is to keep the country safe. Currently around 80% of MI5's resources are used to support counter-terrorism work. MI5 investigates threats to national security through the gathering of secret intelligence, and by working closely with other UK and overseas partners. MI5 does this within a strict framework of legislation and oversight to ensure its investigatory powers are used only where it is necessary and proportionate to do so. MI5 has greatly improved its ability to work at both a national and regional level by setting up a network of stations around the country. UK law enforcement agencies, including all regional police forces, maintain a close working relationship with MI5 on counter-terrorism issues.

Ministry of Justice (MoJ). Her Majesty's Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) manages the risks posed by terrorist and extremist offenders, in partnership with other public sector organisations, the police and the security and intelligence agencies.

National Crime Agency (NCA). NCA Leads UK law enforcement's fight to cut serious and organised crime. The NCA has the threat lead for a number of enabling factors that lead to an increased risk of terrorism, including illegal firearms, people and commodity smuggling, illegal activity in prisons, cyber crime, and financial crime, and works in close collaboration with Counter-Terrorism Policing. The NCA also has a network of international liaison officers and is the National contact point for Europol and Interpol.

National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). NCSC is part of GCHQ and became operational in October 2016. The NCSC is the UK's technical authority on cyber security and provides a single, central body for cyber security at a national level. It manages national cyber security incidents, carries out real-time threat analysis and provides tailored sectoral advice.

National Security Council (NSC). NSC is the main forum for collective discussion of the Government's objectives for national security and about how best to deliver them in the current financial climate. A key purpose of the Council is to ensure that ministers consider national security in the round and in a strategic way. The Council meets weekly and is chaired by the Prime Minister.

Northern Ireland Office (NIO). The NIO supports the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and is responsible for coordinating the strategic approach to tackling the threat from Northern Ireland related terrorism in Northern Ireland.

Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). SIS uses our secret network of agents and partners overseas to penetrate terrorist groups, detect threats to the UK and our interests, and disrupt those in a lawful way. We work covertly to degrade terrorist organisations and deny them safe operating space overseas.

