Foreign Affairs Magazine

[SS from essay by Tom Segev, Israeli historian and the author of A State at Any Cost: The Life of David Ben-Gurion.]

To Israelis, October 7, 2023, is the worst day in their country’s 75-year history. Never before have so many of them been massacred and taken hostage on a single day. Thousands of heavily armed Hamas fighters managed to break through the Gaza Strip’s fortified border and into Israel, rampaging unimpeded for hours, destroying several villages, and committing gruesome acts of brutality before Israeli forces could regain control. Israelis have compared the attack to the Holocaust; Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has described Hamas as “the new Nazis.” In response, the Israel Defense Forces have pursued an open-ended military campaign in Gaza driven by rage and the desire for revenge. Netanyahu promises that the IDF will fight Hamas until it achieves “total victory,” although even his own military has been hard put to define what this means. He has offered no clear idea of what should happen when the fighting stops, other than to assert that Israel must maintain security control of all of Gaza and the West Bank.

For Palestinians, the Gaza war is the worst event they have experienced in 75 years. Never have so many of them been killed and uprooted since the nakba, the catastrophe that befell them during Israel’s war of independence in 1948, when hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were forced to give up their homes and became refugees. Like the Israelis, they also point to terrible acts of violence: by late March, Israel’s military campaign had taken the lives of tens of thousands of Palestinians, among them thousands of children, and rendered well over a million homeless. As the Palestinians see it, the Israeli offensive is part of a larger plan to incorporate all Palestinian lands into the Jewish state and get them to abandon Gaza entirely—an idea that has in fact been raised by some members of Netanyahu’s government. The Palestinians also hold on to the illusion of return, the principle that they will one day be able to reclaim their historic homes in Israel itself—a kind of Palestinian Zionism that, like Israel’s maximalist aspirations, can never come true.

[SS from essay by Maha Yahya, Director of the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center.]

Over the past six months, tensions along Israel’s border with Lebanon have escalated dramatically. Israel has now deployed 100,000 troops to its north to confront the Shiite militant group Hezbollah, and the fighting there has steadily intensified. Nearly 400 Lebanese—including around 70 civilians and three journalists—have been killed, 90,000 Lebanese civilians have been displaced from around 100 towns and villages along the Israeli-Lebanese border, and Lebanese villages and olive groves have incurred widespread damage from phosphorus bombs. Hezbollah, meanwhile, has attempted to demonstrate its support for Hamas, now under siege from Israel in Gaza after its October 7 attack, by firing rockets almost daily at Israeli towns and military targets, displacing nearly 80,000 Israelis and killing a half dozen civilians.

Then, on April 1, Israel bombed Iran’s consulate in Damascus, killing senior officers in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps. Two weeks later, Iran launched an unprecedented missile attack on Israeli soil, and Israel retaliated with a strike on Iran. Both Israel’s attack and Iran’s response were unexpected. Iran, in particular, has a long history of muted responses to Israeli provocations, simply because a war with Israel or its main ally, the United States, is not in Tehran’s interest.

[SS from essay by Marc Lynch, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University.]

Since Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel, the Middle East has been rocked by mass protests. Egyptians have demonstrated in solidarity with Palestinians at great personal risk, and Iraqis, Moroccans, Tunisians, and Yemenis have taken to the streets in vast numbers. Meanwhile, Jordanians have broken long-standing redlines by marching on the Israeli embassy, and Saudi Arabia has refused to resume normalization talks with Israel, in part because of its people’s deep fury over Israel’s operations in the Gaza Strip.

For Washington, the view is that none of this mobilization really matters. Arab leaders, after all, are among the world’s most experienced practitioners of realpolitik, and they have a record of ignoring their people’s preferences. The protests, although large, have been manageable. Former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and other leaders have long encouraged protests about the treatment of Palestinians, which allow their people to blow off steam and direct their anger toward a foreign enemy instead of against domestic corruption and incompetence. In time, or so the argument goes, the fighting in Gaza will end, the angry protesters will go home, and their leaders will carry on pursuing self-interests, an activity at which they excel.