Abstract
This article illustrates the determinants of bidder collusion using data from German auctions. Special attention is thereby devoted to the question at whether art and antiques auctions are particularly attractive for bidding rings as the conditions for rings to succeed may be quite favorable at these auctions. Cartel stability at art auctions, for example, may be enforced by the structure of bidders or the expected surplus from collusive arrangements. Actually, the estimations of a binary choice model show that even after controlling for determinants suggested by auction theory, art and antiques auctions turn out to be particularly susceptible to bidder collusion.
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Beckmann, M. Art Auctions and Bidding Rings: Empirical Evidence from German Auction Data. Journal of Cultural Economics 28, 125–141 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JCEC.0000019483.38761.63
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JCEC.0000019483.38761.63