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Silent Auctions in the Field and in the Laboratory

Author

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  • R. Mark Isaac
  • Kurt Schnier

Abstract

We analyze data from hundreds of auctions from three field silent auction sessions. We focus on the descriptive statistics and on a parametric model of jump bidding. We then report data from six laboratory sessions of silent auctions. As a controlled environment, this allows us to evaluate the auctions in ways not available within the field. The laboratory experiments capture essential features of the field sessions and thus comprise a credible laboratory testbed for further examination of institutional perturbations in the silent auction. (JEL D44, H41) Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • R. Mark Isaac & Kurt Schnier, 2005. "Silent Auctions in the Field and in the Laboratory," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 43(4), pages 715-733, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:43:y:2005:i:4:p:715-733
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sander Onderstal & Arthur J.C. Schram & Adriaan R. Soetevent, 2011. "Bidding to give in the Field: Door-to-Door Fundraisers had it right from the Start," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-070/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 10 Nov 2011.
    2. Sherstyuk, Katerina & Dulatre, Jeremy, 2008. "Market performance and collusion in sequential and simultaneous multi-object auctions: Evidence from an ascending auctions experiment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 557-572, March.
    3. Peter T. L. Popkowski Leszczyc & Michael H. Rothkopf (deceased), 2010. "Charitable Motives and Bidding in Charity Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(3), pages 399-413, March.
    4. Mark Isaac & Svetlana Pevnitskaya & Kurt S. Schnier, 2012. "Individual Behavior And Bidding Heterogeneity In Sealed Bid Auctions Where The Number Of Bidders Is Unknown," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(2), pages 516-533, April.
    5. Yongfu He & Peter Popkowski Leszczyc, 2013. "The impact of jump bidding in online auctions," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 387-397, December.
    6. Bos, Olivier, 2016. "Charity auctions for the happy few," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 83-92.
    7. Philipp Herrmann & Dennis O. Kundisch & Mohammad S. Rahman, 2013. "To Bid or Not to Bid Aggressively? An Empirical Study," Working Papers Dissertations 08, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
    8. Anthony M. Kwasnica & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2013. "Multiunit Auctions," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 461-490, July.
    9. Katerina Sherstyuk, 2009. "A comparison of first price multi-object auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(1), pages 42-64, March.
    10. Carpenter, Jeffrey & Holmes, Jessica & Matthews, Peter Hans, 2011. "Jumping and sniping at the silents: Does it matter for charities?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(5), pages 395-402.
    11. Khoroshilov, Yuri, 2015. "An experimental study of signaling in auctions with a flexible reserve price," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 124-137.
    12. Katerina Sherstyuk, 2011. "Complexity and bidder behavior in iterative auctions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(4), pages 2769-2776.
    13. Yaron Raviv, 2008. "The Role Of The Bidding Process In Price Determination: Jump Bidding In Sequential English Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 46(3), pages 325-341, July.
    14. Delnoij, Joyce & Rezaei, Sarah & Rijt, Arnout van de, 2023. "Jump bidding does not reduce prices: Field-experimental evidence from online auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 209(C), pages 308-325.
    15. R. Isaac & Svetlana Pevnitskaya & Timothy Salmon, 2010. "Do preferences for charitable giving help auctioneers?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 13(1), pages 14-44, March.
    16. Haruvy, Ernan & Popkowski Leszczyc, Peter T.L., 2009. "Bidder motives in cause-related auctions," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 324-331.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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