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TITLE: Soviet Military Doctrine and  
Warsaw Pact Exercises

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the Warsaw Pact the primary function of Soviet military doctrine is to prevent Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia from adopting military doctrines of territorial defense similar to those of Romania and Yugoslavia. The Soviets use their military doctrine as the basis for all joint Pact activities which prevent members of the Pact from acquiring the capability to wage a war of territorial defense. The most important of these activities is the system of joint military exercises.

The military-political axioms shared by the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the five loyal East European members of the WTO require a theory of military art that eschews 'reliance on one's own forces' and facilitates multi-lateral intervention in each other's territory in joint defense of the gains of socialism against internal and external enemies. This paper suggests that in the joint exercises the Soviets drill the armies of the Pact for nuclear offense against the West in order to render them incapable of conventional defense against the East. It further suggests that in the joint exercises the Soviets also prepare East European conventional forces for massive multilateral interventions in the member states of the alliance.

The aspects of the system of joint exercises which support this analysis are: 1) the pattern of location of the exercises in which the armed forces of individual Pact members participate; 2) the pattern of assigning command of the joint exercises; 3) the practice of offensive actions, including nuclear actions, which rule out preparation for territorial defense; 4) the nature of the organization of staff work for the exercises; 5) the assignment of individual missions in the exercises to multi-national combined arms groupings of forces; 6) the impact of the joint exercises on the nature of the military training programs of individual Pact members; 7) the impact on the careers of East European officers of the command structure of the exercises and of the military-education system that prepares East European officers for WTO exercises; and

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8) the nature of the political activities that take place during joint exercises.

The paper contains, appended at Table 1, a listing of 71 major WTO exercises in the period 1961-79, by a considerable margin the most complete listing available in open sources. Other tables summarize participation of the forces of the GDR, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria in WTO ground forces/combined arms exercises; WTO exercises of anti-aircraft troops, air forces, navies, and rear services; and East European and Soviet commanders of WTO exercises, all for the period 1961-79.

Soviet theorists claim that the military-political component is the more decisive component of military doctrine. In the case of the Warsaw Pact, this claim is completely justified. For the five loyal East European members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) the prerequisite for accepting the Soviet conceptions of military art, troop training, military economics, and the organization of a national defense system is acceptance of a common set of military-political axioms. For Yugoslavia and Romania, the theoretical basis for rejection of the military-technical component of Soviet doctrine is rejection of the military-political component of Soviet doctrine and the diplomatic policies linked to it.

The principal threat to the axiom of joint defense of the gains of socialism against internal and external enemies is the challenge posed by the military doctrines of Yugoslavia and Romania. These doctrines are standing invitations to the defense ministries of East Europe to adopt strategies of territorial defense also. The Yugoslavs and the Romanians both reject the theory and practice of the principal military-technical components of Soviet doctrine in favor of doctrines of territorial defense. Both states assume that the likely aggressor will use conventional rather than nuclear weapons. The military art (strategy, operations, and tactics) of each of these two states addresses the problem of ensuring the survival of national military forces and national political leadership in the event of occupation of either country by an enemy force estimated at 750,000-1,250,000 soldiers. As a Pact member, Romania has been much more cautious than Yugoslavia in condemning military blocs. But the Romanians have firmly rejected Soviet military-political axioms concerning aggressive imperialist designs on Romania.

On the other hand, Soviet theorists have chosen not to attack Yugoslav and Romanian military doctrines by name.

Instead, they have contended themselves with vociferous denunciations of Maoist military doctrine as unsuitable for small socialist countries. The Soviets use their military-political axioms to justify Soviet domination of all aspects of joint Pact activity, including the system of joint military exercises. In elaborating on the axioms pertinent to the system of WTO exercises, Soviet theorists demonstrate a distinct preference for vague enemies: imperialism, reaction, forces opposed to socialism and peace. These hostile forces are not confined to Europe or even to capitalist states; they constitute a world-wide threat to socialism and, Soviet analysts hasten to point out, are invariably organized in a coalition.

Pact and Western sources agree that the larger WTO exercises often simulate the use of nuclear weapons in combat. If Pact or Western sources provided more detailed information about the specific kinds of weapons used in WTO exercises and the kinds of actions practiced, it might be possible to determine if the WTO exercises trained soldiers only for offensive actions and mainly for nuclear offense, as required by the published Soviet treatises on military art. Pact sources usually do not make clear whether the actions conducted in joint exercises are offensive or defensive in character. They rarely mention the conduct of extensive defensive actions, but they occasionally discuss the conduct of extensive offensive actions in response to a NATO attack. Evidence concerning other aspects of Pact exercises suggest that even if WTO exercises do practice defense using conventional weapons, they nonetheless rule out the practice of the synchronized defense of national territory by national service branches under national command.

In conclusion: The organization of both the military and political aspects of the WTO exercises are directed at justifying WTO policies which pre-empt the development of East European capabilities for territorial defense, and at preparing Soviet and East European forces militarily and politically for intervention in East Europe. Soviet military doctrine serves not as the inspiration but the justification for the joint Warsaw Pact exercises. In turn, the exercises provide the Soviets with the means to enforce conformity to the military-political and military-technical components of Soviet doctrine.

## Soviet Military Doctrine and Warsaw Pact Exercises\*

by

Christopher Jones

In the Warsaw Pact the primary function of Soviet military doctrine is to prevent Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia from adopting military doctrines of territorial defense similar to those of Romania and Yugoslavia. The Soviets use their military doctrine as the basis for all joint Pact activities which prevent members of the Pact from acquiring the capability to wage a war of territorial defense. The most important of these activities is the system of joint military exercises.

Soviet military doctrine has two mutually-dependent components: the military-political and the military-technical. Soviet theorists claim that the military-political component is the more decisive in the formulation of military doctrine. The military-technical component consists of four principal subcategories: the theory of military art; the theory of troop training; the theory of military economics; and the theory of voennoe stroitel'stvo, which is best translated as the theory of the organization of a national defense system.

The theory of military art consists of three sub-theories: those of strategy, operations and tactics. A theory of strategy is a specific set of views for planning and conducting a particular war by one supreme headquarters. A theory of operations is a

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This paper is based upon study written for the National Council for Soviet and East European Research.

specific set of views on the organization of combined arms actions in a given theater of a particular war. A theory of tactics is a set of views on how best to use a particular type of troops (tank, signal, etc.) in a specific theater. A theory of troop training is a specific set of views on how to train military personnel for the specific tactics and operations necessary to pursue a particular strategic objective. A theory of military economics is a specific set of views on what kinds of weapons can be produced for a specific war and how best to organize their production on both the national and alliance levels. A theory of the organization of a national defense system encompasses the specific organization of a national defense ministry and national service branches, the territorial disposition and administration of military units, the organization of conscription and military training, and the mobilization of the civilian population for auxiliary military services.<sup>1</sup>

The Yugoslavs and the Romanians both reject the theory and practice of the principal military-technical components of Soviet doctrine in favor of doctrines of territorial defense. Both states assume that the likely aggressor will use conventional rather than nuclear weapons. The military art (strategy, operations and tactics) of each of these two states addresses the problem of ensuring the survival of national military forces and national political leadership in the event of occupation of either country by an enemy force estimated at 750,000-1,250,000 soldiers. The troop training of each country emphasizes the training of regular and para-military forces for "people's war" actions adapted to the special conditions of each country. The military-economic policies of Yugoslavia and Romania emphasize domestic production of small and medium-sized arms and limited purchase of Western and Chinese weapons, transport and reconnaissance equipment. Romania and Yugoslavia jointly

produce a jet interceptor outfitted with British engines. The organization of the national defense system of each country is designed to maintain during an occupation the continuity of national political authority over civilians and to supply civilians with economic, medical and other necessities.<sup>2</sup>

According to the Yugoslavs, the formulation of postwar Yugoslav doctrine on territorial defense began in 1958.<sup>3</sup> The Romanians developed their postwar territorial defense system sometime between 1958, when Soviet troops withdrew from Romania, and 1968, when President Ceausescu mobilized the system the day after the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. The available evidence suggests that the critical years in the development of Romania's territorial defense system were the late 1950's and early 1960's.<sup>4</sup> A former Polish intelligence officer who emigrated to the West has written that in the late 1950's General Zygmunt Dusynski headed a group of high-ranking Polish officers who unsuccessfully attempted to draw up plans for establishing within the Warsaw Pact "a separate, compact, well-defined 'Polish Front', intended as an exclusive theater of operations for the Polish armed forces...."<sup>5</sup> According to this account, Dusynski's plans called for the formulation of a specifically Polish military doctrine, a Polish national defense system and an independent Polish armament industry.<sup>6</sup> In the late 1950's the East German defense ministry faced the task of developing a national military doctrine for the newly-formed (1956) National People's Army. At the same time the pro-Soviet remnants of the Hungarian officer corps were in need of a Hungarian military doctrine predicated on participation in the Warsaw Pact, rather than on Imre Nagy's policy of withdrawal.

To borrow a Soviet expression, perhaps it is not altogether accidental that in the late 1950's when one or more East European states was developing a

national military doctrine of territorial defense, the Soviets also began a major reformulation of military doctrine.<sup>7</sup> There may also be a connection between the appearance of Marshall V. D. Sokolovskii's Military Strategy in 1962 and the introduction of the Warsaw Pact's system of multi-lateral exercises. The first of these took place in late 1961; four more took place in 1962. Sokolovskii's text specifically called for the incorporation of East European forces in joint theater actions under Soviet command<sup>8</sup> and insisted that the next war fought in Europe would be a nuclear war which would require the development of a new military art.<sup>9</sup> Other authoritative Soviet texts point out directly that there is a connection between formulating Soviet military doctrine and maintaining Soviet military alliances.<sup>10</sup>

Soviet theorists claim that the military-political component is the more decisive component of military doctrine. In the case of the Warsaw Pact, this claim is completely justified. For the five loyal East European members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) the prerequisite for accepting the Soviet conceptions of military art, troop training, military economics and the organization of a national defense system is acceptance of a common set of military-political axioms. For Yugoslavia and Romania, the theoretical basis for rejection of the military-technical component of Soviet doctrine is rejection of the military-political component of Soviet doctrine and the diplomatic policies linked to it.

Soviet theorists have produced a voluminous literature which traces the WTO's military-political axioms back to Lenin. These axioms form a circular Maginot line in which each axiom is defined as a basic element of the others: joint defense of the gains of socialism in each fraternal country against external and internal enemies; proletarian internationalism; socialist

internationalism; defense of the socialist fatherland; the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and military affairs; the Marxist-Leninist conception of the necessity of the military-political unity of the armed forces of the socialist states; the concept of the "combat confederation" of the armed forces of the socialist states; the concept of joint defense of socialism and peace.<sup>11</sup>

The Soviets use their military-political axioms to justify Soviet domination of all aspects of joint Pact activity, including the system of joint military exercises. In elaborating on the axioms pertinent to the system of WTO exercises, Soviet theorists demonstrate a distinct preference for vague enemies: imperialism, reaction, forces opposed to socialism and peace. These hostile forces are not confined to Europe or even to capitalist states; they constitute a world-wide threat to socialism and, Soviet analysts hasten to point out, are invariably organized in a coalition. The threat posed by this hostile coalition has led Maj. General Samoilenko to a conclusion shared by all his Soviet colleagues: "The military unity of the socialist states is a vital necessity because a new world war, if the enemies of peace and socialism unleash it, will be a coalition war."<sup>12</sup>

The Soviets have not maintained a monopoly on this military-political axiom. According to General of the Army A.A. Epishev, Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Armed Forces, "The military doctrines of the socialist confederation proceed from the fact that it is possible to prevent a new world war only by the joint efforts of the fraternal socialist countries."<sup>13</sup> Despite Epishev's claim, the military doctrines of two East European socialist states do not proceed from the Soviet assumption of how to prevent a new world war. The Yugoslav government has maintained since the formation of the Warsaw Pact that the greatest threat to world peace comes

from the competition between the military coalitions headed by the US and the USSR. One spokesman for this view, Maj. General Dusan Dozet, wrote in 1970:

"This state of 'peace armed to the teeth', the balancing on the edge of peace or war, does not, of course, eliminate the danger of direct confrontation between the superpowers....

"It is precisely this state...that conceals the greatest danger to small and medium-sized countries, both those states outside the blocs and those inside....

"The small and medium-sized countries are the lasting objects of intensive pressure, intervention and aggression, this applying equally to non-aligned and bloc-aligned countries.

"They are not in a position to achieve security in a bloc mechanism or under its protection.

"Security can be achieved only by relying on their own forces...."<sup>14</sup>

As a Pact member, Romania has been much more cautious than Yugoslavia in condemning military blocs. But the Romanians have firmly rejected Soviet military-political axioms concerning aggressive imperialist designs on Romania. Ceausescu has also stated repeatedly that Romania will respond to aggression by NATO only according to the provisions of the Warsaw Treaty and the provisions of Romania's bi-lateral treaties with WTO states. (Each of these treaties leaves it to Romania to decide what form of assistance Romania will provide if another WTO member is attacked.)<sup>15</sup> When the Soviets pressed Ceausescu at the November, 1978 meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the WTO to agree to higher levels of military spending and tighter integration of the WTO command structure, Ceausescu refused.<sup>16</sup> In seeking endorsement from the Romanian Central Committee for his decision, Ceausescu reaffirmed, albeit somewhat nervously, his rejection of Soviet military/political axioms and his endorsement of Titoist military-political policies. According to the

English translation of his address to the Central Committee provided by the Romanian news agency, Ceausescu declared,

"...in the case of an aggression in Europe against a country in the membership of the Warsaw Pact, we will fulfill our obligations taken under the Pact and also under the bilateral pacts of mutual assistance, according to the respective provisions.

"Naturally, we declare and will do everything for the military pacts--both the NATO and the Warsaw Pact--to be abolished the soonest since we are firmly convinced that it is not the military pacts that ensure the independence, sovereignty and peace, but on the contrary, they only maintain the state of tension.

"...But, why not say it, our relations with all the neighboring countries, with the states in this part of Europe are very good... countries like Greece and Turkey are not concerned with intensifying the arming....So why should we choose such a way?...

"Practically speaking, we have good relations with all countries of Europe--I mean those not in the Warsaw Pact. We have good relations with all NATO member countries and even very good relations with some of them."<sup>17</sup>

Soviet military-political theorists insist that the socialist confederation has taken up arms only as a last resort because the forces of imperialism have consistently rejected Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament. They also insist that no small or medium-sized state can stand alone against the hostile coalition of imperialist forces because such states lack the economic resources necessary to fend off the imperialist armies preparing for nuclear war.<sup>18</sup> Soviet theorists proceed from their discussion of the imperialist threat to argue that socialist armies exist not only to defend socialism against its external enemies but against its internal enemies as well. Colonel Timorin writes that the internal function of a socialist army has three aspects: 1) as a psychological deterrent against anti-socialist forces; 2) as a back-up for internal security forces; 3) as a combat force "in those cases when the opposition of the enemies of socialism within a country acquire significant scale, intensity, duration and sharpness (a

counterrevolutionary uprising, mutiny, banditry, the unleashing of civil war)."<sup>19</sup>

The Soviet volume on the WTO edited by the late Marshall Iakubovskii, former Commander of the Pact, points out that in executing its internal functions a socialist army will not have to rely on its own forces but can count on fraternal assistance from other socialist armies. The Iakubovskii text declares that one of the missions of the WTO is "joint defense of the gains of socialism in each fraternal country when these gains are threatened by danger from internal or external reaction."<sup>20</sup> This volume specifically cites Soviet actions in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 as examples of such fraternal assistance,<sup>21</sup> as do virtually all other detailed Soviet discussions of the principle of joint defense of the gains of socialism. The Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Armed Forces has identified the principle of joint defense of the gains of socialism as "a law of history."<sup>22</sup>

The principal threat to the axiom of joint defense of the gains of socialism against internal and external enemies is the challenge posed by the military doctrines of Yugoslavia and Romania. These doctrines are standing invitations to the defense ministries of East Europe to adopt strategies of territorial defense. In April of 1968 the commandant of the Gottwald Military-Political Academy in Prague and several of his subordinates jointly drafted a 100-page memorandum outlining three possible defense postures for Czechoslovakia outside the Warsaw Pact. One was disarmament in conjunction with a general European disarmament; another was alliance with other small socialist states in central Europe; the third option was territorial defense.<sup>23</sup>

Within one month of the drafting of the "Gottwald Memorandum," Soviet troops entered Czechoslovakia on WTO maneuvers. After the intervention of August 21, the Gottwald Academy was closed down for several years and the officers responsible for the "Memorandum" were cashiered.

Soviet theorists have chosen not to attack Yugoslav and Romanian military doctrines by name. Instead, they have contented themselves with vociferous denunciations of Maoist military doctrine as unsuitable for small socialist countries.<sup>24</sup> In its denunciation of territorial defense as a Maoist heresy, the Soviet volume on the WTO edited by Marshall Iakubovskii specifically calls attention to the function of common military-political axioms as the basis for the Pact's adoption of common views on military art, troop training, military economics and the organization of national defense systems:

"Marxist-Leninists categorically reject the position of those who assert that each socialist country should rely only on its own forces in the organization of its defense.

"Karl Marx himself affirmed that 'a negative attitude toward fraternal alliance, which must exist among the workers of different countries and must persuade them to stand side by side in their struggle for liberation, should be met with a common assault on such separate efforts.'

"Therefore, the Maoist preaching of 'reliance on one's own forces' is a theory which has the objective of breaking the unity and solidarity of the socialist countries.

"The principle of unity is not a temporary one deriving only from membership in the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

"It is a constantly-functioning principle characteristic for all-round cooperation of the countries of the socialist confederation and having a firm military-strategic base--the commonality of goals and tasks in the securing of the armed defense of socialism and peace by the collective efforts of the fraternal peoples and armed forces.

"All of the allied countries decide together the questions of the strengthening of their defense, being guided in this way by common criteria in the question of the organization of national defense

systems and the training of their national armed forces and by a common Marxist-Leninist understanding of the manifestations and processes of military affairs and of the laws and regularities of war and of the principles of military art.

"For relations among the allied armies there are characteristically united views on the propositions of operational art and tactics, of the military use of service branches and types of troops within a service branch and on the conduct of a joint policy in the area of the standardization of the basic types of weapons and technology."<sup>25</sup>

The Soviets do not depend on the intrinsic logic of their military-political axioms to persuade East European defense ministries to accept these axioms and their military-technical correlaries. The Soviets depend on the force of the bi-lateral treaties and party programs into which these axioms have been written. Reincarnated as articles of international treaties and sections of party programs, the military-political axioms of Soviet doctrine are binding on the officers of five East European WTO countries in their capacities as state officials and party members.<sup>26</sup>

#### The System of Joint Warsaw Pact Exercises

The military-political axioms shared by the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the five loyal East European members of the WTO require a theory of military art that eschews 'reliance on one's own forces' and facilitates multi-lateral intervention in each other's territory in joint defense of the gains of socialism against internal and external enemies. The published Soviet discussions of the strategy, operations and tactics of waging a war in Europe offer such a theory of military art. Analysts of these Soviet discussions have documented an emphasis on the offensive use of very large conventional forces capable of waging a limited nuclear war with Soviet nuclear weapons.<sup>27</sup> The available evidence indicates that the published Soviet

discussions of the conduct of large-scale offensive actions using Soviet nuclear weapons serves as the basis of the military art (strategy, operations and tactics) practiced in the joint WTO exercises. This paper suggests that in the joint exercises the Soviets drill the armies of the Pact for nuclear offense against the West in order to render them incapable of conventional defense against the East. It further suggests that in the joint exercises the Soviets also prepare East European conventional forces for massive multilateral interventions in the member states of the alliance.

The aspects of the system of joint exercises which support this analysis are: 1) the pattern of location of the exercises in which the armed forces of individual Pact members participate; 2) the pattern of assigning command of the joint exercises; 3) the practice of offensive actions, including nuclear actions, which rule out preparation for territorial defense; 4) the nature of the organization of staff work for the exercises; 5) the assignment of individual missions in the exercises to multi-national combined arms groupings of forces; 6) the impact of the joint exercises on the nature of the military training programs of individual Pact members; 7) the impact on the careers of East European officers of the command structure of the exercises and of the military-education system that prepares East European officers for WTO exercises; and 8) the nature of the political activities that take place during joint exercises.

This analysis does not deny the potential role of Pact exercises in preparing WTO armies for war with NATO: it only says that preparation for war with NATO is not the primary purpose of Pact exercises. This analysis does not deny that Soviet force groups in East Europe practice the conduct of offensive nuclear war against NATO; it only implies that such practice

is intended for an exclusively Soviet offensive.

The Warsaw Pact system of frequent and large-scale joint maneuvers on both a multi-lateral basis and bi-lateral (Soviet-East European) basis began in the "Buria" exercise of October-November, 1961 under Marshall A.A. Grechko. Grechko assumed his duties as WTO Commander-in-Chief in July, 1960 after having served as Commander of the Soviet Ground Forces (1957-60) and Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (1953-57). According to the volume on the WTO edited by the next Pact commander, Marshall Iakubovskii, joint tactical exercises had taken place before 1961<sup>28</sup> but this paper can identify only such two exercises, both bi-lateral. In August, 1957 Soviet and East German troops conducted a joint exercise<sup>29</sup> while Grechko was still the Soviet commander in Germany. From July 18-August 8, 1958 the Soviet air force and the Bulgarian ground forces, air force, and navy conducted a joint exercise in Bulgaria under the command of Soviet Air Marshall N.S. Skripko,<sup>30</sup>

Grechko expanded the scope of WTO exercises from the tactical level to the operational and strategic levels. According to the U.S. Air Force translation of the Soviets' Dictionary of Basic Military Terms, a tactical exercise can involve a battalion, regiment, division or corps and may include combined arms actions.<sup>31</sup> Tactical exercises practice tactics, which the Soviet dictionary (in the American translation) defines as "objective laws of combat.....Each service and branch has its own tactics."<sup>32</sup> This dictionary defines operational art as "the theory and practice of preparing for and conducting combined and independent operations by major field formations or major formations of the Services." An action at the operational level is an "operational-strategic maneuver" which the Soviet dictionary defines as "an organized movement of large groupings of major field forces of the armed forces within theaters of military operations for the purpose

of creating the most advantageous grouping of men and equipment for the completion of assigned missions."<sup>33</sup> The Soviet dictionary defines a "strategic maneuver" as an action designed "to secure the rapid and complete destruction of major enemy groupings."<sup>34</sup>

By developing a system of bi-lateral and multi-lateral exercises at the tactical, operational and strategic levels Marshall Grechko transformed the military organizations and military capabilities of the five East European armies that were permanently drawn into the system of joint exercises. Soviet and East European sources readily identify the system of joint exercises as the central focus of Pact activities but they are erratic in providing information about the number and nature of the joint exercises. Graham Turbiville, a former U.S. army intelligence officer, published in a journal of the U.S. Army a list of 36 major WTO exercises in the period from 1961-1977, but carefully disclaimed that his list was complete.<sup>35</sup> My paper, drawing on Turbiville's list and a combing of Soviet and East European materials, presents a list of 71 major WTO exercises for the period from 1961-79. This list of 71 is probably short of the true total of the larger tactical, operational and strategic level exercises and the high-level command staff exercises. But even if the Soviets supplied a complete listing of the more important WTO exercises, it might still not give an accurate picture of the extent of the activities that take place under the system of joint exercises. Both Soviet and East European sources suggest that the number of lower-level tactical exercises and of lower-level joint staff exercises without the participation of troops is greater than the number of large-scale tactical, operational and strategic maneuvers and high-level command staff exercises.<sup>36</sup>

The Helsinki accords of 1975 required both NATO and the WTO to report

only those exercises involving more than 25,000 troops and encouraged the invitation of observers. Whatever the intentions of those who drafted the sections on confidence-building measures, the actual effect is that the Soviets have probably reduced the size of most tactical and operational-strategic exercises to a figure below 25,000 and have sharply reduced the publication of all information on the system of joint exercises. Information on the system of joint exercises is for all practical purposes limited to the period from 1961 to 1974. Most of this information comes from the period after the appointment of Marshall Iakubovskii as Pact Commander in the spring of 1967. During 1967 Pact sources reported six large-scale joint exercises; for 1968, seven; for 1969, eleven; for 1970, four, for 1971, six; for 1972, five; for 1973, six; and for 1974, six. But in 1975, the year of the Helsinki agreement, the Soviets reported no joint WTO exercises; in 1976, two; in 1977, one; in 1978, none; and in 1979, two. If in fact the WTO has sharply reduced the number of joint exercises after 1975, then it has virtually ceased what had been until 1975 the most important activity in the Warsaw Pact.

#### The Joint Exercises: Patterns of Location and Patterns of Command

The system of joint exercises introduced by Marshall Grechko provided for the periodic re-entry of Soviet and other WTO troops into the territories of the three countries where Soviet troops were not stationed in 1961: Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria. As a reciprocal gesture, Grechko's program invited the armed forces of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria to participate in joint exercises on the territory of other WTO states, including, in at least two cases, multi-lateral exercises on the territory of the USSR.<sup>37</sup> In 1962 the WTO held exercises in Czechoslovakia and Romania and also held an

exercise in Hungary in which Romanian troops participated. The different histories of Soviet-Czechoslovak relations and Soviet-Romanian relations after 1962 correspond closely to the different decisions taken by these two East European states on continued participation in WTO exercises.

The periodic WTO maneuvers in Czechoslovakia established a Soviet capability for rapid and massive occupation of Czechoslovak soil while simultaneously pre-empting the possibility of the development of a Czechoslovak system of territorial defense. According to Turbiville's list, the September, 1962 exercise in Czechoslovakia of Czechoslovak, Soviet and Polish troops was followed in June of 1964 by another exercise in Czechoslovakia. The June 1964 exercise involved participation of Czechoslovak, Soviet and East German troops. Krasnaia Zvezda reported exercises in Czechoslovakia from July 7-15, 1964 (which Turbiville does not) involving the command staffs of Soviet and Czechoslovak troops. The Czechoslovak Minister of Defense, Bohomir Lomsky, conducted the exercise in the presence of the Chief of the WTO Staff, P.I. Batov of the Soviet army, and of V.A. Sudets, Commander of the Soviet Anti-Aircraft Troops.<sup>38</sup>

In 1966, in the presence of Marshall Grechko, General Lomsky commanded Czechoslovak, Soviet, East German and Hungarian forces in the Vltava exercises in Czechoslovakia. This exercise involved more than 20 organs of administration, large formations and special units, including airborne troops. According to Krasnaia Zvezda, the materiel used in this exercise could have formed a single column 850 kilometers long,<sup>39</sup> a distance greater than the length of Czechoslovakia from east to west. As an operational exercise, Vltava served as preparation for even larger operational exercises in 1968.

During the Prague spring the system of WTO exercises provided Soviet forces with quick and convenient access to Czechoslovak territory. On May 29,

1968 a plenum of the Czechoslovak Central Committee opened at which the loose coalition of "progressives" more or less united around Dubcek proposed a resolution calling for the convocation of an extraordinary party congress two years ahead of schedule in order to elect a new central committee at the congress. If they could pass the resolution, the progressives hoped that they would be able to name a majority of the delegates to the congress. With Soviet backing, the "conservatives" surprised the progressives by voting for the resolution, which easily obtained a majority.<sup>40</sup> The next day Soviet airborne troops landed at the Prague airport and Soviet troops from the group of Soviet forces in Germany crossed into Bohemia. Startled Czechs called the Ministry of Defense to find out what had happened. Eventually Defense Minister Martin Dzur informed the press that Warsaw Pact maneuvers had just begun. A spokesman for the Ministry later explained that even the participants in the May 30 exercises had not been informed until the last moment so that the exercises would be "as close as possible to reality."<sup>41</sup> At least one of the Soviet officers on maneuvers took time off to address a group of members of the Czechoslovak party. According to a liberal Czech journal, he told them that if "anti-socialist forces" threatened their country, "the honest Communists" had only to ask and they would have at their disposal "the entire Soviet army."<sup>42</sup> If a Soviet officer did make such an offer, he would only have been carrying out the obligations required by the military-political axioms of the WTO states.

Pravda's coverage of the May plenum gave the impression of a debate that the conservatives dominated. One adopted resolution called for action against an alleged rightist danger.<sup>43</sup> During the Husak era, the spokesmen for the conservatives publicly stated that the May plenum had called for an offensive against the rightist danger in order to bring the conservatives

victory at the elections in late June and early July to choose delegates to the extraordinary party congress scheduled for September 9.<sup>44</sup> A Pravda editorial of July 19, 1968 admitted that attempt to use the elections to defeat the progressives had backfired:

"The facts have shown that the offensive proclaimed by the May plenum of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee against the rightist, anti-socialist forces was not supported either ideologically, politically or organizationally;

"it simply did not take place...."<sup>45</sup>

However, the offensive proclaimed by the May plenum was supported by the combat confederation of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact. From June 20-30 the Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia conducted a joint exercise with Czechoslovak troops and with Polish, GDR, and Hungarian and Soviet troops who maneuvered on their home territories. Marshall Iakubovskii conducted these forces in the "Shumava" exercise, which involved more than 30 organs of administration, including communications and logistics forces and special troops assigned to mark highways and other access routes.<sup>46</sup> After the "conservatives" in the Czechoslovak party suffered a sharp setback in the contest for selection of delegates to the party congress, the Soviets issued repeated demands that the Czechoslovak Presidium meet with the Soviet leadership to discuss threats to the gains of socialism in Czechoslovakia.

After failing to get the Czechoslovak Presidium to attend a bi-lateral meeting, Brezhnev assembled his East European allies in Warsaw on July 14. The five fraternal parties wrote the "Warsaw Letter" addressed to the Central Committee (not the Presidium) of the Czechoslovak party for the purpose of rallying the conservatives in the Central Committee to postpone the congress and purge the progressives on the Presidium. Noting that the Presidium of the Czechoslovak party had failed to respond to Brezhnev's request for a

meeting, the five warned the Central Committee members about the growing threats of "imperialism" and "reaction," the two enemies identified by the military-political axioms of the WTO. The five also warned,

"The forces of reaction...abusing the slogan of 'democratization', unleashed a campaign against the Czechoslovak Communist Party and its honest and devoted cadres, with the clear intention of liquidating the party's leading role, undermining the socialist system and pitting Czechoslovakia against other socialist countries."<sup>47</sup>

Grim as the situation was, the authors of the Warsaw Letter had not given up hope:

"We know that there are forces in Czechoslovakia that are capable of upholding the socialist system and defeating the anti-socialist elements....

"The tasks today are to give these healthy forces a clear perspective, rally them to action and mobilize them against the forces of counterrevolution...."<sup>48</sup>

From Moscow' perspective, the healthy forces should not be discouraged by a mere electoral defeat. As the Pravda editorial of July 19 observed, "Needless to say, the forces of socialism in Czechoslovakia, objectively measured, are far greater than those now striking at the revolutionary gains of the Czechoslovak people."<sup>49</sup> At this time, the Soviet troops which had participated in the 'Shumavá' exercise were still on Czechoslovak soil.

Dubcek finally gave in and agreed to form an ad-hoc delegation of the Czechoslovak leadership drawn partly from the Presidium and partly from the Central Committee to meet with the Soviet Politburo on July 29 in the Slovak town of Cierna. On July 24 General S.S. Mariakhin, Commander of the Rear Services of the Soviet Armed Forces began conducting "Neman," a massive logistical exercise. On July 31, after the conclusion of the Cierna talks, Krasnaia Zvezda revealed that the 'Neman' exercises had been shifted to Poland and East Germany under Mariakhin's command. These exercises ended August 9 with the

establishment of a joint Soviet-Polish-East German headquarters.<sup>50</sup> Two days later General S.M. Shtemenko began directing an exercise of communications troops in the West Ukraine, Poland and East Germany. The exercise ended August 20.<sup>51</sup> General Shtemenko had been named Chief of the WTO Staff on August 5. A British analyst reported that an exercise of Soviet and Hungarian communications troops took place in Hungary during August 17-20.<sup>52</sup> On the night of August 20-21 the armed forces of the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria occupied Czechoslovakia.<sup>53</sup>

The Soviet justification for the intervention drew upon the military-political axioms shared by the loyal WTO armies. According to Pravda, the fraternal armies had responded to a request from a group of party and state leaders for military assistance. "The reason for this appeal," Pravda explained,

is the threat posed to the socialist system existing in Czechoslovakia and the constitutionally-established state system by counterrevolutionary forces that have entered into collusion with external forces hostile to socialism."<sup>54</sup>

In 1962 Romania, like Czechoslovakia, agreed to the conduct of joint WTO exercises on its territory. As in most of the larger WTO exercises, the host Defense Minister commanded the exercise, but in this exercise<sup>55</sup> as in all Pact exercises,<sup>56</sup> central WTO agencies did the planning for the maneuvers, Marshall Grechko attended the October 19, 1962 exercise as did defense ministers from several WTO members and other high-ranking East European and Soviet military officers. Unidentified forces from Romania, the Soviet Union and Bulgaria participated under the command of General Salajian of Romania. Judging by the fact that all the political activities of the exercises (parades, speeches, meetings, etc.) were held in the Romanian port of Constanta, it is possible that some naval forces participated in the exercises. According

to the translations of the classified journal Voennaia Mysl' released to the public by the Central Intelligence Agency, General Salajin also commanded an exercise of Romanian, Soviet and Bulgarian forces in Romania sometime during the fall of 1963.<sup>57</sup>

After the 1963 exercises, Romania never again permitted WTO manuevers on Romanian soil, although it has sent to other WTO exercises personnel whom the Romanians have described as observers and the Soviets have described as participants. The Romanians have agreed on at least two occasions and probably three, to have Soviet and Bulgarian officers sit in a map room of the Romanian Defense Ministry and conduct with Romanian officers what both sides have described on two occasions as "command-staff map manuevers."<sup>58</sup>

It might be possible to understand Romania's refusal to permit continued WTO exercises on Romanian soil if the exercises of 1962 and 1963 were similar to those held in 1964 and 1967 in Bulgaria, another Pact state without a Soviet garrison which also happened to have a coast on the Black Sea and extensive mountain and forest areas. Krasnaia Zvezda claimed that Soviet, Bulgarian and Romanian forces participated in the 1964 exercise in Bulgaria, which included naval and airborne landings.<sup>59</sup> A Soviet-Bulgarian text, which claims that Romania joined the Soviets and Bulgarians in the 1967 Rodopy exercise in Bulgaria, reports that during this exercise ground forces, air forces, naval forces and airborne troops conducted "a defensive battle for the seizure of the sea coast and also for the conduct of actions in mountains and forest areas."<sup>60</sup> If the 1962 and 1963 exercises in Romania also included naval and airborne landings for the defensive seizure of the sea coast<sup>and</sup> mountain and forest areas, it is possible that the Romanians concluded that WTO exercises on their territory were not intended primarily as preparation for battles with NATO.

The Soviet-Bulgarian discussion of the Rodopy exercise revealed a style of organization which, if practiced in exercises on Romanian soil, might have pre-empted Romania's ability to determine the capabilities of Romanian forces. According to this study,

"For raising the effectiveness of the administration of troops in the [Rodopy] exercises there were mutual exchanges of groups and representatives among units and formations of various countries.

"This method of work was widely practiced: Bulgarian and Soviet officers [note the omission of any reference to Romanian officers] jointly worked out documents or participated in practical measures.

"As a result, the operational capabilities of staffs [i.e., the capabilities of staffs to organize movements of major field formations] was raised and the possibility was achieved of broadly and openly exchanging opinions in the questions decided." 61

There are common patterns of the location of exercises and assignment of command in the WTO ground forces/combined arms exercises of the armed forces of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Poland and Hungary, the three states in which Soviet garrisons were stationed prior to the introduction of the system of joint exercises. These patterns recur in the exercises of the Czechoslovak armed forces after the establishment in 1968 of the Soviet Central Force Group in Czechoslovakia. (See tables 1 to 9 .) Documentation of these patterns is based on information from my list of 71 exercises.

For each of the national armed forces of the GDR, Poland and Hungary in the period from 1961-79 about one third of the ground forces/combined arms exercises in which they participated were conducted exclusively on their own territory. For each of the national armed forces of these three states about one third of the ground/forces arms exercises in which they participated were conducted entirely on foreign soil. The remainder of the exercises were conducted jointly on home and foreign territory. This pattern of the location of ground forces/combined arms exercises reduces the opportunity for national defense ministries to develop a capability for the conduct of a war in defense of national territory.

For each of the national armed forces of the GDR, Poland and Hungary in the period from 1961-79 at the very most only one-third of the WTO ground forces/combined arms exercises in which they participated were exercises in which the national armed forces were commanded by their own officers. At least two-thirds of the ground forces/combined arms exercises of any one of these national armed forces took place under the command of a foreign officer, both on home territory and on foreign soil. This pattern of the assignment of command reduces the possibility that the officers of a given state will acquire the experience necessary to conduct combined arms actions in defense of their national territory.

This pattern also accustoms national military forces to accept commands from foreign officers.

The armed forces of the GDR participated in at least 27 ground forces/combined arms exercises in the period from 1961-79 and probably many more.<sup>62</sup> Of these 27, seven took place exclusively on German soil; nine were held completely outside the GDR; and 11 took place jointly on the territory of East Germany or Poland or Czechoslovakia. Of these 27 exercises, commanders can be identified for 22. Of these 22 exercises, three had East German commanders. Of the 19 foreign commanders, 12 were Soviet officers.

The armed forces of Poland participated in at least 25 ground forces/combined arms exercises in the period from 1961-69, and probably more.<sup>63</sup> Of these 25, seven were conducted entirely in Poland; seven were held completely outside Poland; and 11 were conducted jointly on the territory of Poland and the territory of the GDR or Czechoslovakia. Of these 25 exercises, commanders can be identified for 21. Of these 21 exercises, six had Polish commanders. Of the fifteen foreign commanders, 10 were Soviet officers.

The same patterns appear in the ground forces/combined arms exercises in which Hungary participated in the period from 1961 to 1979, although Hungary did not really begin to participate in the system of WTO exercises until 1966. The exercise of 1962 was probably held in order to invite Romanian troops to Hungary in return for the Romanian invitation to Soviet and Bulgarian troops to participate in the exercises of 1962. Another peculiarity of Hungary's participation in the joint exercises is that no large multi-lateral exercise took place in Hungary until 1979.<sup>64</sup> In the period from 1961-79 the armed forces of Hungary participated in at least 18 ground forces/combined arms exercises, and probably more.<sup>65</sup> Of these 18, seven were conducted exclusively in Hungary; seven were conducted entirely outside

Hungary; and four took place jointly on Hungarian and Czechoslovak territory. Of these eighteen exercises, commanders can be identified for only 10. Of these 10 exercises, two had Hungarian commanders. Of the eight foreign commanders, five were Soviet officers.

The pattern of the participation of the Czechoslovak armed forces in ground forces/combined arms exercises for the period from 1961-79 deviates from the GDR, Polish and Hungarian patterns because of the high frequency of WTO manuevers on Czechoslovak soil from 1961-68, before the establishment of the Central Force Group. But for the period from 1969-79, the patterns of exercises of the Czechoslovak armed forces conform to the patterns of the exercises of the GDR, Polish and Hungarian armed forces. For the period 1961-79, the armed forces of Czechoslovakia participated in at least 25 ground forces/combined arms exercises and probably more.<sup>66</sup> Of these 25, nine took place exclusively in Czechoslovakia; six were held on foreign soil; and 10 were conducted jointly on the territory of Czechoslovakia and of the GDR or Poland or Hungary. For the period 1961-79, commanders can be identified for 18 of the 25 exercises. Of these 18 exercises, five had Czechoslovak commanders. Of the 13 foreign commanders, six were Soviet officers.

For the period 1969-79, the armed forces of Czechoslovakia participated in at least 16 ground forces/combined arms exercises and probably more. Of these 16, five were conducted exclusively in Czechoslovakia; four took place completely outside Czechoslovakia and seven were conducted jointly on the territory of Czechoslovakia and of Hungary or the GDR or Poland. Commanders can be identified for 11 of these 16 exercises. Of these 11 exercises, three had Czechoslovak commanders. Of the eight foreign commanders during this period after the 1968 invasion, only two were Soviet commanders.

The pattern of Bulgaria's participation in joint ground forces/combined arms exercises deviates from the patterns of the GDR, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia (after 1968), because there is no Soviet garrison in Bulgaria and because Romania, the only WTO state on which Bulgaria borders, refuses to allow exercises held jointly on territory of Bulgaria and Romania. For the period from 1961-79 the armed forces of Bulgaria participated in four ground forces/combined arms exercises held exclusively in Bulgaria, nine exercises conducted completely outside Bulgaria and one logistics exercise which the Soviets claim was held jointly on Bulgarian and Romanian soil.<sup>67</sup> Of these 14 exercises, commanders can be identified for 12. Of these 12 exercises, three had Bulgarian commanders. Of the nine foreign commanders, five were Soviet officers.

The Iakubovskii text on the WTO says that joint WTO exercises regularly take place among the Pact anti-aircraft troops, air forces, navies and special troops.<sup>68</sup> Pact sources reveal very little about such exercises. For the 17 that can be documented, (see Table No. 7) commanders can be identified for 15. Of these, 14 were Soviet officers, either the WTO Commander-in-Chief, the WTO Chief of Staff or the Commanders of the Soviet Anti-Aircraft Troops, the Soviet Air Force, the Soviet Navy or the Soviet Rear Services. Because Soviet sources occasionally identify the commander of the Soviet Anti-Aircraft Troops as ex officio commander of the WTO anti-aircraft troops, it is possible that the commanders of the other Soviet service branches serve as ex officio commanders of the non-ground forces service branches of the WTO.<sup>69</sup> In any case, the pattern of the assignment of command in WTO exercises suggests that the anti-aircraft troops, air forces, navies and/<sup>rear</sup>services of the loyal Warsaw Pact states do not have an opportunity to practice the support of their <sup>the</sup>sister national service branches in/defense of national territory.

Other Aspects of WTO Exercises: Offense and Nuclear Weapons; Planning and Conduct of Staff Work; Assignment of Missions to Multi-National Groupings; Impact on the Training Programs of National Armed Forces; Impact on the Careers of East European Officers

Pact and Western sources agree that the larger WTO exercises often simulate the use of nuclear weapons in combat.<sup>70</sup> If Pact or Western sources provided more detailed information about the specific kinds of weapons used in WTO exercises and the kinds of actions practiced it might be possible to determine if the WTO exercises trained soldiers only for offensive actions and mainly for nuclear offense, as required by the published Soviet treatises on military art. Pact sources usually do not make clear whether the actions conducted in joint exercises are offensive or defensive in character. They rarely mention the conduct of extensive defensive actions, but they occasionally discuss the conduct of extensive offensive actions in response to a NATO attack.<sup>71</sup> Evidence concerning other aspects of Pact exercises suggest that even if WTO exercises do practice defense using conventional weapons, they nonetheless rule out the practice of the synchronized defense of national territory by national service branches under national command.

One of these aspects is the organization of staff work for the exercises. Of the<sup>49</sup> WTO exercises from 1961-79 for which commanders can be identified, 21 had East European commanders. (See Table No. <sup>8</sup> ). But even though East European officers have regularly commanded WTO exercises, they do not appear to have obtained the major responsibilities for planning the exercises. Their principal functions appear to be those of demonstrating regular national command of national armed forces and of accustoming other Pact armies to the principle of foreign command while sparing these armies the humiliation of/foreign officers drawn only from the Soviet armed forces.

WTO communiqués invariably describe Pact exercises as being conducted not according to the plan of the national defense ministry of the commander of the exercise but "according to the plan of the United Command" or "according to the plan of the United Armed Forces" or "according to the training program of the United Armed Forces." The Iakubovskii text on the WTO says that the Staff of the United Armed Forces (UAF) has the responsibility for "planning and conduct of joint maneuvers, exercises and military games of diverse scale--from the operational-strategic exercises to troop exercises and exercises of special troops."<sup>72</sup> (In Soviet usage, "special troops" include engineering, chemical, radio-technical, railway construction, road construction and automotive troops.) A Soviet-Polish text echoes the Iakubovskii volume on the role of central Pact agencies in planning the exercises: "...troop, naval, command-staff and special troop exercises, joint war games and maneuvers are regularly conducted according to the plan of the United Command of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact members."<sup>73</sup>

in Soviet sources

There is no information available/on who serves as chief of staff for a given exercise. Nor is there any information as to whether exercise staffs are assembled on an ad-hoc basis or are drawn from the WTO Staff. The Iakubovskii text says that the WTO Staff has participated in the conduct of five joint exercises and that the WTO Staff is multi-national in composition.<sup>74</sup>

Whenever Krasnaia Zvezda has mentioned the staff of a particular WTO exercise, it points out that the staff is multi-national.<sup>75</sup> In any case, there is no possibility that national general staffs are charged with the exclusive preparation or conduct of joint WTO exercises at any level.

The limited information available on the composition of the forces participating in the joint exercises suggests that missions are not assigned

exclusively to the armed forces of one state but are always shared by units drawn from the military forces of at least two states. Official communiques <sup>always</sup> almost/ state that the purpose of a given exercise was to improve the interaction of the allied forces (rather than to prepare separate national armed forces for distinct missions). Pact discussions of the WTO often make the same point.<sup>76</sup> In its discussion of the 1965 October Storm exercise the Iakubovskii text said that one of the purposes of the exercise was to check "capabilities for organizing interaction in coalition groupings."<sup>77</sup> This volume also noted in its discussion of the 1969 Oder Neisse exercise, which it identified as <sup>at the time</sup> the largest WTO exercise ever held, "In all stages there was widely carried out interaction and mutual aid among the sub-units and units of the allied armies in carrying out common tasks."<sup>78</sup> According to the U.S. Air Force translation of the Soviet Dictionary of Basic Military Terms a Soviet "unit" can be a grouping no bigger than a regiment and often smaller. This text identifies a Soviet "sub-unit" as either a battalion, battery, company, platoon or squadron.<sup>79</sup>

During the Oder-Neisse exercises Krasnaia Zvezda mentioned a joint action carried out by East German armored forces, Czechoslovak airborne troops and Polish and Soviet air forces; it also mentioned a joint action by naval infantry from the USSR, Poland and East Germany.<sup>80</sup> During the Brotherhood in Arms exercise of 1970 the Soviet army newspaper discussed a joint action executed by a German tank company and a Soviet tank company.<sup>81</sup> In a discussion of the Shield 72 exercises in Czechoslovakia, a joint Soviet-Czechoslovak study reported an action in which Hungarian artillery began shelling an enemy position after which unspecified Polish and Czechoslovak forces fought "shoulder to shoulder" while being supported by Soviet mechanized infantry.

When the enemy brought up reserves, Soviet tank, artillery and air forces went into action and annihilated the enemy.<sup>82</sup> The mutual dependence of WTO armed forces on each other in carrying out missions in joint exercises, or, probably more accurately, the dependence of East European armies on Soviet forces, may be characteristic of even low-level tactical exercises. According to a Czechoslovak officer writing in Krasnia Zvezda, in a low-level tactical exercise of troops from the Central Force Group and the Czechoslovak army, two Czechoslovak officers declared that they could not have completed their mission "were it not for the aid of Soviet officers."<sup>83</sup>

Pact sources make clear that there is a close connection between the system of joint exercises and the system of training the armed forces of the five loyal WTO members. The joint exercises serve as an evaluation of the results of troop training in a given year and as the basis for planning the training programs of the following year. The Iakubovskii text declares that "according to the results of the exercises theoretical conclusions are reached and practical recommendations are made for introduction into the practice of troop training."<sup>84</sup>

In 1963 Pact officers began meeting annually to review the exercises of the summer and fall and to plan training programs and exercises for the coming year.<sup>85</sup> After the creation of the Military Council of the Warsaw Pact in 1969, these sessions have been held jointly with sessions of the Military Council. The Iakubovskii text says that these joint sessions examine the results of combat and operational training for the preceding year and plan the training and exercise programs for the coming year.<sup>86</sup>

The Chairman of the Military Council is the WTO Commander-in-Chief; its members are all his Soviet deputies<sup>87</sup> and his East European deputies, including a Romanian officer. The Iakubovskii volume notes that the

recommendations of the Military Council have only a "consultative" character but that "as a rule" WTO members abide by the recommendations.<sup>88</sup> This arrangement probably suits the Soviets and the Romanians equally well: the Soviets can avoid Romanian vetoes and the Romanians can ignore the recommendations that as a rule are carried out by the other members of the Pact. The Chairman of the Military Council does not rely only on his East European deputies to carry out the recommendations of the Council. He also relies on a group of senior Soviet officers who serve as his liaison representatives to the armed forces of each member state.<sup>89</sup> According to the Jakubovskii study, one of the tasks of these liaison officers is "to give aid to the national commands in the training of troops..."<sup>90</sup> According to Colonel Semin, a Soviet journalist specializing on the WTO,

"Troop contingents assigned to the United Armed Forces daily carry out combat and political training according to the plans of the national commands, but the working out of the basic questions of the joint actions of these troops is carried out according to the plans of the United Command."<sup>91</sup>

Linking the organization of the Pact training programs to the joint exercise system enables the Soviets to control the training programs of the national armed forces assigned to the Warsaw Pact. The training programs in turn determine the capabilities of these national armed forces for specific kinds of military actions. The link between the WTO exercises and the WTO training programs is not a purely fortuitous result of the introduction of the system of joint exercises by Marshall Grechko. The theory of troop training and the theory of military art (strategy, operations and tactics) are both sub-theories of the military-technical component of the military doctrines of the Warsaw Pact states. The five loyal East European members of the Pact have found that to embrace one sub-theory of Soviet doctrine for the conduct

of the joint exercises is to be embraced by the other sub-theories.

The system of Warsaw Pact exercises affords Soviet officers the opportunity to evaluate the East European officers participating in the exercises. The Soviets may use such evaluations as one device for ensuring that national defense ministries will promote only those officers who have demonstrated in the joint exercises loyalty to the military-political and military-technical concepts on which the Warsaw Pact is based. The opportunity for Soviet officers to evaluate the performances of East European officers arises from the role of the WTO Commander-in-Chief and the UAF Staff in evaluating the exercises. A 1973 diplomatic convention ratified by the five loyal East European members of the Pact insures Soviet domination of the Staff and the other central agencies of the Pact.<sup>92</sup> The opportunity for Soviet evaluation of East European officers also arises from the fact that Soviet officers have directly commanded 28 of the 49 WTO exercises for which commanders can be identified. (See Table No. 9 ). Of these 28 Marshall Iakubovskii commanded 12; Gen. S.M. Shtemenko, former Chief of the WTO Staff, commanded three; the heads of the Soviet Anti-Aircraft Troops, the Soviet Air Force and the Soviet Navy have together commanded a total of nine. The present WTO Commander, Marshall V.G. Kulikov, has been identified as the commander of only one exercise, but Kulikov's low profile is almost certainly the result of the post-Helsinki hiatus in reporting Pact maneuvers.

WTO sources frequently identify the joint exercises as critical examinations of troops, commanders and staffs. According to the Iakubovskii text, one of the purposes of the first multi-lateral WTO exercises, the 1961 "Buriá" maneuvers under Marshall Grechko, was "checking the preparation of operational staffs to carry out the administration of allied groupings of forces in the complex conditions of a combat situation."<sup>93</sup> Just prior to a

WTO exercise of 1970, a Krasnaia Zvezda editorial noted, "The personnel of the allied armies have come well-prepared to their autumn examinations (and an exercise is always a rigorous examination)." <sup>94</sup> Following the completion of this exercise, Krasnaia Zvezda quoted Marshall Iakubovskii as saying "...the exercises which have taken place were a serious examination for the fraternal armies and indicate....the skills of commanders and staffs in resolving tasks in complex, swiftly-changing circumstances." <sup>95</sup>

A factor which may affect Soviet evaluations of the skills of East European commanders and staffs is the old-school tie. East European officers at the level of army captain have the option of pursuing the three-to-four years of post-graduate education necessary for promotion to command responsibilities at either an East European military academy or a Soviet academy. <sup>96</sup>

The subject of instruction at all East European and Soviet post-graduate military academies is "military doctrine" in its broad Soviet sense; often it is almost entirely a study of Soviet texts on the sub-fields of military doctrine. <sup>97</sup> Judging by the limited evidence available, the East European graduates of Soviet mid-career academies appear to do well in their subsequent careers. <sup>98</sup> Their successes may be due to one or more of the following factors: the superior academic quality of Soviet military academies; "old-boy" friendships with Soviet officers in central WTO agencies; the possible existence of a "nomenklatura" system that for all practical purposes reserves certain East European commands for graduates of Soviet military academies. According to a Western study, such a "nomenklatura" system exists in the Soviet Armed Forces for the graduates of the Soviet mid-career academies. <sup>99</sup>

The Voroshilov General Staff Academy in Moscow may have secured such a monopoly on the training of East European officers for command and staff

positions in the joint WTO exercises. The Voroshilov Academy accepts Soviet and East European colonels and generals who have completed mid-career academies and trains them for command responsibilities in defense ministries, general staffs, service branches, military districts and naval fleets. According to a Soviet history of the Academy, "in response to the desire of the governments of the socialist states....the Soviet government organized the training and improvement of the leading command staff of the fraternal armies in the Academy of the General Staff."<sup>100</sup> This volume also suggests that the Voroshilov Academy alone is qualified to train WTO officers for the conduct of large-scale exercises: "The designation of the Academy of the General Staff as the highest military-educational institution of the operational-strategic type determines the course of study and training of the generals and officers of the friendly socialist countries."<sup>101</sup> This study notes that in the 1961/62 academic year the Academy revised its program for foreign officers by placing them in a joint program with Soviet officers.<sup>102</sup> The revision of the program of study for East European officers coincides with the introduction of the system of joint exercises. In a brief discussion of the achievements of Voroshilov graduates this text noted the prominent role of Voroshilov alumni in WTO exercises. It also noted that Voroshilov graduates held "high posts" in their national armed forces. For instance, in 1976, of the five East European states that send officers to the Voroshilov Academy, four had Voroshilov alumni as defense ministers, and all five had Voroshilov graduates as chiefs of staff.<sup>103</sup>

Krasnaia Zvezda's accounts of individual WTO exercises<sup>104</sup> often identify East European officers in the exercises who are alumni of Soviet academies. Krasnaia Zvezda occasionally quotes them as saying that their Soviet education

prepared them well for the exercises and as saying that it is very useful in the exercises to have a fluent command of Russian military terminology. These accounts of the interactions of WTO officers in joint exercises often note the friendships of Soviet and East European alumni of Soviet academies. Krasnaia Zvezda reported during the 1970 Brotherhood in Arms exercises in the GDR that Lt. Col. Wolfgang Chernig of the East German army was assigned to work with a group of Soviet officers among whom were graduates of an unidentified Soviet military academy in Leningrad where Chernig had also studied. Chernig told a Krasnaia Zvezda correspondent that both he and his wife had warm memories of their years in Leningrad. The correspondent reported that Soviet officers had laughed after Chernig told Krasnaia Zvezda about his wife's reaction to the news that her husband had been assigned to work with Soviet officers during Brotherhood in Arms. According to the front page story in Krasnaia Zvezda, Frau Chernig had begged her husband, "Take me with you as your driver. I would really like to meet some Russians again."<sup>105</sup>

#### Political Activities in the Joint Exercises

Judging by accounts in Krasnaia Zvezda, Warsaw Pact exercises anticipate a conflict in which a series of rapid, dispersed troop movements and tactical nuclear strikes will alternate with a series of political rallies, friendship meetings, concerts and visits to sites of historical and cultural interest. Soviet and East European sources pay far more attention to the military-political aspects of the joint exercises than they do to the military-technical aspects. Western observers of Pact exercises either ignore the political aspects of Pact exercises<sup>106</sup> or mention them only in passing.<sup>107</sup> The primary purpose of the political activities in the joint exercises is

legitimizing the military-political axioms of joint defense of the gains of socialism against external and internal enemies. In practice this means justifying a system of military exercises which pre-empts national capabilities for territorial defense and prepares Pact armies for intervention in each other's territories.

The themes of the political activities of the exercises come from the shared military-political axioms of the WTO and the military histories of each alliance member jointly written by Soviet and East European military historians. The military-historical literature of the Pact includes a 35-volume "Library of Victory" written by Soviet and East European authors. This series examines the joint struggle against fascism by the Soviet army and civilian and military personnel from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia. The military-political literature of the WTO also includes several studies of the history of military cooperation between the Soviet Union and individual East European Pact members.<sup>108</sup>

Pact sources began reporting political activities in the joint exercises in the fall of 1962.<sup>109</sup> The publicity given to the political exercises of the 1962 exercises coincides with the appointment in May of 1962 of A.A. Epishev as Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Armed Forces. During General Epishev's tenure in office the Soviet force groups in East Europe, the four western military districts of the USSR and the Soviet Black Sea and Baltic Sea Fleets have developed an extensive network of joint political activities directed by the main political administrations of the Warsaw Pact states. (Romania disbanded its main political administration in 1964.) The Soviet forces involved in the conduct of joint political activities with the WTO armed forces probably constitute about half of all Soviet military personnel. The joint/ political

activities seek to cultivate feelings of proletarian internationalism among the multi-national personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces and among the multi-national personnel of the Warsaw Pact.

Some Western analysts have suggested that the officer corps of the Soviet Union objects to the existence of the political administration of the Soviet armed forces because this system impedes the development of Soviet military-technical capabilities.<sup>110</sup> Any Soviet officer with experience in the Soviet force groups in Europe, the Baltic or Black Sea Fleets or the four western military districts of the USSR probably finds that Soviet domination of the Warsaw Pact would not be possible in its present form without the WTO network of political administrations dedicated to the strengthening of proletarian internationalism and to the justification of the organizational structures of the WTO.<sup>111</sup>

General Epishev's background suggests that he was well-prepared to supervise the development of the military-political activities designed to safeguard Warsaw Pact forces from Romanian and Yugoslav military-political conceptions of "reliance on one's own forces." Before the Second World War he was in charge of the cadre department of a Soviet division and received a mid-career degree from the Academy of Mechanization and Motorization. During the war he served as a political officer with the Soviet forces that liberated Poland and Czechoslovakia. After the war he served in the KGB and then worked in the Ukraine as a party secretary in charge of cadres. From 1955-61 he served as Soviet ambassador to Romania. From 1961 to May of 1962 he served as Soviet ambassador to Yugoslavia.<sup>112</sup>

Col. Semin, a Soviet military journalist specializing on the WTO, presents the following outline of the conduct of political activities in

joint exercises: Representatives of the main political administrations of the participating armies form a united operational group. This group organizes meetings among the fraternal troops, meetings of the soldiers with the local population and plans programs of "agitation-propaganda" and "cultural enlightenment." This group also supervises a joint press center, a joint multi-lingual newspaper published during the exercises, joint multi-lingual radio broadcasts for the participating soldiers and a joint cinematography group.<sup>113</sup> The film group probably submits entries for the annual Warsaw Pact Film Festival, which began in 1966.<sup>114</sup>

According to Col. Semin, the main political administration of the officer under whose command the exercise is taking place "as a rule" is responsible for the formation of the united operational group which directs the political activities of a given exercise.<sup>115</sup> According to the Iakubovskii text, the united operational group has its representatives in the staff directing the exercise and in the political departments of the participating armed forces.<sup>116</sup> Col. Semin notes, and Pact sources confirm, that the highest-ranking party, state and military officials of the host country participate in political meetings with the soldiers and in joint meetings of soldiers and civilians in factories, farms and towns. When the fraternal soldiers meet, they discuss ways of improving combat readiness and military mastery and their dedication to the principles of socialist internationalism. In addition to their meetings with the local population, the WTO personnel also visit war memorials and historical exhibits connected with the working-class movement of the host country. According to Col. Semin, the political-education activities "as a rule" take place during pauses in military actions. "When the situation permits," the joint operational group organizes joint discussions and seminars on "military-political and theoretical themes," speeches by

and propagandists, /the exchange of assemblies and of films. The meetings of soldiers and civilians often include performances by choral and dance groups and orchestras and also performances by artists participating in the exercises.<sup>117</sup>

A joint Polish-Soviet study reports that during the Brotherhood in Arms exercises of 1970 in the GDR there were more than 40 meetings of allied military units, more than 200 political rallies involving soldiers and civilians and about 300 cultural programs.<sup>118</sup> According to a Soviet-Czechoslovak volume, during an unidentified exercise between the Soviet Central Force Group and the Czechoslovak People's Army there were five meetings of commanders and political officers, six meetings of outstanding enlisted military personnel, four large political rallies and 50 joint excursions.<sup>119</sup> Political activities appear to take place even during low-level tactical exercises. Krasnaia Zvezda reported in 1971 that after jointly laying a pontoon bridge across the Danube, Soviet and Hungarian soldiers advanced to a concert given by the orchestra of the staff of the Southern Force Group.<sup>120</sup>

Krasnaia Zvezda gave particularly detailed coverage to the political activities of the 1970 Brotherhood in Arms exercises, perhaps because, as the Soviet army newspaper noted, the fraternal armed forces were simultaneously observing the 15th anniversary of the WTO, the 100th birthday of Lenin, the 21st anniversary of the GDR and the 26th anniversary of the Czechoslovak People's Army.<sup>121</sup> Krasnaia Zvezda recounted the visit to a Soviet tank regiment of Erich Muchlenburg, a full member of the East German Politburo. Muchlenburg gave a speech on the contribution of the exercises to the peace and security of the socialist confederation and then presented the regiment

with a bust of Karl Marx. After having been reminded of the German origins of Soviet communism, the officers of the regiment then reminded Muchlenburg of the Soviet origins of German communism: they ushered him into the regimental room of combat glory where they recounted the history of their regiment, including its participation in the conquest of Germany. A German officer accompanying Muchlenburg replied that in 1945 he had been a child in Swedt, one of the towns captured by this very regiment. Krasnaia Zvezda pointed out that Swedt was now one of the terminals for the Friendship Oil Pipeline from the Soviet Union.<sup>122</sup>

The political activities of the joint exercises focus on demonstrating the necessity of a multi-national military alliance and on justifying multi-national maneuvers on the soil of individual Pact members. During one of the most recent publicized exercises, the "Friendship-79" exercises of Soviet and Czechoslovak troops in Czechoslovakia, Krasnaia Zvezda reported the visit of a joint delegation of the fraternal armies to local villages and factories. Krasnaia Zvezda specifically pointed out the multi-national composition of the delegation: it included two Czechs, a Ukrainian, a Georgian, a Dagestani and a Tatar.<sup>123</sup> A Krasnaia Zvezda editorial during the Brotherhood in Arms exercises explained the central role of Soviet forces in this multi-national alliance:

"Yes, the soldiers of the fraternal armies speak in different languages, but they think in the same way. In this regard they are like brothers in one big family.

"Yes, and they understand and recognize that the older brother in this family is the Soviet soldier who defended his Fatherland, who brought freedom to the peoples of Europe and who in his military victory was always true to the international proletariat and struggled for the happiness of mankind."<sup>124</sup>

There are, however, historical reasons<sup>125</sup> for suggesting that Czechs, Ukrainians, Georgians, Dagestanis, Tatars and the other nationalities of the

Warsaw Pact also have other, less fond memories of big brother. The goal of the political activities of the joint exercises is to arm the soldiers of the WTO against such memories and against attacks on the military-political axiom of the necessity for joint defense of the gains of socialism against internal and external enemies. "In bourgeois military sociology," warns General Epishev,

"there is often an attempt to portray the principles of the international defense of socialism as 'an attack on national sovereignty' as 'diktat' and 'the hegemony of certain countries.'" 126

According to the Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Armed Forces,

"It is not difficult to see that the basic direction of the attack of bourgeois propaganda on the consciousness of the personnel of the armies of the socialist countries sets the goal of emphasizing national differences and opposing some socialist states to others.

"All this is done to loosen the unbreakable moral-political unity of the socialist countries and their armed forces and to disrupt the fraternal relations which exist among them." 127

M.S. Kirichenko, the author of a Soviet study of the Warsaw Pact, identifies some of the slanders used to loosen the unbreakable unity of the armed forces of the socialist states: 1) the Soviet army exported socialist revolutions to Eastern Europe; 2) the Soviet forces stationed in East Europe are occupation troops; 3) Soviet military specialists interfere in the internal affairs of East European armed forces; 4) Soviet troops crushed "liberalization" in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968.<sup>128</sup> Kirichenko calls for "a sharp class struggle with the forces which propagandize various theories of 'neutralism', 'non-alignment', 'an inter-bloc position' and 'reliance on one's own forces.'"<sup>129</sup>

Several Soviet sources testify to the utility of political activities in preparing WTO soldiers for the moral-political strains of occupying a Warsaw Pact member. Krasnaia Zvezda's coverage of the events in Czechoslovakia following the intervention of August 20-21 mentioned friendly meetings of the fraternal soldiers with Czechoslovak civilians in factories, farms, and towns. The Soviet army newspaper often noted the concern of Soviet military personnel for the welfare of their colleagues in the Czechoslovak army, as demonstrated by the Soviet pilot who took it upon himself to fly a seriously-ill Czech soldier direct to Prague for medical treatment unavailable in Slovakia. 130 On his return from Czechoslovakia in 1968 Lt. Christo Radulov of the Bulgarian People's Army and his unit stopped in the Odessa Military District to discuss the intervention with the soldiers of the district. At a political meeting he declared,

"It was difficult for us in the first days. The counterrevolutionaries and their chorus ranted and raved. It was necessary to have iron nerves in order not to succumb to the provocations.

"But for us the example was always the Soviet soldier, who demonstrated obvious control and self-mastery." 131

At the same meeting, another Bulgarian officer, Parashkev Palukov said,

"The joint entry of our troops into Czechoslovakia strengthened our friendship even more. We lived in one big family. And as in every family, we all shared.

"Each of us is bringing back a great many addresses from the USSR, Hungary, Poland and the GDR. We are going to write and keep each other informed.

"You know, we are more than friends. We are brothers in spirit, brothers in arms...." 132

For the Bulgarian soldiers who were not able to participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, subsequent joint WTO exercises provided opportunities to meet pen pals from the fraternal armies.

In conclusion: the organization of both the military and political aspects of the WTO exercises are directed at justifying WTO policies which pre-empt the development of East European capabilities for territorial defense and at preparing Soviet and East European forces militarily and politically for intervention in East Europe. Soviet military doctrine serves not as the inspiration but the justification for the joint Warsaw Pact exercises. In turn, the exercises provide the Soviets with the means to enforce conformity to the military-political and military-technical components of Soviet doctrine.

1.

See the article on military doctrine in N.V. Ogarkov, et al. eds., Sovetskaia voennaia entsiklopediia (The Soviet Military Encyclopedia) (Moscow, Voenizdat, 1977), Vol. 3., pp. 225-229.

2.

Both Yugoslavia and Romania have presented their military doctrines in a large number of publications. Two English-language presentations are: Maj. Gen. Aleksandr Vukotic, et. al., eds., The Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense (Belgrade: Medunarodna Politika, 1970); Col. Iulian Cernat et. al. eds., National Defense: The Romanian View (Bucharest: Military Publishing House, 1976).

3.

The Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense, p. 61.

4.

See my discussion in a forthcoming work, Defending Socialism in East Europe (Praeger). This volume will incorporate the study written for the National Council for Soviet and East European Research.

5.

Michael Checinski, "The Postwar Development of the Polish Armed Forces" (RAND Corp, forthcoming), p. 17.

6.

Ibid.,

7.

Two authors date the reformation of Soviet doctrine to December, 1959. See Harriet Fast Scott, William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 41-42.

8.

Soviet Military Strategy (in English) (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1963), p. 495.)

9.

Ibid., chp. 6.

12

Maj. Gen. V.F. Samoilenko, "Voennoe sodruzhestvo stran sotsializma" ("The Military Confederation of the Socialist Countries") in S.A. Tiushkevich et al., eds., Voina i armia (War and Armed Forces) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1977), p. 366. See endorsement of this proposition by A.A. Grechko in his first article on the Warsaw Pact, Krasnaia Zvezda, Oct. 6, 1961 and in his last article on the WTO, Kommunist #15, 1972. For a more academic development of this proposition see V.I. Nechipurenko, V.I. Lenin o zashchite sotsialisticheskogo otechestva (V.I. Lenin on the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland) (Moscow: Moscow University Press, 1973), p. 144.

13

A.A. Epishev, Ideologicheskaiia bor'ba po voennym voprosam (Ideological Struggle in Military Questions) (Moscow, Voenizdat, 1974), p. 91.

14

The Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense, pp. 124-126.

15

See article 4 of the Warsaw Treaty; see article 8 of the Soviet Romanian Treaty of 1970.

16

The best account of the developments surrounding Ceausescu's actions at the 1978 PCC meeting is Patrick Moore's, "The Ceausescu Saga," (Radio Free Europe Research: RAD Background Report, Romania/275 20 Dec. 1978.

17

"Speech by Nicolae Ceausescu...at Plenary Meeting of the CC of the RCP" in Romania: Documents/Events, November, 1978 (Bucharest: Agerpress).

12

Maj. Gen. V.F. Samoilenko, "Voennoe sodruzhestvo stran sotsializma" ("The Military Confederation of the Socialist Countries") in S.A. Tiushkevich et al., eds., Voina i armia (War and Armed Forces) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1977), p. 366. See endorsement of this proposition by A.A. Grechko in his first article on the Warsaw Pact, Krasnaia Zvezda, Oct. 6, 1961 and in his last article on the WTO, Kommunist #15, 1972. For a more academic development of this proposition see V.I. Nechipurenko, V.I. Lenin o zashchite sotsialisticheskogo otechestva (V.I. Lenin on the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland) (Moscow: Moscow University Press, 1973), p. 144.

13

A.A. Epishev, Ideologicheskaiia bor'ba po voennym voprosam (Ideological Struggle in Military Questions) (Moscow, Voenizdat, 1974), p. 91.

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17

"Speech by Nicolae Ceausescu...at Plenary Meeting of the CC of the RCP" in Romania: Documents/Events, November, 1978 (Bucharest: Agerpress).

18.

See I.I. Iakubovskii et. al. eds., Boevoe sodruzhestvo narodov i armii stran Varshavskogo dogovora (The Combat Confederation of the Peoples and Armies of the Warsaw Pact Countries) (Moscow, Voenizdat, 1975), chps. 4,5.

19.

A.A. Timorin, "Sotsialno-politicheskaia priroda i naznachenie sotsialisticheskikh armii" (The Socio-Political Nature and Function of Socialist Armies" in Tiushkevich, et. al., Voina i armia., pp. 352-353.

20.

Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo, p. 30.

21.

Ibid., p. 133

22.

See Epishev, Ideologicheskaja bor'ba pp. 71-72:

"First, defense of the gains of socialism is a general law of the socialist Revolution in whatever form or whatever country it has been carried out....

"The defense of the socialist revolution is one of the decisive factors of securing the transitions of peoples to socialism.

"Without this, the revolution cannot achieve its victorious completion and cannot guarantee external security and freedom of the social and national development of peoples.

"Secondly, defense of socialism embraces not only the sphere of military affairs but includes all other areas of social life as well: economic culture, politics and ideology.

"It is sufficient to say that military force always, and particularly now, is based on the power of economic, moral-political and scientific potential.

"Thirdly, the law of the necessity of the defense of socialism applies as long as imperialism exists, which is a constant threat to socialism. ...

"Moreover, as historical experience has shown, this threat exists not only in the form of a direct attack on the socialist countries, but in the form of the so-called 'quiet counterrevolution.'

[this is a reference to the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia, which Soviet journalists described at the time as the 'quiet counterrevolution.]

"Fourthly, and finally, the defense of socialism is an exceptionally important internationalist task."

23.

For a discussion of this document see Christopher Jones, "Dubcek, Jan Palach and the Gottwald Memorandum: Could Czechoslovakia Have Deterred the Soviet Intervention?" Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, Vol. 3, 1979. For the Gottwald Academy's own summary of the "Gottwald Memorandum" see Osteuropa Archiv, Vol. 12, 1970.

24.

For example, see Epishev, Ideologicheskaiia bor'ba, pp. 83-90.

25.

Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo, pp. 138-139.

26.

Soviet texts on the WTO frequently call attention to the importance of the overlapping network of bilateral treaties and party programs in maintaining the cohesion of the WTO. For example, see Iakubovskii, Boevoe odruzhestvo, p. 110; A. A. Epishev, Partiia i armia (The Party and the Armed Forces) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1977), p. 321; A.A. Grechko, article in Kommunist #15, 1972, p. 41. For a much more detailed discussion of the military-political axioms of the WTO and their incorporation into party and state documents see my forthcoming Defending Socialism in East Europe (Praeger). For East European party programs, see the ongoing series of Soviet translations of East European party documents into Russian; for the relevant bi-lateral state treaties see vols. 25, 26, 31 of Ministerstvo inostrannykh del, SSSR, Sbornik deistvuiushchikh dogorov, soglashenii i konventsii zakliuchennikh SSSR s inostranannymi gosudarstvami (USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Collection of Treaties, Agreements and Conventions in Force Concluded by the USSR With Foreign States) (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia) and pp. 150-156 of another publication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vneshnaia politika Sovetskogo Soiuz 1976: Sbornik dokumentov (The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, 1967: Collection of Documents)

27

See two works by Joseph Douglass, The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976) and Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979). See also, Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," Commentary, July, 1977.

Much of the Soviet material on which these studies are based appear in the following: Harriet Fast Scott, ed., Soviet Military Strategy (English translation and collation of the three editions of V.D. Sokolovskii, Voennaia strategiiia) (New York: Crane and Russak, 1975); A.A. Sidorenko, The Offensive (U.S. Air Force translation of the Soviet work, Nastuplenie) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, no date).; also the "Selected Translations of Voennaia Mysl'," a Soviet classified military journal, released by the CIA and FBIS. Available on microfilm from the Library of Congress.)

28

Iakubovskii, ed., Boevoe sodruzhestvo, p. 151: "In the first years joint exercises were conducted primarily on a tactical level, then beginning in 1961 they began to take place regularly on the operational and strategic scale, with the participation of almost all types of armed forces and types of troops."

29

A.V. Antosiac, ed., Zarozhdenie narodnikh armii stran-uchastnits Varshavskogo dogovora (The Birth of the Peoples Armies of the Member States of the Warsaw Pact) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975), p. 363.

30

A.A. Epishev (USSR), Velko Palin (Bulgaria), eds, Naveki vmeste (Forever Together) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1969), p. 287.

31

Dictionary of Basic Military Terms: A Soviet View (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, no date), p. 219.

32  
Ibid., p. 218.

33  
Ibid., p. 144.

34  
Ibid., p. 213.

35  
Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., "Soviet Bloc Maneuvers," Military Review,  
August, 1978.

36  
In the GDR Volksarmee no. 25, 1969 Maj. Gen. Fleisswehr of the GDR lists a total of 40 joint exercises in the period from 1964-68 conducted between the National People's Army of the GDR and the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Turbiville, who cites this article in his study, does not speculate how many, if any, of these 40 are included in his list of 36; I am not able to guess how many, if any, are included in my list of 72. Fleisswehr, a GDR Deputy Minister of Defense in 1969, breaks down the 40 as follows: 10 joint command staff exercises for higher staffs; 10 staff-and-command exercises using one German and one Soviet division; 16 joint ground forces maneuvers and four joint naval and air exercises. My list of 72 indicates that for the period of 1964-68 the service branches of the GDR participated in 13 WTO exercises, but I cannot determine if the Soviet forces which participated in the ground forces exercises always included units from the Group of Soviet forces in Germany, as specified by Fleisswehr.

Naveki Vmeste, the joint Soviet-Bulgarian study which was published in 1969 reports on p. 289 that "in recent years" joint Soviet-Bulgarian exercises have been conducted "on the most diverse scales with the participation of ground forces, air forces and navies." But, apart from the 1958 Soviet-Bulgarian exercises in Bulgaria, the Soviets have reported only those

in which they have claimed that Romania participated, a total of five. This total does not suggest exercises "on the most diverse scales."

A Soviet study of the Belorussian Military District noted that during the summer of 1967 one of its formations, the Irkutsk-Pinsk division, had participated in an exercise conducted on Polish soil with the Polish armed forces. This text also reported that "formations [soedinenie] and units [chasti] of the Belorussian Military District and the Polish armed forces have "more than once taken part in joint exercises and maneuvers." (A.G. Ovchinnikov, ed., Krasnoznamennyi Belorusskii voennyi okrug (The Red Banner Belorussian Military District) (Minsk: Belarus, 1973), p. 501.) This study did not indicate however, how many times more than once. An Oct. 12, 1975 p. 2 article in Krasnaia Zvezda mentioned in passing the conduct of a joint exercise of Soviet and Polish tank companies in the Silesian Military District of Poland but did not indicate whether such exercises had taken place more than once.

A Czech officer writing in the October 10, 1972 issue of Krasnaia Zvezda mentioned an incident in a Soviet-Czechoslovak joint tactical exercise and then added, "Frequently the sub-units (podrazdelenie- translation: a battalion or a company or a platoon or a squadron) of the two friendly armies act in combat actions, constituting a monolithic striking force." On at least one other occasion (August 2, 1979), Krasnaia Zvezda has mentioned joint Soviet-Czechoslovak exercises at the podrazdelenie level and on at least one occasion (July 14, 1971) has mentioned the conduct of low-level Soviet-Hungarian tactical exercises.

37

See my list for the exercises of May 14-19, 1969 and the exercises in the Carpathian Military District sometime during the summer of 1973 under

the command of Lt. Gen. Abashin.

38

Krasnaia Zvezda, July 17, 1964.

39

Krasnaia Zvezda, Sept. 21, 1966.

40

For a further discussion of this and related events see my "Autonomy and Intervention: The CPSU and the Struggle for the Czechoslovak Communist Party, 1968," Orbis, summer, 1975.

41

Michel Tatu, "Arrivee des premieres troupes sovietiques qui doivent participer aux 'exercices du pacte de Varsovie'," Le Monde, May 31, 1968 in Tatu, L'Heresie Impossible (Paris: Editions Bernard Grasset, 1968), p. 115.

42

Ibid., Tatu quotes Literarni Listy.

43

"Plenum Tsentralnogo Komiteta ChSKP" ("Plenum of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee), Pravda, June 8, 1968, p. 4.

44

See the resolution adopted by the Husak Central Committee on the history of the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia, "The Lessons of Crisis Development," published in Pravda pobezdaet (The Truth Shall Prevail) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1971.)

45

Pravda, July 19, 1968, p. 1.

46

Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo, p. 154.

47

Pravda, July 15, 1968, p. 1.

48  
Ibid.

49  
Pravda, July 19, 1968.

50  
Krasnaia Zvezda, July 24, 26, 31 and August 9, 1968.

51  
Ibid., August 20, 1968.

52  
Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Evolution of the Warsaw Pact, Adelphi Papers, #58, June, 1969, p. 41.

53  
For a further discussion of the role of WTO exercises in preparing for this invasion see Gen. James H. Polk, "Reflections on the Czechoslovak Invasion," Strategic Review, winter, 1977.

54  
Pravda, August 22, 1968 p. 2. See also footnote No. 22 for General Epishev's discussion of how the military-political axioms of the combat confederation required a military response to the situation in Czechoslovakia.

55  
Krasnaia Zvezda, October 19, 1962, wrote that the exercise was conducted "according to the plan of preparation of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact."

56  
See page 26 of this paper and see also footnote No. 72 of this paper.

57  
Col. D. Diev, Lt. Col. K. Spirov, "Combat Collaboration [better translation: "The Combat Confederation..."] of the Armies of the Warsaw Pact States," Voennaia Mysl' #2, 1968 in CIA FBIS FPD 0049/69 "Selected Translations from Voennaia Mysl' 25 April, 1969," p. 64. It is possible that

because of typographical or other errors in either the original Soviet edition or the CIA translation the 1963 exercise referred to was in fact the 1962 exercise, which was not mentioned by Cols. Diev and Spirov, even though Krasnaia Zvezda reported this exercise. However, the list presented by Cols. Dive and Spirov mentions selected exercises in chronological order; in this order the Romanian-Soviet-Bulgarian exercise of 1963 is listed after the Sept. 1963 exercise in the GDR commanded by Heinz Hoffmann. Diev's list, like all other lists presented by WTO sources, is presented as a "for example" citation. A given WTO source invariably omits exercises mentioned by other WTO source.

58

Exercises of Feb., 1972 as cited in Turbiville's list (no Pact sources confirm this); exercise of Feb. 12-21, 1973 in Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo, p. 292 (Turbiville does not report this); and exercise of Feb. 17-22, 1974, cited on p. 293 of Iakubovskii but not cited by Turbiville.

59

Krasnaia Zvezda, Sept. 22, 1964.

60

Epishev and Palin, eds., Naveki Vmeste, p. 290.

61

Ibid., p. 290.

62

See footnote no. 36.

63

See footnote no. 36.

64

See my forthcoming, Defending Socialism in East Europe for a possible explanation.

65

See footnote no. 36.

66

See footnote no. 36.

67

Exercise of June 4-14, 1974.

68

Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo, p. 158.

69

For a further discussion of this possibility, see my forthcoming Defending Socialism in East Europe.

70

Krasnaia Zvezda coverage of the October Storm exercise of October 16-22, 1965 and of the Oder-Neisse exercise of September 21-28, 1969; Macintosh, "The Evolution of the Warsaw Pact," p. 8.

71

Krasnaia zvezda, Sept. 28, 1969; Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 13, 1973, p. 26.

72

Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo, p. 145.

73

P.A. Zhilin (USSR), E. Jadziak (Poland), eds., Bratstvo po oruzhiu (Brotherhood in Arms) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975), p. 352.

74

Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo, p. 146 and pp. 290-293 for exercises of June 24-July 2, 1971; July 12-21, 1971; Feb. 28-March 4, 1972; Sept. 4-16, 1972; Feb. 12-21, 1973.

75

Krasnaia Zvezda, Sept. 29, 1969 and Sept. 10, 1976.

76

See Zhilin and Jadziak, eds., Bratstvo po oruzhiu, pp. 353-355 and P.A. Zhilin (USSR) and F. Gerfurt (Czechoslovakia), Na vechnye vremena (For Eternity) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975), pp. 306-307.

77

Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo, p. 152.

78

Ibid., p. 155.

79

Dictionary of Basic Military Terms, p. V.

80

Krasnaia Zvezda, Sept. 26, 1969.

81

Ibid., October 7, 1979.

82

Zhilin and Gefurt, eds., Na vechnye vremena, p. 307.

83

Krasnaia Zvezda, October 10, 1970.

84

Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo, p. 150. Some of the other sources which testify to this link read as follows: Editorial, Krasnaia Zvezda, October 21, 1970: "During this time [1955-70] in the mutual relations among the fraternal armies there has developed an harmonious system of the coordination of the training of the troops and staffs in which a special role is assigned to the joint exercises." Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo, p. 160: "Joint exercises take place annually according to an agreed-upon plan. It is necessary to emphasize that great attention is devoted in the United Armed Forces to the exchange of experience of the training of soldiers and sailors. The national and United Commands, the commanders and staffs of the allied armies share everything which is best in the combat and political training of personnel, and in the method of training and in the educational-material base. The United Command and the Staff of the United Armed Forces generalize the leading experience of the allied armed forces and share it for the achievements of all commanders, staffs and troops." Gen. Josef Kaminski of Poland, deputy Chief of Staff of the UAF in Krasnaia Zvezda, Sept. 8, 1976: "According to the results of exercises and maneuvers,

necessary conclusions are drawn and then recommendations are made for introduction into the practice of troop training." Communique on the Oder-Neisse exercise of 1969 in Krasnaia Zvezda Sep. 20, 1969: "The goal of these exercises is the evaluation of the training of troops in 1969....."; Krasnaia Zvezda editorial on these exercises, 28 Sept. 1969: "The United Command accords great significance to the conduct of joint measures in the operational and combat training of the allied forces because these measures and especially troop exercises permit us to decide the important questions of the working out of interaction, the exchange of experience and the achievement of mutual understanding.....This exercise was preceded by the all-round training of troops, fleets, and aviation and of generals and officers and of organs of the rear...."

85

The Iakubovskii text usually describes each of these meetings as assemblies of the "leading staff of the WTO armies who meet to discuss "combat and operational training." The wording used to describe these meetings from 1963-69 is virtually identical with the wording used to describe joint sessions of the "leading staff" of the WTO armies and the Military Council in the period beginning in 1969. These post-1969 sessions are specifically identified as discussions of the exercises of a given year for the purpose of preparing the training programs and exercises of the coming year. For the descriptions of the post-1969 sessions see pp. 144 and pp. 288-293. The descriptions of the pre-1969 meetings are as follows in the Iakubovskii text: P. 283: Feb., 28, 1963, in Warsaw, a meeting of WTO defense ministers to consider "plans for measures for coordinating military training in 1963." No meeting is mentioned for 1964. P. 284: Meeting of Nov. 24-25, 1965 in Warsaw of "Representatives of the leadership of the armies of the member

states of the Warsaw Pact at which were discussed questions of combat training and combat readiness." See p. 285 for meeting of Nov. 14-17, 1966 in Budapest "of representatives of the armed forces of the member states of the Warsaw Pact at which were discussed questions connected with the operational activity, combat training and combat readiness of troops." See p. 285 for meeting of Nov. 13-17, 1976 in Dresden of "the leading staff of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact at which were discussed questions of the raising of combat readiness and the level of operational and combat readiness of troops....and tasks were designated for 1968." See p. 286 for meeting of Nov. 26-29, 1968 in Bucharest "of the leading staff of the armies of the member states of the Warsaw Pact at which were considered questions of the combat training of troops and the further strengthening of the defensive capabilities of the allied states."

86

Ibid., p. 145: "It has already become a tradition that at the end of each year there are combined sessions of the Military Council at which in an all-round manner are considered the results of combat and operational training during the preceding year and the tasks are designated for troops and fleets for the following training year. Such sessions are conducted jointly with meetings of the leading staff of the allied armies."

87

See page 24 of this study.

88

Ibid., p. 144.

89

Ibid., p. 144. For identification of these officers in 1978 see Central Intelligence Agency "USSR's Organization of the Ministry of Defense CR78-15257, Dec., 1978.

90

Ibid.

91

Col. V. Semin in S.K. Il'in et al., eds., Partiino-politicheskaia rabota v Sovetskikh vooruzhennykh silakh (Party-Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974), p. 591.

92

For a discussion of this document see my article on the Warsaw Pact in the 1978 edition of Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual and also in my forthcoming Defending Socialism in East Europe.

93

Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo, p. 151.

94

Krasnaia Zvezda, October 7, 1970.

95

Ibid., October 20, 1970. See also the editorial of July 10, 1978: "An exercise is the highest form of training and upbringing, and the most important means of raising field, air and naval mastery. It is difficult to overestimate their role in the improvement of the mastery of commanders and staffs in the administration of troops, the forces of the fleets and in the increase of the coordination of sub-units, units and ships and in the strengthening of discipline and organization."

96

See my forthcoming Defending Socialism in East Europe.

97

Ibid.

98

Ibid.

99

H.F. Scott, W.F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR, 352: "Once an officer has successfully completed work at a [post-graduate, mid-career]

academy, he is assigned under a special nomenklatura or list of positions that can be filled only by officers who are graduates of military or naval academies or their equivalents."

100

V.G. Kulikov, ed., Akademiia generalnogo shtaba (The General Staff Academy) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), p. 288.

101

Ibid., p. 231.

102

Ibid., p. 299.

103

Ibid., p. 242.

104

See Krasnaia Zvezda, October 23, 1965 and its coverage of the Shield 76 exercises, the 1969 Oder-Neisse exercises and the 1970 Brotherhood in Arms exercises.

105

Ibid., Oct. 7, 1970.

106

Turbiville, "Soviet Bloc Maneuvers."

107

Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Warsaw Pact Today," Survival, May-June, 1974, p. 122: "From 1961 onwards the Pact organized a series of multi-lateral military exercises, many of which were well publicized....most of them amounting in practice to large-scale politico-military demonstrations emphasizing the enthusiasm, interalliance solidarity and friendship of the component national armies.

108

A.V. Antosiak et. al., eds, Zarozhdenie narodnikh armii stran-uchastnits

varshavskogo dogovora, 1941-1949 (The Birth of the Peoples Armies of the Member States of the Warsaw Pact, 1941-1949) (Moscow: Nauka, 1975); Epishev and Palin, eds., Naveki vmeste; Zhilin and Jadziak, eds., Bratsvo po oruzhiu; Zhilin and Gefurt, eds., Na vechnyi vremena.

109

See Krasnaia Zvezda, Oct. 10, 1962 for an account of the exercises in Poland; see Ibid., October 20, 1962 for an account of the exercises in Romania.

110

See Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.)

111

See my forthcoming, Defending Socialism in East Europe.

112

Sovetskaia voennaia entsiklopediia, Vol. 3, pp. 311-312.

113

Col. V. Semin in S.K. Il'in et al., eds., Partiino-politicheskaia rabota....., p. 599.

114

P.I. Efimov, ed., Boevoe soiuz bratskikh armii (The Combat Union of the Fraternal Armies) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974), p. 29.

115

Semin in S.K. Il'in, Partiino-politicheskaia rabota....., p. 599.

116

Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo, p. 263.

117

Semin in S.K. Il'in, Partiino-politicheskaia Rabota, pp. 600-601.

118

Zhilin and Jadziak, eds., Bratstvo po oruzhiu, p. 355.

119

Zhilin and Gefurt, eds., Na vechnye vremena, p. 309.

120

Krasnaia Zvezda, July 14, 1971.

- 121  
Krasnaia Zvezda, October 8, 1970.
- 122  
Ibid.
- 123  
Krasnaia Zvezda, Feb. 8, 1979.
- 124  
Krasnaia Zvezda, October 8, 1970.
- 125  
See Alexander M. Nekrich, The Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978).
- 126  
Epishev, Ideologicheskaiia bor'ba, p. 104.
- 127  
Ibid., p. 110.
- 128  
M.S. Kirichenko, Na strazhe mira (Guarding the Peace) (Minsk: Belarus, 1975), pp. 71-74.
- 129  
Ibid., p. 75.
- 130  
"My stali lushche videt" ("We Have Begun to See Better"), Krasnaia Zvezda, Sept. 10, 1968.
- 131  
N.T. Panferov, et al., eds., Odesskii krasnoznamennyi (The Red Banner Odessa Military District) (Kishinev, Kartia Moldoveniaske, 1975), p. 280.
- 132  
Ibid., p. 3

Table 1

## Warsaw Pact Exercises, 1961-1979

<u>Name/date</u>	<u>location</u>	<u>participants</u>	<u>commander</u>	<u>forces</u>	<u>sources</u>
1961: Oct.-Nov. Buria	GDR, P, CS, w. USSR	GDR, P, CS, USSR	Grecho (USSR)	Staffs, troops, GF, AF, Nav. Airborne	KZ: 10/6/61 Iak. p. 282 p. 151
1962: spring	H	H, R, USSR		Staffs, troops	VM (CIA)p. 6-
Sept.	CS	CS, P, USSR			Turbiville
Oct. 1-9	P,n. GDR	GDR, P. USSR	Spychalski (P)	AF, GF, Nav.	VM: (CIA)p. KZ: 10/10/6 KZ: 10/11/6 Iak. p. 282
Oct. 19	R	R, B, USSR	Salajin (R)		KZ Oct.19-21
1963: Sept. 9-14 Quartet	s.GDR	GDR, CS, P, USSR	Hoffman (GDR)	40,000 troops 700 tanks 8300 arm. veh. 500 artillery 300 aircraft  sim. nuclear devices airborne troops	Iak p. 152 p. 282 KZ-passim
: fall	R	R,B, USSR	Salajin (R)		VM (CIA)p.
1964: June	CS	CS, GDR, USSR			Turbiville
: July 7-15	CS	CS, USSR	Lomsky (CS)	command staff	KZ 7/17/64
: Sept. 15-20	B	B,R, USSR	Dzhurov (B)	Nav. Airborne GF:?	KZ: 9/22/6- Iak. p.283
1965: April 5-11	GDR	GDR, USSR		GF, AF, Airborne	KZ 4/11/65 4/9/65
: Oct. 16-22 October Storm	GDR	GDR,CS,P, USSR	Koshevoi (USSR)	50,000 troops 800 tanks 1000 arm.veh. 5000 mot.veh. 400 aircraft	Iak. p.284 pp.152- 153 KZ: 10/24/6 : passim
1966: July 20-27	Baltic Sea	GDR, P, USSR		Nav., AF.	Iak. p. 28-
: Sept. 20-25 Vltava	CS	CS, H, GDR, USSR	Lomsky (CS)	Staff, troops 20 adm. organs	KZ: Sept. 21, 22, 25, 1966 Iak. p.153, 285

<u>Name/date</u>	<u>location</u>	<u>participants</u>	<u>commander</u>	<u>forces</u>	<u>sources</u>
1967: May 27- June 5	P, n.GDR	GDR, P. USSR	Spychalski (P)	multi-stage command-staff exercises	Iak. p. 285 KZ 6/7/67
: June 14-19 Maneuver	H, CS	H, CS, USSR	Iakubovskii (USSR)	Operational staffs, all types of forces	Iak. p. 285 KZ 6/21/67
: summer	P	P, USSR		Irkutsk-Pinsk Div. (Belorus. Milit. Dist.) Polish soldiers	KBMD, p. 501
: Aug. 20-27 Rodopy	B, Black Sea	B, USSR (R?)	Dzhurov (B)	GF, AF, Nav. Airborne	NV: p. 289-291 Iak. p. 285 p. 153
: August Florett	GDR	GDR, USSR			Turbiville
: October Oder	P	P, GDR, USSR			Turbiville
1968: May 30	CS	USSR	(probably USSR)	GF, Airborne	<u>Le Monde</u> 5/31/68
: June 20-30 Shumava	CS, P, GDR, USSR	H, CS, GDR, P, USSR	Iakubovskii (USSR)	Operational, tactical staffs, communications, logistics, others 30 adm. organs	Iak. p. 154
: July 5-19 Sever	N. Atlantic Norwegian Sea Barents Sea Baltic Sea	GDR, P. USSR	Gorshkov (USSR)	command-staff, Nav. amphibious	Iak. p. 154, p. 286 Turbiville
: July-August Sky Shield	WTO states	WTO states		Anti-air	Turbiville
: July 24- August 9 Neman	USSR, P, GDR	USSR, P, GDR	Mariakhin (USSR)	Rear services	KZ: July 24, 26, 31 Aug. 9-10
: Aug. 11-20	w. Ukraine, P, GDR	USSR, P, GDR	Shtemenko (USSR)	Operational staffs, GF, communications troops	Iak. p. 286 KZ: 8/20/68
: Aug. 17-20	H	H, SU		communications	Turbiville AP #58, p. 14
: Aug. 20-21	CS	B, H, GDR, P, USSR	Pavlovskii (USSR)	invasion force: GF, AF, Airborne	AP #58, p. 14

<u>Name/date</u>	<u>location</u>	<u>participants</u>	<u>commander</u>	<u>forces</u>	<u>sources</u>
1969: March 1-7	GDR	GDR, USSR	Iakubovskii (USSR)		Iak. p. 286 KZ: 3/29/69 : passim
: March 25- April 1	B	B, USSR R (?)	Iakubovskii (USSR)	Operat. staffs GF. Nav. anti- air.	NV: p. 293 Iak. p. 287
: March 30- April 4 Spring 69	P, GDR, CS,	P, GDR, CS, USSR	Chocha (P)	Staffs, GF, communications	Iak. p. 287 KZ 4/6/69
: April 4-16 Zenit 69	P. H. CS, w. USSR	P, H, CS, USSR	Batitskii	Anti-ir. AF	Iak. p. 287, 158
: May 14-19	USSR	USSR, B, H R (?)	(probably Soviet)	GF	Iak. p. 287 KZ: 5/20/69 Sov. Moldavia 5/20/69
: June 2-7	H	H, USSR			KZ 6/8/69 Iak. p. 287
: July 4-11	P	P, GDR, USSR	Shtemenko (USSR)	Staffs, rear services	KZ: 7/12/69 Iak p. 287
: July 23- Aug. 2	GDR, P, CS USSR	P, CS, USSR	Kutakov (USSR)	AF	Iak. p. 287 KZ: 8/3/69
: Aug 10-15	w. CS	CS, USSR	Maiorov (USSR)	command- staff	Iak. p. 287 KZ: 8/16/69
: Sept. 21-28 Oder-Neisse	P, Baltic Sea	P, GDR, CS, USSR	Jaruzelski (P)	GF, AF, Anti-air. Nav., sim. nuc. weapons	KZ: passim : 9/27/69 : 9/28/69 Iak.: p. 155 largest WTO exercise to date
: Oct. 10-16	GDR, P. CS, w. USSR	GDR, P. CS, USSR		Staffs of GF of GDR, P, CS; Staff of AF of USSR	Iak. p. 288 KZ: 10/17/69
1970: July 1-9	H	H, USSR	Iakubovskii (USSR)	Operat. staffs of: GF, Anti-air. AF. Nav. (!!?)	KZ: 7/10/70
: July 13-17 Zenit 70	WTO states	WTO states	Batitskii (USSR)	Anti-air.	Iak. p. 158, p. 289
: Aug. 17-19	CS	CS, USSR	Valo (CS)	GF	KZ: 8/19/70 AGSh.: p. 243

<u>Name/date</u>	<u>location</u>	<u>participants</u>	<u>commander</u>	<u>forces</u>	<u>sources</u>
1970: Oct. 12-18 Brotherhood in Arms	GDR	B, H, GDR, P. CS, USSR, R(?)	Hoffman (GDR)	GF, AF Nav. of GDR, P, USSR GDR local def. units; GDR work- ers militia KZ: 10/8/70: largest WTO exercise to date	KZ: passim Iak. p. 155, p. 259
1971: June 24- July 2	GDR, CS	staff of WTO; GDR, CS, USSR	Iakubovskii (USSR)	Staff of WTO Operat. staffs of: GF, AF, Anti-air.	KZ:7/3/71 Iak. p.29
: July 5-12	CS, P	CS, P, USSR	Dzur (CS)	AF, Anti-air GF( ?)	KZ:7/14/71 Iak.p.29
: July 12-21 Visla-Elbe 71	GDR, P	Staff of WTO; GDR, P, USSR	Shtemenko (USSR)	Staff of WTO; Staffs, rear orgs of GDR, P, USSR	Iak.p. 29 KZ:7/22/71
: Aug 2-5 Opal-71	H, CS	H, CS, USSR	Czinege (H)	GF	Iak.p.29 KZ: 8/7/71
: Sept. 14-19	GDR	GDR, P, USSR	Hoffman (GDR)	Staffs, forma- tions	Iak.,p.29 KZ:9/21/71
: Oct.	CS	CS, USSR			Turbivill
1972: Feb.	R	R,B, USSR			Turbivill
: Feb.28- March 4	P	Staff of WTO; P, GDR, USSR	Iakubovskii (USSR)	Staff of WTO; Staffs of GF, AF. Nav. Anti-air	Iak. p.29 KZ:3/5/72
: March 21-28	B	B, USSR R(?)	Dzhurov (B)	command staffs	Iak.p.29 KZ:3/29/72
: April 18-23	Black Sea	Staff of WTO; B, USSR R(?)	Iakubovskii (USSR)	Staff of WTO; Nav. staffs, fleets	Iak. p.29 BKPNA, p. 363
: Sept. 4-16 Shield 72	CS	Staff of WTO; CS, H, GDR, P, USSR	Dzur (CS)	GF, AF, Anti- air, Staff of WTO, Iak.p.156: approx. same size as Oder- Neisse, Brother- hood in Arms	KZ:passim Iak.p.156 p.29

<u>Name/date</u>	<u>location</u>	<u>participants</u>	<u>commander</u>	<u>forces</u>	<u>sources</u>
1973: sometime	CS, H	CS, H, USSR		Operat. staffs	Iak. p. 158
: sometime	WTO states	WTO states	Batitskii (USSR)	Anti-air	Iak., p. 158
: Feb. 12-21	R	Staff of WTO; R, B, USSR	Iakubovskii (USSR)	map exercises: Staff of WTO; Operat. staffs of: GF, AF, Nav. Anti-air	Iak. p. 292 KZ: 2/22/73
: June 26- July 5	GDR, P	GDR, P, USSR	Iakubovskii (USSR)	Operat. staffs of rear services	Iak. p. 158 p.292
: summer	Carpathian Milit. Dist. USSR	USSR, B, H	Abashin (USSR)	Sov.-Bulgarian Friendship Mech. Infantry Regiment (Lt. Col. L.E. Generalov)	
				Hungarian regiment	KPVO:p.18 (Col. Mikhail Gerov)
				Bulgarian regiment	(Col. Delcho Delchev)
: Sept 19-24 Vertes	H	H, USSR		"units" (?)	Iak.p.292 KZ: 9/25/7. Turbiville
1974: sometime	WTO states	WTO states	Batitskii (USSR)	Anti-air.	Iak. p. 158
: Feb. 17-22	R	R, USSR		map exercises: Operat. staffs, R, USSR	Iak. p.293 KZ: 2/23/7-
: May 14-24	H,CS	H, CS, USSR		Operat. staffs, troops	Iak. p. 15 p. 29. KZ 5/24/74
: June 4-14	B, R(?)	B, USSR R(?)	Iakubovskii (USSR)	Staff exercises, rear services	Iak. p.158 p.293
: June 17-24 Summer 74	w.P	P, USSR	Jaruzelski (P)	Staffs, troops	Iak. p.293 Trybuna Luc 6/25/74
: Sept. 4-13	Baltic Sea	GDR, P. USSR	Iakubovskii	Staffs, fleets	Iak. p.293 KZ: 9/14/7-
1976: Sept. 9-15 Shield 76	P	P, GDR, CS, USSR	Jaruzelski (P)	35,000 troops	US.State Dept. Report KZ: 9/16/76 : passim

<u>Name/date</u>	<u>location</u>	<u>participants</u>	<u>commander</u>	<u>forces</u>	<u>sources</u>
1976: Oct. 18	H	H, USSR		18,000 troops	U.S. State Dept Report
1977: July 7	S. Baltic Sea	GDR, P, USSR	Kulikov (USSR)	Staffs, fleets	KZ: 7/8/77
1979: Feb. 2-7 Friendship 79	CS	CS, USSR		26,000 troops	U.S. State Dept Report KZ: 2/8/79
: May 12-19 Shield 79	H	H, B, CS, USSR	Czinege (H)	less than 25,000 troops	U.S. State Dept Report KZ: 5/20/79

Code: B=Bulgaria; GDR=German Democratic Republic; H=Hungary; P=Poland; CS=Czechoslovakia  
R=Romania.

GF=ground forces; AF=air forces; Nav.=navies; Anti-air=anti-aircraft troops;  
Airborne=airborne troops.

Iak.=Iakubovskii, Boevoe sodruzhestvo; KZ=Krasnaia Zvezda; VM (CIA)=CIA FBIS FPD 0049/69 "Selected Translations from Voennaia Mysl' April 25, 1969;" Turbiville=Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., "Soviet Bloc Maneuvers," Military Review, August, 1978; KBMD=Krasnoznamennyi Belorusskii voennyi okrug (Minsk: Belarus, 1973); NV=Naveki vmeste (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1969); AP #58=Adelphi Paper #58; AGSh=Akademiia generalnogo shtaba

(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976); BKPNA=B'lgarskata kommunisticheska partiia i narodnata armia (Sofia: Voennoizdatelstvo, 1976); KPVO=Krasnoznamennyi pricarpatskii (L'vov: Kameniar, 1976); U.S. State Dept Report=U.S. State Department, Implementation of the Helsinki Accord (semi-annual reports beginning December, 1976)

Note: If more than one source is listed, this means that each source listed must be consulted to obtain the information listed for that exercise.

TABLE NO.2

## Participation of GDR Armed Forces in WTO Ground Forces/Combined Arms Exercises, 1961-79

Exercises in the GDR

date/name	location	participants	commander	forces
1963: Sept. 9-14 Quartet	s. GDR	GDR, CS, P, USSR	Hoffman (GDR)	40,000 troops 7,00 tanks 8,300 arm.vehic. 500 artillery 300 aircraft Airbne. troops sim. nuc. devices
1965: April 5-11	GDR	GDR, USSR		GF, AF, Airbne.
1965: Oct. 12-22 October Storm	GDR	GDR, CS, P, USSR	Koshevoi (USSR)	50,000 troops 800 tanks 1,000 arm.vehic. 5,000 mot.vehic. 400 aircraft
1967: August Florett	GDR	GDR, USSR		
1969: March 1-7	GDR	GDR, USSR	Iakubovskii (USSR)	
1970: Oct.12-18 Brotherhood in Arms	GDR	GDR, B, H, P, CS, R(?) USSR	Hoffman (GDR)	GF, AF Nav. of GDR,P,USSR GDR local def.units GDR workers militia
1971: Sept.14-19	GDR	GDR,P, USSR	Hoffman (GDR)	Staffs, formations

Exercises outside the GDR

date/name	location	participants	commander	forces
1964: June	CS	GDR, CS, USSR		
1966: Sept.20-25 Vltava	CS	GDR, CS, H, USSR	Lomsky (CS)	Staffs, troops 20 adm. organs

Exercises outside the GDR (continued)

date/name	location	participants	commander	forces
1967: October	P	GDR, P, USSR		
1968: Aug. 20-21	CS	GDR, P, H, B, USSR	Pavlovskii (USSR)	invasion force: GF, AF, Airbne.
1969: July 4-11	P	GDR, P, USSR	Shtemenko (USSR)	Staffs, rear organs
1969: Sept. 21-28 Oder-Neisse	P, Baltic Sea	GDR, P, CS, USSR	Jaruzelski (P)	GF, AF, Nav. Anti-air. sim.nuc.devices
1972: Feb.28- March 4	P	WTO Staff; GDR, P, USSR	Iakubovskii (USSR)	WTO Staff; Staffs of GF,AF Nav.Anti-air
1972: Sept. 4-16	CS	WTO Staff; GDR, CS, H, P, USSR	Dzur (CS)	WTO Staff; GF, AF, Anti-air.
1976: Sept. 9-15 Shield 76	P	GDR, P, CS, USSR	Jaruzelski (P)	35,000 troops

Exercises jointly on GDR and other WTO territory

date/name	location	participants	commander	forces
1961: late Oct.- early Nov. Buria	GDR,P, CS, w. USSR	GDR, P, CS, USSR	Grechko (USSR)	Staffs, troops GF, AF, Nav. Airbne.
1962: Oct. 1-9	n.GDR, P	GDR, P, USSR	Spychalski (P)	GF, AF, Nav.
1967: May 27- June 5	n.GDR, P,	GDR, P, USSR	Spychalski (P)	command -staff
1968: June 20-30 Shumava	GDR, CS, P, USSR	GDR, CS, P, H, USSR	Iakubovskii (USSR)	Operat & tactical staffs communications 30 adm. organs

Table No. 2

Exercises jointly on GDR and other WTO territory (continued)

date/name	location	participants	commander	forces
1968: July 24 August 9 Neman	GDR, P, USSR	GDR, P, USSR	Mariakhin (USSR)	rear services
1968: Aug. 11-20	GDR, P. w. Ukraine	GDR, P, USSR	Shtemenko (USSR)	Staffs, communications
1969: March 30- April 4 Spring 69	GDR, P, CS	GDR, P, CS, USSR	Chocha (P)	Staffs, GF communications
1969: Oct. 10-16	GDR, P, CS, w. USSR	GDR, P, CS, USSR		Staffs of GF of GDR, P, CS; Staff of AF, USSR
1971: June 24- July 2	GDR, CS	WTO Staff; GDR, CS, USSR	Iakubovskii (USSR)	WTO Staff; Operat. staffs of GF, AF Anti-air
1971: July 12-21 Visla-Elbe 71	GDR, P	WTO Staff; GDR, P, USSR	Shtemenko (USSR)	WTO Staff; Staffs, rear orgs., of GDR, P, USSR
1973: June 26-GDR, P July 5	GDR, P	GDR, P, USSR	Iakubovskii (USSR)	Operat. staffs of rear organs

Source: Table No. 1

Code: Table No. 1

Table 3

## Participation of Polish Armed Forces in WTO Ground Forces/Combined Arms Exercises, 1961-79

Exercises in Poland

<u>date/name</u>	<u>location</u>	<u>participants</u>	<u>commander</u>	<u>forces</u>
1967: summer	P	P, USSR		Polish troops Irkutsk-Pinsk Division (Belorus. Milit. Dist.)
1967: October Oder	P	P, GDR, USSR		
1969: July 4-11	P	P, GDR, USSR	Shtemenko (USSR)	Staffs, rear organs
1969: Sept. 21-28 Oder-Neisse	P Baltic Sea	P, GDR, CS, USSR	Jaruzelski (P)	GF, AF, Nav., Anti-air., sim. nuclear devices
1972: Feb. 28-March 4	P	WTO Staff; P, GDR, USSR	Iakubovskii (USSR)	WTO Staff; Staffs of GF, AF, Nav., Anti-air.
1974: June 17-24 Summer 74	w.P.	P, USSR	Jaruzelski (P)	Staffs, troops
1976: Sept. 9-15 Shield 76	P	P, GDR, CS, USSR	Jaruzelski (P)	35,000 troops

Exercises outside Poland

1962: Sept.	CS	P, CS, USSR		
1963: Sept. 9-14 Quartet	s.GDR	P, GDR, CS, USSR	Hoffman (GDR)	40,000 troops 700 tanks 8,300 arm. vehicles 500 artillery 300 aircraft Airborne sim. nuc. devices
1965: Oct. 16-22 October Storm	GDR	P, GDR, CS, USSR	Koshevoi (USSR)	50,000 troops 800 tanks 1,000 arm. vehicles 5,000 mot. vehicles 400 aircraft
1968: Aug. 20-21	CS	P, GDR, H, B, USSR	Pavlovskii (USSR)	invasion force: GF, AF, Airborne

Table 3

Exercises outside Poland (continued)

<u>date/name</u>	<u>location</u>	<u>participants</u>	<u>commander</u>	<u>forces</u>
1970: Oct. 12-18 Brotherhood in Arms	GDR	P, GDR, CS, H, B, R (?), USSR	Hoffman (GDR)	GF, AF; Nav. of GDR, P, USSR GDR local def. units GDR workers' militia
1971: Sept. 14-19	GDR	P, GDR, USSR	Hoffman (GDR)	Staffs, formations
1972: Sept. 4-16 Shield 72	CS	WTO Staff; P, CS, GDR, H, USSR	Dzur (CS)	WTO Staff; GF, AF, Anti-air.
<u>Exercises jointly on Polish and other WTO territory</u>				
1961: Oct.-Nov. Buria	P, GDR, CS, w. USSR	P, GDR, CS, USSR	Grechko (USSR)	Staffs, troops, GF, AF, Nav., Airborne
1962: Oct. 1-9	P, n.GDR	P, GDR, USSR	Spychalski (P)	AF, GF, Nav.
1967: May 27-June 5	P, n.GDR	P, GDR, USSR	Spychalski (P)	command staff
1968: June 20-30 Shumava	P, CS, GDR, USSR	P, CS, GDR, H, USSR	Iakubovskii (USSR)	Operat., tactical staffs; communication 30 adm. organs
1968: July 24-Aug.9 Neman	P, GDR, USSR	P, GDR, USSR	Mariakhin (USSR)	Rear services
1968: Aug. 11-20	P, GDR w. Ukraine	P, GDR, USSR	Shtemenko (USSR)	Operat. staffs, communications
1969: March 30- April 4 Spring 69	P, GDR, CS	P, GDR, CS, USSR	Chocha (P)	Staffs, GF communications
1969: Oct. 10-16	P, GDR, CS, w. USSR	P, GDR, CS, USSR		Staffs of GF of GDR, P, CS; Staff of AF, USSR
1971: July 5-12	P, CS	P, CS, USSR	Dzur (CS)	AF, Anti-air; GF: ?
1971: July 12-21 Wisla-Elbe 71	P, GDR	WTO Staff; P, GDR, USSR	Shtemenko (USSR)	WTO Staff; Staffs, rear orgs. of P, GDR, USSR
1973: June 26-July 5	P, GDR	P, GDR, USSR	Iakubovskii (USSR)	Operat. staffs of rear services

Source: Table No. 1  
Code: Table No. 1

Table 4

## Participation of Hungarian Armed Forces in Ground Forces/Combined Arms Exercises, 1961-79

Exercises in Hungary

<u>date/name</u>	<u>location</u>	<u>participants</u>	<u>commander</u>	<u>forces</u>
1962: spring	H	H, R, USSR		Staffs, troops
1968: Aug. 17-20	H	H, USSR		communications
1969: June 2-7	H	H, USSR		Staffs, troops
1970: July 1-9	H	H, USSR	Iakubovskii (USSR)	Operat. staffs of GF, AF, Anti-air., Nav. (!!?)
1973: Sept. 19-24 Vertes	H	H, USSR		
1976: Oct. 18	H	H, USSR		18,000 troops
1979: May 12-19 Shield 79	H	H, B, CS, USSR	Czinege (H)	less than 25,000 troops

Exercises outside Hungary

1966: Sept. 20-25 Vltava	CS	H, CS, GDR, USSR	Lomsky (CS)	Staffs, troops 20 adm. organs
1968: June 20-30 Shumava	CS, GDR, P, USSR	H, CS, GDR, P, USSR	Iakubovskii (USSR)	Operat., tactical staffs, communications 30 adm. organs
1968: Aug. 20-21	CS	H, B, GDR, P, USSR	Pavlovskii (USSR)	invasion force: GF, AF, Airborne
1969: May 14-19	USSR	H, B, R (?), USSR	(probably Soviet)	GF
1970: Oct. 12-18 Brotherhood in Arms	GDR	H, B, CS, GDR, P, USSR, R (?)	Hoffman (GDR)	GF, AF; Nav. of GDR, P, USSR GDR local def. units GDR workers' militia
1972: Sept. 4-16 Shield 72	CS	WTO Staff; H, CS, GDR, P, USSR	Dzur (CS)	WTO Staff; GF, AF, Anti-air.
1973: summer	Carpathian Milit. Dist. (USSR)	H, B, USSR	Abashin (USSR)	1 USSR regiment, GF 1 H regiment, GF 1 B regiment, GF

Exercises jointly on Hungarian and other WTO territory

1967: June 14-19 Maneuver	H, CS	H, CS, USSR	Iakubovskii (USSR)	Operat. staffs, all types of forces
1971: August 2-5 Shield 71	H, CS	H, CS, USSR	Czinege (H)	GF

Table 4

## Participation of Hungarian Armed Forces in Ground Forces/Combined Arms Exercises, 1961-79

Exercises jointly on Hungarian and other WTO territory (continued)

<u>date/name</u>	<u>location</u>	<u>participants</u>	<u>commander</u>	<u>forces</u>
1973: sometime	H, CS	H, CS, USSR		Operat. staffs
1974: May 14-24	H, CS	H, CS, USSR		Operat. staffs, troops

Source: Table No. 1

Code: Table No. 1

Table 5

## Participation of Czechoslovak Armed Forces in WTO Ground Forces/Combined Arms Exercises, 1961-79

Exercises in Czechoslovakia

<u>date/name</u>	<u>location</u>	<u>participants</u>	<u>commander</u>	<u>forces</u>
1962: Sept.	CS	CS, P, USSR		
1964: June	CS	CS, GDR, USSR		
1964: July 7-15	CS	CS, USSR	Lomsky (CS)	command staff
1966: July 20-27 Vltava	CS	CS, H, GDR, USSR	Lomsky (CS)	Staffs, troops 20 adm. organs
1969: Aug. 10-15	w.CS	CS, USSR	Maiovov (USSR)	command staff
1970: Aug. 17-19	CS	CS, USSR	Valo (CS)	GF
1971: October	CS	CS, USSR		
1972: Sept. 4-16 Shield 72	CS	WTO Staff; CS, H, GDR, P, USSR	Dzur (CS)	WTO Staff; GF, AF, Anti-air.
1979: Feb. 2-7 Friendship 79	CS	CS, USSR		26,000 troops
<u>Exercises outside Czechoslovakia</u>				
1963: Sept. 9-14 Quartet	s.GDR	CS, GDR, P, USSR	Hoffman (GDR)	40,000 troops 700 tanks 8,300 arm. vehicles 500 artillery 300 aircraft Airborne sim.nuclear devices
1965: Oct. 16-22 October Storm	GDR	CS, GDR, P, USSR	Koshevoi (USSR)	50,000 troops 800 tanks 1,000 arm. veh. 5,000 mot. veh. 400 aircraft
1969: Sept. 21-28 Oder-Neisse	P, Baltic Sea	CS, P, GDR, USSR	Jaruzelski (P)	GF, AF, Nav., Anti-air. sim. nuclear dev.
1970: Oct. 12-18 Brotherhood in Arms	GDR	CS, GDR, P, B, H, R (?), USSR	Hoffman (GDR)	GF, AF; Nav. of GDR, P, USSR GDR local def. units GDR workers' mil.

Table 5

Exercises outside Czechoslovakia

<u>date/name</u>	<u>location</u>	<u>participants</u>	<u>commander</u>	<u>forces</u>
1976: Sept. 9-15 Shield 76	P	CS, P, GDR, USSR	Jaruzelski (P)	35,000 troops
1979: May 12-19 Shield 79	H	CS, H, B, USSR	Czinege (H)	less than 25,000

Exercises jointly on Czechoslovak and other WTO territory

1961: Oct.-Nov. Buria	CS, GDR, P, w. USSR	CS, GDR, P, USSR	Grechko (USSR)	Staffs, troops of GS, AF, Nav., Airborne
1967: June 14-19 Maneuver	CS, H	CS, H, USSR	Iakubovskii (USSR)	Operat. staffs, all types of forces
1968: June 20-30 Shumava	CS, GDR, P, USSR	CS, H, GDR, P, USSR	Iakubovskii (USSR)	Operat. & tactical staffs, communica- tions 30 adm. organs
1969: March 30-Apr. 4 Spring 69	CS, GDR, P	CS, GDR, P, USSR	Chocha (P)	Staffs, GF, communications
1969: Oct. 10-16	CS, GDR, P, w. USSR	CS, GDR, P, USSR		Staffs of GF of CS, GDR, P; Staff of AF, USSR
1971: June 24-July 2	CS, GDR	WTO Staff; CS, GDR, USSR	Iakubovskii (USSR)	WTO Staff; Operat. staffs of GF, AF, Anti-air.
1971: July 5-12	CS, P	CS, P, USSR	Dzur (CS)	AF, Anti-air. GF: ?
1971: Aug. 2-5 Opal 71	CS, H	CS, H, USSR	Czinege (H)	GF
1973: sometime	CS, H	CS, H, USSR		Operational staffs
1974: May 14-24	CS, H	CS, H, USSR		Operational staffs, troops

Source: Table No. 1

Code: Table No. 1

Table No.6

## Participation of Bulgarian Armed Forces in WTO Ground Forces/Combined Arms Exercises, 1961-79

Exercises in Bulgaria

date/name	location	participants	commander	forces
1964: Sept.15-20	B	B, R, USSR	Dzhurov (B)	Nav., Airborne, GF:?
1967: Aug. 20-27 Rodopy	B, Black Sea	B, USSR, R,(?)	Dzhurov (B)	GF, AF, Nav. Airborne
1969 March 25- April 1	B	B, USSR, R (?)	Iakubovskii (USSR)	Operat. staffs of GF, Nav., Anti-air.
1972: March 21-28	B	B, USSR, R (?)	Dzhurov (B)	command staffs

Exercises outside Bulgaria

1962: Oct. 19	R	B, R, USSR	Salajin (R)	
1963: fall	R	B, R, USSR	Salajin (R)	
1968: Aug.20-21	CS	B, H, GDR, P, USSR	Pavlovskii (USSR)	invasion force: GF, AF, Airborne
1969:May 14-19	USSR	B, H, USSR, R (?)	(probably Soviet)	GF
1970:Oct.12-18 Brotherhood in Arms	GDR	B, H, GDR, P, CS, USSR, R (?)	Hoffman (GDR)	GF, AF, Nav. of GDR, P, USSR GDR local def.units GDR workers' militia
1972: Feb.	R	B, R, USSR		
1973: Feb. 12-21	R	WTO Staff; B,R, USSR	Iakubovskii (USSR)	map exercises: WTO,Sta operat. staffs of GF, AF, Nav. Abti-air.
1973: summer	Carpathian Milit. District, USSR	B, H, USSR	Abashin (USSR)	Bulgarian regiment (Col. Delcho Delchev)  Sov.-Bulgarian Friend- ship Mech. Infantry Regiment (Lt. Col. L.E. General) Hungarian regiment (Col. Mikhail Gerov)
1979: May 12-19	H	B, H, CS, USSR	Czinege (H)	less than 25,000

cont.

location

participants

commander

forces

Exercises jointly on Bulgarian and other WTO territory

1974: June 4-14	B, R (?)	B, USSR, R (?)	Iakubovskii (USSR)	Staff exercis rear organs
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Sources: Table No. 1

Code: Table No. 1

Table No.7

## WTO Exercises of Anti-aircraft Troops, Air Forces, Navies, and Rear Services, 1961-79

Anti-aircraft exercises

date/name	location	participants	commander	forces
1968: July August Sky Shield	WTO states	WTO states		Anti-air.
1969: April 4-16 Zenit 69	H, CS, P, w.USSR	H, CS, P, USSR	Batitskii (USSR)	Anti-air., AF
1970: July 13-17 Zenit 70	WTO states	WTO states	Batitskii (USSR)	Anti-air.
1973: sometime	WTO states	WTO states	Batitskii (USSR)	Anti-air.
1974: sometime	WTO states	WTO states	Batitskii (USSR)	Anti-air.

Air Force exercises

1969: July 23- Aug. 2	GDR, P, CS, USSR	P, CS, USSR	Kutakov (USSR)	AF
1971: July 5-12	CS, P	CS, P, USSR	Dzur (CS)	AF, Anti-air. GF:?

Naval exercises

1966: July 20-27	Baltic Sea	GDR, P, USSR		Nav., AF
1968: July 5-19 Sever	N. Atlantic Norwegian Sea Barents Sea Baltic Sea	GDR, P, USSR	Gorshkov (USSR)	command staff, Nav., amphibious
1972: April 18-23	Black Sea	WTO Staff; B, USSR, R (?)	Iakubovskii (USSR)	WTO Staff; Nav. staffs, fleets
1974: Sept. 4-13	Baltic Sea	GDR, P, USSR	Iakubovskii (USSR)	Nav. staffs, fleets
1977: July ? s.	Baltic Sea	GDR, P, USSR	Kulikov (USSR)	Nav. staffs, fleets

Table No.7

<u>Rear services</u> date/name	location	participants	commander	forces
1968: July 24- August 9 Neman	USSR, P, GDR	USSR, P, GDR	Mariakhin (USSR)	Rear servic
1969: July 4-11	P	USSR, P, GDR	Shtemenko (USSR)	Staffs, rea services
1971: July 12-21 Visla-Elbe 71	P, GDR	WTO Staff; USSR, P, GDR	Shtemenko (USSR)	WTO Staff; Staffs, rea: services
1973: June 26- July 5	P, GDR	USSR, P, GDR	Iakubovskii (USSR)	Operat. staffs rear services
1974: June 4-14	B, R (?)	USSR, B, R (?)	Iakubovskii (USSR)	Staffs, rear services

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Source: Table No. 1

Code: Table No. 1

Table 8

## East European Commanders of WTO Exercises

<u>commander</u>	<u>date/name</u>	<u>location</u>	<u>participants</u>	<u>forces</u>
Spychalski (P)	1962: Oct. 1-9	P, n.GDR	P, GDR, USSR	AF, GF, Nav.
Salajin (R)	1962: Oct. 19	R	R, B USSR	
Hoffman (GDR)	1963: Sept. 9-14 Quartet	s.GDR	GDR, CS, P, USSR	40,000 troops Airborne 700 tanks 8300 arm. vehicles 500 artillery 300 aircraft sim.nuc.devices
Salajin (R)	1963: fall	R	R, B, USSR	
Lomsky (CS)	1964: July 7-15	CS	CS, USSR	command staff
Dzhurov (B)	1964: Sept. 15-20	B	B, R, USSR	Nav., Airborne GF?
Lomsky (CS)	1966: Sept. 20-25 Vltava	CS	CS, H, GDR USSR	Staffs, troops 20 adm. organs
Spychalski (P)	1967: May 27-June 5	P, n.GDR	P, GDR, USSR	command staff
Dzhurov (B)	1967: Aug. 20-27 Rodopy	B, Black Sea	B, R(?) USSR	GF, AF, Nav. Airborne
Chocha (P)	1969: March 30-April 4 Spring 69	P, GDR, CS	P, GDR, CS, USSR	Staffs, GF, communications troops
Jaruzelski (P)	1969: Sept. 21-28 Oder-Neisse	P, Baltic Sea	P, GDR, CS, USSR	GF, AF, Nav., Anti-air. sim.nuc. devices
Valo (CS)	1970: Aug. 17-19	CS	CS, USSR	GF
Hoffman (GDR)	1970: Oct. 12-18 Brotherhood in Arms	GDR	GDR, B, H, P, CS, R(?), USSR	GF, AF, Nav. of GDR, P USSR GDR local def. units; GDR workers militia

<u>commander</u>	<u>date/name</u>	<u>location</u>	<u>participants</u>	<u>forces</u>
Dzur (CS)	1971: July 5-12	CS, P	CS, P, USSR	AF, Anti-air GF(?)
Czinege (H)	1971: August.2-5 Opal 71	H, CS	H, CS, USSR	GF
Hoffman (GDR)	1971: Sept. 14-19	GDR	GDR, P, USSR	Staffs, forma- tions
Dzhurov (B)	1972: March 21-28	B	B, R(?) USSR	command staffs
Dzur (CS)	1972: Sept. 4-16 Shield 72	CS	Staff of WTO; CS, H, GDR, P, USSR	Staff of WTO GF, AF, Anti-ai
Jaruzelski (P)	1974: June 17-24 Summer 74	w.P	P, USSR	Staffs, troops
Jaruzelski (P)	1976: Sept. 9-15 Shield 76	P	P, GDR, CS, USSR	35,000 troops
Czinege (H)	1979: May 12-19 Shield 79	H	H, B, CS, USSR	less than 25,000 troops

Source: Table No. 1

Code: Table No. 1

Identification of East European officers at time of command of exercises:

Spychalski, M. Minister of Defense, Poland  
 Salajin, L., Minister of Defense, Romania  
 Hoffman, H., Minister of Defense, GDR  
 Lomsky, B., Minister of Defense, Czechoslovakia  
 Dzhurov, D., Minister of Defense, Bulgaria  
 Chocha, B., Chief of Staff, Dep. Defense Minister, Poland  
 Valo, V., Commander, Western Military District, Czechoslovakia  
 Czinege, L., Minister of Defense, Hungary  
 Jaruzelski, W., Minister of Defense, Poland

Table 9

## Soviet Commanders of WTO Exercises

<u>commander</u>	<u>date/name</u>	<u>location</u>	<u>participants</u>	<u>forces</u>
Grechko	1961: late Oct-early Nov. Buria	GDR, P, CS, w. USSR	GDR, P, CS, USSR	Staffs, troops, GF, AF, Nav., Airborne
Koshevoi	1965: Oct. 16-22 October Storm	GDR	GDR, CS, P, USSR	50,000 troops 800 tanks 1,000 arm. veh. 5,000 mot. vehicles 400 aircraft
Iakubovskii	1967: June 14-19 Maneuver	H, CS	H, CS, USSR	Operat. staffs all types of forces
Iakubovskii	1968: June 20-30 Shumava	CS, P, GDR, USSR	CS, H, GDP, P, USSR	Operat. & tactical staffs, communication troops, 30 adm. organs
Gorshkov	1968: July 5-19 Sever	N. Atlantic Norwegian Sea Barents Sea Baltic Sea	GDR, P, USSR	command staff Nav. amphibious
Mariakhin	1968: July 24-Aug. 9	GDR, P, USSR	GDR, P, USSR	Rear services
Shtemenko	1968: August 11-20	w. Ukraine, GDR, P	GDR, P, USSR	Operational staffs, GF, communications troops
Pavlovskii	1968: August 20-21	CS	B, H, GDR, P, USSR	invasion force: GF, AF, Airborne
Iakubovskii	1969: March 1-7	GDR	GDR, USSR	
Iakubovskii	1969: March 25-April 1	B	B, R(?), USSR	Operat. staffs GF, Nav., Anti-air.
Batitskii	1969: April 4-16 Zenit 69	P, H, CS, w. USSR	P, H, CS, USSR	Anti-air., AF
Shtemenko	1969: July 4-11	P	P, GDR, USSR	Staffs, rear orgs.
Kutakov	1969: July 23-August 2	GDR, P, CS, USSR	P, CS, USSR	AF
Maivorov	1969: August 10-15	CS	CS, USSR	command staff
Iakubovskii	1970: July 1-9	H	H, USSR	Operational staffs of GF, AF, Anti-air., Nav. (?!?)

<u>commander</u>	<u>date/name</u>	<u>location</u>	<u>participants</u>	<u>forces</u>
Batitskii	1970: July 13-17	WTO states	WTO states	Anti-air.
Iakubovskii	1971: June 24- July 2	GDR, CS	Staff of WTO; GDR, CS, USSR	Staff of WTO; Operat. staffs of GF, AF, Anti-air.
Shtemenko	1971: July 12-21 Visla-Elbe 71	GDR, P	Staff of WTO; GDR, P, USSR	Staff of WTO; Staffs, rear orgs. of GDR, P, USSR
Iakubovskii	1972: Feb. 28- March 4	P	Staff of WTO; P, GDR, USSR	Staff of WTO; Staffs of GF, AF Nav., anti-air.
Iakubovskii	1972: April 18-23	Black Sea	Staff of WTO: B, R (?), USSR	Staff of WTO; Nav. staffs Nav. fleets
Batitskii	1973: sometime	WTO states	WTO states	Anti-air
Iakubovskii	1973: Feb. 12-21	R	Staff of WTO; R, B, USSR	map exercises: Staff of WTO; Operat. staffs of GF, AF, Nav., Anti- air
Iakubovskii	1973: June 26- July 5	GDR, P	GDR, P, USSR	Operat. staffs of rear services
Abashin	1973: summer	Carpathian Milit. Dist. USSR	B, H, USSR	1 Soviet regiment, GF 1 Hungarian regiment, GF 1 Bulgarian regiment, GF
Batitskii	1974: sometime	WTO states	WTO states	Anti-air
Iakubovskii	1974: June 4-14	B, R(?)	B, R(?), USSR	Staffs, rear services
Iakubovskii	1974: Sept. 4-13	Baltic Sea	GDR, P, USSR	Nav. staffs, Nav. fleets
Kulikov	1977: July ?	S. Baltic Sea	GDR, P, USSR	Nav. staffs, Nav. fleets

Source: Table 1

Code: Table 1

Identification of Soviet officers at time of command of exercises:

Gluchko, A.A., Commander-in-Chief, WTO  
 Koshchevoi, P.K., Commander, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany  
 Iakubovskii, I.I., Commander-in-Chief, WTO  
 Gorchikov, A.S., Commander, Soviet Navy  
 Melnikhin, S.S., Commander, Rear Services, USSR  
 Shtemenko, S.M., Chief of Staff, WTO  
 Pavlovskii, I.G., Commander, Ground Forces, USSR  
 Batitskii, P.F., Commander, Soviet Anti-aircraft Troops, Comdr WTO Anti-aircraft troops  
 Koshchevoi, P.S., Commander, Soviet Air Force  
 Koshchevoi, A.M., Commander, Central Group of Forces (Czechoslovakia)  
 Koshchevoi, N.B., Deputy Commander, Carpathian Military District, USSR  
 Melnikov, V.G., Commander-in-Chief, WTO