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Abstract
This article examines the requirements for high and very high resolution photography of the USSR and other denied areas during the Cold War. It discusses the partial success of GAMBIT-1 and the much greater success of GAMBIT-3 beginning in 1966 in acquiring the former. The article reviews the development of the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) in the same period to collect very high resolution photography, the rationale for it, and the major technical and financial problems the program soon experienced. It then describes the debate beginning in 1968 over the value of this imagery considering the MOL’s costs and the growing success of GAMBIT-3, and these and the other factors that led President Richard Nixon to cancel the program the following year.
Notes
1. Berkowitz, “The Soviet Target,” 103–4.
2. There are several definitions of ‘resolution’. One of the most common is ground resolved distance, a measurement indicating the distance two objects need to be apart to be determined as separate from one another. McDonald and Widlake, “Looking Closer and Looking Broader,” 2.
3. Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency, 104–12, 127–8, 135–9, 144, 159–81; and Brugioni, Eyes in the Sky, 154–63, 227–42, 330–46.
4. SAMOS Orbital Satellite Reconnaissance; and Oder, Fitzpatrick, and Worthman, The CORONA Story, 27–8.
5. Intelligence Requirements; and SAMOS Orbital Reconnaissance.
6. Oder, Fitzpatrick, and Worthman, The GAMBIT Story, 17, 177–8.
7. Ibid., 18, 23, 43, 52, 179–82.
8. Ibid., 58–9, 74–7.
9. Outzen, The Dorian Files Revealed, 30, 71, 76.
10. Ibid., 143–51.
11. Ibid., 155–64; and Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume IIIB, 73–5.
12. Hall, “The Truth About Overflights,” 24–39; and Welzenbach, “Observation Balloons and Reconnaissance Satellites.”
13. Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency, 104–12, 127–8, 135–9, 144, 159–81; Brugioni, Eyes in the Sky, 154–63, 227–42, 330–46; and Ruffner, CORONA, 101–13.
14. Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume IIA, 1–22; Brugioni, Eyes in the Sky, 371–5; and Oder, Fitzpatrick, and Worthman, The CORONA Story, 27–8.
15. Intelligence Requirements; and Oder, Fitzpatrick, and Worthman, The GAMBIT Story, 16–7.
16. Oder, Fitzpatrick, and Worthman, The GAMBIT Story, 17; and [Redacted], Acting Director to Director, National Reconnaissance Office.
17. Oder, Fitzpatrick, and Worthman, The GAMBIT Story, 15–22; Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume IIB, 324–30, 409–18; and SAMOS Orbital Satellite Reconnaissance System.
18. Oder, Fitzpatrick, and Worthman, The GAMBIT Story, 29–40.
19. Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume IIA, 1–4, 164–77; and Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume IIB, 334–44, 439–61.
20. [Redacted], Acting Director to Director, National Reconnaissance Office.
21. Oder, Fitzpatrick, and Worthman, The GAMBIT Story, 179–82.
22. Memorandum for the Record.
23. Ibid.; and Requirements for Satellite Photography.
24. Oder, Fitzpatrick, and Worthman, The GAMBIT Story, 25–6.
25. Ibid., 41–2; and Statistical Evaluation. It should be noted that every photograph of a target did not provide useful intelligence. Photographic quality could be degraded by haze, clouds, obliquity, and other factors to such a degree that they could not be read out by photo analysts. See, for example, Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume IIIA; 228; and Analysis of Gambit (110) Project.
26. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 2/7. The chair of the Special Group 5412 was the president’s special assistant for national security affairs and the other members the deputy undersecretary of state, deputy secretary of defense, director of central intelligence, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 1964, the Special Group 5412 was renamed the 303 Committee. See, for example, COMOR Photo Working Group Policies and Procedures. Satellite targets for each GAMBIT-1 mission were divided into one of seven categories – Priority 1a, 1b, 1c, 2, 3, 4, and 5. See, for example, Statistical Evaluation.
27. Total Active COMOR Targets; and Revised Target File.
28. Statistical Evaluation.
29. State Department Briefing.
30. Oder, Fitzpatrick, and Worthman, The GAMBIT Story, 44, 52; McDonald and Widlake, “Looking Closer and Looking Broader,” 69; and Mission Coverage Index.
31. Oder, Fitzpatrick, and Worthman, The GAMBIT Story, 55–67; and Outzen, The Dorian Files Revealed, 150.
32. Outzen, The Dorian Files Revealed, 30–8.
33. Ibid., 51–6, 65–6; Message re DORIAN Optical; and Cyrus R. Vance.
34. Proposed MOL Program.
35. Ibid.
36. High Resolution Photography, 38–43.
37. Outzen, The Dorian Files Revealed, 72–3, 93–4.
38. Ibid., 71–4.
39. Ibid., 75–7.
40. Ibid., 93–6.
41. Ibid., 145–7; Oder, Fitzpatrick, and Worthman, The GAMBIT Story, 52–3; McDonald and Widlake, “Looking Closer and Looking Broader,” 7; and Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume IIIA, 173–9.
42. McDonald and Widlake, “Looking Closer and Looking Broader,” 7–8.
43. Ibid., 8, 31; Oder, Fitzpatrick, and Worthman, The GAMBIT Story, 74–5; McDonald and Widlake, “Looking Closer and Looking Broader,” 8, 31; Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume IIIA, 244–8; and Memorandum for Record, PSAC Review of MOL Program.
44. McDonald and Widlake, “Looking Closer and Looking Broader,” 32; Analysis of Gambit (110) Project; and Intelligence Targets.
45. Analysis of Gambit (110) Project; and Outzen, The Dorian Files Revealed, 150.
46. Oder, Fitzpatrick, and Worthman, The GAMBIT Story, 75–105; and McDonald and Widlake, “Looking Closer and Looking Broader,” 8–9, 32–4.
47. Oder, Fitzpatrick, and Worthman, The GAMBIT Story, 99.
48. Ibid., 100–3.
49. Ibid., 102–5.
50. Ibid., 147–51.
51. The Intelligence Value, 2.
52. Ibid., 3–5; Outzen, The Dorian Files Revealed, 149.
53. Outzen, The Dorian Files Revealed, 155–7.
54. Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume IIIB, 73; Outzen, The Dorian Files Revealed, 155–6; and Robert P. Mayo.
55. Outzen, The Dorian Files Revealed, 157–64; and Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume IIIB, 73–5.