KRISTINA FRÖBERG ATTIYA WARIS BRINGING THE BILLIONS BACK HOW AFRICA AND EUROPE CAN END ILLICIT CAPITAL FLIGHT FORUM SYD POLICY FORUM BRINGING THE BILLIONS BACK – HOW AFRICA AND EUROPE CAN END ILLICIT CAPITAL FLIGHT Authors: Kristina Fröberg and Attiya Waris Copyright: Forum Syd and Kristina Fröberg Editor Global Studies: Kristina Fröberg Language and stylistic review: Stefan Pessirilo Layout: Martin Johansson Print: Katarina Tryck, January 2011 Published by Forum Syd förlag, Box 15407, 104 65 Stockholm Phone:+46 8 506 370 00, e-mail:globalastudier@forumsyd.org Website: www.forumsyd.org ISSN 1404-7845 ISBN 978-91-89542-59-4 KRISTINA FRÖBERG ATTIYA WARIS BRINGING THE BILLIONS BACK HOW AFRICA AND EUROPE CAN END ILLICIT CAPITAL FLIGHT his report is no 37 in the series GLOBAL STUDIES. he Global Studies reports are intended to be a basis for advocacy work by civil society organisations and are produced in cooperation between the participating organisations. his report has been published in collaboration between the following organisations: Forum Syd gathers 200 Swedish civil society organisations collaborating for global justice. See www.forumsyd.org Policy Forum is a coalition of over 90 civil society organisations in Tanzania that seeks to inluence policy processes in order to reduce poverty, promote equity, and bring about greater transparency and accountability. See www.policyforum-tz.org Reports in the series Global Studies can be ordered from Forum Syd, www.forumsyd.org. his study has been published with the inancial support from Sida. Sida, however, has not participated in the production of this study, and does not take any responsibility for the contents of the report or the opinions expressed hereunder. THE AUTHORS Dr Attiya Waris is a lecturer at the School of Law at the University of Nairobi in Kenya, as well as an advocate of the High Court of Kenya. She comes from a strong mixed practitioner and academic background, having worked in several countries in Africa in various diverse institutions including law irms, Non-Governmental Organisations as well as the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. She is a member of the OECD Task Force on Tax and Development and vice chair of the Tax Justice Network. Kristina Fröberg is a political scientist and an advocacy oicer on issues concerning global development at Forum Syd in Sweden. Kristina has been working with global inancial structures such as illegitimate debts and illicit capital light at Forum Syd since 2003. TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction....................................................................................................... 07 Overview of the report 08 Magnitude, contributing factors and consequences............................................ 10 he magnitude of capital light rom developing countries 10 Efects on development 12 Deinition and origin 15 How commercial illicit capital light happens 17 Failing tax authorities 19 Tax havens 19 Tax competition and exemptions 24 Measures by Europe and the international community....................................... 26 Measures already taken by Europe and the international community 27 Measures needed to hinder illicit capital light 29 Non-Governmental actors in Europe 37 Illicit capital light from Africa........................................................................... 39 Magnitude 39 Efects on development 44 Capital light and debt 45 Stakeholders – the Arican context 46 Case studies........................................................................................................ 50 Kenya 50 Republic of South Arica 56 Tanzania 60 Summary recommendations ............................................................................... 66 Appendix............................................................................................................. 68 References........................................................................................................... 76 INTRODUCTION ”he ugliest chapter in global economic afairs since slavery” Raymond Baker, Senior Fellow at the US Centre for International Policy and Director for Global Financial Integrity Program, June 2007 ---------- “It is a contradiction to support increased development assistance, yet turn a blind eye to actions by multinationals and others that undermine the tax base of a developing country” South African Finance Minister Trevor Manuel, 2008 1 ---------- “We will crack down on the tax havens that siphon of money rom developing countries – money that could be spent on bed nets, vaccinations, economic development and jobs” UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, March 2009 2 Every year between US$ 850-1000 billion disappears without a trace from developing countries, ending up in tax havens or rich countries3. he main part of this is driven by multinational companies seeking to evade tax where they operate, and has been called “the ugliest chapter in global economic afairs since slavery” 4. he sum that leaves developing countries each year as unreported inancial outlows, referred to as illicit capital light, amounts to ten times the annual global aid lows, and twice the debt service developing countries pay each year. For each dollar that goes to the developing world in aid, almost US$10 come back to developed countries through illicit means. his money, if properly registered and taxed in the country of origin, could of course contribute to considerable development and make a major diference in the ight to combat poverty. Despite this, and even though rich countries also would gain from measures to hinder illicit capital light, many development organisations, parliamentarians and other decision makers in European and African countries are not well aware of the issue. Prominent leaders like Obama, 07 Brown and Sarkozy have made strong statements concerning the problem, and some well-known civil society organisations have done extensive work on it. Nonetheless, illicit capital light is not yet mainstreamed on the agenda of most of the people working with development that is undermined by these illicit outlows. Capital light represents a higher burden in Africa, as a percentage of GDP, than in other regions5. At the same time, actions to stop illicit capital light must be taken by decision makers in both Africa and Europe if they are to succeed. he capital outlow from Africa and the absorption into western economies deserve equal attention and require concerted efort. hrough greater transparency in the global inancial system illicit outlows can be curtailed. Development organisations and academics in Africa and Europe agree on the measures needed at the international level to put a stop to illicit capital light. To end the secrecy that enables it, they for example call for automatic and multilateral exchange of information between tax authorities, as well as imposition of sanctions on tax havens that do not cooperate. Another critical measure would be to require multinational companies to report the proit they make and taxes they pay in each country where they operate. his could become mandatory if it was made part of international inancial reporting standards. here is also a need for speciic measures at the country level. Such measure include the building of legal frameworks better suited to address the problem, awareness raising about the links between tax evasion, tax revenue and social services, as well as capacity building of tax authorities. International cooperation to stem capital light ultimately has to be dealt with in a representative global body like the UN. For this reason, development organisations in both Africa and Europe call for the UN Committee on Tax Matters to be upgraded with a political mandate and strengthened. Putting an end to illicit capital light is an urgent matter of global justice, of bringing the billions back to where they were produced and where they should contribute to the welfare of the people. At the same time, it is a win-win opportunity for Europe and Africa. Nations on both continents sufer from illicit capital light and the loss of growth and tax revenue that comes with it. Both would gain from transparency that would counteract not just tax evasion, but also illegal trade in drugs, weapons and humans. To make it happen it is time for civil society, journalists, and decision makers in Africa and Europe to join cause. OVERVIEW OF THE REPORT he irst chapter of this report seeks to explain what illicit capital light is, its global magnitude, how it happens, and its consequences for the poor in developing countries. he chapter also explores the key role that tax havens play in capital light. he second chapter reviews the measures that have been taken by Europe and the international community so far to combat capital light from developing countries, as well as the reactions and actions taken in response to measures advocated by civil society organisations and academics. 08 In the third chapter, illicit capital light from Africa and the speciic context that it operates in is explored. Efects on the African continent are described. To provide concrete examples, case studies of Kenya, South Africa and Tanzania are presented in the fourth chapter. he chapter ‘Illicit capital light from Africa’ and the case studies of Kenya and South Africa are written by Dr Attiya Warris. he case study of Tanzania comes from the Budget Working Group of Policy Forum in Tanzania. In the inal chapter, recommendations by civil society organisations in Africa and Europe are summarised. he discussion in this report is limited to a compilation of existing data and sources of information available on capital light. It is not intended as a report with primary data, but instead as a survey and comprehensive compilation of work undertaken so far. NOTE : Since the formulation of this report an update of the estimations of illicit inancial lows from developing countries has been released by Global Financial Integrity. his update shows that in 2008 illicit capital light from developing countries had increased to between US$ 1.26 trillion - 1.44 trillion. During 2000-2008 Africa was the region with the largest real growth of illicit capital light, amounting to 21.9 %. Please refer to Kar D and Curcio K (2011), Illicit inancial lows from developing countries: 2000-2009, Update with a focus on Asia, for these new data. 09 MAGNITUDE, CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND CONSEQUENCES By Kristina Fröberg THE MAGNITUDE OF CAPITAL FLIGHT FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES Illicit capital light from developing countries are unrecorded inancial lows that end up in tax havens or rich countries. (Read more about the deinition under the headline deinition and origins on page 15.) he most recognised estimations showing illicit capital light from developing countries and used by, for example, the World Bank, are from Global Financial Integrity, a program at the US Centre for International Policy, which is a non-governmental research institute based in Washington, DC. hese show that between US$850 billion – 1 trillion left developing countries as illicit capital light during 20066. VOLUME OF ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS FROM ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2002 - 2006 (US$ BILLIONS) 1.200 1.000 800 600 400 200 0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 he grey and black lines represent the lower and upper end of estimates of possible ranges of illicit capital light Source: Kar, D and Cartwright-Smith, D (2008), Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2002-2006, Global Financial Integrity. 10 Illicit inancial lows from developing countries are growing at a rapid and steady pace. Over the 5 year period that estimations were made, the volume increased at an average rate of around 18%7 per year. Estimations of illicit capital light from Africa over a 39 year period show that it grew at an average rate of around 12 percent per year.8 Multiple economic models and ilters are utilized to weed out spurious data in order to yield the most reliable estimates possible. But since illicit inancial lows are primarily generated through transactions that completely bypass statistical recording, currently existing models have a limited capacity to relect the actual volume of illicit capital light. Because of this inability of oicial statistics to capture all of the monetary particulars of illegal commerce (which is the driving force behind these illicit outlows) the estimations presented are extremely conservative and are likely to understate the actual problem.9 CAPITAL FLOWS BETWEEN DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (AVERAGE 2002-2006) As shown in the image below, there is a net low of capital from developing countries to developed countries. Developing countries pay far more on debt servicing than they receive from oicial donors, and they lose even more in illicit capital light than they pay on debt servicing. his situation makes developing countries net creditors of donor countries. Outflow $1.205 billion Global development aid Developing countries’ migrant remittances Net foreign direct investment to developing countries New loans to developing countries Inflow $857 billion $84 billion $619 billion Illicit capital flight (estimate) $167 billion Developing countries’ debt service $226 billion $456 billion $380 billion $130 billion Profit remittances on foreign direct investment Developing countries Source: Eurodad fact sheet ’Capital light diverts developing inance’. he image is based on data from the OECD and the World Bank as well as estimates of illicit lows compiled by Eurodad. 11 EFFECTS ON DEVELOPMENT Illicit capital light cancels investment, reduces tax collection, worsens income gaps, hurts competition, undermines trade and drains hard-currency reserves. he low of illicit money from developing countries is based on shifting the wealth out of the countries where 80 per cent of the world’s population lives into countries where 20% live. Raymond Baker, Senior Fellow at the US Centre for International Policy and Director for GFI, calls illicit capital light “the most damaging economic condition hurting the poor in developing and transnational economies.” He comes to the conclusion that for the irst time in the 200 year run of the free-market system we have built and expanded an entire integrated global inancial structure with the basic purpose to shift money from the poor to the rich.9A Christian Aid has estimated that due to just two forms of illicit capital light (‘mispricing’ and ‘false invoicing’ by multinational companies, which are explained on page 17-18) developing countries are losing US$160 billion per year in tax revenue. his is more than one-and-a half times the combined aid budgets of the entire rich world, which is around US$100 billion. Taking into account additional sums from aggressive tax avoidance and other forms of trade abuse (which will be deined in the next section), the total loss of tax revenue is several times that amount. In 2010, more people than ever were going hungry. Almost one billion people were going without even a full meal a day10. he United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are a set of targets for halving extreme poverty, providing universal primary education, halting the spread of HIV and AIDS, and much more, by 2015. To meet the MDGs, more public sector employees need to be hired, such as teachers, doctors and agricultural extension workers. he World Bank estimates that there is a shortfall of US$40-60 billion per year in the funds needed to reach all of the MDG’s. he inancial crisis and recession has lowered aid lows, and developing country economies and tax revenues have been afected by declines in external private sources such as foreign direct investments, export earnings and migrant remittances. his has further reduced the chances of meeting the MDGs. If the tax missing through illicit capital light were paid, there would be enough funds to meet the MDG requirements several times over. he estimations of revenue lost through illicit capital light have been made on tax rates that developing countries apply today. Low-income countries – and most middle income countries too – raise a much smaller proportion of their national income in taxes than rich countries. he average for low-income countries as a whole is just less than 15% of national income, but many raise a smaller proportion. In contrast, the world’s rich countries raise on average 37%. A commonly cited reasonable minimum for a developing country’s revenue to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is 15%11. At least 21 low and 18 middle income countries raised a smaller proportion than this in 2007. Action Aid has calculated that if these countries had been able to turn at least 15% of their GDP into tax revenues they could have realised US$198 billion more in 2007. his is more than all foreign development assistance combined, and far exceeds the annual MDG funding gap. Economic structures and tax competition discussed later on in this report make it diicult for developing countries to raise their tax revenue, but recent examples from countries like Rwanda, Uganda and South Africa show that it is possible.12 12 AMOUNT NEEDED TO REACH THE MDGs, AS WELL AS LOST TAX REVENUE AND POTENTIAL TAX REVENUE US$ Billion / year 198 200 160 150 100 40-60 50 0 Amount missing to reach the Millennium Development Goals Lost tax revenue because of two forms of illicit capital flight (’mispricing’ and ’false invoicing’) Amount that developing countries could gain by raising taxes corresponding to at least 15% of GPP Source: Estimations from the World Bank, Christian Aid (2008), ’Death and taxes: the true toll of tax dodging’, and Aciton Aid (2009), ’Accounting for poverty: how international tax rules keep pople poor’ Not only is tax a potential source of greater funds to invest in public services, it also has advantages compared to aid because of its relatively stable form of income, as well as its close link to better governance and accountability. In addition, it creates an opportunity for greater autonomy on the part of developing countries. Since the amount of aid difers depending on the donor governments elected and the Gross National Income of the donor countries, aid is an unstable source of income. Development aid as a source of income also makes the recipient governments more accountable to donors than to their own citizens. Aid often still comes with conditionalities determining the macro-economic politics of the receiving country, such as privatisation of public services and liberalisation of trade. Hindering illicit capital light is because of this not only a matter of a country’s right to its own resources, but is also important as a democratization process which shifts governments’ accountability from donors to its own populations. On top of tax revenues there are other gains to be made if illicit capital light could be stopped. If it wouldn’t be possible to evade taxes and make big proits on illicit capital light without getting caught, some of the money might have stayed in the countries of origin. If reinvested, it could have contributed to jobs and growth in those countries. Illicit capital light also hurts competition in the free market. he companies that act according to law, and honour their social responsibility through paying taxes, are disadvantaged compared to those that proit from illicit capital light. Big multinational companies often have more resources than small and medium sized companies to hire lawyers and professionals that could help them pursue illicit capital light without getting caught. Because of this, capital light can be a threat to the survival of small and medium sized companies at the national level, as well as to multinationals that report their inancial transactions and pay the right amount of tax. 13 At the individual level, illicit capital light and tax evasion also create an unequal playing ield and worsen income gaps. It is rich individuals that have the means to open an account in a tax haven and place money there without reporting it to their tax authorities. When this is done, tax revenue that could have contributed to social services like health care and education is lost. Both health and education are prerequisites for individuals to raise income. When this cannot be funded by public means, it is poor people that sufer. When national inancial imbalances due to illicit capital light result in devaluation, the wealthy who hold external assets are insulated from the efects, while the poor enjoy no such cushion. he possibility to conduct illicit capital light also makes criminal activities like human traicking and illegal trade with weapons and drugs proitable, and decreases the risk of getting apprehended. herefore combating illicit capital light is also a matter of ighting these activities, in other words, tackling human abuse, exploitation and violence. he same applies to corruption, which in itself is a threat to democracy. If the possibility to pursue illicit capital light wasn’t there, corruption would be less proitable and much easier to detect and trace. SEVEN REASONS TO COMBAT ILLICIT CAPITAL FLIGHT 1. It would raise revenue incomes and contribute to considerable public funds for development in the countries of origin (typically developing countries). 2. It would reduce the incentive to place proits outside the country of origin, which might lead to increased domestic investments, jobs and growth. 3. It would make criminal activities less proitable and easier to discover and trace. 4. It would make corruption less proitable and easier to discover and trace. 5. It would make governments less accountable to donors and more accountable to their tax payers – their citizens. 6. It would lead to fairer competition in the ree market, which would beneit small and medium sized companies at the national level, as well as multinationals that report their inancial transactions and pay the right amount of tax. 7. It would reduce income gaps between rich and poor. 14 DEFINITION AND ORIGIN Illicit capital light from developing countries13, according to the estimations presented in this report, can be deined as unrecorded inancial lows. Flight capital takes two forms. he legal component stays on the books of the entity or individual making the outward transfer. he illegal component is intended to disappear from records in the country from where it comes. Illicit money is money that is illegally earned, transferred across borders, or utilized. If it breaks laws or regulatory frameworks in its origin, movement, or use, it merits the label of illicit. By far the vast majority of unrecorded transnational inancial lows are illicit, because they are violating the national criminal and civil codes, tax laws, customs regulations, VAT assessments, exchange control requirements and banking regulations of the countries from which unrecorded/illicit lows occur14. For the purpose of this report, the concepts of ‘illicit inancial lows’ and ‘capital light’ will be used interchangeably, always referring to illicit capital light. Illicit capital light is comprised of three main types of transactions. he irst is arising from criminal activities, such as drug trade, human traicking and illegal trade with weapons. his part accounts for approximately 30-35% of the illicit capital lows from developing countries. he second is capital light due to corruption (bribery and embezzlement of national wealth). his accounts for about 3%. he third is commercial illicit inancial lows through tax evasion and avoidance practices by multinational companies. his accounts for 60-65% of the illicit capital outlows15. DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF ILLICIT CAPITAL FLIGHT Corruption (bribery and embezzlement of national wealth) 3% Commercial transactions through multinational companies 60-65% Criminal activities like trade with drugs, weapons and humans 30-35% Source: Kar and Cartwright-Smith, (2010) Illicit inancial lows from Africa: Hidden Resource for Development, Global Financial Integrity, p.1. 15 Tax evasion is the general term for eforts to evade taxes by illegal means. Tax avoidance entails the legal utilisation of the ambiguities and indeterminacies of tax rules and regulations to one’s own advantage, in order to reduce the amount of tax that is payable, by means that are within the law. Aggressive tax avoidance occurs when companies exploit loopholes and laws in tax laws. Ever more ingenious and complex instruments are invented with the sole purpose of getting around tax laws. Even though this may be legally allowed, such behaviour is in conlict with tax compliance. If a company does not aim to pay the right amount of tax at the appropriate time and place, it abuses the spirit of the tax law. Tax planning is diferent from both tax evasion and tax avoidance. Any company has the option of carrying out tax planning in order to minimise tax liability within the law of the territory in which it operates. his activity is entirely legitimate in that it is enacting the intentions of the relevant legislation16. But between tax evasion, tax avoidance and tax planning there are grey zones. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CONCEPTS OF ILLICIT CAPITAL FLIGHT, TAX EVASION, TAX AVOIDANCE, AND TAX PLANNING Illicit Capital Flight Unreported transnational financial outflows Tax Evasion Evading taxes by illegal means 16 Tax planning Legal and enacting the intentions of the relevant legislation Tax Avoidance Exploiting loopholes and flaws in tax laws; might be legal but is in conflict with tax compliance and the spirit of the law HOW COMMERCIAL ILLICIT CAPITAL FLIGHT HAPPENS Because of the bank secrecy of tax havens, individuals can hide money in them and evade tax simply by transferring money to a bank account in a tax haven, and not inform their country’s own tax authority about it. But multinationals, which are large operations with many employees and requirements to report detailed annual accounts on a global level, need to use other methods. he most common methods are described in the following sections. Transfer mispricing Multinational groups of companies are often complex structures with hundreds of subsidiaries, a substantial number of which may be located in tax havens where no or very low taxes are paid and secrecy is applied (see explanation of tax havens on page 19). Proits are allocated between subsidiaries through internal trading, a complicated process which is hard for tax authorities to police. It is estimated that 60% of international trade is now intra-irm trade between subsidiaries of the same multinational17. Transfer pricing involves determining the sales prices between diferent entities within a multinational. In most countries this must be done using the ‘arm’s length principle’, that is to say, the price must be equivalent to the open market price that would apply between unrelated and independent companies18. Normally, trading parties want to get the best price for themselves. But when two companies trade that belong to the same ownership they do not want the best price for the individual company, but a price that creates the best overall result for the multinational corporation to which they both belong. he companies may therefore allocate the proit between the two subsidiary companies in such a way that a minimal amount of tax has to be paid. When a multinational company deliberately is manipulating the prices they charge for goods or services to artiicially high or low prices to shift proits to low tax jurisdictions, this is called transfer mispricing. EXAMPLES OF TRANSFER MISPRICING Examples of mispricing are plastic buckets bought by a subsidiary in a developing country for US$973 per bucket from another subsidiary in a tax haven. A more realistic price paid on the open market would have been around one dollar. he rest of the price paid is just a way to shift proit to the subsidiary in the tax haven where less tax is paid. As an example of a reverse approach, video cameras are sold by a subsidiary in a developing country to a subsidiary in a tax haven for US$13 per camera19, which is much lower than the open market price. he subsidiary in the tax haven can then sell the video cameras at a market price and the proit made from this will end up in the tax haven instead of the developing country. Continued on the next page 17 Continued Transfer mispricing allows even more tax evasion when it is applied to intangibles like logos, brands, consultancies or property rights. he company assigns ownership of its brand in a shell subsidiary created in a tax haven. All the productive parts of the company in other parts of the world then pay royalties and other fees to this shell company. his guarantees a continuous shift of money to tax havens20. Global Financial Integrity has estimated the volume of capital light from developing countries as a result of transfer mispricing. hey found that during the year 2006 this amounted to between US$471 and 506 billion21. International inancial reporting standards (IFRS) only require multinational groups of companies to report on a consolidated basis - that means one set of accounts showing the overall inancial activities and results for that group, without breaking them down for each country. his makes it very hard for tax authorities in developing countries to know what proit is made by a multinational company from activities in their country, what tax should be paid, and to uncover evidence of transfer mispricing. Falsiied invoicing Falsiied invoicing could be performed in several ways, all of which have in common that the import or export of goods are not reported truthfully or are even completely falsiied. A company in a developing country that is importing goods could inlate the price it declares that it has to pay to the foreign supplier, so that it can report lower proits and therefore pay less tax. he reverse can also happen. A person exporting goods from a developing country could deliberately undervalue what is being sold, at least in oicial documents, so that proits are once again hidden. Since it is often based on verbal agreements between buyers and sellers, falsiied invoicing is diicult to detect and is widespread. It is, for example, estimated that 60 % of trade transactions in Africa are mispriced by an average of more than 11%22. Round tripping Some of the money made from, for example, transfer mispricing, returns to the country of origin through what is called ‘round tripping’. his means that a company that has shifted proits from a developing country towards a tax haven reinvests part of the proits in the same developing country. his time it is being considered as foreign direct investment and thus it can beneit from favourable iscal conditions like tax holidays ofered by the host country. Round tripping allows not only tax evasion and avoidance, but also takes advantage of the tax exemptions that many developing countries grant to incoming investment. Similar ways are also used to recycle money coming from criminal activities into the legal economy23. 18 FAILING TAX AUTHORITIES Another condition that makes illicit capital light from developing countries possible is that tax administrations often are poorly resourced and lacking in staf capacity. Lack of technology and capacity to collect taxes, as well as the ineiciency and lack of expertise of tax authorities create loopholes that otherwise would have been plugged. Weak tax administrations and poor tax compliance reduce the tax revenue available to governments, and force them to rely on the taxes that are the easiest to administer, which may not be the most progressive ones. Rich people beneit most from weak tax administrations. hese are the people who can aford to put in place tax avoidance and evasion schemes that require time and resources to investigate. Some of the reasons for the gap in tax eiciency between rich and poor countries are structural. In rich countries, more people are earning above the threshold at which they can aford to pay taxes and still inance their basic needs. Rich countries are also able to raise more tax than poorer ones because a much larger proportion of the economic transactions take place in the formal economy. However, investments in tax authorities’ capability have shown signiicant diferences in tax revenue income. Ghana, for example, worked with the German government’s development agency GTZ to improve its tax policy and administration between 2003 and 2005. his contributed to an increase in corporation tax revenues of 44% in real terms24. International development cooperation to improve the capacity of the Rwandan revenue authority helped to increase tax revenue collected from around US$96 million in 1998 to over US$384 million in 200625. TAX HAVENS “here is a building in the Cayman Islands that houses supposedly 12000 US-based corporations. hat’s either the biggest building in the world or the biggest tax scam in the world, and we know which one it is.” US President Barack Obama, December 2007 26 Tax havens are jurisdictions that use secrecy and low tax rates as a selling point to attract businesses for their inancial services industries. he banking secrecy that they apply makes it almost impossible to ind out who owns an account there, how much money it is worth, and where the money came from. As a consequence, tax havens also hide criminal activities and illicit lows of money. he Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD, (an intergovernmental body comprising the 34 richest countries in the world), describes them as countries that ofer themselves as places to be used by non-residents to escape tax in their country of residence.27 Research based on leaked documents from Lichtenstein suggests that only 5% of individuals placing assets in tax havens declare them for tax purposes in their home country28. 19 Tax havens deliberately create legislation to ease transactions undertaken by people who are not resident in their domain. As a result, there is very little activity in tax havens, and they are sometimes described as ‘virtual’ centres or ‘legislative spaces’. Transactions to tax havens can be referred to as ‘ofshore’ because they take place in legal spaces that decouple the real location from the legal location, and legally protected secrecy ensures that transactions are not linked to those who are efecting them. Because of this, tax havens are often also referred to as ofshore centres or secrecy jurisdictions. he establishment of tax havens has little to do with geography, such as the misconception that they are typically located on small islands29. he term jurisdiction in this context is used to describe any territory with its own legal system. As can be seen on the map on page 22-23, this could be an independent or sovereign state, a component of a federal or confederal state, a dependent, associated or overseas territory, or an internal zone to which a special legal regime has been applied.30 Indeed, the major global players in the supply of inancial secrecy are mostly not tiny, isolated islands, but rich nations operating their own specialised jurisdictions of secrecy. In the deinitions and listings that have been made of tax havens, ofshore inancial centres and secrecy jurisdictions, there are some diferences. he main listings of tax havens have been made by the OECD. In 2000, it identiied 41 tax havens using the criteria presented in the box below. In 2007, it was determined that 3 of these should no longer be considered tax havens. OECD DEFINITION OF TAX HAVENS Since 1998 the OECD has deined tax havens through a combination of four characteristics: no or only nominal taxes on relevant income lack of efective exchange of information with other tax authorities lack of transparency in the operation of legislative, legal or administrative provisions no requirement that activity be substantial to qualify for tax residence (However, the fourth criterion of ‘no substantial activities’ was rejected by the new US administration in 2001 and withdrawn in the OECD Progress Report of 2002) In 2000, he Financial Stability Forum (a group of inance ministers, central bankers and international inancial bodies from 12 developed nations) created a list of Ofshore Financial Centres largely similar to the OECD list of tax havens, but using diferent indicators. he World Bank and IMF used this list and expanded it with four jurisdictions, identifying 46 ofshore inancial centres. Tax Justice Network (an independent organisation dedicated to research and analysis in the ield of tax and regulation) launched a ‘Financial Secrecy Index’ in 2009. his is a ranking of the jurisdictions that are most aggressive in providing secrecy in international inance. he ranking combines two broad measures, one qualitative and one quantitative. he irst measure is an opacity 20 score based on veriiable sources which looks at laws, regulations, cooperation with information exchange processes and so on. his is given most weight. he second measure is a weighting to each jurisdiction according to the scale of cross-border inancial services that it hosts. he top ten secrecy jurisdictions in the ranking are: Delaware (USA), Luxembourg, Switzerland, Cayman Islands, City of London (UK), Ireland, Bermuda, Singapore, Belgium and Hong Kong. he index contains 60 jurisdictions in total. Half of them are closely connected to Britain, either through their status as Crown Dependencies or British Overseas Territories, or through membership in the Commonwealth of Nations (formerly the British Commonwealth). Most of the jurisdictions listed in the Financial Secrecy Index have been deined as tax havens in a list of tax havens which Tax Justice Network released in 2007, using the criteria presented in the box below. his list contains 69 tax havens. TAX JUSTICE NETWORKS DEFINITION OF TAX HAVENS strong bank secrecy low or zero taxation no requirement of economic substance for the transactions booked ring fence between its domestic regime and the regime ofered to non-residents31 In the past 30 years, the number of tax havens has grown rapidly. his rise has been facilitated by technological development that has increased the mobility of inancial lows. In 2007, more than half of global trade occurred via tax havens, although these accounted for merely 3% of global GDP32. Due to its culture of secrecy, the size of the ofshore economy is hard to measure precisely. International eforts to measure it often have focused only on narrow aspects of it. But in 2010 GFI released a report that looks at deposits held ofshore by private entities on a country-by-country basis, achieving a level of speciicity previously unavailable to the public. he GFI report analyzes data from the Bank of International Settlements and the International Monetary Fund to measure deposits in areas considered as secrecy jurisdictions under the deinition established by Tax Justice Network33. he total current deposits by non-residents in tax havens is according to this just under US$10 trillion. (If 15% of this would be paid in tax it would raise US$1500 billion, which is 15 times more than total annual global aid). he report also concludes that the rate of growth of ofshore deposits in secrecy jurisdictions has expanded at an average of 9 percent per annum since the early 1990s, signiicantly outpacing the rise of world wealth in the last decade. he gap between these two growth rates may be caused by increases in illicit inancial lows from developing countries and tax evasion by residents of developed countries34. 21 WORLD MAP OF TAX HAVENS City of London (UK) Belgium Iceland Netherlands Frankfurt (Germany) Latvia Isle of Man Lichtenstein Ireland Austria Guernsey Hungary Jersey New York (USA) Delaware (USA) San Marino Switzerland Bermuda Andorra Leb Madeira (Portugal) Bahamas Turks & Caicos Islands Gibraltar British Virgin Islands Cayman Islands Campione d’Ita Luxembourg Melilla (Spain) Anguilla Antigua & Barbuda Belize Cyprus Monaco Dominica Aruba St Lucia Tel Aviv (Israel) Dub Malta Barbados St Vincent & Grenadines Costa Rica Panama Grenada Liberia Montserrat Netherlands Antilles St Kitts & Nevis São Tomé e Principe US Virgin Islands Uruguay South Africa OECD Countries Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech Republic 22 Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan K L M N N N Tax havens, ofshore inance centres, and secrecy jurisdictions according to either the OECD-, IMF-, or Tax Justice Network-lists, or jurisdictions ranked by the ‘Financial Secrecy Index’. Classiications according to OECD, IMF and Tax Justice Network, and ranking of the tax havens marked on the map, can be found in the table on page 74-75 in the appendix. alia & Trieste (Italy) Ingushetia (Russia) Turkish Rep. of Northern Cyprus banon Bahrain Hong Kong Taipei (Taiwan) Philippines Macao Northern Mariana Islands Marshall Islands bai (United Arab Emirates) Labuan (Malaysia) Somalia Palau Brunei Nauru Singapore Maldives Samoa Tonga Seychelles Vanuatu Mauritius Niue Cook Islands OECD countries are marked with Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Slovenia Spain Sweden or if also a tax haven Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States 23 Tax havens are also hosting a large part of the shadow banking system, because of the streamlined regulation that allows inancial institutions to circumvent the regulations imposed in other countries. Nobel laureate Paul Krugman argues that the lack of regulation of the shadow economy laid the groundwork for the inancial crisis, re-creating the kind of inancial vulnerability that made the Great Depression possible35. It should be kept in mind that some of the tax havens are located in poor and small countries that heavily rely on the income that the inancial activities in the tax haven produce. To be able to redirect their production of income to other areas they will need support. TAX COMPETITION AND EXEMPTIONS On top of the revenue lost through the factors mentioned above, the use of tax incentives to compete for investments has been a cornerstone of development plans for many years. his is not illegal and is not included in the estimations of illicit capital light discussed in this report, but since it means another huge loss of tax revenue for developing countries it is worth mentioning. Because taxed enterprises can enter into economic relationships with exempt ones to shift their proits through transfer pricing, it is also related to illicit capital light. Tax holidays or exemptions for investors are becoming commonplace. here is a race to the bottom, in terms of environmental, social and economic conditions for foreign direct investments, in which low income countries compete with each other to attract investment. Africa’s low income countries reduced their corporate tax rate from 44% in 1980 to 33% in 200536. A recent IMF survey of sub-Saharan Africa shows a remarkable increase in tax incentives: in 1980 less than half of sub-Saharan countries ofered tax holidays; by 2005, more than two thirds did37. According to the same report, Zambia, for example, lost US$63 million in forgone revenue from 2004-2006 because of reductions in mining royalty payments38. he World Bank and the IMF are often cited as the sources of pressure on countries to open up to foreign corporations. One example of this is the Wold Bank and PricewaterhouseCoopers’ annual ‘Doing Business’ indicator, which since 2006 has included a ranking of countries according to an estimate of the total tax rate incurred by companies39. he practice of ofering tax incentives, however, is now under attack as economically unviable. Research has shown that lost revenue exceeds the beneits of increased investment. IMF is also recognising this. In the 2001 publication ‘Tax Policy for Developing Countries’ the IMF says: “Of all the forms of tax incentives, tax holidays (exemptions from paying tax for a certain period of time) are the most popular among developing countries. hough simple to administer, they have numerous shortcomings. First, by exempting proits irrespective of their amount, tax holidays seem to beneit an investor who expects high proits and would have made the investment even if this incentive were not ofered. Second, tax holidays provide a strong incentive for tax avoidance, as taxed enterprises can enter into economic relationships with exempt ones to shift their proits 24 through transfer pricing. hird, the duration of the tax holiday is prone to abuse and extension by investors through creative re-designation of existing investment as new investment (for example closing down and restarting the same project under a diferent name but under the same ownership). Fourth, time-bound tax holidays tend to attract short-run projects, which are typically not as beneicial to the economy as longer term ones. Fifth, the revenue cost of the tax holiday to the budget is seldom transparent.”40 In addition the IMF concludes that foreign investors - the primary target of most tax incentives - base their decision to enter a country on a whole host of factors, of which tax incentives are frequently far from being the most important. A United Nations report in 2000 also concluded that it is generally recognised that investment incentives have only moderate importance in attracting FDI41. he revenue loss that tax-competition leads to can in the long term end in an investment loss rather than attracting FDI, as multinational companies prioritise the quality of infrastructure, a well-educated workforce and a dynamic local market far higher than tax advantages when investing in countries42. Because tax incentives are frequently targeting foreign investment, they can create unfair competition in sectors where both national and international companies compete, and harm domestic entrepreneurship and investment43. he visible concessions ofered to foreign business could also encourage tax evasion and avoidance by domestic companies and individuals44. he lower average corporate tax revenues that tax competition leads to often result in a shift of the tax burden towards wages and consumption. his shifts the tax burden onto domestic taxpayers whose means are likely to be less, and most of whose spending would stay within the national economy. his harms employment generation and increases inequality, and ultimately could slow economic growth45. With all this in mind it should be said that carefully used tax incentives could also be deployed in a positive way for poor people, for example as part of an industrial development strategy. A part of the problem is that tax incentives are frequently negotiated outside the legislative framework. It is for example common practise in the extractive sector to include tax exemptions in large mining contracts, but these are not made available for public scrutiny. In many countries, parliaments have no oversight or opportunity to debate the tax incentives ofered in mining contracts at all46. 25 MEASURES BY EUROPE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY By Kristina Fröberg International measures to stop capital light from developing countries would also beneit developed countries. Rich countries also lose huge amounts of tax revenue due to illicit capital light. Sweden for example loses around SEK46 billion per year in tax revenue due to illicit transactions related to tax havens47. his is almost 6% of the total tax revenue in the Swedish state budget of 200948, and one and a half times what is spent on aid.49 In the UK the diference between the corporate tax that should have been paid according to tax liability and what is actually paid was somewhere between 9% and 33% in 2005.50 Although rich countries have much better margins than poor and middle income countries, and sufer less from illicit capital light, the money lost is still important to their budgets, especially during hard times like inancial crises. To stem capital light, rich countries have organised tax cooperation through the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Tax cooperation in the OECD has mainly been focused on exchange of information between states, so that bank secrecy in tax havens is opened up to tax authorities and illicit capital light can be tracked and stopped. But the OECD model for tax information agreements has been designed to suit rich countries, and thus developing countries haven’t yet been able to make use of them. In the following chapter, measures to hinder capital light that would bring about a win-win situation for both developing and developed countries are presented. Among them are a new form of information agreements that also would beneit rich countries more than the existing agreements, since they include more countries and cost less to negotiate and use. he other measures presented would provide completely new tools and possibilities for both poor and rich countries to track capital light. 26 MEASURES ALREADY TAKEN BY EUROPE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY Actions already taken by the G20 and OECD he irst time that governments of the major economies acknowledged the impact of international tax rules and illicit capital light on developing countries was during the G20 Summit in London in April 2009. At the Summit a commitment to “developing proposals, by the end of 2009, to make it easier for developing countries to secure the beneits of a new cooperative tax environment” was undertaken. G20 MAJOR ECONOMIES he Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (G20) is a group of inance ministers and central bank governors from 20 economies: 19 countries plus the European Union. heir heads of government or heads of state have also periodically conferred at summits since their initial meeting in 2008. Collectively, the G-20 economies comprise 85% of global gross national product, 80% of world trade (including EU intra-trade) and two-thirds of the world population. Its leaders announced on September 25, 2009, that the group will replace the G8 as the main economic council of wealthy nations. he members are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, the European Union, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.51 hese developments at the G20 Summit were in part the result of an unprecedented banking crisis with some of its roots in ofshore inance - a global recession that meant governments desperately needed every last penny of revenue income. Other factors behind the developments were highproile examples of tax evasion uncovered in Lichtenstein and Switzerland, a new US president with a track record of seeking to stop tax haven abuse, and nearly a decade‘s worth of campaigning and research by academics, activists and development organisations in civil society52. he centre of the current global political debate rests with two groups of the world’s richer countries - the G20 and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)53. he G20 has taken the lead on pushing for stronger tax cooperation measures (which means information exchange between states so that illicit lows of money can be tracked), and sanctions on tax havens that do not comply. It has bolstered support for the OECD, which is the global body with the greatest technical expertise on tax cooperation. he OECD has a forum for tax administration, which operates a peer review mechanism through which countries’ cooperation on tax matters is assessed. 27 he OECD black, grey and white list of tax havens he most high proile outcome at the G20 Summit in April 2009 was the creation of a black, grey and white list of tax havens, assessed in terms of their level of tax cooperation. As a criteria the list uses the number of bilateral information exchange agreements that a state has signed with other states (one by one). hese are based on standards developed by the OECD. he list is backed by several sanctions, and G20 leaders stated that “lack of transparency and failure to exchange tax information should be vigorously addressed”54. he black list contains jurisdictions that have not committed to the OECD tax standard for information exchange agreements. hey are called uncooperative tax havens. he grey list is made of jurisdictions that have committed to the tax standard, but have not yet substantially implemented it. To be considered as having substantially implemented the tax standard, a jurisdiction has to have 12 bilateral information exchange agreements in place. When this is done the jurisdiction can qualify for the white list55. he threat of being blacklisted led to a series of diplomatic activities where tax havens committed to signing tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) with other jurisdictions, often with other tax havens or states with small populations. As of October 27, 2010, there were no jurisdictions left on the black list, and only 9 states left on the grey list (Liberia, Montserrat, Nauru, Niue, Panama, Vanuatu, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Uruguay)56. Over 150 exchange agreements had been signed with tax havens. However, because tax havens managed to fulil the criteria through making agreements with other tax havens that would not request information exchange, or jurisdictions with small populations, this did not lead to the information exchange that many had hoped for. In addition, the fact that the OECD model agreements are bilateral (signed by only two states) makes them costly and time-consuming for poor countries to negotiate. his means that a country’s ability to sign an agreement is based on its economic power. By October 27, 2010, Mexico and Argentina were the only two developing states that had signed tax information exchange agreements with tax havens57. Moreover, the tax authority in a country which has signed an agreement has no automatic right to the information it requests (e.g. if a citizen or company holds an account and how much money it is worth). To receive the information, it has to prove that it is ‘foreseeably relevant’ to its administrative or enforcement work (in other words, allege a crime), and provide a large amount of information that it may not have. his is even more costly and time consuming. Because of this, even well-funded and resource-rich tax authorities like in the US have made few requests. Switzerland, for example, was able to state that its agreement to commit to OECD information exchange standards was consistent with maintaining banking secrecy58. It is very unlikely that developing countries would be able to take advantage of such agreements. 28 MEASURES NEEDED TO HINDER ILLICIT CAPITAL FLIGHT International measures that could hinder illicit capital light from developing countries are mainly about increasing transparency so that the illicit outlows can be traced and stopped. But they are also about strengthening the authorities that are to discover and correct them. If the international community is going to be able to develop and implement measures that will beneit all, these must be developed and implemented by a global body where both developed and developing countries are represented. his section presents the most important measures promoted by development organisations and academics, and describes the reactions and actions taken on them by EU institutions and other international bodies like the OECD. Automatic and multilateral information exchange With scarce resources, authorities in developing countries need more information to track down and tackle cases of tax evasion by multinational companies, money from criminal activities, individual corruption, or other illicit capital leaving their states. As mentioned earlier, it is nearly impossible for developing country tax authorities to acquire this information, either because information exchange agreements with other jurisdictions do not exist, or because they are too diicult to use. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working with development have long argued that the bilateral web of information agreements in the existing model is too costly for developing countries, and that the agreement has to be truly multilateral if developing countries are to beneit from it. Participation in the system must mean just one agreement that includes the exchange of information with all other participants, and exchange with every state, no matter how poor, and it must be empowered with the threat of collective sanctions. he agreement must be open to any democracy to sign, and global in scope. NGOs generally also conclude that if developing countries are to beneit, they also need access to tax information automatically. his means that they wouldn’t have to spend money and time making a request for the information and prove that it is ‘foreseeably relevant’. Rather than applying for information on a case-by-case basis, states would have immediate access to the information electronically. he EU Savings Taxation Directive Tax authorities within the EU already exchange information about individuals’ savings income on an automatic basis under the EU Savings Taxation Directive (EUSTD). his shows that it is technically viable to exchange information automatically on a multilateral basis. If the EUSTD would be extended to include all types of capital income (not only individuals’ savings but also other legal persons’ capital income such as foundations, trusts, insurance companies and corporations), and to other non-European countries, it would enable the identiication of tax evasion and avoidance practices to developing countries59. With 42 member states, the EUSTD is the largest multilateral 29 arrangement providing for a working system of automatic information exchange. he coverage of the EUSTD is already not limited to EU member states but extends to 15 other secrecy jurisdictions, such as the Cayman Islands and Switzerland. In addition, negotiations are underway with Norway to become a member state. Large amounts portfolio investments of developing country residents are kept on deposit in Europe. his provides a strong case for developing countries to also have the opportunity to participate in the information exchange.60 However, if tax authorities in developing countries are to be able to participate in the development of an automatic information exchange system, it must also include demand-driven technical assistance. he OECD Joint Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters Since 1988 there has been a Joint Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters of the Council of Europe and the OECD, which includes multilateral information exchange upon request. After an initiative from the UK which was announced at an OECD meeting on February 28, 201061, the convention has been opened up for all interested countries through an additional protocol. However, as of May 27, 2010, only 15 countries in total had signed the convention, and Mexico was the only developing country.62 he convention allows the parties to the convention to implement automatic information exchange, but it does not require it. he countries that wish to implement automatic information exchange would need to enter into additional bilateral agreements with each other to make it work. he Tax Justice Network concludes that “the Convention appears to provide a useful framework for information exchange upon request, for simultaneous and cross-border tax examinations, for the protection of data conidentiality and for a number of other important areas. It does not, however, make the material progress in the direction of automatic information exchange. If and when major developed countries agreed within the framework of the amending protocol to ofer participants automatic information exchange, the attractiveness of this convention as an alternative to the EUSTD would increase. So far however, the only existing multilateral system of Automatic Information Exchange is the EUSTD”63. Actions on automatic information exchange by the European Parliament he EU Parliament has adopted a number of reports and resolutions concerning capital light that promotes automatic and multilateral information exchange. he most important one is perhaps the Domenici report, a resolution which was adopted by the Parliament with an overwhelming majority (554 votes to 46, with 71 abstentions) in February 2010. In order to put an end to bank secrecy, the European Parliament recommends an automatic and multilateral exchange of information that should take place in all circumstances and without exemptions. As a irst step towards a global framework for automatic information exchange, the Parliament wants to apply it to all EU Member States and dependent territories. he Domenici report also states that the commitments made by the G20 are not enough to tackle tax evasion. Likewise, 30 it points out that the OECD framework for combating tax havens is unsatisfactory since it takes place only upon request. he Parliament calls on the OECD for the improvement of its standards, with the aim of making automatic and multilateral exchange of information the global standard. Furthermore, the report calls for the expansion of the scope of the European Savings Tax Directive mentioned above to cover not only individuals, but also legal entities such as private companies (in particular multinational corporations) and trusts, as well as various sources of investment income. he European Parliament also calls for an extension of the provisions of the Savings Tax Directive to jurisdictions harbouring illicit capital lows such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Macao, Dubai, New Zealand, Ghana and certain states of the US. he Domenici report strongly condemns the role played by tax havens, tax evasion and tax avoidance in hindering the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and urges the Member States to make the ight against these activities a priority, while advocating the imposition of a regime of incentives and sanctions against illicit capital lights. For example, the following sanctions are considered: a special levy on movements to or from non-cooperative jurisdictions, non-recognition within the EU of the legal status of companies set up in non-cooperative jurisdictions, and a prohibition on EU inancial institutions establishing or maintaining subsidiaries and branches in non-cooperative jurisdictions.64 EU communication on tax and development In its Spring Package 2010, the EU Commission put forward a communication on tax and development: ‘Cooperating with developing countries on promoting good governance on tax matters’. his put the issue high on the EU agenda for the very irst time. European development organisations generally conclude that while the communication contains a good analysis of the problems related to illicit lows, there is a clear lack of concrete and ambitious proposals to solve these problems. It favours global conventions with binding commitments on transparency and exchange of information, and it supports the adoption and implementation of international standards, including through multilateral agreements and automatic information exchange. But as a concrete step forward it only recommends sharing experiences in international tax cooperation gained through instruments such as the EU Savings Directive, in order to explore the feasibility of multilateral agreements and automatic exchange of information65. he document constitutes a necessary but insuicient step in the right direction. On June 14, 2010, the EU Foreign Afairs Council passed a Conclusion that largely supported the Commission communication.66 31 FIGHTING ILLICIT CAPITAL FLIGHT THROUGH INFORMATION EXCHANGE (between jurisdictions to be able to track tax evasion and avoidance, criminal activities and corruption) Main actors Initiative Non-Governmental Organisations (Eurodad, Tax Justice Network, Christian Aid, Action Aid, Forum Syd, etc.) European Parliament (EU Commission and Council will share experiences to investigate further) Global automatic and multilateral information exchange where all countries can participate in one common agreement and make use of information exchange automatically regardless of the country’s economic strength EU through the European Savings Tax Directive (EUSTD) Multilateral and automatic information exchange. However, it only addresses individuals’ savings income (not corporations etc.) and only includes EU member states + 15 tax havens OECD through the Joint Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (only 15 states participating by 2010) Multilateral information exchange where all countries can participate in the same agreement, but some might not be able to aford to make the requests needed to get information exchanged. G20 and OECD Bilateral information exchange agreements. Information exchanged between two states upon request if proven ‘forseeably relevant’. Country by country reporting As mentioned earlier, almost two thirds of the illicit capital light from developing countries originates from commercial transactions within multinational companies, through methods like transfer mispricing and falsiied invoicing. his is hard to detect because international inancial reporting standards (IFRS) only require multinational groups of companies to report on a consolidated basis. hey must only present one set of accounts showing the overall inancial activities and results for the group, without breaking them down for each country. Data for individual companies and countries is therefore aggregated, hiding all intra-group transactions. If multinational companies were required to break down their inancial results for each country of operation, it would enable tax authorities, media and civil society to see how much proit is made 32 in each country, and how much tax should be paid. his is called country-by-country reporting67. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working to stop illicit capital light from developing countries assert that it would be an important tool to uncover potential cases of tax avoidance and evasion. Country-by-country reporting should according to NGOs include a list of subsidiaries together with the turnover, proits, and taxes paid in each country, as well as the number and costs of employees, the nature and value of any assets owned, and information to show the extent of intra-group transactions68. A compulsory country-by-country reporting system adopted at a global level would dramatically improve the transparency of the activities and proits of transnational companies, and thus detect capital light driven by tax evasion and avoidance schemes. More than 100 governments worldwide, including EU member states, tend to incorporate international inancial reporting standards into law. hese are developed by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). he IASB is a private sector body which deines its stakeholders as shareholders and providers of capital. During the past years, civil society organisations have urged their governments, the EU, G20 and OECD to put pressure on the IASB to adopt a new standard that includes country-by-country reporting. If this happened, the majority of multinational companies would have to report their inancial activities in every country where they operate. Actions taken by the OECD In July 2009, the UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown and the French President Nicolas Sarkozy called on the OECD to look at country-by-country reporting and the beneits of this for tax transparency and reducing tax avoidance69. In January 2010, OECD countries agreed that country-bycountry reporting standards for multinational companies should be incorporated in the OECD guidelines for multinational companies by the end of 2010. But the guidelines are only guidelines, and are not binding. It is still up to each company to apply them or not. he OECD is currently also carrying out a technical feasibility study of a country-by-country reporting standard. Actions taken by the EU parliament In the previously mentioned Domenici report, a resolution which was adopted by the EU Parliament in February 2010, the Parliament recommends country-by-country reporting to become obligatory for transnational companies in the EU. he report also stresses that international accounting standards should be revised so as to establish a country-by-country reporting of companies’ annual accounts. Furthermore, it suggests an “EU public register listing the names of individuals and undertakings having set up companies and accounts in tax havens, with a view to unveiling the true beneiciaries shielded by ofshore companies”70. In a resolution from June 2010, the Parliament again calls for the enhancement of tax transparency by improving international accounting standards, adopting a country by country standard, and “systematic disclosure of proits made and taxes paid” by irms operating in developing countries71. 33 Actions taken by the EU Commission and Council he communication ‘Cooperating with developing countries on promoting good governance on tax matters’, published by the EU Commission in April 2010 and later approved by the EU Council Conclusions, calls for further investigation into country-by-country reporting. he Commission “supports ongoing research on a country-by-country reporting requirement of a reporting standard for multinational corporations, notably in the extractive industry”. But no concrete commitments are announced to be taken by the EU in this respect in order to push a binding mechanism further72. Responding to the calls from the Parliament, the commission has committed itself to release a new communication on the issue by September 2011. Actions taken by the International Accounting Standards Board and the World Bank he International Accounting Standards Board (IASB, described on page 33) has responded to calls for greater transparency in inancial accounting by consulting on an international accounting standard on country-by-country reporting for the mining industries. On the IASB website, many development organisations have contributed to a discussion paper on extractive industries, arguing for country-by-country reporting. he World Bank also has made a contribution to the paper which strongly supports a country-by-country reporting standard in the extractive sector. he World Bank supports civil society arguments, stating that the IASB is far too concentrated on investors’ opinions and does not pay enough attention to the public interest, which it should do according to its constitution. he World Bank also requests the inclusion of all the disclosure proposals on a country-by-country basis that the civil society coalition Publish What You Pay73 proposes in an International Financial Reporting Standard, and argues that this is justiiable on cost/beneit grounds. he World Bank argues that the cost of introducing a country-by-country reporting requirement would not be too high because multinational companies are expected to already have data on a national basis for taxation purposes. Moreover, it points out that audited accounting information improves reliability and enhances the ability of shareholders to monitor the activities of a company. he World Bank even states that in a sector as highly instable as the extractive industries, it is only possible to pursue reliable comparability analysis and gather comprehensive information to access inancial, political, and reputational risks if these disclosure requirements are established. To counter the argument that a country-by-country reporting requirement would lead to a loss of competitive advantage by companies that apply it, the Bank argues that more than 100 countries require, permit, or are seeking convergence with International Financial Reporting Standards, and that mandatory country-by-country reporting will level the playing ield better than voluntary regimes. Lastly, the World Bank states that more transparency will beneit capital providers74. he initiative by the World Bank to support country-by-country reporting is very welcomed by non-governmental development organisations, but they are also asking the World Bank to apply the reporting to its own activities. he International Finance Corporation (IFC), which is a member of the World Bank Group, supports private sector investment in developing countries. 34 Research has shown that a number of private sector beneiciaries of IFC funds use tax havens in their investments in developing countries. To ensure that this is not done for illicit tax purposes, the IFC should require all its beneiciaries to introduce country-by-country reporting75. Since the World Bank uses public money for the mission to “ight poverty with passion and professionalism for lasting results and to help people help themselves”, it is especially important that it acts as a role model and combats illicit capital light instead of contributing to it. Actions taken by the United States Since July 2010, country-by-country reporting is already mandatory for the extractive and energy companies registered in the US76. Oil, gas, and mining revenues are critically important economic sectors in about 60 developing countries, which, despite abundant natural resources, rank among the lowest in the world in poverty, economic growth, and governance assessments. he bill that was passed in July represents an important step in the right direction for many civil society organisations that have been advocating for such a standard. FIGHTING ILLICIT CAPITAL FLIGHT THROUGH COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING (requiring proit and tax paid to be reported by multinational companies in every country of production so that illicit capital light can be detected) Main actors Initiative Non-Governmental Organisations (Eurodad, Tax Justice Network, Christian Aid, Action Aid, Forum Syd, etc.) European Parliament (EU Commission and Council supports further investigations) Mandatory country-by-country reporting for all types of multinational companies, starting with EU countries and incorporated in International Financial Reporting Standards by the International Accountants Standards Board OECD through their guidelines for multinational companies Voluntarily country-by-country reporting for all types of multinational companies he World Bank recommends the International Accountant Standards Board to implement this in the International Financial Reporting Standards but does not apply it to their own beneiciaries. IASB is investigating this. Already mandatory for extractive industries registered in the USA. Country-by-country reporting mandatory for the extractive sector 35 A political mandate for the UN committee on tax matters Combating illicit capital light in a way that beneits developing countries requires a forum that can create and enforce global rules designed to beneit all. Today there is no global body with the political mandate, legitimacy, and technical expertise that is needed to do this. he G20 and OECD, where work is proceeding fastest, are mainly ‘rich countries’ clubs, and are not representative of the majority of developing countries. Several middle income countries participate in the G20, but there is no regular low income country participation. While the OECD Global Forum is expanding to include some developing country representation, it remains a part of the OECD structure with membership dominated by rich countries and tax havens. It doesn’t have the necessary legitimacy to handle political aspects of tax cooperation. Capital light and tax cooperation should ultimately be tackled by a representative political body with a political mandate from all countries. he United Nations’ Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) has an expert committee on tax matters. But this has only a technical mandate and not a political one. Lack of resources also limits both developing country participation and the secretariat of the committee. he UN summits on ‘Financing for Development’ in Doha in 2008 and in New York in 2009 called on ECOSOC to “examine the strengthening of institutional arrangements to promote international cooperation in tax matters”77. In the negotiations before the summit in Doha, the G77 group of developing countries requested that the committee be upgraded to an intergovernmental body with a political mandate, but this did not make it into the inal Doha communiqué. Civil society organisations that work with capital light promote as a irst step that all governments should support the United Nations Committee of Experts on Tax Matters by strengthening it and upgrading it to an intergovernmental body. One major outcome of this should be a UN Code of Conduct on International Cooperation in Combating Tax Evasion, which is to be implemented at the national and international level.78 Strengthening tax authorities and repatriation To meet their international poverty reduction commitments, developing countries must invest time, money and political will in strengthening national tax inspectorates to increase the domestic tax revenue collected and the size of their national budgets. For this to happen, rich countries and international donors must increase the funding for developing countries to strengthen their tax systems, surveillance, and collection, and to track illicit lows of capital. his should include making technical assistance available to developing countries that request it, for them to purchase from a service provider of their choice. At the African tax inspectors meeting in South Africa in 2008, it was stated that: “Improving revenue performance will require a major improvement in tax administration through better service 36 delivery, and taxpayer education, efective use of automated systems, better cooperation between tax administrations to counter tax evasion and aggressive tax planning, and strengthening audit and human resource management capability”79. As shown by examples on page 19, signiicant investment of resources, expertise and political will can substantially improve compliance. Donors should make speciic eforts aiming at recovering and repatriating stolen assets to developing countries. While some important steps are being taken by he World Bank and UN regarding corruption, the focus is biased by looking exclusively into the demand side of corruption while ignoring the supply side. his aspect of corruption needs to be tackled by shedding light on capital light facilitators and tax havens. For example, in 2007 the World Bank launched the Stolen Assets Recovery Initiative (StAR). his is an important step in tackling illicit capital light. But since the StAR does not consider that there should be shared responsibility from banks and inancial centres that host stolen assets, there is still much to be done. StAR also limits its role to a technical one, and is not promoting any regulatory measures whatsoever in order to tackle capital light. Furthermore, by exclusively focusing on corruption-related lows, the bank is ignoring the biggest part of the picture represented by commercial lows, namely through tax evasion and avoidance schemes used by multinational corporations. EXISTING INITIATIVES TO SHARE KNOWLEDGE At the global level, initiatives to share knowledge already exist, such as the OECD’s Global Relations programme, International Tax Dialogue, and the International Tax Compact (initiated by the German government). At the regional level, there is, for example, the African Tax Administration Forum. hese are in need of encouragement and support. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS IN EUROPE here are a number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Europe that work to stop illicit capital light from developing countries. One of the irst to do so and with the widest network around Europe is the Tax Justice Network (TJN), which is an independent organisation launched in the British Houses of Parliament in March 2003. It is dedicated to high-level research, analysis and advocacy in the ield of tax and regulation and work to map, analyse and explain the role of taxation and the harmful impacts of tax evasion, tax avoidance, tax competition and tax havens. TJN is not aligned to any political party, and its network includes academics, accountants, development organisations, economists, faith groups, inancial professionals, journalists, lawyers, public-interest groups, and trade unions. 37 In particular, TJN aims to promote more local campaigns for tax justice, especially in developing countries, and to provide a medium through which tax justice issues can be promoted within multilateral agencies. For example, Richard Murphy, he founder of TJN, invented the idea of country-by-country reporting, now used by the OECD, EU and World Bank. Read more about TJN work and campaigns at www.taxjustice.net. During 2007, EURODAD (European Network on Debt and Development) started their work on capital light from developing countries. Eurodad is a network of 58 NGOs from 19 European countries working on issues related to debt, development inance and poverty reduction. Members like Christian Aid UK and Action Aid UK have been particularly active in working with capital light from developing countries, both when it comes to research and campaigns. Southern networks that Eurodad works very closely with include Jubilee South, Afrodad, Latindadd and hird World Network. Read more about Eurodad at www.eurodad.org. Despite the fact that resources lost through illicit capital light far outnumber aid to developing countries or debt repayments from developing countries, the issue is not yet on the mainstream agenda of the majority of development NGOs or decision makers in Europe. If illicit capital light from developing countries is to be stopped, wider knowledge and commitment among both NGOs and decision makers is needed. 38 ILLICIT CAPITAL FLIGHT FROM AFRICA By Dr Attiya Waris MAGNITUDE According to a report from Global Financial Integrity80 (GFI) by Kar and Cartwright-Smith, Africa as a whole lost US$854 billion in cumulative capital light over the period from 1970-2008. his is enough not only to wipe out the region’s total external debt of around US$250 billion (at end 2008), but potentially to also leave US$600 billion for economic growth and poverty alleviation. he illicit lows grew at an average rate of 11.9% per annum in real terms over the 39 year period. It increased from about US$57 billion in the 1970s to US$437 billion over the nine years from 2000-2008. Still, these estimates only address one form of trade mispricing, and do not include the mispricing of services, nor encompass the proceeds of smuggling, trade in narcotics and contraband, violations of intellectual property rights, human traicking, or other illegal activities. Estimations of illicit capital light from Africa also present the most analytical diiculties because countries with inadequate data account for almost 37% of regional GDP. Hence, Kar and Cartwright-Smith attempted to adjust for some of the factors responsible for the underestimation (by taking into account some of the components not covered) while clearly recognizing the limitations of such approximations. As a result of these adjustments, total illicit lows from Africa more than doubled from US$854 billion to 1.8 trillion81. However, estimations to adjust illicit lows generated through illegal activities were not included. Another estimation by Boyce and Ndikumana82 of the accumulated capital light from just SubSaharan countries, and only between 1970-2004, calculates it to US$420 billion (converted to 2004 prices). With calculated interest83 accumulation, capital light is assumed to total over US$600 billion over the period. GFI has made more conservative estimations for Sub-Saharan Africa over the same period. A country was omitted from the total if it was deemed that their data were unreliable or if some of the data were incomplete84.hey found that Sub-Saharan Africa lost US$282 billion in capital light in real 2004 dollars. But extending the period to 2008 sharply increased the cumulative total to US$533 billion, which shows a remarkable increase in capital light from Sub-Saharan Africa over the last four years. 39 Some of the sharp acceleration in illicit outlows during 2000-2008 relative to earlier decades was undoubtedly driven by oil price increases, as well as increased opportunities to misprice trade that typically accompany increasing trading volumes due to globalization. Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole experienced the highest GDP growth rates in over 30 years during the period 2000-2008, underpinned by high commodity prices and structural reforms in a number of countries. Several researchers have pointed out that economic growth without credible reform could lead to more, not less capital light, since the increase in incomes would simply inance the increased accumulation of foreign assets. REAL ILLICIT FLOWS FROM SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 1970 - 2004 US$ millions, 2004 prices 40.000 35.000 30.000 25.000 20.000 15.000 10.000 5.000 0 -5.000 1970 1975 1980 1985 Kar & Cartwright-Smith 1990 1995 2000 Ndikumana & Boyce Source: Kar and Cartwright-Smith, (2010) Illicit inancial lows from Africa: Hidden Resource for Development, Global Financial Integrity. 40 AFRICAN WEALTH IN TAX HAVENS Studies of private wealth of High Net Worth Individuals (HNWI)85 estimate that private wealth held in tax havens by Sub-Saharan Africans may constitute up to US$270 billion. he World Wealth Report 2008 estimated that there are about 101,000 Africans in this category, growing at an annual pace of 10%. Of these, 2% are considered as Ultra-HNWI86, amounting to only 2170 persons on the entire African continent (the total population is around 1 billion). However, this igure may be an inaccurate estimate at best, as assets of wealthy and especially ultra-wealthy Africans are likely to be spread to various family members, while also trust or incorporated accounts are not identiiable to a single person. Research at Global Financial Integrity on the absorption of illicit funds shows that while some of the private assets held outside their countries by developing country nationals might be legitimate, the bulk of such funds are certainly not87. Regional and country outlows Despite the diference in samples and data between the estimations of GFI and Boyce and Ndikuma, 15 of the top 20 countries with cumulative illicit outlows are identiied by both studies. hey are Angola, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. While an overwhelming part of illicit outlows from Africa has been from Sub-Saharan countries, there are signiicant disparities in the regional pattern of illicit lows. For example, outlows from West and Central African states, which by far are the biggest from the Sub-Saharan region, is mainly so because of the high outlows from Nigeria, which also is included in the economic group ‘fuel exporters’. he proportion of illicit lows from West and Central Africa might be also be somewhat overstated because other regions in Africa include many countries that are poor reporters of data and thereby understate their contributions to illicit lows. Flows from the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region are also likely to be understated because of lack of data from Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan, as well as DR Congo, Rwanda and Uganda. Hence, the long-term evolution of illicit lows from diferent regions of Africa needs to be interpreted with caution. 41 REGIONAL ILLICIT CAPITAL FLIGHT FROM AFRICA 1970-2008 Millions of US Dollars Total illicit inancial lows Africa North Arica Sub-Saharan Horn of Africa Great Lakes Southern West and Central Fuel-exporters Nonfuel-exporters 1970s 57,291 19,161 38,130 2,354 6,925 5,894 22,956 20,105 7,867 1980s 203,859 72,020 131,839 14,131 16,079 20,581 81,047 67,685 26,517 1990s 155,740 59,813 95,927 5,108 4,978 31,447 54,394 48,157 22,375 2000-2008 437,171 78,742 358,429 15,603 10,285 116,828 215,712 218,970 23,342 1970-2008 854,061 229,737 624,324 37,197 38,267 174,751 374,109 354,917 80,102 1980s 21,678 7,754 13,924 1,421 1,778 2,412 8,313 6,922 2,729 1990s 17,813 6,316 11,497 715 580 4,659 5,544 5,105 2,433 2000-2008 50,328 9,166 41,162 1,949 1,286 13,388 24,538 24,806 2,787 1970-2008 29,021 6,866 22,156 1,183 1,142 9,635 10,196 9,878 2,502 1990s -4,8 0,5 -7,0 -15,5 -17,7 7,3 -11,4 -15,6 -1,6 2000-2008 24,6 6,0 30,1 33,5 35,0 21,5 36,0 42,6 11,0 1970-2008 12,1 6,5 15,1 20,0 13,5 16,7 14,5 21,8 13,6 Average illicit inancial lows Africa North Arica Sub-Saharan Horn of Africa Great Lakes Southern West and Central Fuel-exporters Nonfuel-exporters 1970s 7,299 3,097 4,202 249 745 811 2,397 2,239 1,017 Rates of change (real 2008 CPI delated) Africa North Arica Sub-Saharan Horn of Africa Great Lakes Southern West and Central Fuel-exporters Nonfuel-exporters 1970s 18,9 14,0 n.a. n.a. 13,2 n.a. 21,5 n.a. n.a. 1980s -2,1 -11,5 1,3 7,3 -12,7 13,5 0,0 2,2 11,3 Source: Kar and Cartwright-Smith, (2010) Illicit inancial lows from Africa: Hidden Resource for Development, Global Financial Integrity Boyce and Ndikumana estimate capital light and break it down for a sample of African countries in the table on page 43. he table summarizes the magnitude of capital light from the sample of 40 sub-Saharan African countries. 42 ILLICIT CAPITAL FLIGHT FROM SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES Total capital light (in US$ million 2004 and % of GDP), stock of accumulated capital light which includes imputed interest earnings (US$ million and % of debt stock) over 1970-2004 period88 Real CF Angola Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Comoros Congo, Dem. Rep. Congo, Rep. Cote d’Ivoire Ethiopia Gabon Ghana Guinea Kenya Lesotho Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mauritius Mozambique Niger Nigeria Rwanda Sao Tome and Principe Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone South Africa Sudan Swaziland Tanzania Togo Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe Total Stock of CF in 2004 Total CF/GDP (%) Stock of CF/Debt (%) 42178.8 -3989.7 1127.9 3076.9 2073.6 18378.9 2190.9 1943.8 1337.7 -176.3 19572.5 14950.4 34349.4 17031.5 8580.8 8503.7 551.2 2665.4 407.4 7430.9 2527.8 -372.0 2319.1 -962.8 10677.7 -5975.7 165696.7 3366.8 723.3 -8885.0 2700.9 4607.7 18266.0 9218.7 1263.9 5185.2 -3481.6 4982.0 9769.5 16162.0 5095.6 -7663.9 -1086.9 4670.6 2566.6 27287.7 2707.1 2774.1 2345.6 -168.7 36737.6 17474.8 54000.6 22526.0 11997.6 11208.4 1048.9 6369.3 893.4 9570.8 3825.4 -425.4 4008.0 650.1 14273.4 -8732.6 240781.0 5889.5 1059.1 -13077.3 2986.3 7005.4 17492.3 16325.0 1342.6 9963.4 -4064.6 6853.7 19814.3 24556.0 215.6 -98.6 12.6 73.6 312.2 116.5 231.1 148.7 31.1 -47.8 295.1 344.3 222.0 175.0 118.7 98.7 14.6 16.6 29.8 170.3 132.9 -7.6 151.2 -16.0 180.6 -195.7 230.0 183.5 1265.9 -114.3 384.1 424.7 8.5 43.0 50.2 45.8 -168.9 73.0 180.2 344.2 5535.2 -399.9 -207.4 269.0 185.3 287.4 523.6 257.4 137.9 -55.2 310.3 299.8 460.0 342.6 289.1 159.3 29.6 93.3 117.0 276.4 111.9 -12.8 174.4 28.3 306.9 -447.8 670.9 355.7 292.4 -332.0 485.7 408.6 176.0 84.4 285.6 127.7 -224.3 142.1 272.2 511.9 419975.7 606733.7 81.8 291.3 Notes: for Burkina Faso, the last year where CF is available is 2003; therefore totals, stocks, and ratios refer to 2003. Source: Ndikumana L and Boyce JK (2008) New estimates of capital light from sub-Saharan African countries: Linkages with external borrowing and policy options, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst 43 EFFECTS ON DEVELOPMENT Capital light from African countries represents a higher burden, as a percentage of GDP, than in other developing regions89. Researchers and economists argue that Africa’s staggering loss of capital through illicit outlows seriously hampers the continent’s eforts at poverty alleviation and economic development90. he magnitude of the outlows explains why donor-driven eforts to spur economic development and reduce poverty have been underachieving in Africa. Capital light constitutes a diversion of scarce resources away from domestic investment and other productive activities. African economies have achieved signiicantly lower investment levels than other developing countries in recent decades91. he African continent is also the most capitalscarce among all developing regions. Estimates show that if Africa were able to attract back the light component of private wealth, domestic capital stock would rise by about two thirds. Africa’s GDP per capital is also estimated to be 16% lower than it would be if the continent had been able to retain its private wealth at home92. he leak of capital is likely to be accompanied by losses of human capital due to outward migration and to missed opportunities for ‘learning-by-doing’ amongst entrepreneurs and inancial institutions93. Capital light is also likely to increase inequalities of income in Africa. Individuals who engage in capital light are generally members of economic and political elites, who take advantage of their privileged positions to acquire and channel funds abroad. Both the acquisition and the transfer of funds often involve legally questionable practices like the falsiication of trade documents (trade misinvoicing), as well as the embezzlement of export revenues and kickbacks on public and private sector contracts. he shortages of revenue and foreign exchange resulting from this hit the less wealthy members of the society hardest. Finally, when national inancial imbalances due to capital light result in devaluation, the wealthy who hold external assets are shielded from the efects, while the poor have to take the consequences.94 As long as illicit capital continues to low out of poor African countries at a rapid pace, eforts to reduce poverty and boost economic growth will be undermined as income distribution becomes ever more skewed. Governor Ndung’u of the Central bank of Kenya noted in a speech to Governors of African central banks that: “In the short run, massive capital outlows and drainage of national savings have undermined growth by stiling private capital formation. In the medium to long term, delayed investments in support of capital formation and expansion have caused the tax base to remain narrow. Naturally, and to the extent that capital light may encourage external borrowing, debt service payments also increased and further compromised public investment prospects. Furthermore, capital light has had adverse welfare and distributional consequences on the overwhelming majority of poor in numerous countries in that it heightened income inequality and jeopardized employment prospects. In the majority of countries in the sub-region, unemployment rates have remained exceedingly high in the absence of investment and industrial expansion”95. 44 CAPITAL FLIGHT AND DEBT It is generally expected that developing countries, facing scarcity of capital, will acquire external debt to supplement domestic saving. he rate at which they borrow abroad - the sustainable level of foreign borrowing - depends on the links among foreign and domestic saving, investment and economic growth. he main lesson of the standard ‘growth with debt’ literature is that a country should borrow abroad as long as the capital thus acquired produces a rate of return that is higher than the cost of foreign borrowing.96 Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have generally adopted a development strategy that heavily relies on foreign inancing from both oicial and private sources. Unfortunately, this has meant that for many countries in the region, the stock of external debt has built up over the decades to a level that is widely viewed as unsustainable.97 Money originating outside Africa cannot be taxed, and it is the poor people in Africa that indirectly pay for the external debts. It has been argued that hindering capital light could bring in much needed capital that would not only stimulate African economies but possibly replace the need for external debt. According to estimations made by Ndikuma and Boyce, the group of Sub-Saharan African countries is a ‘net creditor’ to the rest of the world in the sense that their private assets held abroad (as measured by capital light including interest earnings) exceed their total liabilities as measured by the stock of accumulated external debt. heir external assets (accumulated capital light minus accumulated external debt) amounted to US$398 billion over the period 1970-2004. he accumulated capital light is three times as high as the accumulated debt stock. Foreign debt and capital light have also been found to be closely interlinked. Research by economists and political scientists suggests that a large extent of the capital light from Africa has been public loans that were channelled out of the country as private funds. A ‘revolving door’ relationship has been identiied between debt and capital light. In some cases, as much as 80 percent of the public loans have left the country as private assets through capital light.98 Ndikumana and Boyce (2008) found that out of every dollar of new external borrowing, as much as 60 cents left the country in the form of capital light the same year. heir results support the hypothesis that debt overhang has an independent efect on capital light: a one-dollar increase in the stock of debt adds an estimated 3-4 cents to annual capital light in subsequent years99. Collier, Hoeler, and Pattillo (2003) report an almost identical result, with a one dollar increase in the stock of debt leading to 3.2 cents of capital light. Foreign borrowing can cause capital light by contributing to an increased likelihood of a debt crisis, worsening macroeconomic conditions, and the deterioration of the investment climate. Foreign borrowing also provides the resources for channelling private capital abroad. But capital light can also lead to more borrowing, since capital light drains national foreign exchange resources, forcing governments to borrow abroad100. 45 STAKEHOLDERS – THE AFRICAN CONTEXT he groups of stakeholders engaging in capital light or trying to stop it in Africa are the same as in the rest of the world. Global Financial Integrity estimates that approximately 60-65% of the illicit capital light from developing countries stems from commercial transactions within multinationals, 30-35% from criminal activities like trades of weapons, drugs and humans, and 3% from corruption. While GFI have not attempted to verify these approximate percentages for Africa, they believe that these are likely to be of roughly the same order of magnitude101. his section explores the speciic context that some of the stakeholders face in Africa. States African judiciaries, legislatures and executives generally have diiculties in understanding the diverse aspects of capital light and how they are relected in the domestic economy. Tax administrations generally sufer from large capacity constraints underpinned by lack of support from donors, making it diicult to assess and collect taxes. Other constraints include: 1. Lack of iscal legitimacy. A general lack of trust on the part of citizens in the quality of public spending. 2. Shallow tax base. Governments are unable to bring informal actors — large and small — into the tax net. In particular, the existing tax base is eroded by the excessive granting of tax preferences and the ineicient taxation of extractive activities. 3. Unbalanced tax mix of African countries. Many countries rely excessively on a narrow set of taxes to generate revenues for their state and some stakeholders are disproportionally represented in the tax base.102 Procurement processes also add to the problem with capital light. For example, Nigeria borrowed money from the World Bank to complete its multi-billion dollar steel complex. Some money disappeared. Some was squandered and mismanaged, causing the national debt to increase. When Nigeria repays the World Bank for a non-operational steel mill that payment will become capital light. In other words, it is the light of money capital caused by the lack of intellectual capital. Secrecy jurisdictions in Africa Within the African region, Mauritius and the Seychelles have been classiied by some experts as inancial tax havens. hey are both regarded as particularly vulnerable or weak states. Mauritius’ potential weakness stems from its ofshore inancial regime, which permits corporate institutions with no physical productive presence within Mauritius to open and operate bank accounts. From the standpoint of the ofshore corporation, the rationale for establishing ofshore is to take advantage of the lower rate of taxation in comparison to neighbouring jurisdictions. he primary incentive for the ofshore jurisdiction is the revenue to be extracted through taxation and the potential to increase employment levels in the inancial services sector. As a strategy to ofset weaknesses in other areas of economic productivity, such as manufacturing and mining, ofshore centres are likely to proliferate in the sub-region in the short to medium term. In 2001, Botswana took measures 46 to diversify its tertiary services sector by establishing an international inancial services companies (IFSCs) regime. Income tax legislation facilitates the establishment of an International Financial Services Centre to facilitate and regulate an ofshore investment sector. he sector will beneit from a taxation rate of 15%, which is 10% lower than the prevailing average corporate rate. An analysis of the ofshore inancial system in the sub-region indicates that one of its attractions is the relatively high level of conidentiality that it ofers concerning the identity of shareholders of corporate entities operating in it. Although directors’ and shareholders’ names are iled with the government registry in Mauritius, the register is not accessible to the public. Mauritius has repeatedly expressed its commitment to maintain its status as a premier of-shore inancial centre, and its acknowledgment of the vulnerability to tainted funds that this entails.103 In addition, other African countries are continuing to set up Exclusive Economic Zones as well as Trade Free Zones and Free Ports, all of which are the irst and lowest level of a tax haven. he impact is manifold. here is a race to the bottom in an attempt to lure in investors using low taxes as a strategic iscal policy. On the other hand, the state practicing this policy forces the hand of its neighbouring states to follow suit, while at the same time providing a bolt-hole for illicit money that can no longer be kept in banks in other tax havens that are falling under more and more scrutiny (especially the OECD member states whose banking institutions are utilising secrecy provisions). he existence of the African tax havens may not only allow for an increase in capital light. he very nature of poor record keeping may allow even the most basic scrutiny where legitimate being rendered impossible. Corrupt leaders and money laundering by criminals here has been discussion on the impact that corrupt leaders and crime are having on capital light.104 Corruption is seen as a key part of illicit outlows.105 No example expresses the African experience in capital light as well as that of Mobutu Sese Seko. If capital light could be personiied, then the infamous Mobutu Sese Seko did. he kleptocratic ruler is said to have looted US$5 billion (World Bank Report, June 2007) and most of it is alleged to have been deposited in Swiss Bank Accounts. Money laundering takes the form of currency transactions, the illegal purchase and sale of minerals like diamonds, as well as the use of front companies and the round tripping of money, which involves sending money back and forth to clean it. Interpol has on occasion called upon the national commercial crime units to carry out money laundering enquiries on behalf of state lawenforcement authorities in Africa. his has entailed carrying out enquiries concerning banking transactions and property acquisitions by persons under investigation in countries which have anti-money laundering legislation. (Currently there are approximately 22 African countries with anti-money laundering legislation and 4 with none at all. he remainder have not been fully researched.106) 47 In spite of the onerous legislative requirements and harsh criminal penalties imposed on diamond operators, diamonds are still stolen from the mining areas on land and sea. Illegal diamond and natural resource deals are also very diicult to detect because, like bribery and corruption, they are conducted in a very secretive manner by parties who all stand to beneit from non-compliance with the law. herefore, in order to detect, interdict and prosecute ofenders, the law-enforcement agencies have to rely on setting traps and mounting ‘sting operations’, which can be very dangerous, and have on a number of occasions led to the murder of law enforcement oicials. An extensive report by CCFD in French, entitled ‘Ill-gotten goods, who beneits from the crime?’, reviews the stolen assets of more than 30 leaders from developing countries, which amounts to more than US$100 billion. It reports that to date, rich countries have returned only 1-4% in stolen assets, this despite repeated promises to ight against corruption. he central issue of the report addresses why this is continuing to take place, and inds the answers in the existence of tax havens, lending to corrupt regimes, and plundering of wealth from natural resources.107 he Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) estimates the extent of global money laundering at two to ive percent of world economic output. he interim indings of the ISS research project suggest a signiicantly large scale of money laundering in the Eastern and Southern Africa anti-money laundering group region. In addition, the United Nations Oice on Drugs and Crime has begun work on anti-money laundering, using three East African countries (Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) as case studies.108 Civil society in Africa African audiences will ind it easier to understand “money capital” because it directly yields tangible products that they can touch, smell or hear. However, despite this, there is a lack of understanding by citizens, especially in grass root communities, that the amount of tax paid is actually a trust given to the state to help them. his leads to a similar lack of understanding that capital light is a direct loss of money that could also be used to assist them. Currently, there are some limited civil society organisations beginning to work in the area of capital light. However, they are beset by many problems. hese include: 1. A lack of understanding of how the issue of capital light links with their ongoing campaigns. 2. A lack of understanding in society of their right over tax collected and its need to be redistributed for their beneit. 3. Government understanding and analysis of inancial issues is limited, in particular amongst parliamentarians, and hence oversight is poor 4. Strong private sector lobbying as well as a strong push by international institutions to privatise and fall in with the current international procedures has led to the status quo being maintained. 5. A lack of freedom of information in most African countries means that even if there was capacity there may be no access to data in order to analyse the situation on the ground. 48 As a result, the few non-governmental organisations in Africa that are working on the issue of capital light come at it mainly from the vantage point of debt relief campaigns, taxpayer associations, as well as some human rights and development based institutions such as AFRODAD, CRADEC, ISODEC, and Policy Forum (See appendix page 68-73). However, civil society organisations of diferent types are beginning to work on issues concerning tax. UNIFEM is developing a gender budgeting project, and LICOCO in the DRC is looking into tax from the point of corruption. Even Greenpeace has engaged in studies of the efects of environmental degradation due to capital light.109 Both local and international organisations are all beginning to delve into understanding the efect that tax or the loss of tax collection has on societies. hey are all in need of training and capacity building as a irst step, followed by assistance in conducting research from their particular perspectives. 49 CASE STUDIES KENYA By Dr Attiya Waris Country facts 110 39.8 million (2009) Population, total US$ 759 current (2009) GDP per capita Life 111 expectancy at birth, total Child malnutrition Literacy 54 years (2009) 17% of children under 5 (2008) 87 % of population age 15+ (2008) Mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 people 42 (2009) Internet users per 100 people 8.7 (2009) 46.6% (2009) Poverty Ratio Total debt outstanding and disbursed US$ 7.44 billion (2008) Net oicial development assistance US$ 1.36 billion (2008) he tax base and collection of tax in Kenya Any country’s revenue base is largely determined by the structure of its industries, the output produced, and the composition of employment that goes along with production. Similarly, changes in tax rates have had an impact on the tax revenue collected, as do trade blocs and potential harmonization of tax rates between countries in a regional block. Kenya is known across Africa for being one of the most active states in terms of tax collection eforts, having made signiicant gains in the past decades to recover its lost revenue capacity. In 2009, a peak in tax revenue was registered. A previous peak year of revenue collection was in 1994. It is argued that this record of recent gains is a return to the peak levels reached in the mid-1990s, rather than an unprecedented record. his is seen as the case in particular as there have been changes in the structure of the tax system. From 1994 onwards, trade taxes reduced in importance, while value-added taxes (VAT) increased slightly. he most sensitive taxes, however, have been the corporate and personal income taxes, which often follow political cycles. However, Kenya’s domestic and international underground economy remains a signiicant area of revenue losses, much of which is neither quantiied nor tackled up to date. he reason for this is that in order to collect taxes from the domestic underground economy, the government would 50 have to enter in revenue bargaining relationships with constituencies such as the informal sector, which by its very nature remains unregistered and unorganised and with whom as a result, the government has not kept up a continuous political dialogue. In engaging with the international underground economy, Kenya must deal with its international relations with other states, as well as the current international iscal and economic laws and policies and their impact on Kenyan tax revenue. Capital light from and to Kenya Contrary to popular belief, classiications of both the domestic and international underground economy include a vast amount of perfectly legal activities as we can see below. CLASSIFICATION OF UNDERGROUND ECONOMY ACTIVITIES Activity status Monetary transactions Non-monetary transactions Legal activities - Tax avoidance - Unreported income - Wages, salaries and assets from unreported work - Under invoicing - Employee discounts - Fringe beneits - Tax avoidance - Barter of legal goods and services - All do–it-yourself and other unpaid help Illegal activities - Tax evasion - Trade in stolen goods - Drug dealing and manufacturing - Gambling and racketeering - Prostitution - Money laundering - Counterfeiting - Smuggling - Fraud - Tax evasion - Barter of drugs - heft for own use - Production of drugs for own use - Child labour Source: KIPPRA 2007 Capital light as evidenced form the above table includes currently both criminal and non-criminal activities. his table uses two classiications, irstly, illegal and legal activities, and secondly, barter and monetary issues, where in terms of scale the legal and monetary components far outweigh the illegal components in most developing countries including Kenya.112 But transferring money out of the country without reporting it is illegal. When capital gets transferred across the border without being reported this becomes illicit capital light. 51 An IMF study in 2000 found that trade misinvoicing is a signiicant problem for Kenya113. How money laundering takes place in Kenya was discussed in a report by the Institute of Security Studies, where areas as diverse as cattle rustling and drug smuggling were analysed to show the extent of the problem of capital leaving Kenya.114 However, Kenya also inds itself on the other side of the fence. A recent statement by the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) disclosed that there was a large amount of unaccounted for liquidity in the economy, and the problem was ascribed to the possible inlux of pirate money into the Kenyan economy.115 As a result, there are no exact igures as to how big this problem is on a national scale. here have been estimates as to the amount of unreported money moved out of the country by Fofack and Ndikumana. In 2010, they calculated the accumulated capital light to date from Kenya as amounting to US$6.369 billion116. his could be compared with the total external debt stock of Kenya, which amounted to US$7.44 billion in 2008, according to the World Bank. However, in Kenya, like many developing states in Africa, the revenue equation isn’t only about technical parameters in estimating the amount lost through capital light. Critical elements to the entire picture on capital light include the legislative provisions and their utilisation in facilitating illicit capital light, as well as the enforcement of the provisions both through the policing and judicial infrastructure. It’s also an issue of consent, which means that the more the citizens can realistically expect from the government, the higher their consent to surrender part of their income to the revenue authorities. he legal background On August 4, 2010, Kenya voted in by referendum a new constitution. his constitution will have a large impact on the manner on which capital light will be dealt with. Speciic pertinent provisions of the Constitution include the followings: Article 34 protects the independence and freedom of print, electronic and all other types of media with the efect that whistle blowers are protected in matters of public interest, e.g., if there has been misappropriation of public funds or in the illicit outlow of capital. his will encourage transparency and act as a deterrent to corruption by public oicials. Article 71 requires that all agreements relating to natural resources are subject to ratiication by parliament if it involves the grant of a right of concession by or on behalf of any person, including the national government, to another person for the exploitation of any natural resource of Kenya. here are several dimensions to this. First, that contracts will become public knowledge upon presentation in Parliament, and second, that there will be parliamentary oversight, limiting the possibility of capital light as well as loss of income through poorly negotiated contracts. Article 75 relates to the conduct of state oicers and speciically prohibits any state oicer from compromising any public or oicial interest in favour of a personal interest. Part 2 of the same article provides for the punishment of the ofending oicer by removal from oice or in accordance with the disciplinary procedure for the relevant oice. 52 Article 76 prevents the illicit outlow of any income to any foreign bank, including but not limited to tax havens. It also deters any state oicer from acquiring wealth by illegally acquiring money from public cofers or incurring external debts for personal gain. Article 201 sets out the principle and framework of public inance that will guide the iscal process in Kenya, as including the promotion of openness, accountability and participation of citizens in inancial matters. All these provisions in the new Kenyan Constitution are new, as yet unexplored and untested. In a referendum that came into force on June 28, 2010, before the new Constitution, the legislators also passed a Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (AML), which means that there is a strong political will to end capital light from Kenya. he AML Act is comprehensive in that it criminalizes the ofence of money laundering, establishes a inancial reporting centre, stipulates anti-money laundering obligations for reporting institutions, establishes an assets recovery agency including its powers and functions, and also establishes a criminal assets recovery fund. he Act also has extensive and elaborate procedures for both civil and criminal forfeiture and international assistance in investigations and proceedings. he enactment of this Act provides Kenya with the requisite legal and institutional framework to tackle the problem of money laundering in the country. Some key highlights of the Act include: Money laundering being declared a criminal ofence punishable by up to fourteen years imprisonment and a ine of up to US$5 million. Persons intending to convey monetary instruments in excess of US$10,000 or its equivalent in any currency to or from Kenya will be required to report the particulars of such conveyance to authorised personnel. Reporting institutions will be required to report suspicious transactions and cash transactions above US$10,000 or its equivalent in any currency to a Financial Reporting Centre. hey will also be required to verify their customers’ identity, establish and maintain customer records, as well as establish and maintain internal reporting procedures. If the legislative and constitutional framework is already in place, what remains is to ensure that the policy makers and stakeholders are capable of acting as responsible watchdogs to the processes and procedures put in place. In addition, there also remains the constant maintenance of the political will, possibly through public pressure as well as civil society pressure, to ensure that capital light is at a minimum reduced and controlled. To stop illicit capital lows there is also a need for international information exchange that reveals illicit Kenyan wealth held ofshore, as well as reports on what proits multinational companies make in Kenya that should be taxed in the country. 53 Measuring capital light from Kenya Various causes of capital light have been put forward over the past few years. A number of economists have singled out portfolio diversiication motives, political and macroeconomic instability (particularly conlicts and macroeconomic volatility), iscal deicits, and expected devaluation of local currencies, as some of the root causes of capital light. However, recent data show that capital light has continued to grow unabated even in recent years when iscal deicits and macroeconomic volatility have been regulated, suggesting that there may be other determining factors, particularly, corruption and poor governance.117 he form of capital light here includes not only individual corruption but also tax evasion by multinational companies, for example through transfer mispricing (see page 17-18) which, according to an IMF study from 2000, is a signiicant problem for Kenya. According to a report from Global Financial Integrity (GFI), the average of illicit outlows per year from Kenya during 2002-2006 is estimated at US$ 686 million.118 his could be compared with the Net Oicial Development Assistance received, which for year 2000 was US$509 million, and by 2005 had risen to US$ 752 billion. Another report from GFI estimates that the average tax revenue loss per year from 2002-2006, due to just one form of trade mispricing, was US$ 48.55 million.119 Capital light and inequality120 Illicit capital light is one of the most pressing concerns when attempting to raise both the tax effort and levels of tax compliance among the top income earners. Kenya has its own share of large taxpayers, many of whom are likely to avoid their responsibilities by placing both their wealth and property outside of Kenya, while still living and working in the country. his phenomenon is commonly known as capital light, and it can be described as illicit in the case where capital that has been moved abroad is either of criminal origin, or has broken the law in the country of origin by being moved abroad without being reported and evading tax121. Regarding wage inequalities in Kenya, it is estimated that 90% of the population that are workers and peasants in urban and rural areas earn at most 15,000 Kshs (approx US$250) a month. he 9% of the population that constitute various levels of the emerging middle class earn at most 100,000 Kshs (US$1660) a month. he top 1% of the population, which can be considered as the economic, social and political elite, earn above 100,000 Kshs (US$1660) a month. hese wealth inequalities are both a cause and a consequence of a lack of tax justice. Firstly, if there was a well-administered progressive income tax in Kenya, income inequalities would be signiicantly reduced. Secondly, with better international tax cooperation Kenya would be able to tax capital gains and wealth held ofshore. Currently, it is nearly impossible to ind out about such banks and corporate accounts. he low level of corporate tax payment is inherently linked to the practice of trade mispricing. 54 Advocacy and research gaps A large part of the Kenyan economy is informal. Record keeping in both the formal and informal sector is largely absent, and money laundering would be diicult to detect in such an environment. An aspect of this informality is the widespread use of cash to transact legitimate business, which makes it easy to introduce cash, earned from crime, into the inancial system. Record keeping by public authorities is in considerable chaos and has efectively imposed secrecy in the conduct of business transactions, which the law never intended. his review clearly shows that there is a need for more in-depth and detailed knowledge on how banks are involved in and facilitate capital light both into and from Kenya at the national, regional as well as continental and international levels. At the national level, there is a need to strengthen the understanding of both citizens and policy makers of the efects of capital light on the individual Kenyan as well as the overall development needs of the state. In addition, there is a need to take the legislation a step further and pursue its efective and eicient enforcement. Whether the current framework of guidelines are suiciently addressing the particular context of Kenyan economy, which is (a) largely cash based, (b) heavily reliant on a parallel, informal banking system, and (c) where informal value transfer methods are the norm, is yet to be seen. NGOs and the media may play an important role in informing civil society of tax evasion and corrupt actions by publishing knowledge that is made easily available for the public. Conclusion Kenya, like most African countries, has the potential to collect more much-needed revenue. Tax evasion seems to be greatest in the corporate sector. Attempts to improve tax compliance can only be successful if the taxation is perceived to be participatory, transparent and non-coercive. his means that policy space for formulation and implementation of tax policy must be opened up to include a wider society. Debate on taxation should be carried out in the open and include all sectors of society if taxation is to play its role as a governance tool in the strengthening of democratic structures. Fiscal legislation to stop illicit capital light has been implemented during 2010, but there is a need to strengthen tax authorities to ensure compliance. here is also a need for information exchange to receive information on unreported wealth held in tax havens, as well as information on the profits that multinational companies are making in Kenya to be able to detect mispricing practices. 55 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA By Dr Attiya Waris Country facts 122 49.3 millions (2009) Population, total US$ 5798 current (2009) GDP per capita 51.5 years (2009) Life expectancy at birth, total Literacy 88% of population age 15+ (2008) Mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 people 92 (2009) Internet users per 100 people 8.6 (2009) Total external debt stock US$ 41.943 billion (2008) Net oicial development assistance US$ 1.125 billion (2008) Today, South Africa is considered the economic motor of Africa.123 Unlike many other African states there has been active research for many years on capital light issues in the South African context. Since capital light involves the movement of money across borders, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) becomes critical, as it involves the authorised capital that is allowed to move in and out of a state for the purpose of facilitation of investment. here is consistent data on FDI lows to and from South Africa available from 1956 and onwards. FDI is a good indicator of the amount of possible capital light as it relects the ease of movement of capital. he easier it is to move the money, the easier to conduct capital light. It is also well established that FDI played a crucial role in the earlier development of the South African economy, and that there has been capital light. For example, Rustomjee has analysed capital light from South Africa under apartheid rule.124 he end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994 increased competition in Africa, and large transnational companies seeking a single production or headquarter centre in Anglophone Africa moved to South Africa, making it the largest and strongest competing economy in Africa.125 South Africa, unlike many African countries, is involved in the international movement of capital as both a receiver and a distributor. While there continues to be capital light out of South Africa to other states including tax havens, the current legal framework allows for capital light into the country as well. hese legal provisions encourage investment which has resulted in the investment of capital illicitly and legally, especially from other African states into the South African economy. he legal background of the South African tax system he power to collect and distribute taxation in South Africa is set out in articles 213-230 of the current South African Constitution.126 In addition, there is an extensive and varied list of legislation on taxation.127 South Africa has a residence-based tax system, which means residents are - subject to certain exclusions - taxed on their worldwide income, irrespective of where their income was earned. Non-residents are, however, taxed on their income from a South African source. 56 Foreign taxes are credited against South African tax payable on foreign income. he majority of the state’s income is derived from income tax (personal and company tax), although nearly a third of total revenue from national government taxes comes from indirect taxes, primarily VAT. he South African Revenue Service (SARS) estimates the tax loss in the country to be up to R30 billion (45% of government revenue)128, largely due to evasion and avoidance by rich individuals and companies.129 At the same time, South Africa has been listed as a tax haven by the Tax Justice Network.130 An increase of the foreign exchange allowance to 750,000 Rand (US$120,000) has opened the inancial loodgates in two directions. As investors are potentially surveying the horizons, the South Africa-based multinational banks are preparing to act, or have already done so. SARS has estimated that South Africa could be losing 64 billion Rand (approximately US$10 billion) to tax havens annually. Pravin Gordhan, the SARS commissioner, said in November 2010 that the German government was sharing information it had received about secret bank accounts in Liechtenstein.131 Measuring capital light from South Africa Smit and Mocke (1991) estimated that the accumulated capital light from South Africa during the period 1970 to 1988 amounted to between US$12-23 billion, depending on the measure used. hey point out that these amounts are large by international standards, and that during the late 1970s capital light from South Africa exceeded that from Argentina, Brazil, or the Philippines.132 Referring to a case study of South Africa by Fedderke and Liu (2002), Boyce and Ndikumana conirm that both the change in political rights dispensation and an index of political instability are positively related to capital light.133 Indeed, the SSA countries with the most developed inancial systems have relatively low levels of capital light (for example Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles).134 he accumulated capital light from South Africa between 1970 and 2004 has been estimated by Boyce and Ndikumana as amounting to US$18.266 billion, however, the trade misinvoicing adjustment could not be calculated in the case of South Africa due to lack of consistent data.135 In 2010, Global Financial Integrity (GFI) estimated that the accumulated capital light from South Africa between 1970-2008 amounted to US$81.840 billion. During the period 2005-2008 alone, capital light from South Africa was almost US$57 billion, which shows a signiicant increase in capital light over the last few years136. In particular, there was a rise in 2007 and 2008. his could be compared with the total external debt stock of the country which in 2008 amounted to US$41.9 billion. Another GFI report estimated the average capital light from South Africa between 2002-2006 at US$ 6.445 billion per year.137 According to the study ‘he implied tax revenue loss from trade mispricing’ (also by GFI), the yearly average of capital light due to just one form of trade mispricing from SA was US$3.872 billion for the same period, and the yearly average tax revenue loss was US$ 1.084 billion138. his means that just one form of trade mispricing by multinationals constituted more than 60% of total capital light during 2002-2006. he revenue loss from this could be compared to the Net Oicial Development Assistance which in 2000 was US$486 million and in 2005 had risen to US$690 million, approximately half of what was lost in revenue due to one form of trade mispricing. 57 During the last 13 years of apartheid, from 1980 to 1993, average capital light as a percentage of GDP was 5.4 percent a year. Post-apartheid, from 1994 to 2000, capital light rose to an average of 9.2 percent of GDP per year.139 Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) is a measure of the net new investment in capital goods (ixed capital assets) by enterprises in the domestic economy during an accounting period. Fixed capital investments typically increase productivity and GDP growth. During 1980-1985, capital outlows as a percentage of GFCF in Africa averaged 39 percent, dropping to 9 percent from 1986-1993. During 1994-2000, capital light as a percentage of GFCF averaged a high of 58 percent. On the whole, it is clear that a very large amount of investment has been foregone in South Africa as a result of the magnitude of capital light.140 South African Revenue Service and the South African Government, in recognition of the peculiar problems facing the conidence of investors, have given tax amnesties for capital light. Once in 2003, and now again in October 2010, the discussion on another amnesty is back on the table.141 Capital light and inequality As discussed earlier in chapters 1 and 3 (page 14 and 44), inequalities in income are increased and the gap between rich and poor is widened by capital light. he economy of South Africa is two-tiered: one rivaling other developed countries, and the other with only the most basic infrastructure. It is therefore a productive and industrialised economy which at the same time exhibits many characteristics associated with developing countries, including a division of labour between formal and informal sectors and an uneven distribution of wealth and income. he primary sector, based on manufacturing, services, mining, and agriculture, is well-developed. UN Habitat igures show that South Africa’s urban population is now at 58 percent, and of the total urban population, 33 percent are living in slums and squatter camps where basic service delivery is poor.142 Overall distribution of wealth is still divided along racial lines, and for some of the poorest of the poor, times are even harder now than they were under white minority rule. he top 20% of families make 60% of the money in South Africa. he bottom half of families take home only 15% of the wealth. he unemployment rate for black South Africans is 41.2%, among the worst in all of Africa. White South Africans have an unemployment rate of 5.1%, among the best in the developed world. 17.1% of South Africans of Indian descent are out of work, while 19.8% of the mixed-race or ‘colored’ population is unemployed. Even more signiicant, in terms of hope for the future, 51.4% of youths aged 16 to 24 are unemployed. hat means that once young people graduate or drop out of school, more than half of them are unable to ind work. Many of these young people turn to black-market activities, such as the drug trade or prostitution, or support themselves through robbery and violent crime. South Africa is also losing the next generation of workers and leaders, while the very wealthy fear for their property and lives in the face of one of the world’s worst epidemics of serious crime. 58 he average black worker makes 12,000 Rand per year (US$1525). A white worker averages 65,400 Rand (US$8,270). 18% of black households have running water, while 87% of white households do. 95% of white families have a telephone, and 46% own a computer. For black families, 31% have a phone, and less than 2% have a computer. Many black families scrape by on US$3 or less per day. hey struggle to scrape together the US$25 yearly school fees for their children.143 In a setting like this, tax revenue is of course extra important to redistribute wealth and give people access to healthcare, education and other basic needs, and the consequences of revenue loss even greater than in a society with less inequality. Civil society, research, and future needs A large part of the South African NGOs connected to issues concerning capital light look at South Africas’ resource bases and are mainly mining oriented, such as South African Resource Watch.144 he others conduct budgetary work like the Institute for Democracy in Southern Africa (IDASA) 145 his includes thematic based analysis such as the South African Women’s Budget Initiative146, who analyse the budget from the perspective of gender-based analysis. In addition, there have been some anti-poverty programmes such as the People’s Budget 2006-2007, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, the South African Council of Churches, and the South African NGO Coalition.147 In addition, the Institute of Security Studies148 has begun working in the area of money laundering and organised crime, not only in South Africa but also in eastern and central Africa. he Institute provides information and analysis of serious organized and cross-border crime patterns in Southern, Western and Eastern Africa to inform about counter-measures at an appropriate level. It studies criminal business in Africa, particularly organized crime, money laundering and the funding of terrorist activities, in order to advise and support institutions of government and parliaments, the private sector, and other interested parties on policies and measures to reduce these forms of crime.149 here is already some research being carried out on capital light. But there is still a need for more in-depth and detailed knowledge on how banks are involved in capital light both into and from South Africa, as well as how the tax haven provisions are utilised at the national, regional as well as continental and international levels by both residents and non-residents. At the national level, there is a need to continue to strengthen the understanding of both citizens and policy makers of efects of capital light on the individual South African, as well as the overall development needs of the state. In addition, there is a need to take the legislation a step further and pursue its efective and eicient enforcement. It should be investigated whether the current framework of guidelines are suiciently addressing the particular context of the South African economy which is (a) cash based, and (b) where informal value transfer methods are the norm. NGOs and the media may play an important role in informing civil society of tax evasion and avoidance and corrupt actions by publishing knowledge that is made easily available for the public. 59 TANZANIA Prepared by the Budget Working Group of Policy Forum in Tanzania Country facts 43.7 million (2009) Population, total GDP per capita US$ 509 (2009) Life expectancy at birth, total 55.6 years (2009) Child malnutrition Literacy 17% of children under 5 (2008) 72 % of population age 15+ (2008) Mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 people 31 (2008) Internet users per 100 people 1.2 (2008) Total debt outstanding and disbursed US$ 5.9 billion (2008) he agricultural sector plays a major role in the economy and employs nearly 80% of the workforce. he most important export commodities are gold and other minerals, industrial products, tobacco, cofee, cotton, cashew nuts, tea and spices. Key growth sectors are mining construction, manufacturing and tourism. Reaching the Millennium Development Goals remains elusive even in areas such as income poverty and access to safe drinking water, which were previously considered within reach150. Introduction Over the past years, the government of Tanzania has focused on raising revenue from a limited number of sources. he focus has been on taxation on drinks, fuel, cigarettes and tobacco products, as well as Value Added Tax and Pay as You Earn (PAYE). he current general consensus amongst the citizens is that these sectors are already overtaxed and that the government cannot impose any further taxes in these areas without aggravating the already rising costs of living and sinking the population further into poverty. he emerging question, therefore, is from where else can government raise more money? In this case study, an analysis based on the available international trade data is made by Policy Forum in Tanzania. It indicates that the Tanzanian government can raise more revenue for the budget by blocking the current massive revenue outlow rather than relying on foreign aid, or over taxation of a few limited sectors. he case study provides an overview and analysis of the Tanzanian government’s revenue based on the projections for the 2009/2010 national budget. It presents some of the data as provided in the Budget Guidelines and Budget Framework for 2009/10-2011/12, which indicates that government revenue will decline steadily until the end of 2012. he study highlights some of the challenges the government will face in light of reduced tax revenues in the wake of the global economic inancial crisis, but also gives insight with regards to how much revenue Tanzania loses through mispricing (for an explanation of mispricing see page 17-18) and uncollected tax. 60 Government’s revenue, aid and debt projections Tanzania’s domestic revenue collection in the 2008/2009 iscal year saw a 10 percent shortfall in meeting its target, and domestic revenue will drop further in 2009/2010 due to the global economic slump. he Government’s projection is that revenue for the year 2009/2010 is expected to fall until the end of 2012, as is foreign assistance. he overall resource envelope will decline by 4% of GDP from 2008/9 to 2011/12. his is primarily due to a projected decline in foreign assistance. 2008/09 2009/10 2011/12 Domestic revenue (% of GDP) 17.7% 17.0% 17.5% Foreign assistance (% of GDP) 9.1% 8.9% 5.3% Overall resource envelope (% of GDP) 26.8% 25.9% 22.8% Projections according to Government Budget Guidelines At the same time, the government has committed itself to continue a policy of zero domestic borrowing for budget inancing over a medium term expenditure framework period. his means that the government has to look to other sources of revenue to cushion its dwindling current sources. Expenditures and plans for domestic resource mobilisation During the 2009/2010 inancial year, the government projects the total government expenditure to Tsh 9.5 trillion (approximately US$ 6.3 billion151). his compares to a slight increase in the government’s overall budget frame since the previous year, but is a decline in real terms if factoring inlation. According to the following table, the total, recurrent, and development expenditures will fall persistently during 2008-2012. his is consistent with the government’s intention of inancing the recurrent expenditure from domestic revenues, while steadily building its savings for inancing infrastructure projects from domestic sources. 2008/09 Total expenditure (% of GDP) 2009/10 2011/12 25.9% 22.8% Recurrent expenditure (% of GDP) 17.7% 16.8% 15.6% Total development expenditure (% of GDP) 9.3% 9.1% 7.3% Expenditures according to the Budget Guidelines and Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) 61 From this data, it is evident that over the next years the government will grapple to manage its budget. As a consequence, its macroeconomic targets may not be achieved. In order for the government to raise these funds, new innovative choices have to be made. According to government plans, the focus for the 2009/2010 budget will be to direct eforts in the following areas: Improving tax administration and accountability among the taxpayers and tax collectors Widening of the tax base by registering new taxpayers and improving tax compliance Instituting improved management and control of tax exemptions Establishing additional Large Taxpayers Units for medium sized taxpayers in order to facilitate collection of more revenue in the medium term Automating the tax system Strengthening supervision of excise and customs duties Increasing the contribution of non-tax revenue from the current level of about 1 percent of GDP to at least 3 percent of GDP in the medium term. Tapping into resources accumulated as revenue from surpluses, dividends and corporate tax from public investments by making changes in the Finance Act of 2008. Despite these good initiatives, experience in the past years indicates that the government’s seemingly good plans have never successfully generated resources to meet its anticipated national targets. he revenues generated from the government’s iscal and monetary plans are still far below the actual revenue required to inance and achieve Tanzania’s national development strategy known as MKUKUTA targets. Achieving the MKUKUTA targets (Tanzania’s national development strategy) MKUKUTA is a Kiswahili acronym for the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty. It forms part of Tanzania’s eforts to deliver on its national Vision 2025. he focus is outcomeorientated and organized around three clusters: Cluster 1: Growth and reduction of income poverty Cluster 2: Improved quality of life and social well-being Cluster 3: Governance and accountability152. According to the Budget Guidelines, the total amount of money required (requirements) to achieve these targets in 2009-2010 is Tsh 5.8 trillion. he actual resources available (ceilings) to the government is Tsh 3.6 trillion. Hence, the diference between the total requirement and ceilings (MKUKUTA funding Gap) is Tsh 2.2 trillion (approximately US$ 1.5 billion). Faced with this shortage, the government has had to make very calculated manoeuvres by thinly spreading the available revenue resources across the three MKUKUTA clusters. 62 he consequence of this scarcity of resources to meet high targets is that the net impact of MKUKUTA has not been adequate to bring about changes in the lives of ordinary citizens. his therefore implies that the government has to look elsewhere to generate more revenue to inance and achieve its MKUKUTA targets. Faced with an already over taxed population and a shrinking source of foreign aid, the logical alternative for the government is to look into the massive revenue that has been lost through illicit conduit means. Revenue loss arising from illicit capital light and tax evasion According to estimations rom Global Financial Integrity, illicit capital light rom Tanzania was on average US$ 660 million per year between 2002-2006153. he total illicit capital light between1970-2008 is estimated at US$7.356 billion154. Mining companies in Tanzania have engaged in aggressive tax evasion measures aimed at reducing their tax obligation. Tax evasion is an illegal practice, where companies knowingly under declare their proits to lower their tax bill (see an explanation on page 17-18). In 2003, an independent auditor contracted by the government to examine the account of four major Tanzanian gold mining companies alleged that two of them over declared their losses, reducing in turn their tax liabilities to the government. If the auditors report is correct, this has cost the government Tsh 171 billion (equivalent to US$132 million) in lost revenues between 1998 and 2003. According to international trade statistics, Tanzania lost approximately Tsh 53.93 billion (approximately US$ 36 million) in revenue due to illicit means and trade mispricing of Tanzanian products sold to foreign countries between 2005 and 2007155. Still, this is a crude igure because it only combines the cumulative revenue estimates lost to the European Union and the United States. he loss excludes revenue lost in trade with trading partner countries like China, India and South Africa. It also excludes revenue lost due to bad contracts in lucrative sectors such as mining, ishing, forestry and tourism. During this period, revenue loss was increasing signiicantly each year. Another estimation of revenue loss due to trade mispricing made by Global Financial Integrity shows that Tanzania on average lost US$ 32.7 million per year between 2002-2006156. Data from the United Nations database Comtrade, Eurostat and the US census board - which contains data on the quantity and value of commodity trade between countries (if reported by one of these countries) - indicates that there is a signiicant variation between the quantity and values of the commodity trade between Tanzania and other countries. he massive loss of revenue is largely due to multinationals evading taxes through a system called transfer pricing and trade mispricing (explained on page 17-18). his system includes under pricing, transfer of proits and establishment of subsidiaries of multinationals in tax havens like the Canary Islands, Jersey, Island of Man and Cayman Islands to avoid paying taxes in countries such as Tanzania. he impact of such tax evasion on Tanzania’s economy is great as the country is badly deprived of the much needed revenue. 63 he trade data between 2005-2007 indicates that Tanzania is the second largest loser of revenues due to trade mispricing in the East African region. Kenya loses the largest volume of revenue to the European Union and United States, while Uganda follows in third place. One of the explanations for this trend is that Kenya is the biggest economy in the region. But another explanation is that most of Tanzanian products are smuggled into Kenya and sold as Kenyan products on to the international market. he international trade statistics therefore record this volume of trade as originating from Kenya. he major products smuggled from Tanzania into Kenya include agricultural, mining and tourism. Revenue loss arising from tax exemptions Tanzania is also losing massive revenue in tax exemptions and tax breaks granted to government departments, donor supported projects, private businesses, NGOs and mining companies. his is not illegal and is not the same thing as illicit capital light, but should be mentioned because of the huge revenue loss it incurs to the country. According to the Tanzanian revenue authority, the Government lost Tsh 587 billion in tax exemptions made between July 2008 and April 2009. Projects under the Tanzania Investment Center (TIC) accounted for the largest percentage of the total exemption. Other beneiciaries included state-owned institutions, the government of Zanzibar, as well as religious and non-religious non-governmental organizations. In 2008 alone the government lost Tsh 1.8 trillion in exemptions (approximately US$ 1.2 billion). More revenue was lost to mining companies operating in Tanzania. None of the mining companies have sought exemptions from royalties or corporate income taxes in any of the contracts. However, they have sought signiicant exemptions from local government taxes, withholding taxes, and fuel levies. he mining agreements stipulate that companies will not pay local government tax in excess of US$ 200,000 a year (Tsh 260 million), even though this is much lower than the 0.3% of the value of company turnover, which the law requires they should pay in local government taxes. he Bomani Commission has estimated that the government has foregone Tsh 39.8 billion (approximately US$ 26.5 million) in 2006/2007 and Tsh 59 billion in 2007/2008 in revenue as a result of fuel levy exemptions granted to the six largest mining companies. In addition, the mining contracts have set stamp duties at 0.3%, a tenth of the rate of 4% stipulated in the substantive law. he revenue lost through a combination of tax exemptions and illicit trade means such as trade mispricing with foreign countries and multinationals amounts to over Tsh 2 trillion a year. his amount would have gone a long way to cover the inancing gap of Tsh 2.2 trillion (approximately US$ 1.5 billion) required to meet the MKUKUTA cluster requirements for the year 2009/2010. Recommendations speciic to Tanzania In order for the government to achieve its stated policy objectives, measures should be taken according to the general recommendations on page 66-67. Eforts that are speciic for the Tanzanian context should be directed in the following areas: 64 We commend the government’s plan to improve tax administration by implementing the TRA’s hird Corporate Plan, which focuses on promoting compliance and accountability among the taxpayers and tax collectors. Locally curbing mispricing by enacting legislation demanding transparency and accountability by multinational companies and foreign governments doing business with Tanzania. Company law in Tanzania should require all registered mining and other extractive companies to use the EITI template in reporting on their annual inancial operations. Seeking the possibility of using Tanzania’s inluence in the United Nations Security Council to lobby for establishment of an international Tax Police system modelled around the global police body Interpol (which combats transnational crime) and the Kimberly certiication process (which monitors global trading in blood diamonds). his process would involve getting exporting countries or countries of origin to certify that a given set of goods have been exported with due consideration of the country’s tax laws. Addressing the indiscriminate and uncalled for tax exemptions and subsidies which are leecing the government of much revenue to inance its operations. he best option for exemption should be case-by-case rather than blanket exemptions to all state institutions, donor supported projects, religious organizations, NGOs and private investments. he exemption and tax waiver policy for large multinational companies and mining companies should be reviewed. Conclusion As the government of Tanzania grapples to maintain inancial stability to inance its budget in the face of the current global economic crisis and dwindling foreign sources, it is clear that the government faces a huge problem with tax dodging by big businesses. he same applies for uncalled for exemptions. he government can raise more revenue internally by blocking the massive losses due to trade mispricing and unnecessary exemptions, which have for so many years allowed companies and individuals to take millions of shillings meant for the Tanzanian government. he consequence of this has been declining revenue collection and declining social service delivery. his has angered the citizens and driven them further towards evading taxes. he citizens need to see improved social service delivery. Social services require revenue and government cannot achieve its targets without collecting more taxes internally. Citizens will be less likely to pay more taxes if they continue to see that large companies that are supposed to pay taxes do not. NOTE: All of the data in this brief should be treated with caution, as the Budget Guidelines provide only preliminary indications of what is expected in the coming inancial year. his brief is also based on the Guidelines for the Preparation of Medium Term Plan and Budget Framework for 2009/10-2010/12 ; A Christian Aid Report, entitled: False Proits: robbing the poor to keep the rich tax free, March 2009; and igures calculated based on trade statistics available at Eurostat and the US Census Board. 65 SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS If non-governmental organisations and decision makers in Europe and Africa act together they can reduce or end illicit capital light. he list below sets out measures recommended from the indings in this report. Commitment at the national, regional and international level is needed to: 1. Improve the international accounting system to make it more transparent so that illicit capital light can be uncovered. Currently, companies are not required to report enough detail about their proits, their tax payments or even their ownership to enable governments to claim the tax that is due. Multinational companies should be obliged to report their inancial activities with a breakdown for each country where they operate. his is called country-by-country reporting. Making it mandatory for all types of multinational companies is a irst step towards prevention of illicit cross-border lows. Governments and international groupings such as the G20 and UN should formally request the International Accounting Standards Board to adopt it in their International Financial Reporting Standards. 2. he key to tackling tax havens is to ensure that all countries require their inancial institutions to reveal information on all sorts of income to tax authorities, and that such information is exchanged between states. Only through information exchange between states will it be possible to track illicit capital light through tax evasion and avoidance, as well as criminal activities and corruption. To be afordable and useful for developing countries, the information exchange agreements have to be multilateral, and exchange of information has to be automatic instead of upon request. To capture capital light fully, the agreement must aim at being global, and there has to be multilateral countermeasures for non-compliance. Ongoing discussions at the G20 and OECD should result in this. Sanctions should be imposed on tax havens that do not actively cooperate on information exchange. If needed and wanted, donors should provide support for developing countries to develop their technical capacity (including the requirements for conidential handling of information) so that they can adhere to a multilateral agreement on automatic information exchange. 3. African states need to strengthen their tax systems, surveillance, and collection of tax to prevent tax evasion and illicit capital light. EU states must support capacity building of tax authorities in African states. his should include technical assistance and expertise, speciically to customs, revenue and bank supervisory authorities. It should be available to African countries that request it, for them to purchase from a service provider of their choice. Donors should make speciic eforts aimed at recovering and repatriating stolen assets to African states. 66 4. To include all countries in the work against illicit capital light, the United Nations Committee of Experts on Tax Matters should be strengthened and upgraded with a political mandate to an intergovernmental body. A main task for the committee should be to develop and promote the UN Code of Conduct on International Cooperation in Combating Tax Evasion, which should be implemented at the national and international level. Non-governmental organisations are calling for the committee to establish tax avoidance and tax evasion as a form of corruption. 5. States should adopt codes of conduct by tax administrations which make clear that tax evasion and avoidance is unacceptable, as well as ensure disclosure of information and iscal cooperation aimed at eliminating bank secrecy. 6. States should take legal action on illicit capital light. he handling of the proceeds of illicit capital light, and aiding and facilitating illicit capital light, should be made a crime with strict penalties that might include suspending a bank’s banking licence and revoking the license to practice of accountants, lawyers and other professionals. Criminal penalties should also be considered in the most egregious cases of abuse. 7. Because of the link between illicit capital light and debt, responsible lending and borrowing has to be ensured. his could be done, for example, through applying the responsible inancing standards developed by Eurodad when signing a loan. his ensures transparency, shared responsibility between borrowers and lenders, and fair arbitration if responsibilities are not honoured. 8. Governments that are on the board of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund should ensure that the institutions do not pressure governments to liberalise capital controls, sector regulations or other economic policies in such a way that will permit greater capital light. 9. Public funds intended for development should not be allowed to beneit tax havens and facilitate illicit capital light trough making use of tax havens. Research has shown that national aid agencies, investment funds for development, and the International Finance Corporation at the World Bank make use of tax havens or support companies that make use of tax havens. his should not be allowed. Companies that beneit from support should be obliged to report their inancial activities on a country-by-country basis. 10. here is a lack of information on and awareness of illicit capital light and its efects on development. Donors should support research by academics, as well as surveillance and awareness raising by civil society organisations. 67 APPENDIX INSTITUTIONS AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON CAPITAL FLIGHT FROM AFRICA Currently there are several initiatives at state, national, regional and international levels dealing with capital light from Africa. hey include: Initiative/Actor Description Link 1 Action Aid Antipoverty NGO that has been engaged in issues on tax evasion and international inancial structures. www.actionaid.org 2 AFRODAD African Forum and Network on Debt and Development, Network of African NGOs. www.afrodad.org 3 African Development Bank he bank has an anti-corruption initiative and works to prevent money laundering. http://www.afdb.org/ en/topics-sectors/sectors/ economic-inancial-governance/anti-corruptioninitiative/# 4 Bank for International Settlements (BIS) International organisation which fosters international monetary and inancial cooperation and serves as a bank for central banks. www.bis.org/ 5 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) Provides a forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters. www.bis.org/bcbs/index. htm 6 Basel Institute on Governance Independent non-proit institution devoted to interdisciplinary research, policy advice and capacity building in the areas of public, corporate, and global governance (Centre for Governance and Research), and ofers special services in the ield of asset recovery (International Centre for Asset Recovery). www.baselgovernance.org/ 68 Initiative/Actor Description Link 7 Christian Aid International NGO working to ight poverty. Illicit inancial lows and tax evasion are addressed in several publications. www.christianaid.org.uk/ 8 Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) Aims to strengthen the inancial market infrastructure through promotion of sound and eicient payment and settlement systems. www.bis.org./cpss/index. htm 9 Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) Monitors developments in global inancial markets for central bank governors. www.bis.org/cgfs/index. htm 10 CRADEC Centre Régional Africain pour le Développement Endogène et. Communautaire (Cameroon ). No website 11 Eastern and Southern Africa Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) Membership organisation for jurisdictions in Eastern and Southern Africa working together for prevention and control of the laundering of the proceeds of serious crimes. www.esaamlg.org/ 12 Egmont Group For Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) Informal international association of FIUs. www.egmontgroup.org 13 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) Intergovernmental body whose purpose is the development and promotion of national and international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist inancing. FATF 40+9 recommendations call for countries to operate FIUs that meet the Egmont Group’s deinition. www.fatf-gai.org 14 Financial Stability Board Established to address vulnerabilities and to develop and implement strong regulatory, supervisory and other policies in the interest of inancial stability. www.inancialstabilityboard.org/index.htm 69 Initiative/Actor Description Link 15 Forum Syd A network of over two hundred Swedish organisations working with international development cooperation and advocacy on global issues with the common aim of global justice. Forum Syd has oices in Nairobi and Muanza. www.forumsyd.org 16 Global Financial Integrity (GFI) and the Task Force on Financial Integrity and Economic Development Promotes national and multilateral policies, safeguards, and agreements aimed at curtailing the cross-border low of illegal money. he Task Force on Financial Integrity and Economic Development, initiated by GFI in 2009, is a coalition of civil society organisations and governments that work to address inequalities in the inancial system. www.gip.org/ 17 Global Witness NGO which investigates and campaigns to prevent natural resourcerelated conlict and corruption. www.globalwitness.org 18 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Publishes assessments of inancial sectors in African countries and engages in anti-money laundering and combating the inancing of terrorism. www.imf.org/external/ np/leg/ amlcft/eng/aml1. htm#custom er 19 IMF and the World Bank Financial sector assessment programme (FSAP). he programme brings together World Bank and IMF expertise to help countries reduce the likelihood and severity of inancial sector crises. www.worldbank.org/fsap 20 Information Portal on Corruption in Africa Online resource portal on anti-corruption and democratic governance in Africa. www.ipocafrica.org 21 Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Applied, policy-oriented research institute operating across Sub-Saharan Africa. he Cape Town branch of ISS runs two major programmes on ‘Organised crime and money laundering’ and ‘Governance and anti-corruption’. www.issafrica.org 70 Initiative/Actor Description Link 22 Institute for Economic Afairs NGO formed to promote informed debate on key policy issues, both economic and political, and to propose feasible policy alternatives in these areas. In addition, the institute provides research backup to policy makers including members of parliament. www.ieakenya.or.ke 23 Inter Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) An intergovernmental body whose purpose is the development and promotion of policies, both at national and international levels, to combat money laundering and terrorist inancing. http://www.fatf-gai.org/ document/60/0,3343,en _32250379_3223686 9_34393596_1_1_1_ 1,00.html 24 International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Membership organisation for jurisdictions to promote high standards, integrity and collaboration on market development. www.iosco.org 25 Interpol he world’s largest international police organisation, with 188 member countries. Facilitates cross-border police cooperation, and supports and assists all organisations, authorities and services whose mission is to prevent or combat international crime. www.interpol.org 26 ISODEC NGO working for sustainable human development through the empowerment of the poor and other marginalised groups, especially women. www.isodec.org.gh 27 Mauritius: Financial Intelligence Unit Financial intelligence unit. www.iumauritius.org/ 28 MONEYVAL; Council of Europe Select committee of experts on the evaluation of anti-money laundering. www.coe.int/t/dghl/ monitorin g/moneyval/ 29 National Taxpayers Association he NTA is an independent, nonpartisan organization focused on promoting good governance in Kenya through citizen empowerment, enhancing public service delivery and partnership building. http://www.nta.or.ke/ 71 Initiative/Actor Description Link 30 Nigeria: Financial Intelligence Unit Financial intelligence unit. www.efccnigeria.org/ index.php?option=com_ docman&task= cat_ view&gid=18 31 Oxfam Novib NGO working to ight global poverty and to build independent livelihoods in developing countries. www.oxfamnovib.nl/ 32 Organisation for Economic Coordination and Development (OECD) Involved in most aspects concerning the ight against illicit inancial lows, anti-corruption, tax evasion, money laundering, terrorist inancing and asset recovery. he web page is a resource for publications, statistics and information. www.oecd.org 33 Policy Forum, Tanzania A network of over 90 NGOs registered in Tanzania, drawn together by their speciic interest in inluencing policy processes to enhance poverty reduction, equity and democratization. www.policyforum-tz.org 34 South Africa: Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) Financial intelligence unit. www.ic.gov.za/ 35 Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR) Partnership between the United Nations Oice on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Bank. Aims to encourage and facilitate more systematic and timely return of assets stolen by politically exposed persons through acts of corruption. http://www1.worldbank. org/publicsector/star_site/ 36 SOMO Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations. http://somo.nl/ 37 he Norwegian Government’s Expert Commission of Inquiry into Capital Flight from Developing Countries Expert commission on tax havens and development. http://www.regjeringen. no/en/dep/ud/press/ news/2009/pm_taxhavens. html?id=567661 72 Initiative/Actor Description Link 38 Tax Research Limited Private company researching and advising on tax issues and other aspects of governance. Directed by chartered accountant Richard Murphy. www.taxresearch.org.uk/ 39 Tax Justice Network Independent organisation which conducts research, analysis and advocacy in the ield of taxation and regulation, including the developmental impacts of tax evasion and tax havens. www.taxjustice.net 40 Tax Justice NetworkAfrica African Secretariat of the Tax Justice Network. www.taxjustice4africa.net 41 International Money Laundering Information Network (IMoLIN) Internet-based network of organisations and individuals. www.imolin.org/ 42 U4 Anti-corruption resource centre serving bilateral donors. Located at Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway. www.U4.no 43 United Nations Ofice on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Operates in all regions of the world through an extensive network of ield oices. Mandated to assist member states in their struggle against illicit drugs, crime and terrorism through technical cooperation and analytical work. www.unodc.org 44 US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Investigation of cases linked to the U.S. http://hsgac.senate.gov/ public/indcfm?FuseAction =Subcommittees. Investigations 73 TAX HAVENS, OFFSHORE FINANCE CENTRES AND SECRECY JURISDICTIONS ACCORDING TO OECD, IMF, TAX JUSTICE NETWORK AND THE FINANCIAL SECRECY INDEX RANKING Tax havens, ofshore inance centres and secrecy jurisdictions Andorra* Anguilla* Antigua & Barbuda* Aruba Austria Bahamas Bahrain Barbados Belgium Belize Bermuda British Virgin Islands Brunei* Cayman Islands Cook Islands* Costa Rica Cyprus Dominica* Germany (Frankfurt) Gibraltar* Grenada* Guernsey Hong Kong Hungary Iceland Ireland Isle of Man Israel (Tel Aviv) Italy (Campione d’Italia & Trieste) Jersey Latvia Lebanon Liberia* Liechtenstein* Luxembourg Macao Malaysia (Labuan) 74 OECD-list IMF-list TJN-list X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Financial Secrecy Index Rank 57 joint 55 joint 46 36 12 33 14 28 9 37 7 16 joint 39 4 joint 46 34 18 joint 39 joint 46 joint 46 13 10 22 6 24 20 11 26 27 54 joint 55 2 29 23 Tax havens, ofshore inance centres and secrecy jurisdictions Maldives* Malta Marshall Islands* Mauritius Monaco* Montserrat* Nauru* Netherlands Netherlands Antilles Niue Northern Mariana Islands Palau Panama Philippines Portugal (Madeira) Russia (Ingushetia) Samoa* San Marino São Tomé e Principe Seychelles* Singapore Somalia South Africa Spain (Melilla) St Kitts & Nevis* St Lucia* St Vincent & Grenadines* Switzerland Taiwan (Taipei) Tonga Turkish Rep. of Northern Cyprus Turks & Caicos Islands* United Arab Emirates (Dubai) United Kingdom (City of London) Uruguay US Virgin Islands* USA (Delaware) USA (New York) Vanuatu OECD-list IMF-list TJN-list X X X X X X X X X X X 58 21 joint 46 32 60 59 joint 46 15 38 19 25 17 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Financial Secrecy Index Rank joint 39 joint 39 8 joint 46 joint 39 joint 39 3 joint 39 31 5 30 joint 46 1 35 * Jurisdictions marked with an asterix are ranked according to their opacity score. Source: Tax Justice Network (2007), Identifying tax havens and ofshore inance centres 75 REFERENCES 1 Trevor Manuel , January 2008. Adressed to the Fourth OECD Forum on Tax Administration. Available at www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/speeches/2008/2008011001.pdf 2 Gordon Brown, 10 March 2009, Speech to DFID conference on eliminating world poverty. Transcript available at www.number10.gov.uk/Page18554 3 Kar, D and Cartwright-Smith, D (2008), Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 20022006, Global Financial Integrity 4 Raymond W Baker, Senior Fellow at the US Centre for International Policy, he Ugliest Chapter in Global Afairs Since Slavery, speech to Global Financial Integrity Program, 28 June 2007 5 Eurodad (2008), Adressing Development’s Black Hole: Regulating Capital Flight 6 Kar D and Cartwright-Smith, D (2008), Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2002-2006, Global Financial Integrity: he main methods of estimating illicit lows by GFI involve a combination of the World Bank Residual Model and the Trade Mispricing Model. he former is intuitively appealing in that source of funds (inlow of capital) which are not matched by recorded use of funds (outlows or expenditures of capital) are considered to be illicit inancial lows. Source of funds include types of capital inlows such as increases in net external indebtedness of the public sector and the net low of foreign direct investment. GFI also utilizes two alternative measures of net external indebtedness of the public sector, one based on changes in the stock of external debt and the other on the net debt lows. Use of funds includes the current account deicit (that is inanced by the capital account lows) and additions to reserves. In this broad macroeconomic framework, outward illicit lows exist when the source of funds exceeds the use of funds, and vice-versa for inward illicit inancial lows. 7 Kar, D and Cartwright-Smith, D (2008), Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2002-2006, Global Financial Integrity 8 Kar, D, and Cartwright-Smith, D (2010) Illicit inancial lows from Africa: Hidden Resource for Development, Global Financial Integrity 9 Kar, D and Cartwright-Smith, D (2008), Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2002-2006, Global Financial Integrity 9A Raymond W Baker, he ugliest chapter in global afairs since slavery, speech to Global Financial Integrity Program, June 28, 2007 10 http://www.1billionhungry.org/ 11 See for example UK Department for International Development (DFID) (2009), Why tax matters for international development, brieing note, London. Cited from Action Aid (2009), Accounting for poverty: how international tax rules keep people poor 12 Action Aid (2009), Accounting for poverty: how international tax rules keep people poor 13 Developing countries in this context are 160 countries classiied as such according to the International Monetary Fund’s international statistics system of country classiications 14 Kar, D and Cartwright-Smith, D (2008), Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2002-2006, Global Financial Integrity 15 Kar and Cartwright-Smith, (2010) Illicit inancial lows from Africa: Hidden Resource for Development, Global Financial Integrity, p.1 16 SOMO (2008), Taxation and Financing for Development, Action Aid, (2009), Accounting for poverty: how international tax rules keep people poor, and Christian Aid, (2008), Death and taxes: the true toll of tax dodging 17 Kapoor, S (2006), Exposing the myth and plugging the leaks, in Impossible architecture, Social Watch 18 SOMO (2008), Taxation and Financing for Development 76 19 Simon J. Pack and John Zdanovic, 2002 and 2006, cited from Eurodad (2008), Adressing Development’s Black Hole: Regulating Capital Flight 20 Eurodad (2008), Adressing Development’s Black Hole: Regulating Capital Flight 21 Kar, D and Cartwright-Smith, D (2008), Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2002-2006, Global Financial Integrity, tables 5 and 6, appendix p.13-17 22 KPMG, Pushed illegal tax dodge, Observer, January 2005. Cited from Christian Aid (2008), Death and taxes: the true toll of tax dodging 23 Eurodad (2008), Adressing Development’s Black Hole: Regulating Capital Flight 24 GTZ, Public inance, web page http://bit.ly/5yqu4, accessed 11 Jan 2011. Cited from Action Aid (2009), Accounting for poverty: how international tax rules keep people poor 25 DFID (2008). Cited from Action Aid, (2009), Accounting for poverty: how international tax rules keep people poor. he sums of 60 million UK£ and 240 million UK£ were converted to US$ according to the rate of 15 Dec 2010. 26 Taken from a transcript of the Democratic presidential debate, 13 December 2007. Available at www. nytimes.com/2007/12/13/us/politics/13text-debate.html?pagewanted=all Cited from Action Aid (2009), What next? 27 OECD (1998), Harmful tax competition: an emerging global issue, Paris. Cited from Action Aid (2009), What next? 28 Commission on Capital Flight from Developing Countries (2009), Tax havens and development, Norad, Oslo, p.30-31 29 Palan, R., Murphy, R., and Chavagneux, C. (2010), Tax Havens: How Globalisation Really Works, Cornell University Press, p. 21 30 TJN (2007), Identifying tax havens and ofshore inance centres 31 Cited from Eurodad (2008), Adressing Development’s Black Hole: Regulating Capital Flight, p.17 32 Kapoor, S (2007), Haemorrhaging money, Christian Aid Brieing, cited from Eurodad (2008), Adressing Development’s Black Hole: Regulating Capital Flight 33 See note 40 or the global map over tax havens, p. 22-23 34 GFI (2010), Privately held , non-residents deposits in secrecy jurisdictions, Washington 35 Krugman, P (2008), he Return of Depression Economics. Penguin, London. Cited from. Action Aid, (2009), Accounting for poverty: how international tax rules keep people poor 36 Keen, M and Mansour, M (2009), Revenue mobilization in sub-Saharan Africa: challenges from globalization. IMF working paper WP/09/157, Washington, p.16 See http://bit.ly/zG9on Cited from Action Aid, (2009), Accounting for poverty: how international tax rules keep people poor 37 Ibid, p.19 38 Exchange rate USD/GBP=0,54871 (2004-6 average) 39 he total tax rate is a World Bank/PricewaterhouseCoopers measure that includes proit, labour consumption and other taxes borne by a company. An independent review in 2008 recommended that the TTR calculation should be excluded from the World Bank’s rankings, and as a result the measure is to be reviewed. See World Bank (2009) Doing business: an independent evaluation, Washington, http://bit.ly/ np3F4 Cited from Action Aid, (2009), Accounting for poverty: how international tax rules keep people poor 40 Tanzi, V and Zee, H (2001), Tax policy for developing countries. IMF Economic issue 27, Washington. See http://bit.ly/tcsR9 41 UNCTAD (2000), Tax incentives and foreign direct investment: a global survey. United Nations, New York/Geneva, 2000, p.11 See http://bit.ly/4tRWsA 42 Murphy, R et al. (2007), Closing the Floodgate, Collecting tax to pay for development, Tax Justice Network 43 Klemm, A (2009), Causes, beneits, and risks of business tax incentives, IMF Working Paper WP/09/21, Washington. See http://bit/ly/SQtC 77 44 Action Aid, (2009), Accounting for poverty: how international tax rules keep people poor SOMO (2008), Taxation and Financing for Development 46 Action Aid, (2009), Accounting for poverty: how international tax rules keep people poor 47 his according to estimations done by the Swedish tax authorities. See: http://www.skatteverket.se/ omskatteverket/omoss/beskattningsverksamheten/specialgranskningar/utlandstransaktioner.4.58a1634211 f85df4dce800011401.html?posid=9&sv.search.query.allwords=skatteparadis Accessed Nov 25, 2010 48 See http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/14/41/65/a783b210.pdf Accessed Nov 25, 2010 49 Sweden in 2009 spent 1.12 % of Gross National Income on aid, which is more than any other country. 50 his according to Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. Cited from Action Aid, (2009), Accounting for poverty: how international tax rules keep people poor p. 20 51 See http://www.g20.org/ 52 Tax Justice Network is an independent organisation launched in the British Houses of Parliament in March 2003. It is dedicated to high-level research, analysis and advocacy in the ield of tax and regulation. It works to map, analyse and explain the role of taxation and the harmful impacts of tax evasion, tax avoidance, tax competition and tax havens. See www.tjn.net 53 he OECD is a 34-member intergovernmental body comprised of states that are committed to “an open market economy, democratic pluralism and respect for human rights”. Based in Paris, its secretariat functions as a global economic “think tank”. 54 G20, Nov 15, 2008, Summit on inancial markets and the world economy: declaration. Available at: www.g20.org/Documents/g20_summit_declaration.pdf 55 OECD (April 2009), A progress report on the jurisdictions surveyed by the OECD global forum in implementing the internationally agreed tax standard. 56 See OECD homepage: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/0/43606256.pdf Assecced 27 Oct 2010 57 See OECD homepage: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/59/43775845.pdf Assecced 27 Oct 2010 58 BBC News, 13 March 2009, Switzerland eases banking secrecy. Cited from Action Aid (2009), What next? 59 Eurodad (2008), Adressing Development’s Black Hole: Regulating Capital Flight 60 Meinzer, M (2010), Policy Paper on Automatic Information Exchange between Northern and Southern Countries, Tax Justice Network. See: http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/AIE_100926_TJNBrieing-2.pdf Accessed Nov 4, 2010 61 See http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/speech_fst_270110. htm Accessed Nov 8, 2010 62 See OECD homepage http://www.oecd.org/document/61/0,3343,en_2649_33767_45336893_1_1 _1_1,00.html, Accessed Nov 8, 2010. May 27, 2010 was the last date that the OECD had updated the information about the signatories in November 2010. 63 Meinzer, M (2010), Policy Paper on Automatic Information Exchange between Northern and Southern Countries, Tax Justice Network, p. 23-24 See: http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/AIE_100926_ TJN-Brieing-2.pdf Accessed Nov 8, 2010 64 European Parliament resolution of 10 February 2010 on promoting good governance in tax matters (2009/2174(INI)) See: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&ref erence=P7-TA-2010-0020 Accessed Nov 3, 2010 Cited from Eurodad article he European Parliament Condemns tax havens and Urges the European Union to Fight Capital light by Maria Victoria and Garcia Ojeda March 3, 2010 at http://www.eurodad.org/whatsnew/articles.aspx?id=4037 Accessed Nov 3, 2010 65 European Commission, April 21 2010, COM(2010)163 inal, Communication from the commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee, Tax and Development Cooperating with Developing Countries on Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters, SEC(2010)426, Brussels. See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNu mber&lg=EN&type_doc=COMinal&an_doc=2010&nu_doc=0163 EU homepage, Accessed Nov 8, 2010 45 78 66 Council conclusions on tax and development - cooperating with developing countries in promoting good governance in tax matters, 3023rd FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting, Luxembourg, 14 June 2010. See http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/NewsWord/EN/foraf/115145.doc Accessed Nov 8, 2010 67 he term country-by-country reporting was invented by Richard Murphy, founder of the Tax Justice Network as well as Director of Tax Research LLP, and promoted by NGOs and researchers. It is now widely used in discussions and documents by the OECD, World Bank, European Parliament etc. 68 Murphy, R (2009), Country-by-country reporting: holding multinational corporations to account wherever they are, Task force on Financial Integrity and Economic Development, Washington 69 UK-French Summit. Declaration on global governance and development, Evian, 2009 70 European Parliament resolution of 10 February 2010 on promoting good governance in tax matters (2009/2174(INI)) See: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&ref erence=P7-TA-2010-0020 Accessed Nov 3, 2010 Cited from Eurodad article he European Parliament Condemns tax havens and Urges the European Union to Fight Capital light by Maria Victoria and Garcia Ojeda March 3, 2010 at http://www.eurodad.org/whatsnew/articles.aspx?id=4037 Accessed Nov 3, 2010 71 European Parliament resolution of 15 June 2010 on progress towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals: mid-term review in preparation of the UN high-level meeting in September 2010 (2010/2037(INI)) See: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&langu age=EN&reference=P7-TA-2010-0210 Accessed Nov 10 2010 72 European Commission, April 21, 2010, COM(2010)163 inal, Communication from the commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee, Tax and Development Cooperating with Developing Countries on Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters, SEC (2010) 426, Brussels, See: http://eurlex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNum ber&lg=EN&type_doc=COMinal&an_doc=2010&nu_doc=0163 EU homepage, Accessed Nov 8 2010 73 Publish What You Pay (PWYP) is a global civil society coalition that helps citizens of resource-rich developing countries hold their governments accountable for the management of revenues from the oil, gas and mining industries. See http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/ Accessed Nov 10, 2010 74 See http://www.ifrs.org/NR/rdonlyres/7FAC2D52-A064-41BD-8BA8-445245232E0B/0/CL55.pdf Accessed Nov 10, 2010. Cited from Eurodad article Country by country reporting hailed by World Bank, but can it practice what it preaches? by Maria Victoria Garcia Ojeda, Aug 31, 2010 See: http://www.eurodad. org/whatsnew/articles.aspx?id=4272&item=4224 Accessed Nov 10, 2010 75 See Murphy, R (2010), Investments for Development: Derailed to Tax Havens: A report on the use of tax havens by Development Finance Institutions, IBIS, CRBM, Eurodad, NCA, Forum Syd and the Tax Justice Network See http://www.eurodad.org/uploadedFiles/Whats_New/Reports/Investments%20for%20 development_Derailed%20to%20tax%20havens.pdf?n=1377, Accessed Jan 10, 2011, and Eurodad and TJN (2010), Is the International Finance Corporation Supporting Tax-Evading Companies? 76 he Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 77 International Conference on inancing for development. Doha declaration on inancing for development. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Afairs, New York, 2008. Cited from Action Aid, (2009), Accounting for poverty: how international tax rules keep people poor. p.46 78 Action Aid, (2009), Accounting for poverty: how international tax rules keep people poor, p.47 79 International conference on taxation, state building and capacity development in Africa. Cited from Action Aid, (2009), Accounting for poverty: how international tax rules keep people poor, p.44 80 Kar, D, and Cartwright-Smith, D (2010) Illicit inancial lows from Africa: Hidden Resource for Development, Global Financial Integrity. For a description of Global Financial Integrity see p. 10 81 Ibid no 80 82 Ndikumana L and Boyce JK (2008) New estimates of capital light from sub-Saharan African countries: Linkages with external borrowing and policy options, Workingpaperseries number 166, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst 79 83 Ibid no 82 Kar, D, and Cartwright-Smith, D (2010) Illicit inancial lows from Africa: Hidden Resource for Development, Global Financial Integrity. For their estimations the authors used the World Bank Residual Method and the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. 85 HNWI refers to persons who have liquid assets of above US$1 million, calculated as the total wealth excluding ixed assets such as houses of residence. 86 Persons who have over US$ 30 million in inancial assets. 87 Kar, D, and Cartwright-Smith, D (2010) Illicit inancial lows from Africa: Hidden Resource for Development, Global Financial Integrity 88 Ndikumana, L and Boyce, JK (2007), New estimates of capital light from sub-Saharan African countries: Linkages with external borrowing and policy options, Paper prepared for the senior policy seminar on ‘Capital Flight from Sub-Saharan Africa: Implications for Macroeconomic Management and Growth’, jointly organized by the Association of African Central Bank Governors, the Reserve Bank of South Africa, and the World Bank, in collaboration with the African Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Bank of England, Oct 30 – Nov 2, 2007, Pretoria, South Africa 89 Ndikumana L and Boyce JK (2008) New estimates of capital light from sub-Saharan African countries: Linkages with external borrowing and policy options, Workingpaperseries number 166, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst 90 Kar, D, and Cartwright-Smith, D (2010) Illicit inancial lows from Africa: Hidden Resource for Development, Global Financial Integrity 91 International Finance Corporation (1998) and Ndikumana (2000), cited from Ndikumana L and Boyce JK (2008) New estimates of capital light from sub-Saharan African countries: Linkages with external borrowing and policy options, Workingpaperseries number 166, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst 92 Collier, Hoeler and Patillo (2001:59), cited from Ndikumana L and Boyce JK (2008) New estimates of capital light from sub-Saharan African countries: Linkages with external borrowing and policy options, Workingpaperseries number 166, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst 93 Nyarko (2007), cited from Ndikumana L and Boyce JK (2008) New estimates of capital light from subSaharan African countries: Linkages with external borrowing and policy options, Workingpaperseries number 166, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst, p 2 94 Ndikumana L and Boyce JK (2008) New estimates of capital light from sub-Saharan African countries: Linkages with external borrowing and policy options, Workingpaperseries number 166, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst, p 3 95 Governor Ndugng of the Central bank of Kenya in a keynote speech at a policy seminar of Governors of African Central banks 2007, cited from Kar, D, and Cartwright-Smith, D (2010) Illicit inancial lows from Africa: Hidden Resource for Development, Global Financial Integrity p. 6 96 Ajayi, S and Khan, M.S (2000) External Debt and Capital Flight in Sub-Saharan Africa 97 Ibid no 96 98 Ajayi, S and Khan, M. S (2000).External Debt and Capital Flight in Sub-Saharan Africa, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.; Ndikumana, L. and Boyce, J. K. (1998) Congo’s Odious Debt: External Borrowing and Capital Flight in Zaire, Development and Change, 29, 195; Ndikumana, L. and Boyce, J. K (2003) Public Debts and Private Assets: Explaining Capital Flight from sub-Saharan African Countries. World Development, 31, 107-130; Ndikumana L and Boyce JK (2008) New estimates of capital light from subSaharan African countries: Linkages with external borrowing and policy options, Workingpaperseries number 166, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst; Ndikumana L and Boyce JK (2001) Is Africa a Net Creditor? New Estimates of Capital Flight from Severely Indebted Sub-Saharan African Countries,. Journal of Development Studies, 38, 27-56; Cerra, V, Rishi, M and Saxena, S. C. (2008) Robbing the Riches: Capital Flight, Institutions and Debt. Journal of Development Studies, 44, 1190-1213. 84 80 99 Ndikumana L and Boyce JK (2008) New estimates of capital light from sub-Saharan African countries: Linkages with external borrowing and policy options, Workingpaperseries number 166, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst, p. 36 100 Ibid no 99, p. 9-10 101 Kar, D, and Cartwright-Smith, D (2010) Illicit inancial lows from Africa: Hidden Resource for Development, Global Financial Integrity, p.1 102 OECD (2010) Position Paper: Taxation in Africa: he path to economic independence 103 Sharife (2010), Treasure islands: Mapping the geography of corruption, Pambazuka news, Issue 492, July 29 2010 See http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/66286 Accessed 10 Jan 2011 104 See http://www.africanprogress.net/info_transparency_accountability.htm Accessed 10 Jan 2011 105 Lawal (2007), Corruption and Development in Africa: Challenges for Political and Economic Change 106 See the IBA Anti-Money laundering Forum http://www.anti-moneylaundering.org/africa.aspx Accessed 10 Jan 2010 107 CCFD, (2007) Terre Solidaire, Biens mal acquis, à qui proite le crime? See http://ccfd-terresolidaire.org/ BMA/ 108 See http://www.unodc.org/easternafrica/en/money-laundering/index.html Accessed Jan 10, 2010 109 Greenpeace (2008) Arnaques au Congo 110 World Bank statistics from http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ AFRICAEXT/KENYAEXTN/0,,menuPK:356536~pagePK:141132~piPK:141109~theSiteP K:356509,00.html Accessed Dec 6, 2010 111 Ibid no 110 112 Baker, R. W (2005) Capitalism’s achilles heel: Dirty money and how to renew the free market system, John Wiley and sons, Inc., New Jersey 113 Kar, D, and Cartwright-Smith, D (2010) Illicit inancial lows from Africa: Hidden Resource for Development, Global Financial Integrity, p. 15 114 Kegoro (2009), Money Laundering Patterns in Kenya: Proiling Money Laundering in Eastern and Southern Africa 115 In addition, although there was reference made in the press to a report analysing capital light from Kenya, repeated attempts to obtain the document proved futile. See Mirugi-Mukundi (2010), Money Laundering Control in Kenya – New Dawn or False Promise, ISS Today, Jul 13, 2010 http://www.iss.org.za/iss_today. php?ID=982 Accessed Aug 30, 2010 116 Fofack, H. and Ndikumana, L. (2009), Potential Gains from Capital Flight: Repatriation for SubSaharan African Countries, World Bank 117 Keynote address of Prof. Njuguna Ndung’u, Governor of the Central Bank of Kenya, at the Senior Policy Seminar on Implications of Capital Flight for Macroeconomic Management and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, (South African Reserve Bank, Oct 30, 2007), Accessed at www.centralbank.go.ke/ download/gove July 19, 2010 118 Kar, D and Cartwright-Smith, D (2008), Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2002-2006, Global Financial Integrity 119 Hollingshead, A (2010), he implied tax revenue loss from trade mispricing, GFI 120 Waris, Kohonen and Ranguma (2009), Taxation and State Building in Kenya: Enhancing revenue capacity to advance humanWelfare, Tax Justice Network 121 Baker, R. W (2005) Capitalism’s achilles heel: Dirty money and how to renew the free market system, John Wiley and sons, Inc., New Jersey 122 World Bank statistics from http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ AFRICAEXT/SOUTHAFRICAEXTN/0,,menuPK:368102~pagePK:141132~piPK:141109~theSiteP K:368057,00.html Accessed Dec 6, 2010 81 123 Stapper (2010) Tax regimes in emerging Africa: Can corporate tax rates boost FDI in sub-Sahara Africa? ASC Working Paper 88/2010, African Studies Centre Leiden, he Netherlands 57 124 Rustomjee (1991), Capital Flight under Apartheid, Transformation 15 125 UNCTAD (2005), Investment Policy Review Kenya 126 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa no. 108 of 1996 127 Customs and Excise Act, 1964, Demutualisation Levy Act, 1998, Diamond Export Levy (Administration) Act [No 14 of 2007], Diamond Export Levy (Administration) Act [No 14 of 2007], Diamond Export Levy Act [No 15 of 2007], Diamond Export Levy Act, 2007, Division of Revenue Act 2008 (Act 2 of 2008), Division of Revenue Act [No 2 of 2008], Division of Revenue Act, 2009, Division of Revenue Act, 2009, Division of Revenue Act, 2010 (No. 1 of 22), Division of Revenue Act, 2010 (No. 1 of 22), Division of Revenue Bill, 2010, Estate Duty Act, 1955, Exchange Control Amnesty and Amendment of Taxation Laws Act, 2003 (Act No. 12 of 2003), Financial Management of Parliament Act (No 10 of 2009), Income Tax Act [No. 28 of 1997], Income Tax Act [No. 58 of 1962], Income Tax Act [No. 58 of 1962], Income Tax Act, 1997 (Act No. 28 of 1997), Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act, No. 97 of 1997, Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty (Administration) Act, 2008, Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty Act, 2008, Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act, 2009, Provincial Tax Regulation Process Act [No. 53 of 2001], Provincial Tax Regulation Process Act [No. 53 of 2001], Revenue Laws Amendment Act , [No. 35 of 2007], Revenue Laws Amendment Act, 2002 (Act No. 74 of 2002), Revenue Laws Amendment Act, 2003 (Act No. 45 of 2003), Revenue Laws Amendment Act, 2004 (Act No. 32 of 2004), Revenue Laws Amendment Act, 2005 (Act No. 31 of 2005), Revenue Laws Amendment Act, 2006 (Act No. 20 of 2006), Revenue Laws Amendment Act, 2007 (Act No. 35 of 2007), Revenue Laws Amendment Act, 2008 (Act No. 60 of 2008), Revenue Laws Amendment Act, [No. 20 of 2006], Revenue Laws Amendment Act, [No. 60 of 2008], Revenue Laws Second Amendment Act , [No. 36 of 2007], Revenue Laws Second Amendment Act, 2005 (Act No. 32 of 2005), Revenue Laws Second Amendment Act, 2006 (Act No. 21 of 2006), Revenue Laws Second Amendment Act, 2007 (Act No. 36 of 2007), Revenue Laws Second Amendment Act, 2008 (Act No. 61 of 2008), Revenue Laws Second Amendment Act, [No. 21 of 2006], Revenue Laws Second Amendment Act, [No. 31 of 2005], Revenue Laws Second Amendment Act, [No. 32 of 2005], Revenue Laws Second Amendment Act, [No. 61 of 2008], Royalty Act (Act 28 of 2008), Royalty Admin Act (Act 29 of 2008), Second Revenue Laws Amendment Act, 2004 (Act No. 34 of 2004), Second Small Business Amnesty and Amendment of Taxation Laws Act, 2006, Second Small Business Tax Amnesty and Amendment of Taxation Laws Act [No. 10 of 2006], Second Small Business Tax Amnesty and Amendment of Taxation Laws Act, 2006 (Act No. 10 of 2006), Securities Transfer Tax Act [No 25 of 2007], Securities Transfer Tax Act, 2007, Securities Transfer Tax Act, 2007 (Act No. 25 of 2007), Securities Transfer Tax Administration Act [No 26 of 2007], Securities Transfer Tax Administration Act, 2007, Securities Transfer Tax Administration Act, 2007 (Act No. 26 of 2007), Skills Development Levies Act, 1999, Small Business Amnesty and Amendment of Taxation Laws Act, 2006, Small Business Tax Amnesty and Amendment of Taxation Laws Act [No. 9 of 2006], Small Business Tax Amnesty and Amendment of Taxation Laws Act, 2006 (Act No. 9 of 2006), South African Revenue Service Act, [No. 34 of 1997], South African Revenue Service Amendment Act, 2002, Tax on Retirement Funds Act, 1996, Taxation Laws Amendment Act [No 8 of 2007], Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 2004 (Act No. 16 of 2004), Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 2005 (Act No. 9 of 2005), Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 2007 (Act No. 8 of 2007), Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 2008 (Act No. 3 of 2008), Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 2010 (Act No. 7 of 2010), Taxation Laws Amendment Act, [No. 17 of 2009], Taxation Laws Amendment Act, [No. 27 of 1997], Taxation Laws Amendment Act, [No. 3 of 2008], Taxation Laws Amendment Act, [No. 9 of 2005], Taxation Laws Second Amendment Act [No 9 of 2007], Taxation Laws Second Amendment Act, 2005 (Act No. 10 of 2005), Taxation Laws Second Amendment Act, 2007 (Act No. 9 of 2007), Taxation Laws Second Amendment Act, 2008 (Act No. 4 of 2008), Taxation Laws Second Amendment Act, 2009 (Act No. 18 of 2009), Taxation Laws Second Amendment Act, [No. 10 of 2005], Taxation Laws Second Amendment Act, [No. 18 of 2009], Taxation Laws Second Amendment Act, [No. 4 of 2008], Transfer Duty Act, 1949, Uncertiicated Securities Tax Act, 1998, Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act, 82 2002, Union and Southern Rhodesia Death Duties Act 1933, Value Added Tax Act 89 of 1991, ValueAdded Tax Act, 1991, Value-Added Tax Act, 1991 128 US$ 4.2 billion 129 See http://www.moneyweb.co.za/economy/tax/153684.htm 130 Christensen (2009), Africa’s Bane: Tax Havens, Capital Flight and the Corruption Interface (WP) WP 1/2009 – 8/1/2009 See http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/ContentWCM_ GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/sub-saharan+africa/dt1-2009 Accessed Jan 10, 131 Momberg (2008), SARS adds muscle to tax haven inquiry Aug 3, 2008 See http://www.iol.co.za/news/ south-africa/sars-adds-muscle-to-tax-haven-inquiry-1.410870 Accessed Nov 18, 2010 132 Boyce and Ndikumana (2000) Is Africa a Net Creditor? New Estimates of Capital Flight from Severely Indebted Sub-Saharan African Countries, 1970-1996, Department of Economics and Political Economy Research Institute University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 9 133 Ndikumana L and Boyce JK (2008) New estimates of capital light from sub-Saharan African countries: Linkages with external borrowing and policy options, Workingpaperseries number 166, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst, p.9 134 Ibid no 133, p.20 135 Ibid no 133, p. 41 136 Kar, D, and Cartwright-Smith, D (2010) Illicit inancial lows from Africa: Hidden Resource for Development, Global Financial Integrity 137 Kar, D and Cartwright-Smith, D (2008), Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2002-2006, Global Financial Integrity 138 Hollingshead, A (2010), he implied tax revenue loss from trade mispricing, GFI, p. 16 139 Mohamed and Finnof (2004), Capital Flight from South Africa, 1980 to 2000, Forum Paper, p 17 140 Ibid no 139, p. 17 141 Mohamed (2010), Why Another Tax Amnesty for Illegal Capital Flight See http://www.engineeringnews. co.za/article/why-another-amnesty-for-illegal-capital-light-2010-09-17 Accessed Jan 10, 2010 142 Lopez Gonzalez, South Africa: Wealth gap becoming a chasm, See http://www.irinnews.org/Report. aspx?ReportId=81116 Accessed Jan10, 2010 143 Szczepanski, Poverty and Inequality in South Africa, See http://www.helium.com/items/1002622poverty-and-inequality-in-south-africa Accessed Jan 10, 2010 144 See http://www.sarwatch.org/ 145 See http://www.idasa.org.za/ 146 Community Agency for Social Enquiry, www.case.org.za 147 See http://www.internationalbudget.org/resources/PeopleBudget06-07.pdf Accessed Jan 10, 2010 148 See http://www.iss.co.za/ 149 See http://www.iss.co.za/pgcontent.php?UID=15259 Accessed Jan 10, 2010 150 From World Bank statistics. See: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ AFRICAEXT/TANZANIAEXTN/0,,menuPK:287361~pagePK:141132~piPK:141109~theSiteP K:258799,00.html Accessed Dec 1, 2010 151 1 US$ dollar = 1500 Tanzanian Shillings (Tsh) 152 See http://www.povertymonitoring.go.tz/ Accessed Nov 29, 2010 153 Kar, D and Cartwright-Smith, D (2008), Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2002-2006, Global Financial Integrity 154 Kar, D, and Cartwright-Smith, D (2010) Illicit inancial lows from Africa: Hidden Resource for Development, Global Financial Integrity 155 Christian Aid (2009), False Proits: robbing the poor to keep the rich tax free 156 Hollingshead, A (2010), he implied tax revenue loss from trade mispricing, GFI 83 BRINGING THE BILLIONS BACK Every year huge unreported lows of money are leaving developing countries, ending up in rich countries or tax havens. If properly reported, this illicit capital light would generate at least US$160 billion per year in tax revenue - more than one and a half times the total annual aid to the developing world. hese are resources that could be crucial in the ight to combat poverty. Contrary to popular belief, only a small share, three to ive percent, of illicit capital light stems rom corruption. Instead, almost two thirds originate rom multinational companies evading to pay tax, and one third is a result of criminal activities such as trade with humans, drugs and weapons. Despite the fact that illicit capital light has severe consequences for developing countries – it cancels investment, undermines trade, hurts competition, worsens income gaps and drains hard-currency reserves – awareness of the measures needed to end it is low. As a percentage of GDP, capital light rom Arica is larger than rom other parts of the world. But Arica cannot stand alone to stop it, cooperation and political will is required by decision makers in Europe as well as in Arica. his report explains illicit capital light, how it happens, its magnitude, its consequences for the poor, and measures needed to end it. It also presents illustrative case studies rom Kenya, South Arica and Tanzania. KRISTINA FRÖBERG is a political scientist and an advocacy oic- er at Forum Syd in Sweden. She has been working with global inancial structures such as illegitimate debts and illicit capital light at Forum Syd since 2003. DR ATTIYA WARIS is a lecturer at the School of Law at the Univer- sity of Nairobi in Kenya as well as an advocate of the High Court of Kenya. She is a member of the OECD Task Force on Tax and Development and vice chair of the Tax Justice Network.