[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE:
SBINET THREE YEARS LATER
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER,
MARITIME, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 17, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-35
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
57-597 WASHINGTON : 2010
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402�0900012010
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California PETER T. KING, New York
JANE HARMAN, California LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
Columbia MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
ZOE LOFGREN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York CANDICE S. MILLER, Mississippi
LAURA RICHARDSON, California PETE OLSON, Texas
ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana
BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico STEVE AUSTRIA, Ohio
BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey
EMMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri
AL GREEN, Texas
JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut
MARY JO KILROY, Ohio
ERIE J.J. MASSA, New York
DINA TITUS, Nevada
VACANCY
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Conner, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARTIME, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, Chairwoman
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona CANDICE S. MILLER, Michichgan
BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey PETER T. KING, New York (Ex
AL GREEN, Texas Officio)
ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Alison Northop, Staff Director
Nikki Hadder, Clerk
Mandy Bowers Minority Subcommittee Lead
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism.................. 1
The Honorable Mark E. Souder, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Indiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism.................. 2
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 4
WITNESSES
Chief David Aguilar, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 8
Mr. Mark Borkowski, Executive Director, Secure Border Initiative,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 8
Mr. Timothy E. Peters, Vice President and General Manager, Global
Security Systems, The Boeing Company:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Mr. Richard M. Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
APPENDIX
Questions From Chairwoman Loretta Sanchez........................ 53
THE SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE:
SBINET THREE YEARS LATER
----------
Thursday, September 17, 2009
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Border, Maritime,
and Global Counterterrorism,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Loretta Sanchez
[chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Sanchez, Thompson, Jackson Lee,
Cuellar, Kirkpatrick, Pascrell, Green, Souder, McCaul,
Bilirakis, Rogers, and Miller.
Also present: Representative Carney.
Ms. Sanchez. [Presiding.] Good morning. The subcommittee
will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting today to
receive testimony on the Secure Border Initiative, SBInet, 3
years later. I would like to at this point ask unanimous
consent that Mr. Carney, a member of the full committee be
permitted to sit and question the witnesses at today's hearing.
Hearing no objection.
Good morning. Today's--hello, Chief--today's hearing will
further examine the Department of Homeland Security's Secure
Border Initiative, physical infrastructure fencing as well as
the virtual fence known as SBInet.
Thank you to our witnesses for being here today, many of
you have been before us before and, in particular, Mr. Stana,
thank you for your continued frank and honest assessment of
what is happening out there on this initiative.
The witnesses' testimony and responses to our questions are
critical parts of the oversight this subcommittee continues to
conduct on the Secure Border Initiative and SBInet. In fact,
many of the members of this committee have had an opportunity
once or twice now to go over and take a look not only at the
physical fence in different portions, but also at the virtual
fence and what is going on with SBInet.
Given that the Boeing SBInet contract is expiring soon, I
think that this is a good opportunity for us to catch our
breath and see what is going on and see whether we have any
movement on this program or if there is a lack of progress in
the program.
And I am particular concerned by SBInet program's ongoing
struggle with transparency and what I see as a pattern of
delayed planned development. For instance, in May of 2008, I
had the opportunity, along with many members of the
subcommittee, to travel to the Tucson sector and to review
SBInet's Project 28 and to hear about the beginning stages of
AJO-1 and TUCSON-1. I think the chief accompanied us on that.
I was assured that these new projects could be fully
operational and able to be accepted by the Department of
Homeland Security by the end of 2008, and I am extremely
disappointed that the new deadlines estimate that TUCSON-1 will
be December 2009 and that AJO-1 will be ready in June of 2010.
Based on my past experience with the missing of deadlines
on this project, I have a real hesitancy to believe that these
deadlines are even going to be met, these new ones.
In the last series of hearings on this topic the
subcommittee was given hard dates and assurances that deadlines
for specific SBInet projects would be met by Boeing, and yet
weeks later, they were pushed back. SBI's full deployment along
the southwest border, now estimated by Boeing and CBP to occur
in 2016, will be 7 years after the original contract end date
of 2009.
This situation is incredibly troubling since in the
meantime, our Border Patrol agents continue to use older and
less capable technology. We have maintenance issues, and more
importantly, there is more danger to our Border Patrol as time
moves on.
Further, as a member of the Congress who is very concerned
about fiscal responsibility, it is hard for me to believe that
DHS would award a contract of $1.1 billion over 3 years, and
continue to award task orders without viable results.
Moving to the other half of the Secure Border Initiative,
the physical border fence, it has also risen in cost. What used
to cost us $3.5 million a mile is now at $6.5 million a mile,
and vehicle fencing has gone from $1 million to $1.8 million
per mile.
And that is sort of unbelievable, considering that
construction costs because, you know, we haven't been
building--construction has been in the dumps--how we could
really justify that the cost of fencing, the vehicle and the
pedestrian fencing, is going up so much.
According to program dates there have been about 3,300
breaches in the fence and it costs us about $1,300 every time
that we have to repair them. And that being said we have yet to
see whether or not this fencing has increased border security
and has justified its cost. I mean, I am still waiting to
really see that, and I know that about a year or two ago,
Chief, you and I had a discussion about what is it really going
to take to do this.
And we were trying to figure out what the metrics would be,
so I am interested to see what you think the metrics are and
how you can justify whether these systems are working for us.
So I look forward to your testimony and to the responses to the
many questions that I have. And I know that you can see from
the interest here that we all have so many questions.
I will now let my ranking member, Mr. Souder from Indiana,
for his opening statement, who is also, I know, very concerned
about this issue.
Mr. Souder. Thank you, Madam Chair. Securing our borders,
closing vulnerabilities and gaining operational control: this
is what was promised to Congress and to the American people
when SBInet was announced 4 years and 9-1/2 months ago.
It is hard to be optimistic when we sit here today and have
partial technology deployed along just 23 miles of the
southwest border and a few northern border pilot sites set to
begin in the next month or two.
Over $1 billion has been allocated for SBInet, but it seems
that very little progress has been made. It has been very slow.
I think it is important to note for the past 3 years we have
been asking for a timeline for SBInet deployment and lifecycle
costs, but they have yet to be provided.
Similarly, there is no picture of the performance metrics
and parameters used to judge the success of this program. It is
hard to have Congress accurately review and conduct oversight
over this initiative without these key pieces of data.
Do not take this criticism as a lack of my support for the
project and the larger goal of securing our borders. I think it
needs to be a top priority for DHS and the administration. Now
is not the time to waver in this commitment. To that end, I
need to raise a concern that I have with the number of miles
considered to be under operational or effective control.
According to the CBP documentation, as of October 2008
there are 625 miles of the southwest border considered to be
under effective control. According to the fiscal year 2010
budget justification, by the end of 2009 there should be 815
miles under effective control.
If these estimates are correct we will have gained 190
miles in a little over a year. This is good news, and I think
it can be attributed to the additional staffing and the
construction of 630 miles of tactical infrastructure, fencing
and vehicle barriers.
The budget justification goes on to say that zero
additional miles outside of the 815 are expected to be under
effective control in 2010. How is it possible that the Border
Patrol could come to this conclusion? What is expected to
happen with SBInet in the next year? Are more personnel or
fencing or the National Guard necessary? CBP needs to address
these concerns at today's hearing.
On Monday, U.S. law enforcement conducted an anti-terror
operation in New York City. According to intelligence
officials, all indications pointed to the need to intervene and
prevent further plotting and coordination.
While few details are known at this time as the
investigation is ongoing, I think it is a poignant reminder
that 8 years after September 11 terrorist attack, we are still
a country at risk. We must remain vigilant and aggressive in
securing our country from attacks.
Securing our borders, closing vulnerabilities and gaining
operational control are essential for bolstering the security
of our nation. The SBInet program should be a cornerstone
building block of this effort.
I would like to add on a personal note that I was down on
the southwest border for about a week, just short of a week,
traveling from San Ysidro over to Nogales. I visited the
TUCSON-1 area again, saw the towers working and on every side
of me different people were being intercepted. I also saw the
physical fencing; we went to about probably six different stops
along the border.
We have breaches in the old fencing. We do not have
breaches in the new fencing. Also the soil in different areas
have changed cost estimates and difficulty. They are continuing
to adjust even in the areas where we have had the breaches.
For example, one of the debates is can you put barbed wire
on? The one kind of fencing in California that they are cutting
through, where it is very expensive, which is what has been in
the news media, can be addressed by trying to block them from
getting to the fence, which is what they are now experimenting
with.
The physical fence does not secure the border. The physical
fence stops vehicles. It stops larger groups. It slows people
down so that as we move the technology behind it we can move
people in behind if it is in a mountainous area, they can catch
them as they move to the road.
If it is in a flat area the rate of speed that they are
coming across is slowed significantly down, and it is the
combination, then, with enough agents, and we have been
plussing up the Border Patrol with which to go get the
different groups then to get them to different places.
And we have to see how we are going to increase this
because, quite frankly, I doubt if an immigration bill is going
to be able to move through this Congress until we have
increased the number of miles that are currently projected,
secured under effective control, because any kind of major
immigration reform will lead to additional pressures on the
border unless we have a higher percent under effective control.
I yield back.
Ms. Sanchez. I thank the ranking member, and the Chair now
recognizes the chairman of the full committee, the gentleman
from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for an opening statement.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I welcome our
witnesses to this hearing today. Today's hearing on the Secure
Border Initiative comes at a very important time as next week
marks an anniversary of sorts for the Department of Homeland
Security.
On September 21st, 2006, DHS awarded a contract to Boeing
to help secure our nation's borders. At that time we were told
that Boeing would be integrating existing off-the-shelf
technology to create a virtual fence along the borders known as
SBInet. It was supposed to be a relatively easy project.
Instead, the Government Accountability Office has
repeatedly raised concern about SBInet, including poor
planning, insufficient testing, inadequate government oversight
and a failure to set and achieve project goals. Today, after
spending nearly a billion dollars on the program we are still
waiting for an effective technological tool to secure America's
borders.
DHS and Boeing have had 3 years to show they can secure the
borders with technology. It is my understanding that they have
at least one more year to do so if the department renews
Boeing's SBInet contract for an additional year as expected,
which I understand has already been executed.
It is time to deliver some tangible results to the American
people and to Congress. I would like to know how DHS is going
to ensure that when Boeing delivers the next phase of SBInet to
the government early next year, taxpayers get their money's
worth.
Clearly, this administration has inherited a serious
challenge and has some difficult choices ahead. DHS either
needs to get SBInet right or find an alternative technology
solution that will do the job. Along with technology, DHS has
committed significant resources in recent years to constructing
physical fencing along the southwest border.
While there are currently over 600 miles of fence and
barriers, according to GAO the department has not
systematically evaluated the effectiveness of these barriers.
At a price tag of roughly $2.4 billion and a potential
lifecycle cost of $6.5 billion, GAO's finding is extremely
troubling.
Looking ahead, both DHS and Boeing have considerable ground
to cover when it comes to deploying effective, efficient border
security technology and infrastructure, I am hopeful this
administration can address many of the problems that have
plagued this program and previous border security technology
efforts.
The witnesses can be assured that this committee will
continue to monitor the Secure Border Initiative closely. I
would like to thank Chairwoman Sanchez for all her work
continuing her oversight on this important topic. I would also
like to thank the witnesses for being here today, and I also
look forward to their testimony. I yield back.
Ms. Sanchez. I thank the Chairman of the full committee.
Other members of the subcommittee are reminded that under
committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
And so now I would like to welcome our panel of witnesses.
I will give the backgrounds of our witnesses and then we will
start down the row and ask for your 5-minute or less summary of
your written testimony.
Our first witness will be Chief David Aguilar. He was named
Chief of the United States Border Patrol in May 2004. As the
nation's highest ranking Border Patrol agent, Chief Aguilar
directs the enforcement efforts of more than 16,500 Border
Patrol agents nationwide, and I commend you for that because I
know we have grown our Border Patrol quite quickly, and you
have been at the helm of that.
So you have the expertise gained from 30 years of service.
We look forward to your testimony, Chief, and welcome.
Our second witness, Mr. Mark Borkowski, was named Executive
Director of the Secure Border Initiative Program Executive
Office in October of 2008. He oversees the SBI implementation
at Customs and Border Protection, and he will oversee SBI's
continued efforts to provide front line personnel with the
enhanced situational awareness along the U.S. borders.
Before joining CBP he was a program executive for the
Robotic Lunar Exploration program in the Exploration Systems
Mission Directorate at NASA headquarters. Welcome.
Our third witness, Mr. Timothy Peters, is a Vice President
of Global Security Systems, a business of Boeing Integrated
Defense Systems. He is responsible for the execution of SBInet
and other GSS programs. Since joining Boeing in 1985, Mr.
Peters has held a number of key engineering and leadership
positions on surveillance and command and control programs. We
welcome you this morning.
And our final witness, Mr. Richard Stana, is the Director
of Homeland Security and Justice Issues at the Government
Accountability Office. During his 33-year career with the GAO,
Mr. Stana has directed reviews on a wide variety of complex
military and domestic issues and most recently he has directed
GAO's work in immigration and border security issues. He has
been frequently before us. We welcome you back.
So without objection, the witnesses' full statements will
be inserted into the record, and I will ask the witnesses to
summarize their statements in 5 minutes or less. And we will
begin with Chief Aguilar, who will give a statement on behalf
of both himself and Mr. Borkowski for CBP.
STATEMENT OF CHIEF DAVID AGUILAR, U.S. BORDER PATROL, U.S.
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
Chief Aguilar. Good morning. Chairwoman Sanchez, Chairman
Thompson and Ranking Member Souder, I want to begin by
expressing my appreciation for this subcommittee's and the full
committee's interest in not only our mission, but especially
the interest and the well-being, safety, of our men and women.
It is good to be here this morning, and it is absolutely a
privilege and an honor to appear before you to testify and
discuss the Secure Border Initiative. As you stated, I am
accompanied by Mr. Mark Borkowski, who is our executive
director for the Secure Border Initiative.
The primary goal of our strategy between the ports of entry
is to gain effective control of our nation's border. Effective
control is achieved when a chief patrol agent in the field
determines that in a given area of operation the Border Patrol
has the ability to consistently detect, identify, classify,
respond to any illegal incursion that occurs between the ports
of entry, and very importantly, has the ability to bring that
illegal incursion to an appropriate law enforcement resolution.
In our view, control of our borders between the ports of
entry comes from an appropriate combination of personnel,
technology and tactical infrastructure, which includes border
fencing. We often refer to this requirement as a three-legged
stool. These components are interdependent and provide for
maximum effectiveness when appropriately applied.
The mix of these three elements will vary depending on the
challenges posed by the area on which we are focusing. Within
that construct, the Secure Border Initiative plays an important
role. It is but one part of our integrated approach, but it is
a very critical and significant piece.
The current focus of the Secure Border Initiative is to
support border control efforts by providing tactical
infrastructure and technology. Before discussing the details of
SBInet, it might be useful to provide a short update on our
progress with respect to construction of tactical
infrastructure along the southwest border.
As of the end of August we have approximately 632 miles of
fence constructed. Of that, approximately 334 miles are
pedestrian fence and the remaining 298 miles are vehicle fence.
Our target, based on our chiefs' assessments, has been
approximately 670 miles throughout the southwest border.
The exact total mileage is imprecise at this point because
it will depend on the actual measurement of completed fence as
opposed to pre-construction estimates. We are actually in the
process of modifying this figure as we speak.
Fence provides what we refer to as ``persistent impedance''
which contributes to our ability to control the border by
providing additional time for agents to respond to incursions,
illegal incursions.
As we have testified before, fence alone will not secure
the border. However, we believe some areas of the border must
have persistent impedance in order to establish control. It is
in those areas where we have emphasized the construction of
fence.
Let me now turn to some specifics about SBInet, the
technology part of SBI and the focus of this hearing. The
SBInet program is focused on developing and deploying a system
that can provide surveillance and situational awareness over
stretches of the border. Project 28 was our initial effort to
prototype this type of system.
While Project 28 suffered from many deficiencies, it has
actually evolved to the point where it is now operational and
provides effective support of our operations. For example, it
has been instrumental in enabling the apprehension of over
5,000 illegal entrants and over 14,000 pounds of narcotics.
More importantly, we were able to use the lessons learned
from Project 28 to design the first generation of the
operational SBInet system. We call this first generation SBInet
Block 1. We have completed most of the engineering design of
SBInet Block 1 and have performed extensive engineering testing
now.
We are in the process of installing our first deployment
into an operational area known as TUCSON-1. TUCSON-1 will
actually replace Project 28 prototype system with a new Block 1
first generation production system to cover 23 miles of border
around Sasabe, Arizona.
The Border Patrol will receive the system, probably in
early January, to conduct a formal process known as Operational
Test and Evaluation, OT&E. In OT&E the Border Patrol will
conduct disciplined assessments in the real world environment
to determine whether the SBInet Block 1 system is effective and
suitable for use.
Based on these assessments, the Border Patrol will
effectively deliver literally a report card to SBI indicating
whether it has met our operational requirements. In parallel
with these test activities, we expect to begin the deployment
of our second area of operation known as AJO-1.
It will cover approximately 30 miles of border near Ajo,
Arizona. Together TUCSON-1 and AJO-1 represent the initial
deployment of Block 1. Through its structured review process,
the Department of Homeland Security has authorized initial
deployment but not full deployment.
After the initial deployment and results of the Border
Patrol's test of Block 1, CBP will be in a better position to
decide on the pace and magnitude of future deployments. The
last 3 years of SBInet had been frustrating and at times very
discouraging.
We believe we are on a reasonable improvement path. We
understand that the Congress and this committee are less
interested in hearing about our improvement plans and, as we,
more interested in results.
We share that interest and commit our best efforts to
produce those results in a prudent and effective manner. We
appreciate this committee's continued support of CBP's efforts
to better secure our borders, and we look forward to any
questions that you might have of us. Thank you.
[The joint statement of Chief Aguilar and Mr. Borkowski
follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of David Aguilar and Mark Borkowski
Chairwoman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder, and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee, it is a privilege and an honor to appear
before you today to discuss ``The Secure Border Initiative: Three Years
Later.'' At U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), we are confident
that we are making significant strides in our integrated efforts to
increase the security of our borders.
I would like to start by emphasizing an important point: our border
security efforts are integrated efforts, and while the Secure Border
Initiative (SBI) is an important element of our overall strategy, it
does not represent a panacea or a stand-alone capability for border
security. It is one part of a much larger effort, which includes many
stakeholders and partners across the federal government, as well as
state, local, tribal, and international partners. The National
Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, released jointly this past
June by Office of National Drug Control Policy Director Kerlikowske,
Attorney General Holder, and Secretary Napolitano is one example of
this broad, integrated effort.
The primary goal of our strategy between the ports of entry is to
secure our Nation's borders. This means consistently detecting illegal
entries into the United States, assessing and classifying any threats
associated with the illegal entries, responding to the area, and
bringing the situation to a successful law enforcement resolution. Put
a bit more simply, the ability to secure the border requires two basic
conditions. First, we must have an accurate awareness of what is going
on in the area around the border. Secondly, we must have the ability to
respond to that awareness how, where, and when we deem it appropriate
to respond. The ability to secure of the border, therefore, comes from
a combination of both the knowledge and the ability to act on that
knowledge.
In our view, control of our borders--particularly between the legal
ports of entry--comes from an appropriate combination of personnel,
technology, and tactical infrastructure. We often refer to this
strategy as a ``three-legged stool.`` One of these legs alone cannot
provide control of the border. The mix of these three elements will
vary depending on the challenges of the focus area. Technology alone
cannot control the borders, but it can provide a significant capability
that augments and improves the effectiveness of an integrated approach.
Similarly, tactical infrastructure, such as fencing, does not control
the border independently of other elements.
How can we measure the effectiveness of each contribution
(personnel, technology, and tactical infrastructure) to the overall
control of the border? That is a difficult question to answer. No one
of the elements that contribute to border control can do the job
without contributions from the other elements. For example, we cannot
say that fencing prevented a discrete number of people from crossing
the border illegally, and that technology prevented some others, and
personnel prevented still others. In fact, even to ask the question
perpetuates the misperception that any single one of these elements can
control the border.
We do believe, however, that we can evaluate and characterize the
effectiveness of our integrated efforts to secure the border. And we
can characterize the contribution of each of the three legs of the
stool even if we cannot precisely quantify the individual contribution
of each component. Technology allows us to detect the entries and to
assess and classify the threat. Personnel provide the response to
confront the criminal element. Tactical infrastructure supports the
response by either providing access or extending the time needed for
the response by deterring or slowing the criminal element's ability to
easily cross the border and escape.
Personnel are the most flexible and robust of the elements, since
they can provide both knowledge (through observation) and response.
However, use of personnel alone is not the most efficient way to
achieve border control. Deploying enough personnel to provide coverage
of large areas of the border would be cost prohibitive as well as a
nonsensical use of funds. Technology can be used to ``watch'' large
areas of the border, thus helping with the ``knowledge'' part of the
equation. By using technology in this role, we can relieve personnel of
the requirement to stand and observe, and redeploy them to serve where
current technology cannot -in the area of response. Finally, we can use
tactical infrastructure, such as fencing, as a fixed resource to deter
and delay illicit border incursions. It is important to recognize that
tactical infrastructure and technology are not interchangeable.
Infrastructure (including fencing) provides a constant and continuous
effect, and more options for response. I wish to be very clear-fence
alone does not and cannot provide effective control of the border. It
does, however, provide a continuous and constant ability to deter or
delay, which we refer to as ``persistent impedance.'' That delay
provides more time for personnel to respond to the incursion, but it
cannot altogether stop an incursion.
The current focus of SBI is to support border control efforts by
providing tactical infrastructure and technology. SBInet, which is the
primary focus of this hearing, represents the technology contribution
of SBI. Before discussing the details of SBInet, it might be useful to
provide a short update on our progress with respect to construction of
the fence along the southwest border. As of the end of August, we have
approximately 632 miles of fence constructed. Of that, approximately
334 miles are pedestrian fence and the remaining 298 miles are vehicle
fence. Our target, based on Border Patrol's operational assessments of
fencing needs, has been approximately 670 miles. The exact total
mileage is imprecise at this point because it will depend on the actual
measurement of completed fence as opposed to pre-construction
estimates. The fence that is not yet complete is still planned but has
been delayed primarily due to legal proceedings related to the
condemnation and transfer of real estate required for the fence.
As already noted, fence provides persistent impedance, which
contributes to our ability to secure the border by providing additional
time for agents to respond to incursions. There are locations where the
Border Patrol has concluded that persistent impedance is absolutely
necessary in order to gain control of the border. There are other areas
where persistent impedance would be a useful contribution but it is not
an absolute necessity. It is important to emphasize the fact that we
have constructed and planned fencing in areas where the Border Patrol
has concluded that persistent impedance is a necessity; we have not
built fence in areas where we think we might be able to achieve control
through other means--that is, through different combinations of
personnel, technology, and tactical infrastructure--or where we have
encountered engineering or other challenges in moving with
construction. Before any consideration is given to building fencing in
other locations, we want to ensure that CBP has determined the
operational requirements for effective control in those areas, and has
the opportunity to compare any other options we can identify. An
accurate assessment requires more experience and observation, both in
areas where we have fencing and in areas where we do not, so that we
have a good basis for the comparison.
Furthermore, we have built fence where we have concluded it is the
most cost-effective way to provide persistent impedance. As a practical
matter, the only other, albeit unrealistic, way to provide persistent
impedance is to deploy personnel fairly densely along the border, in
fixed locations, twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week. We
reviewed these options in a set of detailed ``Analyses of
Alternatives,'' we have provided to the Congress as part of our annual
expenditure plan.
Let me now turn to some specifics about SBInet, the technology part
of SBI, which is the focus of this hearing. The SBInet program is
focused on developing and deploying a system of networked sensor towers
that can provide surveillance and situational awareness over stretches
of the border. The SBInet system will be deployed in discrete Areas of
Responsibility (AoRs) each of which covers a length of border ranging
between approximately 20 and 40 miles. The basic concept involves
constructing towers in locations that are selected based on knowledge
of terrain, vegetation, and typical routes used by illegal entrants, as
well as by sensitivity to and impact on the environment. Each of the
sensor towers in an AoR includes a ground surveillance radar, a day
camera, and a night camera. Each also includes a receiver for signals
from unattended ground sensors (UGSs), which are hidden within the AoR
and can detect nearby movement. There are also communications relay
towers, which receive the signals from the sensor towers and transmit
them back to a Border Patrol station. One key element of SBInet that
distinguishes it from other technology at the border is the networking
of the towers and sensors. Information from the various cameras,
radars, and sensors is combined within a computer system called the
Common Operating Picture (COP). The COP provides a display on computer
monitors that includes an integrated picture of the radar and sensor
detections from all of the towers within an AoR. It also provides the
feeds from the day and night cameras, and software that can point the
cameras in order to look at what the radars and sensors have detected.
Project 28 was our initial effort to prototype this type of SBInet
system. As a prototype, we did not intend Project 28 to be the actual
system we would put in production. We did, however, anticipate that,
even as a prototype, Project 28 would provide us with improved
capability, and we advertised that it would be a relatively simple and
low risk effort. Unfortunately, it did not work as well as we
anticipated and took longer than it should have to complete. But we
learned from the experience and we are in the process of making
significant improvements.
Since the initial experience, we have improved Project 28 to the
point that it is currently operational and effective in supporting the
Border Patrol in the area around Sasabe, Arizona. Border Patrol agents
credit Project 28 with providing them with enhanced situation awareness
that has assisted in the detection and subsequent apprehension of over
5,000 illegal entrants and the interdiction of over 14,000 pounds of
marijuana. Without Project 28-and absent some other increase in
capability, such as more agents--the success rate of these
apprehensions and interdictions may have been lower.
Our SBInet contractor, Boeing, has taken a great deal of criticism
for its past performance on SBInet. In truth, SBI has not been fully
satisfied with performance to date. It is worth noting, however, that
Boeing delivered Project 28 on a firm fixed price task order basis and
absorbed tens of millions of dollars in losses in order to correct the
initial deficiencies, demonstrating a significant commitment to deliver
a useful capability.
We were able to use the lessons we learned from Project 28 to
design the first generation of the operational SBInet system. We call
this first generation SBInet Block 1. We have completed most of the
engineering design of SBInet Block 1 and have performed extensive
engineering testing. Although the engineering tests increased our
overall confidence in the system, they did identify some areas for
improvement. We do not believe those areas represent ``show stoppers,''
but we have taken steps to enforce a deliberative and disciplined
process to address them, including opting to delay some program
activities while we await the results of further testing and analysis.
At this point, we are in the process of doing our first deployment
into an operational known as Tucson-1, will replace Project 28 (the
prototype system) with the new Block 1 (first generation production
system) to cover 23 miles of border around Sasabe, Arizona. Tus-1
includes nine sensor towers and eight communications relay towers, all
of which are now constructed. We are now starting basic system and
component checkout of the Tus-1 systems and awaiting results of some
remaining corrective actions before authorizing Boeing to begin more
comprehensive system testing. SBI anticipates being prepared to provide
that authorization within the next few weeks, at which point we will
conduct extensive engineering tests on the system. Those tests are
designed to demonstrate that the system meets its engineering
requirements. If it passes, SBI will accept the system from Boeing.
Provided SBI accepts it, the Border Patrol will receive the system,
probably in early January, to conduct a formal process known as
Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E). In OT&E,the Border Patrol will
conduct disciplined assessments in a real world environment to
determine whether the SBInet Block 1 system is effective and suitable
for use. Based on these assessments, the Border Patrol will effectively
deliver a report card to SBI, indicating whether or not it has met
their operational requirements. The Border Patrol is still designing
the test regimen, but we anticipate OT&E will continue at least into
March of next year.
While testing is underway, we expect to begin the deployment of our
second AoR, known as ``Ajo-1,'' Ajo-1 will cover about 30 miles of
border near Ajo, Arizona. Our experience with Ajo-1 will build on Tus-1
and Ajo-1 and ensure we can move from one deployment activity to
another in a smooth and effective manner. Ajo-1 should be completed and
tested by late spring or early summer of next year.
Taken together, Tus-1 and Ajo-1 represent the initial deployment of
Block 1. Through its structured review process, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) has authorized initial deployment--but not full
deployment. This is a normal sequence of events. Before authorizing
full deployment, we need to have the results of the Border Patrol's
OT&E and demonstrate that we can effectively and efficiently complete
the deployment process. As currently planned, full deployment of Block
1 means deployment along the Arizona border. The exact schedule for
that deployment will depend on the successful completion of initial
deployment activities, as well as other decisions that will be advised
by the initial deployments. For example, based on results from the
initial deployments, CBP will gain experience and knowledge about how
well SBInet contributes to the technology element of border control.
With that knowledge, we can make better decisions about where it is
most cost-effective to use SBInet Block 1. CBP will also have better
information about the desired pace of deployments going forward and can
reflect those decisions in future budget submissions.
In short, we believe we are making appropriate progress towards the
deployment of SBInet Block 1. Based on the testing that has been
performed to date, we have a sound level of engineering confidence that
the system will meet its requirements. In order to increase our
confidence, we are proceeding with the initial deployments and the
formal OT&E process.
We have set requirements for our program that are modest but
effective. Remembering that technology does not, in and of itself,
control the border, we require SBInet Block 1 to detect at least 70
percent of incursions within each AoR and provide accurate
identification at least 70 percent of the time. The Subcommittee may
recall that early goals for SBInet were at 95 percent, rather than the
70 percent we have currently established. This threshold does not
indicate that we will allow failure to detect or identify incursions 30
percent of the time. Rather, we recognize that the SBInet system is one
contribution among several resources we have available, such as air
assets, tactical infrastructure, additional technology, and personnel.
Based on experience, cost, and a better understanding that the role of
technology is to contribute, SBInet's contribution may well be adequate
to provide an overall, integrated capability of 95 percent or more,
when all of the other elements of border control are taken into
account.
In designing the Block 1, we have selected modest components which
we believe are cost-effective and anticipate will do the job. While
there are other cameras and radars that are higher performing, by
starting with the currently-designed Block 1, we: avoid the risk of
over-designing; we reduce the risk of excessive cost, schedule, and
technical problems; we provide an operational capability sooner; and we
provide the quickest possible opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness
of the system in an operational environment. With some real-world
experience, we can make future decisions about how and if we should
enhance the system. Our block approach to SBInet, which represents an
acquisition strategy known as spiral development, provides us an
opportunity to deliver cost-effective enhancements in the future, as
needed or desired.
While we are deploying the SBInet Block system and tightening up
our requirements discipline, we are also taking steps to improve our
competence in the management of complex acquisition programs. We have
redesigned our SBI organization to develop and retain skilled
government personnel in the disciplines that are key to successful
program management. We are also strengthening our oversight and
management of our contractors' activities to ensure we are able to
communicate our requirements clearly and consistently.
We are strengthening the role and influence of the end users of our
systems--in this case, the Border Patrol--in the development and
acquisition process. The structured we described, which is a normal
process in the Department of Defense but relatively new to us, is one
example. Beyond that, operational end users participate in overseeing
program activities, setting priorities, and deciding on acquisition
courses of action. End users also now have a more structured process
and conduit to request consideration of program changes, and to
participate in trade-offs between capabilities and costs.
We are eager to establish better ways to predict and evaluate the
effectiveness of our systems. We are confident that increased
enforcement efforts have had a positive effect on our ability to
control our borders. Since 2006, we have increased the size of the
Border Patrol from approximately 12,350 agents to nearly 20,000 today.
We now have almost 650 miles of fence deployed to areas along the
border where we need it most. And we have begun to deploy effective
technology to critical areas. There is no question, based on the
measures we have available, that these enforcement activities have
reduced illegal activity between the ports of entry.
Going forward, we acknowledge we need to find a better way to
characterize and measure the effects of increased enforcement. The
third party indicators we currently use, like trends in apprehensions
or drug seizures, taken with our subject matter expert assessment about
relative levels of border control, are useful and valid. But we still
need to develop tools that will allow us to assess different mixes of
personnel, tactical infrastructure, and technology; to compare their
effectiveness; and to compare their costs. In this way, we can make
better decisions about the most cost-effective investments. In order to
develop the appropriate tools, we need to gain experience and measure
results of our ongoing efforts. We believe we are headed in that
direction with our current activities.
In closing, although we know that the last three years of SBInet
have been frustrating and at times discouraging for all involved, we
believe we are on a path towards improvement. We thank Congress and
this Subcommittee for your interest in this issue and share your desire
for the achievement of results. We appreciate the Subcommittee's
continued support of CBP's efforts to better secure our borders and
look forward to responding to your questions.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Chief.
And I will now recognize Mr. Peters to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes or less.
STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY E. PETERS, VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL
MANAGER, GLOBAL SECURITY SYSTEMS, THE BOEING COMPANY
Mr. Peters. Good morning, Chairwoman Sanchez, Chairman
Thompson, Ranking Member Souder and committee members. I
appreciate the opportunity to discuss SBInet progress with you
today.
I will update you today on development and deployment
status of the SBInet Block 1 system. This capability is a
substantially improved version of the prototype we delivered to
Customs and Border Protection in early 2008. I will also say a
few words about our deployments on the northern border.
P28, which has been operational for 18 months now, has
proven to be a valuable enforcement tool for the Border Patrol.
P28 also serves as a valuable engineering tool for the
development of Block 1 in future SBInet systems.
Over the past 2 years many important lessons have been
learned from the P28 prototype and incorporated into the SBInet
Block 1 system. The first deployment known as TUCSON-1 or TUCS-
1 has been constructed in the area of P28 and covers 23 miles
of the border at the Sasabe port of entry.
A second deployment called AJO-1 has been initiated to the
west of TUCS-1 and will cover 30 miles of border at the
Loopville port of entry. The TUCS-1 deployment consists of nine
sensor towers, eight communication towers and a command and
control facility.
The Block 1 system includes a fixed tower design an
upgraded sensor package and improved communication system and a
new common operational picture or COP. BOEING engineers work
side-by-side with Border Patrol agents in the design of the
look, feel and function of the Block 1 common operational
picture.
During this development, we have encountered technological
challenges common to the integration of commercial off-the-
shelf components. Two recent issues have proven to be
especially problematic. The first, control of the radar during
azimuth scanning and the second, human machine interface
freezes.
After a detailed root cause corrective action effort, I am
pleased to report that we have implemented solutions that
address each of these problems and subsequently have undergone
several weeks of successful testing without recurrence.
The Block 1 system is scheduled to complete system
qualification tests in the next month at facilities in Playas,
New Mexico. Then in the deployed TUCS-1 system will undergo
system acceptance testing during the fourth quarter of this
year.
When completed we will deliver the system to the government
for operational test and evaluation, which will be overseen by
the Border Patrol. Results of these tests will assist the
customer in determining future deployments and system
enhancements.
The Ajo deployment is also progressing. The system design
is complete and construction of the Border Patrol command and
control facility has been initiated. However, site specific
work and installation of the system are awaiting environmental
approval from the Department of the Interior.
In summary, the SBInet Block 1 system, pending successful
completion of the testing that I outlined, will be ready for
deployment across the southwest border.
Boeing has also been working on the northern border
deployments in the Detroit and Buffalo sectors. In these
deployments Boeing is installing remote video surveillance
systems to enhance agent surveillance capabilities in a
temperate river environment. The RVSS' are comprised of two
sets of day and night cameras mounted atop monopoles and/or
existing structures.
These systems feed video images back to Border Patrol
sector headquarters. Installation began in the Buffalo sector
in early May of this year and in the Detroit sector in early
September. Both deployments are planned to be delivered to the
government by early 2010.
In conclusion, I would like to say that SBInet has been
both an important and challenging program to the Boeing
Company. The P28 prototype and Block 1 system represent
approximately half of the government-funded effort that Boeing
has received to date.
Additionally, Boeing has made a number of significant
capital and research and development investments to ensure the
success of the SBInet program. The Block 1 system remains the
core of our effort.
As I mentioned earlier, I believe we have a system that is
robust and soon will be ready for a widespread deployment. Our
goal remains to provide the technology and tools to support
enhanced border security and increased agent safety as the best
value of the taxpayers.
With the Tucson sector deployment underway, SBInet now has
a solid foundation for future deployments. Thank you for the
opportunity to provide testimony this morning, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Peters follows:]
Prepared Statement of Timothy E. Peters
I'm Tim Peters, Vice President of Boeing's Global Security Systems,
which includes the SBInet program. I appreciate the opportunity to
discuss progress on SBInet before the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime,
and Global Counterterrorism.
Today, I'll address our progress in designing and developing the
overall SBInet solution. I'll also update you on the deployment status
of Block 1, which is based on the same concept of integrated,
commercial technology, but includes improvements from P-28. I'll also
say a few words about activities on the Northern Border.
P-28 Lessons Learned
P-28 has proven to be a valuable operational tool for the Border
Patrol, as well as a framework for development of Block 1 and future
SBInet systems. Operational for eighteen months, P-28 has been
instrumental in apprehension of thousands of illegal border crossers
and interception of thousands of pounds of narcotics, according to
recent Customs and Border Protection reports. Many important lessons
learned from the prototype P-28 system have been incorporated into the
development of Block 1, including:
--Active involvement of the entire user community in the system
design and function;
--Laboratory testing of components, systems and subsystems, and
the creation of an operationally representative test-bed for
field testing; and
A substantially improved Common Operating Picture.
Block 1
The Block 1 system has been in development for the past two years.
The first deployment is known as Tucson 1--or TUS-1--is now well along
in the P-28 area of operations and will cover 23 miles of the border
around the Sasabe Port of Entry. A second deployment, called AJO-1, has
been initiated west of the TUS-1 area of operations and will cover 30
miles of border at the Lukeville Port of Entry. AJO-1 construction will
follow TUS-1 by several months while we await the Department of the
Interior's environmental approval.
TUS-1 consists of nine sensor towers and eight communications
towers. Of the 17 total towers, Boeing built 13 new towers and modified
four existing government towers. As of today, all tower construction is
complete, and all sensors have been installed. For those of you
familiar with the system, it has a distinctly different look to
complement its improved capabilities. We are using a fixed tower, an
upgraded sensor package, a different support equipment package, and
most importantly, greatly improved communication technology.
Specifically, TUS-1 and all future deployments will send data back to
sector headquarters via a line-of-sight microwave link or fiber-optic
link where it is available or not cost-prohibitive to do so. Gone are
the satellite dishes used in the P-28 system, as well as the system
lags they produced. The TUS-1 system is much more responsive, providing
information to agents more quickly. The new Common Operating Picture
(or COP) software is also responsible for significant improvements in
responsiveness and usability. Boeing engineers sat side-by-side with
Border Patrol agents who served as the primary designers of the look,
feel and function of the Block 1 COP.
While we've encountered some technological challenges--not uncommon
when integrating off-the-shelf components – we're working
diligently within our team and the customer to resolve issues quickly
and thoroughly, so the operational system will be robust and reliable.
There have been two recent issues that have been particularly
problematic – radar control, and human-machine interface
malfunctions. I'm happy to report that we have implemented solutions to
address each of those problems. We've been testing these solutions for
several weeks, and the problems have not recurred.
Once these solutions are fully implemented over the coming weeks,
the Block 1 system will complete System Qualification Test (SQT) at
test facilities in Playas, New Mexico, then the deployed TUS-1 system
will undergo Systems Acceptance Testing (SAT) during the fourth quarter
this year. When completed, we'll hand the system over to the government
for Operational Testing and Evaluation (OT&E), which will be overseen
by the Border Patrol. Results of these tests will assist the customer
in determining future deployments, system enhancements and designs for
other border geographies.
Our goal has been to provide a complete system, technology and
tools to bolster security for the nation, increase agent safety and add
value for taxpayers. With the Tucson deployment underway, SBInet now
has a baseline to be replicated in future deployments, such as AJO-1.
We have a frame of reference from an operational deployment, not just
the prototype of Project 28. The Block 1 system remains the core of our
effort, and I believe our work over the last few years has lowered risk
and increased system integrity. I also believe our work has produced a
capability that will give the Border Patrol agents a highly effective
tool to enhance border security and improve agent safety. We have now
had the opportunity to work in the field with the Border Patrol Agents
and have a more thorough understanding of the challenges they are
facing. We believe that the Block 1 system architecture we are
providing, once deployed, is readily scalable and upgradeable to
incorporate new and improved sensors to meet changes in the Border
Patrol Agent's mission.
AJO-1
The AJO-1 deployment is also progressing well. System design is
complete, and the command-and-control facility is already under
construction. The majority of the hardware has been purchased, and site
work and installation are awaiting environmental approval from the
Department of the Interior, expected in mid-October. The AJO deployment
consists of six sensor towers and five communications towers, spanning
about 30 miles of border.
Northern Border
The Boeing team has also been active on the Northern Border with
projects in the Detroit and Buffalo Sectors. Boeing is installing
Remote Video Surveillance Systems, or RVSS, to enhance surveillance
capabilities in a cold-weather, river environment. The RVSS are
comprised of two sets of day and night cameras atop monopoles or
existing structures. These systems feed video images back to sector
headquarters using the same microwave communications design as being
deployed in TUS-1 on the southwest border. However, in this deployment
we aren't including radar for additional detection or a Common
Operational Picture for multi-sensor correlation and tracking. Eleven
RVSS are slated to be installed in the Detroit Sector to monitor
activities along the St. Clair River and five in the Buffalo Sector to
monitor activities along the Upper Niagara River. Installation began in
the Buffalo Sector in May, and efforts recently started in the Detroit
Sector. We expect both projects to be fully operational by early 2010.
Conclusion
In conclusion, let me say that SBInet has been both a challenging
and also an important program to The Boeing Company. The Project 28
prototype and Block 1 system, which have received a majority of the
attention, represent approximately half of the government-funded effort
to date. Boeing has invested its own funds in SBInet: we built a
systems integration lab in Huntsville, Alabama; we established the
Rapid Application Development / Joint Application Development lab in
Arlington, Virginia; and we created modeling and simulation tools to
support development. These have been significant factors in the
program's success to date. Boeing has also leveraged existing
capabilities to support SBInet. For example, the entire TUS-1 network
was replicated in our existing Network Systems Integration Laboratory
(NSIL) in El Segundo, California, to ensure it was operationally robust
prior to deployment.
Boeing's support to Customs and Border Protection has extended
beyond SBInet. Last year, we supported tactical infrastructure efforts
through the Supply and Supply Chain Management task order. Using our
supply chain expertise, we procured more than $440 million or 140,000
tons of steel for use in 290 miles of fence construction. That's the
equivalent of three modern-day aircraft carriers. According to
September 2008 testimony by then-U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Commissioner W. Ralph Basham, between $63 million and $100 million was
saved.
Our goal has been to provide a complete system, technology and
tools to bolster security for the nation, increase agent safety and add
value for taxpayers. With the Tucson deployment underway, SBInet now
has a baseline to be replicated in future deployments, such as AJO-1.
We have a frame of reference from an operational deployment, not just
the prototype of Project 28. The Block 1 system remains the core of our
effort, and I believe our work over the last few years has lowered risk
and increased system integrity. I also believe our work has produced a
capability that will give the Border Patrol agents a highly effective
tool to enhance border security and improve agent safety. We have now
had the opportunity to work in the field with the Border Patrol Agents
and have a more thorough understanding of the challenges they are
facing. We believe that the Block 1 system architecture we are
providing, once deployed, is readily scalable and upgradeable to
incorporate new and improved sensors to meet changes in the Border
Patrol Agent's mission.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your
questions.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Peters, and thank you for
coming under time.
Mr. Stana, for 5 minutes or less on your testimony?
STATEMENT OF RICHARD M. STANA, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Mr. Stana. Thank you, Chairwoman Sanchez, Chairman
Thompson, Mr. Souder, members of the subcommittee. Shortly
after the launch of the secure border initiative, this
committee asked us to review the SBI program and to provide
periodic updates on the status of our efforts and interim
findings.
My testimony and our report provide our fourth formal
update. As you know, SBI is a multi-year multi-billion dollar
program aimed at stemming illegal entry into the country. Since
fiscal year 2005, SBI has received funding amounting to over
$3.7 billion and DHS has requested over $779 million for next
fiscal year.
I would now like to highlight our observations on program
status and challenges. With respect to technology deployment,
the SBInet program continues to experience delays. When the SBI
contract was let in September 2006, the initial SBInet
technology deployment for the entire southwest border was
planned to be completed by early fiscal year 2009, but by
February 2009 the completion date had slipped to 2016.
Similarly, in February 2008 the SBI program office reported
that TUCSON-1 and AJO-1 in Block 1 would be complete by the end
of calendar year 2008. TUCSON-1 is now scheduled for final
acceptance by January 2010 and AJO-1 in June 2010.
The cost of the SBInet projects from fiscal years 2007
through 2014 was estimated at $6.7 billion, but the cost could
change due to program adjustments. A lifecycle cost has not
been estimated.
Along with environmental issues and funding reallocations,
the results of testing activities contributed to these delays.
SBI program office officials emphasized, and we agree, that
testing is a necessary step of deployment in that it ensures
that technology capabilities perform as required.
By February 2009 testing results revealed problems
including the instability of camera under adverse weather
conditions, mechanical problems with the radar at the tower,
and issues with the sensitivity of the radar. The SBI program
office is still working with Boeing to address some of these
issues.
In a 1-week user evaluation last spring that was not part
of formal testing, Border Patrol agents had an opportunity to
address the suitability and effectiveness of Block 1 technology
compared to Project 28 and mobile surveillance system
technology.
The Border Patrol found that on windy days the Block 1
radar had issues that resulted in an excessive number of false
detection, and that the capability was not adequate for optimal
operational effectiveness.
They also found that the features of the Block 1 camera
were insufficient in comparison to features of the Project 28
and MSS cameras. Once all SBInet capabilities are deployed in
TUCSON-1, the Border Patrol is to perform a complete
operational testing. Provided there are no additional schedule
changes, this testing of TUCSON-1 is scheduled to begin in
January.
Until SBInet is deployed, CBP cannot determine what
operational changes it will need to take full advantage of the
new technology. In the meantime, the Border Patrol relies on
existing equipment such as cameras mounted on towers that have
intermittent problems including signal loss.
During our site visit to Tucson last March, Border Patrol
agents told us, as they had during our previous visits, that
Project 28 system had improved their operational capabilities
but they must continue to work around ongoing problems, such as
finding good signal strength for the wireless network, remotely
controlling cameras and modifying radar sensitivity.
To fill gaps or augment legacy equipment, SBI program
office procured and delivered 40 MSS units, but these units
sometimes are not operational because of the need for repairs.
Turning to tactical infrastructure, the deployment of 661
miles of fencing and vehicle barriers along the southwest
border is nearing completion. But delays persist due mainly to
property acquisition issues.
About 633 miles had been completed and CBP was scheduled to
complete the remaining 28 miles by November. Yesterday CBP
provided an update of miles completed and remaining and these
totals decreased slightly. About $2.4 billion has been
allocated from fiscal years 2006 through 2009 to complete
fencing projects.
CBP estimates the lifecycle cost for the fencing and
related roads, lighting and so on, assuming a 20-year lifespan,
to be about $6.5 billion. According to CBP data, as of May
2009, there had been 3,363 breaches in the fence with each
breach costing an average of about $1,300 to repair.
Despite the $2.4 billion investment in tactical
infrastructure, CBP has not systematically evaluated the impact
of tactical infrastructure on gains or losses in the level of
effective border control.
Such an evaluation is important to help demonstrate its
contribution to effective control of the border and to help CBP
to determine whether more tactical infrastructure would be
appropriate given other alternatives and constraints.
In our report, we recommended that DHS evaluate the impact
of tactical infrastructure on effective control and DHS
concurred with our recommendation and describes actions
recently completed, underway or planned to address it.
In closing, the SBInet program continues to face
uncertainties and expectation gaps. Three years ago at the time
the Boeing contract was signed, DHS was to have SBInet
capabilities across the northern and southern borders as of
today.
While this was likely an overambitious goal and lessons
have since been learned, schedules have continued to slip. In
the meantime, the border control continues to rely mostly on
Legacy technology and we remain uncertain about whether the new
system will meet the Border Patrol's needs and expectations.
These uncertainties underscore Congress' need to stay
closely attuned to DHS' progress to ensure that SBInet
deployments work as planned, the schedule stabilizes and that
the investments made in the program yield an efficient and
effective system that addresses our nation's border security
needs.
I would be happy to answer any questions that members may
have.
[The statement of Mr. Stana follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard M. Stana
Chairwoman Sanchez, Ranking Member Souder, and Members of the
Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the
implementation of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Secure
Border Initiative (SBI) program--a multiyear, multibillion dollar
program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal
immigration. Securing the nation's borders from illegal entry of aliens
and contraband, including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction,
continues to be a major challenge. In November 2005, DHS announced the
launch of SBI to help address this challenge. The U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) supports this initiative by providing agents
and officers to patrol the borders, secure the ports of entry, and
enforce immigration laws.\1\ In addition, CBP's SBI program is
responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system
using technology, known as SBInet, and tactical infrastructure--
fencing, roads, and lighting--along the southwest border to deter
smugglers and aliens attempting illegal entry.\2\ Since fiscal year
2005, SBI has received funding amounting to over $3.7 billion.
Approximately $1.1 billion has been allocated to SBInet and $2.4
billion to tactical infrastructure.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ At a port of entry location, CBP officers secure the flow of
people and cargo into and out of the country, while facilitating
legitimate travel and trade.
\2\ The SBI Program Executive Office, referred to in this testimony
as the SBI program office, has overall responsibility for overseeing
all SBI activities for acquisition and implementation, including
establishing and meeting program goals, objectives, and schedules for
overseeing contractor performance,and for coordinating among DHS
agencies. However, as of March 2009, the tactical infrastructure
program office was realigned and is now managed on a day-to-day basis
by CBP's Office of Finance Facilities Management and Engineering
division.
\3\ Remaining funds were allocated to program management and
environmental requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SBInet surveillance technologies are to include sensors, cameras,
and radars. The command, control, communications, and intelligence
(C3I) technologies are to include software and hardware to produce a
Common Operating Picture (COP)--a uniform presentation of activities
within specific areas along the border. SBInet technology is to be
initially deployed in two geographic areas --designated as Tucson-1 and
Ajo-1-- within the Tucson sector.\4\ In September 2006, CBP awarded a
prime contract for SBInet development to the Boeing Company for 3
years, with three additional 1-year options. As of July 8, 2009, CBP
had awarded 13 task orders to Boeing for a total amount of
approximately $1.1 billion.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The U.S. Border Patrol has 20 sectors in which it is
responsible for detecting, interdicting, and apprehending those who
engage in illegal activity across U.S. borders between official ports
of entry.
\5\ See appendix II of our September 2009 report--GAO, Secure
Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact
of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed, GAO-09-896 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 9. 2009)--for a summary of the task orders awarded to Boeing for
SBI projects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to deploying technology across the southwest border,
DHS planned to deploy 370 miles of single-layer pedestrian fencing and
300 miles of vehicle fencing by December 31, 2008. Pedestrian fencing
is designed to prevent people on foot from crossing the border and
vehicle fencing consists of physical barriers meant to stop the entry
of vehicles. In September 2008, DHS revised its goal, committing
instead to having 661 miles either built, under construction, or under
contract by December 31, 2008, but did not set a goal for the number of
miles it planned to build by December 31, 2008. Although some tactical
infrastructure exists in all the southwest border sectors, most of what
has been built through the SBI program is located in the San Diego,
Yuma, Tucson, El Paso, and Rio Grande Valley sectors.
My testimony is based on a report we are publicly releasing today
\6\ that is the fourth in a series of interim reports on SBI
implementation.\7\ My testimony will discuss the following key issues
in our report: (1) the extent to which CBP has implemented the SBInet
technology program and the impact of any delays that have occurred, and
(2) the extent to which CBP has deployed the SBI tactical
infrastructure program and assessed its results. Our full report also
provides a status of SBI program office staffing and the progress the
office reports in achieving its human capital goals. I will conclude
with some observations regarding our recommendation and DHS's response.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ GAO-09-896.
\7\ GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected Aspects
of SBInet Program Implementation, GAO-08-131T (Washington, D.C.: Oct.
24, 2007); Secure Border Initiative: Observations on the Importance of
Applying Lessons Learned to Future Projects, GAO-08-508T (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 27, 2008); and Secure Border Initiative: Observations on
Deployment Challenges, GAO-08-1141T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2008);
GAO-09-896.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For our report, we reviewed program schedules, status reports, and
previous GAO work and interviewed DHS and CBP officials, including
representatives of the SBI program office and the tactical
infrastructure program office; the Border Patrol (a component of CBP);
and the Department of Interior (DOI). We visited three SBI sites where
SBInet technology (Project 28) and/or fencing had been deployed at the
time of our review.\8\ We determined that funding, staffing, and
fencing mileage data provided by CBP were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of our report. More detailed information on our scope and
methodology appears in our September 2009 report. Our work was
performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Project 28 was an effort to provide a technology system with
the capabilities to control 28 miles of the border in Arizona.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
sbinet continues to experience delays, and border patrol continues to
rely on existing technology that has limitations that newer technology
is planned to overcome
SBInet technology capabilities have not yet been deployed and
delays require the Border Patrol to rely on existing technology for
securing the border, rather than using newer technology planned to
overcome the existing technology's limitations. As of September 2006,
SBInet technology deployment for the southwest border was planned to be
complete in fiscal year 2009. When last reported in February 2009, the
completion date had slipped to 2016. In addition, by February 2009, the
schedule for Tucson-1 and Ajo-1 had slipped from the end of calendar
year 2008, and final acceptance of Tucson-1 was expected in November
2009 and Ajo-1 in March 2010. As of April 2009, Tuscon-1 was scheduled
for final acceptance by December 2009 and Ajo-1 had slipped to June
2010.\9\ (See fig. 1 for schedule changes over time).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ The SBI program office defines final acceptance as the SBI
program office taking ownership of the SBInet technology system from
the contractor and comes before handing the technology over to Border
Patrol.
Flaws found in testing and concerns about the impact of placing
towers and access roads in environmentally sensitive locations caused
delays. By February 2009, preliminary results of testing revealed
problems that may limit the usefulness of the system for Border Patrol
agents, including the instability of the camera under adverse weather
conditions, mechanical problems with the radar at the tower, and issues
with the sensitivity of the radar. As of May 2009, the SBI program
office reported that they were still working with Boeing to address
some issues such as difficulties aligning the radar.
As a result of the delays, Border Patrol agents continue to use
existing technology that has limitations, such as performance
shortfalls and maintenance issues. For example, on the southwest
border, the Border Patrol relies on existing equipment such as cameras
mounted on towers that have intermittent problems, including signal
loss. The Border Patrol has procured and delivered some new technology
to fill gaps or augment existing equipment. However, incorporating
SBInet technology as soon as it is operationally available should
better position CBP to identify and implement operational changes
needed for securing the border.
Tactical Infrastructure Deployments Are Almost Complete, but Their
Impact on Border Security Has Not Been Measured
Tactical infrastructure deployments are almost complete, but their
impact on border security has not been measured. As of June 2009, CBP
had completed 633 of the 661 miles of fencing it committed to deploy
along the southwest border (see table 1). However, delays continue
mainly because of challenges in acquiring the necessary property rights
from landowners. While fencing costs increased over the course of
construction, because all construction contracts have been awarded,
costs are less likely to change. CBP plans to use $110 million in
fiscal year 2009 funds to build 10 more miles of fencing, and fiscal
year 2010 and 2011 funds for supporting infrastructure. The life-cycle
cost study prepared by a contractor for CBP shows that total 20-year
life-cycle costs are estimated at about $6.5 billion for all tactical
infrastructure--including pre-SBI infrastructure as well as that
planned for fiscal years 2009, 2010, and 2011--and consisting of
deployment and operations and future maintenance costs for the fence,
roads, and lighting, among other things.
Table 1: Tactical Infrastructure Deployment Progress as of June 26, 2009
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Miles
Miles in deployed Total Miles
Infrastructure place through miles in remaining
type before SBI as of place as Target to meet
SBI* 6/26/09 of 6/26/ target
09
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pedestrian 67 264 331 358 27
fencing
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vehicle fencing 76 226 302 303 1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total fencing 143 490 633 661 28
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of SBI data.
* Seventy-eight miles of pedestrian fencing and 57 miles of vehicle
fencing were in place before the SBI program began. However, since SBI
began construction, some miles of fencing have been removed, replaced
or retrofitted resulting in mileage totals that are different from
those we have reported in earlier reports.
CBP reported that tactical infrastructure, coupled with additional
trained agents, had increased the miles of the southwest border under
control, but despite a $2.4 billion investment, it cannot account
separately for the impact of tactical infrastructure. CBP measures
miles of tactical infrastructure constructed and has completed analyses
intended to show where fencing is more appropriate than other
alternatives, such as more personnel, but these analyses were based
primarily on the judgment of senior Border Patrol agents. Leading
practices suggest that a program evaluation would complement those
efforts.\10\ Until CBP determines the contribution of tactical
infrastructure to border security, it is not positioned to address the
impact of this investment. In our report, we recommended that to
improve the quality of information available to allocate resources and
determine tactical infrastructure's contribution to effective control
of the border, the Commissioner of CBP conduct a cost-effective
evaluation of the impact of tactical infrastructure on effective
control of the border.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ In program evaluation, scientific research methods are used to
establish a causal connection between program activities and outcomes
and to isolate the program's contributions to them. GAO, Program
Evaluation: Studies Helped Agencies Measure or Explain Program
Performance, GAO/GGD-00-204 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS concurred with our recommendation and described actions
recently completed, under way, and planned that the agency said will
address our recommendation. For example, DHS commented that it is
considering using independent researchers to conduct evaluations and
considering using modeling and simulation technology to gauge the
effects of resource deployments. We believe that such efforts would be
consistent with our recommendation, further complement performance
management initiatives, and be useful to inform resource decision
making.
This concludes my prepared testimony. I would be pleased to respond
to any questions that members of the subcommittee may have.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Stana, and I thank the
witnesses for all of their testimony. I will remind each of the
members that he or she will have 5 minutes to question the
witnesses, and I will now recognize myself for some questions.
Mr. Peters, in your testimony I think it was you who said
that Project 28 has become a valuable enforcement tool for the
last 18 months. That was part of your testimony, correct?
Mr. Peters. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Sanchez. Because I am having a little problem really
trying to understand what is going on out there, and I haven't
been out there for a while, as you know, Chief. Originally, we
all thought, a majority of us that Project 28 was actually
going to be an operational system that was going to be able to
be used by the CBP.
And later we learned that no, now you all thought it was
going to be a prototype where you would test different things,
and that is about the point, at least the last time that I was
out on the Tucson sector looking at it, Chief.
And TUCSON-1 and AJO-1 actually overlapped Project 28. Am I
correct? I mean, we spent the money to do Project 28. We
thought it was going to be operational. It was just a prototype
to test out different things.
Now, you are telling me that it is operational and that it
has been useful, but at the same time we are turning that same
equipment out, and we are putting in new equipment across AJO-1
and TUCSON-1, which have a big overlap with the original
Project 28.
So I guess my question is, if that is the case, why is Mr.
Stana telling me that we have less capability or worse
equipment on there? Was it cameras or radar that you were
talking about, Mr. Stana?
Why is it that it seems to me, not only were you falling
behind in time, but were falling behind, and we are spending
much more money, but now we have actually got technology that
is worse?
Somebody?
Mr. Borkowski. How about I take that? I think what Mr.
Stana was referring to in the old technology is the pre-SBInet
technology. There is on the border things called remove video
surveillance system cameras, those kinds of things. Those are
technologies that have been placed, in fact, since before 2000.
So the way I understood the report, and I think Mr. Stana
actually did highlight the difference between that technology
and Project 28, those are the technologies that the Border
Patrol is essentially laboring with awaiting SBI, and I think
that was the point of his testimony.
Now against that backdrop, SBInet Project 28 is an
improvement compared to those old systems but it is not the
production system. So I think that is the context in which we
are talking about the old technology.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Stana, can you clarify that for me?
Mr. Stana. Yes, a couple of different points here just for
clarification. Project 28 was supposed to have a leave behind
capability for 28 miles of the border. So your observation
about why are we overlaying Block 1 stuff on Project 28 is a
valid question.
And the answer to that is, is Project 28, while useful to
the Border Patrol in its current iteration, is not really what
the Border Patrol needs most. I mean, they appreciate the help,
and they appreciate the 5,000 apprehensions and the drug
seizures and all, but it is really not the end game here.
With respect to--in the meantime, until a better capability
comes on board, the Border Patrol will need to use Project 28
assets. We will have to use the RVSS' on the poles, as Mark
mentioned, and other technologies, sensors that may not be tied
to any kind of a COP. But until Block 1 comes on and its
predecessors and the final design of SBInet is settled on, they
are pretty much stuck with what they have got.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Stana, let me ask you. Your report says
that ``as of September 2006 SBInet technology development of
the southwest border was planned to be complete in fiscal year
2009. When last reported in February 2009,'' just this past
February, ``the completion date has slipped to 2016.'' What
were the reasons given for this?
Mr. Stana. Well, I think that the contract that was signed
by Boeing and DHS way back in September 2006, almost 3 years to
the day, was very ambitious and probably overly ambitious.
It called for a completion of the project on off-the-shelf
technology largely, to integrate it and have Project 28 be the
first iteration, and go forward and actually duplicate it with
some modification up and down the border. It would be finished
in 3 years.
When they got into it they realized for a number of reasons
that was overly ambitious and they didn't consult with the
Border Patrol on design. There were some features there; didn't
realize how tough it was; many lessons to be learned from
Project 28.
As the project has matured, they have realized other issues
have cropped up. You know camera distance is a persistent
problem. Radar clutter on windy or rainy days a persistent
problem. And these are issues that they are still trying to get
on top of.
Ms. Sanchez. So from a technology standpoint, how close are
we on TUCSON-1 and AJO-1 to actually be able to use something
that is operational, that is at the capability we had imagined
in the beginning after getting through Project 28?
We would have for the Border Patrol to actually be able to
see people moving, decide where to go and apprehend them, et
cetera, because you tell me you have looked at it on a day or
two when they didn't know you were coming in and on a windy day
it all fell apart.
Mr. Stana. Well, I am not really sure where we are right
now. I think it is good that testing is being done. There is
retest plans, re-planning, lots of testing and that is good.
The thing that, I guess, is of concern is that the testing is
finding two things. One is that the testing is finding the same
general kinds of problems with the hardware and the interface
and the software.
Ms. Sanchez. The same ones as Project 28 had?
Mr. Stana. Well, I mean, if you look at camera distance,
which was a problem with 28, radar clutter was a problem with
28. Some of these issues are being addressed.
But I am not so sure, and we won't know until it is
ultimately deployed in January and the Border Patrol takes over
for operational testing exactly whether this is going to yield
the product that the Border Patrol finds operationally
effective. We just won't know until that kind of testing is
done.
The other concern we have is with the way testing was
designed and executed, and we have another team in GAO, our
information technology team that is looking at those issues.
They have surfaced some concerns. Their work will be completed
in the next few months.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Stana. I mean, this is
important. I also want to come back at some point to talk about
the measure and whether we are really going to measure what
resources ultimately we are going to have to put towards this
if we ever get SBInet to work enough for you to be able to use
it confidently, if you will, Chief Aguilar.
But in the interest of time, I know there is so many
members who have questions, I will now recognize for 5 minutes
my ranking member, Mr. Souder of Indiana.
Mr. Souder. Thank you, Madam Chair. First for the record,
Congressman Miller and I on June 8, 2009 asked for a copy of
the northern border action strategy, and we would appreciate an
answer.
Also, on July 31, 2009, a month-and-a-half ago, three
ranking members from Government Reform and Oversight, Natural
Resources and this committee plus two subcommittee ranking
members, myself and Congressman Bishop asked for the Fish and
Wildlife and the Department of Interior overlap with DHS and
would appreciate answers to those letters.
Let me plunge directly in where Chairman Sanchez was
headed. I think that Mr. Stana's point about ``overambitious''
is an incredible understatement that some of us raised concerns
in the beginning, not about the partners, but about the
concept.
You have hilly areas of the border, particularly in that
area from Nogales over to where it flattens out by Organ Pipe
in the Ajo area. In my district when I am going back and forth
between Warsaw and Fort Wayne any little bump, yet alone the
hills like in California, will cause me to lose my cell phone
service.
It wasn't too hard to figure out that when you have relay
towers, particularly when this subcommittee group visited it as
a group and we saw the tall towers to try to address that, that
the wind was going to blow that.
We already knew that from the military. This would have
been transferable information, and I don't believe there was
adequate advanced planning before plunging into this contract
about the realism of it.
Now what--in TUCSON-1 they have addressed challenges with
some smaller towers some taller towers. They are trying to
overcome some of the conceptual flaws of how you do this
transmission of technology in a mountainous area, how that is
different in the flat areas.
There aren't continual flat areas anywhere along that
border. Chief Aguilar did some of this over by Douglas in the
early primitive forms that kind of identified how do you tell?
In fact, the first time I was at the--I just blanked on the
airbase in Saudi Arabia after Khobar Towers before 9/11, they
couldn't tell even with far more expensive military technology
the difference between a tumbleweed and terrorists coming up on
Prince Sultan Air Force Base.
One of my questions has been repeatedly how do we get
military technology, which we have already paid for in the
government, transferred into border technology?
I have IGT Aerospace, Raytheon, General Dynamics, USSI, DAE
all in my district, all who do electronics warfare and so on. I
have been talking to them. SBInet is incredibly cheap compared
to anything we do in the military.
And we are trying to do what they are doing in tracking
terrorists and what they are doing in military on the cheap,
and it has been a struggle. As we get into some of the
particulars, let me ask Mr. Peters a question, in your
contract, because early on we saw that there wasn't pre-testing
prior to coming to the border, you built a testing center, is
that correct?
Mr. Peters. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Mr. Souder. Did the government fund that, or how much of
that was funded by government versus private?
Mr. Peters. Government-funded, and Boeing has also made
some contributions to that capital.
Mr. Souder. Significant?
Mr. Peters. I don't know the number off the top of my head,
and I will get that for you.
Mr. Souder. And was your contract on Project 28 a fixed
cost, and then you absorbed anything that ran over that cost.
Is that true?
Mr. Peters. Yes, sir. The deployment of the P28 prototype
was a fixed cost, and then the Boeing Company brought its
resources to complete the project.
Mr. Souder. Would you say that you have contributed double
what the government did?
Mr. Peters. Yes, sir, approximately two-times.
Mr. Souder. And in TUCSON-1 how is that working?
Mr. Peters. TUCSON-1 is a different contract, and so we
are, you know, we are working to deploy that. We are currently
partway through our SQT, our system qualification test, and we
will move into our system acceptance test later this fall.
Mr. Souder. The government challenge now is, is that when
we invest in something that we basically had too optimistic and
ambitious goals and now have this kind of investment. If we
switch the partnership group that we have, we lose the testing
center and we lose a lot of what you have invested in your
private funds, or do we have to pay you for that?
Mr. Peters. You will certainly lose the non-recurring
engineering that, you know, has spent over the past 2 years on
TUCSON-1. And then we would have to look at specifically what
portions of the Playas site were, you know, Boeing-funded and
which were government-funded.
Mr. Souder. And we need to understand it because we run
into this in military contracting, that this type of contact
that we have here where they had to do the cost overruns puts
us in a different situation as we develop future alternatives.
Mr. Borkowski, one of the overly ambitious, to use Mr.
Stana's words, was that this was going to be able to be
communicated to the vehicles. Does that appear realistic, and
is that in the future proposals because that would be a great
advance? But I know what these systems cost when we transfer
them to Humvees, and it is nothing like the cost of what you
are proposing to do.
Mr. Borkowski. Correct, sir. The SBInet Block 1 does not
include the mobile data terminals, and for several reasons. One
is the cost of creating the capability. The other is the
operational experience and the ConOps that we gained. It is a
question of do we really get benefit from that. So SBInet Block
1 does not include mobile data terminals to deal with those
kinds of questions.
Mr. Souder. And Tucson won't either, TUCSON-1?
Mr. Borkowski. Correct. TUCSON-1 is the first deployment of
the so-called SBInet Block 1. So the plan for the system will
not include it.
Mr. Souder. I see. Then so the goal is to go to a center,
and then the center communicates it to the vehicle.
Mr. Borkowski. Correct.
Mr. Souder. Which is a difference from our original
conception of the program?
Mr. Borkowski. Correct.
Mr. Souder. But there was no way to cost effectively do the
other?
Mr. Borkowski. Correct. Now we are still looking at options
if they are required downstream, but they are not in the
baseline at this point.
Mr. Souder. Because to some degree in the mountainous areas
it is easier to get in behind and send the people there than to
try to figure out how to transmit this data into a vehicle when
the terrain is going up and down. Is that not correct?
Mr. Borkowski. Correct. That is absolutely correct.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. Yield back.
Ms. Sanchez. I thank the ranking member.
I will now recognize the chairman of the full Committee of
Homeland Security in the House, Mr. Thompson, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much. Continuing somewhat
along the line of your questioning and the ranking member's,
earlier this year the Border Patrol agents had an opportunity
to operate the newest SBInet technology at the Boeing test
facility.
We have already heard that according to GAO the agents
indicated that on windy days the radar had an excessive number
of false detections, which is one of the same problems that
plagued Project 28.
But the agents also compared the new camera technology to
the existing Project 28 and mobile unit cameras and said that
the new cameras did not even measure up to the existing ones.
Now, is this true?
Mr. Borkowski. It is true that that was the conclusion of
the agents, yes. Those are true statements.
Mr. Thompson. So the agents don't know what they were
talking about?
Mr. Borkowski. No, that is what the agents experienced. But
one of the reasons for doing the operational assessment, which
was informal, was to test some other things like how well did
we explain the operation of the system.
How well did we train the operators to use the system? They
are familiar with, for example, Project 28, and a lot of these
operators are familiar with the mobile surveillance system.
So one of the reasons for doing that operational assessment
was to collect that information, figure out what the problem
was, what was the cause of that, and then if in the actual
deployment that really is an issue. So that was the purpose of
that was to collect that information.
Now, in many cases we don't think that that problem
persists into SBInet Block 1 as deployed in TUCSON-1, but
again, that is with the formal operational test and evaluation.
Mr. Thompson. So if your testimony to the committee is that
it happened, but there were some reasons for it happening, and
it has been corrected.
Mr. Borkowski. We believe so. And again, we will see for
sure in the operational test and evaluation but we believe so.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Stana, would you want to comment?
Mr. Stana. Well, first that is why you have testing is to
get the bugs out of a system. In this case the Border Patrol
agents who tested the system found the bugs that you described,
among others, and there was a cause for concern.
The concerns they raised were some on the COP, all the
components were integrated, but some was with the hardware
itself. If the camera range issue and the radar flutter issues
are corrected, I guess I would have to see that in testing
before I would buy that, you know, just right away. But that is
why we have testing and that is why the operational testing by
the Border Patrol in January is going to be very telling.
Mr. Thompson. Madam Chairwoman, I have a diagram I want to
put on the screen. Well, so much for technology. We have had
the information distributed to our witnesses, and what you have
before you is the original concept behind SBInet. And what I
really want to do is to have you to explain to the committee
what specific steps Boeing has taken toward making this
technology depicted in this diagram a reality.
[The information follows:]
Mr. Borkowski. Are you asking that question----
Mr. Thompson. Well, I guess both Mr. Peters and yourself.
Mr. Borkowski. Okay. The Project 28 which was a prototype,
although to be fair not properly advertised as such, attempted
to test this concept of operations and to learn from it. So it
did have things like satellite communications. It did have
things like the mobile data terminals. It did have the kinds of
things that are depicted here.
Based on that experience, SBInet Block 1 is a different
concept. It is a concept that uses microwave communications and
relay towers to send the information from the sensors back to
the station and then at the station for agents to dispatch
others to respond.
So this concept is not the concept of SBInet Block 1 based
on the lessons learned from Project 28 and the current estimate
of the operational needs of the Border Patrol.
Mr. Thompson. So it was changed?
Mr. Borkowski. Yes, it was.
Mr. Thompson. Did that reflect the change in pricing or
just the change in technology?
Mr. Borkowski. The Project 28, which as we discussed was a
firm fixed price, did overrun, but Boeing had to absorb those
costs.
As we have designed the new system, that new system is put
on by new task orders which are like new contracts. I mean they
are all on this basic contract. And they are priced based on
what we know or anticipate we want to do next.
And the go-forward is priced--and by the way, that is a
cost reimbursable contract, that means the government will pay
what it costs--so those are estimated based on the current
concept.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Stana, based on what you just heard, is
that a generally accepted procurement procedure?
Mr. Stana. Well, I think it is a generally accepted
approach to begin with a project and build on what you can
actually make work. That is fine. What is missing here and I
don't know if it is fair to as the Congress to consider a $6.7
billion investment, if we really don't know what the end-game
is going to look like.
And I know there is some development that goes on here, but
what this seems to articulate to me is this is someone's vision
of the end-game where you will have maybe satellites, UAVs,
sensors, mobile units and so on, and I don't know how much of
that is still on the table in the out years. So there is just a
lot of uncertainties.
Mr. Thompson. Well, I think the whole issue of the
procurement is what kind of has us in the weeds most of the
time, when we are trying to figure out exactly where we are,
and perhaps we can get some further direction. Chief, you might
be able to help us at some point in trying to clear this up.
I yield back, Madam Chair.
Ms. Sanchez. I thank the Chairman.
And I will now recognize Mr. McCaul, of Texas for 5
minutes.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank the witnesses for
being here. Recently I went down to the El Paso Intelligence
Center, EPIC, and at that point in time, Juarez was and still
is in a state of crisis. It is probably the most violent city
in the American continent.
President Calderon has said he is in a war with drug
cartels and I mention this only to frame the issue. That is
really why we are here today. That is the threat. That is why
getting operational control of the border is so important.
They showed me the fence that had been--the physical fence
that had been built in El Paso which has allowed Border Patrol
to gain more operational control. But while the physical fence
is nearly completed, progress along the lines of a virtual
fence using technology, in my view, has barely begun.
And I wanted to reference to a--it is an unclassified
notation in a DHS intelligence report saying that ``drug
trafficking organizations operating in Chihuahua, Mexico use
some 300 identified makeshift crossings at low points along the
Rio Grande between El Paso and Presidio.'' This is according to
a Mexican government study cited in a Juarez daily newspaper.
And this unclassified map from the DHS intelligence report
shows Chihuahua and the main drug trafficking locations.
Despite the evidence that this Mexican state is a source of
significant drug trafficking and violence, it is alarming to me
that the SBInet project does not anticipate deploying
surveillance technology to this section of the Texas--Mexico
border, including the Marfa and Del Rio Border Patrol sectors,
until after the year 2014 at the earliest--2014.
We have completed the physical fence. Virtually, to the
point, why in the world does this take so long to do?
Mr. Borkowski. What we have tried to do is come up with
what we think is a reasonable and prudent and acceptable
budget, an ambitious but acceptable budget. So essentially the
plan that you are describing is a plan that we put forward as
how much could we do with the most budget that we could
reasonably expect to ask for?
Now, that is not necessarily, by the way, the budget we
will get but that was the plan we laid out. The idea I think is
to get through this SBInet Block 1 to a point where we can then
start stamping these out, essentially, as production.
And then the pace of that depends on funding, one, and then
two, any desire to build off of SBInet Block 1, is there
anything I want to change in it, as I go into other areas? But
that is fundamental where that pace came from. It was the most
that we thought we could reasonably ask for in funding, which
is not necessarily what we will get, okay, so that all has to
be focused in on this, too.
Mr. McCaul. Well again this is--we are spending a great
deal of money up here in Washington, and yet we still can't get
this border situation under control. And it seems to me we
ought to be investing more in this technology to get this thing
done more rapidly than the year 2014.
You know, my constituents and the American people want this
done, and they don't want to wait 5 years to see this thing
completed. My governor, Texas Governor Rick Perry, in the mean
time because of the crisis down there, has requested 1,000
National Guard troops be deployed and has asked for that from
the federal government.
He has not received any response as I am aware to date. Can
you tell--can anyone on this panel speak to that request?
Chief Aguilar. The request that Governor Perry has made is
still be worked out, being looked at between DHS and DOD. At
this point I cannot give you an update. I will get you what we
have as soon as we can, sir.
Mr. McCaul. Well, I would hope the secretary would respond
to the letter. I think it is important, particularly if we
can't get this technology done by the year 2014. It seems to me
it is a good idea to get more human manpower and resources down
there on the border. Chief Aguilar, would you agree with that
comment?
Chief Aguilar. Absolutely. Any kind of capability that we
can get down to the border as fast as possible is going to help
us secure our border. Just in fairness to Mr. Borkowski out
here as to the question that was asked, the lay-down plan,
given the capability requirements that we have identified from
a technology systems base is what gets us to Texas in 2014.
That is not necessarily saying that is when we want to get
there. We would like to get there yesterday, but of course what
we are--what we have identified is the capability requirements
package that they are working to create, and given the budget
that we think we are going to get, that is that lay-down plan
timeline for Texas.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Chief.
And Madam Chair, I hope we can, on this committee and Mr.
Chairman, the full committee, work to speed up this process,
make it more efficient, more functional so we can finally get
operational control of this border. And with that, I yield
back.
Ms. Sanchez. I think there is nobody in disagreement with
you on this committee. As you know, Mr. McCaul, we have been
working on this for a while.
I would like now to recognize one of our members who
actually represents a border area with some of the most
crossings. I believe that would be Mr. Cuellar at this point.
Are you ready to go, Mr. Cuellar?
Mr. Cuellar. Yes, Madam Chair.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you very much for your leadership in
having this meeting. First of all, I want to thank the
witnesses for being here, and one of the questions I have, GAO
and the other committee I sit in, in Government Oversight
Reform, just came out with a report just a couple of days ago
criticizing Homeland and the billions of dollars that they have
invested in technology.
And saying that it is--I guess you are one of the at risk
agencies that we have subject to fraud, abuse, et cetera on
that, so start off with that background. And again I appreciate
everything that you all do, but I guess it gets us a little
frustrated. Being on the border, I have lived near the border
and, Chief, you are from the area and you know what it is.
I mean billions of dollars have been invested but, you
know, if we don't do our work correctly you are going to have
governors saying we have got take things in our hands. For
example, Governor Perry came up with saying that he was going
to send this, ``elite Texas Rangers,'' which I know because I
used to do the budgets for the Texas Rangers.
Do you know--did they coordinate with you in any way or
form?
Chief Aguilar. Yes, sir. In fact the Texas Rangers were
actually trained by our national tactical team, BORTAC.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. Knowing their budget, do you know how
many are coming down to the border?
Chief Aguilar. I don't know how many are coming down. I can
tell you that I believe there was about 15, give or take a few,
that were actually trained by our tactical unit.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay, so what Governor Perry is talking about,
just 15 Texas Rangers that will come in and supplement the work
that you are doing?
Chief Aguilar. Yes, sir. I will additionally state that the
Rangers, DPS and the county sheriffs have always worked very
closely with us in the past.
Mr. Cuellar. Well, I am talking about this new elite Texas
Rangers.
Chief Aguilar. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cuellar. So 15 for the record, 1,200 miles for the
Texas border?
Chief Aguilar. Yes, sir, 1,200 miles, 15 that we trained.
Yes.
Mr. Cuellar. All right. The other thing is is the--and I
appreciate the work that Boeing has done. I know there have
been questions about the work, but the Defense Department has
been working on pilot programs. And I don't know if they have
done a pilot program close to Wilmot, Texas in my district
there. I think they just finished one in the northwest.
And in sitting down with them, and--is they are saying
that, you know, instead of millions of dollars for a, let us
say, five-mile radius, they are saying that they can do this in
the tens of thousands. And Mr. Borkowski, I think you and I,
Borkowski, we spoke a little bit before, you said it is not
really what they are, you know, they are--it is not up to par.
But you know, I still go back and I have seen some of the
work, but if it is military--and I think, Mr. Souder, I think
you might have mentioned this before I got in--but if it is
military tested and they have done this in the heat--that was
one of the reasons why we had trouble on the SBI at the very
beginning.
They have done this before. It is proven, and it is in the
tens of thousands of dollars, why the heck are we paying
millions of dollars when we can do this in the tens of
thousands for the same length that we have?
Mr. Borkowski. Certainly, if we can do what we need to do
for tens of thousands, we would like to see that and look at
it. We would be happy to look at that.
We are actually and have talked to parts of the DOD. It
turns out the applications they are talking about compared to
our needs don't always match quite the way they might think.
However, I do spend 3 to 6 hours on an average week, talking
with Department of Defense people on their proposals, talking
with various vendors and contractors because we actually are
trying to collect a reservoir of other technologies.
So that we can start, as we gain experience with the SBInet
and we are able to measure its effectiveness and we gain
experience with some of these other systems, we can start
picking and choosing what we put where. So we would be very
interested in looking at those.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I have sat down with these
folks several times, and I will ask both, Madam Chair, I would
love for you all if we could sit down and do a briefing, Mr.
Souder, because with all due respect, if we could have maybe
Boeing and the departments sit down with the Defense.
I have seen this presentation and unless if I am missing
something I would like for somebody to tell me that I am
missing something on this, but if we can do the same range for
tens of millions, military tested equipment, it has been
proven. It is cheaper to the taxpayers' dollars. It is quicker
to implement. Why can we not do that? Mr. Chairman or Madam
Chair, if you want to set that up?
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Cuellar, actually, as you know, I sit on
the Armed Services Committee so we have been talking to the
Department of Defense and we have set up a briefing next week
to take a look at some of the applications that they have.
I think DHS is correct in saying that they don't exactly
match up, but we will have the briefing and an informational
meeting so that we can take a look at it and then we can
decide, since we set the policy, the Congress does, as to
whether what the Department of Defense has done in other areas
like Iraq and all and looking at the borders.
For example, whether that technology, because it tends to
be less expensive than what we are experiencing here, whether
that is applicable and that whether that really, you know,
blankets or allows us to feel the confidence level we need at
our border.
Mr. Cuellar. Well and again I--yes. I would like to talk
to, you know, sit down because again I have seen this and being
on the border, having this type of technology is better than
waiting for years and years and years for something. And if we
can do this at tens of thousands of dollars, I would like to
see this sit down so, I want----
Ms. Sanchez. Unless it gets the job done, I think all of us
would like to see it. Thank you, Mr. Cuellar, for your
questions.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Sanchez. I will now recognize my good friend from
Florida, Mr. Bilirakis, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it very
much. Mr. Peters, share with us your perspective on lessons
learned from previous SBInet deployments and areas that the
department and Boeing can improve upon to ensure future
deployments are completed in as timely and cost effectively as
possible.
Mr. Peters. Yes, sir, be happy to do that. Probably the
biggest lesson learned we took away or one of the major ones
was the establishment of a test facility in an environment
similar to what you are going to be deploying in, and that
would be Playas, New Mexico test bed that we established.
Another one was the early user involvement. We talked about
P28 being a prototype system developed predominately by
engineers. We got very valuable, useful feedback from the
users, when they looked at that P28 prototype system, in terms
of the human-machine interface. We were able to incorporate
that back into the actual Block 1 system design.
We also learned lessons, going back to Mr. Thompson's
diagram, learned lessons about latencies that were in the
system, the P28 prototype used a Ku band satellite
communication system and it introduced latencies into the
system. So we knew we had to take those out and we went to a
microwave line-of-sight-type communication system in the Block
1 design.
We learned, as we talked earlier, about the wind moving the
radar around and introducing clutter into the system, so we had
to introduce clutter rejection algorithms into the design. So
those things--P28 was a very valuable, and that is why I had it
in my opening statement, P28 was a very valuable engineering
tool.
In addition to being an enforcement tool for the Chief and
the Border Patrol, it was a very valuable engineering tool for
us to take those lessons learned and introduce them into the
Block 1 design, which is what we will take out to the field, at
both Tucson and Ajo.
Mr. Bilirakis. Sorry about that. Is the department
satisfied with the contracting vehicle for SBInet? Does it
provide sufficient protections for taxpayers, if the system
doesn't work? Does it prevent large cost overruns, and for
example, are there disincentives or penalties for contractor or
missed deadlines or program errors that cause delays?
Mr. Borkowski. In general, I would say that the contract we
have is awkward. It is not the contract, in hindsight, that
probably we should have. It does have the capability to do
incentives and disincentives.
Ultimately, the responsibility though for holding the costs
and--it is basically the government program management. The
contract is a standard contract. It is a standard type of
acquisition. It gives us the tools that we do need.
It includes elements like award fee and incentive fee,
which adjusts profit based on performance of the contractor.
And as we put additional tasks on, we are in the position where
we put disincentives.
For example, on the northern border, there are schedule
incentives, and if schedules are missed there are penalties for
missing them. There are also other kinds of tools that we have
outside of the contract.
But I would say that the contract as it is structured is
awkward, and as we get to the point where we have this kind of
production system that we can start stamping out, we are going
to need to look at how do we get out from under the structure
of this contract.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Mr. Stana, in your testimony you noted the concerns about
the impact of placing towers and access roads in
environmentally sensitive locations have caused SBInet
deployment delays. Has GAO quantified the impact these
environmental concerns have had on technology deployments
relative to the other factors that may be slowing this project
up?
Mr. Stana. Well, there were three factors that really
tugged at the pace at which the SBI Block 1 was being fielded.
The environmental concern was one. There was some confusion
whether the provisions of the Secure Fence Act applied to the
SBI program. Turns out it didn't, so they had to go through
some environmental procedures to place the towers and roads.
The other two were the fencing, you know, getting money
reallocated to complete the fencing as much as they could by
the end of 2008. And the third is is the SBI program just
wasn't ready for full fielding. They had to re-plan and retest.
So even if the environmental concerns weren't there, it is
not to say that, you know, they would have met the 2008 date
that they originally put out there because there were retest
and re-plan issues out there.
We couldn't tell exactly how much each one of those factors
tugged, but the fact is that the delays persist and it is not
only due to environmental issues. There were other testing
issues and the appropriateness and the readiness of technology
to be fielded issues that were still there.
Mr. Bilirakis. All right, thank you very much.
Thanks, Madam Chair.
Ms. Sanchez. The Chair recognizes Mr. Thompson for a
comment.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Borkowski, you said the contract was awkward. For the
committee's information, who developed the contract?
Mr. Borkowski. Ultimately we are responsible for that
contract so we developed it, and we are responsible for its
nature.
Mr. Thompson. So I would assume that because we now know it
was an awkward contract, we won't enter into any more awkward
contracts?
Mr. Borkowski. I can't promise that. I hope that we learn
our lessons from these kinds of experiences. I have the
contract I have, and I have to make the most of it until I am
in a position, a reasonable time position to fix it, but----
Mr. Thompson. Maybe I need to ask the Chief.
Ms. Sanchez. The Chief, I don't think, had anything to do
with the contract because he wasn't--weren't you not allowed to
even suggest deployment or----
Chief Aguilar. At the beginning we were not involved in the
contract, and it would actually be a CBP responsibility over
all as to how the contract is actually designed, sir. And I
would agree with Mr. Borkowski that at the most opportune time
we will look for a realignment, if you will, where it can be
done because I agree with Mr. Borkowski. It is an awkward way
of doing business.
Ms. Sanchez. So let me ask you something because I am told
that it is a possibility you may be doing add-on or you may be
extending in the very near future. Does that mean the extension
or the add-ons are going to be all awkward also?
Mr. Borkowski. The extension of the contract is done and
the contract itself has what are called task orders, which are
essentially subcontracts. And that is what makes it awkward
because the elements of each of these task orders are really
connected, but they look like they are independent contracts
and that is the awkward part.
Now, the way that we are managing that now is we have
imposed requirements on the contractor to connect those so we
can work around it. And certainly, though, in the future to the
degree that I am in control of the design of the contract, we
would not do this in the future, but it is what we have.
Ms. Sanchez. I believe, Mr. Souder, I will recognize you.
You had a comment also.
Mr. Souder. Yes, and I think it is important that Mr.
Peters also acknowledge that it was a tad awkward on your side,
and that generally speaking Boeing does not have the principle
of entering into contracts that cost you more than two times
what you get?
Mr. Peters. Yes, sir, it is an awkward arrangement
particularly in a development contract where, as Mr. Borkowski
said, you have multiple task orders and they are linked
together but contractually they are treated as separate.
That is what makes it awkward. That is what makes it slow
and inefficient for the contractor and customer relationship.
Mr. Souder. And it is fairly safe to say that, if this
project ended now, it would have been an experience you would
have rather not been in. The assumption here is that if Boeing
can continue it maybe you can recoup back to even.
But one thing that needs to be pointed out here is there
was not an enrichment of the private sector in this contract.
This was just basically way over-promised and everybody has
lost their shirt, so to speak on it, so far.
Mr. Thompson. Well, but I think the record needs to reflect
that this was a competitive process. It was not a sole source.
So Boeing knew they had risk going in and that risk is----
Ms. Sanchez. Supposed to be borne by the private sector.
Mr. Thompson. Absolutely. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Ms. Kirkpatrick, you have been very
vigilant over there waiting for your turn, so I will recognize
you, also from a border state, from Arizona, Ms. Kirkpatrick
for 5 minutes.
Ms. Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Madam Chairman, it is an honor
to yield to the esteemed colleague from Texas, Mr. Cuellar, so
I don't mind waiting. Thank you, panel, for being here.
The security of our nation depends on maintaining
operational control of our borders, there is no question about
it. And if the SBInet is able to meet our ambitions, it will be
a valuable tool in achieving this control.
However, time-after-time, officials from DHS and Boeing
have come in and told Congress that the program is back on
track, that past problems have been resolved and everyone is
ready to move forward. And time-after-time we later find out
the old problems have not been fixed and there continue to be
delays.
Today we are hearing again the same story. After months of
being told SBInet is back on track and ready for deployment,
the GAO is reporting that the technology has many of the same
flaws it has had for years. This program is too important to
keep messing up and needs to get back on track.
Mr. Stana, how much closer are we now than we were 2 years
ago to having an operational system that works the way we have
envisioned without the operational shortfalls that have been
evident in the past?
Mr. Stana. That is a good question, and I don't have a
complete answer for you. What I do know is that the testing
regimes that have been designed for Block 1 are more rigorous
than they were for Project 28 and there were some lessons
learned from Project 28 that have been incorporated in the
design of the Block 1.
On the other hand, we are seeing the same kinds of issues
that we have seen in camera projects dating back into the
1990s, you know, about camera range and reliability and flutter
and these kinds of things. So I guess we will find out when it
goes to operational testing.
I share your concern about the optimism. I think Mr. Peters
is the third Boeing Vice President that I recall here at the
witness table, and each time there has been an optimistic
assessment, and I can understand coming from the contractor why
that would be.
But I think we have to wait and see exactly what is
delivered and is it operationally efficient and effective for
the use of the Border Patrol.
Ms. Kirkpatrick. The second part of my question is why are
we not testing until January of next year? Why don't we start
testing now, the operational test?
Maybe, Mr. Peters, you can answer that.
Mr. Peters. We actually are testing but there are phases of
tests. There is the test that, you know, the contractor has to
sell this off to me as the engineering geek, okay. And so we
are going to do that and that is going to start here shortly.
In fact, some of it has already started in Tucson.
At that point, I am going to make a conclusion about
whether Boeing gave me what I thought they were supposed to
give me. When that happens--now, my customer is the Chief of
the Border Patrol.
Now, I am going to turn that over to the Chief of the
Border Patrol and he is going to make whatever conclusions he
chooses to make. That is the testing we are talking about
starting in January, so there are steps to get to that.
Ms. Kirkpatrick. Can that be accelerated?
Mr. Peters. We hope it can but again the schedule that we
have given you is the schedule that we think is reasonable.
Again, you know, there are risks, as Mr. Stana says, and I
don't want to over-promise. I want to tell you think we have
done the best we can at this point to give us the most
confidence in that.
We will try to accelerate if we can. We are already working
with Boeing on that, but we are not confident that we will
succeed.
Ms. Kirkpatrick. All right. I appreciate your desire not to
over-promise. We do not need that now, but we do need a system
that is operational. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Ms. Kirkpatrick.
I will now recognize Mr. Rogers for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank the witnesses
for being here. You know, a little over 4 years ago when I was
chairing the MIO subcommittee we did an investigation into ISIS
and just thought surely that could never happen again. And it
seems like this is eerily similar to the outcome that we saw
from that debacle but with a lot bigger numbers.
I would ask Mr. Borkowski and Mr. Stana, could you tell me
why you think we have let it happen again?
Mr. Borkowski. I can't tell you why we think we have----
Mr. Rogers. But with much bigger numbers.
Mr. Borkowski. Right. The only thing I can tell you, sir,
is that I think that we have had to build our own competence in
managing a program like this and then learning what you have to
put in place.
And some of the things that we put in place at the start of
this program, in hindsight, were not effective. And so now we
are in a position where we can either stop and start over or we
can fix as much as we think we need to fix to make the risk
going forward prudent, and that is exactly what we are doing,
and there are risks in that approach.
So we are trying to fix what should have probably been
fixed before this program, but we are doing it in the process
of delivering it, and I can't explain how we got here.
Mr. Rogers. And I just don't understand, just from a
technical standpoint, why it is so difficult. I mean, they are
basically cameras on a pole, and we have got folks monitoring
multiple cameras in a dispatcher format.
I have been out there and I have seen them, and I just
don't understand why we are having problems. This is not the
most sophisticated technology that our country has. As you just
heard the Chairwoman, what we are doing in Iraq is much more
sophisticated.
Mr. Borkowski. In some ways it is and in some ways it
isn't. And one of the keys things here--well, first of all,
there are two things going on here and I will use a little bit
of an analogy because what we bet on--and it was probably not a
good bet--but what we bet on was that this was like buying a
new printer for your computer, and you are supposed to be able
to plug it in, when you go home and, you know, the printer is
supposed to work.
When I do that half the time the printer doesn't work. It
is supposed to, but it doesn't, and I have to go get the CD-ROM
and cram it into place and I will eventually get it to work.
That is one factor.
The other is I think we miss the point sometimes that this
is a network system, okay. That is very important. This is a
network system. All of these towers are connected and what that
means is that you have got, in the case of TUCSON-1, nine
radars, nine infrared cameras, nine electrical optical cameras,
all coming together into one pipeline, one communication
pipeline.
So there is the process you have to go to manipulate the
data from those things to get them all to fit in that pipeline.
Mr. Rogers. And I understand that, but my point is that is
basic technology. We do it here. We have all sorts of
information systems here that if we move around just in this
one building, just in this one hearing in the televising of it.
This is not rocket science. And I don't understand why we can't
do that networking along that border in a more effective way.
Mr. Borkowski. We can, and if we had started with the
assumption of let us look at the requirement, let us look at
what bandwidth we have and so forth and designed systems, we
probably would have been okay, but we didn't.
We started with the assumption that we can plug these
things together and it will fit. And once we did that we were
in trouble because when it didn't fit, we hadn't started from
that normal, natural beginning and now we had to make it fit.
And so we started the wrong way in my opinion.
Mr. Rogers. That is true.
Mr. Stana, you used a figure of $6.7 billion a little while
ago. What was that figure about?
Mr. Stana. That is the total estimated cost of SBInet from
fiscal years 2007 through 2014. And it is not a lifecycle.
Mr. Rogers. So that is what I was going to get at. Nobody
knows how much this is going to cost.
Mr. Stana. Well, nobody knows what it is going to look
like, so how would they know what it costs?
Mr. Rogers. Right. And I am just amazed that we have spent
over $3 billion already and we don't have a system that works.
It is just phenomenal to me. But last, I want to go to Chief
and ask about something that I am interested in, blimps.
You know, we use blimps for weather purposes. We use them
in the military for aerial surveillance because they loiter.
They can stay up for a very extended period of time. Do you
currently use blimps along the border for aerial surveillance?
And if so, how many and what kind of platforms do you use them
for?
Chief Aguilar. We do not currently use blimps. We have
tested them in the past out in the field in Arizona
specifically. We don't have any now. We do fly some radar
aerostats along the southwest border, but they are not
surveillance blimps.
One of the things that we are asking Mr. Borkowski, SBInet
is specifically to capability. If he believes that a blimp is a
proper platform, he will take a look at that. But our--and this
is the good thing about the way that the relationship works
between the border patrol, the SBInet program and whoever the
contractor is going to be.
We articulate requirements. This is what the Border Patrol
needs from an operational perspective. They start doing the
research and assessing what it is that can bring us that
capability in the most efficient, effective and, of course,
reasonable manner from a funding perspective.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I know that you all like the drone, but
it is so expensive and the blimps are being used by the
military now, by weather services. I would like to see you all
look at that. One of my concerns all along about the video
cameras on poles is they can be shot out, and it is just a
fact, by the bad guys, and you don't get the real high
surveillance that allows you to look over into Mexico.
So, but I will try to get a meeting with you, Mr.
Borkowski, and talk about more about that later.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Sanchez. You are quite welcome, Mr. Rogers.
I will now recognize Ms. Jackson Lee for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the chairwoman and ranking
member for the hearing. The background of a number of my
questions will be simply the conditions at the border that I
think are well-known and have accelerated over the last year.
The gun running, the explosive violence on the Mexican side
of the border spilling over to the U.S. border and the interest
of the American people about whether or not this violence can
be contained and what elements we are using.
Certainly, SBInet deals specifically with the issues of
securing the border in ways that might capture the less endowed
criminal because there are other ways to promulgate the
violence that is going on. Mr. Stana, if you would give me what
you think is the major Achilles heel of this program, the major
indictment of this program, if you would do that?
And Chief Aguilar, would you give me a status of the
lawsuits and the negotiations dealing with the fence? This is
part fence, part virtual that is at the Texas border? And I
would also like to understand why there was an extension of the
Boeing contract and what is expected to be accomplished out of
that extension.
Mr. Stana, first of all?
Mr. Stana. Okay, thank you. With a broad stroke, I would
say getting something that works to spec has been the most
difficult part of this program and Project 28 was accepted. It
didn't meet all the specifications, but it is within the right
of the secretary to accept it and he did back in March 2008. It
has been helpful but it has not worked to spec, and now we are
seeing the same thing.
I also would note that the spec for acceptance of Block 1
is now a 70 percent identification rate, so that means when you
are talking about drug runners or bad criminals, it can be
accepted if they can find seven out of 10 of them. And I hope
that would come----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Three can really be explosive.
Mr. Stana. I hope that that metric would come up because,
you know figuring that three out of 10 are going to get by and
you can still accept the program, as I understand that metric,
seems to me a lower bar than maybe we want.
Ms. Jackson Lee. What about the training of the Border
Patrol agents, their understanding, comprehension, comfort
level with it?
Mr. Stana. You know, they have been trained to use Project
28. They were trained on the mobile units and then there was
delay getting the mobile units fielded and deployed. You know,
I think the Border Patrol is doing what it can to train, but
until this thing gets deployed, you really won't have the----
Ms. Jackson Lee. But as Mr. Thompson asked the question
about the agents who said they were uncomfortable or couldn't
get their hands around it.
Mr. Stana. As we understand the Border Patrol agents were
thoroughly familiar with MMS' and Project 28 and the folks that
our people talk with sort of dismissed that counterargument.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Aguilar, Chief Aguilar, if you want to
comment and then add on the lawsuits, please?
Chief Aguilar. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And then you might be able to--someone
jump in on the contract being extended.
Chief Aguilar. Right. I will ask Mr. Borkowski to speak to
the contract extension, ma'am, and I will also ask him to fill
in some of the gaps with--relative to the land condemnation,
the lawsuits that are ongoing currently.
As we speak, we have built about 92 miles of fence just in
Texas, and I mention Texas because that is where most of the
lawsuits are happening at. We intend to build 115 miles in
total. So we have about 23 miles that are caught up in some
kind of litigation or concerns having to do with IBWC and
things of this nature.
We are working through those lawsuits, through those
condemnations, and we fully expect to either build a fence by
the end of this year or articulate a means by which to get the
persistent impedance that we are looking to get in those areas
where we cannot build a fence because of the ongoing lawsuit.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I would like to pursue that with you, but
if I could get the answer on the Boeing question and what
results are we looking for at the end of this year?
Mr. Borkowski. Well, the Boeing contractor--obviously
Boeing is in the process of building these things and testing
them, so we needed to extend the contract to allow them to do
that. And in fact, part of what is awkward about this contract
is it has these independent task orders, and those task orders
have periods that are not the same as the master contract.
So we extended the contract to allow Boeing to continue the
work that was contracted on the task orders because it is a
task order contract extension, just provides us the flexibility
to continue having Boeing continue the work that was already
contracted and, if appropriate, do follow-on work. So that is
the reason we have extended the contract.
Ms. Jackson Lee. On my last seconds, I just think that we
need to have a steadfast monitoring of the progress here. This
is an ongoing saga of 10 years plus and our borders are
screaming for the right kind of security, and America is
screaming for the right kind of security.
I look forward to some in-office briefings, and I thank you
all very much and I yield back.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee.
And now I will recognize Ms. Miller, from Michigan for 5
minutes.
Ms. Miller. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I
certainly want to thank you for calling this hearing, and I
want to thank the witnesses as well for their testimony and to
the Chief and the Director. Certainly appreciate your service
to our country, all of you, and what you are doing, which is
not an easy job.
And I am very interested in SBInet, and I actually want to
talk a little about what my experience in my region in our
sector has been on the northern border. And as always seems to
happen, we always talk about the southern border, and believe
me, I am not minimizing. I am very cognizant of all the
problems we have on the southern border.
But the northern border of our nation is twice as large, as
long, and has some similar challenges as well as some unique
dynamics as well. And a principal advocacy of mine of course is
the northern border.
And it was mentioned a little bit about some of what is
happening in the Detroit Sector and the Buffalo Sector with
SBInet. But let me just say that our experience is happening
very quickly and generally quite positively in regards to
SBInet.
And I want to personally thank, if it is not inappropriate,
Chief Gallegos, who is the Detroit Sector chief, and I know you
guys move around in your business, but I hope you don't--we
don't want to lose him. We really like him and he is doing a
great job.
And I will tell you, as we have rolled out SBInet in the
northern sector--actually, principally in my district, of
course we always have--in Michigan you have the map of your
state on the end of your hand here and we are having 11
surveillance cameras put up on the monopoles along this sector,
as well as we have a mobile unit at Selfridge Air National
Guard Base which is in the immediate geographic area, and it
houses all different facets of the military, but the CBP has a
large presence there.
And the SBInet is complementing, under the CBP umbrella the
Great Lakes Northern Border Wing for CBP which has air assets
and water assets, additional personnel is there for a number of
reasons, some of the unique dynamics.
Not only do we have sort of an asymmetrical theater going
on there with the Great Lakes, the long liquid border that we
share with Canada, we have the two busiest border crossings on
the northern tier are there.
The busiest rail entry in the northern, the entire country
actually, is there. And all of this is happening, and so we
have a lot of the same kinds of things that are happening on
the southern border.
We are anticipating that we have the ground mission for UAV
next year, 2010, there as well, again under the DHS CBP. And
the interesting thing for me that has, and I just want to speak
to this as a positive experience, is the rollout of all of
these surveillance cameras.
You can imagine how we were all very concerned about how
the public would say, my gosh, big brother. All of a sudden you
are putting these huge surveillance cameras in one of the
busiest boating sectors, for example, in the entire world
really.
People are out there saying, what do you--you know I am out
there having a beer. Are you going to be looking--or women be--
whatever. There was a lot of public consternation about the
rollout of this.
And I will tell you, our Detroit Sector chief and CBP, how
they rolled it out, they brought in all the affected
stakeholders, our local law enforcement officers, the county,
the sheriff, obviously the Coast Guard which is one of your
critical partners, our Canadian counterpart, everybody, and
most importantly, the public.
And how the public has accepted this now as not an
intrusion into their privacy but something that they are
looking forward to, and I think the first thing with SBInet,
the very first big bust that we have as a result of these
cameras, will dissipate any public hesitation about it and
how--what an important critical tool it is, an element for
border security going forward.
And I know I should ask a question, but I just want to make
the committee aware of what is happening here and speak to
this. And I was noticing that the chairman put up here--
actually as we look at this, one of the other things that is
happening, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as well,
in our area is something called an Operation Integration Center
along the northern border.
Because we have, although in our case we have all the water
and everything shown on here, all of these various cameras and
various types of things, all of this data, you know you have to
collect the data, right? Collect all the data, analyze the
data, and then get it back out into the hands of the Border
Patrol agents, the brave men and women who are tasked with
protecting our border.
And CBP is putting an Operation Integration Center as well
at the Great Lakes Northern Border Wing which will be a pilot
program for the northern border of analyzing all of this data
and utilizing it in an efficient manner.
And I think that is one of the things that we learned from
9/11. That was one of their big recommendations. The ability--
you have to move from the need to know to the need to share
information amongst all of the agencies.
And I know my time is running out here, but I just wanted
to mention that----
Ms. Sanchez. Your time has actually run out.
Ms. Miller. My time has run out. I would invite the
committee to come and take a look firsthand of what is
happening on the northern border. And again, our experience is
very positive. We are much looking forward to this in our area.
Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. Ms. Miller, I would just like to acknowledge
your continued efforts to talk about the northern border. I
know from a political standpoint and what America worries
about, they are always talking about the southern border, but
the reality is we have three real borders.
We have the southern border. We have the northern border,
which is quite open as we still all know, and the resources and
all don't seem to get there, and we also have the maritime
border. And in particular we were very worried about the
Caribbean situation, drugs coming in and people smuggling, et
cetera, which also doesn't get as big a play.
And we are hoping on this committee at some point this year
or early next year to address both the Caribbean region and as
well as the northern border, and I was just talking to our
ranking member and we will try at some point, I hope, to make a
trip up to the northern border.
We did a few years ago when we went to Niagara, the
Niagara--Buffalo area, but it definitely is overdue and as we
know, the stronger we become on one side and some of the links
we make them stronger then people go to the place where we are
not paying as much attention or it is weak or--so we definitely
have it on our list, and I thank you for that.
Ms. Miller. Thank you very much, Ms. Chairwoman.
Ms. Sanchez. Our next person will be Mr. Pascrell, of New
Jersey for 5 minutes.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Madam Chair. Madam Chair, the fact
is that our inability to find a border security solution that
actually works makes it impossible for the Congress to enact
real comprehensive immigration reform. That is the bottom line.
And with all due respect, and I thank them for their
service, Chief Aguilar, Mr. Borkowski and Mr. Stana and to many
respects our friend from Boeing here, not the technology that
is the problem. See, I don't think the technology is the
problem. It is our inability to articulate a coherent policy
for practicing and protecting our borders. That is the problem.
I don't think they are the problem. We are the problem, and
the administration is the problem before and now. So you can
put more personnel--I mean we just discovered we had a northern
border in the last 2 years. I thought that had disappeared,
dematerialized. But you can have more personnel, more walls and
fences and more electronics and we are good at that stuff, you
know, like to work with that.
But we are not good at accomplishing what we set out to do
and that is to have an overall plan and have a clear budget.
This budget is certainly not clear to me. Maybe it is clear to
all of you.
So Chief Aguilar and Mr. Borkowski, I have a simple
question on the actual results we have seen from the Secure
Border Initiative. Since fiscal year 2005, SBI's funding has
amounted to over $3.7 billion. This year the Department of
Homeland Security has requested $779 million in SBI funding for
the fiscal year 2010.
My question is what are the actual results on the border
before and after we had put all this funding into technology on
the border? And my second question, and I will have a third
one, but my second question, just to be clear, how many more
illegal crossings have we stopped in the years since we started
SBI as compared to the years before? How many more drug
seizures have we made?
How many weapons have we stopped from going across the
border because remember, Madam Chair, we weren't even concerned
about all the weapons that were going from the United States
down into Mexico which are now killing our guys and gals--our
guys and gals. We certainly don't want to stop industry do we?
So we want those weapons to continue to go over from all kinds
of sources. Let us start with those two questions.
Chief Aguilar. Let me begin with the statistics that you
asked for, Congressman. The peak year for activity levels was
fiscal year 2000, the year of 9/11, 1.6 million apprehensions
of illegal entries between the ports of entry. In addition to
that, close to a million pounds of narcotics. As we speak we
are going to end up this year with about 5-1/2 or 550,000
apprehensions, a decline of over 62 percent.
One of the reasons we have been able to do that--oh, and by
the way, the narcotics apprehensions is about 2.5 million
pounds, a tremendous increase. One of the reasons for that
ability to increase the narcotics apprehensions, we could
because our ability to focus on other threats such as
narcotics.
When we mitigate the illegal alien incursions we are able
to focus our efforts on other threats. One of the reasons we
have been able to do that is because of some of these
expenditures of funds, some of these expenditures of funds.
Within these $3.7 billion that you spoke about, we got
capabilities to us such as the MSS that was spoken to earlier,
mobile surveillance system, which gives us a standalone
capability. It is a system standalone capability. It is not
networked, but it gives us a tremendous amount of enhancement
to our agents.
Mr. Pascrell. What about the interdictions of weapons going
from the United States to Mexico?
Chief Aguilar. We have actually increased our efforts as a
department, CBP. Border Patrol is assisting----
Mr. Pascrell. How many weapons have you confiscated?
Chief Aguilar. I don't have that number for you right now,
sir, but I can get it for you.
Mr. Pascrell. Do you have any idea?
Chief Aguilar. I wouldn't guess at this point, sir. I would
rather not. I will get you the number.
Mr. Pascrell. Is that a priority?
Chief Aguilar. It is a DHS and a CBP priority in which
Border Patrol specifically assists, and this Congress has
actually given the Border Patrol 44 specific positions for next
year in order for us to continue assisting. But the main focus
on southbound weapons is by our OFO counterparts at the ports
of entry checking traffic southbound. But I----
Mr. Pascrell. Could you get back to me and let the
committee know how many weapons have been confiscated----
Chief Aguilar. Absolutely.
Mr. Pascrell. ----that are going from the United States
into Mexico?
Chief Aguilar. Yes, sir. I would also take the opportunity,
Congressman, to address something that I think is important
because of the level of support that Congress has given to CBP,
Border Patrol and DHS, but specifically CBP. Madam Chair,
unfortunately I think we may have provided you with some wrong
stats.
The number of Border Patrol agents, and I am very pleased
to put this forth, as of the 29th of August, was actually
20,000 agents, 20,000 Border Patrol agents. We have grown
tremendously.
That along with the capability being given to us right now
by Project 28, its evolution, its morphing, its development,
its continued enhancements, is helping us tremendously. We
still have a lot further to go and we are working very hard
because of the recognition that we do need to secure this
border as America has demanded.
Mr. Pascrell. Having a second round?
Ms. Sanchez. We will see. Thank you to the gentleman from
New Jersey.
When I began this hearing I spoke about metrics and trying
to understand whether putting up a physical fence or putting up
a virtual fence is really going to allow us to, if you will,
take scarce resources and deploy them and use them better so
that, in fact, we can bring down the apprehension, bring down
the number of people coming across illegally, get the number of
drugs that we need to.
And Mr. Pascrell, I completely share your view that until
we fix the immigration issue we will continue to have excess
people, people trying to get into this country. That really
clutters up what we are really trying to do which is to get
really bad guys, get the drug dealers, get people who would
harm this country.
So unfortunately this is just one piece of that. This is
the, you know, the piece of security, and I think it is fair to
say that the people in the United States don't believe that we
have been doing a good job of securing our borders. And that is
why this SBInet, that is why the resources that we are giving
to Chief Aguilar and others, that is why the physical fence in
places where it does work is so important for this cause.
We need to have a level of confidence in the American
public that in fact we can keep people out and we can also
catch the bad guys. So I appreciate you bringing up the issue
of how important the reform of immigration is.
I would like to at this point recognize a member who we
gave unanimous consent to sit on this committee today, who sits
on the full committee, actually is the chair of our oversight
committee, and he and I have chaired many hearings together, in
particular looking at the issues of border security, and that
would be Mr. Carney for 5 minutes.
Thanks for waiting around to get a chance to ask your
questions.
Mr. Carney. Well, thank you for the gracious invitation to
attend, Madam Chair, and I have several questions, probably
more than 5 minutes worth, but we will not do--this is not the
last time we will gather, I am sure, on the subject.
Chief Aguilar, you mentioned earlier in your comments that
you have sort of a three-legged stool, that--and it is all
interdependent. You know, I think one of the legs, the
technology leg, is a fairly wobbly leg. How are you
compensating for that?
Chief Aguilar. We are compensating for that wobbly leg by
continuing to develop our capabilities within the technology
realm. Going from standalone technology, for example, to a
integrated system or a network of systems for technology is
where we need to get to.
In addition to that----
Mr. Carney. But I know what we need to get to but what are
you doing now?
Chief Aguilar. Well, as I said, that is part of the actual
development that we are going through that Mr. Borkowski is
doing on our behalf. Our responsibility as agents is to
identify and articulate the requirements that we have.
His responsibility is then to search out a means by which
to fill that gap, that void that we have articulated as a need.
We have technology. We have standalone technology. We are
putting pieces together in a rudimentary fashion, but what we
are working towards is that integrated network system that we
are--that is what we are requiring. So it is a work in progress
basically.
Mr. Carney. Putting pieces together in a rudimentary
fashion. Okay. Okay.
Mr. Borkowski, I have got to compliment you on a comment
you made sort of offhand, but it wasn't lost on me, that P28
was not sold as advertised. I don't know anybody on this
committee who thought it was a prototype when they agreed to
it, but now it is being sold as a prototype, as to somehow, you
know, it is just somehow a bit of a slight of hand. And it just
rankles me to hear that as a prototype.
In any event, you said something that was interesting, that
you purchased several printers over the course of your time and
sometimes, you know, they work half of the time they work as
advertised, half the time they don't. You continued to buy
those printer products that don't work as advertised?
Mr. Borkowski. You know it is interesting because we had
this discussion at the department, and when I had this with
senior leaders at the department they said, ``Well, you know,
that is why you buy a Mac.''
But the issue that you have and the question that we always
have is if you go to, you know, as an individual when I go to
buy, a Mac costs about three times a P.C., and so I am going to
make a conscious decision about do I want to buy--pay the one-
third and pay the pain of always cramming in the printer, or am
I going to pay three times and have the high confidence in the
thing, and that is exactly the situation we are in.
And typically in the government we go with the one-third
cost. And I am not saying that was necessarily a bad decision.
You know, I am not--you could make that argument either way,
but that is essentially what happened to us.
Mr. Carney. Mr. Peters, I think you are probably in maybe a
better position than your two predecessors, but we asked the
question a year-and-a-half ago, maybe 2 years ago now, of one
of your predecessors of what happened?
And they said, ``Well, we didn't have the A team in the
contract.'' I mean, that was their answer. ``We didn't have the
A team on there.'' I am not sure how far down the alphabet they
were, but I want to believe that you are the A team and that
you are going to do this well.
We want to be able to believe you, but you have to
understand, in the context of what has happened in the past, it
is tough for this committee and certainly my subcommittee to
believe your words until we see results. And results are going
to be absolutely essential and, you know, the trials coming up
here in the next couple of months we are going to be paying
very close attention.
In fact, it wouldn't surprise me if we get a request from
this committee and my subcommittee to observe them, to be on
the ground, you know, when they are going on because we are
paying that close attention.
Mr. Stana, the last question is for you and it is a yes or
no answer actually. I know it is hard in government, but has
the American taxpayer so far gotten what they paid for?
Mr. Stana. No.
Mr. Carney. Thank you. No further questions.
Ms. Sanchez. And I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Pennsylvania? Pennsylvania. Okay, I want to go back to the
original, one of the original things I said, metrics. So one of
the discussions, Chief Aguilar, you and I have had over time is
we have now given you 20,000 positions.
You have done a great job in finding people, trying to
train them, bringing them along and building a culture that is
really about getting the bad guys but, you know, most of the
people who cross the border really have a reason to be crossing
and making sure that people feel confident about that.
My question to you is because we had this discussion, if we
get SBInet working and if we put up the physical fence in
places as we have, is that going to create more work in a sense
for your workforce where you will need more people?
Or is that going to make it a necessity not to have the
20,000 agents that you currently have because the last time we
discussed this I believe you said something to the effect, ``I
don't really know if my workforce will decline or whether we
will just be catching so many more people that I am actually
going to need more people to get them, more people to detain
them, more people to put them through the process.''
So what is the magic--do you think now and what is the
metric? How are we going to judge whether we are just making so
much busywork in a sense for us and really not using the scarce
resources of the American people to still go after the bad
guys?
The terrorists, the person who means to, you know, bring in
chemical weapons, which is really, I think, when we look at
homeland security, our biggest desire is to really get the bad
guys before something happens on our soil.
Chief Aguilar. Yes, ma'am, and we have spoken about this
before and thank you for asking the question because I think it
is important that at every opportunity we speak to this. First
of all, I think it is important that we recognize that the
efforts that are ongoing are to secure our borders. Each one of
our borders--you articulated three of them and I agree there
are three versions of our borders--requires a different
enforcement model.
The purpose of the application of the enforcement model is
to basically, on the southern border for example, is to
mitigate the high level of cross border illegal traffic that is
occurring because of the potential for exploitation of that
high traffic by not only narcotics traffickers, illegal aliens,
but especially the terrorists that are still looking to come
into this country.
So applying the right enforcement model comprised of the
right type of technology, the right level of technology, the
right numbers of personnel, and the tactical infrastructure is
critical. The metrics that correlate to that is how do we
measure that mitigation of cross border activity?
There are several ways that we use. Third party indicators,
what happens to activity that is associated with a high level
of cross border activity? We see in San Diego, for example, we
use to see a lot of stolen vehicles, people getting run over on
the major highways.
We used to see a lot of rapes, murders on the immediate
border. We used to see stash houses. We used to see staging on
the Mexican side, social costs because of hospitals and things
of this nature having to basically cater to this illegal
traffic that was occurring.
We measure all of those to gauge what is happening overall
from a global perspective as it relates to a specific area of
the border. So we take all of those things into account. Some
of the things we take into account--assaults against our
officers.
We know for a fact that when we are going into an area of
operation to gain control, assaults against our officers are
going to escalate. They are going to go up. We fully expect
that. We train, organize and equip our officers in order to be
responsive to that.
So we take a look at all these metrics looking for the
outcome of securing our border. On our northern border, I won't
go into a lot of detail, but on the northern border we have an
absolute need to increase our situational awareness of just
what is happening, as Ms. Miller said.
That we at this point, frankly, there are some points on
the northern border where we just don't know what we don't know
because we are not out there to the degree that we need to be.
So what are the metrics? It is intelligence. It is working
with CBSA. It is working with RCMP, working with our IBIS
units, our ICE partners, FBI, DEA, interlocking all the
intelligence that we have, getting greater fidelity on that
northern border. So those are the metrics that we are looking
at.
Now, as we move forward one of the complexities that we are
faced with is that we are dealing with the obvious--human
criminal aspect. For everything, for every action that we take
they are going to react.
Whether it is because they are wanting to come into this
country to make a better life or to destroy our way of life, or
whether they are looking to come into this country to bring in
their narcotics loads. There are certain draws into this
country. So that human aspect we have to take into account. We
actually play for that displacement.
It is going to move until we are at a point where we have
secured our entire southwest border. As we speak, in California
on the Pacific side yet--2 days ago we had two loads of aliens
that went out 20 miles into the Pacific and then went north 39
miles and then landed. The reason for that is they can't get
past us along the land borders in San Diego. That is actually a
measure of success.
Coast Guard is involved with us right now so that we take
that avenue away from them also. So those are the things that
we are tracking. Those are the metrics and that is the way that
we pre-plan where it is that we are going.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Chief.
Mr. Souder, do you have a couple more questions for, sir?
Mr. Souder. Yes. I wanted to make a couple of comments and
a fundamental question. Mr. Pascrell and others have talked
some about the north border. As somebody who worked narcotics
issues for many issues, as well as that evolved into terrorism
and did a border report after a series of hearings prior to 9/
11, and have worked with Chief Aguilar for many years, let me
say that I have visited every state on the north border, have
held joint hearings with the Canadians on the north border when
I was chair over in the Government Reform and Oversight and
before the creation of this committee.
And the problems that we have are common. It is people and
contraband. The contraband can be narcotics. The contraband can
be chemical weapons. It can be nuclear and it is a constant
challenge. The people can be coming for work. They can be
coming for terrorism. They can be coming for a variety of
reasons, and the problem is that if any can get through, which
is almost impossible to stop, then any could be the one
carrying the nuclear weapon.
And the challenge is how you get zero tolerance when you
have these huge borders and that obviously requires intel,
which is critical, and then it requires every strategy. Part of
the job of Mr. Stana and your whole agency is to be a pain in
the neck and to try to hold the agencies accountable. That you
obviously don't have all the information, but it provides an
independent check and we need to hear that constantly.
I don't know whether or not this program ultimately will be
justified in cost. Quite frankly I was one of the early
skeptics because I felt this was an excuse to avoid building a
real fence and dealing with it and it was too massive of
approach rather than a building block approach, and if you did
28 miles, when you have as long a border as we are and put this
much money in 28 miles it wasn't going to be workable.
I don't agree with the statement that some of us didn't
raise that question in the very beginning. We had questions as
to what the deal was with this. The prototype was an ideal
structure that in the military world would have been incredibly
expensive. In this world we didn't have the dollars to do it.
You can see certain advantages with the UAVs going up. You
can see where the gun is. Our agents that have been killed in
California, had they had technology to tell them that there
were three guys there with a gun he wouldn't have been
assassinated.
If you can see at Organ Pipe where a park ranger was
killed, if we would have had information that would have been
able to get down to them there they would have been able to see
where his gun was. They would have been able to see where the
drugs were.
That is incredibly expensive, and the question is what can
we do that is reasonable, that is workable on both borders to
add technology to the people and to the other methods that we
use?
And because they are always going to change. Chief Aguilar
definitely made a terrific point in that is what we deal in
narcotics all the time. The degree you push them out more you
increase their expense. You have reduced the numbers. You have
more chances that they will trip up, more chances that you will
see them, and the whole reality here is, is that we are never
going to reach 100 percent.
But the degree we make it harder, the more likely are that
you are going to catch them and we are much more aware than we
were on 9/11.
Now, my fundamental question is that there were some signs
that you are going to look at SBInet in January and see whether
it would proceed. And at some point if we are going to do the
whole border, particularly if we are doing the north, too.
Congress still hasn't seen a--what the range of the cost of
this project is.
The only way we can do that is to take, okay, here is what
we did for 28 miles. Now we are doing that with TUCSON-1. Are
we going to extrapolate that? What percent of that do you
extrapolate?
Then you wind up with these huge figures that scare
Congress off. Ultimately we need some sort of ``effective
control'' of the border. Do you see yourself evolving towards
another strategy? A faster strategy, a more of a building block
strategy, what do you see Mr. Borkowski?
Mr. Borkowski. We see ourselves as going to a building
block strategy. So what we have at this point is we have a plan
that if it is appropriate that talks about covering the whole
border. And we need to be prepared to execute that plan. But
like you, we don't have all the data we need to convince
ourselves that that is the right plan.
It may make more sense to be a little more selective about
where we put this. So for example, one of these areas of
responsibilities covers about 20 to 40 miles of border. That is
roughly the range. And it costs us, loosely speaking, about $50
million to cover that, you know, to put it in. Now, there is
the operation cost.
So you can start to see that as we figure out what the
effectiveness of this is, compared to other lower costs or
other types of technology, which is the reason I am having
these 3 to 6 hours of meetings every week, to collect those
other technologies. We will gain some experience here and then
the department is going to be in a position to say, okay, we
are prepared.
We are prepared to cover the whole border, but before we do
that let us take some of this experience and say is that really
the most cost effective way to mix infrastructure, technology
and personnel in all parts of the border?
So our strategy has been be prepared to do it. Get to the
point where you are prepared to do it as quickly as told, but
also make sure as you do it you have incremental steps where
you can check. And we can have this discussion about how much
is the right amount in each part of the borders so then we
are----
Mr. Souder. And then it is important for anybody who is
watching this hearing or reviews the record of this hearing, to
understand that while we are focused on this sector of Arizona
which continues to have, plus Douglas, the most intense
pressure, although we don't know what we don't know.
The fact is that your agency isn't just focusing on this
area because we talked just beforehand about what is being done
at Big Bend and Amistad in Texas. Congresswoman Candice Miller
just talked about selfridge. You are working the whole border.
It is just this is the most intense area because it is the most
tense area of conflict and numbers. I yield back.
Ms. Sanchez. And I might remind my ranking member that the
border is much more than just the land border also. There is a
reason why we are called the Border, Maritime and Global
Counterterrorism Subcommittee. Engages quite a bit.
Mr. Pascrell, do you have a question or two?
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you.
I want to ask Mr. Stana about standards. I know that
Homeland Security keeps on changing the goal. It makes it more
difficult for them to do, and the other folks, to do what they
have to do.
It is my understanding that at various times when it has
become apparent that the SBInet would not be able to meet
established performance criteria, that the department has
simply lowered its standards rather than fixing the problems
with the system.
At one point there were nine such criteria, and we talked
about this a few years ago. Now there are three. At one point
the system was supposed to identify and classify 85 percent of
the entries. Now it is only 70 percent. So Mr. Stana, what can
you tell us about the performance criteria for both Project 28
and TUCSON-1? How do they compare and are we grading on a
curve?
Mr. Stana. With respect to Project 28 the criteria there
was 95 percent plus or minus 5 percent, so that was much
higher. For Block 1 I believe the objective is 85 percent, but
the threshold for acceptability is 70 percent. I would hope
that over time that bar would go up a little bit. That seems a
little bit low.
I think, you know, 2010 is going to be a crucial year with
these operational tests, and if the technology turns out to
work and, you know, with a few tweaks or right out of the gate
that is great. We all hope it works.
If it doesn't then perhaps the department needs to think
about a plan B because this is the second prototype in essence
after Project 28 and if it this doesn't work with appropriate
metrics, then what?
Mr. Pascrell. Well, let me ask you this question. I mean
you anticipate it. You have looked at this and you have
overseen the situation for quite some time now. You have
witnessed the changes I have talked about, the goals changing.
What is the main problem here? Since we are not satisfied
here--it is quite obvious--both sides of the aisle as to what
is happening down there?
And then it is not any way a reflection on the hard work
that the chief does and the other folks have done. But we are
not getting it done. And while that is not getting done we are
not responding to the major problem of immigration.
In fact, the economy of America has more to do with the
immigration than any of our brilliant ideas here about how we
are going to make sure we know who comes into this country from
wherever they are coming, north, south or, you know, from
planets. It doesn't matter. What is your analysis?
Mr. Stana. Well, I would put it this way. This is a very
difficult thing to do. We can talk about hooking up printers
and I think that--and I understand that he is trying to use a
metaphor here, but it almost simplifies the task at hand, and
maybe we are still having an expectation gap here. Is the
technology really ready to do what we have contracted for it to
do? That is one thing.
The second this is is that I think in setting contracts
that talk about the whole northern and southern border in 3
years and, you know, now we are--it seems like every time we
have one of these hearings everything is going to be fixed and
we are disappointed.
Maybe it is just--is time to really think about whether
this is the way to go? Are cameras really of sufficient rigor
and technology to get the 10-mile range that maybe the Border
Patrol might like? Are the radars really able to deal with the
winds that you have to expect down in Arizona? Or is there
another plan?
I know the Border Patrol likes MSS' as sort of a stopgap
for small areas and they have their problems, too. But in
thinking about this, and it is a good question, maybe the grand
plan is something that isn't achievable right now given the
current state of technology, and maybe, depending on what
happens in 2010, it might be time to think about other options.
Mr. Pascrell. I want to thank you for your honesty, and I
ask this question to you because I respect your acumen in this
area. Perhaps maybe we ought to get the immigration policy
first before we deal with the border situation because
wouldn't--if we had a robust immigration policy that we can
come together, both sides, that would certainly affect the
traffic on any of our borders.
And it might simply save us a lot of money, and doing what
we are doing is not succeeding, not to the extent that we want
it to. I am very concerned of putting our men and women in
jeopardy if we are not clear about the policy in the first
place, and I would suggest that we are not. I will stand
corrected if I am wrong.
And I have seen too many valleys in this thing and not
enough peaks, and I am concerned. We have been here together,
whether we were before when we were a select-committee before
we were even a committee, you know, I have been here trying to
do it to the best of my ability, to be in--to be something
hopefully positive.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. I think we are headed in the wrong direction.
That is my opinion. I don't know. I am not going to ask you
whether you agree or disagree, but----
Mr. Stana. Well, I am not a policymaker, Mr. Pascrell. I
just try to provide information and analysis.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. The gentleman's time has expired anyway so we
will lose that.
Mr. Souder. I want to say----
Ms. Sanchez. Go ahead, Mr. Souder, just a comment.
Mr. Souder. I would like to say something that the other
members can't really say. The republican administration
overpromised the ability of technology to do this, and we would
appreciate that the new administration doesn't overstate it.
Come in with realistic goals, realistic budgets and that we
will try and address it from there.
Ms. Sanchez. And I think overall what you are hearing from
this committee is that we are very concerned about securing the
border, and I think we have worked in a very bipartisan manner
to attempt to do that and keep the politics out of this,
although as Mr. Souder and I were just discussing, there are
always politics involved whether it is immigration policy or
the border, et cetera.
I have one more question for you because as the chairwoman
of this subcommittee in particular, again, one that is titled
Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism, as you probably
hear--and I hear this over and over and we talk to our
membership.
Some of us have made some trips to some of the areas. There
are more areas to be secured. We were talking about the
Colombia drug issue.
Chief Aguilar, you spoke about how people are avoiding the
land now and they are going around and coming through the
ocean. We have a real open area as far as the Caribbean arena,
and so there has been a lot of bantering around, especially at
some of my members about the fact that they go and they travel
and they take a look at these things.
I want to ask both Mr. Stana and Chief Aguilar, do you
think it has been worthwhile for the members to come out and
actually take a look at, for example, SBInet, to go over and
talk to the Mexican officials about border violence that is
happening?
Do you think we should be going to the northern border? Do
you--just what is happening and talking to the Coast Guard and
what is going on, for example, in the Pacific or the Caribbean?
Do you think that is worthwhile or do you think we should
just take Mr. Stana's and your word for what is happening out
there?
Chief Aguilar. You should not take our word for it. I would
absolutely recommend that you continue going out to the field.
And it is a very complex matter that we are handling. It is in
requirement of a comprehensive approach and the enforcement
model that I spoke to earlier is very specific to each one of
those borders and even within those borders within specific
areas it needs to be literally designed for the area we are
focusing on.
I would absolutely love to have you and the rest of the
committee members out there. I think it is critical that you
get a look at it firsthand. Absolutely yes.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Stana, how do you feel about that?
Mr. Stana. Yes. Well, I would like you to take my word for
things, but I think it is absolutely essential. I get down
there three or four times a year and the Border Patrol and Air
and Marine are good enough to take us around and, you know, up
in the helicopter. There is no substitute for seeing it
firsthand, seeing what works, what doesn't work, what the
challenges are.
It sounds awfully simplistic sometimes to say well, you put
this camera and this radar together and a COP and everything is
going to get--it is difficult. The terrain is difficult. The
challenges are there, and I think getting down there is one way
to gather a firsthand appreciation for the difficulty of this
task.
Ms. Sanchez. I appreciate your comments, and I just want to
remind all of you and in particular Mr. Peters, you didn't have
too many questions--representing Boeing there. I just wanted to
let you know this is not about a witch hunt.
This is about trying to figure out how we make a system
work because the American people have not only tasked with
spending the money to do so, but we have such broad issues out
there that affect so many people on a day-to-day basis.
That if we can't get this under control, if we can't work
together and we can't figure it out, you know, it is very
difficult to work on some of these and have the confidence to
work on some of these other issues that are out there.
So I want to thank all of you for being before us today,
for your valuable testimony. I want to thank the members for
having attended so well, and members of the subcommittee may
have some additional questions for you. We will put them in
writing. We hope you will get them back to us as quickly as
possible.
And hearing no further business, this subcommittee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:23 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairwoman Loretta Sanchez for David Aguilar and Mark
Borkowski
Question 1a. The Committee understands that recently constructed
border fencing is already in need of repair in many places along the
border. The Government and Accountability Office (GAO) noted that each
breach in the fence costs on average $1,300 to repair. Moreover, GAO
reports that the overall 20-year life-cycle cost for the fence is
estimated to be $6.5 billion.
What is the total cost of repairs for border fencing already
constructed?
Answer. Since March of 2008, CBP has expensed $7,509,688 for
contracts on fence maintenance for the El Centro, Yuma, Tucson, Laredo
and El Paso Sectors.
Question 1b. What is the current status of procuring maintenance
services for the border fence?
Answer. Short term maintenance contracts are currently in place for
the Yuma, Tucson, Laredo, and El Paso Sectors. Additional short term
maintenance contracts for the San Diego, El Centro, Marfa, Del Rio and
Rio Grande Valley Sectors are scheduled to be awarded during first
quarter of fiscal year 2010. These contracts will be in place until the
long term ``Comprehensive TI Maintenance and Repair'' (CTIMR) contracts
are awarded.
Question 1c. Please describe CBP's long-term strategy for fence
maintenance.
Answer. The long term strategy for fence maintenance is to be
provided through the ``Comprehensive TI Maintenance and Repair''
(CTIMR) contracts covering all nine Sectors. The strategy is for CBP to
set aside two of the four contracts to small businesses and the
remaining two to full and open competition. The first CTIMR Request for
Proposal is currently under development, with contract awards scheduled
for fiscal year 2010.
Question 2. Last year, CBP reprogrammed approximately $400 million
from unobligated SBInet funds, along with funding from other Department
accounts, in an effort to complete construction of border fencing by
the end of 2008. How did the reprogramming of funds affect the schedule
and deployment of SBInet?
Answer. The funding that was redirected from SBInet to the Tactical
Infrastructure program last year effectively eliminated the potential
to complete SBInet deployments in Arizona by the end of 2011. However,
even with the full funding, meeting this SBInet deployment schedule
would have been high risk due to technical and management challenges.
When CBP re-planned the SBInet deployments within available funding, we
were able to step back, make trade-offs between risk and schedule, and
provide enhanced testing and engineering rigor before we resumed
deployment.
Question 3. According to a recent GAO Report (GAO-09-896), CBP has
not systematically evaluated the impact of tactical infrastructure on
the border. This finding is very troubling considering the $2.4 billion
investment that American taxpayers have made in this infrastructure.
Considering all the funding that Congress has provided for fencing
and the $400 million in reprogramming that CBP directed last year for
fencing, why hasn't CBP completed this type of study?
While apprehensions have generally decreased along the southwest
border, how do you account for the rise in apprehensions in the San
Diego sector, where fencing has been present for some time?
Answer. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled
Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the
Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed (GAO-09-896) recommended
that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) conduct a cost-effective
evaluation of the impact of the tactical infrastructure's contribution
to border security. CBP concurred that this study would be beneficial
and has since committed to completing this study by the end of calendar
year 2011.
The Office of Border Patrol (OBP) recently met with a
representative from the DHS Center of Excellence for Border Security
and Immigration (co-located at the University of Arizona at Tucson and
the University of Texas at El Paso) and discussed CBP's need to analyze
the impacts of tactical infrastructure on border security. The Center
of Excellence, established through the DHS Science & Technology
Directorate, has an open task order with the Department of Homeland
Security. OBP is currently developing its Fiscal-Year (FY) 2010 spend
plan for allocation of the necessary funding to facilitate the study
and ensure its completion by the end of calendar year 2011.
Border security cannot be achieved through fencing alone; rather,
it requires the appropriate combination of tactical infrastructure,
personnel, and technology. Nevertheless, immediate and continuous
access to the border is a critical component to achieving control of
the border. Tactical infrastructure provides access to the border, as
well as additional time to respond to an illegal entry by deterring or
slowing the criminal element's ability to easily cross the border and
escape.
The Secure Border Initiative has deployed an additional 24.6 miles
of fencing in the San Diego Sector (SDC) since fiscal year 2007. Most
of these projects were completed at the end of calendar year 2008.
Apprehension Data:
fiscal year 2006 Apprehensions 142,108
fiscal year 2007 Apprehensions 152,460
fiscal year 2008 Apprehensions 162,347
fiscal year 2009 Apprehensions 118,705
Apprehensions for SDC were down 27 percent when compared to fiscal year 2009--fiscal year 2008 respectively Border Security:
Effective Operational Control
SDC currently has 50 percent of the Area of Responsibility under Operational Control (30 Miles), 10 of which have been achieved in the past three years
Secure and Safe Border
Reduced volume of activity
Reduction in drive throughs
Displacement of activity to the coastline
Quality of life has increased as evident by the vitality of the San Ysidro and Otay Mesa communities / businesses Questions From Chairwoman Loretta Sanchez for Timothy E. Peters Question 1. In your testimony you referred to Project 28 as a ``prototype.'' This Committee went to great lengths trying to determine exactly what the Border Patrol was receiving with Project 28: a ``prototype,``a ``test bed,'' or an ``operational tool.'' Every term means something different and raises certain expectations. Can you state for the record what the Border Patrol will be receiving in Tucson 1? Answer. Project 28 (P28) was a prototype, requested by the department in the Request for Proposal to create a segment of the offeror's concept of operations to ``demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed overall solution'' (Section M, Factor 7, p. 100 of the SBInet RFP). Tucson 1 (TUS1) is the first deployment of an operational segment using the Block 1 SBInet configuration. It will cover approximately 23 miles of border and consist of nine sensor towers, eight communications towers (four new and four upgraded existing towers), a new common operating picture (COP) software package, a command and control facility, and associated warranties. Question 2. According to the Government Accountability Office, Project 28 technology currently in place is of limited use to Border Patrol agents because they are forced to work around shortcomings with the wireless network, camera controls, and radar. What would you tell agents in the field who are waiting for Tucson-1 to be deployed with the expectation that it will offer them more operational utility than its predecessor? Answer. As Chief of the Border Patrol David Aguilar testified to Congress on September 17, 2009, P28 is operational and provides effective support to our operations. As part of the Project 28 prototype, Boeing provided 50 Mobile Display Terminals (MDTs) in vehicles to demonstrate the feasibility of providing Common Operational Picture (COP) like capability to vehicles in the field. This capability, which utilizes wireless network technology, requires the vehicle to be within range of a P28 tower with unrestricted line of sight. The rough terrain in the P28 area created problems for this type of communication design and it did not provide reliable connectivity for the agents. As a result, the MDT was not included in the Block 1 design. In order to understand the feasibility of the use of MDTs, a CBP chaired communications working group was created to study the future communications architecture options. Boeing has subsequently developed MDT software which leverages commercial infrastructure and is ready to proceed once the communications working group determines which wireless network architecture it wants to adopt. This capability will be available for use in deployments beyond Block 1. One of the early trades done on the Project 28 prototype was to determine the type of communication system used to transmit data between the towers and headquarters. The trade study recommended the use of satellite communications which avoided the lengthy process of getting frequency allocations needed for the microwave line of sight concept as well as cost and schedule for erecting repeater towers. The use of satellite communications included an inherent latency in the response time between command input from the user and response of the sensor in the field. This was particularly noticeable in the camera control. The system being deployed utilizes microwave line of sight and, where possible, fiber optic communication links. The use of microwave line of sight technology significantly reduces the response time of the sensor to the Border Patrol agent's input, and therefore, significantly improves the camera control performance. The radar integration on Project 28 the default command set provided by the radar manufacturer for integration into the COP. During integration testing it became apparent that additional command settings for ``tuning``the radar would be needed to address different weather conditions. Block 1 has integrated the full radar command set to the COP, and currently, has provided four ``user selectable'' weather settings for the operator. The Boeing Team has been in active communication and collaboration with the Border Patrol since 2007 to provide a system that meets their needs. The Block 1 configuration is the result of this input from the user in both formal and informal communications as well as a detailed, formal requirements definition process. The system, which will go through Systems Acceptance Test, will meet or exceed the requirements established for it in the contract and will have the look and feel determined by the Border Agents involved in its development. Question 3. One factor that likely contributed to the flaws with Project 28 was insufficient component testing prior to deploying the system into the field. The Committee understands that the Boeing testing facility in New Mexico was built to resolve many of these testing issues. In addition to the testing facility, what is Boeing doing differently this time to ensure that problems with Tucson-1 are identified and rectified in a timely manner? Answer. The processes used for P28 and for the SBInet Block 1 system are significantly different. The P28 concept was developed by the Boeing Team during the proposal preparation period and involved only limited interaction with the customer as set out in the RFP. The RFP required bidders to propose a task order to build ``one or more modules'' (Section L-12, Subpart A.5, p. 88 of the SBInet RFP) of their proposed concept of operations that could be constructed in eight months time for a fixed price of $20 million. To meet this objective the Boeing Team used a ``Prototype'' approach to develop, integrate, and test the P28 system. The competition also provided that the government could award this task order to the winning bidder, ``without negotiations or discussions,'' which they exercised. Subsequent to the award, discussions with the Border Patrol were restricted by policy that was in place at the time. Development of the Block 1 system including the TUS1 deployment is being run as a standard development contract under the FAR. This includes a formal requirements definition process, trade studies, extensive testing of hardware and software at all levels, milestones reviews, etc. The Boeing Team has established a number of facilities to test system components, subsystems, and systems in a laboratory environment and in an environment representative of its deployment. Boeing built a Mission Analysis and Assessment Lab and a Rapid Application Development1 Joint Application Development (RAD/JAD) Lab, both in Arlington, Virginia. These labs enabled us to incorporate Border Patrol Agent inputs in both the geographic laydown of the system and as features in the design of the Common Operational Picture (COP). In addition we set up a System Integration Lab in Huntsville, Alabama, and a full system test facility in Playas, New Mexico to ensure component and systems tests were conducted in a controlled and geographically representative environment. While the situation and schedule of P28 did not accommodate component testing, the program now has the time and the facilities to thoroughly test the system at all levels. Likewise, the interaction with the users, which was severely limited in P28, is robust and healthy in the Block 1 development. All of this ensures that problems are identified early and addressed in a timely manner. Questions From Chairwoman Loretta Sanchez for Richard Stana Question 1a. In the past, GAO has discussed a number of reasons SBInet was at risk of failing to meet user needs and operational requirements or performing as intended. These reasons included ambiguous schedules, lack of clear definitions and baselines, ineffective testing, and poor management. Many of these same problems also affected earlier technology programs such as the Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System and the American Shield Initiative. What parallels, if any, do you see between SBInet and the Department's previous failed border security technology programs? Answer. There are some parallels between SBInet and previous border security technology programs. In February 2006, we reported that the Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS)--a system composed of sensors, databases, and cameras--was subsumed into the American Shield Initiative (ASI).\1\ The goals of ASI were to address ISIS capability limitations and support the Department of Homeland Security's antiterrorism mission. We reviewed the ASI program and found, among other things, that the program had not established the people and process capabilities required for effective program management. While the program had defined and begun implementing a plan to manage program risks, it had not yet defined key acquisition management processes, such as effective project planning, and contract tracking and oversight. As a result, the program risked repeating the inadequate contract management oversight that led to a number of problems in deploying, and operating and maintaining the ISIS technology. At that time, DHS had decided to reevaluate ASI within DHS's broader border interior enforcement strategy, the Secure Border Initiative (SBI). In September 2008, we reported that DHS needed to address significant risks in delivering SBInet, including program planning issues.\2\ For example, we reported that ineffectively defined and managed SBInet requirements and ineffective management of testing activities increased the risk of SBInet not meeting mission needs and performing as intended, as well as the chances of expensive and time- consuming system rework. Furthermore, in June 2009, the DHS Inspector General reported that the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) had not established adequate controls and effective oversight of contract workers responsible for providing SBI program support services.\3\ Furthermore, the DHS IG reported that CBP had not provided an adequate number of contracting officer's technical representatives to oversee support services contractor's performance. As a result, contractors were performing functions that should be performed by government workers. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\GAO, Border Security: Key Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of Border Surveillance Technology Program, GAO-06-295 (Washington, D.C.: Fed. 22, 2006). \2\ GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment, GAO-08-1086 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2008). \3\ DHS-OIG, Better Oversight Needed of Support Services Contractors in Secure Border Initiative Programs, OIG-09-80 (Washington, D.C.: Jun. 17, 2009). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Question 1b. Given all your findings, do you believe that the DHS- Boeing partnership will produce an effective technological solution to secure the border within the next year? Answer. At this point, it is hard to tell whether DHS and Boeing will produce an operational SBInet technological solution, with an initial deployment, to secure the border within the next year. In February 2009, preliminary results of testing revealed problems that would limit the usefulness of the system for Border Patrol agents, including the instability of the camera under adverse weather conditions, mechanical problems with the radar at the tower and issues with the sensitivity of the radar. The SBI program office oversaw Boeing's efforts to rework and retest these issues, but as of May 2009, the SBI program office reported that they were still working to address some issues, such as difficulties aligning the radar. Initial user assessments conducted by Border Patrol officers comparing the performance capabilities of existing technology and new technology testing also showed potential issues with cameras and radar as compared with existing technology. Testing of the system has continued as DHS and Boeing move toward final acceptance, at which point the government takes ownership of the system. Following final acceptance, scheduled for January 2010 for Tuscon-91 and June 2010 for Ajo-1, the Border Patrol will conduct operational testing to determine how the system works while in use. Until this operational testing gets underway and its results become known, it will be difficult to know whether or not the SBInet solution will meet Border Patrol's needs. Question 2a. We understand that Boeing and the SBInet program office have begun to incorporate the independent validations of the Army Test and Evaluation Team into their testing and product assessments. How valuable are these independent validations for the SBInet program? Question 2b. Given the concerns you have raised about SBInet over the years, do you believe there should be a larger role for these independent assessments? Answer. While GAO has not conducted a review of the value of the Army Test and Evaluation Team's independent validations for the SBInet program, independent validations are generally very useful, as recognized by DHS itself in its acquisition guidebook. Such validations should provide objective and unbiased conclusions regarding the system's operational effectiveness and suitability from a source other than the program office, user representative, or vendor who might have an interest in presenting a more positive picture of the system's capabilities. Question 3. In your recent report on SBI (GAO-09-896), you point out that CBP has procured 40 Mobile Surveillance System (MSS) units to fill the gaps or augment existing border security technology, until a more comprehensive system can be deployed under SBInet. It is the Committee's understanding that while these MSS units aren't without their own limitations, they have radar and camera capabilities that meet or exceed those offered by Project 28 or Tucson-I. Given the amount of time and money that has been spent trying to deploy an operational SBInet system, does it make sense to look at MSS units or other technologies that might be of use to the Border Patrol? Answer. Until SBInet capabilities are deployed across the southwest border, Border Patrol agents are using existing capabilities, supplemented by more recently procured MSS units, but these do have limitations and are not a substitute for newer technology. As we reported in September 2009, Border Patrol officials said that the MSS units represent increased operational capabilities for the Border Patrol. In addition, in a user assessment, Border Patrol agents noted that the features of the camera to be deployed in Tucson-1 were insufficient in comparison to features of the Project 28 and MSS camera. However, MSS units are not connected to a Common Operating Picture and, thus, require an officer to operate each one. In addition, SBI program officials and Border Patrol noted that the units were not designed to be used 24/7 and that at any given time, a unit may not be operational because of the need for repairs. For example, as of April 2009, 15 of the 23 units at Border Patrol's Tucson sector were operational. These MSS limitations underscore the importance of DHS's SBInet testing and evaluation activities in 2010. If SBInet is deemed not ready for deployment or if the technology does not meet Border Patrol needs, other options may need to be considered to assist in controlling the nation's borders.