European Security and Defence Policy

The contemporary debate in democracies routinely describes online information threats such as misinformation, disinformation and deception as security-issues in need of urgent attention. Despite this pervasive discourse, policymakers often appear incapable of articulating what security means in this context. Turning to EU policy and previous research on cybersecurity, this dissertation empirically unpacks, critically interrogates and theoretically rethinks the meaning of security in relation to online information threats. In so doing, the articles elucidate a new ‘referent object’ implicitly guiding securitization. Contemporary interventions can be seen as grounded in assumptions about the protection of human judgement. Using Hannah Arendt’s writings on ‘political judgement’ as a point of reference for critically evaluating contemporary policy, the dissertation points to several problems with existing approaches to security in a democratic context where free debate constitutes a legitimizing element of political authority. The rethinking of security departs from this problematic and shows that treating human judgement as a ‘referent object’ – if firmly grounded in the interplay between independent human communicating subjects – can better address some problematic questions about legitimate authority and political community currently haunting security interventions in cyberspace.

This study examines the role of political factors in attitudes toward World War II in contemporary Ukraine. The question under examination is which factors determine public views of the principal warring sides and their leaders in Ukraine. This paper uses a representative national survey specifically designed for this research project and conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in 2012. It analyzes the roles of regionalism, political party preferences, ethnicity, language, age, and sex in attitudes toward the Red Army, Soviet partisans, the German Army (Wehrmacht), and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) during the war, as well as toward the wartime leaders of the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and the UPA. The analysis of the survey data shows that regional values, political party preferences, ethnicity, language, and age have significant effects on views of the Soviet Army and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army during the war and attitudes toward the wartime activities of Joseph Stalin and Roman Shukhevych. Public perceptions of the German Army and Adolf Hitler in Ukraine do not vary much across regions, political parties, and ethnic, language, age, and sex groups.

Hai-Nyzhnyk P., Chupriy L., Fihurnyi Y., Krasnodemska I., Chyrkov O. (2018). Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine: ethnonational dimension and civilizational confrontation. Saarbrucken (Germany): LAP Lambert Academic Publishing. 229 p.

The expert-analytical study analyzes the preconditions, course and contemporary socio-political consequences of the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation, which has signs of not only direct and covert, but also inter-state conflict and even civilizational confrontation.

The following paper explores the main resolutions of the EU since the break of the millennium regarding Cyber-related issues, estimates whether they have a practical sense or only a declaratory nature, and lays out some observances regarding these decisions.

In its Resolution entitled “Europe and Space” of 17 January 2002, the European Parliament requested the European Commission to produce a White Paper on space “setting out the main objectives of the policy to be implemented in the medium and long term.”. In consequence and as a step towards the White Paper, the European Commission, in cooperation with ESA, elaborated a Green Paper on Space Policy, which was adopted by the Commission3 on 21 January 2003. The objective of this document was to stimulate a European-wide debate on the issue and launch a process meant to gather inputs from all relevant actors in Europe. The consultation process following the publication of the Green Paper has been organised by the EC/ESA Joint Task Force. The present document is an EC/ESA joint report on the consultations, to be presented to the Joint Task Force. This report will lead the way to the White Paper (including an action plan), to be elaborated by the European Commission in cooperation with ESA.
The opening conference in Brussels on 6 March was followed by a series of five consultation workshops, taking the debate to member states’ capitals (Madrid, Berlin, Rome, London and Prague). The Greek Presidency of the European Union also convened a special workshop in Athens for 8/9th May, which concentrated on a discussion of security matters.

The international analysis carried out in the first two decades after the fall of communism brings us new information regarding the evolution of the influence of NATO on European security and politics. This article aims to analyze the role of NATO in ensuring European security seen through the research of the most significant German think tanks. It is important to underline the fact that the concept of "security" is not unanimously understood by the international environment. After the collapse of the bipolar system of international relations, various structures engaged in the study of international relations set themselves the goal of identifying the signs of a newly emerging system and offering their assessments to the actions of the main actors trying to participate in its formation. The USA set the course for the construction of a unipolar international system, which would be guided by the USA. This approach is most often observed in the studies of American experts on global security problems. (Michta, 2014:36-54

Fortunately, there is a science-based approach that can protect Pakistan from both internal and external threats. It is appropriately termed, Invincible Defence Technology (IDT), because it assures invincibility, peace and even economic progress, to the nation and the military that employ it.

Its methods have been proven and adopted as part of the training of America's future commanders at Norwich University, a nationally respected and oldest military academy in the USA. IDT is further validated by 23 peer-reviewed studies carried out in both developed and developing nations. Its coherence-creating effect has also been documented on a global scale in a study published in the Journal of Offender Rehabilitation. When large assemblies of civilian IDT experts gathered during the years 1983 - 1985, international conflict decreased 32%, terrorism-related casualties decreased 72%, and overall violence was reduced in nations without intrusion by other governments.

Da qualche anno assistiamo a un curioso, ma ben comprensibile, comportamento da parte di alcuni stati, di osservatori ed esponenti politici europei e tedeschi, ovvero quello di richiamare la Germania a un maggiore impegno militare. Nel 2014, ad esempio, dalla Cancelliera Merkel al ministro della Difesa tedesco Ursula von der Leyen, al Capo dello Stato Gauck, tutti avevano ribadito la necessità per la Germania di “immischiarsi” negli affari internazionali anche con azioni militari. Lo stesso
ministro degli Esteri polacco Sikorski aveva detto di preferire una Germania forte e leader a una debole e incerta. In mancanza della prima, ai polacchi non sarebbe rimasto altro che rivolgersi alla difesa americana e creare, come poi avvenuto, una sorta di fascia cuscinetto con gli Stati Baltici e la Svezia in chiara funzione antirussa. Lo stesso Hollande ha chiesto e ottenuto, a seguito degli attentati di Parigi (13 novembre 2015), un impegno armato tedesco e la Germania ha inviato 650 militari in Mali e dei Tornado in Siria. Dello stesso parere erano testate importanti come Die Welt o Der Tagespiegel, che sottolineavano che era giunto il momento per il paese di uscire dalla pubertà e abbracciare il ruolo di potenza. Era questo un dibattito interno alla Germania, ma anche esterno ed europeo, dettato dalla profonda evoluzione avvenuta (e tuttora in corso) nel panorama geopolitico globale. La sensazione generale è che sia ormai giunto il tempo per la Germania di lasciare la «cornice Europa»1, ma essa, consapevole dei suoi limiti più culturali che fisici, continua a rimanere sul ciglio del balcone di casa, con lo sguardo rivolto verso l’interno nella speranza di poter tornare a far parte di un’Europa forte, nel suo classico ruolo di gregario.

"U ovom radu kritički se obrađuje materija vezana za objektivne činioce, odnosno faktore koji utiču na to da vrednosti koji se štite sistemom nacionalne bezbednosti budu zaštićene ili ugrožene. S tim u vezi autor najpre ukazuje na pojam i vrste objektivnih činilaca nacionalne bezbednosti, a zatim objašnjava kako oni u pozitivnom i negativnom smislu utiču na stanje zaštićenosti, odnosno ugroženosti nacionalne bezbednosti jedne zemlje.

Ključne reči: faktori; bezbednosni izazovu; nacionalna bezbednost; ugrožavanje; zaštita"

Raising the subject of the "Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)" in the circles of power generally produces shrugs of disinterest or disillusion. However, the acronym is frequently heard in Brussels, recently. So, what is really PESCO? A major innovation of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, when it was rewritten in the Treaty of Lisbon, PESCO was distorted and became illegible. Therefore, in order to understand what it really is, one needs to rediscover the original spirit of the preparatory works which led to it writing. PESCO is, with the European Defence Agency and the Collective Defence Clause, one of the three indivisible elements which were eventually to give

With cybercrime’s yearly revenues estimated at $1 trillion and national security networks probed daily and often breached, cyber security is a vital concern for public and private organizations globally. This research ponders the problem of improving information security by looking at organizations under the lens of Socio-technical systems. The main objective of this study is to ascertain if Net Assessment, one of the principal frameworks for analyzing the United States’ national security strategy, can be used to improve an organization’s capabilities in the field of information and cyber security through its multidisciplinary and holistic approach. To reach this goal, the study identifies and analyzes the aspects Net Assessment offers which are not
included in current information security risk management and assessment methodologies.
The research follows an inductive process, designed using a qualitative approach which makes use of content analysis, comparative analysis and purposive sampling. The first step drafts
a list of current information security risk assessment and risk management methodologies, and then isolates a representative sample. The second step identifies and analyzes existing metaanalytical methods and models devoted to the appraisal, selection, and indexing of risk management and assessment methods. It then defines a categorization framework capable of
accurately capturing the different risk management and assessment method’s functionalities. A third step maps the coverage of the two selected methodologies (NIST and ISO) against the identified functionality categories. After a critical analysis of Net Assessment, and a reasoned estimate of its main differences and capabilities in the context of information security, Net Assessment’s features are mapped in the category list.
The comparison of the features of the three methodologies identifies Net Assessment as a very credible avenue for improving multiple aspects currently neglected by the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) frameworks. The study results maintain that, if implemented as a companion to these standards, Net Assessment may improve an organization’s security strategy, its allocation of funding for security, provide more accurate estimates of risks and threats, better alignment between potential risks and countermeasures, and improve the inputs for real time and automatic tools.

Contemporary security practices rarely represent new inventions – albeit change is important to it, the security politics of today often has a very long lineage. It adapts, reworks and sometimes just rehashes old ideas and practices of policing, and is embedded in deeply entrenched, historically grown and power-laden frameworks of collective, national, local or international sense-and decision-making. This contribution to Contemporanea's Special Section on the "History of Transnational Security Management in Europe" argues that is important and useful for critical security studies to enter into a more systematic kind of dialogue with history. If, in turn, historians are willing to help in this effort and engage themselves more closely with the analytical frameworks and discussions of security scholars, then productive new academic encounters ensue.

The challenges facing Europe and the world in the late twentieth century is global in nature. Their solution is possible if a common strategy, none of the parties are not able to defend its national interests without the cooperation of other countries. United Western Europe is a fairly influential participant in international relations.

The European Union is an emerging player in the field of international conflict prevention, management and resolution. Moreover, within that milieu, the Union is frequently profiled for its efforts in situations of ethno-communal conflict. The frequent justification for this engagement is that the Union is uniquely qualified for, and uniquely capable of, same. This article interrogates the ‘uniqueness’ of the Union as an international actor and seeks to identify competing narratives sustaining a definition of the Union’s international role. It is hoped that this will help inform debates surrounding approaches to EU crisis intervention. This should allow us to better understand the variety of policy debates surrounding the union and to interrogate more effectively the assumptions of policy-making elites.

Ostatniego ćwierćwiecza polskich przemian politycznych dotyka i niniejsza publikacja, która jest zbiorem artykułów przygotowanych przez pracowników naukowych i doktorantów z różnych ośrodków w kraju. Prace dotykają zarówno polityki wewnętrznej, jak i zagranicznej państwa, co oznacza, że odnoszą się do stosunkowo dużego obszaru poznawczego. Zdecydowaną przewagę uzyskały w tej tematyce problemy zewnątrzpaństwowe odnoszące się do Unii Europejskiej, polityki zagranicznej, kilku aspektów bezpieczeństwa europejskiego i międzynarodowego, migracji wewnątrzeuropejskich czy Kościoła katolickiego. Wszystkie te kwestie mieszczą się w ogólnych zarysach „wybranych problemów politycznych” państwa polskiego w latach 1989-2014. Zadaniem niniejszej publikacji stało się przybliżenie Czytelnikom takich problemów politycznych Polski z ostatniego ćwierćwiecza, które wymagają dodatkowego komentarza, pogłębionych analiz podmiotowych i przedmiotowych oraz ciągle aktualnego spojrzenia metodologicznego i merytorycznego.

Modern physics has discovered a fundamental field of pure intelligence containing in seed form all the manifest states of the universe. Although its existence can be inferred, this unified field is not open to direct observation. Its unifying properties can be experienced when the awareness of the observer becomes refined during the practice of the Transcendental Meditation® (TM®) and TM-Sidhi® Programme. The experience of the unified field creates a psychophysiological state in the observer that reflects the properties of the field: infinitely correlated, unified, self-referral, and integrative. The development of these qualities is not obtained through behavioural or intellectual training, but occurs spontaneously by cultivating a state of least excitation of the nervous system. The unique results of the Transcendental Meditation and TM-Sidhi Programme have been documented in over 600 research studies, many of them published in scientific journals. Use of this holistic consciousness technology will enable the military to set up an ongoing Conflict Prevention Operation through a Prevention Wing of the Military®. In addition to its regular duties, this unit would create a heightened state of mental alertness and radiate intrinsic peacefulness as the basis for impenetrable, non-aggressive defence and constructive peacebuilding without political, economic or cultural bias.

In February this year, at the École de Guerre in Paris and at the Munich Security Conference, France’s President Emmanuel Macron again reiterated the need to strengthen European autonomy in foreign and security policy and presented yet another proposal in this area. This time he offered to launch a strategic dialogue on the role of the French nuclear deterrence in Europe’s collective security. Although the proposal is addressed to all of France’s European partners, the most important response will come from Germany. Official reactions in Berlin have so far been consistent with the German approach to French defence initiatives – Germany declared it is ready for such a dialogue but remains cautious about its goals. Berlin does see the need to boost Europe’s role in foreign and security policy and recognises Paris as its most important partner in this field. However, Germany’s approach differs considerably from that of France. Berlin prefers to strengthen the EU’s security and defence policy and the European pillar in NATO, rather than build European strategic autonomy under French leadership. At the same time it does not necessarily have the required political will and military means to back up its own rhetoric.

The question of a defence White Book at European level has been under discussion for some time. Many voices, particularly in the European Parliament, are pushing for such an initiative, while others consider that it is not only unnecessary, but could even dangerously divide Europeans.
Concretely, the question cannot be tackled separately from that of defence planning and processes which underpin the development of military capabilities, as White Books are often the starting point for these.
Within the European Union, however, there is not just one, but three types defence planning: the national planning of each of the Member States; planning within the framework of NATO (the NATO Defence Planning Process) and, finally, the European Union’s planning, which has developed in stages since the Helsinki summit of 1999 and comprises many elements. Its best-known component - but by no means not the only one - is the capability development plan established by the European Defence Agency.
How do all these different planning systems coexist? What are their strengths and weaknesses? Answering these preliminary questions is essential in mapping the path to a White Book. This is what this study sets out to do.

While the new security environment has driven the EU to take a bigger role in security and defence, it has also forced the EU-NATO relations to evolve from a desirable strategic partnership to a more ‘essential’ one, since both their security is interconnected and neither organisation has the full range of tools available to address the new security challenges on its own. Thanks to the new framework initiated by the Joint Declaration in 2016, cooperation between the EU and NATO has been gradually improving in several designated areas. But it is obvious that, within the defined framework, there are many obstacles to overcome before opportunities could be more fully exploited. While the new challenges emanated from the East and South of Europe can be seen as an opportunity for a wider cooperation, the rise of illiberalism and authoritarianism in the world, even including the member nations, poses a big challenge against the cooperation. Further concrete steps are to be taken for a wider and substantial cooperation between two Brussels-based organisations. We argue that a joint response must be formulated in the form of a common strategy, implemented in an integrated way by using a more comprehensive toolbox.

This article draws on identity construction, emotions and a notion of productive power to address the question of why Swedish policymakers and public opinion are becoming increasingly supportive of NATO membership. It contributes theoretically by arguing that such textual phenomena intertwine with 'disciplinary power', which operates on the bodies of the subjects of power, exposing them to verbal and physical sanctions, a host of complex feelings and enhanced levels of self-disciplining. The article analyses 354 editorials and op-eds related to Sweden and NATO, published in the four biggest Swedish newspapers in 2014-2018; 1408 tweets, with a focus on 14 selected NATO campaigners and their advocacy; and semi-structured interviews with 12 such influencers. It concludes that Swedish NATO campaigners produce and negotiate emotional discourses in a way that targets other influencers and potential influencers by exposing them to ridicule and allegations of treason. While tendencies are similar on both sides of the debate, the article demonstrates that productive power currently intertwines with disciplinary power in a way that makes anti-NATO advocacy seem more fraught with personal risk than pro-NATO campaigning, and joining NATO appear to be the most normal, realistic and responsible policy option.

"The aim of this monograph is to present the European Defence Agency (EDA), an institution of the European Union, established in July 2004. The author focuses on the description of the Agency as such, analyzes its activities until 2011, as well as presents possible scenarios of its development, especially on the basis of current predictions of future international security environment. This publication is a complex scientific description of the European Defence Agency subject and its transfer on the ground of polish science which until now had no monograph on this matter.

The first chapter characterises EDA, historical context and reasons behind its establishment. Author describes and analyzes Agencies’ legal basis and its functioning, as well as outlines its internal structure. Moreover, he pictures Agency relations with other institutions within the European Union institutional framework and with these outside the EU, having an influence on EDA’s functions and tasks.

Chapter II depicts activities of the European Defence Agency in the years 2004 – 2011. Author characterises Agencies’ and its member state’s struggle with the realization of four main goals for which EDA has been established. He presents its previous successes in the field of creation of military capabilities and points out magnitude of work still to be done.

Third and final chapter tries to anticipate the future of the European Defence Agency. Author illustrates respectively: security challenges for Europe yet to come; future of Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU and implications for the development of defence capabilities; as well as the most important external and internal factors, which will have an influence on EDA in the second decade of XXI century and more distant future.

Conclusions of the monograph allow to place the thesis that European Defence Agency is already an important part of the European defence capabilities creation landscape. Despite uncertain future and dependency on the good will of its member
states, EDA has the potential to become one of the main pillars of European defence."

Les temps où l’évocation de la défense européenne suscitait au mieux les sourires des eurosceptiques et au pire les critiques virulentes des atlantistes les plus militants sont révolus. Toutefois, pour l’observateur en dehors du cercle des initiés, cette défense européenne, bien que plus présente sur la scène sécuritaire internationale depuis l’activation de la coopération structurée permanente (mieux connue sous son acronyme anglais PESCO), reste source de confusion et d’incompréhension.
Deux éléments sont à l’origine de ce défaut de compréhension et des conclusions souvent erronées qui en découlent. Le premier résulte d’une comparaison simpliste entre le fonctionnement de l’OTAN et ’la mise en œuvre de la politique de sécurité et de défense commune de l’Union européenne. Le second est lié à la méconnaissance de l’évolution de notre environnement sécuritaire, du profil de la menace et des doctrines de guerre « hybride » de nos ennemis. Je reviendrai plus tard sur l’inadéquation du qualificatif « hybride », qui ne décrit qu’imparfaitement le type de menace à laquelle nous sommes exposés.
La première partie de mon argumentaire démontrera le caractère indispensable de l’intégration de la défense européenne pour apporter une contribution européenne plus substantielle à l’effort de défense, principalement dans le cadre de l’OTAN mais aussi au sein d’autres formats collaboratifs.
La seconde partie étudiera les mécanismes d’intégration qui sont à l’œuvre afin de doter l’Union européenne des structures nécessaires à la réalisation de son ambition sécuritaire qui découle de la Stratégie globale de 2016.
La troisième partie tentera de définir un nouveau paradigme de défense et d’anticiper les évolutions nécessaires dans l’architecture sécuritaire internationale afin d’évoluer d’une logique de défense collective vers celle d’une résilience intégrée.

Since the end of World War II, foreign policy and security issues have haunted the European dreams of complete integration in terms of alignment in a highly challenging field, which is also constantly
interrupted by sovereignty concerns of member states. Within today’s changing dynamics, the EU’s current instruments seem to fall short of preventing terrorism or providing a meaningful answer to the problems in the Middle East. The EU’s capacity to act in this field needs to be strengthened. The newest approach presented by the European External Action Service (EEAS) is called PESCO (the Permanent Structured Cooperation) and aims to change this current structure of “inactivity”. This short paper will briefly analyze this new instrument.

The Mali conflict and the intervention of the European Union Resume After the outbreak of the Mali civil war the security risks caused by the war, such as the expansion of the Al-Qaeda's influence and the increasing number of illegal arms and drug trade in West Africa, the huge number of refugees and illegal immigrants encouraged the European Union to establish a crisis management intervention. With the UN mandate France helped the Mali army against the rebels until the UN troops replaced them. At the same time the EU started its mission, which was made for train the local military forces.

A Mali polgárháború kitörését követően a háború okozta biztonsági kockázatok, mint például az Al-Kaida térnyerése és ezzel együtt az illegális fegyver és drogszállítások megnövekedése Nyugat-Afrikában, a menekültek és illegális bevándorlók hatalmas száma, az Európai Uniót válságkezelő beavatkozásra ösztönözték. Az ENSZ felhatalmazása alapján előbb Franciaország segített a Mali hadseregnek a lázadókkal szemben, majd őket az nemzetközi ENSZ csapatok váltották. Ezzel párhuzamosan elindult az EU missziója, melyet a helyi katonai erők kiképzésére hoztak létre.

The 2016 EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) is aimed at adapting the EU’s external action to a more complex and uncertain global scenario. It means a visible “pragmatic turn” and a marked focus in societal resilience and in its neighborhood. This chapter provides a description as well as an interpretation of the EUGS, taking into account its institutional foundations, its material content and its nature as a security narrative; that is, as a discursive device that shapes the identity and values of the EU, as well as the internal–external axis of European security and its external action, thus entailing noticeable normative dilemmas. The chapter concludes that the EUGS contributes to shaping a new security legitimation for an EU that suffers a deep existential crisis.

Among all European countries the United Kingdom has had by far the greatest impact on the course of European military integration. Since the early 1950s British skepticism, built on ‘atlanticism’ and a concern of weakening sovereignty in defence, has blocked progress in the European defence autonomization process. However, Britain’s political initiative and its more flexible stance led to establishing the Common Security and Defence Policy in 1999.
The United Kingdom European Union membership referendum is scheduled to take place on 23 June 2016. The decision to withdraw the UK from the European Union could have crucial impact on the future of CSDP because in that case the biggest European military power would place itself outside the process of military integration. On the other hand, without Britain it could be easier for 27 remaining members of the EU to expand the CSDP.

A Szovjetunió felbomlását követően a NATO keleti bővítése szinte végig teljes mértékben az USA és nyugati szövetségesei elképzelései szerint alakult. Az identitás-válságban szenvedő, útját kereső, súlyos gazdasági gondokkal küzdő, gyenge Oroszországot a nyugat részéről meg lehetett győzni arról, hogy a német újraegyesítést követően a NATO keleti bővítése nem fog folytatódni. A továbbiakban a NATO keleti bővítése nem ütközött különösebb ellenállásba vagy akadályba, Moszkva tehetetlenül tudomásul vett mindent. Ez egészen az ukrajnai és grúziai háborús konfliktusig folytatódott, amikor Oroszország először tanúsított érdemi és történelmi következményekkel járó ellenállást, elhalasztva Ukrajna és Grúzia felvételét a NATO-ba.
A NATO keleti bővítése elleni orosz ellenállás radikalizálódásának és új minőségi szintre lépésének mérföldköve a 2021 decemberében az USA számára átadott, majd rövidesen nyilvánosságra hozott orosz biztonság- és védelempolitikai kezdeményezés. Ez radikálisan új helyzetet teremt (!). Minden jel arra mutat, hogy Oroszország alaposan átgondolta az egészet és nem blöfföl.  Moszkva a továbbiakban nem tűri el a NATO további keleti bővítését és nyugati együttműködés hiányában saját katonai-technikai (katonai infrastruktúra telepítése) és katonai eszközeivel (katonai beavatkozás) fogja garantálni érdekei érvényesítését. Az orosz álláspont lényege, hogy a nyugat „vagy arrébb megy” a katonai fenyegetéssel, vagy „arrébb lesz téve.”
Szinte teljesen kizárt, hogy az USA és a NATO elfogadja az orosz kezdeményezésben foglalt, leglényegesebb pontokat,    mivel ehhez a nyugat részéről a korábbi elvek és a gyakorlat teljes felülvizsgálatára,  illetve korábbi „alapelvek” jelentős részének feladására lenne szükség.  Marad tehát az orosz érdekérvényesítés katonai dimenziójának megtapasztalása, mint „végső érv”.  Mindez nem jelent NATO-orosz háborút, ugyanakkor a Szövetség keleti bővítésének végét valószínűleg igen, emellett az eddigiekben nem látott mértékű gazdasági adok-kapok játszmát is valószínűleg igen. Emellett várható a nyugat és kelet harcának további éleződése, aminek többek között az orosz-kínai együttműködés minden eddiginél sokkal szorosabbra zárása valószínűleg következménye lesz.  Ez a küzdelem egy negatív végösszegű játszma, ami a nyugat relatív hanyatlását és a kelet további felemelkedését fogja gyorsítani.

The advent of blockchain technology has caused a particular excitement across businesses and governments. Many researchers remain sceptical about the advantages of blockchain for DoD operations, and some point out that the structure of the technology may impede them. The so-called “immutability” of data in a blockchain is guaranteed as long as the network is big enough and the participation is well distributed among the users. But as we shall see, this isn’t always the case, and the defence sector should be aware of it. If a user is infected in a permissionless network (a network which you can join without having to ask for permission), and other users are aware of it, they can easily ignore him and the blocks he is attempting to post. But if data from a permissioned network owner or consortium member is accessed, it will have more severe implications. If the owner or part of the consortium is compromised, so is the network. Blockchain isn’t as invulnerable as is often thought, and we shall delve into its challenges and limits regarding its implementation in the defence sector. In this paper, we will examine how blockchain works and discuss its civilian and military uses. We shall see how numerous departments of defence all over the world are working on implementing blockchain technology for defence and security purposes.

This paper shall also address in detail the developments within the main countries and powers that are currently integrating blockchain into their armies, such as China, Russia and the United States. Beyond that, we shall analyse how blockchain, like any other new technology, still has its shortcomings. This leads us to the questions of whether blockchain has the potential to be a real game-changer in military affairs if it has been investigated thoroughly enough, and whether sufficient funds have been allocated to its optimisation.

Following the 2005 London bombings, there is widespread public debate about diversity, integration, and multiculturalism in Britain, including the role of education in promoting national identity and citizenship. In response to official concerns about terrorism, a review panel was invited to consider how ethnic, religious and cultural diversity might be addressed in the school curriculum for England, specifically through the teaching of modern British social and cultural history and citizenship. The resultant Ajegbo report proposes a new strand on "identity and diversity: living together in the UK", be added to the citizenship education framework. While the report gives impetus to teaching about diversity, it does not strengthen the curriculum framework proposed in the Crick report. It fails to adopt a critical perspective on race or multiculturalism or adequately engage with young people's lived experiences of citizenship within a globalised world. I analyse how the review panel conceptualises identity, democracy and diversity. I then consider its assumptions about racism, human rights, and citizenship education, concluding with reflections on how citizenship education might be developed in the task of re-imagining the nation and meeting the needs of emergent cosmopolitan citizens.

In times when the public, political and academic discourses flourish with contributions that deliberate on whether it is 'all quiet on NATO's Eastern flank', Jakub J. Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell are among a handful that dare advance a straightforward argument on the 'unquiet frontier' with their 2016 book 'The Unquiet Frontier: Rising Rivals, Vulnerable Allies, and the Crisis of American Power'. The authors – one a renowned academic, the other a think-tanker – have successfully managed to address the topic from both academic and policy-oriented perspectives. The book dismantles the current US strategy in relation to its allies – but also vis-à-vis growing revisionist powers – and advocates for both continued US presence abroad as well as the strengthening of ties with US allies worldwide.