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First published July 1998

A Territorial Imperative? The Military Revolution, Strategy and Peacemaking in the Thirty Years War

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1.
1 M. Roberts, `Gustav Adolf and the Art of War', in Essays in Swedish History (London, 1967), pp. 72-5. I would like to thank Geoffrey Parker, Robert Stradling, Larry Marvin, Reid Rozen, and Paul Allen, all of whom read and commented on versions of this article. I also owe thanks to two organizations: International Security Studies, headed by Paul Kennedy, whose fellowship gave me time to write the article; and the Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte, headed by Konrad Repgen, for permitting me to use as yet unpublished material that they have collected.
2.
2 H. Delbrück, The Dawn of Modern Warfare, vol. iv of History of the Art of War, trans. W.J. Renfroe, Jr (Lincoln, NB, 1985), pp. 293-315, esp. pp. 298-9, 315; C. von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. M. Howard and P. Paret (Princeton, NJ, 1976), pp. 330, 553. Delbrück, with his preference for a war of annihilation over a war of attrition, found the latter (the only type practised in the early modern period in his judgement) `hostage to an internal contradiction' (p. 294), and described Thirty Years War strategy in particular as full of `a large number of paradoxes' (pp. 298-9). Nevertheless, he acknowledged the limitations placed on early modern strategy because of the contemporary social and political structure, and commented that Thirty Years War strategy had not been adequately studied.
3.
3 M. van Creveld, Supplying War (New York, 1977), p. 17; G.E. Rothenberg, `Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, Raimondo Montecuccoli, and the ªMilitary Revolutionº of the Seventeenth Century', in P. Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ, 1986), pp. 32-3, 46; D. Parrott, `Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years War: The ªMilitary Revolutionº ', Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen XXXVIII (1985), pp. 19-22; B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd rev. edn (New York, 1967), p. 63; J. Black, A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society, 1550-1800 (London, 1991), pp. 13-17; R.F. Weigley, The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo (Indianapolis, 1991), p. 537; G. Parker, `The ªMilitary Revolutionº, 1560-1660: A Myth?', Journal of Modern History XLVIII (1976), pp. 195-214 and The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 (New York, 1988), pp. 43-4; M. Roberts, `The Military Revolution', in Essays in Swedish History (London, 1967), p. 202.
4.
4 The German experience in the two world wars, in which they were the most successful power on the tactical and operational levels but were defeated because of their complete failure in the area of strategy, is exemplary; see the relevant chapters of A.R. Millett and W. Murray, eds, Military Effectiveness (3 vols, Boston, MA, 1988).
5.
5 I. Bernays, `Die Diplomatie um 1500', Historische Zeitschrift CXXXVIII (1928), pp. 18- 23; G. Perjés, `Army Provisioning, Logistics and Strategy in the Second Half of the 17th Century', Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae XVI (1970), pp. 35-8; Weigley, The Age of Battles, xii, 539. One rare exception to this is Liddell Hart, Strategy, pp. 63, 71, who does claim that objectives were limited in response to limited military means. However, his criticism of the effectiveness of the military itself is as severe as anyone's.
6.
6 Perjés, `Army Provisioning', p. 26.
7.
7 B. Kroener, Les Routes et les Étapes: Die Versorgung der französischen Armeen in Nordostfrankreich (1635-1661): Ein Beitrag zur Verwaltungsgeschichte des Ancien Re Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte xi (Münster, 1980), p. 170.
8.
8 For an excellent summary of the roles of fortresses in early modern warfare, see J. Lynn, `Food, Funds, and Fortresses: Resource Mobilization and Positional Warfare in the Campaigns of Louis XIV', in Lynn, ed., Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present (Boulder, CO, 1993).
9.
9 See e.g. H. Salm, Armeefinanzierung im Dreissigjährigen Krieg: Der Niederrheinisch-Westfágime, Èlische Reichskreis 1635-1650, Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte xvi (Münster, 1990), p. 168, in which he shows that over 90% of Imperial military resources received in north-west Germany came from contributions. This total is somewhat overstated because the theatre was not typical, but it is still telling. See also J. Lynn, `How War Fed War: The Tax of Violence and Contributions during the Grand Siè cle', Journal of Modern History LXV (1993), pp. 286- 310.
10.
10 Roberts, `The Military Revolution', p. 215; Parker, The Military Revolution, pp. 43-4. J.W. Wijn propounded a thesis similar to Parrott's in the 1930s. His views on strategy are summarized in `Military Forces and Warfare 1610-48', in J.P. Cooper, ed., The Decline of Spain and the Thirty Years War 1609-48/59, iv (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 202- 25; and, in somewhat more depth, in the chapter on strategy in Het Krijgswezen in den Tijd van Prins Maurits (Utrecht, 1934), pp. 518-32.
11.
11 G. Zeller, L'Organisation défensive des frontiè res du nord et de l'est au XVIIe siè cle (Paris, 1928), pp. 124-6. Russell Weigley forms an interesting exception here: while most historians are convinced that early modern strategists focused almost exclusively on fortresses, he believes that they put their faith entirely in battles. See esp. The Age of Battles, p. 536.
12.
12 M. van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA, 1985), pp. 22, 39-40.
13.
13 Kroener, Les Routes et les É tapes, pp. 34-5, 55-6, 112.
14.
14 Rothenberg, `Maurice of Nassau', pp. 32-3, is one of the few recent authors who weights this factor heavily. See also A. Corvisier, La France de Louis XIV: ordre intérieur et place en Europe, 3rd edn (Paris, 1990), pp. 90-1.
15.
15 D. Parrott, `The Administration of the French Army during the Ministry of Cardinal Richelieu', (DPhil., Oxford, 1985), ch. 3, esp. pp. 151-61, 222-3.
16.
16 J. Engel, `Von der spätmittelalterlichen respublica christiana zum Mächte-Europa der Neuzeit', in J. Engel, ed., Die Entstehung des neuzeitlichen Europa, Handbuch der europäischen Geschichte iii (Stuttgart, 1971), p. 351.
17.
17 M. Howard, War in European History (New York, 1976), p. 37. See also J.C. Allmayer-Beck and E. Lessing, Die Kaiserliche Kriegsvölker von Maximilian I bis Prinz Eugen 1479- 1718 (Munich, 1978), pp. 119-20, in which they lament that `the war had ceased to be a knightly duel for a long time, instead becoming, the more attritional strategy came to the fore, an act of mutual blackmail'.
18.
18 Black, A Military Revolution?, pp. 13-14. See also G. Parker, The Thirty Years War (Boston, MA, 1984), p. 298.
19.
19 A. Kraus, Maximilian I: Bayerns Groer Kurfürst (Graz, 1990), p. 149.
20.
20 R.L. O'Connell, Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons, and Aggression (New York, 1989), p. 147.
21.
21 Van Creveld, Supplying War, pp. 8-10. For a critique of Supplying War, see J. Lynn, `The History of Logistics and Supplying War', in Feeding Mars, pp. 9-27.
22.
22 Clausewitz, On War, pp. 330, 553; Roberts, `The Military Revolution', p. 215.
23.
23 Parrott, `Strategy and Tactics', pp. 19-22.
24.
24 Wijn, `Military Forces and Warfare 1610-1648', p. 224, specifically writes: `War was more territorial in character'; G. Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 7-11; M.S. Anderson, War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime, 1618-1789 (Leicester, 1988), p. 42; Roberts, `Gustav Adolph and the Art of War', p. 73; Kraus, Maximilian I, pp. 149, 155.
25.
25 Parrott, `Administration', pp. 15, 348-9; Corvisier, La France de Louis XIV, pp. 90-1. Similar negative reappraisals have been made by Spanish historians objecting to the notion of decline; see R. Stradling, `Seventeenth-Century Spain: Decline or Survival?', in Spain's Struggle for Europe, 1598-1668 (London, 1994), p. 26.
26.
26 O. Ranum, The Fronde: A French Revolution 1648-1652 (New York, 1993), pp. 82-3. Similarly, Kalevi Hosti writes: `The war came to an end not because of any great commitment to peace in the abstract or because of decisive military victories and defeats. Rather, the parties exhausted themselves. Their treasuries were depleted, the mercenaries who constituted the bulk of the military forces refused to fight without pay, and since the huge armies and their hordes of camp-followers had to live off the land, inflicting great cruelties among the peasantry, they began to run out of the means of survival': Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989, Cambridge Studies in International Relations xiv (New York, 1991), p. 29.
27.
27 Black, A Military Revolution?, pp. 15-16; A. Lossky, Louis XIV and the French Monarchy (New Brunswick, NJ, 1994), pp. 50-51.
28.
28 Mazarin to Longueville, 19 Aug. 1645, in Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin, ed. A. Chéruel, ii (Paris, 1872), no. 87 (here and subsequently, all references are to the number of the letter rather than the page); Mazarin to plenipotentiaries, 3 Dec. 1643, op. cit. i, no. 344.
29.
29 Turenne to Mazarin, 4 Oct. 1644, Archives du Ministère des Affaires É trangères, Correspondance politique, Allemagne (hereafter cited as CP All.) 24, fos. 373-4.
30.
30 E. Jarnut, ed., Die Französischen Korrespondenzen: 1645-1646, series II, section B, vol. iii of Acta Pacis Westphalicae (work in progress, hereafter cited as APW II B 3), Servien to Lionne, 14/19 Apr. 1646, APW II B 3, 228; A. Tischer, ed., Die Französischen Korrespondenzen: 1646, series II, section B, vol. iv of Acta Pacis Westphalicae (work in progress, hereafter cited as APW II B 4), d'Avaux to Mazarin, 30 July 1646, no. 92. I would like to express my appreciation to Konrad Repgen and the rest of the staff of the Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte for allowing me to see these volumes in advance of their publication.
31.
31 Mazarin to plenipotentiaries, 24 Mar. 1646, APW II B 3, 182, p. 494; see also Mazarin to Longueville, 21 Apr. 1646, op. cit., no. 233.
32.
32 R. Mandrou, Introduction to Modern France, 1500-1640: An Essay in Historical Psychology, trans. R.E. Hallmark (New York, 1975), pp. 236-42.
33.
33Mémoires du Maréchal de Turenne, ed. P. Marichal (Paris, 1909), Piè ces justificatives, p. 303.
34.
34 CP All. 23, `Mémoire touchant l'Allemagne, au tems de Maréchal du Guébriant, 127'. The document also urged crossing the Lech and invading Bavaria, because the Duke of Bavaria was old and loved his duchy and would sooner separate from the Habsburgs than see it ruined. These were the exact lines that Mazarin's strategy would follow in the ensuing five years.
35.
35 It is difficult to determine the exact time that it took letters to travel, but in the 1644 campaign - the one in which Turenne was the closest to Paris - he typically responded to Mazarin's letters two or three weeks after they were sent (e.g. Turenne to Mazarin, 27 Aug. 1644, CP All. 24, fos. 126-7, and 3 Sept. 1644, fos. 156-8). Even allowing for a delay in the sending of the responses, it is still clear that the time spent in transit was considerable. In one case where the details are known (from the 1648 invasiion of Bavaria), a letter from Paris took 18 days to reach Turenne (Turenne to Mazarin, 5 May 1648, CP All. 108, fos. 24r-v).
36.
36 Mazarin to Longueville, 6 July 1646, APW II B 4, 54; Turenne to plenipotentiaries, 29 Dec. 1644, CP All. 25, fo. 363. Also Marichal, Piè ces justificatives, pp. 280-81 (Mazarin-Turenne, 12 July 1646); op. cit., p. 20 (Mazarin-Turenne, 26-30 Aug. 1646).
37.
37 Mazarini to Enghien, 21 Aug. 1644, Lettres ii, no. 22. Mazarin's loose control suited his circumstances, but it was not the only alternative available to early modern statesmen. Maximilian of Bavaria, in particular, kept a tight grip on the reins, writing orders nearly every day and sometimes more, and insisting that no major action (such as a decision to engage in battle) be undertaken without his permission.
38.
38Op. cit.
39.
39 Mazarin to Enghien, 21 July 1644, Lettres ii, no. 4. References to Mazarin leaving decisions to his commanders could be repeated indefinitely; see also Mazarin to Enghien, 21 July 1644, Bibliothèque Mazarine manuscripts (hereafter BM), vol. 2214, 218v-219; Anne to Enghien, 17 Aug. 1644, Archives de Guerre, Correspondance (herafter AG), vol. 98, no. 69; Le Tellier to Turenne, 27 Apr. 1646, AG99, fos. 199v- 201; Mazarin to Turenne, 22 Sept. 1644, Lettres ii, 38; Marichal, Piè ces justificatives, pp. 261, 272, 281.
40.
40 J. Bérenger, Turenne (Paris, 1987), p. 231, cites evidence that shows that even the Bavarians thought Turenne was the main obstacle to peace; also p. 265. Turenne's political opinions are not surprising when one realizes that his mother was William of Orange's daughter, and his aunt was wife to Friedrich V of the Palatinate, the Winter King.
41.
41Op. cit., p. 265; Turenne, Mémoires, pp. 102-3.
42.
42 Richelieu did not take defeat well and usually placed the blame on his commanders, sometimes going so far as to have them executed; see Parrott, `Administration', pp. 327-31; and J. Chagniot, `É thique et pratique de la ªprofession des armesº chez les officiers français au XVIIe sie Ácle (Paris, 1991), pp. 85-6. It appears that the only incidence of Mazarin being anywhere nearly as harsh was in his trial of De La Mothe-Houdancourt after the incompetent Catalonian campaign of 1644. Even there, the Catalans initiated the complaints: A. Chéruel, Histoire de France pendant la minorité de Europe au XVIIe sie l'organisation de l'arme Ácle', in V. Barrie-Curien, ed., Guerre et Pouvoir en Â, Michel Le Tellier et Louis XIV, ii (Paris, 1879), pp. 66-72; and, according to L. Andre Âe monarchique (Paris, 1906), pp. 321-6, it was mostly Le Tellier's affair anyway; and in 1646, when Harcourt tried to starve out Lérida against Mazarin's advice and ended up ignominiously retreating, Mazarin did not attempt to punish him. See also Duc d'Aumale, Histoire des princes de Condé pendant les XVIe et XVIIe siècles iv (Paris, 1886), p. 314, for an opinion that Mazarin's treatment of the commander surrendering Freiburg was more lenient than Richelieu's would have been.
43.
43Historischer Atlas von Baden-Württemberg (Stuttgart, 1972-88); Salm, Armeefinanzierung.
44.
44 On the geographical nature of warfare in the early modern period, see Parker, `The Military Revolution', pp. 94-5.
45.
45 The following brief narrative of the French campaigns during 1644, 1645, and 1646 is drawn largely from the account of D. Croxton in `Peacemaking in Early Modern Europe: Cardinal Mazarin and the Congress of Westphalia, 1643-1648' (PhD, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1996). I have referred to primary sources only where they are particularly relevant to the article. The campaigns may also be followed with considerable accuracy in F.W. Barthold, Geschichte des groûen deutschen Krieges vom Tode Gustav Adolfs ab mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Frankreich, pt. 2, Von der Wahl Ferdinands III. zum römischen Könige bis zum Schluûe des westfälischen Friedens' (Stuttgart, 1843); J. Heilmann, Kriegsgeschichte von Bayern, Franken, Pfalz und Schwaben von 1506 bis 1651 ii (Munich, 1868); Aumale, Histoire iv, and, esp. for 1646, Försvarsstabens Krigshistoriska Avdelning, Från Femern och Jankow till Westfaliska Freden (Stockholm, 1948).
46.
46 Mazarin to Turenne, 20 July 1644, BM, v 2214, fos. 217r-v. Pace Aumale (Histoire 309- 311), Mazarin was certain of his decision once he took it; there is no evidence that he reconsidered.
47.
47 Turenne to Mazarin, 27 Aug. CP All. vol. 24, fos. 126-127v; instruction to Enghien following the battle of Freiburg, 17 Aug. 1644. Bibliothèque Nationale (hereafter BN), Manuscrits français (hereafter Mf), vol. 4169, fos. 131-136v; Queen to Enghien, 17 Aug. 1644, AG, vol. 98, no. 69; Turenne to Mazarin, 12 Aug. 1644, CP All. vol. 24, fos. 50-51v; Turenne, Mémoires, pp. 25-6.
48.
48 Turenne to Mazarin, 8 Dec. 1644, CP All. vol. 25, fos. 281-4v.
49.
49 As had Turenne's predecessor as commander of the Armée d'Allemagne, Guébriant: Aumale, Histoire iv, p. 363; Mazarin to Turenne, 1 Aug. 1644, Lettres ii, no. 8 and n. One of Mazarin's major reasons for sending Enghien to join Turenne in the first place was the hope that, after checking the Bavarians, the two could turn against the Palatinate: Chéruel, Histoire de France i, pp. 299-300, 325-7.
50.
50 F. Dickmann, Der Westfälische Frieden, 2nd edn (Münster, 1965), p. 169; d'Avaux to Brienne, 23 Nov. 1644, in U. Irsigler and K. Goronzy, eds, Die französischen Korrespondenzen: 1644, series II, section B, vol. i of Acta Pacis Westphalicae (Münster, 1986), no. 296; Servien to Brienne, 25 Nov. 1644, 300.
51.
51 Le Tellier to Turenne, 6 Feb. 1645, BN Mf vol. 4200, fos. 9v-10; Mazarin to Turenne, 9 Mar. 1644, CP All. vol. 46, fos. 197-9; Mazarin to Erlach, 16 Apr. 1645, CP All. vol. 46, fo. 325.
52.
52 Mazarin to Enghien, 11 July 1645, Lettres ii, no. 79.
53.
53 P. Broucek, Der Schwedenfeldzug nach Niederösterreich, 1645/46, Militärhistorische Schriftenreihe vii (Vienna, 1967), pp. 19-22.
54.
54 Turenne, Mémoires, pp. 72-6.
55.
55 K. Ruppert, `Die Kaiserliche Politik auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongreû (1643- 1648)', Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte XX (Münster, 1979), pp. 126-38, esp. pp. 126-31, 147-52, 161-4. G. Immler, Kurfürst Maximilian I. under der Westfälische Friedenskongreû, Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte xx (Münster, 1992), pp. 185-96, 219-22, 241-2.
56.
56 BN Mf vol. 4173, fos. 226-8; Turenne, Mémoires, pp. 264-70.
57.
57 E.g. Bérenger, Turenne, 232; Chéruel, Histoire de France ii, p. 316.
58.
58 Longueville to Mazarin, 13 June 1646, APW II B 4, no. 7; plenipotentiaries to Mazarin, 14 June 1646, p. 11.
59.
59 Louis XIV to plenipotentiaries, 22 June 1646, APW II B 4, p. 23; plenipotentiaries to Brienne, 25 June 1646, no. 28; Marichal, Piè ces justificatives, p. 273. Mazarin to Turenne, Marichal, op. cit., pp. 288-90; Le Tellier to Turenne, BN Mf vol. 4201, fos. 277-278v, prove conclusively that Turenne's action was authorized, and indeed that Mazarin was more concerned about it occurring too late than too soon.
60.
60 Weigley, The Age of Battles, pp. 28, 35. This is not to single out Weigley for this error, which is endemic in historiography; e.g. David Eltis writes of the new siege warfare `distorting strategy' in his The Military Revolution in Sixteenth-century Europe (New York, 1995), pp. 93-4.
61.
61 Mazarin, Lettres i, p. 334 (2 Sept. 1643); iii, p. 36 (17 Aug. 1644); iii, p. 215 (18 Aug. 1645); Marichal, Pièces justificatives, pp. 256-64 (letter from Mazarin to Turenne, 18 May 1646).
62.
62 Clausewitz, On War, pp. 595-6.
63.
63Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Notes of Adelzreitter, 23 Oct. 1644; Kurbayern Geheimer Rat, vol. 198, fasc. 3, fo. 45; Immler, Kurfürst Maximilian I, pp. 48-50; P.C. Hartmann, `Bayern als Faktor der französischen Politik während des Dreiûigjährigen Krieges', Um Glauben und Reich: Kurfürst Maximilian I. Beiträge zur Bayerischen Geschichte und Kunst, 1573-1657, vol. ii, pt. 1 of Wittelsbach und Bayern (Munich, 1980), pp. 452-3, mentions an interesting French memorandum from 1643 which argued that Bavaria's great strength lay in the extensive lands she occupied for the quartering of her troops. See also G. Parker, `In Defence of the Military Revolution', in C. Rogers, ed., Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe (Boulder, CO, 1997), p. 349.
64.
64 Notes of Adelzreitter, 23 Oct. 1644, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Kurbayern, Geheimer Rat, vol. 198, fasc. 3, fo. 45.
65.
65 Mercy to Maximilian, 17 Apr. 1645, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Kurbayern, È uûeres Archiv vol. 2818, fos. 481-482v.
66.
66 Cf. the excellent account in W.E. Heydendorff, `Vorderösterreich im Dreiûigjährigen Kriege. Der Verlust der Vorlande am Rhein und die Versuche zu deren Rückgewinnung', pt. 2, 1639-48, Mitteilungen des O Ästerreichischen Staatsarchivs xiii (1960), pp. 107-94.
67.
67 Turenne to Mazarin, 3 and 25 June 1644, CP All. vol. 23, fos. 219-20, 236r-v.
68.
68 Erlach himself noted his special status as governor: while all the other governors in French service owed their position to the crown, it was the crown that owed the possession of Breisach to Erlach, since he controlled it after the death of Bernhard and agreed to enter French service: A. von Gonzenbach, Der General Hans Ludwig von Erlach von Castelen: Ein Lebens-und Charakterbild aus den Zeiten des dreiûigjährigen Kriegs ii (Bern, 1880), pp. 478-9.
69.
69 For example, Le Tellier favoured Erlach in the latter's dispute with the Frenchman d'Oysonville because d'Oysonvillle spent more money for his weaker garrisons in Alsace than Erlach did for his garrison in Breisach; Gonzenbach, Erlach ii, p. 421. See also Le Tellier to Erlach, 11 Oct. 1644, BN Mf vol. 4199, fos. 120-24. Le Tellier also wrote of Erlach's loyalty that he was `un peu... difficile à s'accomoder avec ceux qui commandent avec et sous lui, mais a là ou Á l'égard de sa fidélité inébranlable et Á il va du service du Roi, il est tout de même comme une roue qui tourne toujours sans cesse'; Gozenbach, Erlach ii, pp. 476-7 n.
70.
70 F. Maier, Die bayerische Unterpfalz im Dreiûigjährigen Krieg: Besetzung, Verwaltung und Rekatholisierung der rechtsrheinischen Pfalz durch Bayern 1621 bis 1649 (New York, 1990), pp. 401-2, 406-7, 411, 421-30.
71.
71 Salm, Armeefinanzierung, pp. 168-9.
72.
72 See n. 69 above.
73.
73 E.g. Mazarin to Turenne, 16 July 1645, CP All. 47, fos. 402-3.
74.
74 Le Tellier to Enghien, 6 Sept. 1644, BN Mf vol. 4198, fos. 166-8; Le Tellier to Turenne, 3 Nov. 1644, BN Mf vol. 4199, fos. 136-8; Mazarin to Enghien, 11 July 1645, Lettres ii, no. 79; Mazarin to Turenne, 2 Dec. 1644, op. cit., no. 47. At another time, Mazarin estimated that two-thirds of the troops desert; Mazarin to Turenne, 4 Sept. 1644, BM, vol. 2215, fos. 171v-173v.
75.
75 P. Sörensson, `Das Kriegswesen während der letzten Periode des Dreiûigjährigen Krieges', in H.U. Rudolf, ed., Der Dreiûigjährige Krieg: Perspektiven und Strukturen, Wege der Forschung cmli (Darmstadt, 1977), pp. 447-8 (repr. from Historische Vierteljahrsschrift xxvii (1932), pp. 575-600).
76.
76 B.R. Kroener, `Soldat oder Soldateska? Programmatischer Aufriû einer Sozialgeschichte militärischer Unterschichten in der ersten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts', in M. Messerschmidt et al., eds., Militärgeschichte: Probleme -Thesen - Wege, Beiträge zur Militär-und Kriegsgeschichte xxv (Stuttgart, 1982), p. 119. Kroener states that `Die Historiographie hat bisher aber weitgehend geleugnet, daû der Soldat nicht nur Täter, sondern in ungleich gröûerem Maûe auch Opfer gewesen ist'; see also Salm, Armeefinanzierung, pp. 171-3.
77.
77 See the account in Croxton, `Peacemaking', n. 45.
78.
78 Wijn, Het Krijgswezen, pp. 518-32, and esp. pp. 518-19, 526-27, emphasizes the differences between post- and pre-Napoleonic strategy and the need to judge the latter on its own terms. See also Clausewitz, On War, p. 593 - although he himself does not always avoid the anachronisms that he decries.
79.
79 Roberts, `The Military Revolution', pp. 202-3. Black, A Military Revolution?, pp. 13-14, focuses almost exclusively on whether battles were or were not `decisive'; Parrott, `Administration', pp. 17 ff., repeatedly considers the failure of the French to win every battle a sign of military incompetence and lack of progress.
80.
80 Parker, `The Military Revolution', pp. 93-4. See also Parker, The Army of Flanders, p. 20.
81.
81 Roberts, `Gustav Adolf', pp. 59, 61; Parrott, `Administration', p. 20. Black is also susceptible to seeking decisive victories; see n. 79 above. See also the discussion of Delbrück's position in n. 2 above.
82.
82 And most modern wars, too: as Paul Pillar has pointed out, the most common end to wars is negotiated settlement even in the era of total war: Negotiating Peace (Princeton, NJ, 1983), pp. 16-17.
83.
83 Sörensson, Das Kriegswesen, is one of the only historians to have drawn this conclusion, and his work, over 60 years old, is now hardly read.

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Derek Croxton
Ohio State University

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