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Coup-proofing: latent concept and measurement
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 January 2024
Abstract
The study of coup-proofing holds significant importance in political science as it offers insights into critical topics such as military coups, authoritarian governance, and international conflicts. However, due to the multifaceted nature of coup-proofing and empirical inconsistencies with existing indicators, there is a need for a more profound understanding and a new measurement methodology. We propose a new measure of the extent of coup-proofing, utilizing a Bayesian item response theory. We estimate the extent of coup-proofing using a sample of 76 countries between 1965 and 2005 and theoretically relevant observed indicators. The findings from the estimation demonstrate that the extent of coup-proofing varies across regime type, country, and time. Furthermore, we verify the construct validity of our measurement.
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Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of EPS Academic Ltd
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