Existing research illustrates how electoral incentives shape candidates’ decisions to reduce ambiguity by cultivating specific group identities. Extending this literature, I argue that electoral contexts may instead incentivize candidates to cultivate ambiguity around their group identities. Drawing on theories of policy platform ambiguity, I argue that by cultivating an ambiguous identity candidates enhance their ability to attract voters across groups by reducing aversion they would otherwise experience from out-group voters. Accordingly, candidates will tend to cultivate ambiguous identities when electoral victory requires attracting voters across social groups, which will tend to be the case under less proportional rules and when their group is small. I examine this theory in the context of Brazilian municipal elections and show that office-seeking Evangelical Christian clergy tend to cultivate Evangelical identities when electoral victory can be achieved by narrowly targeting Evangelical voters but ambiguous identities when victory requires attracting both Evangelical and non-Evangelical voters.