Original Article
YOUTH, REVOLUTION, AND REPRESSION
Mehdi Shadmehr,
Peter Haschke,
Mehdi Shadmehr
- [email protected]
- 305-414-9140 | Fax: 305-284-6526
Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, 33146
Department of Politics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, 08544
Search for more papers by this authorPeter Haschke
- [email protected]
- 828-251-6996 | Fax: 828-251-6023
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina–Asheville, Asheville, NC, 28804
The authors wish to thank Dan Bernhardt, Jose Cheibub, Luke Fitzpatrick, Justin Fox, Mark Gibney, Jude Hays, Kerim Kavakli, Patrick Kuhn, Paulina Marek, Michael Peress, Bing Powell, Kjetil Storesletten, Milan Svolik, James Vreeland, seminar participants at the University of Rochester department of political science, UIUC department of economics, and MPSA Conference.Search for more papers by this author
Mehdi Shadmehr,
Peter Haschke,
Mehdi Shadmehr
- [email protected]
- 305-414-9140 | Fax: 305-284-6526
Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, 33146
Department of Politics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, 08544
Search for more papers by this authorPeter Haschke
- [email protected]
- 828-251-6996 | Fax: 828-251-6023
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina–Asheville, Asheville, NC, 28804
The authors wish to thank Dan Bernhardt, Jose Cheibub, Luke Fitzpatrick, Justin Fox, Mark Gibney, Jude Hays, Kerim Kavakli, Patrick Kuhn, Paulina Marek, Michael Peress, Bing Powell, Kjetil Storesletten, Milan Svolik, James Vreeland, seminar participants at the University of Rochester department of political science, UIUC department of economics, and MPSA Conference.Search for more papers by this authorAbstract
We develop a simple model to study the effect of age structure on the interactions between the state and dissidents. Younger populations are more prone to protest. As the population grows younger, states that can discriminately target repression to different groups, but cannot concede discriminately, decrease repression. In contrast, states that can target concession, but not repression, increase repression. We test these results in nonmilitary single-party regimes and military regimes without political parties. Moreover, we study state response to dissent in East European communist regimes in the late 1980s, showing that state response was more repressive in countries with younger populations. (JEL D74)
Supporting Information
| Filename | Description |
|---|---|
| ecin12293-sup-0001-AppendixS1.pdfPDF document, 152.8 KB | Appendix S1. Online appendix |
| ecin12293-sup-0002-AppendixS2.pdfPDF document, 124.9 KB | Appendix S2. Proofs of Propositions 1, 3, 4, and 5 [Correction added on 4 December 2015, after first online publication: Due to formatting restraints, Appendix S2 has been removed from the main article and uploaded as online Supporting Information.] |
Please note: The publisher is not responsible for the content or functionality of any supporting information supplied by the authors. Any queries (other than missing content) should be directed to the corresponding author for the article.
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