Introduction
There is a long-standing discussion on the impact of coups on democratization and political change.
1 Although coups often end democratic rule, some researchers have argued that coups can provide important opportunities to remove autocratic rulers and foster democratic change (
Collier, 2009;
Marinov and Goemans, 2014;
Miller, 2012,
2014,
2016,
2021;
Snyder, 1992;
Thyne and Powell, 2014). The 1974 coup in Portugal, for example, ended long-standing autocratic rule and paved the way for a democratic transition. Recent coups such as Mali in 2020 and Sudan in 2021 have been accompanied by promises of elections and reform. Others, however, emphasize that coups are most often followed by increased repression and autocracy, even if autocratic rulers are ousted (
Derpanopoulos et al., 2016,
2017;
Lachapelle, 2020). After a failed 1969 coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea, for example, President Nguema unleashed a wave of repression and suspended the constitution to rule by decree, making the country even more autocratic (
Jackson and Rosberg, 1982: 246).
2 While some have recognized the heterogeneous impact of coups on political change (
Tansey, 2016;
Zengin, 2021), we still lack an understanding of what causes this variation.
In this manuscript, we seek to reconcile these disparate findings and argue that a missing link is popular mobilization. We assert that the threat from popular mobilization plays a crucial role in shaping the post-coup trajectory. The aftermath of coups tends to be chaotic; rulers often have limited control after a successful coup, and failed coups can reveal serious vulnerabilities for an incumbent. Coup attempts boost intra-regime tension, increase the likelihood of new coups, decrease expected regime life-span, and heighten the probability that the incumbent is exiled, jailed, or executed. The existence (or absence) of popular mobilization affects leaders’ incentives to democratize or autocratize as a way to overcome the towering challenges created by the coup. Regime divisions combined with pressure from below can promote democratic reforms, as concessions to a protest movement can help navigate the political crisis. Moreover, regime splits improve the prospects for effective popular mobilization. Thus, when coups and popular mobilization coincide, the regime should be more susceptible to offer concessions and democratic reforms to try to hold on to power. Furthermore, an incumbent facing elite divisions may also seek to establish alliances with a mobilized opposition, thereby increasing the potential leverage of the opposition and its ability to demand democratic reform. Finally, popular mobilization can strengthen soft-liners within a regime favoring democratic reform. In the absence of popular mobilization, however, an incumbent is likely to respond to regime fragility and elite divisions by tightening autocratic rule and expand the use of repression.
We extend prior research on coups, mobilization, and political change by showing how elite divisions combined with mobilization from below can promote democratic change as well as when coups are more likely to strengthen autocracy. We provide a first systematic evaluation of how popular mobilization affects political change after coups and show results in line with our theoretical expectations. Our analysis considers the full range of possible changes after a coup, that is, any change toward more democracy or autocracy, unlike existing studies restricted to changes between regime categories. We develop measures based on the precise dates of events and changes, and use decay functions to capture delayed effects of coups and mobilization. This mitigates potential problems arising from the loss of the ordering of events in aggregation and allows us to account for the sequence of events. We first present robust evidence showing that the likelihood of changes in either direction increases substantially in the aftermath of a coup, highlighting the importance of understanding the heterogeneous effects of coups d’état. We then show that coups in the context of popular mobilization are likely to spur democratic change and that the impact of popular mobilization on democratic change almost doubles in the presence of a coup. In contrast, in the absence of popular mobilization, successful coups are likely to foster autocratic change, while failed coups do not show a systematic impact on autocratization. The findings lend substantial support to our theoretical argument and highlight how popular mobilization can sway post-coup trajectories toward more democracy. Indeed, combined with popular mobilization, the clouds from coup attempts are likely to have silver linings, with brighter prospects for future democratic reform.
The determinants of the post-coup trajectory
Our brief review of the literature demonstrates the ambiguous effects of coups on political change and prospects for democratization, appearing to spur increased repression and autocratization in some cases and elections and democratic reform in others. One possible explanation is that coups simply have highly erratic consequences and no consistent effect on democratization, reflected in the divergent results and high sensitivity to specifications in existing empirical studies. A more compelling alternative is to consider plausible factors that might account for this heterogeneity and identify when one set of these mechanisms is likely to dominate. We posit that popular mobilization plays a key role in shaping post-coup trajectories.
Powell and Thyne (2011) define coups as “illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive” (p. 252). Coups represent clear threats to leaders “from within” elites, but leaders can also face important challenges “from below” through popular mobilization. By one estimate, popular uprisings are second only to coups in removing autocratic rulers (
Svolik, 2012).
5 Large-scale popular mobilization has in practice posed greater challenges to leaders than violent uprisings.
6 Furthermore, many studies show that non-violent movements increase the likelihood of democratic transitions compared both to cases with violent mobilization and no mobilization (
Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011;
Kim and Kroeger, 2019;
Rivera Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013;
Teorell, 2010;
Ulfelder, 2005).
Coups and popular mobilization are, however, not independent alternative threats to political leaders; they often occur at the same time and may reflect common conditions and causes. In our data, we find that 13 percent of all coups occur within the same calendar year as popular mobilization, and about 40 percent occur within a 4-year window of popular mobilization. Popular mobilization against an unpopular ruler can legitimate attempts to seize power and increase elite divisions. Both forces were present in Egypt in 2011, when the army removed President Mobarak following a popular uprising. A number of empirical studies confirm that coups are more likely during popular mobilization (
Casper and Tyson, 2014;
Frantz and Ezrow, 2011;
Johnson and Thyne, 2018;
Powell, 2012;
Wig and Rød, 2016;
Yukawa et al., 2022). Coups can also boost popular mobilization, encouraging more actors to participate in anti-government demands (
Brancati, 2014). Coups and popular mobilization are often examined separately, even though political change often reflects a combination of pressure from below and from within, and elite splits are rarely exogenous to popular mobilization and dissent.
7
Just as coups and protest may have related origins, mobilization can fundamentally shape the prospects for democratization after a coup. Looking at each component in isolation risks exaggerating the apparent independent effect of individual factors. Although we have insightful case studies relating popular mobilization and elite divisions in democratization and political change, we lack comprehensive comparative studies of their combined impact.
8 An important exception is
Miller (2021) who argues that the effect of popular mobilization on democratic transitions is contingent on violent shocks disturbing the autocratic equilibrium, including coups.
9 We extend
Miller (2021) and consider the combined effect of popular
non-violent mobilization and coups on polity changes. We argue that popular mobilization can make democratization more likely after coups, but coups are unlikely to foster democratic change in the absence of popular mobilization.
Coups and regime vulnerability
Coups introduce a host of challenges to the regime. Both failed and successful coups increase the likelihood of new coup attempts, decrease the expected life-span of a regime, and increase the likelihood that the incumbent ends up in exile, is jailed, or executed (
Chambers and Ufen, 2020;
Tansey, 2016). One year after losing office, 31.5 percent of leaders are in exile, 13.9 percent are in jail, and 12.5 percent are dead (
Miller, 2021: 71–72). This situation is further complicated by lack of oversight; coups make it unclear who is siding with whom. Consequently, intra-regime tensions, fractionalization, and competition will likely be exacerbated (
Chambers and Ufen, 2020;
Miller, 2021;
Tansey, 2016). Leaders in power after successful or failed coup attempts will need to consolidate power to reduce the likelihood of future attempts (
Bennett et al., 2021). In the following section, we detail how popular mobilization can influence the likelihood that leaders will seek to resort to repression or concede to reforms in order to address the challenges after coup attempts.
Post-coup challenges during mass mobilization
Existing research provides clear support for a positive impact of mass mobilization on autocratic breakdown and democratic change (
Bayer et al., 2016;
Dahlum et al., 2019;
Hollyer et al., 2015;
Karatnycky and Ackerman, 2005;
Kim and Kroeger, 2019;
Rivera Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013;
Teorell, 2010;
Ulfelder, 2005). A protest movement demonstrates both willingness to mobilize and the ability to overcome barriers to collective action. Moreover, popular mobilization often brings together broad coalitions and wide social networks (
Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). This empowers the opposition and strengthens the masses relative to ruling elites (
Gleditsch and Ward, 2006;
Kim and Kroeger, 2019;
Rivera Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013). Popular mobilization can spur democratic change in the wake of deposed autocrats, but an incumbent can also initiate democratic reforms when confronted with popular mobilization. Work on democratization has stressed how reforms often arise as a response to changes in the balance of power between the ruler and the ruled (
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001), and ruling elites have strong incentives to promise democratic reform when the regime is threatened. Democratic reforms may reduce their power, but can allow them to retain political influence, and are more attractive than to be overthrown (
Kim and Kroeger, 2019). Leaders losing power in competitive elections face better post-tenure fates than leaders ousted irregularly (
Debs, 2016;
Kim, 2017;
Kim and Kroeger, 2019;
Miller, 2021).
The likelihood of success clearly depends on movement characteristics, such as size and inclusiveness (
Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011;
Dahlum, 2022), but is also shaped by the strength and unity of the regime.
Miller (2021) suggests that even broad-based movements have limited ability to unseat an authoritarian regime when the regime is united and willing to make use of physical force. However, coups reflect elite divisions and deepen cracks within a regime, expanding opportunities for effective popular mobilization (
Miller, 2014,
2021). Popular mobilization in the context of a coup further increases the revolutionary threat and yields incentives to implement democratic reforms. An incumbent might try to undermine and repress a movement, but repression might backfire and increase support for mobilization, both among the general population and individuals within the regime (
Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011;
Davenport et al., 2022;
Hess and Martin, 2006;
Rasler, 1996). Orders to repress can turn the security forces against the incumbent, spelling the end of the regime with the loss of coercive capacity. Such loyalty shifts are more likely to occur when regime divisions are highlighted by a coup. Thus, repression is at best a high-stakes gamble for a divided regime facing popular mobilization. In sum, elite division and popular mobilization can reinforce each other, and coups in the context of popular mobilization is likely to boost mechanisms connecting mass mobilization to democratic change.
10
Democratic reforms can also be introduced by incumbents to navigate intra-regime tensions. In the high-risk and non-transparent situation after a coup, incumbents may try to reach out to the broader population to bolster support and secure their position. An incumbent might try to increase their popularity and decrease the risk of a new coup by offering democratic reforms, since coup attempts are staged in part depending on the popularity of incumbents (
Wig and Rød, 2016). For example, when efforts by the military to force Mugabe to resign in Zimbabwe in 2017 initially failed, the army encouraged people to take to the streets and demonstrate against Mugabe, permitting protest that would not previously have been accepted. However, once protest has been allowed and people sense that further concessions could be possible, preventing future protest is likely more difficult. Popular mobilization in the post-coup context can also bolster soft-liners who are willing to contemplate democratic reform and increase their influence within the regime. Based on the above discussion, we propose the following hypothesis on coups and democratization:
H1. Coups are more likely to foster democratic change when accompanied by popular mobilization.
The 1974 coup removing the Estado Novo regime in Portugal illustrates the pervasive uncertainty following a coup and how popular mobilization can promote political change and democratization. The 25 April military coup by the Armed Forces Movement called for an end to ongoing wars in overseas colonies and reform of civil-military relations—democracy was not a goal at the outset (
Huntington, 1991: 4). However, the coup was followed by large-scale mobilization, celebrating the end of dictatorship, and set the stage for a transition to democracy after 48 years of autocratic rule. The outcome was by no means obvious at the time. Many feared that the coup makers—which included officers aligned with the Communist Party—would introduce a Marxist dictatorship (
Graham, 1992;
Linz and Stepan, 1996). Although the coup was instrumental in removing the regime, many accounts accord popular mobilization a key role in securing the democratic transition (
Accornero, 2013;
Fernandes, 2015;
Miller, 2021).
Palacios Cerezales (2017), for example, highlights how the anti-communist rallies and demonstrations in 1975 empowered moderate leaders and reversed the balance of power within the military, paving the way for a turn to electoral democracy.
Coups in the absence of mobilization
In the absence of mass mobilization, we expect autocracy and autocratic survival strategies to dominate. Without a threat from mass mobilization or a clear need to seek broader external support, both leaders that have come to power through a coup and surviving incumbents are more likely to focus on containing potential coup-makers and minimizing threats from within the elite (
Shen-Bayh, 2018). Likely tactics such as purges or efforts to accommodate through selective rents will often be associated with greater autocracy.
Furthermore, instability and chaos following coups can provide leaders an opportunity to accumulate more power, and leaders not constrained by popular mobilization are more likely to take advantage of these. Coup attempts are often motivated by personal ambitions rather than any clear policy or political differences (
Decalo, 1990;
Miller, 1971;
Onwumechili and Carle, 1998). Moreover, they are normally carried out by high ranking officials, with extensive networks and ties to other influential actors (
Geddes, 1999;
Singh, 2014). Coup-makers thus have both incentives and opportunities to consolidate power by reaching out to powerful actors rather than the masses.
11
Although many of these arguments focus on the consequences of coups in non-democracies, coups pose a significant threat to democracies, in particular unconsolidated democracies (
Onwumechili and Carle, 1998;
Svolik, 2015). Our discussion and the mechanisms highlighted are also relevant to the potential ability of mass mobilization to prevent autocratization following coup attempts. Popular mobilization can play a pivotal role in preventing democratic breakdown and autocratization. It is easier to concentrate power through a coup attempt in the absence of popular mobilization. Moreover, popular mobilization can increase elite incentives to preserve democratic institutions and support peaceful competition for political power.
Successful versus failed coups
Our previous
H1 on democratization also implies that coups in the absence of mass mobilization are likely to foster autocratic change. But extant studies demonstrate that coup outcomes also matter, and many studies suggest that specific changes such as increased corruption, repression, and reduced judicial constraints follow successful coups but not failed coups (
Bennett et al., 2021;
Lachapelle, 2020). We propose that there are greater opportunities to autocratize in the aftermath of a successful than a failed coup. Successful and failed coups present very different challenges to the ruler. A leader in place after a failed coup is likely to be notably weakened, and the coup demonstrates that elites perceive that a “leader is weak enough to be removed by the use of force and/or they are dissatisfied enough with the status quo that an attempt is worthwhile” (
Easton and Siverson, 2018: 597). Efforts to purge and punish those responsible after a failed coup can backfire. It may be difficult for leaders to identify who may have sympathized with the coup attempt, and efforts to purge potential rivals can alienate elites and the security apparatus, potentially increasing the risk of a new coup attempt (
Easton and Siverson, 2018: 600). Similar problems also arise from other countermeasures. For example, efforts to centralize power can antagonize the security forces. Successful coups are to some extent a display of power, demonstrating the ability to seize control and at least tacit support of the security forces. Centralizing power is less risky for a successful coup maker than an incumbent weakened by a failed coup. Thus, in the absence of mass mobilization, we expect autocratic changes to be more common following successful than failed coups.
H2. In the absence of mass mobilization, successful coups are more likely to foster autocratic change than failed coups.
Timing
We have argued that coups often have distinct short- and long-term consequences. A coup may depose a leader immediately, but it may take some time before changes in institutions are introduced. The instability induced by a coup can have persistent effects for some time after the initial event on incentives to democratize and autocratize.
Tusalem (2010) demonstrates a persistent legacy for coup risks, with a higher risk of a new coup noticeable 5 years into the post-coup period.
Most extant studies of coups or mobilization on political change focus on the immediate effects and are limited to changes in the current year or following 2 years (see, for example,
Derpanopoulos et al., 2016;
Rivera Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013;
Thyne and Powell, 2014).
12 However, for many outcomes, past events can also have important lingering and cumulative effects, even if the most recent events tend to be most important (
Reid et al., 2021).
Dahl (2016) and
Dahlum et al. (2019) identify enduring effects of protest movements on the likelihood of democratic change. In some cases, popular mobilization may quickly be followed by democratic change, but in other cases, it may take considerable time before the impact of contention is manifested in political change.
13 One round of protests may fail to unseat a regime, but can help establish a sustained challenge and trigger subsequent events that result in greater democracy after some time. Research on organized violence stresses how social norms and mobilized networks continue to play a crucial role after active conflict and contribute to the high risk of renewed conflict (
Hegre et al., 2017;
Reid et al., 2021). Similar legacy effects are likely to apply to popular mobilization as well, in the sense that past protest movements can affect perceived threats and subsequent government responses well beyond the initial active protest period. Protests in South Korea in the 1980s, for example, are often seen as crucial for the subsequent transition to democracy, even though this did not take place until the 1990s (see, for example,
Kim, 2000). Consequently, looking only at the immediate consequences of campaigns can understate the full impact of mobilization on political change. A longer time perspective allows us to capture the potential enduring impact of events as well as incomplete or interrupted changes and enduring outcomes, as in Egypt following the fall of Mubarak, with less-than-fully-competitive initial elections and a subsequent military coup. Indeed,
Miller (2021) finds that half of all post-coup democratic transitions fail within 10 years.
We expect coups and popular mobilization to have a combined impact on the prospects for political change even when they do not occur exactly at the same time. When coups are preceded by previous popular mobilization, the prior history of mobilization will guide an incumbent’s risk assessment and the choice of tactics. Prior mobilization can influence the incumbent’s expectations about successful repression as well as the potential negative consequences of repressive strategies. By contrast, the likely threat of popular mobilization is lower without a prior history of collective action, even if a coup might generate grievances. However, synergistic effects on democratization from a coup and popular mobilization are less likely the longer the distance between events. We use decay functions to allow for coups and mobilization to have interactive effects beyond when events occur simultaneously and how the length of time between events modifies the conditional impact.
Results
We start by comparing changes in the Polity score for cases with and without coups (including the year of the coup as well as the two subsequent years) in
Figure 1. The two bars to the left show the share of cases with change (in any direction) for cases with coups (green) and without (dark gray). Change is far more common in observations with coups (25%) than non-coup cases (only 6%). In the second and third bars, we differentiate between change toward more democracy and more autocracy. Democratic and autocratic changes are about equally likely in cases with coups, but for cases without coups, changes toward democracy are about twice as common as changes toward greater autocracy, reflecting the secular trend toward greater democracy over the period. The two rightmost bars for the magnitude of positive and negative changes demonstrate that post-coup changes tend to be larger than changes outside coups, in both directions on the Polity scale. Taken together, this provides initial support for the expectation that coups often trigger political change, and both changes toward democracy and autocracy become more common. We show that the positive impact of coups on any change in Polity score still holds when adding control variables in
Table A-7 in the
Supplemental Appendix.
We now turn to assessing our propositions under which post-coup changes in specific directions are more or less likely.
Table 1 reports a series of country-fixed effects linear regression estimates, where we consider the effect of any type of coup, independent of the final outcome, with
t-values in parenthesis. We first consider a sample of all non-democracies, including all countries in the
Gleditsch and Ward (1999) list below 7 on the Polity scale. In line with our expectations, we find that a coup without mass mobilization is associated with an increased likelihood of autocratic change, but when mass mobilization is present, democratic change dominates.
The first column in
Table 1 shows that when considering the effect of coup attempts only, and not mobilization, the estimated coefficient on changes in the Polity score is negative, although far from statistically significant. In the second column, we add popular mobilization and an interactive term for mobilization and coup attempts. We now find a negative and significant coefficient for coup, suggesting that we are more likely to see autocratic changes when coups take place without popular mobilization. We find a positive coefficient for popular mobilization, indicating a positive relationship with changes on the Polity scale, in line with previous research. We also note that the positive coefficient for popular mobilization is much larger than the negative coefficient for coup attempts. When we turn to the interactive or combined effects of coups and popular mobilization, we find a positive coefficient. The net effect now depends on the sum of the relevant coefficients. Since the main coefficient for popular mobilization and the interactive terms with coups are larger than the main coefficient for coups, the net predicted change must be positive when we have coups and popular mobilization, consistent with our claim that changes toward greater democracy are more likely to take place following coups accompanied with popular mobilization. Moreover, the interactive term for popular mobilization and coups are of a magnitude similar to the individual coefficient for popular mobilization, indicating that coups and splits within a regime can boost further the democratizing effects of popular mobilization.
In the third column, we distinguish between successful and failed coup attempts. As can be seen, we now find a larger negative coefficient for successful coups, and a much smaller and not significant negative coefficient for failed coups. This indicates that autocratizing changes in the aftermath of coups in the absence of popular mobilization mainly arise from successful coups. Based on these results, failed coups are by themselves not “helpful” for democratization in the absence of popular mobilization, just “less bad” than successful coups. Again, we find large positive coefficients for mobilization as well as the interactions between mobilization, and failed and successful coups. This suggests that popular mobilization can help curtail the autocratizing effects of coups and improve the prospects for democratization. Our estimates suggest that failed coups have a slightly stronger democratizing effect than successful coups, but we cannot conclude that the difference between the two is statistically significant given the relatively large confidence intervals and limited observed cases.
The implied net substantive effects of coups and popular mobilization depend on several terms as well as the time since events. We plot the marginal predicted impact on changes in the Polity score in
Figure 2(a) and (
b). For simplicity, we assume that coups and protest occur simultaneously, and examine how the predicted impact is reflected at the event (year 0) and subsequent years, declining with the decay functions specified above. The horizontal axis denotes year after the initial event, while the vertical axes denote either predicted change by year in
Figure 2(a) or cumulative predicted change since year 0 in
Figure 2(b).
21
As can be seen in
Figure 2(a), we see a clear predicted decline in the Polity score following a successful coup without protest. The impact is the largest in the year of the events, but remains non-negligible in the following years. For a failed coup absent protest, the negative change is very small at the outset and not significantly different from zero. (For successful coups, the negative predicted values are significantly different from 0 up to the second year.) For the scenarios involving protest, the predicted change in Polity is positive and substantial. We see the largest predicted changes when protest is accompanied by coups, with a higher predicted positive change for failed coups than successful coups, but even successful coups and mobilization have a larger predicted impact than protest not accompanied by a coup. The net predicted impact of a failed coup with protest is almost 80 percent larger than for mobilization not accompanied by a coup.
Since our model set-up is based on country-year data, the predicted values are also annual expected changes. Most countries do not see a series of small changes by each year, and there is a great deal of variation in the timing and magnitude of any changes following coups and popular mobilization.
Figure 2(b) provides an alternative way to illustrate the implied cumulative effect by adding the predicted impact by year for the first year for the most likely autocratizing scenario (i.e. a successful coup with no popular mobilization) and the most likely democratizing scenario (i.e. a failed coup accompanied by popular mobilization). This suggests substantively large net predicted effects over a 4-year period, with negative changes of around −2 on the Polity scale for successful coups without mobilization, and positive changes around 6 for a failed coup with popular mobilization. Although it is difficult to account for the specific timing of changes, these results suggest a high likelihood of substantial changes associated with combinations of coups and popular mobilization, in line with our expectations.
In columns 4, 5, and 6, we repeat our analyses on a sample of all country-years. This allows us to consider the impact of coups on political change beyond non-democracies and changes for countries above the ⩾7 threshold on the Polity scale. Previous research has mainly focused on the prospects for democratization after coups in autocracies, but our theory and discussion has also highlighted the ability of popular mobilization to contain the autocratizing effects of coups. The full sample also allows us to also consider coups in democracies. Moreover, we can examine if our results also hold when we include countries ⩾7 but below the maximum Polity score 10 (which may include recent democracies or countries with some less democratic traits). We find generally similar results for our models estimated on the full sample. We find a larger negative coefficient for coup attempts on change in Polity in column 4, potentially reflecting added cases of democratic breakdown after coups. When we add popular mobilization and the interactive term in column 5, we find results similar to the non-democracy sample, although the interactive term is just below the 0.05 significance level for a two-tailed test and only significant in a one-tailed test. When differentiating between coup outcomes in column 6, we find a large and negative coefficient for successful coups. However, the results also suggest that popular mobilization can offset the autocratizing effect. For failed coups, we again find little evidence for a systematic impact on autocratization without popular mobilization, and a net positive impact on change in Polity when failed attempts are accompanied by popular mobilization.
Robustness tests
To examine whether the key findings are sensitive to model specifications, we run a number of robustness tests, and our findings remain robust across these. Skeptics may wonder whether the specific sequence of events matters. We have emphasized the role of expectations, and based on our argument, the implications should be the same if (a) coups occur during protest (or in the recent aftermath of protest) or (b) new protest follow a coup attempt, since in either case incumbents will have greater incentives to try to promise reform. As mentioned previously (within the same calendar year), coups are more likely to take place following recent mobilization than for new mobilization to follow a coup (there are only three cases of popular mobilization emerging after a coup without prior mobilization, see
Table A-2 in the
supplemental appendix). However, to examine possible differences across sequences, we conduct additional analyses where we remove specific sequences, first taking out all cases where popular mobilization precedes a coup attempt (
Table A-8), and second all cases where coup attempts precede the emergence of protest (
Table A-9). The results remain substantively similar across these alternative tests.
Table A-5 presents the model for all coups (not separating by outcome) with different specifications of the independent variables, including decay and window functions. The negative effect of coups holds for decay functions up to 4 years and for window specifications up to 2 years. The positive interaction effect between coup and protest holds for all decay functions and windows up to 3 years. In
Table A-10, we apply the same set-up distinguishing by coup outcome. The insignificant results of failed coups hold across all specifications, while the positive interaction with protest holds for all decay functions, but only the 1-year window. The negative effect of successful coups holds across all decay functions and for window functions up to 2 years. The positive interaction effect between successful coup and protest holds for all decay functions and windows up to 3 years. Again, the effect of protests holds for all specifications.
Using the V-dem Liberal Democracy Score and the same lagging approach as in the Polity analysis (see
Table A-11 in the
supplemental Appendix), we find a positive interaction effect in the context of social mobilization for failed coups and successful coups continue to show a negative effect. We also test whether the results are limited to after the Cold War (see
Tables A-12 and
A-13 in the
Supplemental Appendix). We find similar results during and after the Cold War, with an effect of coups conditional on popular mobilization, and the interactive terms when differentiating between outcomes are similar across the samples although not consistently significant in the shorter period with the lower number of cases. There is no evidence that coups generally promote democratization in the Post Cold War period, as some have suggested. The coefficients for coups in general and successful coups are negative and significant. The results for coups independent of outcome are robust to Jackknife resampling, where we re-estimate the model leaving out each individual country from the estimation sample (see
Table A-14), although the interaction effects by distinct outcomes are not consistently significant. Finally, we show in
Table A-15 that the results hold when dropping all control variables and do not arise simply as an artifact of the particular model specification.
Discussion and conclusion
Previous research on the impact of coups on democratization has reached seemingly contradictory conclusions. Whereas some contend that coups provide a good opportunity for unseating dictators and promote democratic reform, skeptics emphasize how coups are likely to foster authoritarianism and repression. We argue that the consequences of coups are heterogeneous and that the expected effects must be considered relative to other forces that affect the prospects for democratization. We focus on the role of popular mobilization.
We assert that the effect of coups hinges on popular mobilization. Coups are more likely to foster democratization when popular mobilization is present, while autocratic rule is more likely absent mobilization. We have suggested that popular mobilization increases pressure for democratization through a number of mechanisms. Most directly, mobilization increases the ability of civil society actors to make credible demands and sanction governments. Moreover, in the aftermath of a coup, vulnerable leaders are more likely to offer concessions and try to enlist popular support to hold on to power. Besides, competition between rival elites can increase the power of civil society and accordingly the value of democratic institutions as a rational compromise for sharing power.
Our empirical analysis provides support for our arguments. In the absence of popular mobilization, coup attempts increase the likelihood of negative changes on the Polity score, while democratic change is more likely after coups in the context of popular mobilization. We show that the autocratizing effect in the absence of popular mobilization is primarily driven by successful coups, similar to research on increased repression and corruption, and failed coups do not have consistent effects on autocratization. In the context of popular mobilization, democratization is more likely following coups than mobilization alone, and the effects after failed coups appear to be more robust than the ones for successful coups.
We have only considered cases with ongoing or recent popular mobilization. However, our postulated mechanisms arguably pertain to capacity for popular mobilization or plausible threat potential. Some coups may not be preceded by prior mobilization, and plausible motivation and opportunities for mobilization can play a similar role even if collective action may be difficult. Although the likelihood of mobilization cannot be fully known ex ante, some cases clearly have much higher prospects for popular mobilization and protest, and this plausible potential threat should make elite instability more likely to result in democratization.
Our analyses demonstrate the need to consider pressure from above and pressure from below as complimentary and possibly related rather than separate or competing forces. Traditional military coups have become less common, at least outside Africa, but we often observe alternative types of efforts by elites to oust unpopular leaders, including “legal” means such as impeachment proceedings, declarations of no-confidence, or even threats of international intervention. In Gambia, for example, President Jammeh refused to hand over power after unexpectedly losing elections in 2016, citing electoral fraud.
22 Jammeh’s refusal to hand over power triggered popular mobilization, and after an intervention by Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) forces in January 2017, Jammeh agreed to go into exile. This example underscores the wider applicability of a combined pressure from below and above beyond coups, and how crises and unraveling elite coalitions provide opportunities for democratization.