“I have often wondered why people with guns ever obey people without them. And I think we still do not know—at least I do not.” (Przeworski 2011, p. 180)
Abstract
Over the last several decades, both economists and political scientists have shown interest in coups d’état. Numerous studies have been dedicated to understanding the causes of coups. However, model uncertainty still looms large. About one hundred potential determinants of coups have been proposed, but no consensus has emerged on an established baseline model for analyzing coups. We address this problem by testing the sensitivity of inferences to over three million model permutations in an extreme bounds analysis. Overall, we test the robustness of 66 factors proposed in the empirical literature based on a monthly sample of 164 countries that covers the years 1952–2011. We find that slow economic growth rates, previous coup experiences, and other forms of political violence to be particularly conducive to inciting coups.
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Notes
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We use the terms “coup” and “coup d’état” interchangeably here. “Military coups” are based on a narrower definition, as the perpetrators would have to include the military.
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As Plümper and Neumayer (2015) point out, this standard approach does not deal systematically with model uncertainty regarding distributional assumptions, measurement error processes, and so on. Thus, the results of an EBA can be considered “robust” only in such a narrow sense.
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We are aware of three studies of coup determinants that use monthly data: Thyne (2010), Bell (2016), and Johnson and Thyne (2016). Johnson and Thyne report similar findings when using country-day and country-year data. Eventually, they opt for using country-month data to increase precision without unnecessarily reducing standard errors by inflating the number of observations.
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Given that resources can be used to protect the incumbent regime from threats, it is very plausible that coups frequently will be unsuccessful (Crespo Cuaresma et al. 2011).
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In the literature, linear probability models, logit, and probit models are roughly equally common. Calculation speed, the absence of convergence problems, the ability to include country-fixed effects as well as the possibility of interpreting the resulting coefficients directly strongly favors the linear probability model in our EBA.
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Sala-i-Martin (1997) proposes using the integrated likelihood to construct a weighted CDF. However, missing observations for some variables pose a problem. Moreover, Sturm and de Haan (2002) show that the goodness-of-fit measure may not be a good indicator of the probability that a model is the true model and that weights constructed as in Sala-i-Martin (1997) are not invariant to linear transformations of the dependent variable. Hence, changing scales can result in different estimates and conclusions. We therefore employ the unweighted version of the CDF.
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This criterion eliminates coups in Argentina (12/1975), Bolivia (05/1981), Congo (08/1968), Haiti (04/1989), Sierra Leone (03/1967), Sudan (12/1966) and Togo (10/1991).
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We run F-tests for the joint significance of the fixed effects. To summarize these tests, we calculate the average p-value of the tests for all regressions run. The results are: 0.218 (regions), 0.170 (decades), 0.544 (months).
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The average p-values for the F-tests of the fixed effects are: 0.616 (months) and 0.303 (decades).
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The average p-value for the test of joint significance of the three coefficients is 0.089 and the median is 3.4E-06.
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Acknowledgments
The authors thank Johann Almeida, Maximilian Gercke, Enisa Halili, and Remon Magdy for excellent research assistance. Helpful comments and suggestions by Mulugeta Bogale, Nehal Brain, Safouene Ghannouchi, Omar Khadhraoui, Xenofon Kontargyris, Ekaterine Lomtatidze, Nada Maamoun, Asma Hadj Mabrouk, Maximillian Mantei, Stephan Michel, Konstantinos Pilpilidis, Todd Sandler, and participants of the 2016 Political Violence and Policy Conference are much appreciated.
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Appendix 1
Appendix 1
Variable (group) |
Used by |
Definition/operationalization |
Data source |
---|---|---|---|
Democracy-dummy |
Bell (2016), Bell and Sudduth (2015), Böhmelt and Pilster (2015), Casper (2015), Casper and Tyson (2014), Girod (2015), Henderson (1997), Hiroi and Omori (2013, 2014), Houle (2016), Johnson and Thyne (2016), Kim (2016), Miller et al. (2016), Piplani and Talmadge (2015), Powell (2012), Powell et al. (2016), Thyne (2010), Tusalem (2010), Wobig (2015) |
Cheibub et al.-classification, recoded monthly for coup years, 1 = democracy |
Cheibub et al. (2010), Bormann and Golder (2013) and own codings |
Economic growth |
Bell (2016), Böhmelt and Pilster (2015), Bove and Rivera (2015), Casper (2015), Casper and Tyson (2014), Hiroi and Omori (2013), Houle (2016), Jackman et al. (1986), Johnson et al. (1984), Kim (2016), Lehoucq and Pérez-Liñán (2014), Londregan and Poole (1990), Miller et al. (2016), Piplani and Talmadge (2015), Powell (2012), Powell et al. (2016), Slater et al. (2014), Thyne (2010), Wells (1974), Wig and Rod (2016), Wobig (2015) |
Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita in the previous year |
Own calculation based on Feenstra et al. (2015) |
Income per capita |
Arbatli and Arbatli (2016), Belkin and Schofer (2003), Bell (2016), Bell and Sudduth (2015), Böhmelt and Pilster (2015), Bove and Rivera (2015), Casper (2015), Casper and Tyson (2014), Galetovic and Sanhueza (2000), Girod (2015), Harkness (2016), Henderson (1997), Hiroi and Omori (2013, 2014), Houle (2016), Johnson and Thyne (2016), Kim (2016), Lehoucq and Pérez-Liñán (2014), Londregan and Poole (1990), Malul and Shoham (2006), Marcum and Brown (2016), Miller et al. (2016), O’Kane (1981, 1993), Piplani and Talmadge (2015), Powell (2012), Powell et al. (2016), Slater et al. (2014), Thyne (2010), Tusalem (2010), Wells (1974), Wig and Rod (2016), Wobig (2015) |
Log-real GDP per capita |
Feenstra et al. (2015) |
Previous coup-dummy |
Arbatli and Arbatli (2016), Bove and Rivera (2015), Galetovic and Sanhueza (2000), Henderson (1997), Kim (2016), Londregan and Poole (1990), Lunde (1991), O’Kane (1981, 1993), Rowe (1974), Tusalem (2010), Wang (1998) |
Previous coup in this country since 1950 or independence, monthly data |
Own calculation based on Powell and Thyne (2011) |
Time since coup |
Bell and Sudduth (2015), Casper (2015), Casper and Tyson (2014), Houle (2016), Johnson and Thyne (2016), Kim (2016), Lehoucq and Pérez-Liñán (2014), Londregan and Poole (1990), Lunde (1991), Powell (2012), Powell et al. (2016), Slater et al. (2014), Wig and Rod (2016), Wobig (2015) |
Linear, quadratic and cubic time trend measured in years, monthly data |
Own calculation based on Powell and Thyne (2011) |
Absolute latitude |
Arbatli and Arbatli (2016) |
The absolute value of the latitude of the capital city, divided by 90 |
La Porta et al. (1999) |
Age dependency ratio |
Slater et al. (2014) |
Ratio of the population older than 64 to the working age population |
World Bank (2016) |
Aid |
Girod (2015), Hiroi and Omori (2014), Rowe (1974), Thyne (2010), Wells (1974) |
Net ODA received (share of GNI) |
World Bank (2016) |
Chief executive military officer-dummy |
Arbatli and Arbatli (2016), Belkin and Schofer (2003), Bell (2016), Böhmelt and Pilster (2015), Bove and Rivera (2015), Johnson and Thyne (2016), Hiroi and Omori (2013, 2014), Miller et al. (2016), Powell (2012), Thyne (2010), Wobig (2015) |
Chief executive is a military officer, 1 = yes |
Beck et al. (2001) |
Colonial history |
Dummies for British, French, and no colonial origin |
||
Coup spillover |
Number of coups per country in the same region in the previous year (regions: Eastern Europe and post-Soviet Union, Latin America, MENA, SSA, Western Europe and North America, Asia, and other regions) |
Own calculation based on Hadenius and Teorell (2007), Powell and Thyne (2011) |
|
Coup-proofing |
Bell and Sudduth (2015), Böhmelt and Pilster (2015), Houle (2016), Powell (2012) |
Effective number of military organizations |
Pilster and Böhmelt (2012) |
Democracy spillover |
Lehoucq and Pérez-Liñán (2014), Miller et al. (2016), Powell et al. (2016), Slater et al. (2014), Wobig (2015) |
Share of democratic countries in the same region at the end of the previous year (regions: Eastern Europe and post-Soviet Union, Latin America, MENA, SSA, Western Europe and North America, Asia, and others) |
Own calculation based on Hadenius and Teorell (2007), Cheibub et al. (2010) |
Economic reform |
Casper (2015) |
Average level of reform in six economic sectors |
Giuliano et al. (2013) |
Education |
Wells (1974) |
Average years of secondary schooling among the population aged 15 and older |
Barro and Lee (2013) |
Fractionalization |
Arbatli and Arbatli (2016), Bell (2016), Girod (2015), Harkness (2016), Henderson (1997), Houle (2016), Jackman (1978), Johnson et al. (1984), Jenkins and Kposowa (1992), Kposowa and Jenkins (1993), Lunde (1991), Piplani and Talmadge (2015), Tusalem (2010) |
Ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization |
Alesina et al. (2003) |
Government consumption |
Slater et al. (2014) |
Share of government consumption at current PPPs |
Feenstra et al. (2015) |
IMF program |
Casper (2015) |
Dummies for IMF program, and World Bank adjustment-project (respectively in effect for over 4 months) |
|
Income inequality |
Gini index |
Solt (2009) |
|
Inflation |
Casper (2015) |
Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator |
World Bank (2016) |
Island-dummy |
Arbatli and Arbatli (2016) |
Country is a small island |
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) |
Military expenditure |
Log-military expenditure |
Singer (1988) |
|
Military expenditure growth |
Böhmelt and Pilster (2015), Bove and Rivera (2015), Powell (2012) |
Annual growth rate of military expenditure in the previous year |
Own calculation based on Singer (1988) |
Military expenditure per personnel |
Bell (2016), Bell and Sudduth (2015), Böhmelt and Pilster (2015), Bove and Rivera (2015), Marcum and Brown (2016), and Powell (2012) |
Military expenditure per personnel |
Own calculation based on Singer (1988) |
Military personnel |
Bell and Sudduth (2015), Böhmelt and Pilster (2015), Bove and Rivera (2015), Kim (2016), Marcum and Brown (2016), Miller et al. (2016), Piplani and Talmadge (2015), Powell (2012), Wells (1974) |
Log-military personnel |
Singer (1988) |
Mineral rents |
Slater et al. (2014) |
Mineral rents (share of GDP) |
World Bank (2016) |
Natural resources |
Total natural resource rents (share of GDP) |
World Bank (2016) |
|
Negative growth-dummy |
Negative annual growth rate of real GDP per capita |
Own calculation based on Feenstra et al. (2015) |
|
Oil exports |
Harkness (2016) |
Net oil exports value per capita, constant prices |
Ross and Mahdavi (2015) |
Oil production |
Oil production value, constant prices |
Ross and Mahdavi (2015) |
|
Political stability (various indicators) |
Arbatli and Arbatli (2016), Bove and Rivera (2015), Casper (2015), Galetovic and Sanhueza (2000), Kim (2016), Maniruzzaman (1992) |
Indicators for assassinations, anti-government demonstrations, government crises, guerrilla warfare, purges, riots, and general strikes |
Banks and Wilson (2012) |
Political stability and absence of violence |
Belkin and Schofer (2003), Böhmelt and Pilster (2015), Hiroi and Omori (2013), Houle (2016), Maniruzzaman (1992), Powell (2012), and Thyne (2010) |
Worldwide Governance Indicator: Perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and politically-motivated violence |
Kaufmann et al. (2011) |
Repression |
Bove and Rivera (2015) |
Political Terror Scale based on US State Department reports |
Gibney et al. (2015) |
Population density |
Population divided by land area |
World Bank (2016) |
|
Population growth |
Wells (1974) |
Annual growth rate of the population size |
Own calculation based on Feenstra et al. (2015) |
Population size |
Arbatli and Arbatli (2016), Casper (2015), Casper and Tyson (2014), Piplani and Talmadge (2015), Slater et al. (2014), Wells (1974) |
Log-population size |
Feenstra et al. (2015) |
Recent independence |
O’Kane (1981) |
Country became independent in this or one of the previous five years |
Own calculation based on Gleditsch and Ward (1999) |
Recent war |
Belkin and Schofer (2003) |
No war in this year or the previous ten years |
Own calculation based on Marshall (2015) |
Regime duration |
Piplani and Talmadge (2015) |
Number of years since the most recent regime change |
Marshall et al. (2014) |
Security of property Rights |
Tusalem (2010) |
Index of legal structure and security of property rights |
Gwartney et al. (2015) |
Size of government |
Slater et al. (2014) |
Index of size of government (expenditures, taxes and enterprises) |
Gwartney et al. (2015) |
Trade |
Sum of exports and imports of goods and services (share of GDP) |
World Bank (2016) |
|
Urbanization |
Urban population (share of total population) |
World Bank (2016) |
|
Violence, conflict, and War |
Arbatli and Arbatli (2016), Bell and Sudduth (2015), Casper (2015), Casper and Tyson (2014), Girod (2015), Johnson and Thyne (2016), Kim (2016), Piplani and Talmadge (2015), Thyne (2010), and Wobig (2015) |
Magnitude scores for civil violence, civil warfare, ethnic violence, ethnic warfare, international violence, and international warfare; number of interstate armed conflicts, internal armed conflicts, and internationalized internal armed conflict |
|
War spillover |
Avg. magnitude of civil, ethnic, and international warfare in the same region in the previous year (regions: Eastern Europe and post-Soviet Union, Latin America, MENA, SSA, Western Europe and North America, Asia, and others) |
Own calculation based on Hadenius and Teorell (2007), Marshall (2015) |
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Gassebner, M., Gutmann, J. & Voigt, S. When to expect a coup d’état? An extreme bounds analysis of coup determinants. Public Choice 169, 293–313 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-016-0365-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-016-0365-0