https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5825-9256
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ABSTRACT
Colonially inherited institutions are a key determinant of the regime type and economic outcomes of postcolonial countries. This study extends this claim to civil-military relations, arguing that former French colonies are especially likely to invest in structural coup-proofing. France created paramilitary units throughout its colonies for which many natives were recruited. After independence, these paramilitaries proved persistent and were consequently used to counterbalance the regular armed forces. In contrast, countries without existing paramilitary organizations had stronger militaries which deterred and even forcibly prevented structural coup-proofing. Quantitative tests using global data on coup-proofing and a paired comparison of civil-military relations in Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana support the claim that former French colonies are more likely to heavily invest in counterbalancing. By showing how French colonial institutions provided post-independence governments with the opportunity to coup-proof, the study contributes to our understanding of civil-military relations as well as the institutional long-term effects of colonialism and foreign rule more generally.
Las instituciones heredadas de las colonias son un determinante clave del tipo de régimen y de los resultados económicos de los países poscoloniales. En este estudio, se amplía esta afirmación a las relaciones cívico-militares y se argumenta que las antiguas colonias francesas son muy propensas a invertir en protección estructural contra los golpes de Estado. Francia creó unidades paramilitares en todas sus colonias para las que se reclutó a muchos nativos. Tras la independencia, estos paramilitares demostraron persistencia y, por consiguiente, se utilizaron para contrarrestar las fuerzas armadas regulares. Por el contrario, los países que no contaban con organizaciones paramilitares tenían ejércitos más fuertes que disuadían e incluso impedían por la fuerza la protección estructural contra los golpes de Estado. Las pruebas cuantitativas que utilizan datos mundiales sobre la protección contra los golpes de Estado y una comparación por pares de las relaciones cívico-militares en Costa de Marfil y Ghana respaldan la afirmación de que las antiguas colonias francesas son más propensas a invertir en contrarrestar las fuerzas. Al mostrar cómo las instituciones coloniales francesas ofrecieron a los gobiernos posteriores a la independencia la oportunidad de protegerse contra los golpes de Estado, el estudio nos ayuda a comprender las relaciones entre civiles y militares, así como los efectos institucionales a largo plazo del colonialismo y la dominación extranjera en general.
Les institutions héritées des colonies sont un déterminant clé du type de régime et des résultats économiques des pays post-coloniaux. Cette étude étend cette affirmation aux relations entre civils et militaires en soutenant que les anciennes colonies françaises sont particulièrement susceptibles d’investir dans une protection structurelle contre les coups d’état. La France a créé des unités paramilitaires dans l’ensemble de ses colonies et de nombreux indigènes ont été recrutés dans celles-ci. Après l’indépendance de ces pays, ces paramilitaires se sont avérés persistants et ont par conséquent été utilisés pour contrebalancer les forces armées régulières. À l’inverse, les pays sans organizations paramilitaires existantes ont pu disposer d’armées plus fortes qui ont dissuadé et même empêché par la force l’établissement de protections structurelles contre les coups d’état. Des tests quantitatifs reposant sur des données mondiales sur la protection contre les coups d’état et une comparaison par paires des relations entre civils et militaires en Côte d’Ivoire et au Ghana soutiennent l’affirmation selon laquelle les anciennes colonies françaises sont davantage susceptibles d’investir massivement dans un contrepoids. En montrant la manière dont les institutions coloniales françaises ont doté les gouvernements post-indépendance de l’opportunité de se protéger contre les coups d’état, cette étude contribue à notre compréhension des relations entre civils et militaires ainsi que, d’une manière plus générale, des effets institutionnels à long terme du colonialisme et de la domination étrangère.
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to Zorzeta Bakaki, Tobias Böhmelt, three anonymous reviewers, and the editors for providing helpful feedback on earlier versions of this paper.
Supplementary Material
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed on the publisher’s website.
Notes
1 Though there are also alternative coup-proofing strategies, we use the terms counterbalancing and structural coup-proofing interchangeably in this paper to increase readability.
2 Additionally, the democracy levels of all former colonies have significantly converged after the Cold War ended (Lee et al. Citation2019).
3 However, European powers also ruled based on the degree of political centralization of the indigenous societies (Firmin-Sellers Citation2000, 254). Nevertheless, others argue that direct rule and protectionist policies were a result of the weaker international position of France compared to Britain (Smith Citation1978, 74–75).
4 Moreover, for countries which were under the colonial rule of multiple foreign powers before achieving independence, only the one colonizer is recorded which “was most responsible for shaping the development of the entity (or entities) that became this modern state” (Hensel Citation2018a). This means that this colonial power controlled a country either for the longest duration or the highest share of its present-day territory. Our main analysis focuses on France as we have theoretical expectations for this colonial power. However, we also examine the long-term effects of other colonial powers on present-day counterbalancing in the appendix.
5 We differentiate between autocracies and anocracies as it is neither theoretically nor empirically clear whether these two regime types are equally likely to coup-proof.
6 A full result table can be found in the appendix.
7 As averaging the original counterbalancing dummy over a country’s observations results in a variable that is bounded between 0 and 1 but continuous, we use a fractional response logit to analyze it (see Papke and Wooldridge Citation1996).