Countering Coups: Leadership Succession Rules in Dictatorships
Abstract
Get full access to this article
View all access and purchase options for this article.
Appendices
Variable | M | SD | Minimum | Maximum | Source |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Institutionalized succession | 0.88 | 0.32 | 0 | 1 | Polity IV (2010) |
Attempted coup | 0.04 | 0.21 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
Time since attempted coup | 17.69 | 13.98 | 0 | 60 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
Post-independence | 0.32 | 0.46 | 0 | 1 | Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) |
Partiest-1 | 0.85 | 0.35 | 0 | 1 | Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) |
Legislaturet-1 | 0.75 | 0.42 | 0 | 1 | Cheibub et al. (2010) |
Ethnic fractionalization | 0.45 | 0.29 | 0.001 | 0.92 | Fearon and Laitin (2003) |
GDP/capitat-1 (logged) | 7.91 | 1.05 | 5.51 | 12.97 | Gleditsch (2002) |
Growtht-1 | 0.01 | 0.16 | −0.66 | 6.43 | Gleditsch (2002) |
Leader age | 58.79 | 11.94 | 24 | 93 | Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2009) |
Cold War | 0.57 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 | Coded by authors |
Effective number of military organizations | 1.72 | 0.63 | 1 | 4.57 | Pilster and Böhmelt (2011) |
Monarchy | 0.09 | 0.29 | 0 | 1 | Geddes et al. (2014) |
Personalist regime | 0.26 | 0.44 | 0 | 1 | Geddes et al. (2014) |
Single-party regime | 0.49 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 | Geddes et al. (2014) |
Military dictatorship | 0.13 | 0.33 | 0 | 1 | Geddes et al. (2014) |
Successful coup | 0.02 | 0.15 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011) |
Leader duration | 11.74 | 9.40 | 0 | 46 | Svolik (2012) |
Foreign aid/capitat-1 (4-year average, logged) | 40.95 | 60.36 | −6.32 | 929.44 | World Bank’s World Development Indicators |
Leader shuffle coup | 0.01 | 0.09 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011); Geddes et al. (2014) |
Regime change coup | 0.01 | 0.12 | 0 | 1 | Powell and Thyne (2011); Geddes et al. (2014) |
References
Biographies
Supplementary Material
Files in Data Supplement