External threats and political survival: Can dispute involvement deter coup attempts?
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Appendices
Variable | VIF | SQRT VIF | Tolerance | R2 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | MID, militarized action by home | 6.08 | 2.47 | 0.16 | 0.84 |
2 | MID, no militarized action by home | 2.05 | 1.43 | 0.49 | 0.51 |
3 | Number of past coup attempts | 1.31 | 1.15 | 0.76 | 0.24 |
4 | MID, favorable outcome for home | 1.59 | 1.26 | 0.63 | 0.37 |
5 | MID, unfavorable outcome for home | 1.23 | 1.11 | 0.81 | 0.19 |
6 | MID, other outcome for home | 6.46 | 2.54 | 0.15 | 0.85 |
7 | Civil conflict | 1.17 | 1.08 | 0.86 | 0.14 |
8 | Post-Cold War dummy | 1.13 | 1.06 | 0.89 | 0.11 |
9 | B–S coup risk score | 2.46 | 1.57 | 0.41 | 0.59 |
10 | Log real GDP per capita | 2.15 | 1.47 | 0.47 | 0.53 |
11 | Log population | 1.40 | 1.18 | 0.71 | 0.29 |
12 | Small island nation | 1.14 | 1.07 | 0.88 | 0.12 |
13 | Absolute latitude | 1.81 | 1.34 | 0.55 | 0.45 |
Mean VIF | 2.31 | ||||
Number of observations = 4766 | |||||
Variable | Eigenvalue | Condition index | |||
1 | 2.66 | 1.00 | |||
2 | 2.46 | 1.04 | |||
3 | 1.29 | 1.43 | |||
4 | 1.06 | 1.58 | |||
5 | 0.98 | 1.65 | |||
6 | 0.92 | 1.70 | |||
7 | 0.86 | 1.76 | |||
8 | 0.75 | 1.88 | |||
9 | 0.68 | 1.98 | |||
10 | 0.61 | 2.09 | |||
11 | 0.40 | 2.58 | |||
12 | 0.26 | 3.18 | |||
13 | 0.07 | 5.98 | |||
Condition number | 5.98 |
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
FE logit, dependent variable: At least one coup attempt (failed or successful) | ||||||
Number of included lags | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
MID, militarized action by home, t | −0.699† | −0.936** | ||||
(0.374) | (0.414) | |||||
MID, militarized action by home, t − 1 | −1.277*** | −1.297*** | −1.316*** | −1.316*** | −1.358*** | −1.140*** |
(0.375) | (0.386) | (0.390) | (0.390) | (0.402) | (0.422) | |
MID, militarized action by home, t − 2 | −0.180 | −0.176 | −0.188 | −0.081 | 0.197 | |
(0.349) | (0.359) | (0.360) | (0.367) | (0.397) | ||
MID, no militarized action by home, t | −0.588† | −0.761** | ||||
(0.318) | (0.357) | |||||
MID, no militarized action by home, t − 1 | −0.545† | −0.628† | −0.653** | −0.662** | −0.594† | −0.405 |
(0.320) | (0.326) | (0.330) | (0.330) | (0.338) | (0.358) | |
MID, no militarized action by home, t − 2 | 0.495† | 0.496† | 0.511† | 0.608** | 0.768** | |
(0.284) | (0.288) | (0.290) | (0.297) | (0.320) | ||
Civil conflict, t | 1.785*** | 1.683*** | ||||
(0.234) | (0.250) | |||||
Civil conflict, t − 1 | 0.727*** | 0.847*** | 0.828*** | 0.821*** | −0.069 | −0.166 |
(0.184) | (0.232) | (0.234) | (0.235) | (0.273) | (0.290) | |
Civil conflict, t − 2 | −0.201 | −0.347 | −0.359 | −0.537† | −0.564† | |
(0.243) | (0.276) | (0.279) | (0.286) | (0.303) | ||
Post-Cold War dummy | −0.323 | −0.180 | −0.109 | −0.107 | 0.039 | −0.393 |
(0.487) | (0.490) | (0.492) | (0.492) | (0.505) | (0.581) | |
B–S coup risk score | 0.101 | |||||
(0.066) | ||||||
Log real GDP per capita | −0.362 | |||||
(0.323) | ||||||
Log population | 1.257 | |||||
(0.964) | ||||||
Continent FEs + geographical controls | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Sample | Coup attempt | Coup attempt | Coup attempt | Global | Coup attempt | Coup attempt |
Observations | 3137 | 3137 | 3137 | 3137 | 3137 | 2757 |
Number of countries | 87 | 87 | 87 | 87 | 87 | 82 |
Pseudo R2 | 0.0442 | 0.0497 | 0.0538 | 0.0557 | 0.0939 | 0.0941 |
Log-likelihood | −814.1 | −809.4 | −805.9 | −804.3 | −771.8 | −686.3 |
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Pooled logit, dependent variable: At least one coup attempt (failed or successful) | |||||||
MID, militarized action by home | −0.832** | −0.825** | −0.886** | −0.934** | −0.838** | −0.845** | −1.008** |
(0.424) | (0.420) | (0.426) | (0.429) | (0.423) | (0.423) | (0.422) | |
MID, no militarized action by home | −0.055 | −0.035 | −0.104 | −0.171 | −0.053 | −0.054 | −0.201 |
(0.331) | (0.326) | (0.333) | (0.332) | (0.332) | (0.330) | (0.329) | |
Number of past coup attempts | 0.065** | 0.063** | 0.072** | 0.070** | 0.057** | 0.064** | 0.066** |
(0.027) | (0.027) | (0.028) | (0.029) | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.030) | |
Log military expenditure per capita (in 2005 $) | −0.043 | −0.031 | |||||
(0.088) | (0.096) | ||||||
Military personnel per capita | 11.413 | 9.496 | |||||
(14.025) | (15.682) | ||||||
Civilian regime | 0.075 | 0.280 | |||||
(0.825) | (0.888) | ||||||
Military regime | 0.487 | 0.639 | |||||
(0.827) | (0.882) | ||||||
Military–civilian regime | 0.060 | 0.232 | |||||
(0.824) | (0.870) | ||||||
Autocracy dummy | 0.008 | 0.079 | |||||
(0.245) | (0.262) | ||||||
Anocracy dummy | 0.591** | 0.647** | |||||
(0.244) | (0.257) | ||||||
Number of anti-government demonstrations | 0.027 | 0.025 | |||||
(0.043) | (0.046) | ||||||
Number of riots | 0.065** | 0.070** | |||||
(0.028) | (0.030) | ||||||
Number of general strikes | 0.208† | 0.207** | |||||
(0.107) | (0.105) | ||||||
British legal origin dummy | 0.444 | 0.343 | |||||
(0.439) | (0.477) | ||||||
French legal origin dummy | 0.579 | 0.506 | |||||
(0.444) | (0.488) | ||||||
Socialist legal origin dummy | 0.107 | 0.044 | |||||
(0.599) | (0.617) | ||||||
Ethnic fractionalization | 0.408 | 0.398 | |||||
(0.316) | (0.326) | ||||||
Religious fractionalization | −0.291 | −0.189 | |||||
(0.299) | (0.307) | ||||||
Marginal effect at means | −0.023 | −0.023 | −0.024 | −0.024 | −0.025 | −0.023 | −0.027 |
(0.011) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.010) | |
Implied percentage change in coup risk | −55% | −55% | −58% | −60% | −56% | −56% | −62% |
Remaining baseline controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Continent FE + geography | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year FE + cubic spline | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Sample | Global | Global | Global | Global | Global | Global | Global |
Observations | 4506 | 4506 | 4506 | 4506 | 4342 | 4506 | 4342 |
Pseudo R2 | 0.160 | 0.160 | 0.168 | 0.168 | 0.153 | 0.161 | 0.171 |
Log-likelihood | −890.7 | −890.4 | −882.2 | −881.8 | −888.4 | −889.7 | −869.9 |
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Pooled logit, dependent variable: At least one coup attempt (failed or successful) | ||||||
MID, militarized action by home | −0.958** | −0.948** | −0.906** | −0.898** | −0.919** | −0.891** |
(0.391) | (0.403) | (0.397) | (0.424) | (0.391) | (0.421) | |
MID, no militarized action by home | −0.551 | −0.183 | −0.531 | −0.166 | −0.479 | −0.114 |
(0.343) | (0.334) | (0.344) | (0.344) | (0.335) | (0.333) | |
Leader deposed by a foreign power | 1.156 | 1.663 | ||||
(0.766) | (1.066) | |||||
MID-related fatality (intermediate estimate), t | 0.001** | 0.001** | ||||
(0.001) | (0.001) | |||||
MID-related fatality (intermediate estimate), t − 1 | 0.001** | 0.001 | ||||
(0.001) | (0.001) | |||||
Number of past coup attempts | 0.183*** | 0.067** | 0.183*** | 0.063** | 0.183*** | 0.063** |
(0.020) | (0.027) | (0.020) | (0.027) | (0.021) | (0.026) | |
MID, favorable outcome for home | −0.635 | 0.062 | −0.662 | 0.023 | −0.778 | −0.108 |
(0.529) | (0.547) | (0.528) | (0.549) | (0.516) | (0.549) | |
MID, unfavorable outcome for home | 0.436 | 0.423 | 0.544 | 0.580 | 0.303 | 0.362 |
(0.454) | (0.508) | (0.438) | (0.488) | (0.421) | (0.465) | |
MID, other outcome for home | 0.837** | 0.756** | 0.793** | 0.721** | 0.728† | 0.655† |
(0.373) | (0.348) | (0.383) | (0.366) | (0.378) | (0.359) | |
Civil conflict | 0.394** | 0.397** | 0.389** | |||
(0.163) | (0.163) | (0.164) | ||||
Post-Cold War dummy | −0.220 | −0.270 | −0.283 | |||
(0.541) | (0.542) | (0.541) | ||||
B–S coup risk measure | 0.268*** | 0.277*** | 0.275*** | |||
(0.060) | (0.060) | (0.059) | ||||
Log real GDP per capita | −0.198** | −0.209** | −0.199** | |||
(0.081) | (0.085) | (0.085) | ||||
Log population | 0.003 | 0.010 | 0.003 | |||
(0.061) | (0.062) | (0.062) | ||||
Geography + continent FEs | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
Year FEs | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
Observations | 5590 | 4766 | 5576 | 4756 | 5576 | 4756 |
Pseudo R2 | 0.0429 | 0.156 | 0.0421 | 0.156 | 0.0448 | 0.158 |
Log-likelihood | −1258 | −968.2 | −1250 | −960.3 | −1246 | −958.3 |
Country | Number of coup attempts | Country | Number of coup attempts | Country | Number of coup attempts |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Iraq | 17 | Uganda | 5 | Czechoslovakia | 1 |
Argentina | 14 | Venezuela | 5 | East Timor | 1 |
Bolivia | 14 | Azerbaijan | 4 | Egypt | 1 |
Sudan | 14 | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 4 | Gabon | 1 |
Thailand | 14 | Dominican Republic | 4 | Georgia | 1 |
Chad | 13 | Gambia | 4 | India | 1 |
Burundi | 12 | Greece | 4 | Kenya | 1 |
Haiti | 12 | Indonesia | 4 | Kyrgyzstan | 1 |
Syria | 12 | Laos | 4 | Papua New Guinea | 1 |
Afghanistan | 11 | Madagascar | 4 | Poland | 1 |
Ghana | 11 | Mali | 4 | Russia | 1 |
Sierra Leone | 11 | Nepal | 4 | Rwanda | 1 |
Benin | 10 | Nicaragua | 4 | Senegal | 1 |
Cambodia | 10 | Niger | 4 | Swaziland | 1 |
Guatemala | 10 | Portugal | 4 | Tajikistan | 1 |
Togo | 10 | Somalia | 4 | Trinidad and Tobago | 1 |
Central African Republic | 9 | Yemen Arab Republic | 4 | Tunisia | 1 |
Comoros | 9 | Fiji | 3 | United Arab Emirates | 1 |
Congo | 9 | Libya | 3 | ||
Guinea–Bissau | 9 | Myanmar | 3 | Total | 498 |
Mauritania | 9 | Pakistan | 3 | ||
Bangladesh | 8 | Qatar | 3 | ||
Nigeria | 8 | Yemen People’s Republic | 3 | ||
Paraguay | 8 | Zambia | 3 | ||
Ecuador | 7 | Armenia | 2 | ||
Honduras | 7 | Brazil | 2 | ||
Ivory Coast | 7 | Chile | 2 | ||
Lesotho | 7 | Costa Rica | 2 | ||
Panama | 7 | Djibouti | 2 | ||
Peru | 7 | Morocco | 2 | ||
Republic of Vietnam | 7 | South Korea | 2 | ||
El Salvador | 6 | Spain | 2 | ||
Ethiopia | 6 | Tanzania | 2 | ||
Guinea | 6 | Albania | 1 | ||
Iran | 6 | Algeria | 1 | ||
Liberia | 6 | Angola | 1 | ||
Philippines | 6 | Bulgaria | 1 | ||
Burkina Faso | 5 | Cameroon | 1 | ||
Equatorial Guinea | 5 | Cuba | 1 | ||
Turkey | 5 | Cyprus | 1 |
Country | Number of coup attempts | Coup risk score | Country | Number of coup attempts | Coup risk score |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Yemen Arab Republic | 4 | 3.82 | Sierra Leone | 11 | 1.46 |
Tajikistan | 1 | 3.70 | Eritrea | 0 | 1.44 |
Guinea–Bissau | 5 | 3.16 | Uzbekistan | 0 | 1.41 |
Azerbaijan | 4 | 3.08 | Ethiopia | 6 | 1.39 |
Burundi | 10 | 2.99 | Iraq | 16 | 1.38 |
Laos | 4 | 2.86 | Gabon | 1 | 1.37 |
Comoros | 9 | 2.79 | Liberia | 6 | 1.36 |
Afghanistan | 10 | 2.77 | Oman | 0 | 1.31 |
Georgia | 0 | 2.74 | Peru | 6 | 1.29 |
Chad | 11 | 2.51 | Bhutan | 0 | 1.27 |
Yemen People’s Republic | 3 | 2.42 | El Salvador | 4 | 1.27 |
Cambodia | 10 | 2.39 | Guyana | 0 | 1.26 |
Turkmenistan | 0 | 2.32 | Djibouti | 2 | 1.26 |
Somalia | 4 | 2.31 | Ecuador | 6 | 1.25 |
Equatorial Guinea | 5 | 2.28 | Republic of Vietnam | 7 | 1.23 |
Central African Republic | 7 | 2.28 | Fiji | 2 | 1.20 |
Burkina Faso | 5 | 2.25 | Kazakhstan | 0 | 1.17 |
Sudan | 10 | 2.18 | Dominican Republic | 4 | 1.11 |
Kyrgyzstan | 0 | 2.06 | Armenia | 2 | 1.08 |
Rwanda | 1 | 2.02 | Libya | 3 | 1.07 |
Mauritania | 6 | 2.01 | Albania | 1 | 1.07 |
Honduras | 6 | 2.00 | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 2 | 1.03 |
Nigeria | 8 | 1.97 | Botswana | 0 | 1.02 |
Mali | 4 | 1.96 | Togo | 9 | 1.01 |
Qatar | 3 | 1.88 | Algeria | 1 | 1.01 |
Thailand | 7 | 1.84 | North Korea | 0 | 0.98 |
Moldova | 0 | 1.83 | Mongolia | 0 | 0.93 |
Congo | 9 | 1.80 | Pakistan | 3 | 0.91 |
Myanmar | 2 | 1.79 | Paraguay | 3 | 0.80 |
Niger | 4 | 1.73 | Nepal | 3 | 0.75 |
Lesotho | 6 | 1.70 | Zambia | 3 | 0.68 |
Guinea | 4 | 1.70 | Nicaragua | 3 | 0.67 |
Benin | 10 | 1.69 | Ivory Coast | 6 | 0.64 |
Uganda | 5 | 1.65 | Macedonia | 0 | 0.64 |
Haiti | 8 | 1.64 | Argentina | 10 | 0.62 |
Bolivia | 14 | 1.63 | Angola | 1 | 0.61 |
Ghana | 11 | 1.57 | Malawi | 0 | 0.57 |
Guatemala | 8 | 1.56 | Cameroon | 1 | 0.56 |
Bangladesh | 7 | 1.53 | Bahrain | 0 | 0.53 |
Swaziland | 1 | 1.52 | |||
Syria | 8 | 1.50 | Total | 356 | |
Belarus | 0 | 1.48 |
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