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First published online October 15, 2014

External threats and political survival: Can dispute involvement deter coup attempts?

Abstract

Diversionary war theory holds that insecure leaders are more likely to pursue aggressive foreign policies than their more secure counterparts. This hypothesis rests on the premise that interstate dispute involvement helps leaders deter potential challenges against their rule. We offer strong support for this premise by looking at coup attempts. Cross-national time-series evidence from interstate dispute participation over the period 1960–2000 indicates that a country in a militarized confrontation with another state is about 60% less likely to experience a coup attempt in the subsequent year. Consistent with our hypothesis, we establish that it is mainly militarized involvement in disputes, rather than non-militarized involvement, that is associated with lower coup likelihood. The results are robust to controlling for a wide set of potential correlates of coups and remain qualitatively intact when we focus entirely on within-country variations in coup attempts and interstate disputes.

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Appendices

Figure A1. AUC scores for the in-sample and out-of-sample predictive power.
Notes: The AUC scores are the areas under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves corresponding to various logit models. In each graph, the leftmost circle denotes the AUC score of the baseline logit specification reported in column (9) of Table 2. The branches on the right correspond to AUC scores of the modified models that omit from the baseline specification one by one each of the above listed independent variables. Following Ward et al. (2010), we compute the out-of-sample AUC scores in panel (B) using a 4-fold cross-validation analysis. First, the regression sample is randomly divided into four partitions of equal size. Then on a rotating basis, three of the partitions (training sample) are used to estimate the model while the fourth one (test partition) is used to assess the predictive success. This cycle is repeated 10 times each time with a new random partitioning. The scores that are reported are the average of the resulting 40 AUC scores. In both panels, the labels for those variables whose AUC scores were tightly clustered cannot be shown in a legible way. Hence, those labels are are not shown in the figures.
Table A1. Collinearity diagnostics for the regressors in the baseline model
  Variable VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R2
1 MID, militarized action by home 6.08 2.47 0.16 0.84
2 MID, no militarized action by home 2.05 1.43 0.49 0.51
3 Number of past coup attempts 1.31 1.15 0.76 0.24
4 MID, favorable outcome for home 1.59 1.26 0.63 0.37
5 MID, unfavorable outcome for home 1.23 1.11 0.81 0.19
6 MID, other outcome for home 6.46 2.54 0.15 0.85
7 Civil conflict 1.17 1.08 0.86 0.14
8 Post-Cold War dummy 1.13 1.06 0.89 0.11
9 B–S coup risk score 2.46 1.57 0.41 0.59
10 Log real GDP per capita 2.15 1.47 0.47 0.53
11 Log population 1.40 1.18 0.71 0.29
12 Small island nation 1.14 1.07 0.88 0.12
13 Absolute latitude 1.81 1.34 0.55 0.45
           
  Mean VIF 2.31      
Number of observations = 4766      
    Variable Eigenvalue Condition index  
    1 2.66 1.00  
    2 2.46 1.04  
    3 1.29 1.43  
    4 1.06 1.58  
    5 0.98 1.65  
    6 0.92 1.70  
    7 0.86 1.76  
    8 0.75 1.88  
    9 0.68 1.98  
    10 0.61 2.09  
    11 0.40 2.58  
    12 0.26 3.18  
    13 0.07 5.98  
    Condition number 5.98  
Table A2. Within-country variation in militarized interstate dispute participation and the timing of coup attempts
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
  FE logit, dependent variable: At least one coup attempt (failed or successful)
Number of included lags 1 2 3 4 4 4
             
MID, militarized action by home, t         −0.699 −0.936**
          (0.374) (0.414)
MID, militarized action by home, t − 1 −1.277*** −1.297*** −1.316*** −1.316*** −1.358*** −1.140***
  (0.375) (0.386) (0.390) (0.390) (0.402) (0.422)
MID, militarized action by home, t − 2   −0.180 −0.176 −0.188 −0.081 0.197
    (0.349) (0.359) (0.360) (0.367) (0.397)
MID, no militarized action by home, t         −0.588 −0.761**
          (0.318) (0.357)
MID, no militarized action by home, t − 1 −0.545 −0.628 −0.653** −0.662** −0.594 −0.405
  (0.320) (0.326) (0.330) (0.330) (0.338) (0.358)
MID, no militarized action by home, t − 2   0.495 0.496 0.511 0.608** 0.768**
    (0.284) (0.288) (0.290) (0.297) (0.320)
Civil conflict, t         1.785*** 1.683***
          (0.234) (0.250)
Civil conflict, t − 1 0.727*** 0.847*** 0.828*** 0.821*** −0.069 −0.166
  (0.184) (0.232) (0.234) (0.235) (0.273) (0.290)
Civil conflict, t − 2   −0.201 −0.347 −0.359 −0.537 −0.564
    (0.243) (0.276) (0.279) (0.286) (0.303)
Post-Cold War dummy −0.323 −0.180 −0.109 −0.107 0.039 −0.393
  (0.487) (0.490) (0.492) (0.492) (0.505) (0.581)
B–S coup risk score           0.101
            (0.066)
Log real GDP per capita           −0.362
            (0.323)
Log population           1.257
            (0.964)
Continent FEs + geographical controls
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Coup attempt Coup attempt Coup attempt Global Coup attempt Coup attempt
Observations 3137 3137 3137 3137 3137 2757
Number of countries 87 87 87 87 87 82
Pseudo R2 0.0442 0.0497 0.0538 0.0557 0.0939 0.0941
Log-likelihood −814.1 −809.4 −805.9 −804.3 −771.8 −686.3
Notes: (1) All the columns are estimated with logit fixed effects (FE) estimator and include year dummies. (2) The time subscript “t” next to variable names denote contemporary values, while “t − k” stands for k-year lagged values of variables.
The variables that are lagged by more than 2 years are not shown. None of the estimated coefficients on these variables are significant. (3) All regression include the set of MID outcome dummies that correspond to the particular lag structureused in each column. The estimated coefficients on these controls are not shown for the sake of brevity and available upon request. (4) The Online Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. (5) Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the *** 1%, ** 5% and † 10% level.
Table A3. MID participation and coup attempts—robustness to additional controls
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
  Pooled logit, dependent variable: At least one coup attempt (failed or successful)
MID, militarized action by home −0.832** −0.825** −0.886** −0.934** −0.838** −0.845** −1.008**
  (0.424) (0.420) (0.426) (0.429) (0.423) (0.423) (0.422)
MID, no militarized action by home −0.055 −0.035 −0.104 −0.171 −0.053 −0.054 −0.201
  (0.331) (0.326) (0.333) (0.332) (0.332) (0.330) (0.329)
Number of past coup attempts 0.065** 0.063** 0.072** 0.070** 0.057** 0.064** 0.066**
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030)
Log military expenditure per capita (in 2005 $)   −0.043         −0.031
    (0.088)         (0.096)
Military personnel per capita   11.413         9.496
    (14.025)         (15.682)
Civilian regime     0.075       0.280
      (0.825)       (0.888)
Military regime     0.487       0.639
      (0.827)       (0.882)
Military–civilian regime     0.060       0.232
      (0.824)       (0.870)
Autocracy dummy     0.008       0.079
      (0.245)       (0.262)
Anocracy dummy     0.591**       0.647**
      (0.244)       (0.257)
Number of anti-government demonstrations       0.027     0.025
        (0.043)     (0.046)
Number of riots       0.065**     0.070**
        (0.028)     (0.030)
Number of general strikes       0.208     0.207**
        (0.107)     (0.105)
British legal origin dummy         0.444   0.343
          (0.439)   (0.477)
French legal origin dummy         0.579   0.506
          (0.444)   (0.488)
Socialist legal origin dummy         0.107   0.044
          (0.599)   (0.617)
Ethnic fractionalization           0.408 0.398
            (0.316) (0.326)
Religious fractionalization           −0.291 −0.189
            (0.299) (0.307)
Marginal effect at means −0.023 −0.023 −0.024 −0.024 −0.025 −0.023 −0.027
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
Implied percentage change in coup risk −55% −55% −58% −60% −56% −56% −62%
Remaining baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE + geography Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE + cubic spline Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Global Global Global Global Global Global Global
Observations 4506 4506 4506 4506 4342 4506 4342
Pseudo R2 0.160 0.160 0.168 0.168 0.153 0.161 0.171
Log-likelihood −890.7 −890.4 −882.2 −881.8 −888.4 −889.7 −869.9
Notes: (1) All regressions include the baseline covariates in addition to those reported in the table. These are the number of past coup attempts, MID outcome dummies, a dummy for civil conflict incidence, post-Cold war dummy, B–S structural coup risk score, income per capita, population, dummy for small island nations and absolute latitude. (2) Cubic splines contain linear, quadratic and cubic terms on the number of years since the last coup attempt. (3) The Online Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. (4) Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the country dimension. Statistical significance at the *** 1%, ** 5% and † 10% level.
Table A4. MID participation and coup attempts—addressing alternative explanations
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
  Pooled logit, dependent variable: At least one coup attempt (failed or successful)
MID, militarized action by home −0.958** −0.948** −0.906** −0.898** −0.919** −0.891**
  (0.391) (0.403) (0.397) (0.424) (0.391) (0.421)
MID, no militarized action by home −0.551 −0.183 −0.531 −0.166 −0.479 −0.114
  (0.343) (0.334) (0.344) (0.344) (0.335) (0.333)
Leader deposed by a foreign power 1.156 1.663        
  (0.766) (1.066)        
MID-related fatality (intermediate estimate), t         0.001** 0.001**
          (0.001) (0.001)
MID-related fatality (intermediate estimate), t − 1         0.001** 0.001
          (0.001) (0.001)
Number of past coup attempts 0.183*** 0.067** 0.183*** 0.063** 0.183*** 0.063**
  (0.020) (0.027) (0.020) (0.027) (0.021) (0.026)
MID, favorable outcome for home −0.635 0.062 −0.662 0.023 −0.778 −0.108
  (0.529) (0.547) (0.528) (0.549) (0.516) (0.549)
MID, unfavorable outcome for home 0.436 0.423 0.544 0.580 0.303 0.362
  (0.454) (0.508) (0.438) (0.488) (0.421) (0.465)
MID, other outcome for home 0.837** 0.756** 0.793** 0.721** 0.728 0.655
  (0.373) (0.348) (0.383) (0.366) (0.378) (0.359)
Civil conflict   0.394**   0.397**   0.389**
    (0.163)   (0.163)   (0.164)
Post-Cold War dummy   −0.220   −0.270   −0.283
    (0.541)   (0.542)   (0.541)
B–S coup risk measure   0.268***   0.277***   0.275***
    (0.060)   (0.060)   (0.059)
Log real GDP per capita   −0.198**   −0.209**   −0.199**
    (0.081)   (0.085)   (0.085)
Log population   0.003   0.010   0.003
    (0.061)   (0.062)   (0.062)
Geography + continent FEs No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year FEs No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 5590 4766 5576 4756 5576 4756
Pseudo R2 0.0429 0.156 0.0421 0.156 0.0448 0.158
Log-likelihood −1258 −968.2 −1250 −960.3 −1246 −958.3
Table A5. The 98 countries in the coup attempt sample (1946–2009)
Country Number of coup attempts Country Number of coup attempts Country Number of coup attempts
Iraq 17 Uganda 5 Czechoslovakia 1
Argentina 14 Venezuela 5 East Timor 1
Bolivia 14 Azerbaijan 4 Egypt 1
Sudan 14 Democratic Republic of the Congo 4 Gabon 1
Thailand 14 Dominican Republic 4 Georgia 1
Chad 13 Gambia 4 India 1
Burundi 12 Greece 4 Kenya 1
Haiti 12 Indonesia 4 Kyrgyzstan 1
Syria 12 Laos 4 Papua New Guinea 1
Afghanistan 11 Madagascar 4 Poland 1
Ghana 11 Mali 4 Russia 1
Sierra Leone 11 Nepal 4 Rwanda 1
Benin 10 Nicaragua 4 Senegal 1
Cambodia 10 Niger 4 Swaziland 1
Guatemala 10 Portugal 4 Tajikistan 1
Togo 10 Somalia 4 Trinidad and Tobago 1
Central African Republic 9 Yemen Arab Republic 4 Tunisia 1
Comoros 9 Fiji 3 United Arab Emirates 1
Congo 9 Libya 3    
Guinea–Bissau 9 Myanmar 3 Total 498
Mauritania 9 Pakistan 3    
Bangladesh 8 Qatar 3    
Nigeria 8 Yemen People’s Republic 3    
Paraguay 8 Zambia 3    
Ecuador 7 Armenia 2    
Honduras 7 Brazil 2    
Ivory Coast 7 Chile 2    
Lesotho 7 Costa Rica 2    
Panama 7 Djibouti 2    
Peru 7 Morocco 2    
Republic of Vietnam 7 South Korea 2    
El Salvador 6 Spain 2    
Ethiopia 6 Tanzania 2    
Guinea 6 Albania 1    
Iran 6 Algeria 1    
Liberia 6 Angola 1    
Philippines 6 Bulgaria 1    
Burkina Faso 5 Cameroon 1    
Equatorial Guinea 5 Cuba 1    
Turkey 5 Cyprus 1    
Table A6. The 81 countries in the high-coup-risk sample (1960–2000)
Country Number of coup attempts Coup risk score Country Number of coup attempts Coup risk score
Yemen Arab Republic 4 3.82 Sierra Leone 11 1.46
Tajikistan 1 3.70 Eritrea 0 1.44
Guinea–Bissau 5 3.16 Uzbekistan 0 1.41
Azerbaijan 4 3.08 Ethiopia 6 1.39
Burundi 10 2.99 Iraq 16 1.38
Laos 4 2.86 Gabon 1 1.37
Comoros 9 2.79 Liberia 6 1.36
Afghanistan 10 2.77 Oman 0 1.31
Georgia 0 2.74 Peru 6 1.29
Chad 11 2.51 Bhutan 0 1.27
Yemen People’s Republic 3 2.42 El Salvador 4 1.27
Cambodia 10 2.39 Guyana 0 1.26
Turkmenistan 0 2.32 Djibouti 2 1.26
Somalia 4 2.31 Ecuador 6 1.25
Equatorial Guinea 5 2.28 Republic of Vietnam 7 1.23
Central African Republic 7 2.28 Fiji 2 1.20
Burkina Faso 5 2.25 Kazakhstan 0 1.17
Sudan 10 2.18 Dominican Republic 4 1.11
Kyrgyzstan 0 2.06 Armenia 2 1.08
Rwanda 1 2.02 Libya 3 1.07
Mauritania 6 2.01 Albania 1 1.07
Honduras 6 2.00 Democratic Republic of the Congo 2 1.03
Nigeria 8 1.97 Botswana 0 1.02
Mali 4 1.96 Togo 9 1.01
Qatar 3 1.88 Algeria 1 1.01
Thailand 7 1.84 North Korea 0 0.98
Moldova 0 1.83 Mongolia 0 0.93
Congo 9 1.80 Pakistan 3 0.91
Myanmar 2 1.79 Paraguay 3 0.80
Niger 4 1.73 Nepal 3 0.75
Lesotho 6 1.70 Zambia 3 0.68
Guinea 4 1.70 Nicaragua 3 0.67
Benin 10 1.69 Ivory Coast 6 0.64
Uganda 5 1.65 Macedonia 0 0.64
Haiti 8 1.64 Argentina 10 0.62
Bolivia 14 1.63 Angola 1 0.61
Ghana 11 1.57 Malawi 0 0.57
Guatemala 8 1.56 Cameroon 1 0.56
Bangladesh 7 1.53 Bahrain 0 0.53
Swaziland 1 1.52      
Syria 8 1.50 Total 356  
Belarus 0 1.48      

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Article first published online: October 15, 2014
Issue published: April 2016

Keywords

  1. Civil–military relations
  2. coup
  3. diversionary war theory
  4. external threats
  5. interstate disputes
  6. political instability

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Affiliations

Cemal Eren Arbatli
National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia
Ekim Arbatli
National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia

Notes

Cemal Eren Arbatli, National Research University–Higher School of Economics, Faculty of Economics, 26 Shabolovka Street, Building 3, 3116A, Moscow, Russia. Email: [email protected]

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This article was published in Conflict Management and Peace Science.

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