Canadian Defence Procurement — updated and revised January 2004 Politics, Procurement Practices, and Procrastination:
the Quarter-Century Sea King Helicopter Replacement Saga Part 3 — “... Slide! ...” – or – Air Command Listens to its ‘Power Animal’
When Canada’s armed forces were unified in 1968, the ‘air element’ found itself operating disparate helicopter types having inherited Sea Kings from the Navy  and twin-rotored Boeing-Vertol CH-113As from the Army. Both types were aging and the Air Force was presented with the unpalatable options faced by all other operators of these helicopters. Option number one was to place follow-on orders [1] for additional CH-124s and CH-113s, allowing for the inevitable attrition as well as the reduction of flight hours that comes with aging airframes requiring increased maintenance. Option number two was to rationalize the helicopter fleet, replacing both existing types with a single new model. Such an aircraft would have to be able to perform both the CH-124’s ASW role and the CH-113’s search-and-rescue missions.
Predictably, the Air Force didn’t move on either option in 1978. As always, other procurement plans had priority – at the time, new fighters and long-range patrol aircraft. And, perhaps, Air Force planners believed that they had time to spare for replacing those aging helicopters. Whatever the reason, the proposed Sea King replacement remained a distinct project and was given a rather low priority. After all, hadn’t the entire CH-124 fleet just been through a thorough structural rebuild and been re-fitted with the latest in Canadian ASW equipment. What’s the rush?
 After 6 years of studies, DND began issuing contracts[1] for the ‘Sea King Replacement Project’ in 1983. These contracts were not for new shipboard helicopters despite the looming 20th birthdays of the Sea Kings. Instead, DND would spend $50M developing avionics – mostly ASW-related gear – for a new helicopter type as yet unidentified. This approach may seem back-to-front but, planners knew that developing first- rate ASW kit would take time. And at the time, Canada had a justifiable reputation as a world leader in ASW technology. Both Canada’s Navy and its defence industry wanted to maintain that reputation. What DND couldn’t anticipate was just how rapidly the state-of-the-art would change for all electronic equipment – including anti-submarine warfare gear – in the coming computer age.
[1] These contracts were issued by Jean-Jacques Blais, the Minister of National Defence in the dying days of the last Trudeau government. In 1999, Blais became a paid lobbyist for MHP contender Thomson Marconi (now Thales Underwater).
< Part 2 — In the Beginning ... the Search for a Sea King Replacement
> Part 4 — the New Shipboard Aircraft (NSA) Project
|
