

# Appendix I: NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces in Europe—Data Published by the Two Alliances

Type	NATO Estimates <sup>a</sup>		WTO Estimates <sup>b</sup>	
	NATO	WTO	NATO	WTO
Personnel	2,213,593 <sup>c</sup>	3,090,000	3,660,200	3,573,100 <sup>d</sup>
Combat aircraft	3,977 <sup>e</sup>	8,250	7,130	7,876 <sup>f</sup>
Total strike aircraft	NA	NA	4,075	2,783 <sup>g</sup>
Helicopters	2,419 <sup>h</sup>	3,700	5,270	2,785 <sup>i</sup>
Tactical missile launchers	NA	NA	136	1,608
Tanks	16,424 <sup>j</sup>	51,500	30,690	59,470 <sup>k</sup>
Anti-tank weapons	18,240 <sup>l</sup>	44,200	18,070	11,465 <sup>m</sup>
Armored infantry fighting vehicles	4,153 <sup>n</sup>	22,400	46,900	70,330 <sup>p</sup>
Artillery	14,458 <sup>q</sup>	43,400	57,060	71,560 <sup>r</sup>
Other armored vehicles	35,351 <sup>s</sup>	71,000		
Armored vehicle launch bridges	454 <sup>t</sup>	2,550		
Air defense systems	10,309 <sup>u</sup>	24,400		
Submarines			200	228 <sup>v</sup>
Submarines—nuclear powered			76	80
Large surface ships			499	102 <sup>w</sup>
Aircraft-carrying ships			15	2
Aircraft-carrying ships armed with cruise missiles			274	23
Amphibious warfare ships			84	24 <sup>x</sup>

Sources: <sup>a</sup> *Conventional Forces in Europe: The Facts*, November, 1988.

<sup>b</sup> "Warsaw Pact Releases Figures on Force Strengths," *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Soviet Union*, January 30, 1989, pp. 1–8.

## Notes for Data Published by the Alliances

The following explanatory notes may be helpful to explain differences in the data presented by the two alliances caused by differences of definition:

<sup>c</sup> "Covers full-time military personnel of land forces, including Army personnel who perform ground-based air defence duties. Also included are

command and general support troops and other ministry of defence troops. Paramilitary forces are excluded.”

<sup>d</sup> WTO definition: “Total of armed forces in Europe and adjoining waters.”

<sup>e</sup> Includes: F-16, F-4, F-5, NF-5, F-104, F-100, F-18, CF-18, F-111, F-35/RF-35, T-2E, A-7/TA-7, A-10, Alphajet, G-91, Buccaneer, Harrier, Jaguar, Mirage F1/3/5, Tornado, F-15, Mirage 2000, Lightning, RF-4, TR-1, C-212, PD808, EF-111, EC-130H, DC-8, Sarigue, C-160 Gabriel, RF-5, RF-16, RF-84, Hunter and Canberra for NATO. NATO has 530 combat aircraft in storage.

MiG-15, MiG-17, MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-25, MiG-27, MiG-29, MiG-31, Su-7, Su-15, Su-17, Su-22, Su-24, Su-25, Su-27, Yak-28, Yak-28P, L-29, L-39, IL-28, AN-12, Tu-16, Tu-22, Tu-128 and Tu-22M for WTO. Also included is the Tu-22M (Backfire) land-based naval aircraft.

Excluded in the figures given are combat-capable training aircraft: 530 for NATO and 5,700 for WTO.

<sup>f</sup> WTO classification: “Combat aircraft of front-line (tactical) Air Force aviation and Air Defense forces and naval aviation.” Types include: fighter-bombers (Buccaneer, Tornado, F-111, Mirage 5, F-4, F-15, F-16, F-18, Jaguar, Mirage III, F-104, Mirage 2000, F-100, F-35 Draken, F-5, F-84, and G-91), ground attack aircraft (A-7, A-10, Harrier, and Alphajet), fighters (F-16, Tornado, Mirage 2000, F-4, F-104, Mirage F-1, F-5), Air Defense Forces fighter-interceptors (Lightning), reconnaissance and electronic warfare aircraft (EF-111, RF-4, Tornado, Jaguar, Mirage F-IR, RF-5, Mirage IIIR, RF-16, Nimrod, Orion P-3, G-91, RF-104, RF-84, EC-130, DC-8, Canberra, and Shackleton), naval aviation (A-4, A-6, A-7, F/A-18, Sea Harrier, AV-8, Etendard, Super Etendard, F-4, Tornado, F-104, F-14, Crusader, ASW aircraft, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare planes), and combat support aircraft for NATO.

Front-line bombers (Su-24), fighter-bombers (Su-22, Su-76, Su-17, MiG-27), ground-attack aircraft (Su-25), fighters (MiG-29, MiG-23, MiG-21, Su-27), Air Defense forces fighter interceptors (MiG-31, MiG-25, Su-27, Su-15, Tu-128, Yak-28), reconnaissance and electronic warfare planes (MiG-25, MiG-21, Su-17, Su-24, Yak-28), naval aviation (Tu-16, Tu-22, Tu-142, Il-38, Be-12, Yak-38, Su-17, MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-29, Su-27) for WTO.

<sup>g</sup> Includes: bombers, fighter-bombers, ground-attack aircraft within front-line (tactical) Air Force aviation aircraft and naval aviation aircraft.

<sup>h</sup> Includes: attack helicopters equipped with anti-tank guided missiles and machine guns and assault/transport helicopters. Not included in the given NATO figure are 180 helicopters held in storage.

<sup>i</sup> WTO definition: “Combat helicopters, including naval.” Types include: gunships (Apache, Huey Cobra, Cobra-TOW, Bo-105P, Lynx, Mangusta, and Gazelle), multi-role (Iroquois, Black Hawk, Bo-105M, Alouette, Lynx, AB-204, AB-205, AB-206 and AB-212), reconnaissance (Kaiowa, Gazelle, Alouette), assault transport and specialized (Puma, EH-IH, and EH-60), Navy helicopters (Sea King, Wessex, Lynx, Super Frelon, Alouette, AB-212, Sea Cobra, Sea Stallion, Sea Hawk, and Iroquois) for NATO and gunship

(Mi-24), assault transport (Mi-8), reconnaissance and force adjustment [razvedka i korrekcirovka] (Mi-24 and Mi-8), electronic warfare (Mi-8), and Navy helicopters (Ka-25, Ka-27, Ka-29, and Mi-14) for WTO.

<sup>j</sup> Includes: Challenger, M-1, Leopard I and II, AMX-30, M-60, Chieftain, Centurion, M-47 and M-48 for NATO and T-80, T-72, T-62, T-64, T-55/54 and T-10/10M for WTO. Not included in the given NATO figure are 5,800 tanks held in storage.

<sup>k</sup> WTO definition: "All types of tanks with which the Warsaw Pact and NATO are equipped."

<sup>l</sup> Includes vehicle mounted and non-vehicle mounted anti-tank guided missile launchers, anti-tank guns and recoilless rifles. Armored fighting vehicles and helicopters whose primary purpose is not anti-tank but which are equipped with anti-tank guided missiles are also covered. Not included in the figure are NATO's 2,700 anti-tank weapons held in storage.

<sup>m</sup> WTO defines this category as: "Antitank missile complexes." Includes: "ATGM combat vehicles of frontline, army, divisional, and regimental echelon and portable systems of the battalion echelon" for WTO and "systems similar in terms of designation and characteristics" for NATO.

<sup>n</sup> Includes: Marder, AMX-10P, M-2 (Bradley) and YPR-765 (25 mm) for NATO and BMP-1/2 and BMD1 for WTO. Not included in the given NATO figure are 575 AIFV held in storage.

<sup>p</sup> WTO definition: "Infantry combat vehicles and armored transports"; includes "infantry combat vehicles, armored personnel carriers, combat assault vehicles, combat reconnaissance patrol vehicles, and combat reconnaissance vehicles," yet excludes light tanks from this category.

<sup>q</sup> Includes: artillery, mortars, and multiple rocket launchers with tubes of 100 mm and above. Not included in the given figure are 2,870 artillery pieces held in storage.

<sup>r</sup> WTO includes much smaller armaments in the definition of this category: "Rocket propelled salvo-fired systems, field pieces (75 mm and above), and mortars (50 mm and above)."

<sup>s</sup> Includes: light tanks, armored personnel carriers, armored command vehicles and military support carriers that are not covered in the preceding category. Not included in the given figure are 7,560 Armored Vehicles held in storage.

<sup>t</sup> Includes assault bridges mounted as an integrated system on armored carriers. Not included in the given figure are 160 Armored Vehicle Launch Bridges held in storage.

<sup>u</sup> Includes anti-aircraft artillery and fixed and mobile surface-to-air missiles. Not included in the given figure are 770 Air Defense Systems held in storage.

<sup>v</sup> Excludes submarines armed with strategic ballistic missiles.

<sup>w</sup> Includes aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, amphibious warfare ships with a displacement of 1,200 tons and over.

<sup>x</sup> Includes those with a displacement of 1,200 tons and over.

# Appendix II: NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces in Europe—Data Published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies

	<i>NATO guidelines</i>		<i>Jaruzelski Area<sup>b</sup></i>		<i>Atlantic to Urals</i>		<i>Global</i>	
	<i>NATO<sup>c</sup></i>	<i>WP</i>	<i>NATO<sup>c</sup></i>	<i>WP</i>	<i>NATO<sup>c</sup></i>	<i>WP</i>	<i>NATO<sup>c</sup></i>	<i>WP</i>
<b>1. Land/Air Manpower (000)</b>								
Total active ground forces <sup>d</sup>	786	995	803	1,137	2,340	2,143	3,197	2,744
Total ground force reserves <sup>e</sup>	1,167	1,030	1,222	1,157	4,543	4,239	5,710	5,340
<b>Divisions<sup>f</sup></b>								
Manned in peacetime <sup>g</sup>	29½	49½	31½	58	105½	101½	125	127½
Manned on mobilization of reserves <sup>h</sup>	10½	12	12½	14	36	113	54½	158
Total war mobilized	40½	61½	44½	72	141½	214½	179½	285½
<b>Ground Force Equipment<sup>i</sup></b>								
Main battle tanks	12,800	18,800	13,000	21,300	22,200	53,000	33,600	68,900
MICV <sup>j</sup>	4,400	8,700	4,400	9,800	6,200	23,600	9,900	31,400
Artillery (incl MRL) <sup>k</sup>	3,100	11,100	3,500	12,200	10,600	36,000	17,000	48,700
Mor (120 mm and over)	1,100	2,100	1,200	2,400	2,900	8,300	2,900	11,700

ATGW, ground-based <sup>l</sup>	6,200	2,650	6,300	3,100	11,000	13,700	28,300	22,400
AA guns <sup>m</sup>	3,100	2,200	3,200	2,400	9,000	11,000	9,900	14,100
SAM <sup>m</sup>	1,100	2,600	1,200	3,000	2,400	12,400	3,400	15,500
Armed hel <sup>n</sup>	516	545	516	635	864	1,220	3,208	2,105
Land Combat Aircraft <sup>o</sup>								
Bombers <sup>p</sup>	84	225	84	225	350	888	489	1,020
FGA/CAS	978	915	1,017	1,005	2,865	2,330	4,895	3,180
Air defence/fighters <sup>q</sup>	309	1,422	347	1,737	1,178	4,432	2,861	5,755
<i>European/Atlantic waters</i>								
<i>Global</i>								
	NATO	WP	NATO	WP	NATO	WP	NATO	WP
2. Maritime								
Naval Forces								
Submarines <sup>r</sup>	206				190		241	272
Carriers <sup>s</sup>	15				2		22	4
Battleships/cruisers <sup>t</sup>	23				24		46	36
Destroyers/frigates <sup>u</sup>	327				193		435	257
Amphibious <sup>v</sup>	69				84		107	117
Naval Air <sup>w</sup>								
Bombers					286			400
Attack	433						899	
Air defence/fighter	161				188		347	290
ASW fixed-wing ac	232				137		700	219
ASW hel	349				274		704	387

Source: The International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1988-1989* (London: IISS, 1988) pp. 236-7.

*Notes by IISS:*

- <sup>a</sup> The territories of FRG, the Benelux countries, GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia.
- <sup>b</sup> NGA plus territory of Denmark and Hungary.
- <sup>c</sup> French and Spanish forces are not part of NATO's integrated military command, but are included in relevant totals.
- <sup>d</sup> Ground Forces exclude paramilitary forces, such as border guards and security troops, though these include formations of up to divisional size, hold heavy equipment and would probably fulfil some rear area security functions in war. Warsaw Pact figures could also be increased considerably by the inclusion of a proportion of the men forming railroad, construction, Kommandatura etc. troops. Marines and Naval Infantry have been included, but troops manning air-defence units, when these are part of an Air Force or a separate service, are not.
- <sup>e</sup> Normally only men within 5 years of their active service period are included, unless a country entry specifies a different parameter. Home Guard manpower has not been included.
- <sup>f</sup> Divisions are not a standard formation between armies; manpower and equipment totals vary considerably. For the purposes of this table we have counted divisional equivalents as being either 3 manoeuvre brigades (normally of 3 battalions plus some supporting units) or 4 regiments (normally groups of battalions of infantry or armour only).
- <sup>g</sup> Includes all Soviet and WP Category A and B divisions and NATO formations manned at over 50% of war establishment.
- <sup>h</sup> Comprises only forces mobilized within the relevant geographical area. North American-based US and Canadian forces earmarked for reinforcement of Europe are shown under the 'Global' heading.
- <sup>i</sup> Totals include all known stocks of material whether manned by active or reserve forces, held as maintenance reserves, or in prepositioned sets (POMCUS). It should be noted that information on WP reserve holdings is much more limited than for NATO and the relevant figures much lower. This may be at least in part accounted for by the WP operational practice of replacing spent divisions by follow-on echelons rather than topping them up from reserve stocks.
- <sup>j</sup> MICV comprise all armoured wheeled or tracked infantry fighting vehicles armed with a cannon of not less than 20mm calibre.
- <sup>k</sup> ATK guns have not been included with artillery this year.
- <sup>l</sup> ATGW proliferation presents particular difficulties for realistic counting rules. The figures shown are estimated aggregates of all dismounted ATGW and those vehicle-mounted weapons with a primary ATK role. Soviet Category 3 divisions have been assumed to hold full scales.
- Totals exclude ATGW on MICV (e.g., M-2/-3 Bradley BMP BMD) or fired by main battle tank main armament (e.g., T-80) and do not, therefore, represent total available ATGW for either side. The substantial reduction in WP numbers from those presented in *The Military Balance 1987-1988* reflects a revised estimate of the TO & E for BMP-equipped regiments together with an increase in the numbers of such regiments in GSVG.

<sup>m</sup> SAM launchers exclude shoulder-launched weapons (e.g., *Javelin*, *Blowpipe*, *Stinger*, SA-7/-14/-16). Air Force and separate Air Defence force SAM and AA guns are included.

<sup>n</sup> Comprises all helicopters whose primary function is close air support or anti-tank. IISS date no longer allows us confidently to discriminate between categories for aggregation purposes. Moreover, some can readily reconfigure between roles.

<sup>o</sup> Totals include OCU and training aircraft of the same type as those in front-line squadrons.

<sup>p</sup> Long-range strategic bombers have been excluded (e.g., B-1, B-52, Tu-95, Mya-4 and *Mirage IVP*).

<sup>q</sup> Comprises aircraft with the capability (weapons, avionics, performance) to engage in aerial combat. Dual-role aircraft with a ground-attack capability are included in the FGA category unless specified in the national entry as belonging to an AD unit.

<sup>r</sup> Excludes only SSB and SBN.

<sup>s</sup> The difference in the totals from the figures given in *The Military Balance 1987-88* can be accounted for by the changed rules for designating warships. See pp. 7-8.

<sup>t</sup> Only amphibious ships (i.e., over both 1,000 tonnes full-load displacement and 60 metres overall length) are included.

# Appendix III: NATO and Warsaw Pact Air Forces in Central Europe

## A. Overall Aircraft in Europe

<i>Reduction Area</i>		<i>Warsaw Pact (current)</i>	<i>NATO</i>
Atlantic to the Urals	Ground attack	2570 (+ 400) <sup>a</sup>	2881 (+ 1034) <sup>b</sup> (+ 18) <sup>c</sup>
	Fighter-interceptor	2620 (+ 970) <sup>c</sup>	1245 (+ 216) <sup>b</sup>
		5190 (+ 1370)	4126 (+ 1268)
Central Europe Extended	Ground attack	1445 (+ 180) <sup>d</sup> (+ 400) <sup>a</sup>	1655 (+ 1034) <sup>b</sup> (+ 18) <sup>c</sup>
	Fighter-interceptor	1975 (+ 970) <sup>c</sup>	787 (+ 216) <sup>b</sup>
		3420 (+ 1550)	2442 (+ 1268)

*Source:* Edward Warner, "Approaches to Conventional Arms Reductions," *Conventional Arms Control and East-West Security*, F. Stephen Larrabee and Robert Blackwill, eds. (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1989).

### Notes

<sup>a</sup> Soviet medium bombers of the Smolensk Air Army based in the European USSR.

<sup>b</sup> U.S.-based aircraft earmarked for reinforcement deployment to Europe according to the 1988 CBO study: *U.S. Ground Forces and the Conventional Balance in Europe*, Congressional Budget Office, June, 1988, pp. 97-8.

<sup>c</sup> Soviet fighter-interceptors of the Air Defense Forces for homeland defense based in the European USSR.

<sup>d</sup> Fencer fighter-bombers of the Vinnitsa Air Army based in the Kiev military district.

<sup>e</sup> French Mirage IV P strategic bombers based in France.



**B. NATO Air Forces in Central Europe Extended**

	<i>Fighter-bombers</i>		<i>Fighter-interceptors</i>	
	<i>Aircraft (location)</i>	<i>#</i>	<i>Aircraft (location)</i>	<i>#</i>
United States	F-111E/F	140	F-5E (UK)	19
	A-10A (UK)	108	F-15C/D (FRG/Na)	96
	F-16C/D (FRG)	96 <sup>a</sup>	F-16C/D (FRG)	60 <sup>a</sup>
	F-4G (FRG)	36		
	Total	380		175
Belgium	F-16A/B	36 <sup>a</sup>	F-16A/B	36 <sup>a</sup>
	Mirage 5 BA/BD	50		
	Total	86		
Canada	CF-18 (FRG)	18 <sup>a</sup>	CF-18 (FRG)	18 <sup>a</sup>
Denmark	F-16A/B	26 <sup>a</sup>	F-16 A/B	26 <sup>a</sup>
	Draken/F-35	15 <sup>a</sup>	Draken/F-35	10
	Draken/RF-35	18		
	Total	59		36
France	Mirage IIIE	80 <sup>b</sup>	Mirage F-1C	135
	Mirage 5F	30	Mirage IIIE	26
	Jaguar A	127 <sup>b</sup>	Mirage 2000B/C	45
	Mirage 2000N	13 <sup>b</sup>		
	Total	250		206
Federal Republic of Germany	Tornado (FRG/UK)	190	F-4F	71 <sup>a</sup>
	T-4F	71 <sup>a</sup>		
	Alpha Jet	153		
	Total	414		
Netherlands	F-16A/B	86 <sup>a</sup>	F-16A/B	61 <sup>a</sup>
	NF-5	47		
	Total	133		
United Kingdom	Tornado (FRG/UK)	149	Tornado	36
	Harrier (FRG/UK)	51	F-4 (FRG/UK)	114
	Jaguar	63	Hawk	72
	Buccaneer	34		
	Total	297		222
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1637<sup>c</sup></b>		<b>825<sup>c</sup></b>

*Source:* Edward Warner, "Approaches to Conventional Arms Reductions," *Conventional Arms Control and East-West Security*, F. Stephen Larrabee and Robert Blackwill, eds. (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1989).

*Notes*

<sup>a</sup> Multirole Belgian, Danish, and Dutch F-16s and Danish Draken F-35s are split between the ground attack and air defense categories in accordance with mission specialization data from the International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1988-1989* (London: IISS, 1988). The multirole US F-16s, Canadian CF-18s, and German F-4Fs, whose pilots are trained for both air-to-air and air-to-ground combat, have been split evenly between the two mission areas.

<sup>b</sup> Includes French 15 Mirage IIIE, 45 Jaguar, and 13 Mirage 2000N fighter-bombers that are identified by IISS as "prestrategic" nuclear delivery systems. Does not include the 18 French Mirage IV P "strategic" bombers that are configured solely for nuclear delivery.

<sup>c</sup> Includes combat-capable aircraft used in training and conversion units.

**C. Warsaw Pact Air Forces in Central Europe Extended**

	<i>Fighter-bombers</i>		<i>Fighter-interceptors</i>	
	<i>Aircraft</i>	<i>#</i>	<i>Aircraft</i>	<i>#</i>
<b>Soviet Union</b>				
In GDR, Poland	MiG-27	135	MiG-21	90
Czechoslovakia	Su-17	225	MiG-23	315
& Hungary	Su-24	90	MiG-25	45
	Su-25	45	MiG-29	90
	Total	495		540
In Legnica Air Army	Su-24	225	n.a.	
In Baltic, Belorussian & Carpathian MDs	MiG-27	180	MiG-21	90
	Su-17	45	MiG-23	135
	Su-25	45	MiG-29	135
	Total	270		360
Poland	Su-17	125	MiG-21	360
	Su-7	30	MiG-23	40
	LIM-6	70		
	Total	225		400

	<i>Fighter-bombers</i>		<i>Fighter-interceptors</i>	
	<i>Aircraft</i>	<i>#</i>	<i>Aircraft</i>	<i>#</i>
GDR	MiG-27	25	MiG-21	225
	Su-17	35	MiG-23	45
	Total	60		270
Czechoslovakia	MiG-27	40	MiG-21	225
	MiG-21	45	MiG-23	45
	Su-25	40		
	Su-7	45		
	Total	170		270
Hungary	n.a.		MiG-21	45
			MiG-23	90
			Total	135
TOTAL		1,445 <sup>a</sup>		1,975 <sup>b</sup>

*Source:* Edward Warner, "Approaches to Conventional Arms Reductions," *Conventional Arms Control and East-West Security*, F. Stephen Larrabee and Robert Blackwill, eds. (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1989).

#### *Notes*

<sup>a</sup> Does not include the 120 Backfire, 120 Blinder, and 160 Badger bombers of the Strategic Air Army headquartered at Smolensk in Belorussia, although many of these bombers are based in the "central Europe Extended" area and would very likely be employed to deliver conventionally armed bombs and missiles against NATO targets in Central Europe during a conventional war. A portion or all of the 180 Fencer fighter-bombers of the air army headquartered at Vinnitsa in the Ukraine might also be deployed forward to carry out conventional bombing missions in central Europe.

<sup>b</sup> Does not include the 135 fighter-interceptors of the Air Defense forces based in the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military Districts that protect the Soviet homeland.

# Appendix IV: Warsaw Pact and NATO Ground Forces in the Atlantic-to-Urals Area

## A. WP Readiness by Division June 1988\*

	<i>Category I</i>			<i>Category II</i>			<i>Category III</i>		
	<i>T</i>	<i>MR</i>	<i>AB</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>MR</i>	<i>AB</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>MR</i>	<i>Total</i>
<b>Non-Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe:</b>									
Bulgaria	0	2	0	0	3	0	0	3	8
Czech	1	3	0	2	1	0	2	1	10
GDR	2	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
Hungary <sup>b</sup>	0	0	0	1.7	3.3	0	0	0	5
Poland	5	3	0	0	0	0	0	5	13
Romania	1	1	0	1	3	0	0	4	10
EE total	9	13	0	4.7	10.3	0	2	13	52
<b>Soviet Forces in: WESTERN STRATEGIC THEATRE:</b>									
<b>Western TVD</b>									
Czechoslovakia	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
GDR	11	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	19
Poland	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Baltic MD	0	0	2	1	3	0	2	4	12
Belorussian MD	0	1	0	3	1	0	7	0	12
Carpathian MD	1	0	0	1	6	0	2	3	13
- subtotal	15	13	2	5	10	0	11	7	63
<b>South-Western TVD</b>									
Hungary	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
Kiev	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	8	16
Odessa	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	8	9
- subtotal	2	2	0	0	0	1	8	16	29
<b>North-Western TVD</b>									
Leningrad	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	11	12

	Category I			Category II			Category III		
	T	MR	AB	T	MR	AB	T	MR	Total
<b>CENTRAL RESERVE</b>									
Moscow	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	7	10
Urals	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	5	6
Volga	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
— subtotal	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	16	20
<b>SOUTHERN STRATEGIC THEATRE:</b>									
North Caucasus	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	7	8
Transcaucasus	0	0	1	0	3	0	0	8	12
— subtotal	0	0	1	1	3	0	0	15	20
USSR total	17	15	5	6	13	1	22	65	144
WTO TOTAL	26	28	5	10.7	23.3	1	24	78	196

*Sources:* This chart was derived using the Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1988–1989* (London: IISS, 1988), pp. 39–52, and was adapted for the study by the Congressional Budget Office, *U.S. Ground Forces and the Conventional Balance in Europe*, June, 1988, p. 92.

*Notes by the Congressional Budget Office*

<sup>a</sup> The Soviet Army can be categorized into three types of combat readiness. Category I units are at 75–100% strength in manpower and can reach full strength after 24 hours' notice. Category II units are manned at 50–70% strength with some equipment in storage. Divisions can be ready in 30 days after mobilization. Category III units are manned at 10–33% personnel strength with about 30–50% of their equipment. Most of their equipment is held in storage. Divisions can be ready 60 or more days after mobilization. Divisions are being reduced with the implementation of the WTO unilateral reduction announcements of December, 1988.

<sup>b</sup> Hungary's ground forces have been reorganized to simplify the command structure. Instead of a standard army/divisional/regimental organization of most Warsaw Pact armies, a corps/brigade structure has been introduced. Hungary has 5 tank brigades and 10 motorized rifle brigades. Assuming 3 brigades equals 1 division, Hungary has 1.7 tank divisions and 3.3 motorized rifle divisions. In 1987–88 Hungary's divisions were established to be in Category II level of readiness, by IISS, and it is assumed readiness level has not changed.

**B. NATO Readiness by Division**

	<i>Divisions<sup>a</sup></i>			<i>Total</i>
	<i>In Place<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Reinforcements</i>		
		<i>Active<sup>c</sup></i>	<i>Reserve<sup>d</sup></i>	
BEL	2/3	2/3	2/3	2
CAN	1/3	0	0	1/3
DEN	0	2	0	2
FRA <sup>e</sup>	3	12	0	15
FRG	12	0	3 1/3	15 1/3
NETH	1/3	1 2/3	1 1/3	3 1/3
UK	3	2/3	0	3 2/3
US	5 1/3	10	15	30 1/3
Total	24 2/3	27	20 1/3	72

*Source:* Adapted from Congressional Budget Office, *U.S. Ground Forces and the Conventional Balance in Europe*, U.S. Government Printing Office, June, 1988.

*Notes*

<sup>a</sup> Includes separate brigades and armored cavalry regiments (ACRs). Three brigades or three ACRs are considered equivalent to one division.

<sup>b</sup> All of these forces could be available within one to three days after NATO starts to mobilize. A small fraction (about one-eighth) are on constant alert, however, and would be available immediately.

<sup>c</sup> All of these forces, except those of the United States, could be available within a week after NATO starts to mobilize. Six of the U.S. divisions would be available within 10 days of NATO's mobilization.

<sup>d</sup> The European reserves could be available within one week after NATO starts to mobilize. The last U.S. reserve unit included here would arrive 79 days after mobilization.

<sup>e</sup> France, although not a military member of NATO, does have bilateral agreements with West Germany stating that France will come to West Germany's aid if the latter is attacked.

# Appendix V: Soviet and Eastern European Unilateral Withdrawals from Eastern Europe

## Soviet, April 1989

	CSSR	GDR	HU	POL	TOTAL
Armed Forces (Personnel)	5,300	34,700 <sup>a</sup>	10,000 <sup>d</sup>		50,000
Artillery Systems		330	200		530
Chemical Defense Battalions	1		1		2
Fighter Aircraft Regiments			1		1
Combat Aircraft	20				20
Interceptor Squadrons			1		1
Vehicles		5,000	3,000		8,000
Motor Transport Battalions	1				1
Parachute Battalions	1		1		2
Tanks	708	3,842 <sup>b</sup>	450		5,000
Tank Divisions	1	4 <sup>c</sup>	1		6
Tank Training Regiments		3	1	1	5
Instructor Regiments		2			2
Airborne Assault Battalions	1	1	1	1	4
Engineers Battalions	1				1
Landing/Assault Brigades				1	1
Independent Battalions		11			11
Helicopter Regiment				1	1
Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiments			1	1	

### Notes

<sup>a</sup> Total Soviet personnel reductions from CSSR, GDR, and HU are 50,000. CSSR and HU account for 15,300, thus, the remainder of 34,700 men is assumed to be withdrawn from the GDR.

<sup>b</sup> Total Soviet tank reductions from CSSR, GDR, and HU are 5,000. CSSR and HU account for 1,158, thus, the remainder of 3,842 is assumed to be withdrawn from the GDR.

<sup>c</sup> The Soviet 7th, 12th, 25th, and 32nd tank divisions are being withdrawn. Each tank division has four short-range nuclear missiles, thus, 24 missiles would be reduced. *The New York Times*, January 24, 1989.

<sup>d</sup> Among the 10,000 soldiers are 2,400 officers and ensigns, and over 8,000 non-commissioned officers and soldiers.

## Eastern Europe February, 1989

	BU	CSSR	GDR	HU	POL	TOTAL
Defense Spending %						
Cut	12	15	10 <sup>a</sup>	17	4	
Armed Forces						
(Personnel)	10,000	12,000 <sup>a</sup>	10,000	9,300 <sup>f</sup>	40,000	81,300
Combat Aircraft	20	51 <sup>b</sup>	50	9	80	210
Artillery Systems	200			430	900	1,530
Aircraft Squadron			1	1 <sup>a</sup>		2
Armored Personnel						
Carriers		165		30	700	895
Jet Fighter Divisions				1		1
Tanks	200	850 <sup>c</sup>	600	251	850	2,751
Tank Divisions		2 1/2				2 1/2
Tank Regiments			6		2	8
Tank Brigades				1		1
Motorized Rifle						
Divisions		3 <sup>d</sup>			4 <sup>b</sup>	7
Missile Launch Pads				6		6
Naval Units	5					5

## Notes

<sup>a</sup> Men will be transferred from combat units to Army construction organizations. Their equipment will be stored and mothballed in depots.

<sup>b</sup> Reduction concerns type MiG 21s and Su-7Bs.

<sup>c</sup> Tank reductions include T-54 and T-55 series.

<sup>d</sup> The Motorized Rifle divisions are to be reorganized into military depots. Their arms and equipment are to be mothballed.

<sup>e</sup> The GDR's defense budget is scheduled to be \$8.8 billion in 1989, up by 3.4% from 1988. *The Washington Post*, January 24, 1989.

<sup>f</sup> The 9,300 figure included between 2,000–2,100 professional soldiers. Half of this number are officers, and half are non-commissioned officers.

<sup>g</sup> In the case of Hungary, one aircraft squadron amounts to 9 interceptor fighter jets.

<sup>h</sup> The 2nd and the 15th mechanized divisions will be dismantled, while the manning level of the 10th and 16th armored divisions will be reduced.

## Further plans

## CSSR:

1. Army construction organizations will be strengthened by 20,000.
2. The number of divisional and regimental tactical exercises is to be reduced by 50 percent, the number of live rounds fired by 25–30 percent, and the number of reservists called up for exercises by 15,000 people.

## GDR:

1. The GDR National People's Army will be reconstructed in such a way that it will have a "still more strictly defensive character."



## POL:

1. Dismantling will affect a dozen regiments of various kind of forces, including armored, artillery, and air force regiments. Furthermore, 30 territorial defense, engineering, construction, road and rail units will be transformed into civil defense formations.
2. Two armored regiments, a brigade of operational and tactical missiles, a mechanized training regiment, and several other units will be dismantled.

*Sources***Bulgaria**

“Zhivkov Announces Military Budget, Forces Cut,” *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: East Europe*, January 30, 1989, p. 8.

**Czechoslovakia**

“Defense Council Announces Arms Reductions,” and “Minister Vaclavik Details Cuts,” *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: East Europe*, January 30, 1989, p. 16.

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“Chief of Staff Notes CSLA Troop, Arms Cuts,” and “Vacek on Timetable for Soviet Troop Withdrawal,” *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: East Europe*, February 7, 1989, pp. 7–8.

**German Democratic Republic**

“Honecker on Troop Withdrawal,” *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: East Europe*, January 24, 1989, p. 33.

“General Outlines Troop Withdrawal from GDR,” *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Soviet Union*, April 19, 1989, p. 9.

**Hungary**

“Karpati on Soviet Cuts, Defense Budget Cuts,” *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: East Europe*, December 9, 1988, p. 23.

“Defense Ministry Details Cuts,” and “Karpati Comments on Measure,” *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: East Europe*, January 31, 1989, p. 33.

“News Briefing on Partial USSR Troop Pullout,” *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: East Europe*, January 31, 1989, p. 34.

“Hungarian Officials, Soviet Envoy on Troop Cut,” *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Soviet Union*, February 2, 1989, p. 42.

“Soviet Commander, Envoy on Hungarian Withdrawal,” *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Soviet Union*, February 3, 1989, p. 5.

“Defense Minister Details Soviet Troop Pullout,” *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: East Europe*, February 3, 1989, p. 15.

**Poland**

“PAP Reports Defense Reductions,” *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: East Europe*, January 25, 1989, pp. 40–41.

“3 Soviet Army Regiments to Leave ‘This Year’,” *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: East Europe*, February 1, 1989, p. 39.

“Siwicki Queried on Military Structural Changes,” *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: East Europe*, February 28, 1989, pp. 26–32.

# Appendix VI: C.S.C.E. Documents: The Stockholm Document; The Agreed Mandate for the C.F.E. Force-Reduction Talks and for the C.D.E.-2 Talks on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures

DOCUMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE  
(September 19, 1986)

On Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

1. The representatives of the Participating States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, The Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Yugoslavia, met in Stockholm from 17 January 1984 to 19 September 1986 in accordance with the provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid meeting relating to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.
2. The participants were addressed by the Swedish Prime Minister, the late Olof Palme, on 17 January 1984.
3. Opening statements were made by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and other Heads of Delegations. The Prime Minister of Spain as well as ministers and senior officials of other Participating States addressed the Conference later.
4. The Secretary-General of the United Nations addressed the Conference on 6 July 1984.

5. Contributions were made by the following non-participating Mediterranean states: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia.

6. The Participating States recalled that the aim of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is, as a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations as well as in their international relations in general.

7. The Participating States recognize that the set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures, which are adopted in the present Document and which, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Madrid Concluding Document, will by their scope and nature and by their implementation serve to strengthen confidence and security in Europe and thus to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force.

8. Consequently, the Participating States have declared the following:

Refrain from the Threat or Use of Force

9. The Participating States, recalling their obligation to refrain, in their mutual relations as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, accordingly reaffirm their commitment to respect and put into practice the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force, as laid down in the Final Act.

10. No consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this principle.

11. They recall the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations.

12. They will refrain from any manifestation of force for the purpose of inducing any other State to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights.

13. As set forth in the Final Act, no occupation or acquisition of territory resulting from the threat or use of force in contravention of international law will be recognized as legal.

14. They recognize their commitment to peace and security. Accordingly, they reaffirm that they will refrain from any use of armed forces inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States, against another Participating State, in particular from invasion of or attack on its territory.

15. They will abide by their commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force in their relations with any State, regardless of that State's political, social, economic or cultural system and irrespective of whether or not they maintain with that State relations of Alliance.

16. They stress that non-compliance with the obligation of refraining from the threat or use of force, as recalled above, constitutes a violation of international law.

17. They stress their commitment to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes as contained in the Final Act, convinced that it is an essential complement to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force, both being essential factors for the maintenance and consolidation of peace and security. They recall their determination and the necessity to reinforce and to improve the methods at their disposal for the peaceful settlement of disputes. They reaffirm their resolve to make every effort to settle exclusively by peaceful means any dispute between them.

18. The Participating States stress their commitment to the Final Act of the C.S.C.E. and the need for full implementation of all its provisions which will further the process of increasing security and developing cooperation in Europe, thereby contributing to international peace and security in the world as a whole.

19. They emphasize their commitment to all the principles of the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States and declare their determination to respect and put them into practice irrespective of their political, economic or social systems as well as of their size, geographical location or level of economic development.

20. All these ten principles are of primary significance and, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others.

21. Respect for and the application of these principles will enhance the development of friendly relations and cooperation among the Participating States in all fields covered by the provisions of the Final Act.

22. They reconfirm their commitment to the basic principle of the sovereign equality of States and stress that all States have equal rights and duties within the framework of international law.

23. They reaffirm the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Respect for and the effective exercise of these rights and freedoms are essential factors for international peace, justice and security, as well as for the development of friendly relations and cooperation among themselves as among all States, as set forth in the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States.

24. They reaffirm that, in the broader context of world security, security in Europe is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole; in this context, they confirm their intention to develop good neighborly relations with all States in the region, with due regard to reciprocity, and in the spirit of the principles set forth in the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States, so as to promote confidence and security and make peace prevail in the region in accordance with the provisions contained in the Mediterranean chapter of the Final Act.

25. They emphasize the necessity to take resolute measures to prevent and to combat terrorism, including terrorism in international relations. They express their determination to take effective measures, both at the national level and through international cooperation, for the prevention and suppression of all acts of terrorism. They will take all appropriate measures in preventing their respective territories from being used for the preparation, organization or commission of terrorist activities. This also includes measures to prohibit on their territories illegal activities, including subversive activities, of persons,

groups and organizations that instigate, organize or engage in the perpetration of acts of terrorism, including those directed against other States and their citizens.

26. They will fulfill in good faith their obligations under international law; they also stress that strict compliance with their commitments within the framework of the C.S.C.E. is essential for building confidence and security.

27. The Participating States confirm that in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations and their obligations under any treaty or other international agreement, their obligations under the Charter will prevail, in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations.

28. The Participating States have adopted the following measures:

#### Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities

29. The Participating States will give notification in writing through diplomatic channels in an agreed form of content, to all other Participating States 42 days or more in advance of the start of notifiable\* military activities in the zone of application\*\* for confidence- and security-building measures.

30. Notification will be given by the Participating State on whose territory the activity in question is planned to take place even if the forces of that State are not engaged in the activity or their strength is below the notifiable level. This will not relieve other Participating States of their obligation to give notification, if their involvement in the planned military activity reaches the notifiable level.

31. Each of the following military activities in the field conducted as a single activity in the zone of application for CSBMs at or above the levels defined below, will be notified:

31.1. The engagement of formations of land forces\*\*\* of the Participating States in the same exercise activity conducted under a single operational command independently or in combination with any possible air or naval components.

31.1.1. This military activity will be subject to notification whenever it involves at any time during the activity:

—at least 13,000 troops, including support troops, or

—at least 300 battle tanks

if organized into a divisional structure or at least two brigades/regiments, not necessarily subordinate to the same division.

31.1.2. The participation of air forces of the Participating States will be included in the notification if it is foreseen that in the course of the activity 200 or more sorties by aircraft, excluding helicopters, will be flown.

31.2. The engagement of military forces either in an amphibious landing or in a parachute assault by airborne forces in the zone of application for CSBMs.

31.2.1. These military activities will be subject to notification whenever the amphibious landing involves at least 3000 troops or whenever the parachute drop involves at least 3000 troops.

\* In this Document, the term “notifiable” means subject to notification.

\*\* See Annex I.

\*\*\* In this context, the term “land forces” includes amphibious, airmobile and airborne forces.

31.3. The engagement of formations of land forces of the Participating States in a transfer from outside the zone of application for CSBMs to arrival points in the zone, or from inside the zone of application for CSBMs to points of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated.

31.3.1. The arrival or concentration of these forces will be subject to notification whenever it involves at any time during the activity:

—at least 13,000 troops, including support troops, or

—at least 300 battle tanks

if organized into a divisional structure or at least two brigades/regiments, not necessarily subordinate to the same division.

31.3.2. Forces which have been transferred into the zone will be subject to all provisions of agreed CSBMs when they depart their arrival points to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated within the zone of application for CSBMs.

32. Notifiable military activities carried out without advance notice to the troops involved, are exceptions to the requirement for prior notification to be made 42 days in advance.

32.1. Notification of such activities, above the agreed thresholds, will be given at the time the troops involved commence such activities.

33. Notification will be given in writing of each notifiable military activity in the following agreed form:

34. General Information

34.1. The designation of the military activity

34.2. The general purpose of the military activity

34.3. The names of the States involved in the military activity

34.4. The level of command, organizing and commanding the military activity

34.5. The start and end dates of the military activity

35. Information on Different Types of Notifiable Military Activities

35.1. The engagement of land forces of the Participating States in the same exercise activity conducted under a single operational command independently or in combination with any possible air or naval components:

35.1.1. The total number of troops taking part in the military activity (i.e., ground troops, amphibious troops, airmobile and airborne troops) and the number of troops participating for each State involved, if applicable.

35.1.2. Number and type of divisions participating for each State

35.1.3. The total number of battle tanks for each State and the total number of anti-tank guided missile launchers mounted on armored vehicles

35.1.4. The total number of artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre or above)

35.1.5. The total number of helicopters, by category

35.1.6. Envisaged number of sorties by aircraft, excluding helicopters

35.1.7. Purpose of air missions

35.1.8. Categories of aircraft involved

35.1.9. The level of command, organizing and commanding the air force participation

35.1.10. Naval ship-to-shore gunfire

35.1.11. Indication of other naval ship-to-shore support

35.1.12. The level of command, organizing and commanding the naval force participation

35.2. The engagement of military forces either in an amphibious landing or in parachute assault by airborne forces in the zone of application for CSBMs:

35.2.1. The total number of amphibious troops involved in notifiable amphibious landings, and/or the total number of airborne troops involved in notifiable parachute assaults

35.2.2. In the case of a notifiable amphibious landing, the point or points of embarkation, if in the zone of application for CSBMs

35.3. The engagement of formations of land forces of the Participating States in a transfer from outside the zone of application for CSBMs to arrival points in the zone, or from inside the zone of application for CSBMs to points of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated:

35.3.1. The total number of troops transferred

35.3.2. Number and type of divisions participating in the transfer

35.3.3. The total number of battle tanks participating in a notifiable arrival or concentration

35.3.4. Geographical coordinates for the points of arrival and for the points of concentration

36. The envisaged Area and timeframe of the Activity

36.1. The area of the military activity delimited by geographic features together with geographic coordinates, as appropriate

36.2. The start and end dates of each phase (transfers, deployment, concentration of forces, active exercise phase, recovery phase) of activities in the zone of application for CSBMs of participating formations, the tactical purpose and corresponding geographical areas (delimited by geographical coordinates) for each phase

36.3. Brief description of each phase

37. Other Information

37.1. Changes, if any, in relation to information provided in the annual calendar regarding the activity

37.2. Relationship of the activity to other notifiable activities

#### Observation of Certain Military Activities

38. The Participating States will invite observers from all other Participating States to the following notifiable military activities:

38.1. The engagement of formations of land forces\* of the Participating States in the same exercise activity conducted under a single operational command independently or in combination with any possible air or naval components.

38.2. The engagement of military forces either in an amphibious landing or in a parachute assault by airborne forces in the zone of application for CSBMs.

38.3. In the case of the engagement of formations of land forces\* of the Participating States in a transfer from outside the zone of application for CSBMs to arrival points in the zone, or from inside the zone of application for

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\* In this context, the term "land forces" includes amphibious, airmobile and airborne forces.

CSBMs to point of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated, the concentration of these forces. Forces which have been transferred into the zone will be subject to all provisions of agreed confidence- and security-building measures when they depart their arrival points to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated within the zone of application for CSBMs.

38.4. The above-mentioned activities will be subject to observation whenever the number of troops engaged meets or exceeds 17,000 troops, except in the case of either an amphibious landing or a parachute assault by airborne forces, which will be subject to observation whenever the number of forces engaged meets or exceeds 5,000 troops.

39. The host State will extend the invitations in writing through diplomatic channels to all other Participating States at the time of notification. The host State will be the Participating State on whose territory the notified activity will take place.

40. The host State may delegate some of its responsibilities as host to another Participating State engaged in the military activity on the territory of the host State. In such cases, the host State will specify the allocation of responsibilities in its invitation to observe the activity.

41. Each Participating State may send up to two observers to the military activity to be observed.

42. The invited State may decide whether to send military and/or civilian observers, including members of its personnel accredited to the host state. Military observers will, normally, wear their uniforms and insignia while performing their tasks.

43. Replies to the invitation will be given in writing not later than 21 days after the issue of the invitation.

44. The Participating States accepting an invitation will provide the names and ranks of their observers in their reply to the invitation. If the invitation is not accepted in time, it will be assumed that no observers will be sent.

45. Together with the invitation the host State will provide a general observation programme, including the following information.

45.1. The date, time and place of assembly of observers;

45.2. Planned duration of the observation programme;

45.3. Languages to be used in interpretation and/or translation;

45.4. Arrangements for board, lodging and transportation of the observers;

45.5. Arrangements for observation equipment which will be issued to the observers by the host State;

45.6. Possible authorization by the host State of the use of special equipment that the observers may bring with them;

45.7. Arrangements for special clothing to be issued to the observers because of weather or environmental factors.

46. The observers may make requests with regard to the observation programme. The host State will, if possible, accede to them.

47. The host State will determine a duration of observation which permits the observers to observe a notifiable military activity from the time that agreed thresholds for observation are met or exceeded until, for the last time during the activity, the thresholds for observation are no longer met.



48. The host State will provide observers with transportation to the area of the notified activity and back. This transportation will be provided from either the capital or another suitable location to be announced in the invitation, so that the observers are in position before the start of the observation programme.

49. The invited State will cover the travel expenses for its observers to the capital, or another suitable location specified in the invitation, of the host State, and back.

50. The observers will be provided equal treatment and offered equal opportunities to carry out their functions.

51. The observers will be granted, during their mission, the privileges and immunities accorded to diplomatic agents in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

52. The host State will not be required to permit observation of restricted locations, installations or defence sites.

53. In order to allow the observers to confirm that the notified activity is non-threatening in character and that it is carried out in conformity with the appropriate provisions of the notification, the host State will:

53.1. At the commencement of the observation programme, give a briefing of the purpose, the basic situation, the phases of the activity and possible changes as compared with the notification and provide the observers with a map of the area of the military activity with a scale of 1 to not more than 500,000 and an observation programme with a daily schedule as well as a sketch indicating the basic situation;

53.2. Provide the observers with appropriate observation equipment; however, the observers will be allowed to use their personal binoculars, which will be subject to examination and approval by the host State;

53.3. In the course of the observation programme, give the observers daily briefings with the help of maps on the various phases of the military activity and their development and inform the observers about their positions geographically; in the case of a land force activity conducted in combination with air or naval components, briefings will be given by representatives of these forces;

53.4. Provide opportunities to observe directly forces of the State/States engaged in the military activity so that the observers get an impression of the flow of the activity; to this end, the observers will be given the opportunity to observe major combat units of the participating formations of a divisional or equivalent level and, whenever possible, to visit some units and communicate with commanders and troops; commanders or other senior personnel of participating formations as well as of the visited units will inform the observers of the mission of their respective units;

53.5. Guide the observers in the area of the military activity; the observers will follow the instructions issued by the host State in accordance with the provisions set out in this Document;

53.6. Provide the observers with appropriate means of transportation in the area of the military activity.

53.7. Provide the observers with opportunities for timely communication with their Embassies or other official missions and consular posts; the host State is not obligated to cover the communication expenses of the observers;

53.8. Provide the observers with appropriate board and lodging in a location suitable for carrying out the observation programme and, when necessary, medical care.

54. The Participating States need not invite observers to notifiable military activities which are carried out without advance warning to the troops involved unless these notifiable activities have a duration of more than 72 hours. The continuation of these activities beyond this time will be subject to observation while the agreed thresholds are met or exceeded. The observation programme will follow as closely as practically possible all the provisions for observation set out in this Document.

#### Annual Calendars

55. Each Participating State will exchange, with all other Participating States, an annual calendar of its military activities subject to prior notification,\* within the zone of application for CSBMs, forecast for the subsequent calendar year. It will be transmitted every year, in writing, through diplomatic channels, not later than 15 November for the following year.

56. Each Participating State will list the above-mentioned activities chronologically and will provide information on each activity in accordance with the following model:

56.1. Type of military activity and its designation;

56.2. General characteristics and purpose of the military activity;

56.3. States involved in the military activity;

56.4. Area of the military activity, indicated by appropriate geographic features and/or defined by geographic coordinates;

56.5. Planned duration of the military activity and the 14-day period, indicated by dates, within which it is envisaged to start;

56.6. The envisaged total number of troops engaged in the military activity;

56.7. The types of armed forces involved in the military activity;

56.8. The envisaged level of command, under which the military activity will take place;

56.9. The number and type of divisions whose participation in the military activity is envisaged;

56.10. Any additional information concerning, inter alia, components of armed forces, which the Participating State planning the military activity considers relevant.

57. Should changes regarding the military activities in the annual calendar prove necessary, they will be communicated to all other Participating States no later than in the appropriate notification.

58. Information on military activities subject to prior notification not included in an annual calendar will be communicated to all Participating States as soon as possible, in accordance with the model provided in the annual calendar.

#### Constraining Provisions

59. Each Participating State will communicate, in writing to all other Participating States, by 15 November each year, information concerning

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\* As defined in the provisions on Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities

military activities subject to prior notification\* involving more than 40,000 troops, which it plans to carry out in the second subsequent calendar year. Such communication will include preliminary information on each activity, as to its general purpose, timeframe and duration, area, size and States involved.

60. Participating States will not carry out military activities subject to prior notification\* involving more than 75,000 troops, unless they have been the object of communication as defined above.

61. Participating States will not carry out military activities subject to prior notification\* involving more than 40,000 troops unless they have been included in the annual calendar, not later than 15 November each year.

62. If military activities subject to prior notification\* are carried out in addition to those contained in the annual calendar, they should be as few as possible.

#### Compliance and Verification

63. According to the Madrid mandate, the confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed upon "will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content."

64. The Participating States recognize that national technical means can play a role in monitoring compliance with agreed confidence- and security-building measures.

65. In accordance with the provisions contained in this Document, each Participating State has the right to conduct inspections on the territory of any other Participating State within the zone of application for CSBMs.

66. Any Participating State will be allowed to address a request for inspection to another Participating State on whose territory, within the zone of application for CSBMs, compliance with the agreed confidence- and security-building measures is in doubt.

67. No Participating State will be obliged to accept on its territory within the zone of application for CSBMs, more than three inspections per calendar year.

68. No Participating State will be obliged to accept more than one inspection per calendar year from the same Participating State.

69. An inspection will not be counted if, due to *force majeure*, it cannot be carried out.

70. The Participating State which requests an inspection will state the reasons for the request.

71. The Participating State which has received such a request will reply in the affirmative to the request within the agreed period of time, subject to the provisions contained in paragraphs 67 and 68.

72. Any possible dispute as to the validity of the reasons for a request will not prevent or delay the conduct of an inspection.

73. The Participating State which requests an inspection will be permitted to designate for inspection on the territory of another State within the zone of application for CSBMs, a specific area. Such an area will be referred to as the "specified area." The specified area will comprise terrain where notifiable military activities are conducted or where another Participating State believes a notifiable military activity is taking place. The specified area will be defined and

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\* As defined in the provisions on Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities

limited by the scope and scale of notifiable military activities but will not exceed that required for an Army-level military activity.

74. In the specified area, the representatives of the inspecting State accompanied by the representatives of the receiving State will be permitted access, entry and unobstructed survey, except for areas or sensitive points to which access is normally denied or restricted, military and other defense installations, as well as naval vessels, military vehicles and aircraft. The number and extent of the restricted areas should be as limited as possible. Areas where notifiable military activities can take place will not be declared restricted areas, except for certain permanent or temporary military installations which, in territorial terms, should be as small as possible, and consequently, those areas will not be used to prevent inspection of notifiable military activities. Restricted areas will not be employed in a way inconsistent with the agreed provisions on inspection.

75. Within the specified area, the forces of Participating States other than the receiving State will also be subject to the inspection conducted by the inspecting State.

76. Inspection will be permitted on the ground, from the air, or both.

77. The representatives of the receiving State will accompany the inspection team, including when it is in land vehicles and in aircraft from the time of their first employment until the time they are no longer in use for the purposes of inspection.

78. In its request, the inspecting State will notify the receiving State of:

78.1. The reasons for the request;

78.2. The location of the specified area defined by geographical coordinates;

78.3. The preferred point(s) of entry for the inspection team;

78.4. Mode of transport to and from the point(s) of entry and, if applicable, to and from the specified area;

78.5. Where in the specified area the inspection will begin;

78.6. Whether the inspection will be conducted from the ground, from the air, or both simultaneously;

78.7. Whether aerial inspection will be conducted using an airplane, a helicopter, or both;

78.8. Whether the inspection team will use land vehicles provided by the receiving State or, if mutually agreed, its own vehicles;

78.9. Information for the issuance of diplomatic visas to inspectors entering the receiving State.

79. The reply to the request will be given in the shortest possible period of time, but within not more than twenty-four hours. Within thirty-six hours after the issuance of the request, the inspection team will be permitted to enter the territory of the receiving State.

80. Any request for inspection as well as the reply thereto will be communicated to all Participating States without delay.

81. The receiving State should designate the point(s) of entry as close as possible to the specified area. The receiving State will ensure that the inspection team will be able to reach the specified area without delay from the point(s) of entry.

82. All Participating States will facilitate the passage of the inspection teams through their territory.

83. Within forty-eight hours after the arrival of the inspection team at the specified area, the inspection will be terminated.
84. There will be no more than four inspectors in an inspection team. While conducting the inspection, the inspection team may divide into parts.
85. The inspectors and, if applicable, auxiliary personnel, will be granted, during their mission, privileges and immunities in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
86. The receiving State will provide the inspection team with appropriate board and lodging in a location suitable for carrying out the inspection, and, when necessary, medical care; however, this does not exclude the use by the inspection team of its own tents and rations.
87. The inspection team will have the use of its own maps, own photo cameras, own binoculars, and own dictaphones, as well as own aeronautical charts.
88. The inspection team will have access to appropriate telecommunications equipment of the receiving State, including the opportunity for continuous communication between the members of an inspection team in an aircraft and those in a land vehicle employed in the inspection.
89. The inspecting State will specify whether aerial inspection will be conducted using an airplane, a helicopter or both. Aircraft for inspection will be chosen by mutual agreement between the inspecting and receiving States. Aircraft will be chosen which provide the inspection team a continuous view of the ground during the inspection.
90. After the flight plan, specifying, inter alia, the inspection team's choice of flight path, speed and altitude in the specified area, has been filed with the competent air traffic control authority, the inspection aircraft will be permitted to enter the specified area without delay. Within the specified area, the inspection team will, at its request, be permitted to deviate from the approved flight plan to make specific observations provided such deviation is consistent with paragraph 74 as well as flight safety and air traffic requirements. Directions to the crew will be given through a representative of the receiving State on board the aircraft involved in the inspection.
91. One member of the inspection team will be permitted, if such a request is made, at any time to observe data on navigational equipment of the aircraft and to have access to maps and charts used by the flight crew for the purpose of determining the exact location of the aircraft during the inspection flight.
92. Aerial and ground inspectors may return to the specified area as often as desired within the forty-eight hour inspection period.
93. The receiving State will provide for inspection purposes land vehicles with cross country capability. Whenever mutually agreed, taking into account the specific geography relating to the area to be inspected, the inspecting State will be permitted to use its own vehicles.
94. If land vehicles or aircraft are provided by the inspecting State, there will be one accompanying driver for each land vehicle, or accompanying aircraft crew.
95. The inspecting State will prepare a report of its inspection and will provide a copy of that report to all Participating States without delay.
96. The inspection expenses will be incurred by the receiving State, except

when the inspecting State uses its own aircraft and/or land vehicles. The travel expenses to and from point(s) of entry will be borne by the inspecting State.

97. Diplomatic channels will be used for communications concerning compliance and verification.

98. Each Participating State will be entitled to obtain timely clarification from any other Participating State concerning the application of agreed confidence- and security-building measures. Communications in this context will, if appropriate, be transmitted to all other Participating States.

99. The Participating States stress that these CSBMs are designed to reduce the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities and emphasize that their implementation will contribute to these objectives.

100. Reaffirming the relevant objectives of the Final Act, the Participating States are determined to continue building confidence, to lessen military confrontation and to enhance security for all. They are also determined to achieve progress in disarmament.

101. The measures adopted in this Document are politically binding and will come into force on 1 January 1987.

102. The Government of Sweden is requested to transmit the present Document to the follow-up meeting of the C.S.C.E. in Vienna and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Government of Sweden is also requested to transmit the present Document to the Governments of the non-participating Mediterranean States.

103. The text of this Document will be published in each Participating State, which will disseminate it and make it known as widely as possible.

104. The representatives of the Participating States express their profound gratitude to the people and Government of Sweden for the excellent organization of the Stockholm Conference and warm hospitality extended to the delegation which participated in the Conference.

Stockholm, 19 September 1986

#### **Annex I**

Under the terms of the Madrid mandate, the zone of application for CSBMs is defined as follows:

On the basis of equality of rights, balance and reciprocity, equal respect for the security interests of all C.S.C.E. participating States, and of their respective obligations concerning confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe, these confidence- and security-building measures will cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area\* and air space. They will be of military significance and politically binding and will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content.

\* In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean area adjoining Europe.

As far as the adjoining sea area\* and air space is concerned, the measures will be applicable to the military activities of all the Participating States taking place there whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe as referred to above, which they will agree to notify. Necessary specifications will be made through the negotiations on the confidence- and security-building measures at the Conference.

Nothing in the definition of the zone given above will diminish obligations already undertaken under the Final Act. The confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed upon at the Conference will also be applicable to all areas covered by any of the provisions in the Final Act relating to confidence- and security-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.

Whenever the term "the zone of application of CSBMs" is used in this Document, the above definition will apply.

## Annex II

### Chairman's Statement

It is understood that, taking into account the agreed date of entry into force of the agreed confidence- and security-building measures and the provisions contained in them concerning the timeframes of certain advance notifications, and expressing their interest in an early transition to the full implementation of the provisions of this Document, the Participating States agree to the following:

The annual calendars concerning military activities subject to prior notification and forecast for 1987 will be exchanged not later than 15 December 1986.

Communications, in accordance with agreed provisions, concerning military activities involving more than 40,000 troops planned for the calendar year 1988 will be exchanged by 15 December 1986. Participating States may undertake activities involving more than 75,000 troops during the calendar year 1987 provided that they are included in the annual calendar exchanged by 15 December 1986.

Activities to begin during the first 42 days after 1 January 1987 will be subject to the relevant provisions of the Final Act of the C.S.C.E. However, the Participating States will make every effort to apply to them the provisions of this Document to the maximum extent possible.

This statement will be an annex to the Document of the Stockholm Conference and will be published with it.

Stockholm, 19 September 1986

\* In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean area adjoining Europe.

**Annex III**

## Chairman's Statement

It is understood that each Participating State can raise any question consistent with the mandate of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe at any stage subsequent to the Vienna C.S.C.E. follow-up meeting.

This statement will be an annex to the Document of the Stockholm Conference and will be published with it.

Stockholm, 19 September 1986

**Annex IV**

## Chairman's Statement

It is understood that the Participating States recall that they have the right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties of alliance; they also have the right of neutrality. In this context, they will not take advantage of these rights to circumvent the purposes of the system of inspection, and in particular the provision that no Participating State will be obliged to accept on its territory within the zone of application for CSBMs, more than three inspections per calendar year.

Appropriate understandings between Participating States on this subject will be expressed in interpretive statements to be included in the Journal of the Day.

This statement will be an annex to the Document of the Stockholm Conference and will be published with it.

Stockholm, 19 September 1986

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**THE AGREED MANDATE FOR THE C.F.E. FORCE REDUCTION  
TALKS AND FOR THE C.D.E.-2 TALKS ON CONFIDENCE- AND  
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES**

(Adopted January 10, 1989)

**CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND  
CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT IN  
EUROPE**

**STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE: ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS ACHIEVED**

The participating States,

In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Madrid Concluding Document, assessed progress achieved during the Conference on Confidence-



and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, which met in Stockholm from 17 January 1984 to 19 September 1986.

They welcomed the adoption at Stockholm of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs).

They noted that these measures are in accordance with the criteria of the Madrid mandate and constitute a substantial improvement and extension of the confidence-building measures adopted in the Final Act.

They noted that the adoption of the Stockholm Document was a politically significant achievement and that its measures are an important step in efforts aimed at reducing the risk of military confrontation in Europe. They agreed that the extent to which the measures will in practice contribute to greater confidence and security will depend on the record of implementation. They were encouraged by initial implementation and noted that further experience and detailed review will be required. They reaffirmed their determination to comply strictly with and apply in good faith all the provisions of the Document of the Stockholm Conference.

They reaffirmed their commitment to the provisions of the Madrid Concluding Document relating to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and agreed to resume the work of the Conference with a view to achieving further progress towards its aim.

#### NEW EFFORTS FOR SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

The participating States,

Recalling the relevant provisions of the Final Act and of the Madrid Concluding Document according to which they recognize the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament,

Reaffirming their determination expressed in the Final Act to strengthen confidence among them and thus to contribute to increasing stability and security in Europe,

Stressing the complementary nature of the efforts within the framework of the C.S.C.E. process aimed at building confidence and security and establishing stability and achieving progress in disarmament, in order to lessen military confrontation and to enhance security for all,

Stressing that in undertaking such efforts they will respect the security interests of all C.S.C.E. participating States inherent in their sovereign equality,

Having also considered ways and appropriate means to continue their efforts for security and disarmament in Europe,

Have reached the understanding that these efforts should be structured as set forth below:

#### NEGOTIATIONS ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES

The participating States have agreed that Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-building Measures will take place in order to build upon and expand the results already achieved at the Stockholm Conference with the aim of elaborating and adopting a new set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe. These negotiations will take place in accordance with the Madrid mandate. The decisions of the Preparatory Meeting held in Helsinki

from 25 October to 11 November 1983 will be applied *mutatis mutandis* (see Annex II).

These negotiations will take place in Vienna, commencing in the week beginning on 6 March 1989.

The next Follow-up Meeting of the participating States of the C.S.C.E., to be held in Helsinki, commencing on 24 March 1992, will assess the progress achieved in these negotiations.

#### NEGOTIATION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

The Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe will take place as agreed by those States named in the mandate contained in the Chairman's statement in Annex III of this document, who among themselves have determined the agenda, the rules of procedure and the organizational modalities of these negotiations, and will determine their timetable and results. These negotiations will be conducted within the framework of the C.S.C.E. process.

These negotiations will take place in Vienna, commencing in the week beginning on 6 March 1989.

The next Follow-Up Meeting of the participating States of the C.S.C.E., to be held in Helsinki, commencing on 24 March 1992, will exchange views on the progress achieved in these negotiations.

#### MEETINGS IN ORDER TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AND INFORMATION CONCERNING THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

It has been agreed that the participating States will hold meetings in order to exchange views and information concerning the course of the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

These meetings will be held at least twice during each session of the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

Provisions on practical modalities relating to these meetings are contained in Annex IV of this document.

At these meetings, substantive information will be provided by the participants in the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe on developments, progress and results in the negotiations with the aim of enabling each participating State to appraise their course.

The participants in these negotiations have undertaken to take into consideration, in the course of their negotiations, the views expressed at such meetings by other participating States concerning their own security.

Information will also be provided on a bilateral basis.

The next Follow-up Meeting of the participating States of the C.S.C.E., to be held in Helsinki, commencing on 24 March 1992, will consider the functioning of these arrangements.

Taking into account the relevant provisions of the Final Act and of the Madrid Concluding Document, and having considered the results achieved in the two negotiations, and also in the light of other relevant negotiations on security and disarmament affecting Europe, a future C.S.C.E. follow-up meeting will consider ways and appropriate means for the participating States to continue their efforts for security and disarmament in Europe, including the question of supplementing the Madrid mandate for the next stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. . . .

## Annex II

## CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT

## NEGOTIATION ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES

With reference to the provision that the decisions of the Preparatory Meeting held in Helsinki from 25 October to 11 November 1983 will be applied *mutatis mutandis* to the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-building Measures, which will take place according to the relevant provisions of the subchapter "Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Aspects of Security and Disarmament in Europe", it is understood that

\*the meetings of the Plenary during the first two weeks will be held according to the work programme attached to this statement. The first Plenary will be held on 9 March 1989 at 10:30 a.m. The first session will end on 23 March 1989,

\*subsequent work programmes will be adopted by the Plenary,

\*in conformity with the rules of procedure, the Government of Austria will designate an Executive Secretary, the designation being subject to approval by the participating States,

\*the Chair at the first Plenary meeting will be taken by the representative of the host country and thereafter in daily rotation, in French alphabetical order, starting with the representative of . . . (drawn by lot at the Vienna Meeting).

This statement will be an Annex to the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting and will be published with it. . . .

## Annex III

## CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT

## NEGOTIATION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

It is understood that the following mandate has been agreed by the States participating in the future Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe:

## MANDATE FOR NEGOTIATION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

The representatives of Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, held consultations in Vienna from 17 February 1987 to 10 January 1989.

These States,

Conscious of the common responsibility which they all have for seeking to achieve greater stability and security in Europe,

Acknowledging that it is their armed forces which bear most immediately on the essential security relationship in Europe, in particular, as they are signatories of the Treaties of Brussels (1948), Washington (1949) or Warsaw (1955), and accordingly are members of the North Atlantic Alliance or parties of the Warsaw Treaty;

Recalling that they are all participants in the C.S.C.E. process; Recalling that, as reaffirmed in the Helsinki Final Act, they have the right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance;

Determined that a Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe should take place in the framework of the C.S.C.E. process;

Reaffirming also that they participate in negotiations as sovereign and independent States and on the basis of full equality;

Have agreed on the following provisions:

#### PARTICIPANTS

The participants in this negotiation shall be the 23 above-listed States hereinafter referred to as "the participants."

#### OBJECTIVES AND METHODS

The objectives of the negotiation shall be to strengthen stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces, which include conventional armaments and equipment, at lower levels; the elimination, as a matter of priority, of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action. Each and every participant undertakes to contribute to the attainment of these objectives.

These objectives shall be achieved by the application of militarily significant measures such as reductions, limitation, redeployment provisions, equal ceilings, and related measures, among others.

In order to achieve the above objectives, measures should be pursued for the whole area of application with provisions, if and where appropriate, for regional differentiation to redress disparities within the area of application and in a way which precludes circumvention.

The process of strengthening stability and security should proceed step-by-step, in a manner which will ensure that the security of each participant is not affected adversely at any stage.

#### SCOPE AND AREA OF APPLICATION

The subject of the negotiation shall be the conventional armed forces which include conventional armaments and equipment, of the participants based on land within the territory of the participants in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The existence of multiple capabilities will not be a criterion for modifying the scope of the negotiation:

\*No conventional armaments or equipment will be excluded from the subject of the negotiation because they may have other capabilities in addition to conventional ones. Such armaments or equipment will not be singled out in a separate category:

\*Nuclear weapons will not be a subject of this negotiation.

Particular emphasis will initially be placed on those forces directly related to the achievement of the objectives of the negotiation set out above.

Naval forces and chemical weapons will not be addressed. The area of

application\* shall be the entire land territory of the participants in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, which includes all the European island territories of the participants. In the case of the Soviet Union the area of application includes all the territory lying west of the Ural River and the Caspian Sea. In the case of Turkey, the area of application includes the territory of Turkey north and west of the following line: the point of intersection of the border with the 39th parallel, Muradiye, Patnos, Karayazi, Tekman, Kemaliye, Feke, Ceyhan, Dogankent, Gozne, and thence to the sea.

#### EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND VERIFICATION

Compliance with the provisions of any agreement shall be verified through an effective and strict verification regime which, among other things, will include on-site inspections as a matter of right and exchanges of information.

Information shall be exchanged in sufficient detail so as to allow a meaningful comparison of the capabilities of the forces involved.

Information shall also be exchanged in sufficient detail so as to provide a basis for the verification of compliance.

The specific modalities for verification and the exchange of information, including the degree of detail of the information and the order of its exchange, shall be agreed at the negotiation proper.

#### PROCEDURES AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS

The procedures for the negotiation, including the agenda, work programme and timetable, working methods, financial issues and other organization modalities, as agreed by the participants themselves, are set out in Annex 1 of this mandate. They can be changed only by consensus of the participants.

The participants decided to take part in meetings of the States signatories of the Helsinki Final Act to be held at least twice during each round of the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in order to exchange views and substantive information concerning the course of the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Detailed modalities for these meetings are contained in Annex 2 to this mandate.

The participants will take into consideration the views expressed in such meetings by other C.S.C.E. participating States concerning their own security.

Participants will also provide information bilaterally.

The participants undertake to inform the next C.S.C.E. Follow-up Meeting of their work and possible results and to exchange views, at that meeting, with the other C.S.C.E. participating States on progress achieved in the negotiation.

The participants foresee that, in the light of circumstances at the time, they will provide in their timetable for a temporary suspension to permit this exchange of views. The appropriate time and duration of this suspension is their sole responsibility.

Any modification of this mandate is the sole responsibility of the participants, whether they modify it themselves or concur in its modification at a future C.S.C.E. Follow-up Meeting.

The results of the negotiation will be determined only by the participants.

\* The participants will be guided by the language on non-circumvention as set out in the section on Objectives and Methods.

## CHARACTER OF AGREEMENTS

Agreements reached shall be internationally binding. Modalities for their entry into force will be decided at the negotiation.

## VENUE

The negotiation shall commence in Vienna no later than in the seventh week following the closure of the Vienna C.S.C.E. Follow-up Meeting.

The representatives of the 23 participants, whose initials appear below, have concluded the foregoing mandate, which is equally authentic in the English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish languages.

The representatives, recalling the commitment of their States to the achievement of a balanced outcome at the Vienna C.S.C.E. Meeting, have decided to transmit it to that Meeting with the recommendation that it be attached to its Concluding Document.

(Initialed by the representatives of the 23 States at the Palais Liechtenstein, Vienna, Austria, the 10th day of January 1989).

**Annex I (Mandate)****PROCEDURES FOR THE NEGOTIATION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE**

The representatives of the 23 states listed in the mandate, hereinafter referred to as "the participants", held consultations in Vienna from 17 February 1987 to 10 January 1989, and agreed on the following procedural arrangements for the conduct of the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

These procedural arrangements have been adopted by the consensus of the participants. They can be changed only by consensus of the participants.

**I. AGENDA**

1. Formal opening.
2. Negotiations, including presentation of proposals by the participants, elaboration of measures and procedures for their implementation, in accordance with the provisions of the mandate of the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

**II. WORK PROGRAMME**

The first plenary of the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe will open in Vienna at 3 pm on the Thursday of the week referred to in the section of the mandate on Venue. A work programme for the meetings of the plenary during the first fourteen days of the round is attached. Thereafter, the plenary will agree further work programmes for the remainder of the first round, and for subsequent rounds. A decision on the date for conclusion of the round will be taken at the first plenary.

In 1989, there will in principle be four rounds.

The participants will, in setting their timetable, take due account of the practical needs of all delegations, including those participating in other negotiations within the framework of the C.S.C.E. process.

**III. WORKING METHODS**

With the exception of the formal opening, all business under the agenda will—unless otherwise agreed—be dealt with in closed plenary and in such subsidiary working bodies as are established by the plenary. The work of such subsidiary bodies will be guided by the plenary.

Decisions shall be taken by consensus of the participants. Consensus shall be understood to mean the absence of any objection by any participant to the taking of the decision in question.

The proceedings of the negotiation shall be confidential unless otherwise agreed at the negotiation.

Unless otherwise agreed, only accredited representatives of the participants shall have access to meetings.

During the plenary meetings all participants shall be seated in the French alphabetical order.

**IV. LANGUAGES**

The official languages of the negotiation shall be: English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish. Statements made in any of these languages shall be interpreted into the other official languages.

**V. ROLE OF THE CHAIRMAN**

The Chairman of the first plenary will be the representative of Poland. The Chair thereafter will rotate weekly according to the French alphabetical order.

The chairman of each meeting shall keep a list of speakers and may declare it closed with the consent of the meeting. The chairman shall, however, accord the right of reply to any representative if a speech made following closure of the list makes this desirable.

If any representative raises a point of order during a discussion, the chairman shall give that representative the floor immediately. A representative raising a point of order may not speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

The chairman shall keep a journal which shall record the date of the plenary, and the names of the chairman of the plenary and of speakers in the plenary. The journal shall be handed from chairman to chairman. It shall be made available only to participants.

**VI. FINANCIAL ISSUES**

The following scale of distribution has been agreed for the common expenses of the negotiation subject to the reservation that the distribution in question concerns only this negotiation and shall not be considered a precedent which could be relied on in other circumstances:

9.95% for France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America.

6.25% for Canada

5.0 % for Spain

3.85% for Belgium, German Democratic Republic, Netherlands, Poland

2.25% for Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Hungary, Norway

0.85% for Greece, Romania, Turkey

0.65% for Bulgaria, Luxembourg, Portugal

0.15% for Iceland

Payment of contributions by the participants shall be made into a special account of the negotiation. Accounts shall be rendered by the host country in respect of each round or at intervals of 3 months, as appropriate. Accounts shall be expressed in the currency of the host country and shall be rendered as soon as technically possible after the termination of a billing period. Accounts shall be payable within 60 days of presentation in the currency of the host country.

#### VII. HOST COUNTRY SUPPORT

The government of Austria shall provide security and other necessary support services for the negotiation.

The host country shall be asked to appoint an administrator, agreed by the participants, to make and manage arrangements for the negotiation. The administrator shall be a national of the host country. The task of the administrator shall include, in liaison with the appropriate host country authorities:

- a. to arrange accreditation for the participants,
- b. to manage the facilities of the negotiation,
- c. to ensure the security of, and control access to, the facilities and meetings,
- d. to employ and manage interpretation staff,
- e. to make available appropriate technical equipment,
- f. to ensure the availability of translation services in all official languages; the practical arrangements for their use being agreed at the negotiation,
- g. to deal with financial matters,
- h. to make available to participants as necessary facilities for press briefings and to arrange appropriate media accreditation.

The administrator shall act at all times in conformity with these rules of procedure. Liaison between the administrator and the plenary will be effected by the chairman.

### **Annex II (Mandate)**

#### **MODALITIES FOR MEETINGS TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AND INFORMATION CONCERNING THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE**

The participants have, for their part, agreed the following modalities for the meetings which are to be held between participants in the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and other C.S.C.E. participating States.

Unless otherwise agreed, meetings will take place at least twice in the course of each round of the negotiation.

Meetings will not be extended beyond the day on which they convene, unless otherwise agreed.

The chair at the first meeting will be taken by the delegation chosen for this purpose by lot. The chair will then rotate among the 35 States represented in alphabetical order according to the French alphabet.

Further practical arrangements may, if necessary, be agreed by consensus, taking due regard of relevant precedents.



STATEMENT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF DENMARK

On behalf of the government of Denmark, I wish to confirm that the Faroe Islands are included in the area of application for the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

STATEMENT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF NORWAY

On behalf of the government of Norway, I confirm that Svalbard including Bear Island, is included in the area of application for the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

STATEMENT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF PORTUGAL

The islands of Azores and Madeira have by right the status of European Islands. It has been agreed in the mandate that all the European island territories of the participants are included in the area of application. I can therefore state on behalf of my government that the Azores and Madeira are within the area of application for the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

STATEMENT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF SPAIN

On behalf of the government of Spain, I confirm that the Canary Islands are included in the area of application for the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

STATEMENT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST  
REPUBLICS

On behalf of the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I confirm that Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya are included in the area of application for the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

This statement will be an Annex to the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting and will be published with it.

*Source: Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting 1986 of Representatives of the Participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Held on the Basis of the Provisions of the Final Act Relating to the Follow-up to the Conference, pp. 14-16, 42-57.*

# Appendix VII: The Warsaw Pact's July, 1988, and March, 1989, Position Papers on C.F.E., and its October, 1988, and March, 1989, Position Papers on C.D.E.-2

STATEMENT BY THE MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION  
on Talks on the Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments in Europe  
July 1988

The Warsaw Treaty member states believe that the interests of European and universal security urgently call for sizable cuts in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe—from the Atlantic to the Urals. They are for talks on this issue to open without delay, in 1988.

The allied states are convinced that the priority objective of these talks is to ensure a radical reduction in the military potentials of both alliances and secure such a situation in the continent in which the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries would have the forces and armaments needed for defence but insufficient for a surprise attack and offensive operations. This would enhance military-political stability and security in Europe in conditions where the U.S.S.R.-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and shorter-Range Missiles is in effect, and facilitate further movement along the path of promoting disarmament, strengthening trust and lowering the threat of war.

The Warsaw Treaty member states proceed from the premise that cuts in armed forces and conventional armaments will be accompanied by a corresponding curtailment of military spending.

Acting on the basis of their joint programme for reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, which they put forward in Budapest in June 1986 and supplemented in Berlin in May 1987, the Warsaw Treaty member states are for the following issues to be resolved during the first phase of the relevant talks.

## 1. Achieving Equal Lowered Levels

The ultimate goal of the first phase of the talks should be achieving roughly equal (balanced) collective levels as regards troop strength and the amount of

conventional armaments for the states members of the two military-political alliances. These levels would be lower than those currently existing on either side.

The process of attaining such levels would be taking place by phases on the European and the regional scale. First of all, it would be expedient to concentrate on the issues of mutually eliminating the imbalances and asymmetries in individual types of conventional arms and in the armed forces of the two military-political alliances in Europe.

The imbalances and asymmetries would be removed by withdrawing forces from the reduction area and subsequently disbanding them or by disbanding them on the spot, as well as by using other possible measures. The arms and military equipment to be reduced would be eliminated on specially assigned sites or be turned over by agreement to be used for peaceful purposes. Provision could be made for storing part of the arms and equipment on a temporary basis. Such storage sites would be kept under constant international control.

The attainment of the final goal of the first phase would lay the groundwork for further significant mutual cuts in troops and armaments. At the second phase the armed forces of each side would be reduced by approximately 25 per cent (by some 500,000 men) with their organic armaments; at the third phase the reduction of the armed forces and conventional armaments would be continued and the armed forces of both sides would acquire a strictly defensive nature.

The Warsaw Treaty member states consider it expedient that all the participants in the talks should not, from the moment they begin and until the agreements achieved at them become effective, take steps running counter to the objectives of the talks, in particular should not build up their armed forces and conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals.

With the agreement's entry into force, all the participants in the negotiations would pledge not to build up their armed forces and conventional armaments in the territory that might be left outside that covered by the initial cuts.

## 2. Preventing a Surprise Attack

Measures to reduce and eliminate the danger of surprise attack would be an integral part of the process of reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe.

For this purpose, starting from the first phase, corridors (zones) with a lower arms level would be created along the line of contact between the two military-political alliances, from which the more dangerous destabilising types of conventional arms would be removed or reduced. As a result, military potentials in these corridors (zones) would be kept at a level ensuring only a defensive capability but ruling out the possibility of a surprise attack.

The depth of the corridors (zones) with a lowered arms level could be agreed on the basis of geostrategic factors, the combat and technical characteristics of the principal types of arms and other criteria.

These steps would be accompanied by agreed confidence-building measures which would limit military activity in the corridors (zones),

providing correspondingly a stiffer regime closer to the line of contact. They would cover, in particular, the scale and number of simultaneous exercises, the duration and frequency of exercises, as well as a ban on major exercises, and restrictions on troops movements.

### 3. Data Exchange and Verification

With a view to determining the correlation of forces between the two military-political alliances and detecting imbalances and asymmetries in the armed forces and conventional armaments on the European and the regional scale early in the talks or, if possible, even before their commencement, relevant initial data essential for conducting the negotiations would be mutually exchanged. Provision would also be made for the possibility of verifying these data with the start of the talks by means of on-site inspections.

An effective system would be created for verifying compliance with the accords to be reached at the talks, by using national technical means and international procedures, including on-site inspections without the right to refuse them. Checkpoints would be set up both along and inside the corridors (zones) with a lowered arms level and in the reduction area (at railway stations and junctions, airfields and ports). Verification would be effected of the process of reducing, eliminating (dismantling) and storing arms and of disbanding military units, as well as of troop activities and the limit on the number of troops and armaments remaining after the cuts.

An international verification commission would be formed and vested with extensive powers (in terms of monitoring, inspections, dealing with contentious issues, etc.).

The Warsaw Treaty member states believe that a considerable reduction and subsequent elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, including munitions for dual-capable systems, would be an important measure towards reducing the war danger and creating a more stable situation in Europe. They reaffirm their proposal for an early opening of relevant talks and conducting them with a view to concluding a mutually acceptable agreement.

The Warsaw Treaty member states proceed from the premise that there is a close relationship between the process of reducing armed forces and conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals and the continued development and broadening of confidence- and security-building measures in Europe within the C.S.C.E. framework. They maintain that the second phase of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe should continue to examine the issues left unresolved at the Conference's first phase, particularly those concerning the extension of confidence-building measures to cover the activity of air forces and navies, and to agree on new-generation confidence-building measures, including those of a restrictive nature. All these measures would contribute to lowering the risk of a surprise attack and promoting openness and predictability in the military field.

The Warsaw Treaty member states are prepared to discuss other possible measures and proposals for strengthening stability in Europe at ever lower levels of armed forces and armaments, with the principles of equality and equal

security being observed and the agreements reached being made effectively verifiable.

*Source: Documents of the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member States (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1988).*

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### **Eduard Shevardnadze's Address in Vienna**

March 6, 1989

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen:

We are opening unique negotiations—unique not only as regards their formula, format, and set of participants. Memory prompts us that never before has an undertaking with so momentous an objective been conceived.

Reason convinces us that the road leading to that objective is the right one.

Instinct tells us that the willingness to reach the end of the road is common to all of us.

The very opportunity that has been offered to us is unique.

Political intuition and objective analysis make us conclude that if we make use of this opportunity, we will obtain a Europe of a new quality and value.

We are in effect opening negotiations not just on reducing troops and conventional arms and on confidence-building measures—we are undertaking the task of overcoming the split of Europe.

As we get under way, it is appropriate to present our vision of the current state of affairs and of the goals shared by all.

The better we know each other's views, the easier it will be to identify reasonable defense requirements of the European countries. Furthermore, reasonable requirements can only be identified on the basis of reasonable perceptions.

Well, today more than ever before, reason is a solid pillar of politics, and this, I believe, is also a unique feature of the moment and the greatest achievement of the new times. Being very different in terms of outlook, convictions, and value systems, and having no intention of giving them up, we have finally been able to perceive ourselves as a single nucleus of the European entity.

The negotiations of 35 and of 23—the two new branches of Helsinki—are starting at a time when things in Europe that only a few years ago seemed impossible have become routine.

The routine nature of these things reveals new standards of international existence.

Soviet and American nuclear missiles are being destroyed as a matter of routine.

Inspections of military facilities are being conducted on a workaday basis.

Notifications of planned military exercises, troop movements and strategic missile launches are being sent in an equally ordinary way.

These routine things have become the norm, the rule, the canon. It is our

duty to extend that also to the reduction of conventional armed forces.

In fact, they are already being reduced—reduced unilaterally by the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia—reduced on a large scale. Thus deeds come ahead of words; obligations precede agreements.

Already during this year the Soviet armed forces deployed in the allied countries of Eastern Europe will be cut by over 20,000 men, 2,700 tanks and 300 combat airplanes. Twenty-four tactical missile launchers will be withdrawn from the German Democratic Republic.

By 1991 the armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty countries will have been reduced by 300,000 men, 12,000 tanks, and 930 combat airplanes.

The composition of the remaining Soviet units and formations in those countries will also change substantially. There will be 40 per cent fewer tanks in motorized rifle divisions and 20 percent fewer tanks in tank divisions.

This diplomacy of example, diplomacy of deeds, calls for something more than just a chorus of praise and approval. Let those in the West who are applauding our unilateral steps respond with a step of their own in those categories of arms where they have an advantage.

However substantial the numerical reductions may be, their main significance probably lies in the political signal that they send.

The actions taken by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries reflect, above all, a new approach to assessing the probability and degree of military threat posed by the West. They reflect growing confidence that security can to an increasing extent be assured by nonmilitary means. The outdated criterion that the more weapons, the better the guarantee of security has been replaced by a single and ever-present resource—an emerging factor of trust.

For our part we would like to hope that our way of thinking and acting is no longer identified in the west with ill will or evil intentions.

The mutual “image of the enemy” that used to pervade both Western and our propaganda is giving way to a more objective and serious look at each other.

Let us together pledge that, that image, which not only affects people’s feelings but also leaves a grave imprint on policy making, dialogue and communication, shall not burden these negotiations.

Now, let me present to you our specific positions.

They call for a three-stage reduction of armed forces in Europe down to a level sufficient exclusively for defense.

Recently NATO, too, has put forward a proposal of stability at lower levels of armaments.

These two approaches can be bridged. Notwithstanding serious differences, they can be brought together. For both NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization call for eliminating the potential for carrying out a surprise attack and for launching large-scale offensive operations. Furthermore, both sides believe that a lower level of over-all military confrontation in Europe has to be attained.

That is already a kind of starting point for the negotiations, which isn’t bad.

This is what we propose. In the first phase, with a duration of two or three years, imbalances and asymmetries would be eliminated, as regards both troop numbers and the main categories of arms.

To achieve this, it is proposed that reduction focus on the most destabilizing kinds and categories of arms, such as attack combat airplanes of tactical aviation, tanks, combat helicopters, combat armored vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and artillery, including multiple rocket launcher systems and mortars.

NATO and the Warsaw Treaty would reduce their armed forces and conventional arms down to equal collective ceilings, which would be 10–15 percent lower than the lowest levels possessed by either of the political–military alliances.

A small remark here. We do not know what proposals our negotiating partners from NATO will bring to this rostrum, but it is clear from our discussions that they would prefer not to affect troop numbers and would artificially restrict the list of destabilizing armaments subject to priority reductions.

Let me ask: What kind of reductions are these if they do not affect the main component of armed forces—their personnel? And surely airplanes and helicopters can be used for a surprise attack.

The next element: Along the line of contact of the two political–military alliances, strips (zones) with lower levels of arms would be set up, in which the most dangerous destabilizing kinds of arms would be subject to withdrawal, reduction, or limitation, and limitations would be imposed on military activities.

Tactical nuclear arms would also be withdrawn from these zones. Nuclear weapon delivery vehicles would be pulled back from the line of contact to a distance that would make it impossible for them to reach the other side's territory.

All of these elements are treated in detail in the proposals of our allies.

In the second phase, also lasting two or three years, further cuts would be carried out to reduce the equal levels attained during the first phase on an equal-percentage basis.

During this stage the armed forces of each side would be reduced by another 25 per cent, that is, by approximately 500,000 men, with their organic armaments. At the same time, other categories of arms would be reduced, and further steps would be taken to restructure the armed forces based on the principles of sufficiency for defense.

Finally, during the third phase, the armed forces would be given a strictly defensive character, and agreements would be reached on ceilings limiting all other categories of arms and based on the principles of armed forces development by which the participating countries would have to abide.

One of the most difficult problems, it would seem, is how to avoid the sterile data debate which Vienna has already heard as the requiem for talks on disarmament in Central Europe.

Even now it is clear that the published figures are causing a great deal of mutual arguments and objections. That is understandable. Differing approaches were applied, and, hence, the conclusions turned out to be different. We would think that it is not productive now to argue who is right and who is wrong.

Wouldn't it be better just to avoid sterile arguments about data while giving priority to strategy and big politics?

We are not citing any absolute figures for future ceilings. This is what experts should work on. It is up to them to develop a common approach, a single method of account, which must be scientific, fair, and objective.

Any ingenious stratagem or undisguised attempt to retain an advantage in a particular kind of arms could torpedo the negotiations.

This is not a matter of arithmetic but more properly of morality. Honesty and fair play are indispensable components of the process of negotiations.

If we—both in the West and in the East—are convinced that growing trust creates an opportunity to lower military confrontation, that conviction should be translated in practice into greater openness and *glasnost*, and lower levels of troops and armaments. The only correct and acceptable way to achieve security is to create a situation that rules out mutual threats.

That is why we are saying that at each stage of the process of disarmament the interests of mutual security must be observed. Without that we shall not be able to stop the arms race. It cannot be stopped selectively. True, we can move faster in one area while postponing a decision in another, but it would be naive to think that one has no relation to the other. And since that is so, we have to take, so to say, a broad-spectrum approach, to move ahead, across the broadest front of disarmament, ridding ourselves of nuclear, chemical, conventional, and any other weapons.

We continue to be fully confident of an early conclusion of the Soviet-American treaty to reduce strategic offensive arms by 50 percent. We hope that the day of the signing of the convention banning and eliminating chemical weapons is not far off.

I also want to emphasize that the Vienna mandate is based on the Madrid mandate, which provides that confidence- and security-building measures must apply not only to Europe but also to the adjacent sea area and the air space above it.

In going back to this question it is not at all our aim formally to reaffirm our position about the need to include naval armaments, too, within the context of confidence-building measures.

Technological advances are changing the role of those armaments. As ships are equipped with long-range cruise missiles, which even conventionally armed can perform strategic tasks, attack capabilities of naval fleets will be even more powerful than they are now. Surface ships and submarines are becoming ideal offensive weapons, best fit for surprise attack.

Measures that give ground forces a strictly defensive structure, withdrawals of tanks and artillery, and all other steps to rule out surprise attack logically bring about the need for serious efforts to limit destabilizing functions and capabilities of naval forces.

The issue of naval forces has been raised on the eve of these negotiations, not as a condition but with only one aim in mind: We have to understand clearly even now that the scope of eventual agreements will, to some extent, be affected by, among others things, the factor of naval arms.

This is equally true of the question of modernizing tactical nuclear arms, if such plans are translated into practical actions.

The reason is not only that modernization is a way to maintain and build up nuclear arsenals.

What is more, it can destroy the fragile trust that has just begun to emerge in



Europe as a result of decisions that are genuinely significant militarily, and important politically and psychologically.

If that happens, Europe will be pushed back to what it was before the conclusion of the Soviet–American treaty eliminating I.N.F. missiles.

The Soviet Union proposes that separate negotiations be started as soon as possible on reducing and completely eliminating tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

What Europe needs is not modernization of missiles but a modernized system of security based on drastic reductions of troops and armaments.

But even then, we would, of course, have to be confident that the new formula for security would work in all situations.

To have such confidence, the most rigorous and reliable verification must be assured. As we see it, that should not be a big problem. In principle we know how it could be done. What is more, we have systems in operation and well-tested methods of control and verification. The implementation of the Stockholm Agreements and the practice of monitoring compliance with Soviet–American agreements make us confident that the problem of verification can be solved in this area as well.

We shall insist on the most stringent and rigorous verification, including inspections without right of refusal, aerial monitoring of the situation and checking the routes of communication used to reinforce troops and equipment.

In other words, there is no verification measure that we would not be ready to consider and to accept on the basis of reciprocity.

Such is our long-term program for reducing conventional armed forces.

Its implementation begins, naturally, with first steps. Let us try to take them and to conclude the initial agreement within a short time.

We have all that is needed for that.

At the negotiations of 35 we would like not only to improve what was done in Stockholm but also to reach agreement on a new generation of large-scale confidence-building measures under which openness and *glasnost* would go hand in hand with limitations of all kinds of military activities and with confidence-building measures extended to naval and air forces.

Neutral and nonaligned countries could play an important role here. We for our part will do our best to make sure that their security interests are fully taken into account.

Let me add another remark.

The evolution of the situation in some regions adjoining Europe makes one think of new dimensions of European security.

In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, that is, in close proximity to Europe, powerful weapons arsenals are being created. It is not enough just to mention that 25,000 tanks and 4,500 aircraft are deployed and ready for combat in the Middle East, and there is a real danger of nuclear and chemical weapons appearing there: Missiles have already appeared with an operational range of 2,500 kilometers, that is to say, of precisely the same class that is being eliminated from Europe. This new situation is emerging against the background of the mounting trend toward European disarmament. The conclusion is obvious: The processes of disarmament in Europe and settlement in the Middle East have to be synchronized.

While the Mediterranean is, in some way, joining in the C.S.C.E. process, the

Middle East and Southwest Asia remain outside our collective concern. I say collective concern because certain attempts are being made on an individual basis.

Today they are clearly insufficient.

While welcoming the Europeans' Middle East initiative, the Soviet Union is calling for joining the efforts of all permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the U.N. Secretary-General, and the European community and helping the peoples of the region to establish peace, put an end to the arms race and initiate wide-range economic and environmental cooperation. To do so, it is imperative to get rid of the rudimentary mentality that requires acting against each other rather than together with others. There should be no playing on any contradictions—whether it is Israel's conflict with the Arabs or the difficulties in the West's relations with Iran.

There should be respect for the values of those with whom we coexist on our planet—even if they do not fit our own standards.

Going back now to the topic of the coming negotiations of 23 and 35, let me express confidence that they have good chances for success.

I want to assure you that the Soviet Union will do its best to help them succeed. It will do so guided by our view of today's world and of ways to assure its security and solve global and regional problems, as set forth by Mikhail Gorbachev at the session of the United Nations General Assembly.

We have a difficult road ahead of us. Our experience—the experience of five Soviet–American summits and more than 30 ministerial meetings—tells us that without such intensive work on problems of real disarmament, there would be no treaty eliminating I.N.F. missiles today.

These negotiations will require something similar, but on a larger scale. At certain stages the matter could be considered at the highest level. It is possible that more than one C.S.C.E. summit meeting would be required. We have to anticipate that at decisive moments, possibly twice a year, foreign ministers might have to meet in order to keep the fire burning at these negotiations and to prepare for the summit.

In this area, which is of major importance for the future of Europe, there is a need for maximum concentration of efforts and active cooperation among all states participating in the Helsinki process.

We are firmly counting on that.

Let me wish the participants in these negotiations an early and productive implementation of the mandate.

Our wholehearted gratitude goes to Austria, which has assumed the difficult function of hosting these talks. We thank the government of the republic and the Austrian people.

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**WARSAW PACT POSITION PAPER ON C.F.E.****Conceptual Approach to the Reduction of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe  
March 9, 1989**

The parties to the agreement will be: Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

The Warsaw Treaty member States believe that the agreement should have the following objectives: to strengthen stability and security in Europe through deep cuts in conventional armed forces, including conventional armaments and equipment, of the Warsaw Treaty member States and of the NATO member countries so as to establish in this way a balance at lower levels at which both military alliances will keep forces and systems necessary solely for defense and insufficient to launch surprise attack or conduct offensive operations; to restructure and redeploy their armed forces on strictly defensive principles.

The process of strengthening stability and security on the European continent should proceed stage by stage and in a manner that will not upset the overall balance or prejudice anyone's security at all stages of the negotiations.

These objectives could be achieved through reductions, limitations, appropriate redeployment measures, equal collective ceilings on armed forces and conventional armaments both throughout the European zone and in its individual regions. The scope and procedure of reduction of national and foreign troops down to agreed levels would be decided upon with each alliance on the basis of the principles and criteria to be agreed at the negotiation.

The reductions in conventional armed forces and armaments will be effected on the basis of reciprocity, with all the Participating States without exception making their appropriate contributions with account taken of their military potentials.

The reductions will be accompanied by corresponding cuts in military expenditures and by measures to convert their conventional armed forces and armaments.

These objectives can be achieved both through agreed steps and unilateral measures to reduce their armed forces and armaments.

The zone of application of agreement would cover the entire land territory of the Participating States in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, including a part of the Asian territory of Turkey and the Soviet Transcaucasus as well as all the European Island territories of the Participating States including the Faroe Islands, Svalbard, the Islands of Azores and Madeira, the Canary Islands, Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya.

At the first stage of reductions which would begin not later than 1991 and end in 1994 all the Participating States would eliminate imbalances and asymmetries between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty as regards both troop numbers and main armaments and would make steps to eliminate the capability to launch surprise attack or initiate large-scale offensive action.

To this end attention would be focused on reducing the most destabilizing

types and categories of armaments such as attack combat aircraft of short-range tactical aviation, tanks, combat helicopters, combat armoured vehicles and armoured personnel carriers, artillery including multiple launch rocket systems and mortars.

The Participating States would reduce their conventional armed forces and armaments down to equal collective ceilings that would be 10–15% lower than the lowest levels possessed by the military political alliances. These ceilings would be agreed between the Participating States in absolute terms. They believe that after the first-stage reductions, by 1994 such collective ceilings for member States of either of the military political alliances could be approximately established for strength of the armed forces, number of attack aircraft, tanks, combat helicopters, combat armoured vehicles and armoured personnel carriers, artillery including multiple launch rocket systems and mortars.

Definitions would be worked out for each category of armaments including a list of concrete systems pertaining to them as well as rules of accounting for the purposes of unified data exchange. Such data can be presented with regard to each individual Participating State including data on the troops stationed in the territory of any other Participating State in the zone of agreements. Both general and random verification of data can be undertaken following their presentation.

The reduction of armed forces could be implemented through disbandment of the troops being reduced or their withdrawal from the territory of another State and subsequent disbandment.

The armaments and equipment being reduced are eliminated under agreed procedures at specially assigned locations or are converted for civilian use. A part of the armaments and equipment are put in temporary storage under international control.

As regards surprise attack prevention measures, starting with the first stage onwards, zones of reduced levels of armaments would be established along the line of contact between the two military political alliances, from where the most dangerous destabilizing types of conventional armaments and equipment would be pulled out, reduced, or limited and where limitations would be

The establishment of such zones in Central Europe and in other regions of the European continent could be effected on the basis of the existing and possible new proposals.

The depth of such zones could be agreed with account taken of geographical factors and performance characteristics of the main types of armaments.

Confidence- and security-building measures would limit military activities within the strips (zones) and would, appropriately, provide for an increasingly rigorous regime as the line of contact is approached. In particular, they would affect the scope and number of concurrent exercises, the duration and frequency of exercises and envisage a ban on large-scale exercises and limitations on troop transfers.

The Second Stage (1994–1997). Subject to the attainment, as a result of the first stage, of lower equal ceilings, the Participating States will implement subsequent reductions on an equal-percentage basis.

At the second stage the armed forces of each side would be cut approximately by 25% (by about 500,000 men) with their organic armaments.

Along with further substantial lowering of the levels of the most destabilizing types and categories of armaments the Participating States shall take steps to reduce other categories of armaments not affected by the first-stage cuts.

The Participating States will make further steps to restructure their armed forces on the basis of the principle of sufficiency for defense.

They will elaborate and make agreed steps to develop predictability and openness in day-to-day military activities and to lower their levels.

The Third Stage (1997–2000). During the third stage further reductions of armed forces and conventional armaments shall be implemented and the armed forces of the Participating States will be given a strictly defensive character.

The Participating States will reach agreement on ceilings on all other categories of armaments.

The Participating States will reach agreements on the principles of armed forces development by which they will abide in the future for the purposes of maintaining a secure and stable peace in Europe.

Verification. The Participating States will agree to exchange data regarding manpower strength, number of conventional armaments, and deployment of military formations and to verify them, including through on-site inspections.

There would be envisaged the establishment of a comprehensive and effective system of verification of compliance with agreements including land and air on-site inspections without the right to refuse. There would be created checkpoints to monitor entry/exit both along and inside the strips (zones) of reduced levels of armaments and in the reduction area (at railway stations, junctions, airfields, ports). Such technical means of verification as artificial Earth satellites, aircraft, helicopters, ground automatic recording systems, including the ones developed through international cooperation, could also be used for the purposes of verification.

There would be verification of the process of reduction, elimination (Dis-mantlement, conversion) and storage of armaments, disbandment of formations and units, non-excess of the strength of armed forces and the number of armaments as well as of the activities of the troops remaining after reductions.

An international verification (consultative) commission would be set up and given wide powers (observation, inspection, consideration of disputes, etc.), which would be made up of representatives of the Participating States.

A prominent part in the implementation of verification and control measures should be played by the highest representative bodies—Parliaments, National Assemblies and the Supreme Soviet—which could act as guarantors of the reductions and redeployment of the armed forces and conventional armaments of the appropriate countries. Related matters could be discussed within the framework of foreign and military affairs committees and be reflected in appropriate statements to be made on behalf of the parliaments.

The Warsaw Treaty member States also envisage that the provisions of the Agreement will not be aimed against any other countries or their security interests and will not be construed as prejudicial to other international treaties concluded by the Participating States.

For the purposes of ensuring the viability and effectiveness of agreements each Participating State will not circumvent their provisions or assume international obligations which would conflict with the Agreement.

STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS FOR FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS OF THE WARSAW TREATY ON CONFIDENCE- AND  
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN  
EUROPE

October 28–29, 1988

The States party to the Warsaw Treaty believe that confidence- and security-building measures as significant means and stimulating factors can facilitate the reduction of military threat and the achievement of real disarmament, as well as the strengthening of peace and stability in relations between States.

From the point of view of improving the political atmosphere, the importance of measures adopted at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe in September 1986 is becoming apparent to the extent of their implementation. The Stockholm Document demonstrates that important security issues can be solved by political will and mutual efforts by all interested States in the Spirit of new thinking. The resumption of the work of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and the further implementation of the Stockholm Document and its provisions broaden the perspectives for negotiations concerning both more significant confidence- and security-building measures and the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe.

Further improvement of confidence- and security-building measures on the European continent is of particular significance today when the 23 States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and NATO are preparing to enter into negotiations of a unique scope and importance on armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. In the view of the allied socialist countries military confidence- and security-building measures and efforts towards the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments are interrelated. Further steps in the field of confidence- and security-building measures facilitate progress towards the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe and the solution of other disarmament issues, which in turn would create favorable conditions to increased confidence.

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States party to the Warsaw Treaty believe that the negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe should be continued as early as 1988. In order to reduce military confrontation and the risk of an armed conflict in Europe, to reduce and avert the danger of a surprise attack and to enhance mutual security, to lend a strictly defensive character to military activities and to increase their openness and predictability as well as to promote the implementation of disarmament measures, the negotiations should make it possible that the measures elaborated ultimately cover the activity of all elements of armed forces (ground, air and naval forces) of the States participating in the process of security and co-operation in Europe (C.S.C.E.). The creation, on an equal basis, of mechanisms and procedures for contacts and consultations would also serve these objectives.

Confidence- and security-building measures should be applied to all the military activities of the participating States that affect European security or constitute part of military actions taking place within the boundaries of

Europe. These measures should be substantial, militarily effective and politically binding.

The military confidence- and security-building measures should be worked out and introduced gradually, taking into account the military and geographical realities in Europe and the level of mutual understanding among States.

Being an important element of the all-European process the negotiations should be conducted on the basis of the Madrid mandate, including the objectives, the principles, the subject of negotiations, the zone of application of confidence- and security-building measures, the rules of procedure contained in the mandate, and should be in accordance with the Concluding Document of the Vienna follow-up meeting.

It would be expedient to continue efforts at the negotiations to develop and expand the existing confidence- and security-building measures, and a new set of measures could also be worked out on the basis of proposals by the participating States.

Agreements to be reached in the course of the negotiations by the 23 and the 35 States respectively should be in harmony with each other and should complement and reinforce each other.

In the view of the States party to the Warsaw Treaty a new generation of confidence- and security-building measures could be worked out in the following main directions:

1. *Constraining measures*

These measures would apply to the size and number of simultaneous military exercises, the duration and frequency of military exercises, ban large-scale military exercises and restrict the redeployment of troops and technical equipment. Moreover, they would envisage the limitation of the number of combat-readiness (alertness) military exercises and the number of troops engaged; they would affect the series of large-scale military exercises constituting a unified military exercise by concept, and would also envisage restraint on military activities in the vicinity of the borders of the participating States.

2. *New confidence- and security-building measures*

These would include prior notification of independent activities by air and naval forces, invitation of observers according to appropriate parameters, inspection of such activities and agreement on restricting measures, modalities of the exchange of annual calendars of such activities; extension of confidence- and security-building measures to the territories of all the countries participating in the C.S.C.E. process; creation of zones of confidence and security in Europe and the adjoining seas and oceans; and also the possibility of working out such confidence- and security-building measures that envisage more stringent regimes on the basis of the closeness to line of contact between the military-political alliances or other States. Measures to avoid incidents on seas and oceans adjoining Europe and in the airspace thereof would also be co-ordinated.

Different aspects of military doctrines could be discussed and compared in the course of or in connection with the negotiations. Issues related to freeze on and reduction of military budgets could also be explored.

The States party to the Warsaw Treaty believe that the establishment of a European center for reducing military threat and preventing surprise attack would signify a qualitatively new step in reinforcing mutual confidence. The task of such a center would be to exchange information and to maintain contacts as well as to hold consultations primarily for the operative settlement of events giving rise to concern or suspicion.

3. *Measures to increase the openness and predictability of military activities: inspection, exchange of information and consultations*

These measures would cover regular exchange of data on armed forces and their activities, including forces deployed at military bases around Europe; exchange of information on the structure and substance of military budgets; refraining from building up armed forces and renouncing the establishment of new military bases on the territories of foreign States; setting up observation posts at agreed sites (points) within the zone of application of confidence- and security-building measures; creation of special operative communication links between the interested countries; improving conditions for inspection and working opportunities for observers; the use of the latest technical equipment; developing relations between political and military representatives of the participating States; and broadening the present practice of exchange of military-diplomatic representations and military delegations.

Other measures promoting mutual understanding and enhancing confidence and security could also be adopted.

The idea and proposals by the States party to the Warsaw Treaty concerning confidence- and security-building measures are based on the defensive nature of their military doctrine. Their implementation is meant to make the military potentials of the participating States become strictly defensive in nature.

In connection with this, the States represented at the meeting stand for the elimination of military bases on foreign territories and reaffirm their position concerning the simultaneous dissolution of the military-political alliances.

In the opinion of the States party to the Warsaw Treaty, the convening of an all-European summit meeting to explore issues concerning the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, with the participation of the United States and Canada, would also contribute to the elaboration and implementation of new confidence- and security-building measures.

The States party to the Warsaw Treaty are ready to study other possible proposals aiming to enhance mutual confidence and security and to accelerate the process of disarmament in Europe.

Budapest, October 29, 1988

\* \* \*



**WARSAW PACT PROPOSALS FOR C.D.E.-2 OF MARCH 9, 1989**  
(As Summarized by Western Participants)

Bulgaria introduced the Eastern proposal on behalf of the Warsaw Pact. The proposal was cosponsored by Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, but supported by all Pact members. The main elements (taken from an unofficial translation) are:

**SECTION 1: Constraining Measures**

1. Limitation of notifiable military activities including practice alerts, involving over 40,000 troops.
2. No more than 3 notifiable activities to be carried out simultaneously on the territory of a participating state. The total number of troops involved concurrently to be limited to 40,000.
3. No more than 2 notifiable activities involving 25,000 troops to be carried out on the territory of each participating state annually.
4. No more than 40,000 troops at any one time to be engaged in a series of exercises carried out in close proximity to one another, even if the exercises have no formal link.

**SECTION 2: Naval and Air CSBMs**

1. Notification of air exercises involving over 150 combat aircraft, or 130 combat aircraft in the air simultaneously, or more than 500 sorties.
2. Notification of transfers of more than 70 combat aircraft into the zone or within it.
3. Observation of air exercises involving over 300 combat aircraft or over 600 sorties.
4. Limits on air exercises involving more than 600 combat aircraft or 1800 sorties.
5. Inclusion of air activities in annual calendars.

**B. Naval Forces**

1. Notification of naval exercises involving over 20 combat ships of more than 1500 tons each, or over 5 ships with at least one over 5000 tons and equipped with cruise missiles or aircraft, or over 80 combat aircraft.
2. Notification of transfers into or within the zone of naval groups of over 10 ships of more than 1500 tons each, or over 5 ships of which at least one is over 5000 tons and equipped with cruise missiles or aircraft.
3. Notification of "Marine Force Transfers" involving over 3000 men to the territory of another state.
4. Notification of transfers to the territory of another state of over 30 naval combat aircraft.
5. Observation of exercises involving over 25 combat ships of more than 1500 tons each or over 100 combat aircraft.
6. Limitation of exercises of over 50 combat ships.
7. Naval exercises to be limited to 10 to 14 days.
8. No more than 6 to 8 naval exercises by each state annually.
9. Prohibition of notifiable naval exercises in areas of intense civil activity or areas of "international significance."
10. Inclusion of naval activities in annual calendars.

11. Conclusion of an agreement on prevention of incidents in Sea areas and air space adjoining Europe.

SECTION 3: Development and amplification of Stockholm Document

1. Lower thresholds for notification and observation of land force activities.
2. Additional information in annual calendars.
3. Improved observation modalities, including aerial observation and aerial survey of the exercise area.

SECTION 4: Zones

1. Establishment of zones involving special limits on force levels and activities.
2. Possible measures to include restructuring of formation, stricter notification and observation thresholds and stricter constraint measures. Verification to include e.g., observation posts in agreed locations. A central European zone to include e.g., FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary.

SECTION 5: Improved openness and predictability of military activities, exchange of information and consultations and verification

1. Regular exchanges of information on the number, structure and deployment of land, naval and air forces disaggregated to brigade/regiment or equivalent formations.
2. Voluntary provision of additional information not covered by the agreement.
3. Periodic discussion of military doctrine and other aspects of policy.
4. Enhanced arrangements for exchange of official visits.
5. Regular bilateral or multilateral consultations on CSBM issues.
6. Use of automatic/remote-control verification equipment.
7. Establishment of a risk-reduction center.
8. Development of a special communication system e.g., for resolving disputes.

# Appendix VIII: NATO's December, 1988, and March, 1989, Position Papers on C.F.E. and C.D.E.-2

STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL  
MEETING IN MINISTERIAL SESSION AT NATO HEADQUARTERS,  
BRUSSELS

DECEMBER 8-9, 1988

In their statement, "Conventional Arms Control: The Way Ahead," the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in March 1988 emphasized that the imbalance in conventional forces remains at the core of Europe's security concerns. We shall be presenting specific proposals at the negotiating table to redress this imbalance.

We look forward to the early commencement of the two negotiations we have proposed: one on conventional stability between the 23 members of the two military alliances in Europe and one on confidence- and security-building measures among all 35 signatories of the Helsinki Final Act.

In these negotiations we will be guided by:

- the conviction that the existing military confrontation is the result, not the cause, of the painful division of Europe;
- the principle of the indivisible security of all our nations. We shall reject calls for partial security arrangements or proposals aimed at separate agreements;
- the hope that the new thinking in the Soviet Union will open the way for mutual agreement on realistic, militarily significant and verifiable arrangements which enhance security at lower levels.

## TOWARDS STABILITY

The major threat to stability in Europe comes from those weapons systems which are capable of mounting large-scale offensive operations and of seizing and holding territory. These are above all main battle tanks, artillery and armoured troop carriers. It is in these very systems that the East has such a massive preponderance. Indeed, the Soviet Union itself possesses more tanks and artillery than all the other members of the Warsaw Pact and the Alliance combined. And they are concentrated in a manner which raises grave concerns about the strategy which they are intended to support as well as their role in maintaining the division in Europe.

The reductions announced by the Soviet Union are a positive contribution to correcting this situation. They indicate the seriousness with which the conventional imbalances which we have long highlighted as a key problem of European security are now also addressed by the Soviet government. We also welcome the declared readiness of the Soviet Union to adjust their force posture. The important thing is now to build on these hopeful developments at the negotiating table in order to correct the large asymmetries that will still remain and to secure a balance at lower levels of forces. For this, it will be necessary to deal with the location, nationality and the state of readiness of forces, as well as their numbers. Our proposals will address these issues in the following specific ways:

— We shall propose an overall limit on the total holdings of armaments in Europe. This limit should be substantially lower than existing levels, in the case of tanks close to a half. This would mean an overall limit of about 40,000 tanks.

— In our concept of stability, no country should be able to dominate the continent by force of arms. We shall therefore also propose that no country should be entitled to possess more than a fixed proportion, such as 30 percent, of the total holdings in Europe of the 23 participants in each equipment category. In the case of tanks, this would result in an entitlement of no more than about 12,000 tanks for any one country.

— Our proposal will apply to the whole of Europe. In order to avoid undue concentration of these weapon categories in certain areas of Europe, we shall propose appropriate sub-limits.

To buttress the resulting reductions in force levels in the whole of Europe, we shall propose stabilizing measures. These could include measures of transparency, notifications and constraint applied to the deployment, movement, and levels of readiness of conventional armed forces, which include conventional armaments and equipment.

Finally, we shall require a rigorous and reliable regime for monitoring and verification. This would include the periodic exchange of detailed data about forces and deployments, and the right to conduct on-site inspections.

#### TOWARDS TRANSPARENCY

Greater transparency is an essential requirement for real stability. Therefore, within the framework of the C.S.C.E. process, the negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures form an essential complement to those on conventional stability. We are encouraged thus far by the successful implementation of the Stockholm Document and we consider that the momentum must be maintained.

In order to create transparency of military organization, we plan to introduce a proposal for a wide-ranging, comprehensive annual exchange of information concerning military organization, manpower and equipment as well as major weapon deployment programmes. To evaluate this information we will propose modalities for the establishment of a random evaluation system.

In addition, in order to build on the success of the Stockholm Document and to create greater transparency of military activities, we will propose measures in areas such as:

- more detailed information with regard to the notification of military exercises,
- improvements in the arrangements for observing military activities,
- greater openness and predictability about military activities,
- a strengthening of the regime for ensuring compliance and verification.

Finally, we shall propose additional measures designed to improve contacts and communications between participating states in the military field; to enhance access for military staffs and media representatives; and to increase mutual understanding of military capabilities, behavior and force postures. We will also propose modalities for an organized exchange of views on military doctrine tied to actual force structures, capabilities and dispositions in Europe.

#### A VISION FOR EUROPE

We will pursue these distinct negotiations within the framework of the C.S.C.E. process, because we believe that a secure peace cannot be achieved without steady progress on all aspects of the confrontation which has divided Europe for more than four decades. Moreover, redressing the disparity in conventional forces in Europe would remove an obstacle to the achievement of the better political relationship between all states of Europe to which we aspire. Conventional arms control must therefore be seen as part of a dynamic process which addresses the military, political, and human aspects of this division.

The implementation of our present proposals and of those we are making for further CSBMs will involve a quantum improvement in European security. We will wish to agree and implement them as soon as possible. In the light of their implementation we would then be willing to contemplate further steps to enhance stability and security in Europe, for example:

- further reductions or limitations of conventional armaments and equipment,
- the restructuring of armed forces to enhance defensive capabilities and further reduce offensive capabilities.

Our vision remains that of a continent where military forces only exist to prevent war and to ensure self-defense, not for the purpose of initiating aggression or for political or military intimidation.

*Source:* "Statement issued by the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Ministerial session at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, December 8-9, 1988," Press Communiqué-Conventional Arms Control, Federal Information Systems Corporation.

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### C.F.E.: WESTERN POSITION PAPER

MARCH 1989

#### NEGOTIATION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE

Position paper provided by the delegations of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.

## OBJECTIVES

The objectives of these negotiations, as agreed in the mandate, are:

- The establishment of a secure and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels;
- The elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security;
- The elimination, as a matter of high priority, of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action.

Through the approach outlined below the Western delegations will seek to establish a situation in which surprise attack and large-scale, offensive action are no longer credible options. We pursue this aim on the basis of equal respect for the security interests of all. Our approach offers a coherent whole and is intended to be applied simultaneously and in its totality in the area of application.

## RATIONALE

The rationale for our approach is as follows:

—The present concentration of forces in the area from the Atlantic-to-Urals (ATTU) is the highest ever known in peacetime and represents the greatest destructive potential ever assembled. Overall levels of forces, particularly those relevant to surprise attack and offensive action such as tanks, artillery and armored troop carriers, must therefore be radically reduced. It is the substantial disparity in the numbers of these systems, all capable of rapid mobility and high firepower, which most threatens stability in Europe. These systems are also central to the seizing and holding of territory, the prime aim of any aggressor.

—No one country should be permitted to dominate Europe by force of arms: No participants should therefore possess more than a fixed proportion of the total holdings of all participants in each category of armaments, commensurate with its needs for self-defense.

—Addressing the overall number and nationality of forces will not by itself affect the stationing of armaments outside national borders: additional limits will also be needed on forces stationed in other countries' territory.

—We need to focus on both the levels of armaments and state of readiness of forces in those areas where the concentration of such forces is greatest, as well as to prevent redeployment of forces withdrawn from one part of the area of application to another. It will therefore be necessary to apply a series of interlocking sub-limits covering forces throughout the area, together with further limits on armaments in active units.

## SPECIFIC MEASURES

The following specific weapons in each of the three categories identified below will at no time exceed:

## Rule 1: Overall limit

The overall total of weapons in each of the three categories identified below will at no time exceed:

- Main Battle Tanks 40,000

— Artillery Pieces	33,000
— Armored Troop Carriers	56,000

## Rule 2: Sufficiency

No one country may retain more than 30 percent of the overall limits in these three categories, i.e.

— Main Battle Tanks	12,000
— Artillery Pieces	10,000
— Armored Troop Carriers	16,800

## Rule 3: Stationed Forces

Among countries belonging to a treaty of alliance neither side will station armaments outside national territory in active units exceeding the following levels:

— Main Battle Tanks	3,200
— Artillery Pieces	1,700
— Armored Troop Carriers	6,000

## Rule 4: Sub-limits

In the area indicated below, each group of countries belonging to the same treaty of alliance shall not exceed the following levels:

- In the area consisting of Belgium, Denmark, The Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, The United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, The German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the territory of the Soviet Union west of the Urals comprising the Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian, Moscow, Volga, Urals, Leningrad, Odessa, Kiev, Trans-Caucasus, North Caucasus military districts:
 

— Main Battle Tanks	20,000
— Artillery Pieces	16,500
— Armored Troop Carriers	28,000 (of which no more than 12,000 AIFVs)
- In the area consisting of Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, The United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, The German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the territory of the Soviet Union west of the Urals comprising the Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian, Moscow, Volga, Urals military districts in active units:
 

— Main Battle Tanks	11,300
— Artillery	9,000
— Armored Troop Carriers	20,000
- In the area consisting of Belgium, Denmark, The Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, The United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, The German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the territory of the Soviet Union comprising the Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian military districts in active units:

- |                         |        |
|-------------------------|--------|
| —Main Battle Tanks      | 10,300 |
| —Artillery              | 7,600  |
| —Armored Troop Carriers | 18,000 |
4. In the area consisting of Belgium, The Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, The German Democratic Republic, and Poland in active units:
- |                         |        |
|-------------------------|--------|
| —Main Battle Tanks      | 8,000  |
| —Artillery              | 4,500  |
| —Armored Troop Carriers | 11,000 |
5. Rule 4 is to be seen as an integrated whole which will only be applied simultaneously and across the entire area from the Atlantic-to-the-Urals. It will be for the members of each alliance to decide how they exercise their entitlement under all of these measures.

#### Rule 5: Information Exchange

Each year holdings of main battle tanks, armored troop carriers and artillery pieces will be notified, disaggregated down to battalion level. This measure will also apply to personnel in both combat and combat support units. Any change or notified unit structures above battalion level, or any measure resulting in an increase of personnel strength in such units, will be subject to notification, on a basis to be determined in the course of the negotiations.

#### MEASURES FOR STABILITY, VERIFICATION AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION

As an integral part of the agreement, there will be a need for:

—Stabilizing measures:

To buttress the resulting reductions in force levels in the ATTU area. These should include measures of transparency, notification and constraint applied to the deployment, movement, storage and levels of readiness of conventional armed forces which include conventional armaments and equipment.

—Verification arrangements:

To include the exchange of detailed data about forces and deployments, with the right to conduct on-site inspection, as well as other measures designed to provide assurance of compliance with the agreed provisions.

—Non-Circumvention provisions:

Inter alia, to ensure that the manpower and equipment withdrawn from any one area do not have adverse security implications for any participant.

—Provisions for temporarily exceeding the limits set down in rule 4 for pre-notified exercises.

#### The Longer Term

In the longer term, and in the light of the implementation of the above measure, we would be willing to contemplate further steps to enhance stability and security in Europe, such as:

—Further reductions or limitations of conventional armaments and equipment.

—The restructuring of armed forces to enhance defensive capabilities and further to reduce offensive capabilities.



TEXT OF THE NATO PROPOSAL FOR C.D.E.-2 AS TABLED AT THE  
VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ON CONFIDENCE- AND  
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES ON MARCH 9, 1989

The Delegations of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America:

- Recalling that the adoption of the Stockholm Document in September 1986 was a politically significant achievement and that its measures are an important step in efforts aimed at reducing the risk of military confrontation in Europe,
- Encouraged by the satisfactory implementation of these measures thus far,
- Determined to build upon and expand the results achieved at the Stockholm Conference and to carry forward the dynamic process of confidence building,
- Stressing the complementary nature within the framework of the C.S.C.E. process of negotiations on further confidence- and security-building measures and negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe,
- Determined
  - to create greater transparency about military organization;
  - to create greater transparency and predictability about military activities;
  - to improve contacts and communications between the participating states;
  - and determined, in the forthcoming negotiations, to promote an exchange of views on military policy,
- In conformity with the Madrid Mandate of 1983 as confirmed by the C.S.C.E. Review Meeting in Vienna 1989, propose confidence- and security-building measures including the following:

I. Transparency about Military Organization

These measures are designed to create more openness and confidence about the military force disposition of each participating state. This will be achieved by regular exchanges of information on forces on land in the zone and on major weapon deployment programmes. The information exchanged will be subject to evaluation.

Measure 1: Exchange of Military Information

Participating states will exchange information concerning military organization, manpower and equipment in the zone. This will include annual information on:

- land forces command organization in the zone;
- the designation of major ground units, down to below divisional level;
- the normal peacetime locations of these units;
- the personnel strength of these units;
- the major weapons systems and equipment belonging to these units;
- land-based air units and their aircraft strength.

It will also include immediate notification of:

- the relocation in the zone of major ground units as specified above from one normal peacetime location to another;
- the calling up of a significant number of reservists.

**Measure 2: Information Exchange on Major Conventional Weapon Deployment Programmes**

Each participating state will inform the others of those major conventional weapons systems and equipment specified in Measure 1 which it intends to introduce into service with its armed forces in the C.D.E. zone in a specified period.

**Measure 3: Establishment of a Random Evaluation System**

In order to evaluate the information provided under Measures 1 and 2, participating states will establish a random evaluation system in which:

- they will have the right to conduct a number of pre-announced visits to normal peacetime locations specified under Measure 1;
- these visits, of a limited duration, will be carried out by personnel already accredited to the host state or designated by the visiting state;
- evaluators will be allowed to observe major weapons systems and equipment;
- appropriate arrangements for the evaluation visit will be made by the host state, whose representatives will accompany the evaluation teams at all times.

**II. Transparency and Predictability of Military Activities**

These measures will build upon those agreed in Stockholm by refining them in order to enhance openness and produce greater predictability of military activities.

**Measure 4: Enhance Information in the Annual Calendar**

Participating states will provide in their annual calendars more information, and in greater detail, about future military activities. This will include the designation, number and type of ground units down to divisional level scheduled to take part in notifiable military activities in the zone.

**Measure 5: Enhance Information in Notification**

To improve the notification concerning military activities, participating states will communicate more information, and in greater detail, about the engagement of their armed forces as well as their weapons systems and equipment in such ground force activities.

**Measure 6: Improvements to Observation Modalities**

Participating states will facilitate observation by organizing more detailed briefings, providing better maps and allowing more observation equipment to be used. Furthermore, in order to improve the observers' opportunities to assess the scope and scale of the activity, the participating states are encouraged to provide an aerial survey of the area of the activity. Moreover, the duration of the observation programme will be improved.

**Measure 7: Lowering of the Observation Threshold**

Participating states will invite observers to notified activities whenever the number of troops engaged meets or exceeds 13,000 or if more than 300 tanks participate in it.

**Measure 8: Improvements to Inspection Modalities**

Participating states will adopt measures for a substantial improvement of the inspection which include:

- increasing the number of passive inspections;
- shortening the period between the inspection request and access of the inspectors to the specified area;
- permitting, on request by inspectors, an aerial survey before the commencement of the inspection;
- improving the equipment and communications facilities that the inspection team will be permitted to use;
- improving the briefings to inspectors.

#### Measure 9: Lowering the Thresholds for Longer Notice of Larger Scale Activities

Participating states will not carry out military activities subject to prior notification involving more than 50,000 troops unless they have been the object of communication stipulated in the Stockholm Document.

### III. Contacts and Communication

These measures are designed to increase the knowledge about the military capabilities of the participating states by developing communications and military contacts.

#### Measure 10: Improved Access for Accredited Personnel Dealing With Military Matters

In order to implement the principle of greater openness in military matters and to enhance mutual confidence, the participating states will facilitate the travel arrangements of accredited personnel dealing with military matters and assist them in obtaining access to government officials. Restrictions on the activities of accredited personnel in the C.D.E. zone should be reduced.

#### Measure 11: Development of Means of Communication

Participating states, while using diplomatic channels for transmitting communications related to agreed measures (calendars, notifications, etc.) are encouraged to consider additional arrangements to ensure the speediest possible exchange of information.

#### Measure 12: Equal Treatment of Media Representatives

Participating states will be encouraged to permit media representatives to attend observed military activities; if media representatives are invited, the host state will admit such representatives from all participating states and treat them without discrimination.

### IV. Exchanges of Views on Military Policy

Confidence-building is a dynamic process which is enhanced by the free and frank interchange of ideas designed to reduce misunderstandings and misrepresentation of military capabilities. To this end, participating states will, in the forthcoming negotiations, avail themselves of the following opportunities:

- to discuss issues concerning the implementation of the provisions of the Stockholm Document;
- to discuss, in a seminar setting, military doctrine in relation to the posture and structure of conventional forces in the zone, including inter alia:

- exchanging information on their annual military spending;
- exchanging information on the training of their armed forces, including references to military manuals;
- seeking clarification of developments giving rise to uncertainty, such as changes in the number and pattern of notified military activities.

# Appendix IX: Reductions Under the NATO and Warsaw Pact Proposals of 1989

## A. NATO's Reduction Proposal Using NATO's Data<sup>a</sup>

	<i>Main Battle Tanks</i>	<i>Armored Personnel Carriers</i>	<i>Artillery/ Multiple Rocket Launchers</i>
NATO Holdings	22,224	47,639	17,328
Reductions	2,224	19,639	828
Proposed NATO/WTO Level <sup>b</sup>	20,000	28,000	16,500
WTO Holdings	39,249 <sup>c</sup>	93,400	33,370 <sup>c</sup>
Reductions	19,249	65,400	16,870

<sup>a</sup> Data from NATO's *Conventional Forces in Europe: The Facts*, November 1988.

<sup>b</sup> NATO's proposal outlines an overall holdings level for these armaments, and NATO and the Warsaw Pact must reduce to meet these levels.

<sup>c</sup> Announced WTO unilateral reductions totaling 12,251 main battle tanks, and 10,030 artillery pieces have been subtracted from these totals.

**B. Warsaw Pact's 10% Reduction Proposal Using WTO Data<sup>a</sup>**

	<i>Main Battle Tanks</i>	<i>Armored Personnel Carriers</i>	<i>Artillery/Multiple Rocket Launchers</i>	<i>Armed Helicopters</i>	<i>Combat Aircraft</i>	<i>Armed Forces Personnel</i>
NATO Holdings	30,690	46,900	57,060	5,270	7,130	3,660,200
Reductions	3,069 <sup>b</sup>	4,690 <sup>b</sup>	5,706 <sup>b</sup>	2,764	951	733,580
<b>Proposed NATO/WTO Level</b>	<b>27,621</b>	<b>42,210</b>	<b>51,354</b>	<b>2,506</b>	<b>6,179</b>	<b>2,926,620</b>
WTO Holdings	47,219 <sup>c</sup>	70,330	61,530 <sup>c</sup>	2,785	6,866 <sup>c</sup>	3,251,800 <sup>c</sup>
Reductions	19,598	28,120	10,176	279 <sup>b</sup>	687 <sup>b</sup>	325,180 <sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Data from "Warsaw Pact Releases Figures on Force Strengths," *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Soviet Union*, January 10, 1989, pp. 1-8.

<sup>b</sup> Indicates a 10% reduction for the side possessing the smaller number of holdings in each of the categories as outlined by the WTO reduction proposal.

<sup>c</sup> Announced WTO unilateral reductions totaling 12,251 main battle tanks, 10,030 artillery pieces, 1,010 combat aircraft, and 321,300 personnel have been subtracted from these totals.

**C. NATO and Warsaw Pact First-Stage Reduction Proposals Using the  
International Institute of Strategic Studies Data<sup>a</sup>**

**1. NATO's Proposal**

	<i>Main Battle Tanks</i>	<i>Armored Personnel Carriers<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Artillery/ Multiple Rocket Launchers</i>
NATO Holdings	22,200	47,639	13,500
Reductions	2,200	19,639	—
Proposed NATO/WTO Level <sup>c</sup>	20,000	28,000	16,500
WTO Holdings	40,749 <sup>d</sup>	93,400	34,270 <sup>d</sup>
Reductions	20,749	65,400	17,770

<sup>a</sup> Data from the International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1988-1989*, London: IISS, 1988. (See Appendix II.)

<sup>b</sup> The working definition for Armored Personnel Carriers is different in interpretation by NATO and IISS. Therefore, the figure given is in compliance to NATO's definition and is used from NATO's *Conventional Forces in Europe: The Facts*, November, 1988.

<sup>c</sup> NATO's proposal outlines an overall holdings level for these armaments, and NATO and the Warsaw Pact must reduce to meet these levels.

<sup>d</sup> Announced WTO unilateral reductions of a total of 12,251 main battle tanks and 10,030 artillery pieces have been subtracted from these totals.

2. Warsaw Pact 10% Reduction Proposal<sup>a</sup>

	Main Battle Tanks	Armored Personnel Carriers <sup>b</sup>	Artillery/ Multiple Rocket Launchers	Armed Helicopters	Combat Aircraft	Armed Forces Personnel
NATO Holdings	22,200	46,900	13,500	864	3,215	2,340,000
Reductions	2,220 <sup>c</sup>	4,690 <sup>c</sup>	1,350 <sup>c</sup>	86 <sup>c</sup>	1,228	700,470
Proposed NATO/WTO Level	19,980	42,210	12,150	778	1,987	1,639,530
WTO Holdings	40,749 <sup>d</sup>	93,400 <sup>b</sup>	34,270 <sup>d</sup>	1,220	2,208 <sup>d</sup>	1,821,700 <sup>d</sup>
Reductions	20,769	51,190	22,120	442	221 <sup>c</sup>	182,170 <sup>d</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Data from International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1988-1989*, London: IISS, 1988. (See Appendix II.)

<sup>b</sup> The working definition for Armored Personnel Carriers is different in interpretation by WTO and IISS. Therefore, the figure given is from NATO's *Conventional Forces in Europe: The Facts*, November, 1988.

<sup>c</sup> Indicates a 10% reduction for the side possessing the smaller number of holdings in each of the categories as outlined by the WTO reduction proposal.

<sup>d</sup> Announced WTO unilateral reduction of a total of 12,251 main battle tanks, 10,030 artillery pieces, 1,010 combat aircraft, and 321,300 personnel have been subtracted from these figures.



**D. WTO May 1989 Reduction Proposal Compared to NATO's March and May 1989 Proposals**  
**1. NATO and WTO Proposals for Overall Alliance Holdings of Reducible Armaments**  
*a. Overall Units Proposed by NATO<sup>a</sup>*

	Main Battle Tanks	Armored Personnel Carriers	Artillery/Multiple Rocket Launchers	Armed Helicopters <sup>d</sup>	Strike Aircraft <sup>d</sup>	Armed Forces Personnel <sup>e</sup>
NATO Holdings <sup>b</sup>	22,224	47,639	17,328	2,185	6,600	305,000
Reductions	2,224	19,639	828	285 (15%)	900 (15%)	30,000
Proposed NATO/WTO Level	20,000	28,000	16,500	1,900	5,700	275,000
WTO Holdings <sup>b</sup>	51,500	93,400	43,400	3,100	13,950	625,000
Reductions	31,500	65,400	26,900	1,200	8,250	350,000

<sup>a</sup> Appendix VIII provides the Western Position paper for the C.F.E. talks where NATO outlines overall alliance limits in three armament categories. (See Appendix VIII: Rule 4, 2.) In May, 1989, President Bush proposed including armed helicopters, strike aircraft and armed forces personnel in the C.F.E. talks, and they are added here.

<sup>b</sup> Data from NATO's *Conventional Forces in Europe: The Facts*, November, 1988.

<sup>c</sup> The Armed Forces Figures are those of the United States and Soviet Forces in Europe.

<sup>d</sup> Estimates; official figures not released.

*b. Overall Limits Proposed by the WTO<sup>a</sup>*

	<i>Main Battle Tanks</i>	<i>Armored Personnel Carriers</i>	<i>Artillery/Multiple Rocket Launchers</i>	<i>Armed Helicopters</i>	<i>Strike Aircraft</i>	<i>Armed Forces Personnel</i>
NATO Holdings <sup>b</sup>	30,690	46,900	57,060	5,270	4,075	3,660,200
Reductions	10,690	18,900	33,060	3,570	2,575	2,310,200
Proposed NATO/WTO Level	20,000	28,000	24,000	1,700	1,500	1,350,000
WTO Holdings <sup>b</sup>	59,470	70,330	71,560	2,785	2,783	3,573,100
Reductions	39,470	42,330	47,560	1,085	1,283	2,223,100

<sup>a</sup> Appendix VIII provides the Western Position paper for the C.F.E. talks where NATO outlines limits in three armament categories. In May, 1989, the Soviet Union proposed figures for these levels that parallel the NATO levels.

<sup>b</sup> Data from "Warsaw Pact Releases Figures on Force Strengths," *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Soviet Union*, January 10, 1989, pp. 1-8.

2. Sufficiency Level Proposed by the WTO<sup>a</sup>

	Main Battle Tanks	Armored Personnel Carriers <sup>b</sup>	Artillery/ Multiple Rocket Launchers <sup>b</sup>	Armed Helicopters	Combat Aircraft	Armed Forces Personnel
Soviet Holdings <sup>b</sup>	41,580	45,000	50,275	2,200	5,955	2,458,000
Announced Unilateral Soviet Cuts	10,000	—	8,500	—	800	240,000
Remaining Holdings Proposed Further Soviet Reductions <sup>c</sup>	31,580	45,000	41,775	2,200	5,155	2,218,000
New Soviet Holdings Level	17,580	27,000	24,775	850	3,955	1,298,000
	14,000	18,000	17,000	1,350	1,200	920,000
Proposed NATO Sufficiency Level <sup>a</sup>	12,000	16,800	10,000	—	—	—

<sup>a</sup> NATO's March, 1989, Position Paper (see Appendix VIII) proposes in Rule 2 a "sufficiency" level according to which no one country would possess more than 30 percent of the overall limit totaling the holdings of both alliances in the three categories. The overall limit was established at 40,000 for Main Battle Tanks, 33,000 for Artillery Pieces, and 56,000 for Armored Troop Carriers. In May, 1989, the Soviet Union accepted this idea in principle, but advanced somewhat different numbers for it, including numbers for helicopters, combat aircraft, and military personnel.

<sup>b</sup> Figures from "Warsaw Pact Releases Figures on Force Strengths," *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Soviet Union*, January 10, 1989, pp. 1-8.

<sup>c</sup> Gorbachev in May, 1989, proposed further reductions at these levels. *Washington Post*, May 24, 1989.

### 3. Limits on NATO and the WTO Armaments Stationed Outside National Territory

	<i>Main Battle Tanks</i>	<i>Artillery Pieces</i>	<i>Armored Troop Carriers</i>
NATO Limits <sup>a</sup>	3,200	1,700	6,000
WTO Limits <sup>b</sup>	4,500	4,000	7,500

<sup>a</sup> Appendix VIII Rule 3 outlines the NATO stationed forces limits of armaments in active units.

<sup>b</sup> The WTO has in principle accepted these limits on stationed forces. *Washington Post*, May 25 and 28, 1989.

#### Sub-limits by Geographic Zone

##### *NATO Position*

Maximum number of armaments in active units for each alliance in each of three zones is limited to:

##### *Zone 1*

West: Belgium, FRG, Luxembourg, Netherlands  
East: Czechoslovakia, GDR, Poland

8,000 main battle tanks  
4,500 artillery pieces  
11,000 armored troop carriers

##### *Zone 2*

West: Belgium, Denmark, FRG, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Great Britain  
East: Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Poland, Baltic-, Belorussian-, Carpathian Military Districts

10,000 main battle tanks  
7,600 artillery pieces  
18,000 armored troop carriers

##### *Warsaw Pact Position*

Maximum number of armaments (including stored arms) for each alliance in each of three zones is limited to:

##### *Central Zone*

West: Belgium, FRG, Luxembourg, Denmark  
East: Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Poland  
8,700 tanks  
7,600 artillery pieces  
14,500 armored troop carriers  
420 strike aircraft  
570,000 troops

##### *Forward Zone*

West: Belgium, Denmark, FRG, Italy, Luxembourg, Greece, Turkey and Norway  
East: Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Odessa-, North and Trans Caucasus-, Lenin-, Baltic Military Districts

*Zone 3*

West: Belgium, Denmark, FRG,  
France, Italy, Luxembourg,  
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,  
Great Britain

East: Czechoslovakia, GDR,  
Hungary, Poland Baltic-,  
Belorussian-, Carpathian-,  
Moscow, Volga-, Ural Military  
Districts

11,300 main battle tanks  
9,000 artillery pieces  
20,000 armored troop carriers

16,000 tanks  
16,500 artillery pieces  
20,500 armored troop carriers  
1,100 strike aircraft  
1,300 combat helicopters  
1 million troops

*Rear Zone*

West: Belgium, Denmark, FRG,  
France, Italy, Luxembourg,  
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,  
Great Britain, Greece, Turkey,  
and Iceland

East: Czechoslovakia, GDR,  
Hungary, Poland, Romania,  
Bulgaria, Odessa-, North & Trans  
Caucasus-, Lenin-, Baltic-,  
Belorussian-, Carpathian-, Kiev-,  
Moscow-, Volga-, Urals Military  
Districts

4,000 tanks  
7,500 artillery pieces  
7,500 armored troop carriers  
400 strike aircraft  
400 combat helicopters  
350,000 troops

**Warsaw Pack Position on Alternative Zones  
Tabled in June, 1989**

*Central Zone*

West: Belgium, Denmark, FRG, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Great Britain

East: Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Poland, Baltic-, Belorussian-, Carpathian Military Districts

13,300 tanks; 11,500 artillery pieces; 20,750 armored troop carriers; 1,120 strike aircraft; 1,250 combat helicopters; 910,000 troops

*North Zone*

West: Norway

East: North half of Leningrad Military District

200 tanks; 1,000 artillery pieces; 150 armored troop carriers; 30 strike aircraft; 30 combat helicopters; 20,000 troops

*South Zone*

West: Italy, Greece, and Turkey

East: Romania, Bulgaria plus Odessa, Trans- and North Caucasus Military Districts

5,200 tanks; 8,500 artillery pieces; 5,750 armored troop carriers; 290 strike aircraft; 360 combat helicopters; 270,000 troops

*Rear Zone*

West: Spain, Portugal, and Iceland

East: South half of Leningrad Military District plus Moscow, Volga, and Ural Military Districts

1,300 tanks; 3,000 artillery pieces; 1,350 armored troop carriers; 60 strike aircraft; 60 combat helicopters; 150,000 troops

*Source:* Arms Control Association.

# Appendix X: NATO and Warsaw Pact Reductions Proposed in This Book

## **I. NATO and Warsaw Pact Ground Force Reduction Proposal**

- A. Comprehensive 20% Build Down Reduction Proposal for Central Europe Extended (including armaments held by reserve units and in storage).
  - 1. NATO Forces in Central Europe Extended
  - 2. WTO Forces in Central Europe Extended
- B. Alternate 20% Build Down Reduction Proposal for Central Europe Extended (excluding armaments held by reserve units and in storage).
  - 1. NATO Forces in Central Europe Extended
  - 2. WTO Forces in Central Europe Extended
- C. NATO and Warsaw Pact 50% Build Down Reduction Proposal for the Atlantic to Urals Area (including armaments held by reserve units and in storage).
  - 1. NATO Forces in the ATTU area
  - 2. WTO Forces in the ATTU area

## **II. NATO and Warsaw Pact Air Force Reduction Proposal**

- A. NATO and WTO 20% Build Down Reduction Proposal for Central Europe Extended.
  - 1. NATO Air Forces in Central Europe Extended
  - 2. WTO Air Forces in Central Europe Extended
- B. NATO and WTO 50% Reduction Proposal for the Atlantic to Urals Area.
  - 1. NATO Air Forces in the ATTU Area
  - 2. WTO Air Forces in the ATTU Area

**I. NATO and Warsaw Pact Ground Force Reduction Proposal**  
**A. Comprehensive 20% Build-Down Reduction Proposal for Central Europe Extended (including armaments held by reserve units and in storage)**

**1. NATO Forces in Central Europe Extended<sup>a</sup>**

	<i>Main Battle Tanks</i>	<i>Armored Personnel Carriers<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Artillery/ Multiple Rocket Launchers</i>	<i>Armed Helicopters<sup>c</sup></i>	<i>Surface- to- Surface Missiles<sup>d</sup></i>	<i>Personnel Ground</i>	<i>Air</i>
Belgium	334	1,267	256	0		65,100	18,700
Canada	77	191	26	32		4,400	2,700
Denmark	210	641	450	14		17,000	6,900
France	1,340	3,010	1,406	215	100 <sup>d</sup>	280,900	95,000
FRG	4,937	3,636	2,344	210		332,100	108,700
Luxembourg	0	5	0	0		800	0
Netherlands	913	1,995	789	0		66,000	18,100
UK	700	1,792	228	48		69,700	0
US	6,151	4,268	1,100	234	600	206,790	44,500
Total	14,662	16,805	6,599	753	700	1,042,790	294,600
Minus 20% New Joint NATO/WTO Level	2,932	3,361	1,320	200 <sup>e</sup>	140	208,558	58,920
	11,730	13,444	5,279	553	560	834,232	235,680



## 2. WTO Forces in Central Europe Extended

		Main Battle Tanks	Armored Personnel Carriers	Artillery/ Multiple Rocket Launchers	Armed Helicopters <sup>c</sup>	Surface- to- Surface Missiles	Ground Personnel	Air Personnel
Czechoslovakia Cat.	I	3,400 <sup>b</sup>	2,500	2,391	45		145,000	52,000
	II	1,141	893	558			53,760	
	III	927	336	396			37,520	
GDR Cat.	I	2,850 <sup>b</sup>	3,750	1,657	100		120,000	37,000
	II	1,740	1,206	728			79,520	
	III	0	0	0			0	0
Hungary Cat.	I	1,300 <sup>b</sup>	1,000	635	40		77,000	22,000
	II	0	0	0			0	0
	III	1,452	996	689			66,192	
Poland Cat.	I	3,950 <sup>b</sup>	2,700	2,385	30		230,000	92,000
	II	2,453	985	1,062			100,800	
	III	0	0	0			0	
USSR Cat	I	1,355	1,450	720	476	6,000	70,000	172,500 <sup>d</sup>
	II	20,398 <sup>b</sup>	9,034	15,440			1,029,920	
	III	10,030	4,741	4,302			422,920	
Total WTO Unilateral Reductions <sup>e</sup>	I	10,030	2,242	2,070			198,800	
	II	3,840	2,051	2,394			227,360	
	III	5,148						
Total		31,898	18,984	22,508	691	6,000	1,601,920	375,500
WTO Unilateral Reductions <sup>e</sup>		7,551	895	5,530	—	—	80,533	40,767
Remaining Total		24,347	18,089	16,978	691	6,000	1,521,387	334,733
WTO Reductions New Joint NATO/WTO Level		12,617	4,645	11,699	138	5,440	687,155	99,053
NATO/WTO Level		11,730	13,444	5,279	553 <sup>c</sup>	560	834,232	235,680

*Notes for Table A:*

<sup>a</sup> NATO figures are for holdings of active duty units and include stored NATO tanks, which NATO's *Conventional Forces in Europe: The Facts* of November, 1988, estimates at 5,800. This storage figure includes 2,887 U.S. war reserve and 1,464 U.S. repositioned POMCUS tanks. Also, NATO figures include 409 APCs and 165 artillery pieces in storage.

<sup>b</sup> This figure is illustrative. NATO is using a new category for reductions which appears to combine armored infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers. NATO has not yet made available specific figures for this new category.

<sup>c</sup> For NATO the following types of helicopters were counted: SA-330 Puma, SA-341/-342 Gazelle, UH-1 Iroquois, AH-1 Cobra/Sea Cobra, AB Bell 205, Hughes 500 m, PAH-1 Bo-159P, CH-124 SH-3, H-53 Stallion, HA-15 Bo105, and CH-47 Chinook. For the WTO the following were counted: Mi-24 Hind, Mi-14 Haze, Mi-8 Hip, Mi-6 Hook, Mi-2 Hoplite, Mi-1Hare, Ka-25 Hormone, and Ka-27 Helix.

<sup>d</sup> Surface-to-surface missiles are listed here in terms of missiles instead of launchers. It is estimated that NATO has about 700 missiles for its 127 launchers including French missiles. We include French missiles in the NATO total, but also recommend that they should be excluded from actual reductions. The total of Pact missiles is estimated at 6,000.

<sup>e</sup> Throughout this book, we follow a standard approach reducing from the level of the numerically smaller side. In this case, 20% is reduced from the totals of the smaller side (WTO), and NATO must reduce 200 helicopters to meet the new WTO level.

<sup>f</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies specifies the given Soviet Air Force personnel figure of 315,000 for the four Groups of Soviet Forces (in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland), and the sixteen military districts of the USSR. Here we assume half of the total or 157,500 is deployed in Central Europe Extended.

<sup>g</sup> In his speech to the U.N. on 12/7/88, Gorbachev announced a unilateral reduction of 10,000 tanks, 8,400 artillery pieces from Soviet forces west of the Urals including those in Eastern Europe. For the purposes of this estimate of unilateral cuts in Soviet forces in Eastern Europe we have deducted half of the armament totals. Gorbachev also announced a cut of 50,000 in Soviet personnel in Eastern Europe. He did not specify the breakdown totals of ground, air, and naval personnel within the 50,000 figure. Therefore, we assume that at least two-thirds or 33,000 of the 50,000 to be reduced are ground force personnel. We subtract the other one-third from the Air Force total with a caveat that some naval personnel may have been included in the 50,000 total. We have deducted the unilateral reductions listed in Appendix V from national totals.

<sup>h</sup> The total of main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and ground personnel for Category I, II & III Warsaw Pact units is somewhat less than the total aggregate figures shown for each of these armaments in the chart. This mismatch, which we are pursuing, probably has several causes. There may be some allowance in IISS figures for training units, repair and storage.

**B. Alternate 20% Build-Down Reduction Proposal for Central Europe Extended (excluding armaments held by reserve units and in storage)**

**1. NATO Forces in Central Europe Extended\***

	<i>Main Battle Tanks</i>	<i>Armored Personnel Carriers<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Artillery/ Multiple Rocket Launchers</i>	<i>Armed Helicopters<sup>c</sup></i>	<i>Surface- to- Surface Missiles<sup>d</sup></i>	<i>Personnel Ground</i>	<i>Air</i>
Belgium	320	1,058	248	0		65,100	18,700
Canada	77	191	26	0		4,400	2,700
Denmark	210	641	450	14		17,000	6,900
France	1,340	3,010	1,266	215	100 <sup>e</sup>	280,900	95,000
FRG	4,937	3,636	2,344	210		332,100	108,700
Luxembourg	0	5	0	0		800	0
Netherlands	750	1,795	772	0		66,000	18,100
UK	700	1,792	228	48		69,700	0
US	1,800	4,268	1,100	234	600	206,790	44,500
Total	10,134	16,396	6,434	721	700	1,042,790	294,600
Minus 20% New Joint NATO/WTO Level	2,027	7,277 <sup>e</sup>	1,950 <sup>e</sup>	168 <sup>e</sup>	140	301,580 <sup>e</sup>	58,920
	8,107	9,119	4,484	553	560	741,210	235,680

## 2. WTO Forces in Central Europe Extended

		Main Battle Tanks	Armored Personnel Carriers	Artillery/ Multiple Rocket Launchers	Armed Helicopters <sup>c</sup>	Surface- to- Surface Missiles	Personnel Ground	Personnel Air
Czechoslovakia Cat.	I	3,400 <sup>b</sup>	2,500	2,391	45		145,000	52,000
	II	1,141	893	558			53,760	
	III	927	336	396			37,520	
GDR Cat.	I	2,850 <sup>b</sup>	3,750	1,657	100		120,000	37,000
	II	1,740	1,206	728			79,520	
	III	0	0	0			0	
Hungary Cat.	I	1,300 <sup>b</sup>	1,000	635	40		77,000	22,000
	II	0	0	0			0	
	III	1,452	996	689			66,192	
Poland Cat.	I	3,950 <sup>b</sup>	2,700	2,385	30		230,000	92,000
	II	2,453	985	1,062			100,800	
	III	0	0	0			0	
USSR Cat.	I	1,355	1,450	720	476	6,000	70,000	172,500 <sup>d</sup>
	II	20,398 <sup>b</sup>	9,034	15,440			1,029,920	
	III	10,030	4,741	4,302			422,920	
Total	I	3,840	2,242	2,070			198,800	
	II	5,148	2,051	2,394			227,360	
	III							
Cat. I and II WTO unilateral reductions <sup>e</sup>	I	31,898	18,984	22,508	691	6,000	1,601,920	375,500
	II	21,583	11,399	9,805	—	—	959,512	—
	III	5,000	—	4,200	—	—	33,000	17,000
Remaining total WTO reduction New Joint NATO/ WTO Level	I	16,583	11,399	5,605	691	6,000	926,512	358,500
	II	8,476	2,280	1,121	138	5,440	185,302	122,820
	III	8,107	9,119 <sup>e</sup>	4,484 <sup>e</sup>	553 <sup>e</sup>	560	741,210 <sup>e</sup>	235,680

*Notes for Table B*

<sup>a</sup> NATO figures are for holdings of active duty units and exclude stored NATO tanks, which NATO's *Conventional Forces in Europe: The Facts of November, 1988*, estimates at 5,800. This storage figure includes 2,887 U.S. war reserve and 1,464 U.S. prepositioned POMCUS tanks. Also, NATO figures do not include 409 APCs, 165 artillery pieces in storage.

<sup>b</sup> This figure is illustrative. NATO is using a new category for reductions which appears to combine armored infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers. NATO has not yet made available specific figures for this new category.

<sup>c</sup> For NATO the following types of helicopters were counted: SA-330 Puma, SA-341/-342 Gazelle, UH-1 Iroquois, AH-1 Cobra/Sea Cobra, AB Bell 205, Hughes 500m, PAH-1 Bo-159P, CH-124 SH-3, H-53 Stallion, HA-15 Bo105, and CH-47 Chinook. For the WTO the following were counted: Mi-24 Hind, Mi-14 Haze, Mi-8 Hip, Mi-6 Hook, Mi-2 Hopleite, Mi-1 Hare, Ka-25 Hormone, and Ka-27 Helix.

<sup>d</sup> Surface-to-surface missiles are listed here in terms of missiles instead of launchers. It is estimated that NATO has about 700 missiles for its 127 launchers including French missiles. We include French missiles in the NATO total, but also recommend that they should be excluded from actual reductions. The total of Pact missiles is estimated at 6,000.

<sup>e</sup> Throughout this book, we follow a standard approach reducing from the level of the numerically smaller side. In this case, 20% is reduced from the totals of the smaller side (WTO), and NATO must reduce 7,277 APC, 1,950 artillery pieces, 168 armed helicopters, and 301,580 ground personnel to meet the new WTO level.

<sup>f</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies specifies a Soviet Air Force personnel figure of 315,000 for the four Groups of Soviet Forces (in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland), and for the sixteen military districts of the USSR. Here we assume half of the total or 157,500 is concentrated in Central Europe Extended.

<sup>g</sup> In his speech to the U.N. on 12/7/88, Gorbachev announced a unilateral reduction of 10,000 tanks, 8,400 artillery pieces from Soviet forces West of the Urals including those in Eastern Europe. For the purposes of this estimate of unilateral cuts in Soviet forces in Eastern Europe we have deducted half of the armament totals. Gorbachev also announced a cut of 50,000 in Soviet personnel in Eastern Europe. He did not specify the breakdown totals of ground, air, and naval personnel within the 50,000 figure. Therefore, we assume that at least two-thirds or 33,000 of the 50,000 to be reduced are ground force personnel. We subtract the other one-third from the Air Force total with a caveat that some naval personnel may have been included in the 50,000 total. East European unilateral reductions are not subtracted from Category I, II & III units but only from National totals, since it is unclear from which type of units they will be reduced.

<sup>h</sup> The total of main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and ground personnel for Category I, II & III Warsaw Pact units is somewhat less than the total aggregate figures shown for each of these armaments in the chart. This mismatch, which we are pursuing, probably has several causes. There may be some allowance in IISS figures for training units, repair and storage.

**C. NATO and Warsaw Pact 50% Build-Down Reduction Proposal for the Atlantic to Urals Area (including armaments held by reserve units and in storage)**

**1. NATO Forces in the ATTU area<sup>a</sup>**

	<i>Main Battle Tanks</i>	<i>Armored Personnel Carriers<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Artillery/ Multiple Rocket Launchers</i>	<i>Armed Helicopters<sup>c</sup></i>	<i>Surface- to- Surface Missiles<sup>d</sup></i>	<i>Personnel Ground</i>	<i>Air</i>
Belgium	334	1,267	256	0		65,100	18,700
Canada	77	191	26	32		4,400	2,700
Denmark	210	641	450	14		17,000	6,900
France	1,340	3,010	1,406	215	100 <sup>d</sup>	280,900	95,000
FRG	4,937	3,636	2,344	210		332,100	108,700
Greece	1,893	2,245	1,336	10		170,500	24,000
Italy	1,720	4,416	1,618	15		265,000	73,000
Luxembourg	0	5	0	0		800	0
Netherlands	913	1,995	789	0		66,000	18,100
Norway	122	150	405	0		19,000	9,100
Portugal	66	232	167	0		44,000	13,600
Spain	838	1,196	1,845	46		232,000	32,500
Turkey	3,607	3,300	2,115	0		522,900	57,400
UK	700	1,792	228	48		69,700	0
US	6,151	4,268	1,100	234	600	216,810	92,800
Total	22,908	28,344	14,085	824	700	2,306,210	552,500
Minus 50% New Joint NATO/ Level	11,454	14,172	7,043	412	350	1,153,105	276,250 <sup>e</sup>
WTO	11,454	14,172	7,042	412	350	1,153,105	276,250

2. WTO Forces in the ATTU area

		Main Battle Tanks	Armored Personnel Carriers	Artillery/ Multiple Rocket Launchers	Armed Helicopters <sup>c</sup>	Surface- to- Surface Missiles	Personnel Ground	Personnel Air
Bulgaria Cat.		2,550 <sup>b</sup>	1,035	1,890	40		115,000	34,000
	I	542	580	288			28,000	
	II	813	870	432			42,000	
Czechoslovakia Cat.	III	813	870	432			42,000	
	I	3,400 <sup>b</sup>	2,500	2,391	45		145,000	52,000
	II	1,141	893	558			53,760	
GDR Cat.	III	927	336	396			37,520	
	I	2,850 <sup>b</sup>	3,750	1,657	100		120,000	37,000
	II	1,740	1,206	728			79,520	
Hungary Cat.	III	0	0	0			0	0
	I	1,300 <sup>b</sup>	1,000	635	40		77,000	22,000
	II	0	0	0			0	0
Poland Cat.	III	1,452	996	689			66,192	0
	I	3,950 <sup>b</sup>	2,700	2,385	30		230,000	92,000
	II	2,453	985	1,062			100,800	0
Romania Cat.	III	1,355	1,450	720			70,000	32,000
	I	1,860 <sup>b</sup>	3,000	675	0		140,000	0
	II	599	313	270			25,760	53,760
	III	1,139	893	558			53,760	
		1,084	1,160	576			56,000	

(continued overleaf)

## 2. WTO Forces in the ATTU area — continued

	Main Battle Tanks	Armored Personnel Carriers	Artillery/ Multiple Rocket Launchers	Armed Helicopters <sup>a</sup>	Surface- to- Surface Missiles	Personnel	
						Ground	Air
USSR	36,200 <sup>b</sup>	28,005	31,950	835	6000	1,912,440	345,000 <sup>c</sup>
Cat.	I	4,741	4,302			442,420	
	II	3,908	2,628			259,060	
	III	19,356	12,132			1,030,120	
Total	52,110	41,990	41,583	1,090	6,000	2,739,440	614,000
WTO Unilateral Reductions <sup>d</sup>	12,751	895	10,030	—	—	214,200	107,100
Remaining Total	39,359	41,095	31,553	1,090	6,000	2,366,840	506,900
WTO Reductions	27,905	26,923	24,511	678	5,650	1,213,735	230,650
New Joint NATO/WTO Level	11,454	14,172	7,042	412	350	1,153,105	276,250 <sup>e</sup>

## Notes for Table C

<sup>a</sup> NATO figures are for holdings of active duty units and includes, stored NATO tanks, which NATO's Conventional Forces in Europe: *The Facts* of November, 1988, estimates at 5,800. This storage figure includes 2,887 US war reserve and 1,464 US prepositioned POMCUS tanks. Also, NATO figures include 559 APCs and 457 artillery pieces in storage.

<sup>b</sup> This figure is illustrative. NATO is using a new category for reductions which appears to combine armored infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers. NATO has not yet made available specific figures for this new category.



<sup>c</sup> For NATO the following types of helicopters were counted: SA-330 Puma, SA-341/-342 Gazelle, UH-1 Iroquois, AH-1 Cobra/Sea Cobra, AB Bell 205, Hughes 500m, PAH-1 Bo-159P, CH-124 SH-3, H-53 Stallion, HA-15 Bo105, and CH-47 Chinook. For the WTO the following were counted: Mi-24 Hind, Mi-14 Haze, Mi-8 Hip, Mi-6 Hook, Mi-2 Hopleite, Mi-1 Hare, Ka-25 Hormone, and Ka-27 Helix.

<sup>d</sup> Surface-to-surface missiles are listed here in terms of missiles instead of launchers. It is estimated that NATO has about 700 missiles for its 127 launchers including French missiles. We include French missiles in the NATO total but also recommend that they should be excluded from actual reductions. The total of Pact missiles is estimated at 6,000.

<sup>e</sup> Throughout this book, we follow a standard approach reducing from the level of the numerically smaller side. In this case, 50% is reduced from the totals of the smaller side (NATO), and WTO must reduce to meet the new NATO levels.

<sup>f</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies specifies the given Soviet Air Force personnel figure of 315,000 for the four Groups of Soviet Forces (in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland), and the sixteen military districts of the USSR. We estimate 100,000 are located in the other military districts outside the Atlantic-to-Urals area leaving 215,000 concentrated in the area.

<sup>g</sup> WTO unilateral reductions in the Atlantic-to-Urals area of 12,751 tanks, 895 armored personnel carriers, 10,030 artillery pieces and 321,300 ground and air personnel (see Appendix V) have been deducted from the National totals. The breakdown totals of ground, air and naval personnel within the 321,300 figure have not been provided. For this estimate, we assume that at least two-thirds or 214,200 are ground force personnel and the remaining one-third constitute an Air Force total with a caveat that some personnel may have been included in the 321,300 total.

<sup>h</sup> The total of main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and ground personnel for Category I, II & III Warsaw Pact units is somewhat less than the total aggregate figures shown for each of these armaments in the chart. This mismatch, which we are pursuing, probably has several causes. There may be some allowance in IISS figures for training units, repair and storage.

**II. NATO and Warsaw Pact Air Force Reduction Proposal**  
**A. NATO and WTO 20% Build-Down Reduction Proposal for Central Europe**  
**Extended\***  
**1. NATO Forces in Central Europe Extended**

<i>Location</i>	<i>Aircraft<sup>b</sup></i>	
Belgium	F-16	97* (36)
	Mirage-5F	50
	total	147
Canada (in the FRG)	F-18	36* (18)
Denmark	F-16	52* (26)
	Draken	43* (8)
	total	95
France	Jaguar	127
	Mirage F-1	135
	Mirage III	106* (26)
	Mirage 5-F	30
	Mirage 2000B/C	58* (45)
	total	456
FRG	AlphaJet	153
	F-4	142* (71)
	Tornado	190
	total	485
Netherlands	F-5	47
	F-16	147* (61)
	total	194
United Kingdom (in FRG)	Harrier	51
	Tornado	293
	F-4	96
	Buccaneer	52
	Jaguar	108
	total	600
United States (in FRG)	F-4	36
	F-16	156* (60)
	total	192
NATO Total		2,205
Minus 20%		441
New Joint NATO/WTO Level		1,764

## 2. WTO Air Forces in Central Europe Extended

Soviet Union				Eastern European States				
Location		Aircraft <sup>b</sup>		Location		Aircraft <sup>b</sup>		
CSSR, GDR, Poland (including HQ Legnica) and Hungary	Fencer	Su-24	315	Czecho- slovakia	Fishbed	MiG-21	270* (225)	
	Fitter	MiG-21	(90)*		Flogger	MiG-27	40	
		Su-17,			Frogfoot	Su-25	40	
		20 22	225		Fitter A	Su-7	45	
		Flogger	MiG-27		135			
	Frogfoot	Su-25	45					
		total	810			total	395	
Baltics Belorussia (including HQ Smolensk), and Carpathians	Fishbed	MiG-21	(90)*	GDR:	Fishbed	MiG-21	(225)*	
	Fitter	Su-17,			Fitter	Su-17,	20, 22	35
		20,22	45		Flogger	MiG-27	25	
		Flogger	MiG-27	180			total	285
		Frogfoot	SU-25	45				
	Backfire	Tu-26	120	Hungary:	Fishbed	MiG-21	(90)*	
	Badger	Tu-16	160					
	Blinder	Tu-22	120	Poland:	Fishbed	MiG-21	(360)*	
		total	760		Fitter	Su-17,	20, 22	125
					Fitter A	Su-7	LIM 6	70
Kiev MD including	Fencer	Su-24	180			total	585	
	Flogger	MiG-27	45					
HQ Vinnitsa		total	225					
Total Soviet Union		1,795		Total Eastern Europe		1,355		
Warsaw Pact Total 3,105 <sup>c</sup>				Warsaw Pact Total after Deleting Unilateral Soviet Reduction <sup>d</sup> 2,650				
WTO Reduction				886				
New Joint NATO/WTO Level				1,764				

**B. NATO and WTO 50% Air Force Reduction Proposal for the Atlantic to Urals Area.<sup>a</sup>****1. NATO Air Forces in the ATTU Area**

<i>Location</i>	<i>Aircraft<sup>b</sup></i>	
Belgium	F-16	97* (36)
	Mirage-5F	50
	total	147
Canada (in the F.R.G.)	F-18	36* (18)
Denmark	F-16	52* (26)
	Draken	43* (8)
	total	95
France	Jaguar	127
	Mirage F-1	135*
	Mirage III	106*
	Mirage 5-F	30
	Mirage 2000B/C	58* (45)
	total	456
FRG	AlphaJet	153
	F-4	142* (71)
	Tornado	190
	total	485
Greece	A-7	59
	F-4	50* (15)
	F-5	76* (20)
	F-104	76
	Mirage F-1	(38)*
	total	299
Italy	F-104	126* (96)
	G-91	141
	Tornado	98
	total	365
Netherlands	F-5	47
	F-16	147* (61)
	total	194
Norway	F-5	30
	F-16	65* (32)
	total	95
Portugal	A-7	42
	G-91	47
	total	89
Spain	F-4	(32)*
	F-5	39
	F-18	46
	Mirage F-1	(62)*
	Mirage III	(48)*(24)
	total	227

**B. NATO and WTO 50% Air Force Reduction Proposal for the Atlantic to Urals Area.<sup>a</sup>—continued**

<i>Location</i>	<i>Aircraft<sup>b</sup></i>		
Turkey	F-4	124	
	F-5	80	
	F-100	95	
	F-104	234* (42)	
	total	533	
United Kingdom (in U.K. and F.R.G.)	F-4	(96)*	
	Buccaneer	52	
	Harrier	51	
	Jaguar	108	
	Tornado	293* (36)	
total	600		
United States (in Europe)	A-10	108	
	F-4	36	
	F-5	19*	
	F-16	228* (96)	
	F-111	140	
total	531		
NATO Total 4,152			
NATO 15% Reduction	1,002 <sup>c</sup>	NATO 50% Reduction	2,300 <sup>c</sup>
New Joint NATO/WTO Level	3,150	New Joint NATO/WTO Level	1,852

## 2. WTO Forces in the ATTU Area

Soviet Union				Eastern European States				
Location		Aircraft <sup>b</sup>		Location		Aircraft <sup>b</sup>		
CSSR, GDR, Poland (including HQ Legnica) and Hungary	Fencer	Su-24	315	Bulgaria:	Fishbed	MiG-21	(110)*	
	Fishbed	MiG-21	(90)*		Flogger	MiG-27	45	
	Fitter	Su-17, 20, 22	225		Fresco	MiG-17	15	
	Flogger	MiG-27	135		Frogfoot	Su-25	45	
	Frogfoot	Su-25	45			total	215	
		total	810					
Baltics, Belorussia (including HQ Smolensk), and Carpathians	Fishbed	Mig-21	(90)*	Czecho- slovakia:	Fishbed	MiG-21	270* (225)	
	Fitter	Su-17, 20, 22	45		Flogger	MiG-27	40	
	Flogger	MiG-27	180		Frogfoot	Su-25	40	
	Frogfoot	Su-25	45		Fitter A	Su-7	45	
	Backfire	Tu-26	120			total	395	
	Badger	Tu-16	160					
	Blinder	Tu-22	120	GDR:	Fishbed	MiG-21	(225)*	
	total	760	Fitter		Su-17, 20, 22	35		
			Flogger		MiG-27	25		
Leningrad MD	Fishbed	MiG-21	45		total	285		
	Fitter	Su-17, 20, 22	45					
	Flogger	MiG-27	45	Hungary:	Fishbed	MiG-21	(90)*	
	total	135						
Odessa and Kiev MDs including HQ	Fencer	Su-24	180	Poland:	Fishbed	MiG-21	(360)*	
	Flogger	MiG-27	135(45)*		Fitter	Su-17, 20, 22	125	
	Fishbed	MiG-21	45		Fitter A	Su-7	30	
	total	360	LIM 6		70			
Vinnitsa					total	585		
	Trans- Caucasus MD	Fencer	Su-24	45	Romania:	Fresco	MiG-17	85
		Fitter	Su-17, 20, 22	225		Orao	IAR-93	35
		Flogger	MiG-27	135			total	120
	Frogfoot	Su-25	45					
	total	450						
Total Soviet Union		2,515	Total Eastern Europe			1,690		
			Warsaw Pact Total			4,205		
			Warsaw Pact Total after Deleting Unilateral Soviet Reduction <sup>d</sup>			3,705		
WTO 15% Reduction		555	WTO 50% Reduction			1,853		
New Joint NATO/WTO Level		3,150	New Joint NATO/WTO Level			1,852		

*Notes for Section II*

<sup>a</sup> Charts II–A and B are derived using Appendix III as the base, and *The Military Balance, 1988–1989*. We have included in the reduction base all ground-attack aircraft, fighter-bombers, and medium bombers, as well as multi-role aircraft which can be used for ground attack. We have excluded air-to-air fighters, training, air-defense, and strategic-bomber-aircraft. For NATO the total aircraft not counted are: 69 F-4, 20 F-5, 120 F-15, 40 Mirage IV, and 72 Hawk. For the WTO the following were not counted: 1025 MiG-23, 360 MiG-29, 90 MiG-25, and 45 Su-15.

<sup>b</sup> For the purposes of the reduction proposal set forth in this book, multi-role aircraft normally classed as fighter aircraft and listed as Fighter–Interceptors in Appendix III have been added to the category of attack aircraft in this chart, and are indicated by asterisks. The number of aircraft of each type shifted is shown in parenthesis. Stored aircraft are included in the totals.

<sup>c</sup> To arrive at the 3,705 Warsaw Pact total, we have added to the WTO Fighter–Bombers total in Appendix III of 1,445 the 1,080 multi-role MiG–21s from the fighter–interceptors column, the 400 Soviet medium-range bombers from the Smolensk Air Army based in European USSR, and the 225 aircraft located in the Kiev military district.

<sup>d</sup> According to Gorbachev's reduction proposal, 800 Soviet combat aircraft of unspecified type would be unilaterally withdrawn. Eastern European members of the Warsaw Pact have announced unilateral reductions of 200 aircraft. We have arbitrarily subtracted one-half of the total 1,000 aircraft, or 500 aircraft from the Warsaw Pact reduction base set forth here.

<sup>e</sup> For Central Europe Extended, NATO is the numerically smaller side, and the WTO must reduce more aircraft to meet the new NATO level. For the ATTU area, the roles are reversed and it is NATO which must reduce more to meet the new joint WTO level.

*Main sources for Appendix X:*

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*Conventional Forces in Europe: The Facts*, (NATO: November, 1988).

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# Appendix XI: Possible Savings from United States Force Reductions

Based on the reduction proposal described in Chapter 10, the Defense Budget Project has prepared the following estimate:

Savings in the year 2000, Fiscal year 1989 in billions.

Operations and Support (O&S) Savings from  
Withdrawing 100,000 Army troops: **\$4.8 billion**

From Congressional Budget Office (CBO) data, adjusted to FY 1989 dollars

O&S Savings from Withdrawing 5 tactical air wings: **\$1–3 billion**

CBO, *Reducing the Deficit* (February 1989) shows annual O&S savings of \$700 million from cutting 3 air wings, or \$233 million for each wing. The range was provided because CBO's methodology yields a conservative result. The upper range is derived using the following method: Take the total FY 1989 O&S budget for the active duty Air Force (roughly \$42 billion), assume that half of this amount is for strategic forces, and that 30% of the \$21 billion in remaining costs for tactical forces are fixed. Thus, divide \$14.7 billion by 25 active duty air wings, for O&S costs of \$588 million per wing.

O&S savings from converting 2–3 U.S.-deployed Army  
divisions to reserve: **\$2.4–\$3.6 billion**

Assume that the entire FY 1989 active duty Army O&S budget (roughly \$46 billion) supports 18 divisions, and that 30% of these costs are fixed. Savings from eliminating two active duty divisions would therefore be \$3.6 billion, and eliminating three would save \$5.4 billion. Assume that the O&S budget for Army reserves (roughly \$8.2 billion) supports 10 divisions, with 30% fixed costs. Adding two reserve divisions would therefore cost \$1.2 billion, and adding three would cost \$1.8 billion. Net savings would be between \$2.4 billion and \$3.6 billion.

O&S Savings from converting 30 U.S. tactical Air  
Force squadrons (10 wings) to reserve **\$1.3–4 billion**

Using the assumptions above, cutting 10 active duty air wings would save between \$2 billion and \$6 billion annually. Assume that reserve forces cost one-third as much as active duty forces to operate and support (the ratio derived above for Army divisions).

ATACMs **\$1–1.5 billion**

CBO, *Alternatives for Improving NATO's Ground Forces* (June 1988), shows



purchases of 11,254 ATACMs between 1994 and 2008 at a cost of \$17.55 billion in FY 1989 dollars. This averages out to \$1.25 billion per year.

Total: \$10.5–16.9 billion

#### POTENTIAL SAVINGS FROM ADDITIONAL FORGONE MODERNIZATION

Initial calculations and assumptions:

Army procurement budget is \$15 billion in FY 1989.

Air Force procurement budget is \$31 billion in FY 89. Assume that roughly \$11 billion is in the black (classified) budget, and that 25% of the remaining \$20 billion is in strategic programs, satellite programs, and airlift and therefore not affected by the reductions. Thus, the portion of Air Force procurement used for these calculations is also \$15 billion.

Assume that future procurement savings for equipment going from active forces to POMCUS sets are 85% of what would otherwise be expected, to allow for spare parts and for lower efficiency (hence greater per unit costs) resulting from reduced production rates.

Assume that future procurement savings for equipment going from active forces to reserves are 70% of what would otherwise be expected, on the same basis as above, but also allowing for some equipment to be purchased expressly for the reserves. Assume that POMCUS and reserves will get the most modern equipment not needed by active duty forces.

1. Savings from withdrawing 100,000 Army troops. Two ways to calculate: 100,000 troops out of 772,000 = 13%.  $0.13$  (proportion of force)  $\times$  \$15 billion (procurement budget)  $\times$  0.85 (to account for the fixed costs) = \$1.6 billion. Alternatively, 3 divisions of 18 = one-sixth, or 17%.  $0.17 \times$  \$15 billion  $\times$  0.85 = \$2.2 billion.
2. Savings from withdrawing 5 of 25 active tactical air wings. Assuming all procurement goes to active wings, and the reserves get the leftovers:  $0.2$  (proportion of the force)  $\times$  \$15 billion (adjusted procurement budget)  $\times$  0.85 (to account for fixed costs) = \$2.6 billion.
3. Savings from converting 2–3 U.S. deployed Army divisions to reserve. Assume 30% fixed costs. 2–3 divisions out of 18 = one-ninth (11%) to one-sixth (17%). If two divisions:  $0.11$  (proportion of force)  $\times$  \$15 billion (procurement budget)  $\times$  0.17 (to account for fixed costs) = \$1.2 billion. If three divisions:  $0.17 \times$  \$15 billion  $\times$  0.7 = \$1.8 billion. Range of estimates = \$1.2–\$1.8 billion.
4. Savings from converting 30 U.S. tactical Air Force squadrons to reserve. Assume 30% fixed costs. 30 squadrons = 10 wings. 10 of 25 active wings = 40%.  $0.4$  (proportion of forces)  $\times$  \$15 billion (procurement budget)  $\times$  0.7 (to account for fixed costs) = \$4.2 billion.

Summary of estimated modernization savings:

- |   |                     |
|---|---------------------|
| 1. From withdrawing 100,000 Army troops:  | \$1.6–\$2.2 billion |
| 2. From withdrawing 5 tactical air wings: | \$2.6 billion       |

3. From converting 2-3 U.S. deployed Army divisions to reserve:	\$1.2-\$1.8 billion
4. From converting 30 U.S. tactical Air Force squadrons to reserve:	\$4.2 billion
Total:	\$9.6-\$10.8 billion

This estimate was prepared in March, 1989, by Gordon Adams, Alexis Cain, and Natalie Goldring of the Defense Budget Project, Washington, D.C.

# Notes and References

## 1 Beginning the Build-Down in Europe: Negotiating the I.N.F. Treaty

1. The text of the I.N.F. treaty, together with a fuller description of the I.N.F. negotiations, is published in my article on the subject for the *SIPRI Yearbook 1988: World Armaments and Disarmament*, on which this chapter is based. The best general sources on I.N.F. are: (1) Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983); (2) Raymond Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985); (3) David N. Schwartz, *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983); (4) Gerard Smith, *Double Talk* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985, paperback ed.); (5) Strobe Talbott, *Deadly Gambits* (New York: Knopf, 1984); and (6) Thomas Risse-Kappen, *The Zero Option* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988). My own book, *Watershed in Europe* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), contains a detailed description of the development of the I.N.F. talks up to the spring of 1986.

## 3 Starting Point: The Current NATO/Warsaw Pact Force Relationship

1. James A. Thomson, "An Unfavorable Situation: NATO and the Conventional Balance", (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, November, 1988).
2. William Kaufmann, "Who Is Conning the Alliance?," paper for the Aspen Strategy Group.
3. "NATO Center Region Military Balance Study 1978-1984" Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation, July 13, 1979, declassified) pages II-2, 5, 6.
4. See William Mako, "United States Ground Forces and the Defense of Central Europe" (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985).
5. The categories, developed in 1973 by U.S. analysts from Soviet models, are described in many places. See, for example, William Kaufmann, "Non-Nuclear Deterrence," in John Steinbrunner and Leon Sigal, eds., *Alliance Security: NATO and the No First Use Question* (Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1983).
6. David M. Shilling, "Europe's Conventional Defenses," *Survival*, March/April, 1988.
7. Malcolm Chambers and Lutz Unterseher, *Is There a Tank Gap?, Peace Research Report*, no. 19, University of Bradford. A version of this study was also published in *International Security*, 1988, 13:1.

#### 4 The New Thinking About Armed Forces in West and East: Can It Help in East/West Negotiations?

1. For a general review of the main proposals and criticisms of them, see Jonathan Dean, "Alternative Defence: Answer to NATO's Central Front Problems?," London, *International Affairs*, vol. 64 (Winter 1987/88) 1.
2. Early proposals for reform of NATO's military posture are described on page 271 of Adam Roberts's *Nations in Arms* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986 2nd ed.).
3. The "Bonin Plan" is briefly described in David Gates's "Area Defense Concepts: The West German Debate," in *Survival*, July–August, 1987. The article provides an excellent short survey of the alternate defense issue.
4. Horst Afheldt, *Defensive Verteidigung*, Reinbek, Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1983; Norbert Hannig, *Verteidigen Ohne Zu Bedrohen*, November, 1986, AFES, Institut für Politik und Wissenschaft, Universität Stuttgart.
5. Studiengruppe Alternative Sicherheitspolitik, *Strukturwandel der Verteidigung*, Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984; Lutz Unterseher, *Defending Europe: Toward a Stable Deterrent*, Studiengruppe Alternative Sicherheitspolitik, Bonn, 1986; John Grin and Lutz Unterseher, "The Spiderweb Defense," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September 1988.
6. Albrecht A. C. von Mueller, *The Integrated Forward Defense*, Starnberg, 1985; "Confidence Building by Hardware Measures," paper for the 34th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, July 1984; "Structural Stability at the Central Front," Paper no. 13, Niels Bohr Centennial, University of Copenhagen, September, 1985.
7. Karsten Voigt, Konventionelle Stabilisierung und strukturelle Nightangriffsfähigkeit, Bonn, *Beilage Zum Parlament*, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschehen, 1988.
8. The text of both letters is published in the Federation of American Scientists, *Public Interest Report* 41:2, February 1988.
9. The text, entitled "An East–West Negotiating Proposal," has been published in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September, 1988.
10. See Vitaly Zhurkin, Sergei Karaganov, Andrei Kortunov, "Reasonable Sufficiency—or How to Break the Vicious Circle," Moscow, *New Times*, Oct. 12, 1987.
11. Cited by Paul Dibb, "Is Soviet Military Strategy Changing?," Adelphi Papers 235, Spring, 1989, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies.
12. See A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov, "The Battle of Kursk from the Standpoint of Defensive Doctrine," in *World Economy and International Relations*, Moscow, no. 8, 1987; and A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov, "The General Setting of Opposing Forces in the Context of Guaranteeing Strategic Stabilization," *World Economy and International Relations*, Moscow, June, 1988.
13. See David Holloway, "Gorbachev's New Thinking," in *Foreign Affairs, America and the World*, 1988/89.

## 5 Lessons from Failure: Vienna One and What We Can Learn From It

1. The Soviets presented figures in 1975 and, in slightly more detailed form, again in 1980. In 1980, NATO counted its own ground-force manpower at 744,000 (the figures are rounded and they exclude 50,000 French troops whom France prohibited from consideration in the talks) and its air-force manpower at 198,000. NATO counted Warsaw Pact ground-force manpower at 956,000 and air-force manpower at 224,000. The Pact claimed it had only 815,000 ground-force personnel and 182,000 air-force personnel. Thus the Pact's estimate of its superiority over NATO in manpower was lower than NATO's estimate by about 183,000. As for the reductions that the Pact would have had to make to come down to the ground-force ceiling of 700,000 proposed by NATO, if the Pact ground-force total was 815,000, as the Pact claimed, the Pact would have had to withdraw 115,000 men. Since about half of the Pact's military personnel in the M.B.F.R. reduction area were Soviet, this would have worked out to a cutback of about 57,000 Soviet forces. But using NATO's estimates that Pact ground forces numbered about 956,000, a total Pact reduction of 256,000 men would have been required to reach the 700,000-man common ceiling proposed by NATO, more than double the number calculated on the basis of Pact figures. About half of these troops, or 128,000, would have been Soviet, and thus the Soviet reduction, too, would have to have been doubled.

## 6 The C.D.E. Parallel Track: Success of the Stockholm Conference

1. C.S.C.E. participants are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, The Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Yugoslavia.
2. For more background on the Helsinki talks and the C.D.E. negotiations, see the author's *Watershed in Europe* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987, Chapters 5 and 8; and John Borawski, *From the Atlantic to the Urals: Negotiating Arms Control at the Stockholm Conference*, (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988).

## 7 The Two Alliances Ready Themselves

1. The text of the Gorbachev speech of April 18, 1986, is contained in FBIS of April 18, 1986, USSR International Affairs, Eastern Europe,

pp. F1–F9; the text of relevant sections of the Budapest Declaration is in FBIS of June 13, 1986, USSR International Affairs, Communist Relations, pp. B8–12, and in *Warsaw Treaty New Initiatives*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1986.

2. The text of this portion of Shevardnadze's U.N. speech is in *Tass Bulletin A-20*, June 8, 1988.

## **8 Negotiators' Headaches: Substantive Problems of Force Reductions**

1. Michael Gordon, "Soviets Shift on Limits on Conventional Forces," *New York Times*, June 30, 1989.
2. Congressional Budget Office, *U.S. Ground Forces and the Conventional Balance in Europe*, June, 1988, p. 66.

## **9 Essential First Steps: Data Exchange, Early Warning, and Constraint Measures**

1. See Congressional Budget Office, *U.S. Ground Forces and the Conventional Balance in Europe*, June, 1988.

## **11 Verifying Deep Cuts**

1. Earlier versions of this chapter have appeared in *The Handbook of Verification Procedures*, edited by Frank Barnaby (London: Macmillan, 1989), and in *Conventional Arms Control and East/West Security*, edited by F. Stephen Larrabee and Robert Blackwill (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1989).
2. See Richard L. Garwin, "Tags and Seals for Verification," *Bulletin of the Council for Arms Control*, London, October, 1988.

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