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United States Department of State

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
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
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Foreign Relations  
of the  
United States  
Diplomatic Papers

The Conferences  
at Malta and Yalta  
1945



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United States  
Government Printing Office  
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## PREFACE

It has long been the custom of the United States Government to release to the public, after a suitable lapse of time, a substantially complete documentary record of our country's diplomacy. This custom, established early in our history, was crystallized by President Lincoln and Secretary of State Seward through the inauguration of the series of volumes now entitled *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers* (then called *Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs*).

The publication of the *Foreign Relations* volumes has tended to fall increasingly far behind the period which they cover. During the past two decades, this lag has reached nearly 18 years. This gap is now being gradually reduced, thanks to the action of the Appropriations Committees of the two Houses of Congress, and efforts will continue to reduce it, due consideration being given to the necessity of avoiding any harm to our current negotiations with other countries or to our national security interests.

This volume of documents on the conferences at Malta and Yalta is the first to appear in a special series of *Foreign Relations* volumes on World War II conferences attended by President Roosevelt or President Truman, along with Prime Minister Churchill or Marshal Stalin, or both of the latter. The series is part of a special *Foreign Relations* publication program prepared by the Department of State, in response to expressions of interest by several Senators and the Senate Committee on Appropriations in its report for fiscal year 1954. This program also includes the preparation and release of a special series on United States relations with China, 1942-1949, as well as the accelerated publication of the regular volumes of the *Foreign Relations* annual series already compiled through the year 1941.

In order to make this volume as complete and useful as possible, the Department of State has not only drawn upon its own files, but has also sought the cooperation of other agencies and individuals, to whom the Department is grateful for their assistance. The compiling and professional editing of this volume were done by a special staff in the Historical Division of the Department of State, under the direction of the Chief of the Division. The technical editing was done by the Division of Publishing Services.





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## INTRODUCTION

In February 1945 President Franklin D. Roosevelt conferred with Prime Minister Churchill at Malta in the Mediterranean, with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin at Yalta in the Crimea, and again with Churchill at Alexandria in Egypt. Since these three conferences were thus closely related chronologically, it was initially decided to include the documentation of all three conferences in the present volume. No unpublished documentation could be found, however, for the Alexandria Conference, which consisted merely of a private conversation on February 15 between Roosevelt and Churchill. Apparently no record of this conversation was made either by or for the President, and no documents were prepared for, or were produced at, the Alexandria discussion. Accordingly, the present volume is limited in fact to the conferences at Malta and Yalta.<sup>1</sup>

The Malta Conference, which began on January 30 and lasted through February 2, consisted of a series of discussions designed primarily to coordinate American and British views on a number of important problems which were expected to come up with the Russians at Yalta a few days later. Most of the Malta discussions concerned military topics and centered around five meetings of the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff. The first four of these meetings were held at Montgomery House, in a suburb of Valletta, while the fifth, with Roosevelt and Churchill in attendance, was aboard the U. S. S. *Quincy*. There were also political discussions, one of which took place aboard H. M. S. *Sirius*, between Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, together with their principal advisers.

President Roosevelt arrived at Malta on the morning of February 2 and participated during that day in discussions ashore and aboard the

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<sup>1</sup> According to the President's Log for February 15, 1945, the conversation with Prime Minister Churchill at Alexandria took place aboard the U. S. S. *Quincy* from 12:25 to 3:56 p. m., with an interruption for lunch at which the President was host to seven guests. (For description of the Log, see *post*, p. 459.) Fleet Admiral Leahy says that the luncheon "was a pleasant social gathering in the President's cabin and I do not recall that affairs of state intruded into the conversation" (*I Was There*, p. 327). The meeting is also mentioned by Churchill in his *The Second World War*, vol. vi, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 397, and by Sherwood in *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, p. 872. The only indications of the substance of the Roosevelt-Churchill conversation at Alexandria appear to be those contained in a White House press release dated February 20, 1945 (Department of State *Bulletin*, February 25, 1945, vol. xii, pp. 259-291) and in an address by Churchill in the House of Commons on February 27, 1945 (*Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons*, 5th ser., vol. 408, cols. 1285-1286). According to these sources the conversation dealt with the prosecution of the war against Japan and the coordination of Anglo-American policy in Italy.



U. S. S. *Quincy* with Prime Minister Churchill and with the American and British Chiefs of Staff.

Most of the American and British representatives who participated in the Malta Conference proceeded by plane on February 3 to the Crimea, where the tripartite conference with the Russians took place from February 4 to February 11. Although the officially approved name of this meeting was "The Crimea Conference", the term "Yalta Conference" has become so widely accepted that it has been used throughout the present volume. As a matter of fact, the conference did not meet in the city of Yalta itself. The American delegation was housed in Livadia Palace about two miles southwest of Yalta on the coastal road, and it was here that a majority of the conference meetings were held. The Soviet delegation occupied the Yusupov Palace, located several miles farther west in the village of Koreiz, while the British delegation was accommodated in the Vorontsov Villa at Alupka, about two miles beyond Koreiz. Although the names "Koreiz" and "Alupka" have been retained on those few documents in this volume on which they appear, the editors have used only the word "Yalta" as the designation of the conference site wherever such indication needed to be supplied.

#### SCOPE OF COVERAGE

The editors have presented in this volume as definitive and comprehensive a coverage of the Malta and Yalta conferences as could be made at the present time. To achieve this purpose it was necessary to obtain much documentation that was never in the files of the Department of State, notably presidential and military papers.

A few papers pertinent to the Malta and Yalta conferences had been obtained by the Department of State from the White House, beginning as early as 1946. By 1950 all White House papers prepared by or for President Roosevelt had been sent to the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York. In order to facilitate the collection of source material for the present volume the Department of State in 1953 asked for the cooperation of the Roosevelt Library. The Director of this Library, with the approval of the Archivist of the United States, set up a special project to identify and microfilm for the editors of this volume all documents pertinent to these two conferences from the Roosevelt and Hopkins Papers in the custody of the Library.

Since the files of the Department of State contained very few papers on the military staff discussions at Malta and Yalta, the Department of State also obtained the assistance of the Department of Defense in locating and releasing documents from the military records of these conferences. This type of material consists of papers documenting the official position or advice of the War and Navy Departments on

politico-military subjects discussed at the international level, as presented by the civilian leaders of those departments and by the American Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff, together with instructions and interpretations on such subjects given to those departments by the President. In addition, a few other papers originating with or transmitted by military authorities have been included where appropriate to clarify references or to set forth information pertinent to the conferences which was given to the President or to his principal advisers. In the selection of military papers the emphasis has been placed upon those relating to subjects with significant implications for the foreign relations of the United States.

This volume, therefore, includes the relevant papers on the Malta and Yalta Conferences from the files of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, together with some papers obtained earlier from the White House. The conference documentation as a whole is not so complete as might be desired, since records of some of the conference discussions do not exist, and since there may be papers of significance among private collections to which access has not been granted.

The editors have sought access to the private papers of individuals who attended the conferences. Certain of these persons have contributed useful comments and suggestions, and some have written memoirs which have been of great value in compiling this official record. Some papers have not become available for inclusion, among them the personal notes of Mr. James F. Byrnes, Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion at that time; the personal papers of Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador to the Soviet Union at the time; and, more particularly, the papers of Mr. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., who was present as Secretary of State.

#### ORGANIZATION OF THE VOLUME

The volume is divided into three major segments. Part I contains pre-conference background material; Part II presents the records of the conference at Malta; Part III consists of the records of the Yalta Conference.

The inclusion of the background material comprising Part I (Chapters 1-4) was necessitated by the fact that the annual *Foreign Relations* volumes for the years of World War II have not yet been published. Accordingly, the editors felt obliged to include in this volume a considerable quantity of pre-conference material in order to indicate at least the general outlines of the historical setting in which the conferences at Malta and Yalta took place. Chapter 1 of this pre-conference documentation shows how the arrangements were made for holding the conferences. Chapter 2 contains correspondence, memoranda, and Briefing Book papers showing the pre-conference status of

United States policy on the principal subjects discussed at Malta and Yalta. For most of these subjects, the documentation presented herein goes back no further than the autumn of 1944. Obviously a full historical coverage of these subjects will have to await the appearance of the *Foreign Relations* volumes for the years 1941-1945. Chapter 3 comprises excerpts pertinent to those conference subjects from the so-called Record (official diary) of Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., for the period from December 1, 1944, the day on which he took the oath of office as Secretary, to January 23, 1945, the day before he left Washington for the trip to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. (His records for the conferences themselves are not available.) Chapter 4 contains two high-level reports surveying the broad lines of Soviet policy on the eve of the conferences.

The records of the conferences themselves (Parts II and III) are organized as follows: (1) At the beginning of each conference (Chapters 5 and 7) there are presented those portions of President Roosevelt's Log which pertain to the days of each conference.<sup>2</sup> This furnishes an over-all calendar of events for the one day on which the President was in attendance at Malta and for all eight days of the conference at Yalta.

(2) Following the excerpts from the Log for each conference, there appear the minutes and related documents of Malta and Yalta respectively, arranged by meetings in chronological order (Chapters 6 and 8). The documents, regardless of their respective dates and subjects, have been placed after the minutes of the meeting to which they refer, or at which they were first discussed.

(3) For the Yalta Conference there are three additional chapters containing documents of a type not found for Malta. Chapter 9, entitled "Other Conference Documents", contains papers which bear directly on Yalta discussions but are not closely enough related to any specific minutes to be included in Chapter 8. Chapter 10 presents literal prints of the English texts of the agreements signed at Yalta. Chapter 11 consists of such hitherto unpublished documents as could be found which were prepared by conference participants after the conference, describing factually certain of the proceedings at Yalta.

#### CATEGORIES OF CONFERENCE RECORDS

The records of the conferences themselves fall into three major categories: (1) minutes of international discussions in which American representatives participated with either the British or the Russians or both; (2) documents which figured in the international negotiations at the conferences; (3) intradelegation documentation relating to

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<sup>2</sup> For description of the Log, see *post*, p. 459.

conference subjects. The scope of coverage in each of these categories is as follows:

(1) *Minutes of International Meetings*—Even with the addition of documents from the White House, the Department of Defense, and the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, the official American record of the international discussions at these conferences contains some gaps. For Malta there are minutes (reproduced herein) of all the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but on the political side there are minutes for only one of the several meetings of the Foreign Secretaries and no American minutes of the Roosevelt-Churchill talks. With respect to the Yalta conference there are minutes of all international military meetings in which the United States Chiefs of Staff participated, and these are included in this volume. No records have been found, however, of the private Roosevelt-Churchill meetings. There are minutes or notes on most of the other political discussions but these are not so complete or definitive as might be desired. On this point the late Secretary of State Stettinius wrote as follows:

“It would . . . have been better at Yalta to have had a stenographic record made of the discussions. The record then could have been distributed to and approved by each delegation and become the official record of the proceedings. There was, however, no single official record of the meetings, nor was there any stenotypist recording every word. Instead, each delegation kept its own minutes. Bridges, for instance, took notes in shorthand for the British, while Bohlen had the double task of interpreting and note taking for the United States. In addition, some members of the American delegation, at least, kept their own personal notes. Every noon at the foreign ministers’ meetings to discuss problems assigned by the three leaders, Edward Page of the American Embassy in Moscow served both as interpreter and as note taker for the American delegation. . . .

“The military followed a different practice in keeping a record of their discussions. Although each of the three nations had its own representative taking notes, these three individuals cleared their versions with each other and with all the participants. In the case of the diplomatic discussions, this practice was unfortunately not followed. . . .”<sup>3</sup>

In view of this situation the editors decided to include in this volume all available minutes or notes on the international political discussions at Yalta. Thus for a majority of the political meetings at Yalta there will be found in this volume two or more accounts, generally in the form of minutes prepared by Charles E. Bohlen, Edward Page, or H. Freeman Matthews, or rough notes in abbreviated long-hand taken by Matthews or Alger Hiss.

(2) *Documents Considered at International Meetings*—This category comprises proposals, memoranda, and correspondence, of

<sup>3</sup> Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference* (New York, 1949), pp. 103-104.

American, British, or Russian origin, that were actually submitted or exchanged as a part of the international negotiations at the conferences. It also includes, of course, the international documents signed at Yalta. For both Malta and Yalta, documents of this type have been included for military, as well as political, subjects.

(3) *Intradelegation Documentation*—This type of documentation includes minutes or notes on discussions within the United States Delegation bearing directly on the subjects under negotiation at the conferences with either the British or the Russians or both. It also includes memoranda and correspondence on such subjects within the United States Delegation or between the Delegation and other officers of the United States Government. At Malta and Yalta there were frequent meetings of top civilian advisers with the Secretary of State or the President to discuss political subjects under negotiation at the conferences, but apparently no minutes of these discussions were prepared. Such notes as could be found on these discussions have been included, together with all significant intradelegation memoranda dealing with international conference subjects.

On the military side, minutes were regularly kept of the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Malta and Yalta. Those portions of these minutes which relate to subjects under international negotiation at the conferences are included in this volume, together with such related documents as are not adequately summarized in the minutes themselves.

#### UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

Only a small proportion of the total documentation published in this volume was found in the indexed Central Files of the Department of State. Documents which came from those files are indicated by a file number, in the usual style of *Foreign Relations*. The great majority of documents in this volume came either from unindexed files (i. e., special collections) within the Department of State or from documentary collections outside the Department. These sources are indicated by brief headnotes above each document. The files and collections so indicated are described in the following paragraphs.

##### A. INSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. *Bohlen Collection*—This collection consists of the Yalta minutes and documents collected by Charles E. Bohlen, then Assistant to the Secretary of State, who served as interpreter for the President at Yalta. It contains all the minutes of the plenary meetings at Yalta which were prepared by Bohlen. It also includes one memorandum of conversation dictated by Averell Harriman and the minutes of the meetings of the Foreign Ministers at Yalta which were taken by Edward Page, Jr., then Second Secretary of the American Embassy at Moscow, who served as interpreter for Secretary Stettinius. Also

in the collection are copies of the more important conference documents and one paper of British origin dating from Malta. The Bohlen Collection, while by no means complete, has been regarded by the Department and the White House as the nearest approach to an official American record of the Yalta Conference.

2. *Hiss Collection*—This collection consists of the notes and documents pertaining to Yalta which were collected by Alger Hiss, then Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs. The collection contains the original penciled notes taken by Hiss at a number of meetings at Yalta, together with a roughly chronological assortment of conference papers and United States Delegation working memoranda and notes prepared by Hiss and others at Yalta. The collection also contains one paper prepared at Malta, a few Yalta papers of British origin, and several papers prepared in the spring of 1945 which pertain to subjects discussed at Yalta. The original Hiss notes on the Yalta meetings have been printed in this publication as nearly facsimile as feasible. A number of memoranda prepared by Hiss at Yalta were not included in this particular collection but were found elsewhere in the UNA files of which this collection formed a part.

3. *Matthews Files*—The files accumulated in the office of H. Freeman Matthews, then Director of the Office of European Affairs. These voluminous files contain a number of Yalta papers not in other collections. They also contain the original penciled notes taken by Matthews at six plenary meetings and four Foreign Ministers' meetings at Yalta. The Matthews notes on the plenary meetings had been transcribed by Matthews into smooth minutes and these have been reproduced in this volume. The rough notes on the Foreign Ministers' meetings, which Matthews had not transcribed, are reproduced in this volume as nearly facsimile as feasible.

4. *UNA Files*—The files of the Bureau (Office) of United Nations Affairs (now the Bureau of International Organization Affairs). These files contain a voluminous collection of documents regarding the establishment of the United Nations and related subjects.

5. *Executive Secretariat Files*—These files provided the only copy that could be found in the Department of State of the Yalta Briefing Book.

6. *L/T Files*—The files of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs.

7. *EE Files*—The files of the Office (Division) of Eastern European Affairs.

8. *EUR Files*—The files of the Bureau (Office) of European Affairs.

9. *Moscow Embassy Files*—Certain files of the American Embassy at Moscow for the period 1936-1950 which are now in the Department of State.

10. *EAC Files*—The files of the United States Delegation to the European Advisory Commission, now in the Department of State.

11. *FEC Files*—The files of the Far Eastern Commission, now in the Department of State.

#### B. OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. *White House Files*—From these files there was obtained a copy of the booklet containing the Log of the President's trip to Malta and Yalta.

2. *J. C. S. Files*—The files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These files provided not only Joint Chiefs of Staff material but also Combined Chiefs of Staff documentation. The approval of the British Chiefs of Staff, along with that of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, was obtained for the declassification of Combined Chiefs of Staff documentation.

3. *Defense Files*—The files of the Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of War and Navy and other relevant files.

4. *Treasury Files*—The files of the Department of the Treasury. One pre-Yalta paper printed in this volume was obtained from these files.

5. *Roosevelt Papers*—The papers of President Roosevelt in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York. The Roosevelt Papers were particularly valuable for the heads-of-government correspondence, most of which was not in the files of the Department of State.

6. *Hopkins Papers*—The papers of Harry L. Hopkins, located in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York. A few notes written by Hopkins to the President during plenary meetings at Yalta were found. There were no other Yalta papers of a unique nature, since Hopkins was too ill at Yalta to participate fully in the conference.

#### PUBLISHED SOURCES

In addition to the Department of State *Bulletin*, the two official publications listed below were found to be the most convenient sources for citations to previously published documents referred to in this volume:

*Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 1939-1945*

Department of State Publication 3580 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949). Hereafter cited as "*Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation*".

*A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49*

Senate Document No. 123, 81st Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950). Hereafter cited as "*Decade*".

The most authoritative unofficial publications containing basic data on the conferences at Malta and Yalta are the following books,

which were written by conference participants or from the papers of participants:

- James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1947). Hereafter referred to as "Byrnes".
- Winston S. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953), volume VI of the series *The Second World War*. Hereafter referred to as "Churchill".
- John R. Deane, *The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Cooperation with Russia* (New York: The Viking Press, 1947). Hereafter referred to as "Deane".
- Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, *Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1952). Hereafter referred to as "King".
- William D. Leahy, *I Was There: The Personal History of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time* (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950). Hereafter referred to as "Leahy".
- Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1948). Hereafter referred to as "Sherwood".
- Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1949). Hereafter referred to as "Stettinius".

While much information is contained in these books that is not in the official record, it would be neither feasible nor appropriate to reproduce such material in this volume. Citations have been made to these books, however, for statements of fact which are specifically supplementary to, or at variance with, the official record as presented herein. A few other unofficial but authoritative books which touch on aspects of the pre-conference negotiations have also been cited at appropriate points in this volume.

Testimony given in congressional hearings by participants in the Malta and Yalta conferences has also been studied for factual additions to the record, and citations to such statements have been made at appropriate points in the volume.

#### EDITORIAL TREATMENT

In the documents presented in this volume the editors have corrected only obvious typographic errors. All permissible variations in spelling, punctuation, and capitalization have been retained as in the original text. The data appearing in the headings and subscriptions of the original documents (place, date, addressee, method of transmission, and classification) have been harmonized by the editors into a reasonably standard pattern in the headings as printed herein. Any substantive titles appearing on the original documents have been retained.

The classification of the document (top secret, secret, confidential, or restricted) is included in the printed heading if such information appears on the document itself. It should be noted, however, that in 1944 and 1945 many documents were not given any formal classi-



fication, although they were handled as if classified and were in some instances so marked subsequently. The editors have endeavored to reproduce in this volume the original classification of the document (if any), disregarding subsequent modifications thereof. In instances in which the classification was stamped rather than typed on the text copy, it is possible that this classification was applied subsequently and did not appear on the document as originally prepared.

Most of the minutes and notes presented in this volume contained lists of participants for each meeting reported on. In order to avoid the useless repetition of such lists and to harmonize differences in spelling, the editors have compiled a single list of the names of participants for each meeting of each conference. A complete list of persons mentioned in the volume will be found on pages xxv-xxxviii, with indications as to whether they were present at Malta, at Yalta, or at both places during the time of the conferences.

All telegraphic instructions of the Department of State are issued over the name of the Secretary or Acting Secretary, although in many cases the name of the Secretary or Acting Secretary is actually signed by an appropriate official of lower rank who subscribes his own initials. In the telegrams printed in this volume, such initials have been retained as a part of the signature, with a bracketed indication in each case of the identity of the signing officer. Similarly, in the case of those third-person communications which are customarily initialed rather than signed, the initials have been retained, together with a bracketed indication of the name of the initialing officer.

In accordance with the customary practice in the *Foreign Relations* series, a limited number of omissions are made in order (1) to avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals, (2) to protect defense information in accordance with Executive Order 10501, and (3) to condense the record, as, e. g. by eliminating items that are merely repetitious, or not germane. All deletions have been indicated by marks of ellipsis (three or seven dots) at the appropriate points in the documents as printed.

A consolidated list of abbreviations, symbols, and code names will be found immediately following this introduction. A list of papers will be found beginning on page xxxix.

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, SYMBOLS, AND CODE NAMES

(This list does not include: standard abbreviations in common usage; unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified at appropriate points; and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context.)

- ACC**, Allied Control Commission  
**A-D**, Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Dunn  
**AFHQ**, Allied Force Headquarters  
**AGWAR**, Adjutant General, War Department  
**ALLSTATE HORSESHOE**, A phrase used between Stettinius and his estate, the Horseshoe, indicating that all was going well  
**AMG**, Allied Military Government  
**AOO**, Air Officer Commanding  
**ARGONAUT**, Code name for the Yalta Conference; also used to refer to military discussions at Malta as well as at Yalta  
**ASDIC**, Allied Submarine Devices Investigation Committee (World War I); also any type of underwater supersonic echo-ranging equipment of vessels  
**ASV**, Airborne search radar  
**AUNOJ**, See **AVNOJ**  
**AVNOJ**, Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation of Yugoslavia  
**BMA**, British Military Authority  
**BMWT**, British Ministry of War Transport  
**BROADSWORD**, Code name for the operation to liberate Malaya and open the Straits of Malacca  
**CAC**, Country and Area Committee, Department of State  
**cc**, carbon copy  
**CCAC**, Combined (American and British) Civil Affairs Committee  
**CCS**, Combined (American and British) Chiefs of Staff  
**CM-in**, Classified message—incoming  
**CMTC**, Combined Military Transportation Committee  
**C of S**, Chief of Staff  
**ComNavGr**, Commander, Naval Group  
**Cong**, Congress  
**CRICKET**, Code name for Malta as a geographical location  
**D-Day**, The term used to designate the unnamed day on which an operation commences, or is to commence; sometimes used with specific reference to the day of Allied cross-Channel assault (June 6, 1944)  
**dukw**, amphibious truck  
**EAC**, European Advisory Commission  
**EAM**, National Liberation Front (Greece)  
**EE**, Office of Eastern Europe Affairs  
**EUR**, Office (Bureau) of European Affairs, Department of State  
**EW**, European War  
**FAN**, Military communications indicator  
**FEA**, Foreign Economic Administration  
**FEC**, Far Eastern Commission  
**FOX**, Military communications indicator  
**FRANTIC**, Code name for England-to-Russia air-shuttle bombing operations  
**G-1**, Army general staff section dealing with personnel at the divisional or higher level  
**G-3**, Army general staff section dealing with operations and training at the divisional or higher level  
**Gestapo**, German Secret State Police  
**GRENADE**, Code name for the attack by the 9th Army from the Roer to the Rhine near Düsseldorf  
**HC**, Hospital Corps

- HMG**, His (Britannic) Majesty's Government
- HMS**, His (Britannic) Majesty's Ship
- ILO**, International Labor Organization
- JCS**, Joint (United States Army and Navy) Chiefs of Staff
- jr**, junior grade
- JLC**, Joint Logistics Committee
- JPS**, Joint Staff Planners
- JSSC**, Joint Strategic Survey Committee
- JWPC**, Joint War Plans Committee
- Le**, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
- LOYALIST**, Code name for the operation to liberate Burma
- L/T**, Assistant (Assistant Legal Adviser) for Treaty Affairs, Department of State
- LVT**, Landing vehicle, tracked
- M**, Communications indicator
- MAGNETO**, Code name for Yalta as a geographical location
- MANHATTAN DISTRICT**, Code name for the atomic-bomb-development project
- MC**, Medical Corps
- MC-V(s)**, Medical Corps, Volunteer (Specialist)
- ME**, Division of Middle Eastern Affairs, Department of State
- MILEPOST**, Code name referring to stockpiling of supplies in eastern Siberia for the use of Soviet forces in the war against Japan
- MR**, Map Room at the White House or at the conference. Served as communications center for the President
- MWT**, Ministry of War Transport (British)
- NAF**, Military communications indicator
- Narkomindel**, People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (Soviet)
- NCR**, Communications indicator
- NEA**, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State
- NIACT**, a communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
- NKVD**, People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Soviet)
- OCTAGON**, Code name for the Second Quebec Conference, September 11-16, 1944
- OPD**, Operations Division, War Department General Staff
- para**, paragraph
- PM**, Prime Minister
- RAF**, Royal Air Force (British)
- RANKIN "C"**, Code name for a plan that provided for Allied action in case of German unconditional surrender and cessation of organized resistance
- ReEmbs**, Regarding the Embassy's (telegram)
- ReEmbstel**, Regarding the Embassy's telegram
- Ret**, retired
- RN**, Royal Navy (British)
- S**, Office of the Secretary of State
- SA**, National Socialist Storm Troops (German)
- SACMED**, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean
- SACSEA**, Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia
- SC**, Supply Corps
- SCAEF**, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force
- SCAF**, Military communications indicator
- SCC**, Secretary's Coordinating Committee
- SEAC**, Southeast Asia Command
- Sec**, Secretary
- ser**, series
- sess**, session
- SHAEF**, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
- SM**, Secretarial memorandum, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- SPA**, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State
- SS**, National Socialist Elite Guard (German)
- SSR**, Soviet Socialist Republic
- Stat**, The Statutes at Large of the United States
- S/W**, Secretary of War
- SWNCC**, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
- TVA**, Tennessee Valley Authority

- U**, Office of the Under Secretary of State
- UJ**, "Uncle Joe" Stalin
- UK**, United Kingdom
- UNA**, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State (now IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs)
- "Uncle Joe"**, Marshal Stalin—term used in correspondence between Roosevelt and Churchill
- UNRRA**, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
- Urtel**, Your telegram
- USA**, United States of America; United States Army
- USAAF**, United States Army Air Forces
- USMC**, United States Marine Corps
- USN**, United States Navy
- USNR**, United States Naval Reserve
- V-E Day**, The day of Allied victory in Europe
- VERITABLE**, Code name for the offensive by the northern group of armies to cross the Rhine
- VHB**, Very heavy bomber
- VHF**, Very high frequency
- VLR**, Very long range (aircraft)
- WAAF**, Women's Auxiliary Air Force (British)
- WAR**, Military communications indicator
- WEARY WILLIE**, Code name for the use of war-weary heavy bombers to be radar controlled and directed as single missiles against otherwise impregnable targets
- WPB**, War Production Board
- WSA**, War Shipping Administration
- Yugos**, Yugoslav



## LIST OF PERSONS MENTIONED

(Identification of a person in this list is limited to circumstances under reference in this volume. Names of persons which appear only as the authors of books or other writings cited in the volume are not included. The symbols which precede certain names in the list provide, so far as it has been possible to ascertain, the following information: An asterisk (\*) indicates presence at Yalta during the time of the conference there. A dagger (†) indicates presence at Malta during the time of the conference there.)

ACHESON, Dean G., Assistant Secretary of State.

AHI, al-Majid 'Abd, Iranian Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

al-. For names beginning *al-*, see the second element.

\*†ALEXANDER, Field Marshal Sir Harold, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

ALEXEY, Tsaryevich of Russia, son of Nicholas II.

\*ALLEN, Denis, First Secretary in the Northern Department of the British Foreign Office.

ALLEN, George V., Chief, Division of Middle Eastern Affairs, and Executive Officer, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State.

\*†ANDERSON, Major General Frederick L., U. S. A., Deputy Commanding General of the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, in Charge of Operations.

\*ANTONOV, General of the Army Alexey Innokentyevich, First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Soviet Army.

\*ARCHER, Rear Admiral Ernest Russell, R. N., Head of the British Military Mission to the Soviet Union.

ARCISZEWSKI, Tomasz, Prime Minister of the Polish Government in London, November 1944-1947.

ARNOLD, General of the Army Henry H., U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces.

\*BACHA, Chief Yeoman Andrew M., U. S. N. R., Interpreter.

\*BACKUS, Lieutenant Commander Leslie H., M. C., U. S. N. R., Medical Officer.

BADOGLIO, Marshal Pietro, Italian Prime Minister, 1943-1944.

BARRETT, Colonel David D., U. S. A., Chief of Staff, China Combat Command (Provisional), China Theater.

BASISTY, Vice Admiral Nikolay Efremovich, Chief of Staff of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet.

BELL, Daniel W., Under Secretary of the Treasury.

BENEŠ, Edvard, President of Czechoslovakia.

BENNER, Colonel Donald W., U. S. A., assigned to Headquarters, Army Air Forces, Washington; member of the Joint Logistics Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

BEREZHKOV, Valentin Mikhailovich, Secretary-Interpreter to the Soviet Delegation, Washington Conversations on International Organization (Dumbarton Oaks), and Diplomatic Courier to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, August 22-September 28, 1944; officer of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

- \*BERIYA, Lavrenty Pavlovich, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union, member of the State Defense Committee, and People's Commissar for Internal Affairs (NKVD).
- BERLE, Adolf A., Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, 1938-1944; American Ambassador to Brazil, 1945-1946.
- BERLING, Major General Zygmunt, Commander of the Polish Forces in the Soviet Union.
- BERRY, Burton Y., American Representative in Rumania with the personal rank of Minister.
- \*BESSELL, Brigadier General William W., Jr., U. S. A., Strategy and Policy Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, and senior Army member of the Joint War Plans Committee.
- BIDAULT, Georges, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government of France.
- BIERUT, Boleslaw, President of the Provisional Legislature or National Council of the Homeland of the Lublin Polish Government.
- \*BIRSE, Major Arthur, Second Secretary, British Embassy, Moscow; interpreter to Prime Minister Churchill at the Yalta Conference.
- BLAKESLEE, George H., Consultant to the Division of Territorial Studies, Department of State.
- \*†BLANCHARD, Lee B., Secretary to the Secretary of State.
- BLOOM, Sol, Member of the House of Representatives from New York.
- \*†BOETTIGER, Mrs. John (Anna Eleanor Roosevelt), daughter of President Roosevelt.
- \*BOGART, Colonel Frank A., U. S. A., Assistant Chief of Staff and member of the Special Planning Staff, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union.
- BOGOMOLOV, Alexander Efremovich, Soviet Ambassador to France.
- \*†BOGUE, Lieutenant Robert W., U. S. N. R., Watch Officer, White House Map Room.
- \*†BOHLEN, Charles E., Assistant to the Secretary of State; interpreter to President Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference.
- BONOMI, Ivanoe, Italian Prime Minister.
- BORTON, Hugh, Country Specialist, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State.
- BOTTOMLY, Air Vice Marshal Norman Howard, Deputy Chief of the British Air Staff (Operations).
- BOWMAN, Isaiah, President of the Johns Hopkins University and Special Adviser to the Secretary of State on Post-war Problems and Plans.
- BRADLEY, Lieutenant General Omar N., U. S. A., Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group.
- BREWSTER, Owen, United States Senator from Maine.
- \*BRIDGES, Sir Edward, Secretary of the British Cabinet.
- \*†BROOKE, Field Marshal Sir Alan, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff.
- BROWN, Walter, Special Assistant to the Director, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion.
- \*†BROWN, Vice Admiral Wilson, U. S. N. (retired), Naval Aide to President Roosevelt.
- BUJAK, Franciszek, Polish economist and educator; in Poland during World War II.
- \*†BULL, Major General Harold R., U. S. A., Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (G-3), Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.
- \*BURROUGH, Commodore Edmund W., U. S. N., member of the Staff of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and senior Navy member of the Joint War Plans Committee.

- BURROWS, Lieutenant General Montagu Brocas, Head of the British Military Mission to the Soviet Union, February–October 1944.
- \*†BUTLER, Nevile Montague, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.
- BYAZ, Colonel, an officer of Soviet Forces, not otherwise identified.
- BYINGTON, Homer M., Executive Assistant to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.
- \*†BYRNES, James F., Director, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion.
- \*†CABELL, Brigadier General Charles P., U. S. A., Director of Operations and Intelligence, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.
- \*†CADOGAN, Sir Alexander, British Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
- CAESAR, Gaius Julius, Roman general, statesman, and writer.
- CAFFERY, Jefferson, American Ambassador to France.
- \*†CALINAQ, Chief Steward Federico, U. S. N., member of the President's mess-man detail.
- CAMPBELL, Captain Colin, U. S. N., Head of the Atlantic Section, Plans Division, in the office of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet; member of the Joint Staff Planners of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- \*CAMPION, John E., United States Secret Service.
- CANNON, Cavendish W., Chief, Division of Southern European Affairs, Department of State.
- \*CAPEL-DUNN, Colonel Denis Cuthbert, Military Assistant Secretary of the British War Cabinet.
- CARRETTA, Donato, Director of the Regina Coeli prison in Rome; killed by a mob in September 1944.
- \*CARTER, Rear Admiral Andrew F., U. S. N. R., Director, Petroleum and Tanker Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; Executive Officer, Joint Army-Navy Petroleum Board.
- \*†CARY, Colonel John B., U. S. A., member of the Strategy and Policy Group (Plans), Operations Division, War Department General Staff.
- CASSADY, Rear Admiral John H., U. S. N., Assistant Deputy to the Chief of Naval Operations (Air) and member of the Joint Logistics Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- CHANG Chih-chung, Director of the Chinese Political Board of Military Affairs Council.
- CHARLES, Sir Noel, British High Commissioner in Italy with the rank of Ambassador.
- \*CHASE, Lieutenant Joseph, U. S. N. R., Navy member of the United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union.
- \*CHEPLICK, Lieutenant (jg) John, U. S. N. R., Interpreter.
- CHERNYAKHOVSKY, Army General Ivan Danilovich, Soviet Commander of the Third Byelorussian Front.
- CHERWELL, Lord, British Paymaster-General.
- CHIANG Kai-shek, Generalissimo, President of the National Government of the Republic of China.
- CHOU En-lai, General, member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
- \*†CHURCHILL, Major Randolph Frederick Edward Spencer, Member of Parliament; son of Prime Minister Churchill.
- \*†CHURCHILL, Winston S., Member of Parliament, British Prime Minister, First Lord of the Treasury, and Minister of Defence.
- CIECHANOWSKI, Jan, Polish Ambassador to the United States.
- CITRINE, Sir Walter, General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress.



- \*†CLARK, Commander Robert N. S., U. S. N., Aide to the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the United States Army and Navy.
- CLARK KERR. See Kerr.
- CLAYTON, William L., Assistant Secretary of State.
- CLEMENCEAU, Georges Eugène Benjamin, French Premier, 1906-1909, 1917-1920.
- \*†COLERIDGE, Commander the Honorable Richard Duke, R. N., Deputy Secretary, British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, and British Deputy Secretary, Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- COMP, Captain Charles O., U. S. N., Commanding Officer of the U. S. S. *Catoclin*.
- \*†CONN, George T., Administrative Officer, Department of State.
- CONNALLY, Tom, United States Senator from Texas.
- †CONRAD, Lieutenant (jg) A. L., U. S. N. R., White House courier.
- †CONSIDINE, Colonel William S., U. S. A., attached to the MANHATTAN DISTRICT project.
- \*†COOKE, Vice Admiral Charles M., Jr., U. S. N., Chief of Staff and Aide to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
- COOPER, Alfred Duff, British Ambassador to France.
- COPERNICUS, Nikolaus, sixteenth-century Polish astronomer.
- \*†CORNELIUS, Chief Warrant Officer Albert M., U. S. A., member of the President's party.
- \*†CORNWALL-JONES, Brigadier Arthur Thomas, Secretary, British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, and British Secretary, Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- CROWLEY, Leo T., Administrator, Foreign Economic Administration.
- \*†CUNNINGHAM, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew, Bart., R. N., British First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.
- †CUNNINGHAM, Admiral Sir John, R. N., British Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, and Allied Naval Commander, Mediterranean.
- CURZON of Kedleston, Marquess, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1919-1924.
- DALADIER, Édouard, French Minister of National Defense and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1940.
- DANIELS, Jonathan W., Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt.
- DARLAN, Admiral Jean Louis Xavier François, High Commissioner of French North and West Africa; assassinated at Algiers December 24, 1942.
- DAVIES, Joseph E., American lawyer and diplomat; Special Envoy of President Roosevelt to confer with Marshal Stalin, May-June 1943.
- \*†DEAN, Colonel Fred M., U. S. A., Executive Assistant to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.
- \*DEANE, Major General John R., U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union.
- \*DECFARD, Wilmer K., United States Secret Service.
- DE GAULLE, General Charles, President of the Council of Ministers of the Provisional Government of France.
- \*†DIXON, Pierson, Principal Private Secretary to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
- \*DORNIN, Commander Robert E., U. S. N., member of the Staff of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
- \*†DORSEY, John H., United States Secret Service.
- DUFTON, Lieutenant Commander Walter S., U. S. N., Executive Officer of the U. S. S. *Catoclin*.
- \*†DUNCAN, Rear Admiral Donald B., U. S. N., Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans) to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet; member of the Joint Staff Planners of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- DUNN, James C., Director, Office of European Affairs, Department of State, January-December 1944; Assistant Secretary of State, December 1944-July 1946.
- DURBROW, Elbridge, Chief, Division of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State.
- \*†EARLY, Stephen, Secretary to President Roosevelt.
- EATON, Charles A., Member of the House of Representatives from New Jersey.
- EDDY, Colonel William A., U. S. M. C. (retired), American Minister to Saudi Arabia.
- \*†EDEN, Anthony, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
- EDWARDS, Vice Admiral Richard S., U. S. N., Deputy Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.
- EGGLESTON, Sir Frederic, Australian Minister to the United States.
- EISENHOWER, General of the Army Dwight D., U. S. A., Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, and Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.
- ESCALANTE, Diógenes, Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States.
- \*†ESTRADA, Chief Steward Pio, U. S. N., member of the President's messman detail.
- \*EVEREST, Brigadier General Frank F., U. S. A., senior Air Force member of the Joint War Plans Committee.
- FAROUK I, King of Egypt.
- FITE, Katherine B., Assistant to the Legal Adviser, Department of State.
- \*†FLORESCA, Chief Cook Mariano, U. S. N., member of the President's messman detail.
- \*†FLYNN, Edward J., Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, 1940-1942.
- \*†FOOTE, Wilder, Assistant to the Secretary of State.
- FORBES, Alastair, British writer.
- FORRESTAL, James, Secretary of the Navy.
- FOSDICK, Dorothy, Assistant to the Associate Chief, Division of International Security and Organization, Department of State.
- GALLACHER, William, Communist Member of the British Parliament.
- GALLMAN, Waldemar J., Counselor, American Embassy, London.
- GEORGE II, King of the Hellenes.
- GILDERSLEEVE, Virginia C., Dean of Barnard College.
- GIRAUD, General Henri Honoré, Commanding General of the French Twenty-first Army Region.
- GOEBBELS, Joseph, German Minister for Public Enlightenment.
- GOERING, Reich Marshal Hermann, German Minister for Aviation.
- \*GOLUNSKY, Sergey Alexandrovich, Soviet Consultant on International Law, assigned to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.
- GRABSKI, Stanislaw, Speaker of the National Council of the Polish Government in London (resigned November 1944).
- \*†GRAHAM, Ralph L., Secretary to the Secretary of State.
- \*†GRAVES, Captain Edwin D., Jr., U. S. N., Deputy Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and United States Deputy Secretary, Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- \*†GREER, Major DeWitt, U. S. A., in charge of the White House Signal Corps Detachment.
- GRENDAL, Colonel General Dmitry Davidovich, Chief of the Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet Army Air Force.
- GREW, Joseph C., Under Secretary of State, December 1944-August 1945.
- \*GRIFFITH, James H., United States Secret Service.
- \*GROMYKO, Andrey Andreyevich, Soviet Ambassador to the United States.

- GROMYKO, Madam Lydia (Grinevich), wife of Ambassador Gromyko.
- GROVES, Major General Leslie R., U. S. A., Commanding General, MANHATTAN DISTRICT project.
- \*GRYZLOV, Lieutenant General Anatoly Alekseyevich, Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Soviet Army.
- GUNTHER, Christian E., Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- \*GUSEV, Fedor Tarasovich, Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom and representative on the European Advisory Commission.
- HACKWORTH, Green H., Legal Adviser, Department of State.
- HALIFAX, The Earl of, British Ambassador to the United States.
- HANDY, Lieutenant General Thomas T., U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff, United States Army.
- HANSELL, Brigadier General Haywood S., Jr., U. S. A., Commanding General of the Twenty-first Bomber Command.
- HARMON, Lieutenant General Millard F., U. S. A., Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Pacific Ocean Area, and Deputy Commander of the Twentieth Air Force.
- \*HARRIMAN, Kathleen, daughter of Ambassador Harriman.
- \*†HARRIMAN, W. Averell, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union.
- \*HARRISON, Geoffrey Wedgwood, First Secretary in the German Department of the British Foreign Office.
- \*†HASTINGS, Robert R., United States Secret Service.
- HESS, Rudolf, German Minister without Portfolio and Representative (*Stellvertreter*) of Hitler (to 1941).
- †HEWITT, Vice Admiral Henry K., U. S. N., Commander, Eighth Fleet.
- HICKENLOOPER, Bourke B., United States Senator from Iowa.
- HICKERSON, John D., Chief, Division of British Commonwealth Affairs, Department of State, January–December 1944; Deputy Director, Office of European Affairs, Department of State, December 1944–August 1947.
- \*HILL, Major General Edmund W., U. S. A., Chief of the Air Division, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union.
- HILL, Lister, United States Senator from Alabama.
- HILLDRING, Major General John H., U. S. A., Director, Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff.
- HIMMLER, Heinrich, Chief of the German Elite Guard (SS) and of the Secret State Police (Gestapo).
- \*†HISS, Alger, Special Assistant to the Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State, May–October 1944; Deputy Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State, November 1944–March 1945; Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State, March 1945–January 1947.
- HITLER, Adolf, Chancellor of the German Reich.
- \*HOLMES, Major General Noel Galway, Deputy Quarter-Master-General of the British War Office.
- \*†HOLMES, Robert E., United States Secret Service.
- \*†HOPKINS, Harry L., Special Assistant to President Roosevelt.
- \*†HOPKINS, Sergeant Robert, son of Harry L. Hopkins.
- HORNE, Vice Admiral Frederick J., U. S. N., Vice Chief of Naval Operations and Chairman, Army-Navy Petroleum Board.
- HORTHY, Admiral Miklos, Regent of Hungary, 1920–1944.
- \*HOUGHTON, Lieutenant C. Norris, U. S. N. R., Interpreter.
- HULL, Cordell, Secretary of State, 1933–1944.
- \*†HULL, Major General John E., U. S. A., Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff.

- HURLEY, Major General Patrick J., U. S. A., American Ambassador to China.
- HYDE, Louis K., Jr., Assistant to the Secretary of State.
- İNÖNÜ, İsmet, President of Turkey.
- IRELAND, Colonel Ray W., U. S. A., Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Air Transport Command.
- \*†ISMAÏ, General Sir Hastings Lionel, British Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence and Deputy Secretary (Military) to the War Cabinet.
- \*†JACOB, Major General Ian, Military Assistant Secretary to the British War Cabinet.
- \*JEBB, Gladwyn, Head of the Reconstruction Department of the British Foreign Office, with the rank of Counsellor.
- JOAN OF ARC, fifteenth-century French heroine.
- JUIN, General Alphonse Pierre, Chief of the French General Staff of National Defense.
- KALININ, Mikhail Ivanovich, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union.
- KAUFFMAN, Henrik de, Danish Minister to the United States.
- \*KAVTARADZE, Sergey Ivanovich, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.
- KELLOGG, Frank B., Secretary of State, 1925-1929.
- KENNAN, George F., Counselor, American Embassy, Moscow.
- \*KERR, Sir Archibald Clark, British Ambassador to the Soviet Union.
- KESSELRING, Field Marshal Albert, German Commanding General of the South-western Theater of War.
- \*KEUSSEFF, Lieutenant Demitri P., U. S. N. R., Interpreter.
- \*KHUDYAKOV, Marshal of Aviation Sergey Vladimirovich, Deputy Chief of the Soviet Air Staff.
- \*KIMACK, Lieutenant (jg) Michael, U. S. N. R., Interpreter.
- \*†KING, Fleet Admiral Ernest J., U. S. N., Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations.
- KIRK, Alexander C., American representative with the rank of Ambassador, Advisory Council for Italy, April-December 1944; political adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater; Ambassador to Italy, December 1944-October 1946.
- \*KLOOCK, Lieutenant (jg) Warren K., U. S. N. R., White House courier.
- KONEV, Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan Stepanovich, Commander of the First Ukrainian Front.
- Koo, Wellington, Chinese Ambassador to the United Kingdom.
- \*KORNILOFF, Yeoman Third Class Nicholas, Jr., U. S. N. R., Interpreter.
- \*KOSTRINSKY, Captain, Third Rank, Mikhail Ilyich, Deputy Chief of Foreign Relations (Liaison) of the Soviet Navy.
- \*KOVAL, Yeoman Third Class Russell, U. S. N. R., Interpreter.
- KRASNOV, a Russian architect, not otherwise identified.
- KROCK, Arthur, Washington correspondent for *The New York Times*.
- KROLENKO, Lieutenant General Nikolay Ivanovich, Chief of the Operations Directorate and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Soviet Army Air Force.
- \*KUCHEROV, Vice Admiral Stepan Grigoryevich, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Soviet Navy.
- \*†KUTER, Major General Laurence S., U. S. A., Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, United States Army Air Forces; at the Malta and Yalta Conferences represented General of the Army Arnold, who was ill.
- KUTRZEBA, Stanisław M., Polish jurist, historian, and educator; in Poland during World War II.

- \*KUZNETSOV, Fleet Admiral Nikolay Gerasimovich, People's Commissar of the Soviet Navy.
- KWAPIŃSKI, Jan, Deputy Prime Minister of the Polish Government in London, 1943-1944; appointed Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Shipping and Acting Minister of Finance of the Polish Government in London, November 1944.
- LAFLEN, Lieutenant Commander Edward C., S. C., U. S. N. R., Supply Officer of the U. S. S. *Catoctin*.
- \*†LAND, Vice Admiral Emory S., U. S. N. (retired), War Shipping Administrator, Chairman of the United States Maritime Commission, and United States member of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board.
- LANE, Arthur B., American Ambassador to Poland.
- \*LANG, Technical Sergeant George J., U. S. A., secretary to General Kuter.
- LASH. See Lausche, Frank J.
- LAUSCHE, Frank J., Governor of Ohio.
- LAW, Richard Kidston, British Minister of State.
- \*†LAYCOCK, Major General Robert Edward, British Chief of Combined Operations.
- \*†LEAHY, Fleet Admiral William D., U. S. N., Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the United States Army and Navy.
- \*†LEATHERS, Lord, British Minister of War Transport.
- LEHMAN, Herbert H., Director General, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.
- LENIN, Nikolay (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov), leader of the Bolshevik Revolution of October-November 1917; Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union, 1917-1924.
- LEVANDOVICH, Major General Stepan Timofeyevich, member of the Soviet Army Air Force Staff.
- LIE, Trygve, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- LINCOLN, Abraham, President of the United States, 1861-1865.
- \*†LINCOLN, Colonel George A., U. S. A. (Brigadier General January 16, 1945), Chief of the Strategy and Policy Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, and member of the Joint Staff Planners of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- \*†LINDSAY, Brigadier General Richard C., U. S. A., Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, Headquarters, Army Air Forces, and member of the Joint Staff Planners of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- LLOYD, Air Vice Marshal Sir Hugh Pughe, British Air Officer Commanding the Mediterranean Command.
- \*†LONG, Dewey E., White House Transportation Officer.
- \*†LOUTZENHEISER, Brigadier General Joe L., U. S. A., Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, Army Air Forces.
- LUKOMSKI, Stanisław, Bishop of Łomża, in Białystok Province; in Poland during World War II.
- \*LUNGH, Captain Hugh, British Interpreter.
- LUXFORD, Ansel F., Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury.
- LYNCH, Robert J., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.
- MACARTHUR, General of the Army Douglas, U. S. A., Commander, United States Army Forces in the Far East, and Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area.
- MACLEAN, Brigadier Fitzroy Hew, Commanding the British Military Mission to the Yugoslav Partisans.
- MACLEISH, Archibald, Assistant Secretary of State.

- MACMILLAN, Harold, Member of Parliament, British Minister Resident at Allied Force Headquarters, Mediterranean Theater, and Acting President of the Allied Commission, Italy.
- MACREADY, Lieutenant General Gordon, Head of the Army Delegation, British Joint Staff Mission in Washington.
- \*MAISKY, Ivan Mikhailovich, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.
- MALININ, Nikolai, Soviet journalist.
- MANIU, Iuliu, President of the National Peasant Party of Rumania.
- MAO Tse-tung, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party.
- \*MAPLES, Captain Houston L., U. S. N., Navy member, Special Planning Staff, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union.
- \*†MARSHALL, General of the Army George C., U. S. A., Chief of Staff, United States Army.
- MASARYK, Jan, Foreign Minister of the Czechoslovak Government in London.
- MASSIGLI, René, French Ambassador to the United Kingdom and representative on the European Advisory Commission.
- \*†MATTHEWS, H. Freeman, Deputy Director, Office of European Affairs, Department of State, January–December 1944; Director, Office of European Affairs, Department of State, December 1944–November 1946.
- MAYER, René, French Minister of Transport and Public Works.
- \*†MCCARTHY, Colonel Frank, U. S. A., Secretary of the War Department General Staff.
- MCCLOY, John J., Assistant Secretary of War.
- \*†MCCORMICK, Rear Admiral Lynde D., U. S. N., Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics Plans and member of the Joint Logistics Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- McDERMOTT, Michael J., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Press Relations).
- \*†MCDILL, Captain Alexander S., U. S. N., Aide to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
- \*†McFARLAND, Brigadier General Andrew J., U. S. A., Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and United States Secretary, Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- \*†McINTIRE, Vice Admiral Ross T., M. C., U. S. N., Surgeon General, United States Navy, and physician to President Roosevelt.
- McNARNEY, Lieutenant General Joseph T., U. S. A., Commanding General of the United States Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater, and Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.
- \*†McRAE, Lieutenant Colonel William A., U. S. A., member of the Advisory Council to the Commanding General, Headquarters, Army Air Forces.
- MEDINA Angarita, Isaias, President of Venezuela.
- MIHAILOVIĆ, General Draža, Leader of the Yugoslav Nationalist Guerrilla Forces.
- MIKOŁAJCZYK, Stanisław, Prime Minister of the Polish Government in London (resigned November 1944) and subsequently leader of the Polish Peasant Party (in exile).
- MIKOYAN, Anatas Ivanovich, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union.
- \*MILLER, Staff Sergeant Arthur, U. S. A., secretary to Major General Kuter.
- MILLSPAUGH, Arthur C., American Administrator General of Finances, Iran.
- \*MOLOTOV, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.
- MONNET, Jean, Head of the French Economic Mission in Washington, 1944–1945.

- MONTGOMERY, Field Marshal Sir Bernard, Commander in Chief, British Twenty-first Army Group.
- MORGENTHAU, Henry, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury.
- MORRIS, Leland B., American Ambassador to Iran.
- MOSELY, Philip E., Chief, Division of Territorial Studies, Department of State; Political Adviser to the United States Delegation, European Advisory Commission.
- MOUNTBATTEN, Admiral Lord Louis, R. N., Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Theater.
- MOWBRER, Edgar A., newspaper columnist and radio commentator.
- MURPHY, Robert D., American Political Adviser on German Affairs with the personal rank of Ambassador, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.
- AL-NAHAS, Mustafa, Pasha, leader of the Egyptian WAFD Party.
- NELSON, Donald M., Chairman, War Production Board, February 1942–October 1944.
- NEMEC, Frantisek, Czechoslovak Minister of Liberated Territories, September 1944–April 1945.
- \*NESTORUK, Yeoman Second Class Alexis, U. S. N. R., Interpreter.
- NEWTON, Nelson, Executive Assistant to the Under Secretary of State.
- NICHOLAS II, Tsar of Russia, 1894–1917.
- NIKOLAY, Metropolitan of Krutitski and Kolomna and Deputy Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church.
- NIMITZ, Fleet Admiral Chester W., U. S. N., Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.
- NORSTAD, Brigadier General Lauris, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Air Staff, Headquarters, Army Air Forces, and Chief of Staff of the Twentieth Air Force.
- NOTTER, Harley A., Chief, Division of International Security and Organization, Department of State, January–October 1944; Adviser, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State, November 1944–January 1948.
- NOVIKOV, Chief Marshal of Aviation Alexander Alexandrovich, Commanding General of the Soviet Army Air Force.
- \*NOVIKOV, Kirill Vasilyevich, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, and Chief of the Second European Division.
- \*†O'DRISCOLL, Daniel J., United States Secret Service.
- \*†OLIVER, Section Officer Sarah (Churchill), Women's Auxiliary Air Force, daughter of Prime Minister Churchill.
- \*OLSEN, Rear Admiral Clarence E., U. S. N., Chief of the Navy Division, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union.
- OSÓBKA-MORAWSKI, Edward Bolesław, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Lublin Provisional Polish Government.
- \*PAGE, Edward, Jr., Second Secretary and Consul, American Embassy, Moscow; secretary and interpreter at the Yalta Conference.
- \*†PARK, Colonel Richard, Jr., U. S. A., Assistant Military Aide to President Roosevelt.
- PASVOLSKY, Leo, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, 1939–1946; also Executive Director, Committee on Post-war Programs, 1944.
- PATTERSON, Richard C., Jr., American Ambassador to Yugoslavia.
- PAULUS, Field Marshal Friedrich, German prisoner of war in the Soviet Union.
- \*PAVLOV, Vladimir Nikolayevich, Personal Secretary and Interpreter to Marshal Stalin.
- PEARSON, Lester Bowles, Canadian Ambassador to the United States.

- \*†PECK, Colonel Clarence R., U. S. A., Executive Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.  
PEHLE, John W., Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury and Executive Director of the War Refugee Board.
- PELL, Herbert C., United States member, United Nations War Crimes Commission.
- PETER II, King of Yugoslavia.
- \*PETERSON, Burrill A., United States Secret Service.
- PETROV, Army General Ivan Efimovich, Soviet Commander of the Fourth Ukrainian Front.
- PLASTRAS, General Nikolaos, Greek Prime Minister.
- PLITT, Edwin A., Chief, Special War Problems Division, Department of State.
- \*†PORTAL, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles, British Chief of Air Staff.
- POTOCKI, Count, Polish nobleman, not otherwise identified.
- \*POTRUBACH, Mikhail Mikhailovich, officer of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, with the rank of First Secretary, Second Class.
- \*†PUTNAM, Major Henry W., U. S. A., member of the President's party.
- RACZKIEWICZ, Władysław, President of the Polish Government in London.
- RAYNOR, G. Haydn, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.
- \*†REILLY, Michael F., United States Secret Service.
- REPIN, Colonel General Alexander Konstantinovich, Chief Engineer and Chief of the Aviation Engineering Service of the Soviet Army Air Force.
- RICHMOND, Major William F., U. S. A., attached to the Five Hundred and Third Army Air Forces Base Unit as a Special Missions Pilot.
- \*†RIDDELL-WEBSTER, General Sir Thomas, British Quarter-Master-General to the Forces, War Office.
- RIDDLEBERGER, James W., Chief, Division of Central European Affairs, Department of State.
- \*†RIGDON, Lieutenant (jg) William M., U. S. N., Secretary and Administrative Assistant to the Naval Aide to the President.
- \*RITCHIE, Colonel William L., U. S. A., Army Air Force member, Special Planning Staff, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union.
- \*†ROBB, Air Marshal Sir James, Deputy Chief of Staff (Air), Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.
- \*ROBERTS, Frank, Counsellor, British Embassy, Moscow.
- \*ROBERTS, Brigadier General Frank N., U. S. A., Chief of Staff and Head of the Special Planning Staff, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union.
- ROCKEFELLER, Nelson A., Assistant Secretary of State.
- ROKOSHOVSKY, Marshal of the Soviet Union Konstantin Konstantinovich, Commander of the Second Byelorussian Front.
- ROLA-ŻYMIERSKI, Michał, Commander in Chief of Polish Forces and Minister of National Defense in the Lublin Polish Government.
- \*ROMANOW, Lieutenant (jg) John P., U. S. N., Interpreter.
- ROMER, Tadeusz, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Polish Government in London (resigned November 1944).
- \*†ROOSEVELT, Franklin D., President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
- ROSENMAN, Samuel I., Special Counsel to President Roosevelt.
- ROTHWELL, C. Easton, Executive Secretary, Joint Secretariat of the Executive Staff Committees, Department of State.
- \*ROWLEY, James J., United States Secret Service.
- SA'ED-MARAGHEH'I, Mohammad, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, June 1942–November 1944, and Prime Minister, March–November 1944.



- SAPIEHA, Adam Stefan, Archbishop of Kraków; in Poland during World War II.
- \*†SARATE, Chief Cook Isidro, U. S. N., member of the President's messman detail.
- SA'UD, Ibn, King of Saudi Arabia.
- SAVAGE, Carlton, Assistant to the Secretary of State.
- \*SAVAGE, Roland M., United States Secret Service.
- \*SAWCHUCK, Yeoman Second Class Andrew, U. S. N. R., Interpreter.
- \*SCHERBATOFF, Lieutenant George S., U. S. N. R., Interpreter.
- SCHOENFELD, H. F. Arthur, American Representative in Hungary with the personal rank of Minister.
- SCHOENFELD, Rudolf E., Counselor, American Embassy near the Governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland in London, with the personal rank of Minister.
- †SCHREIBER, Lieutenant General Sir Edmond, Governor and Commander in Chief of Malta.
- †SCHREIBER, Mrs. Phyllis (Barchard), wife of Lieutenant General Schreiber.
- †SCHREIBER, Miss, one of two daughters of Lieutenant General Schreiber.
- SCHUYLER, Brigadier General Cortland T. Van R., U. S. A., Chief American Military Representative, Allied Control Commission for Rumania.
- SEWARD, William H., Secretary of State, 1861-1869.
- SEYID Zia-ed-din. See Tabatabai, Seyid Zia-ed-din.
- SFORZA, Count Carlo, Italian High Commissioner for Punishment of Illegal Acts under Fascism and Minister without Portfolio, 1944.
- SHEVCHENKO, Major General F., Chief of Staff to the Soviet Far Eastern Commander.
- SIMEON II, King of Bulgaria.
- SIMOVIĆ, General Dušan, Yugoslav Prime Minister and Prime Minister of the Yugoslav Government in London, 1941-1942.
- \*SKLENAR, Yeoman Second Class Harry, U. S. N. R., Interpreter.
- SLAVIN, Major General Nikolay Vasilyevich, Assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Soviet Army.
- \*SMITH, Commander John V., U. S. N., Aide to the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the United States Army and Navy.
- †SMITH, Lieutenant General Walter Bedell, U. S. A., Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.
- \*SMITH, Rear Admiral William W., U. S. N., Director, Naval Transportation Service, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
- SOBOLOV, Arkady Alexandrovich, Counselor, Soviet Embassy, London, and Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Delegation to the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations.
- \*†SOMERVELL, Lieutenant General Brehon B., U. S. A., Commanding General, Army Service Forces.
- \*†SOMERVILLE, Admiral Sir James, R. N., Head of the Admiralty Delegation, British Joint Staff Mission in Washington.
- SOONG, T. V., Chinese Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- SPAATZ, Lieutenant General Carl, U. S. A., Commander in Chief, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe.
- \*†SPAMAN, Guy H., United States Secret Service.
- \*STALIN, Marshal of the Soviet Union Iosif Vissarionovich, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.
- STANLEY, The Honorable Oliver Frederick George, Member of Parliament and British Secretary of State for the Colonies.
- †STARK, Admiral Harold R., U. S. N., Commander, United States Naval Forces, Europe, and Commander, Twelfth Fleet.
- STASSEN, Commander Harold E., U. S. N. R., Assistant Chief of Staff for Administration and Flag Secretary to the Commander, Third Fleet.

- STEINHARDT, Laurence A., American Ambassador to Turkey.
- STEPANOV, Mikhail Stepanovich, Soviet Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade.
- \*†STETTINIUS, Edward R., Jr., Under Secretary of State, October 1943–November 1944; Secretary of State, December 1944–June 1945.
- STEVENSON, Ralph Skrine, British Ambassador to Yugoslavia.
- STIMSON, Henry L., Secretary of War.
- \*STONER, Chief Warrant Officer Frank G., U. S. A., member of the White House Signal Corps Detachment.
- STRANG, Sir William, British representative on the European Advisory Commission, with the rank of Ambassador.
- STREICHER, Julius, publisher of the German National Socialist weekly publication *Der Stürmer*.
- \*†STROOP, Captain Paul D., U. S. N., Aviation Plans Officer on the Staff of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
- ŠUBAŠIĆ, Ivan, Prime Minister of the Yugoslav Government in London.
- \*SULLIVAN, Lieutenant Thomas W., M. C., U. S. N. R., Medical Officer.
- SULTAN, Lieutenant General Daniel I., U. S. A., Commanding General of United States Forces, India-Burma Theater.
- ŠUTEJ, Juraj, Minister of Finance of the Yugoslav Government in London.
- SZALASY, Ferenc, Prime Minister and Regent of Hungary; hanged as a war criminal in 1946.
- TABATABAI, Seyid Zia-ed-din, Deputy from Yazd to the Fourteenth Iranian Majlis, 1944–1946.
- TANSEY, Brigadier General Patrick H., U. S. A., Chief of the Logistics Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, and member of the Joint Logistics Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- TAYLOR, William H., Assistant Director, Division of Monetary Research, Department of the Treasury.
- TEDDER, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur, Deputy Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.
- \*THEAKSTONE, Major Louis Marguarde, British Interpreter.
- THOREZ, Maurice, Secretary General of the French Communist Party.
- TITO, Marshal (Josip Broz), Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia.
- TOBIN, Captain Robert G., U. S. N., Assistant Director to the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Logistic Plans, and member of the Joint Logistics Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- TRUMAN, Harry S., President of the United States, 1945–1953.
- TULLY, Grace, Private Secretary to President Roosevelt.
- TURNER, Audrey C. See Wagner, Mrs. Audrey (Turner).
- \*†TWITCHELL, Colonel Hamilton A., U. S. A., Chief, Organization and Equipment Section, G-3, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.
- \*†TYREE, Commander John A., Jr., U. S. N., Assistant Naval Aide to President Roosevelt.
- \*†TYSON, Major Terence L., M. C., U. S. A., Medical Officer assigned to the Secretary of State.
- VANDENBERG, Arthur H., United States Senator from Michigan.
- VASILYEVSKY, Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Mikhailovich, Chief of Staff of the Soviet Army and First Deputy Minister of Defense.
- VENOSTA, Giovanni Visconti, Italian Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, June–November 1944.
- VINCENT, John Carter, Chief, Division of Chinese Affairs, Department of State.

- VOROSHILOV, Marshal of the Soviet Union Klement Efremovich, Chairman of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary.
- \*VYSHINSKY, Andrey Yanuaryevich, First Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.
- WAGNER, Mrs. Audrey (Turner), Principal Clerk, White House Office.
- WANG Shih-chieh, Chinese Minister of Information.
- \*WARE, Captain Henry, U. S. A., Interpreter.
- WASILEWSKA, Wanda, Head of the Union of Polish Patriots in the Soviet Union.
- \*†WATSON, Major General Edwin M., U. S. A. (retired), Military Aide and Secretary to President Roosevelt.
- WEDEMEYER, Lieutenant General Albert C., U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the China Theater, and Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
- WELLES, Sumner, Under Secretary of State, 1937-1943.
- WHITE, Harry Dexter, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, 1943-1945; Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, 1945-1946.
- \*†WILLIAMS, Roger, United States Secret Service.
- WILLKIE, Wendell, Republican candidate for President, 1940.
- WILSON, Edwin C., Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, May 1944-January 1945; Ambassador to Turkey, January 1945-October 1948.
- \*WILSON, Geoffrey Masterson, Russian Expert in the Northern Department of the British Foreign Office.
- \*†WILSON, Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland, Head of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington.
- WILSON, Woodrow, President of the United States, 1913-1921.
- WINANT, John G., American Ambassador to the United Kingdom and representative on the European Advisory Commission.
- WIŃOS, Andrzej, member of the Union of Polish Patriots in the Soviet Union.
- WIŃOS, Wincenty, leader of the pre-1939 Polish Peasant Party; Prime Minister of Poland, 1920-1921 and 1923-1926; in retirement in Poland during World War II.
- \*†WOOD, Frank B., United States Secret Service.
- \*†WOOD, Major General Walter A., Jr., U. S. A., Deputy Director of Plans and Operations, Headquarters, Army Service Forces, and member of the Joint Logistics Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- \*†WOODWARD, Lieutenant Colonel Harper L., U. S. A., Administrative Officer with the Advisory Council to the Commanding General, Headquarters, Army Air Forces.
- WRIGHT, Michael, Acting Counsellor, British Embassy, Washington.
- YOST, Charles W., Executive Secretary of the Executive Staff Committees, Department of State.
- ŻELIGOWSKI, General Lucjan, member of the National Council of the Polish Government in London.
- ZHUKOV, Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich, Commander of the First Byelorussian Front.
- ZULAWSKI, Zygmunt, a leader in the Polish Socialist Party; in Poland during World War II in the London-directed Polish underground.

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Feb. 8	<b>Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a. m.</b>	
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	<i>Matthews Notes</i>	741
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Feb. 8	<i>United States Delegation Memorandum</i> List of items referred to the Foreign Ministers, with the following attachments: arguments against inclusion of any of the Soviet republics among the initial members; list of nations which were invited to previous United Nations conferences; agreement with British regarding policy on Iran; and Tehran Declaration on Iran.	746

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Feb. 8	<i>The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Request that the five Latin American "Associated Nations" be urged to declare war promptly.	794
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Feb. 9	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11 a. m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Approval of the minutes of the C. C. S. 187th meeting; draft final report to the President and the Prime Minister; efforts to improve liaison with the Soviet High Command in the matter of strategic bombing in Eastern Germany; concluding remarks.	799
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Feb. 9	<b>Sixth Plenary Meeting, 4 p. m.</b>	
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## **I. PRE-CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS**



# 1. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCES<sup>1</sup>

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*<sup>2</sup>

TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

[ABOARD THE PRESIDENTIAL SPECIAL,<sup>3</sup>  
17 July 1944.]

Number 27. Top Secret and Personal. From the President for Marshal Stalin.

Things are moving so fast and so successfully that I feel there should be a meeting between you and Mr. Churchill and me in the reasonably near future. The Prime Minister is in hearty accord with this thought. I am now on a trip in the far West and must be in Washington for several weeks on my return. It would, therefore, be best for me to have a meeting between the tenth and fifteenth of September. The most central point for you and me would be the north of Scotland. I could go by ship and you could come either by ship or by plane. Your Army is doing so magnificently that the hop would be much shorter to Scotland than the one taken by Molotov two years ago.<sup>4</sup> I hope you can let me have your thoughts. Secrecy and security can be maintained either aboard ship or on shore.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> For a memorandum by Harry Hopkins, dated October 19, 1945, on the genesis of the Yalta Conference, see Sherwood, pp. 843-845.

<sup>2</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

<sup>3</sup> Roosevelt was away from Washington for more than a month at this time. He left the Capital aboard the Presidential Special on July 13, 1944; arrived at San Diego on July 19; sailed for Hawaii on July 21; arrived at Pearl Harbor on July 26; sailed for Alaska on July 29; arrived at the Aleutian base of Adak on August 3; visited Kodiak and other points in Alaska; delivered a radio address from Puget Sound Navy Yard at Bremerton, Washington, on August 12; and arrived back in Washington on August 17. (*New York Times*, August 13, 1944, pp. 1, 20; August 18, 1944, p. 1; *F. D. R.: His Personal Letters* [New York, 1947-1950], vol. [iv], pp. 1522, 1524, 1525, 1529.)

<sup>4</sup> A footnote on the original indicates that the underscored sentence was deleted before delivery to Stalin. See the two following documents.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 18 July 1944.

Personal and Top Secret for the President from Harriman.

I recommend that you consider omitting from your message to Marshal Stalin your . . . [No. 27] the following sentence "Your

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

Army is doing so magnificently that the hop would be much shorter to Scotland than the one taken by Molotov two years ago". The implication of this sentence is that Marshal Stalin should fly over enemy occupied territory. Because of the dangers inherent in such a flight I feel there may be resentment on the part of Stalin's principal advisors which might jeopardize the prospects of the meeting itself. Because of the real fear that I have of such a reaction by the Soviets I have taken the liberty of holding delivery of your message awaiting your reply.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)* <sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

[ABOARD THE PRESIDENTIAL SPECIAL,]

18 July 1944.

Number 29. Personal and Top Secret. From the President for Ambassador Harriman.

Replying to your message . . . [of July 18], you are authorized to delete before delivery the following sentence:

"Your Army is doing so magnificently that the hop would be much shorter to Scotland than the one taken by Molotov two years ago."

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

Roosevelt Papers

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*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt* <sup>1</sup>

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to President F. D. Roosevelt.

I share your thought about the desirability of a meeting between you, Mr. Churchill and myself.

However, I must say, that now, when the Soviet Armies are involved in battles on such a wide front, it would be impossible for me to leave the country and depart for a certain period of time from the conducting of front matters. All my colleagues consider it absolutely impossible.

JULY 22, 1944.

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<sup>1</sup> Apparently transmitted by the Soviet Embassy, Washington.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

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*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin* <sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

[PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII,]

27 July 1944.

Number 32. Top Secret and Personal. For Marshal Stalin from the President.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

I can fully understand the difficulty of your coming to a conference with the Prime Minister and me in view of the rapid military progress now being made but I hope you can keep such a conference very much in mind and that we can meet as early as possible. Such a meeting would help me domestically and we are approaching the time for further strategical decisions.

ROOSEVELT

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 24 September 1944.

Personal and Top Secret for the eyes of the President only from Harriman.

This evening I explained to Marshal Stalin that you had asked General Hurley to call on him to explain your concern over China and to give him personally a message regarding a future meeting. Stalin interrupted to say that he had been ill with the grippe when Hurley was in Moscow, that in the past he had been able to shake it in a few days but that this time he had been ill for several weeks. He looked more worn out than I have ever seen him and not as yet fully recovered. I explained that you had in mind a meeting in the latter part of November and that as it was too late for Alaska the Mediterranean might provide a suitable place. He said that a meeting was very desirable but that he was afraid his doctors would not allow him to travel. It had taken him two weeks to get over an ear attack he had had from his flight from Teheran and his recent illness had been due to a trip to the front. I suggested that the warm weather in the Mediterranean would do him good but he said his doctors considered any change of climate would have a bad effect. Molotov claimed that his associates felt Stalin must protect his health and that traveling was not good for him. Stalin then said that Molotov was strong and vigorous and that as his Deputy a man in whom he had great confidence he could meet you and the Prime Minister any time you wished. I assured Stalin that you liked Molotov and were always glad to see him but suggested that his doctors might later on take a different view of the desirability of a warm climate particularly if the trip would be made by sea. Jokingly I suggested also the possibility of his having some new doctors by that time. He agreed that might be a good idea but gave no further encouragement. I am satisfied that Stalin is anxious to meet you but he is definitely worried about his health. Although Stalin showed the effects of his grippe I do not feel that you need have any concern over the possibility of serious illness.

<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.



Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The President to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)* <sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] 4 October 1944.

Number 76. Top Secret and Personal from the President to Ambassador Harriman.

Your number . . . [telegram of October 3] received.<sup>2</sup>

Will you please deliver the following message to Marshal Stalin at once:

"While I had hoped that the next meeting could have been between you, Churchill and myself, I appreciate that the Prime Minister wishes to have an early conference with you.

You, naturally, understand that in this global war there is literally no question, political or military, in which the United States is not interested. I am firmly convinced that the three of us, and only the three of us, can find the solution to the still unresolved questions. In this sense, while appreciating the Prime Minister's desire for the meeting, I prefer to regard your forthcoming talks with Churchill as preliminary to a meeting of the three of us which, so far as I am concerned, can take place any time after the elections here.

In the circumstances, I am suggesting, if you and Mr. Churchill approve, that our Ambassador in Moscow be present at your coming conference as an observer for me.<sup>3</sup> Naturally, Mr. Harriman would not be in a position to commit this Government relative to the important matters which you and the Prime Minister will, very naturally, discuss.

You will, by this time, have received from General Deane, the statement of our Combined Chiefs of Staff position relative to the war against Japan<sup>4</sup> and I want to reiterate to you how completely I accept the assurances which you have given us on this point. Our three countries are waging a successful war against Germany and we can surely join together with no less success in crushing a nation that I am sure in my heart is as great an enemy of Russia as she is of ours."

The above message will indicate to you that I wish you to participate as an observer.

I can tell you quite frankly, but for you only and not to be communicated under any circumstances to the British or the Russians, that I would have very much preferred to have the next conference between the three of us for the very reasons that I have stated to the Marshal. I should hope that this bilateral conference be nothing more than a preliminary exploration by the British and the Russians

<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Sherwood (p. 833) indicates that Hopkins stopped the transmission of a previous draft of this telegram which would in effect have "let Churchill speak for the United States as well as for Great Britain".

<sup>4</sup> The President evidently was referring to the Joint Chiefs of Staff position alluded to *infra*.

leading up to a full dress meeting between the three of us. You, therefore, should bear in mind that there are no subjects of discussion that I can anticipate between the Prime Minister and Stalin in which I will not be greatly interested. It is of importance, therefore, that when this conference is over Mr. Hull and I have complete freedom of action.

I will expect you to come home immediately when the discussions are over and, naturally, you will keep Mr. Hull and me fully and currently advised during the talks.

ROOSEVELT

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill* <sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 4 October 1944.

PRIORITY

Number 626, 4 October 1944, Top Secret and Personal from the President for the Prime Minister.

I can well understand the reasons why you feel that an immediate meeting between yourself and Uncle Joe <sup>2</sup> is necessary before the three of us can get together. The questions which you will discuss there are ones which are, of course, of real interest to the United States, as I know you will agree. I have therefore instructed Harriman to stand by and to participate as my observer, if agreeable to you and Uncle Joe, and I have so informed Stalin. While naturally Averell <sup>3</sup> will not be in a position to commit the United States—I could not permit anyone to commit me in advance—he will be able to keep me fully informed and I have told him to return and report to me as soon as the conference is over.

I am only sorry that I cannot be with you myself but I am prepared for a meeting of the three of us any time after the elections here, for which your meeting with Uncle Joe should be a useful prelude, and I have so informed Uncle Joe.

Like you, I attach the greatest importance to the continued unity of our three countries. I am sorry that I cannot agree with you, however, that the voting question should be raised at this time. That is a matter which the three of us can I am sure work out together and I hope you will postpone discussion of it until our meeting. There is after all no immediate urgency about this question which is so directly related to public opinion in the United States and Great Britain and in all the United Nations.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> Stalin.

<sup>3</sup> Harriman.

I am asking our military people in Moscow to make available to you our Joint Chiefs' statement to Stalin.<sup>4</sup>

You carry my best wishes with you and I will eagerly await word of how it goes.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>4</sup> See *post*, p. 362, footnote 2.

Roosevelt Papers

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*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

8 OCTOBER 1944.

From: Marshal Stalin

To: The President

Your message of October 5th<sup>2</sup> somewhat puzzled me. I supposed that Mr. Churchill was going to Moscow in accordance with the agreement reached with you at Quebec. It happened, however, that this supposition of mine does not seem to correspond in reality.

It is unknown to me with what questions Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden are going to Moscow. So far I have not been informed about this by either one. Mr. Churchill, in his message to me,<sup>3</sup> expressed a desire to come to Moscow, if there would not be any objections on my part. I, of course, gave my consent. Such is the matter in connection with Mr. Churchill's trip to Moscow. In the future I will keep you informed about the matter, after the meeting with Mr. Churchill.

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<sup>1</sup> Apparently transmitted by the Soviet Embassy, Washington.

<sup>2</sup> Quoted *ante*, p. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane), to the Joint Chiefs of Staff*

[Excerpt]<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY

M 21412.

Moscow, 17 October 1944.

. . . Stalin then said that Mr. Hopkins, with the approval of the President, had talked with Mr. Gromyko and he had indicated that the President was anxious to meet with Marshal Stalin somewhere in the Black Sea area. He said unequivocally that he would be

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<sup>1</sup> Printed in full *post*, pp. 371-374.

delighted to meet the President and was prepared to so do toward the end of November. . . .

Roosevelt Papers

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

Translation<sup>2</sup>

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to President Franklin Roosevelt.

1. During the stay of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden in Moscow we have exchanged views on a number of questions of mutual interest. Ambassador Harriman has, certainly, informed you about all important Moscow conversations. I also know that the Prime Minister had to send you his estimate of the Moscow conversations. On my part I can say that our conversations were extremely useful for the mutual ascertaining of views on such questions as the attitude towards the future of Germany, Polish question, policy in regard to the Balkan States, and important questions of further military policy. During the conversations it has been clarified that we can, without great difficulties, adjust our policy on all questions standing before us, and if we are not in a position so far to provide an immediate necessary decision of this or that task, as for example, on the Polish question, but nevertheless, more favourable perspectives are opened. I hope that these Moscow conversations will be of some benefit from the point of view that at the future meeting of three of us, we shall be able to adopt definite decisions on all urgent questions of our mutual interest.

2. Ambassador Gromyko has informed me about his recent conversation with Mr. Hopkins, in which Mr. Hopkins expressed an idea that you could arrive in the Black Sea at the end of November [and] meet with me on the Soviet Black Sea coast.<sup>3</sup> I would extremely welcome the realization of this intention. From the conversation with the Prime Minister, I was convinced, that he also shares this idea. Thus the meeting of three of us could take place at the end of November in order to consider the questions which have been accumulated since Teheran. I would be glad to receive a message from you on this matter.

OCTOBER 19, 1944.

<sup>1</sup> Apparently transmitted by the Soviet Embassy, Washington. A handwritten notation on original reads: "Recd. 22/1900".

<sup>2</sup> Appears on the original.

<sup>3</sup> See the Hopkins memorandum in Sherwood, pp. 844-845.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 22 October 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Top Secret Number 801.

Para 8. I was delighted to hear from U. J. that you had suggested a triple meeting towards the end of November at a Black Sea port. I think this a very fine idea, and hope you will let me know about it in due course. I will come anywhere you two desire.

<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels. For other excerpts from this telegram, see *post*, pp. 159-160, 206, 328, 400.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 22 October 1944.

PRIORITY

Number 632, Personal and Top Secret, from the President to the Prime Minister.

The selection of a Black Sea port for our next meeting seems to be dependent upon our ability to get through the Dardanelles safely as I wish to proceed by ship. Do you think it is possible to get U. J. to come to Athens or Cyprus?

ROOSEVELT

<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 23 October 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Top Secret No. 804.

Para 2. U. J.'s doctors do not like him flying and I suppose there would be the same difficulties in Russian warships coming out of the Black Sea as of American and British warships coming in. One way

<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

would be for Turkey to declare war, which I expect she would be very willing to do. But I am not at all sure that the Russians would welcome this at the present juncture in view of what I told you about their wish for revision of the Treaty of Montreux.<sup>2</sup> Alternatively we could ask Turkey to waive the Montreux Treaty for the passage either way of the said ships. This I expect the Russians would like. But I am not so sure about the Turks. From what I saw of the Crimea it seems much shattered and I expect all other Black Sea ports are in a similar state. We should therefore in all probability have to live on board our ships. I am inquiring about Athens from Eden who will be there in a day or two. Personally I should think it a splendid setting and here again we should have our ships handy. Cyprus is of course available where absolute secrecy, silence and security can be guaranteed together with plain comfortable accommodation for all principals. Will you telegraph to U. J. on the subject, or shall I? Or, better still, shall we send a joint message?

<sup>2</sup> For the text, in French, together with an English translation, of this convention regarding the regime of the Straits, which was signed at Montreux July 20, 1936, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXXIII, pp. 213-241.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin* <sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] 24 October 1944.

Number 100, Personal and Top Secret, from the President for Marshal Stalin.

I am delighted to learn from your message dated October 19<sup>2</sup> and from reports by Ambassador Harriman of the success attained by you and Mr. Churchill in approaching an agreement on a number of questions that are of high interest to all of us in our common desire to secure and maintain a satisfactory and a durable peace. I am sure that the progress made during your conversations in Moscow will facilitate and expedite our work in the next meeting when the three of us should come to a full agreement on our future activities and policies and mutual interests.

We all must investigate the practicability of various places where our meeting in November can be held, such as accessibility, living accommodations, security, etc., and I would appreciate suggestions from you.

I have been thinking about the practicability of Malta, Athens, or Cyprus if my getting into the Black Sea on a ship should be impracticable or too difficult. I prefer travelling and living on a ship.

<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels; repeated to Churchill as Roosevelt's No. 635, same date.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 9.

We know that the living conditions and security in Malta and Cyprus<sup>3</sup> are satisfactory.

I am looking forward with much pleasure to seeing you again.

Please let me have your suggestions and advice.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>3</sup> In the message as repeated to Churchill, "Athens" was substituted for "Cyprus" at this point.

Roosevelt Papers

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*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

Translation<sup>2</sup>

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to President F. D. Roosevelt.

I have received your message of October 25.<sup>3</sup>

If the idea that was expressed earlier about the possibility of our meeting on the Soviet Black Sea coast appears to be acceptable for you I would consider it extremely desirable to realize this plan. The conditions for a meeting there are absolutely favorable. I hope that by that time it will be also possible to provide a safe entrance of your vessel into the Black Sea. Since the doctors do not recommend to undertake any big trips at the present time, I have to give consideration to that.

I shall be glad to see you as soon as you find it possible to undertake the trip.

OCTOBER 29, 1944.

<sup>1</sup> Apparently transmitted by the Soviet Embassy, Washington.

<sup>2</sup> Appears on the original.

<sup>3</sup> The reference is presumably to No. 100 from Roosevelt, dated October 24, 1944, *supra*.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] 2 November 1944.

Number 641, Personal and Top Secret, from the President for the Prime Minister.

Referring to my 635,<sup>2</sup> I have received a reply from U. J. which is not very helpful in the selection of a place for our next meeting. He states that if our meeting on the Soviet Black Sea Coast is acceptable he considers it an extremely desirable plan.

His doctors to whose opinion he must give consideration do not wish him to make any "big trips."

<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> The reference is to the communication repeating to Churchill the message sent Stalin by Roosevelt on October 24, 1944. See *ante*, pp. 11-12.

He gave me no information as to location of the meeting, accessibility, living conditions, etc., except to express a hope that it will be possible to provide a safe entrance for my ship into the Black Sea.

He will be glad to see me as soon as I find it possible to make the trip.

I do not wish to go to the Black Sea if it can be avoided, first because the Congress will be in session at that time which makes it imperative that I be at all times within rapid mail communication with Washington by Air Mail, and, second because of sanitary conditions.

Dr. McIntire tells me that health conditions in Black Sea ports such as Odessa are very bad, and we must think of the health of our staff and our ships' crews as well as ourselves.

What do you think of the possibility of our inducing U. J. to meet with us in Piraeus, Salonica, or Constantinople. Any of these would not be a "big trip" for him.

Please give me your advice as to the best date for the meeting from your point of view, together with any information you may have in regard to a suitable place for the meeting, danger from enemy action, living conditions, etc. I will take a ship to wherever we may go.

I fear that Uncle Joe will insist on the Black Sea. I do think it important that we three should meet in the near future.

All advice and assistance that you can contribute to the solution of this problem will be appreciated.

ROOSEVELT

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 5 November 1944.

Personal and Top Secret from the Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Number 814.

1. Your number 641. I send you in my immediately following the report which I called for from the First Sea Lord.<sup>2</sup> The whole matter has been carefully studied by the Admiralty and, as you will see, every port is reported on separately. Our sailors have pretty good knowledge of these ports. On all this I consider the Black Sea out of the question and the Piraeus very little better.

2. I am somewhat attracted by the suggestion of Jerusalem. Here there are first-class hotels, government houses, etc., and every means can be taken to ensure security. The warships could probably lie at Haifa unless the weather turned very rough, in which case they could go to Port Said or Alexandria.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



3. Alexandria would probably be a feasible proposition.
4. U. J. could come by special train, with every form of protection, from Moscow to Jerusalem. I am having the timetables of the journeys studied and will telegraph to you about them.
5. I think we ought to put the proposition to U. J., and throw on him the onus of refusing. After all, we are respectable people too.
6. In the event of his not coming, I earnestly hope you will pay your long-promised and deferred visit to Great Britain and then visit your armies in France. The right thing would be to have the conference between us in Britain. I have trenched so often on your hospitality. We could no doubt get Molotov to deputize for Stalin. He counts for a lot.
7. Perhaps you would send me a draft of the telegram we should send to Stalin, after considering the information I am now sending you.

PRIME

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] 14 November 1944.

Number 648. Top Secret and Personal from the President for the Prime Minister.

The more I think it over the more I get convinced that a meeting of the three of us just now may be a little less valuable than it would be after I am inaugurated on the twentieth of January. The location of a meeting now is very difficult. All my people advise strongly against the Black Sea. I do not think there is a chance that U J would agree to Jerusalem, Egypt or Malta.

But there is a real chance that by the end of January or early February he could get rail transportation to head of the Adriatic. He might be willing to come to Rome or the Riviera. I would of course stop in England going or returning. I do not think he wants to fly or take a very difficult and long rail journey to Haifa.

Incidentally it would be far easier for me as I am undergoing the throes of the old session and preparing for the new session on January third.

. . . . .

What do you think of postponement? It appeals to me greatly. My best to you on your Parisian trip. Don't turn up in French clothes.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>[Excerpts]<sup>2</sup>

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 16 November 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Top Secret. Number 822.

2. Your number 648.

I am very sorry that you are inclined to make no further effort to procure a triple meeting in December, and I will send you a separate telegram making some further suggestions about this.

PRIME

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

<sup>2</sup> Paragraphs 3-10 of this telegram are printed *post*, pp. 284-286.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 18 November 1944.

PRIORITY

Number 124, Personal and Top Secret, from the President for Marshal Stalin.

All three of us are of one mind—that we should meet very soon, but problems chiefly geographical do not make this easy at this moment. I can, under difficulties, arrange to go somewhere now in order to get back here by Christmas but, quite frankly, it will be far more convenient if I could postpone it until after the Inauguration which is on January twentieth.

My Navy people recommend strongly against the Black Sea. They do not want to risk a capital ship through the Aegean or the Dardanelles, as it would involve a very large escort much needed elsewhere. Churchill has suggested Jerusalem or Alexandria, and there is a possibility of Athens, though this is not yet sure.

Furthermore, I have at this time a great hesitation in leaving here while my old Congress is in its final days, with the probability of its not adjourning finally until December fifteenth. Also, I have to be here, under the Constitution, to send the Annual Message to the new Congress which meets here in early January.

What I am suggesting is that we should all meet about the twenty-eighth or thirtieth of January, and I should hope that by that time you will have rail travel to some port on the Adriatic and that we

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

should meet you there or that you could come across in a few hours on one of our ships to Bari and then motor to Rome, or that you should take the same ship a little further and that we should all meet in a place like Taormina, in eastern Sicily, which should provide a fairly good climate at that time.

Almost any place in the Mediterranean is accessible to me so that I can be within easy air distance of Washington in order to carry out action on Legislation—a subject with which you are familiar. I must be able to get Bills or Resolutions sent from here and returned within ten days.

I hope that your January military operations will not prevent you from coming at that time, and I do not think that we should delay the meeting longer than the end of January or early February.

Of course, if in the meantime the Nazi Army or people should disintegrate quickly, we would have to meet earlier, though I should much prefer the meeting at the end of January.

A further suggestion as to a place would be one on the Riviera but this would be dependent on the withdrawal of German troops from northwestern Italy. I wish you would let me know your thoughts on this.

I hope to talk over many things with you. We understand each other's problems and, as you know, I like to keep these discussions informal, and I have no reason for formal agenda.

My Ambassador in China, General Hurley, is doing his best to iron out the problem between the Generalissimo and the forces in North China. He is making some progress but nothing has been signed yet.

My warmest regards to you.

ROOSEVELT

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] 18 November 1944.

Number 649, Personal and Top Secret from the President for the Prime Minister.

Your 822.<sup>2</sup> I am sending you in a message to follow a copy of a message I have just sent to Uncle Joe on the subject of our next meeting.<sup>3</sup> It does not seem to me that the French Provisional Government should take part in our next conference as such a debating society would confuse our essential issues. The three of us can discuss the questions you raise in regard to turning over parts of Germany to

<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 15, and *post*, pp. 284-286.

<sup>3</sup> Sent as No. 650, of the same date. For the text of the message to Stalin, see No. 124 from Roosevelt to Stalin, *supra*.

France after the collapse of Naziism and the further problems of helping to build up a strong France.<sup>4</sup>

. . . I shall be glad to have your views about the time and place of our next meeting.

ROOSEVELT

<sup>4</sup> Three sentences of this omission are printed *post*, p. 286.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 19 November 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, Personal and Top Secret number 825.

1. Naturally I am very sorry to receive your numbers 649<sup>2</sup> and 650.<sup>3</sup>

2. Your message to U. J. will, of course, make it certain that he will not come anywhere before the end of January. Also you yourself give independently the important reasons which make it difficult for you to come earlier.

3. These reasons, I fear, destroy the hope which we had cherished that you would now pay your long-promised visit to Great Britain, and that we two could meet here in December and ask U. J. to send Molotov, who would be an adequate deputy. It is a great disappointment to me that this prospect should be indefinitely postponed.

4. There is, in my opinion, much doubt whether U. J. would be willing or able to come to an Adriatic port by January 30th, or that he would be willing to come on a non-Russian vessel through this extremely heavily-mined sea. However, if he accepts we shall, of course, be there. I note you do not wish the French to be present. I had thought they might come in towards the end in view of their vital interests in the arrangements made for policing Germany, as well as in all questions affecting the Rhine frontiers.

5. Even if a meeting can be arranged by the end of January, the two and a half intervening months will be a serious hiatus. There are many important matters awaiting settlement, for example, the treatment of Germany and the future world organization, relations with France, the position in the Balkans, as well as the Polish question, which ought not to be left to moulder.<sup>4</sup>

PRIME

<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3 to the preceding document.

<sup>4</sup> The paragraph here omitted is printed *post*, pp. 286-287.

Roosevelt Papers

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>Translation<sup>2</sup>

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to President F. D. Roosevelt.

It is greatly regretted that your naval organs doubt the expedience of your initial supposition that the Soviet coast of the Black Sea should be chosen as the meeting place for the three of us. The suggested by you date of the meeting at the end of January or beginning of February has no objections on my part, but at the same time I have in mind that we shall succeed in choosing as a meeting place one of the Soviet port cities. I still have to take into consideration the advice of the doctors about the danger of long trips.

I still hope, however, that we shall succeed, if not right now, then somewhat later to agree finally upon an acceptable for all of us meeting place.

I am sending you my very best wishes.

NOVEMBER 23, 1944.

<sup>1</sup> Apparently transmitted by the Soviet Embassy, Washington.

<sup>2</sup> Appears on the original.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 26 November 1944.

PRIORITY

Number 658. Top Secret and Personal from the President for the Prime Minister.

Your 825.<sup>2</sup> Uncle Joe has now replied to my message in regard to the tripartite meeting forwarded to you in my 650.<sup>3</sup>

He expresses regret that my Naval advisors doubt the expediency of meeting on the shore of the Black Sea. He does not object to a meeting at the end of January or the beginning of February, but he has in mind that we shall choose as a meeting place one of the Soviet port cities. He must consider the opinion of his doctors that a long trip would be a danger to him.

He hopes that we will now or soon finally agree upon a meeting place that will be acceptable to all of us.

I have a feeling that we will not succeed in getting U. J. to travel beyond the Black Sea unless the Germans should have surrendered by that time.<sup>4</sup>

ROOSEVELT

<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 17.

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 16, footnote 3.

<sup>4</sup> The paragraphs here omitted are printed *post*, p. 287.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 27 November 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Top Secret Number 834.

. . . . .

2. Your 658. I agree with your conclusion that U. J. will not travel beyond the Black Sea but I am sure the ports there will be unfit for us until the winter has passed.<sup>2</sup>

. . . . .

PRIME<sup>3</sup>


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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

<sup>2</sup> The paragraph here omitted is printed *post*, pp. 287-288.

<sup>3</sup> A handwritten notation in the margin by Leahy reads: "No reply necessary."

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET

[WARM SPRINGS, GEORGIA,<sup>2</sup>]

PRIORITY

9 December 1944.

Number 672. Top Secret and Personal from the President for the Prime Minister.

. . . . .

I think I can leave after Inauguration Day. I hoped that Uncle Joe could come to Rome or Malta or Taormina or Egypt but if he will not—and insists on the Black Sea—I could do it even at great difficulty on account of Congress. Harriman suggested Batum which has an excellent climate. You and I could fly there from Malta or Athens, sending ahead one of my transport Flagships on which to live. Yalta is also intact, though the roadstead is open and we should probably have to live ashore.

. . . . .

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> Roosevelt was at Warm Springs, Georgia, from November 28 to December 18, inclusive, 1944 (*New York Times*, December 20, 1944, p. 15).

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 14 December 1944.

[Received 15 December.]

Personal and Top Secret for the President from Harriman.

I talked with Marshal Stalin this evening about the proposed meeting and explained that you wished the meeting to take place somewhere in the Mediterranean. He said he knew that and had answered you that he could not go to the Mediterranean. He suggested Odessa where he was already having prepared suitable facilities ashore. He said if you preferred to go to the Crimea or the eastern part of the Black Sea where it was warmer anywhere down to Batum he would be agreeable. I explained the many reasons why you were insisting on the Mediterranean and the difficulties of the Black Sea emphasizing particularly that you wished to be on a naval vessel and not to fly. He said eventually that he would consult his doctors as to whether they would allow him to fly to the Mediterranean. He said that he would see me again in about a week to give me some info on certain military matters and I hope to have another chance to discuss the matter.

Stalin appeared well.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

Moscow, 15 December 1944.

[Received 16 December.]

Personal and Secret for the President from Harriman.

Supplementing my . . . [telegram of December 14] sent last night reporting on my talk with Stalin about the place of the proposed meeting although Stalin definitely left the door open for consideration of the Mediterranean I do not feel too optimistic that he will finally agree to go there. It was my definite impression however that he wanted to accede to your request and he spoke rather regretfully when he said he would have to consult his doctors again.

He brought the subject of the meeting up himself and indicated that he was anxious to have it take place promptly after the inauguration.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 23 December 1944.

PRIORITY

Number 676, Personal and Top Secret, from the President for the Prime Minister.

I am today sending to Harriman the following message in regard to our projected three party meeting with U. J.

Please let me have your opinion as to the possibilities of this plan from your point of view.

"If Stalin cannot manage to meet us in the Mediterranean I am prepared to go to the Crimea and have the meeting at Yalta which appears to be the best place available in the Black Sea having the best accommodations ashore and the most promising flying conditions.

We would arrive by plane from some Mediterranean port and would send in advance a naval vessel to Sevastopol to provide necessary service and living accommodations if it should be necessary for me to live on board ship.

I would plan to leave America very soon after the inauguration on a naval vessel. You will be informed later of a date of arrival that will be satisfactory to Churchill and to me. My party will be numerically equal to that which was present at Teheran, about 35 total.

I still hope the military situation will permit Marshal Stalin to meet us half way."

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 26 December 1944.

Personal and Top Secret for the President from Harriman.

In a talk with Molotov this afternoon I again asked for an appointment with Marshal Stalin to discuss the place of the meeting. Molotov said that this could be arranged but that he knew the position of Marshal Stalin and could tell me as the decisions unfortunately were not dependent upon the Marshal alone. Stalin had again consulted his doctors who maintained their position that he should not make a long journey at the present time. He therefore could not go to the Mediterranean. He would however gladly come to any place on the Soviet Coast of the Black Sea and if you could not come there it had been decided that Molotov as his First Deputy could go to meet you and the Prime Minister wherever you wished. I inquired whether

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.



full consideration has been given to your suggestion of traveling by rail. He maintained categorically that the decision was based on consideration of the length of the journey as well as the mode of travel. From my previous discussion with Stalin and this one with Molotov I am now convinced that Stalin will not go to the Mediterranean for this meeting. I said in conclusion that I knew you were most anxious to meet Marshal Stalin [and] that I would communicate with you and see him again in the next day or two with your final answer. I am seeing him tomorrow on another matter and will then discuss arrangements for the meeting in the Crimea in accordance with your . . . [telegram of December 23].<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[Moscow,] 27 December 1944.

To the President from Harriman:

I told Molotov this afternoon that I had received word from you that if Marshal Stalin could not come to the Mediterranean you were prepared to come to the Black Sea. I emphasized the difficulties that this decision made for you but that in consideration of Marshal Stalin's health you were prepared to face them. We discussed in detail the arrangements for the holding of the meeting at Yalta with your ship at Sevastopol. Molotov said he would discuss the questions with Marshal Stalin and get in touch with me tomorrow. It was agreed that I and appropriate members of the Military Mission should go to the place of the meeting after preliminary arrangements have been made. It would be helpful if I could be informed of the names of the principal members of your party and the number and character of the balance of the party so that suitable arrangements can be made for their accommodation. As hotels and Sanatoria were stripped of their furniture the Russians will have to make extensive preparations. If you are to be accompanied by the Chiefs of Staff would you wish me to discuss with Marshal Stalin his bringing their opposite numbers of the Russian staff. I feel this would be helpful in the establishment of relationships useful in future discussions. In addition I have found that Marshal Stalin has sometimes given his agreement on military proposals which he has not fully studied and subsequently reversed them after consulting his staff. The presence of members of his staff would I believe therefore contribute to definite decisions. Molotov asked for the approximate date when you expected to arrive in the Crimea. I explained that the Prime Minister had agreed to go wherever you decided and therefore I suggested that

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<sup>1</sup> Sent via United States Army radio.

the Marshal not communicate with Mr. Churchill until you had had a chance to do so after which I presumed Marshal Stalin would wish to extend him an invitation. I did this as I do not know how far you have kept the Prime Minister informed of the recent developments. I would appreciate advice on this point. In order that we can make arrangements at Sevastopol, it would be helpful to have advice as to the character and number of naval vessels for which provision should be made. Also the approximate number of airplanes which will bring your party. In addition the character of the mail planes and from where they would fly.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Referring to this message, Harriman telegraphed the President on December 28, 1944: "I have a message from Molotov today stating that Marshal Stalin has agreed to your suggestions regarding the meeting which I presented yesterday . . ." (Roosevelt Papers).

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 29 December 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Top Secret. Number 861.

Your 676.<sup>2</sup> I send you in my immediately following the Admiralty report on Yalta.<sup>3</sup> If this place is chosen, it would be well to have a few destroyers on which we can live if necessary. There would be no difficulty in flying from the great air base and weather center at Caserta. I, myself, landed in a York at Simferopol. I dare say, however, Stalin will make good arrangements ashore. Our party will be kept to the smallest dimensions. I think we should aim at the end of January. I shall have to bring Anthony<sup>4</sup> and Leathers.

PRIME

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 21.

<sup>3</sup> Sent as No. 862; not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Eden.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 30 December 1944.

PRIORITY

Number 682. Top Secret and Personal from the President for the Prime Minister.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

Your 861<sup>2</sup> and 862.<sup>3</sup> I am preparing to leave the U. S. as soon as possible after the Inauguration by warship to the Mediterranean and from there by airplane for Yalta, but have not yet so informed Stalin.

I will give you accurate dates as soon as details are worked out.

My thought now is to send a Naval ex-passenger ship to the Black Sea to provide services and living accommodations if necessary. This ship could berth in Sevastopol if necessary because of weather.

Information from Harriman indicates that suitable quarters and staff meeting place can be made available at Yalta where the city was not damaged during the German occupation.

It is my intention to take with me about 35 persons, including Joint Staff, personal staff, Secret Service, servants, etc.<sup>4</sup>

I will give you more detailed information in the near future.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Actually the staff taken to Yalta by the President was ten times that number. The British Delegation was equally large. Cf. the *Log, post*, p. 462, and Churchill, p. 344.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 31 December 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Top Secret. Number 868.

Your 682:—

I will certainly meet you at Yalta. We are preparing to send a small signal ship to Sebastopol, also a civil liner for accommodation if later information indicates that this is necessary to supplement quarters on shore. It will be necessary for me to take with me about the same numbers as attended the last Quebec conference.<sup>2</sup> This includes the provision for a round-the-clock signal service, but any excess over those who can be conveniently put up on shore will live aboard. Pending further news from you I am taking January 28th as target date for arrival of ships. I shall fly direct via Caserta in the C-54 which General Arnold gave me and which is a wonder. Have you a name for this operation? If not I suggest "ARGONAUT" which has a local but not deducible association.

PRIME

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

<sup>2</sup> A handwritten note in the margin at this point reads as follows: "PM's #771 of 20 Aug indicated he would take 121 plus 'a few from Washington ['] to Quebec'".

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] 31 December 1944.

Number 685, Personal and Top Secret, from the President for the Prime Minister.

Referring to your 861<sup>2</sup> in regard to taking off by plane from Caserta, my advisors, medical and otherwise, consider it inadvisable to fly in high altitudes over the mountains between Italy and destination.

Admiral Hewitt has recommended going by Naval vessel from here to Malta and flying from Malta to destination, which can be done without reaching any high altitude. The same applies to Alexandria or Suez, but would necessitate my spending more time on the ship.

Is there any reason why I should not transfer from ship to plane at Malta which might involve remaining overnight?

We are working on the details and hope to give you full information in the early future.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 23.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The President to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*<sup>1</sup>TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] 31 December 1944.

Number 153, Personal and Top Secret, from the President to Ambassador Harriman.

Replying to your . . . [telegrams of December 26, 27, and 28],<sup>2</sup> I am now preparing to leave the U. S. by warship as soon as possible after the Inauguration and by airplane from the Mediterranean to Yalta. I have so informed Churchill who is agreeable, and I will at a later day give you accurate dates of departure and arrival Yalta.

My party for which suitable arrangements should be made will be as follows:

Fleet Admiral Leahy, General of the Army Marshall, Fleet Admiral King, General of the Army Arnold, Lieutenant General Somervell, Vice Admiral Cooke, Major General Hull, Major General Wood, Rear Admiral McCormick, Rear Admiral Duncan, Brigadier General Lindsay, Colonel Lincoln, Brigadier Generals Bessell and Everest, Commodore Burrough; Aides to the Chiefs of Staff—Colonel

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 21-23, and p. 23, first footnote.

McCarthy, Captain McDill, Commander Dornin, and Commander Clark; fifteen members, officers and clerks of the Secretariat of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Mr. Bohlen, interpreter.

My personal group will be Vice Admirals McIntire and Brown, Major General Watson, Mr. Harry Hopkins, six White House staff officers, sixteen Secret Service Officers, and eight servants.

I may be able to bring Stettinius and Jimmy Byrnes.

The total number from here will be about seventy.

About a week before our arrival at Crimea it is my present intention to send a naval auxiliary not a combatant man of war to anchor off Yalta or in Sevastopol if necessary to provide services, etc. She will act as supply ship and communication center. She can provide some furniture from cabins to make up for any deficiencies and also certain standard food supplies.

We will arrive in four or five airplanes of the C-54 type. There should be a daily mail plane from Cairo of the Army C-54 or smaller type.

Churchill suggests that he will want to bring some British destroyers.

ROOSEVELT<sup>1</sup>

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 1 January 1945.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Top Secret number 871.

We shall be delighted if you will come to Malta. I shall be waiting on the quay. You will also see the inscription of your noble message to Malta of a year ago. Everything can be arranged to your convenience. No more let us falter! From Malta to Yalta! Let nobody alter!

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 2 January 1945.

PRIORITY

Number 688. Top Secret and Personal from the President for the Prime Minister.

Your 871. We plan to arrive by ship at Malta early forenoon 1 February and hope to proceed at once by plane without faltering. It will be grand to meet you on the quay.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] 3 January 1945.

Number 690, Personal and Top Secret, from the President for the Prime Minister.

Your 868.<sup>2</sup> I have informed Harriman that I will arrive Yalta February first or second by airplane from Malta and that Chiefs of Staff will arrive at same time possibly from Egypt.

I have also informed Harriman that we are sending a Naval auxiliary non-combatant vessel to Sevastopol to arrive three or four days in advance of my arrival.

Your suggestion of "ARGONAUT" is welcomed. You and I are direct descendants.

In considering itinerary of visit to Black Sea, it has developed much to my regret that because of my extended absence from Washington it is necessary for me to postpone my projected visit to the United Kingdom until a later date.

I will make every effort to arrange to visit the U. K. in May or June.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 24.

Roosevelt Papers

*The President's Naval Aide (Brown) to the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet (Cooke)*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 3 January 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR VICE ADMIRAL COOKE:

Subject: Details of White House Arrangements for ARGONAUT.

1. The Prime Minister and Ambassador Harriman have been informed that the President expects to arrive at Malta on board a man-of-war on the early forenoon of 1 February and to proceed at once by plane to Simferopol.

2. The State Department has been informed that the *Catoctin* will leave Naples on 22 January for Sevastopol and that the passage of the Dardanelles will be made about 24-25 January. She has been described as a naval auxiliary non-combatant vessel. The State Department has been directed to inform the President of Turkey of our intention and to arrange for the *Catoctin's* passage of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus.

3. It is requested that appropriate instructions be issued to the *Catoctin* to carry out the above and that appropriate instructions also

be issued for her to communicate as necessary with Mr. Harriman and to do whatever may be necessary to assist in providing communications, furniture (if desired), provisions and supplies for the mission. I suggest that her instructions might authorize the commanding officer to use his judgment as to whether she should remain at Sevastopol or off Yalta.

4. It might be well for her to transport some army jeeps for use of the mission.

WILSON BROWN,  
Vice Admiral, U. S. N.,  
Naval Aide to the President

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 5 January 1945.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Top Secret number 874. Your 690.<sup>2</sup>

In none of your telegrams about ARGONAUT have you mentioned whether U. J. likes this place and agrees to it and what kind of accommodation he can provide. I am looking forward to receiving this. It has occurred to some of us that he might come back and say "Why don't you come on the other four hours and let me entertain you in Moscow?" However, I am preparing for Y[alta] and am sending a larger liner which will cover all our troubles.

Would it not be possible for you to spend 2 or 3 nights at Malta and let the staffs have a talk together unostentatiously? Also, Eisenhower and Alexander could both be available there. We think it very important that there should be some conversation on matters which do not affect the Russians, e. g., Japan, and also about future use of the Italian Armies. You have but to say the word and we can arrange everything.

We are very sorry indeed you will not come to our shores on this journey. We should feel it very much and a very dismal impression would be made if you were to visit France before you come to Britain: In fact, it would be regarded as a slight on your closest ally. I gather however that you will only go the [to] the Mediterranean and Black Sea, in which case it is merely a repetition of Teheran.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 27.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 6 January 1945.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Top Secret Number 875.

ARGONAUT. Please see my number 874.

If you do not wish to spend more than one night at Malta, it could surely be arranged that both our Chiefs of Staffs should arrive there say a couple of days before us and have their preliminary discussions. We would then all proceed by air to ARGONAUT, thus in no way impeding the journey of the two non-military ships to Sebastopol. Our combined Chiefs of Staff discussions would of course also proceed at Sebastopol at periods when military advisers were not required for the general meetings. The British Chiefs of Staff are repeating this to the United States Chiefs of Staff and suggesting an agenda.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] 6 January 1945.

Number 692, Personal and Top Secret, from the President for the Prime Minister.

Your 874 and 875. I am informed by Harriman that U. J. will meet us at Yalta February first or second.

Preparations are being made to take care of us and our Staff in undamaged houses in Yalta. I will send my ship to Sevastopol to arrive three or four days in advance of my arrival.

There is a chance that weather might permit of the ship's anchoring off the place of meeting.

With favorable weather at sea I can arrive Malta February second, and it is necessary to proceed by air the same day in order to keep the date with U. J.

That is why I regret that in view of the time available to me for this journey it will not be possible for us to meet your suggestion and have a British-American Staff meeting at Malta before proceeding to ARGONAUT. I do not think that by not having a meeting at Malta any time will be lost at ARGONAUT.

I am envious of your visits to the great battlefront which are denied to me by distance.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.



Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 6 January 1945.

Number 159, Personal and Top Secret, from the President to Ambassador Harriman.

Please inform Stalin that I have told Churchill that I will meet with him and Stalin at Yalta on the second of February.

Stalin may wish to extend an invitation to Churchill who has informed me that he will be pleased to meet with us at Yalta.

It is assumed that you will provide from Moscow the number of Russian speaking American officers necessary to handle at the conference details of our contacts with local Soviet officials.

Mr. Bohlen will come from here to act as my official interpreter.

It appears probable that our party at Yalta from here will number eighty instead of seventy as previously stated.

Please inform us as soon as possible in regard to the housing arrangements for my party and also regarding the provision of a motor car for my personal use.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 8 January 1945.

Personal and Top Secret for the President from Harriman.

I have communicated to Marshal Stalin through Molotov the date you have selected for the meeting, suggested his extending an invitation to the Prime Minister, and submitted the code name you proposed. The above refers to White House cables Nr 159<sup>2</sup> and 160<sup>3</sup> January 6 and 7. I have arranged to bring down several Russian speaking American officers to act as interpreters and to assist in dealing with the details of talks with the Russians. I have already informed Molotov that there would be about 100 in your party, which would take into account those coming from Moscow, including General Deane, Admiral Olsen, General Hill, and the special MILEPOST Planning Staff, General Roberts, Captain Maples, USN, and Colonel Bogart. With Molotov's cordial approval I am planning to go to the Crimea the end of the week just as soon as the Hungarian Armistice

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>3</sup> This message read as follows: "The British and American Chiefs of Staff have agreed on the code name 'ARGONAUT' for the projected meeting" (Roosevelt Papers).

is concluded and will then be able to advise you in detail regarding the housing arrangements. The Russians will no doubt provide a first class car for your personal use equipped with bullet proof glass such as is used by Soviet high officials.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 8 January 1945.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Top Secret No. 880.

1. I am still thinking it of high importance that our military men should get together for a few days before we arrive at ARGONAUT. There will no doubt be opportunities for them to confer together at Sebastopol on days when we are engaged in politics and do not require technical advice. All the same, there are a tremendous lot of questions which should be looked at beforehand, and our agenda ought really to be considered.

2. Even further to this I would add that there would be great advantages in a preliminary conference of about a week's duration between the foreign ministers. If these could be gathered at the Pyramids or Alexandria, about which arrangements are very easy, and could join us at ARGONAUT, an immense amount of preliminary work would be done. I do not know whether you are bringing Stettinius with you, or whether you would bring him for such a conference. If so, I should greatly welcome it, and the moment that such a decision has been taken, we would invite Molotov to come to the rendezvous. You will remember what advantages were gained last time by the discussions which took place in Moscow before we met at Teheran. Pray let me know whether this appeals to you at all.

3. What are your ideas of the length of our stay at ARGONAUT? This may well be a fateful conference, coming at a moment when the great allies are so divided and the shadow of the war lengthens out before us. At the present time I think the end of this war may well prove to be more disappointing than was the last.

<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 9 January 1945.

No. 881. Prime Minister to President. Personal and Top Secret.

1. Please see paragraph one of my Nr. 880. In spite of your

<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

Nr. 692,<sup>2</sup> our Staffs consider it of the highest importance that they meet with yours before we go on to ARGONAUT. I understand that your Chiefs of Staff are flying separately from you. Why then can they not reach Malta say on January 30th and meet our people there? We think this very important, and we do not see how the agenda can be covered unless there is this preliminary talk. I beg you to consider this. I shall only arrive in time to welcome you on February 2nd.

2. We cannot tell what the flying will be from Malta onward and you may easily have to wait an extra day in Malta. However if our staffs have covered some of the ground, we can spend this day discussing with them. Uncle Joe may if the weather is bad have to put up with a delay. But he may comfort himself with the reflection that he has made us come to him, which in all the circumstances we are wise to do.

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<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 29.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*

TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] 9 January 1945.

Number 696, Personal and Top Secret, from the President for the Prime Minister.

Your 880 and 881. I have directed Marshall, King and Arnold, with their assistants, to arrive Malta in time for a conference with your staff in forenoon of January 30.

In regard to an advance conference between the foreign ministers and the Secretary of State in view of my absence from Washington during the time required to proceed by sea to Malta, it is impracticable for Stettinius to be out of the country for the same extended period.

He will join me at Malta and be with us in ARGONAUT.

My idea of the length of stay at ARGONAUT is that it should not be more than five or six days.

I am very desirous of keeping our date with U. J. if it can possibly be done.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 10 January 1945.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, personal and Top Secret, Number 884.

Your Number 696.

1. Thank you very much about the Combined Chiefs of Staff's preliminary meeting.

2. Eden has particularly asked me to suggest that Stettinius might come on 48 hours earlier to Malta with the United States Chiefs of Staff so that he (Eden) can run over the agenda with him beforehand, even though Molotov were not invited. I am sure this would be found very useful. I do not see any other way of realising our hopes about world organisation in five or six days. Even the Almighty took seven. Pray forgive my pertinacity.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, 11 January 1945.

Personal and Top Secret for the President from Harriman.

Molotov advises me that Marshal Stalin has accepted the code name ARGONAUT and has so advised Mr. Churchill. This is in reply to your White House 160 Jan 7.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 30, footnote 3.

Roosevelt Papers

*The President's Chief of Staff (Leahy) to the President*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 12 January 1945.

Leahy to President:

The following draft reply to Harriman's messages of January 11 is forwarded for your consideration:

"Receipt is acknowledged of your . . . [five telegrams dated January 11].<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> One of the telegrams under reference is the message printed *supra*. Another has not been found. The other three dealt with identification cards for Americans going to Yalta, living accommodations at Yalta, and the travel arrangements referred to in Leahy's draft reply.

I will be pleased to see you at Malta and learn from you of the latest developments in your area.

I expect to depart Malta for ARGONAUT February second.

Stettinius will not visit Moscow prior to or immediately following ARGONAUT.

It is not considered advisable for you to urge Stalin to bring his military staff with him. He will undoubtedly bring those that he wants without urging by us."<sup>2</sup>

W[ILLIAM] D. L[EAHY]

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<sup>1</sup> It is not known whether this proposed message was sent by Roosevelt to Harriman.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 12 January 1945.

PRIORITY

Number 699, Personal and Top Secret, from the President to the Prime Minister.

Your 884.<sup>2</sup> It is regretted that projected business here for the Secretary of State will prevent Stettinius' arrival Malta before January 31.

It is my present intention to send Harry Hopkins to England some days in advance of the Malta date to talk with you and Eden.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 33.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 13 January 1945.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, personal and Top Secret, No. 886.

1. Shall we not have to warn the Turks of the impending arrival of the two ships? We could indeed argue that they are "merchant vessels" for the purposes of the Montreux Convention, with purely defensive armament and not bound on any exclusively military mission. They could thus in theory arrive unannounced at the Straits; but the Turks could still insist on stopping and examining them, and in fact they would be obliged under Article Three to stop for sanitary inspection, which might lead to anything.

2. Should we not tell President Inonu about them at the latest possible moment, for his own strictly personal information, and ask him to give all the orders necessary to ensure that the ships shall pass

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

through unquestioned except by formality? There would be no need to tell him more than that there was going to be a meeting of the heads of governments some day somewhere in the Black Sea.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The President's Chief of Staff (Leahy) to the President*

[WASHINGTON,] 13 January 1945.

From: Admiral Leahy

To: The President (Hyde Park)

I have sent the following message to Prime in reply to his 886 (MR-out-12).

"Your 886. I have directed the State Department to take such action at an appropriate time through Steinhardt with the Turkish Government as is necessary to insure passage to the Black Sea without delay or interference of the 'Naval auxiliary *Catoctin*, not a combatant vessel' and also four smaller Naval vessels which are really mine sweepers and which the Navy wishes to send to the Black Sea.

"We will have Steinhardt give the Turks identical information regarding the passage of American airplanes to be used by my party and for daily mail trips. Signed Roosevelt."<sup>1</sup>

LEAHY

<sup>1</sup> The message quoted was sent as telegram "Number 700, Personal and Top Secret from the President for the Prime Minister", dated January 13, 1945.

Pursuant to instructions from the Secretary of State, Ambassador Steinhardt made the necessary arrangements with the Turkish Prime Minister (Roosevelt Papers, Stettinius to Steinhardt, Nos. 169 and 174, January 16 and 18, 1945, and Steinhardt to Stettinius, January 19 and 20, 1945).

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 14 January 1945.

Prime Minister to President, personal and Top Secret nr 889.

1. Anthony is very pleased that Stettinius will come to CRICKET if possible on the 31st instant. He will be there to receive him.

2. I will meet you there on your arrival. I must point out however that thereafter the weather will be our master. I have received from Stalin a notification that he is expecting me at MAGNETO on the 2nd. Ought we not to make it clear that we are governed by weather? My air staff are considering the possible alternatives for the onward flight and I will telegraph their views as soon as possible, but it seems likely that unless you can arrive at CRICKET on the 1st we shall not meet U. J. till the 3rd.

3. I am delighted that you will send Harry<sup>2</sup> over here. There will certainly be plenty to talk over.

<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

<sup>2</sup> Hopkins.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 15 January 1945.

PRIORITY

Number 166, Top Secret for Ambassador Harriman from the Secretary of State, via Navy Channels.

In addition to myself and Bohlen whom you know about I shall bring with me to ARGONAUT H. Freeman Matthews; Alger Hiss, for Dumbarton Oaks matters; and four men who will act as secretaries. I will be accompanied by a military aide designated by General Marshall. Bohlen asks that if possible you bring Nelson Newton with you to help him in writing up the minutes. If this is not possible let me know and I shall bring another male stenographer.

STETTINIUS<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> In reply Harriman stated that he would bring Edward Page, Jr., as an interpreter and general assistant to Bohlen, and also another stenographer in place of Nelson Newton, who had already left Moscow on another assignment (Roosevelt Papers, telegrams from Harriman, January 16 and 18, 1945).

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 16 January 1945.

(Personal and Top Secret for the President from Harriman)

I am sure that you will be well satisfied with the accommodations for yourself and the principal members of your party. You will be in the Livadia summer palace of the Czar where are two principal buildings one of 21 rooms and one of 41 rooms and a third building formerly I understand for the guards. I am not yet certain about accommodations for the recent large increased number of the military group. I first told Molotov that the party would be of a number in accordance with your several telegrams with a margin to take care of Stettinius group as now decided upon. The arrangements he has been making have been on this basis. I am now asking for additional accommodations and am hopeful that reasonably satisfactory arrangements can be made for the whole party ashore as we now learn that the *Catoctin* can only be based at Sevastopol.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)* <sup>1</sup>TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] 16 January 1945.

Number 167, Top Secret and Personal, for Ambassador Harriman from the President.

Referring to Deane's M22351 <sup>2</sup> of 14 January and your . . . [telegram of January 16].<sup>3</sup>

I hope that you will be able to arrange, without offending the Russians, for the setting up of my personal mess ashore and the use of my stewards and cooks. I desire this in order to maintain my usual diet. Our supplies will be obtained from the *Catoctin*.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> *Supra*.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President* <sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 17 January 1945.

(Personal and Top Secret for the President from Harriman)

Reference cable . . . [of January 16], White House number 167, in my first talk with Molotov about arrangements I told him I felt sure it would be desirable for you to have your own mess and mess crew and bring your own food for your usual diet just as we had arranged it in Teheran. He readily agreed and I am thoroughly satisfied he took it as an appropriate and quite natural thing to do. I have since been advised that arrangements on this basis are being made in the twenty-one room palace mentioned in my . . . [telegram of January 16].<sup>2</sup> Weather permitting I expect to go there on the 21st, and have arranged to take Kathleen <sup>3</sup> along as this is her department.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 36.

<sup>3</sup> Miss Kathleen Harriman.

112/1-2045

*The Assistant to the Secretary of State (Bohlen) to the Under Secretary of State (Grew)*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 20, 1945.

Day before yesterday at the White House at a meeting between Mr. Hopkins, Admiral Wilson Brown, and Mr. Early it was decided



that the censorship code would be invoked as of January 19 against any speculation as to the time, place, or even general area of the forthcoming meeting and as to the movements of any United States military or diplomatic officials.

It was decided that if any press or other inquiries are made as to the whereabouts of any official whose movements are directly or indirectly connected with the meeting a reply should be simply "He is out of town", and no further background information or explanation should be given. The Secretary has requested that this be followed throughout the Department in answering any inquiries as to the whereabouts of any State Department officials.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

cc to Mr. McDermott

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

LONDON, January 21, 1945.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Top Secret Number 891.

I suggest that the press should be entirely excluded from ARGONAUT, but that each of us should be free to bring not more than three or four uniformed service photographers to take "still" and cinematograph pictures to be released when we think fit. Please let me know if you agree.

There will of course be the usual agreement communiqué, or communiqués.

I am sending a similar telegram to U. J.

PRIME

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] 22 January 1945.

Number 704, Personal and Top Secret, for the Prime Minister from the President.

I am in full agreement with the suggestion regarding press representatives and photographers made in your 891.<sup>2</sup>

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> Churchill replied, in his telegram No. 892, "Please tell U. J." (Roosevelt Papers).

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*<sup>1</sup>TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] 22 January 1945.

Number 178, Top Secret and Personal, from the President to Marshal Stalin.

I have decided to not have any press representatives at ARGONAUT and to permit only a small group of uniformed service photographers from the American Navy to take the pictures that we will want.

Prime Minister Churchill agrees.<sup>2</sup>

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> Stalin's reply, dated January 23, as received by the President in translation, included the statements, "I do not have any objections against your proposals" and "The same reply I sent to the Prime Minister's request" (Roosevelt Papers).

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

LONDON, January 24, 1945.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Top Secret number 894.

It would be a great pity if Eisenhower and Alexander only come to CRICKET and if we do not have them with us at MAGNETO.<sup>2</sup> This will really make it impossible for the Heads of Government to enter fully into the military problems. I hope therefore they may be instructed as originally proposed to come to MAGNETO as well as CRICKET and if they have to be absent from either, it should be CRICKET.

The above of course is subject to battle exigencies.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

<sup>2</sup> Alexander was present at both Malta and Yalta, but Eisenhower was not. The latter's chief of staff, Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, was, however, in attendance at Malta.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

LONDON, January 24, 1945.

Nr 2064 to Map Room White House from Harry Hopkins.

Send following to President.

"Have had very satisfactory visit London. Leaving for Paris tomorrow. Churchill well. He says that if we had spent ten years on research, we could not have found a worse place in the world than

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

MAGNETO but that he feels that he can survive it by bringing an adequate supply of whisky. He claims it is good for typhus and deadly on lice which thrive in those parts. Sorry to hear that Watson seasick as usual. Regards to all. Signed Harry."

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill* <sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

[U.S.S. "QUINCY", AT SEA,] 28 January 1945.

Number 706, Personal and Top Secret from the President to the Prime Minister.

Thank you for your 893 <sup>2</sup> and 896.<sup>3</sup>

The approaches to ARGONAUT appear to be much more difficult than at first reported. I will have my advance party make recommendations as to how I shall travel after Malta.

I agree that we must notify U. J. as soon as we can fix our schedule in the light of present information.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This message dealt with details of plans for the flight from Malta to Yalta.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. This message dealt with unfavorable travel conditions from the Crimean airport to Yalta.

## 2. NEGOTIATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON PRINCIPAL SUBJECTS

### *Editorial Note*

In view of the fact that this volume is to be published prior to the annual *Foreign Relations* volumes for the years 1944 and 1945 it was felt desirable to present in this chapter a collection of documents designed to show in broad outline the pre-conference status of the principal subjects which came up for discussion at Malta or Yalta. In general, the pre-conference period as defined for the purposes of this volume is the period, extending back into the mid-autumn of 1944, during which the plans and policies for the forthcoming tripartite conference were being developed. For all subjects treated in this chapter, the editors have endeavored to find and include primarily those key documents which highlight the nature of each problem and show the policy position taken by the United States Government on each major issue that subsequently came up for consideration at Malta and Yalta. In view of the present limitations of time and space, a fuller coverage of these subjects will have to await the appearance of the annual *Foreign Relations* volumes for the years of World War II.

Although the Combined Chiefs of Staff had an agenda for the military discussions at Malta and Yalta (*post*, pp. 424-426) there was no fixed agenda for the political discussions at either conference. For several months preceding the conferences, however, a number of subjects were considered in the diplomatic correspondence and in correspondence within the United States Government as subjects which should be taken up at the forthcoming conference or conferences of the heads of government. All subjects of this type have been included in this chapter, and particular effort has been made to include under these topics all significant documents which were prepared in anticipation of the forthcoming "Big Three" meeting. For some subjects, of course, there were no significant, high-level negotiations in the several months immediately preceding the conferences.

Also included are papers from the so-called Yalta Briefing Book which was prepared for the use of Secretary Stettinius and President Roosevelt. The subjects treated in this chapter have been arranged in an order parallel to the order in which those subjects appear in the Briefing Book, except that Briefing Book papers on subjects that were not mentioned at Malta or Yalta have been omitted.

Briefing Book papers will be found at the end of each subject dealt with in this chapter except for the last six subjects, on which there were no studies or recommendations in the Briefing Book.

The great majority of Briefing Book papers are undated. A number of them were completed as early as November 1944, as evidenced by the following excerpt from a memorandum, dated November 10, 1944, from the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) to Under Secretary Stettinius:<sup>1</sup>

“Preparation for Big Three Meeting

1. You now have the policy papers on U. S. policy and attitudes toward Eastern Europe, the Balkan area, and the Near East, which relate to possible clashes of interests between the Soviet and British Governments. These policy papers include the general position of the U. S. with respect to protection of the persons and property of its nationals in those areas and have specific recommendations with regard to the policy and attitudes we should pursue toward the Polish situation, the Yugoslav situation, Rumania, Hungary, Albania, and the countries of the Near and Middle East. I think these memoranda should be brought to the President's attention, probably not long before his conference with the Prime Minister and Stalin. On the trip to the conference would be the ideal time to bring them to his attention as there would then be an opportunity to discuss these situations and the positions we should adopt in order to protect American interests.”

On January 10, 1945 the Executive Secretary of the Secretary's Staff Committee (Rothwell) sent Assistant Secretary Rockefeller a memorandum of which the first paragraph read as follows:<sup>2</sup>

“At the Secretary's Staff Committee meeting of January 10, the Secretary asked that all memoranda for the President on topics to be discussed at the Meeting of the Big Three should be in the hands of Mr. Alger Hiss not later than Monday, January 15. These memoranda should go to Mr. Hiss through Mr. Yost.”

Secretary Stettinius presented a copy of the Briefing Book to the President on January 18, 1945, and later that day sent to Roosevelt the following top-secret memorandum:<sup>3</sup>

“Memorandum for the President

Subject: Political matters for discussion at the forthcoming meeting

For your convenience I am attaching hereto an extra copy of the memorandum that I left with you in the black binder this morning

<sup>1</sup> Matthews Files. For other excerpts from this memorandum, see *post*, pp. 47-48, 283-284.

<sup>2</sup> 740.0011 EW/1-1045.

<sup>3</sup> Roosevelt Papers. References to the preparation and utilization of the Briefing Book papers will be found in Stettinius, pp. 29-30, and Byrnes, p. 23.

covering the ten points which the State Department hopes can be satisfactorily dealt with in the forthcoming discussions.

E. R. Stettinius, Jr."

[Attachment]

"United States Political Desiderata in Regard to the Forthcoming Meeting

Secret

1. Soviet-British agreement to compromise on the voting procedure of the Security Council along the lines of the United States proposal.

2. Soviet-British agreement to the proposed establishment of an emergency European high commission composed of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and France.

3. Soviet participation in working out a common allied political program for liberated Europe on the basis of which the emergency high commission would operate.

4. Soviet-British agreement to the short term and long term political and economic treatment of Germany as outlined in the United States proposals.

5. Soviet agreement to a solution of the Polish problem which would insure the emergence of a free, independent, and democratic Poland. For this purpose pending elections in Poland the establishment of an interim government which would be broadly representative of the Polish people and acceptable to all the major allies.

6. Soviet agreement to permit UNRRA to carry out its functions of distribution and supervision of relief supplies in areas liberated by the Soviet Armies.

7. Soviet agreement to a clarification of the status and responsibilities of the United States representation on the Allied Control Commissions in former enemy countries which have surrendered to the Soviet Armies.

8. Soviet agreement, in accordance with the spirit of the Declaration on Iran of December 1, 1943,<sup>4</sup> to respect the decision of the Iranian Government to postpone negotiations with foreign powers or companies regarding oil concessions until the termination of hostilities and the withdrawal of allied troops now on Iranian soil.

9. Soviet-British agreement to the desirability and the common interest of bringing about the maximum degree of unity in China and for this purpose Soviet undertaking to use their influence with the Chinese Communists to further an agreement between the national Government and the Chinese Communists along the lines of General Hurley's efforts.

10. A common policy between the three countries in regard to the question of the rearming of the Western European democracies in the postwar period."

<sup>4</sup>Post, pp. 748-749.

## ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION

### *Editorial Note*

For background information on this subject, see *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation*. The following excerpts from this publication (pp. 374-375) summarize the situation at the outset of the pre-Yalta negotiations:

"It will be recalled that when the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals<sup>1</sup> were published, October 9, 1944, not only the voting question but several other questions had been left 'open' and that a full United Nations Conference was contemplated as soon as agreement had been reached on certain of these questions among the governments that had taken part in the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations. . . .

. . . work on the six open questions began promptly after October 9, . . .

The superior committee [in the Department of State] was composed of Acting Secretary Stettinius, presiding, and Messrs. Hackworth, Dunn, Pasvolsky, and Wilson, with the executive assistance of G. Hayden Raynor . . . Mr. Stettinius was able to report in the first meeting of this committee on November 1, 1944, that the President's general plan was to cover all the open items requiring decision in a conference with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin but that arrangements for such a conference were not completed. . . ."

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<sup>1</sup> The Dumbarton Oaks conversations on the organization of international security took place in Washington between August 21 and October 7, 1944. For the text of the resulting Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, dated October 7, 1944, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 8, 1944, vol. xi, pp. 368-374; or *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation*, pp. 611-619.

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UNA Files

*The Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss) to the Chief of the Division of International Security and Organization (Notter)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 27, 1944.

The attached drafts of two memoranda to the President have been prepared in response to directions given by Mr. Stettinius yesterday. It was his feeling that the main memorandum should simply list the "open" items, should indicate without specification that settlement of some of these items could best be handled by the President personally, should request an opportunity to discuss methods of settlement, and should attach a supplementary memorandum on the question of the position to be taken with respect to voting in the Council.

He has asked that both drafts be circulated at this time to you and to Messrs. Dunn, Hackworth and Wilson for comment. Mr.

Stettinius thought that the supplementary memorandum should be cleared with the Joint Chiefs of Staff before it is finally sent to the President.<sup>1</sup> However, this step will not of course be taken until after the memorandum has been approved within the Department.

[Attachment 1—Draft

[WASHINGTON,] October 27, 1944.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Questions Left Unsettled At Dumbarton Oaks.

For your convenience I am listing hereunder the questions which still have to be settled in connection with the establishment of a world security organization.

1. What voting procedure should be followed in the Council? This involves not only the extremely important question of the extent to which the permanent members of the Council shall be authorized to veto discussion in or action by the Council, but it also involves the less controversial question of whether decisions of the Council should in some or all cases be by a simple majority vote (either of those present and voting or of the full Council membership) or by some prescribed greater majority.

2. Should the proposed charter of the world security organization provide for territorial trusteeship and if so what should be the nature of such provision?

3. Who should be the initial members of the organization?

4. Where should the proposed organization and its component parts be located?

5. What provision should be made for orderly termination of the functions of the League of Nations and perhaps for transfer to the new organization of the League's property?

6. What arrangements should be made for detailed drafting of the statute of the proposed international court of justice and of the actual charter of the proposed organization (the latter will, of course, be based on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals but it will be a job of some complexity as the Dumbarton Oaks proposals are quite informal in character)?

It would appear that some of these matters had best be settled by your own direct action in such manner as you yourself determine; others may lend themselves readily to settlement by more routine diplomatic action undertaken by the Department. I should appreciate an early opportunity to discuss with you the methods which you feel should be followed to accomplish settlement of the above open items.

I am attaching hereto a brief supplementary memorandum which sets forth our recommendations as to the position this Government should take at this time on the most difficult of the unsettled items, namely the extent of the veto power to be accorded to permanent

<sup>1</sup> The Department of Defense has supplied the information that the Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently were not consulted on this question



members of the Council. This supplementary memorandum has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>2</sup> Will you please indicate whether you approve of the recommendations therein set forth?

[Attachment 2—Draft]

[WASHINGTON,] October 27, 1944.

SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDUM

Subject: Recommended Position On the Question of Veto Power of Permanent Members

1. *Procedures of the Council.*

The Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security and to this end two main types of procedure are specified in some detail in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. First, the Council is authorized to facilitate the pacific settlement of disputes between nations. Secondly, the Council is authorized to take diplomatic, economic or military measures to maintain peace and security.

2. *Preferred American position.*

It is recommended that from the point of view of American interests the most desirable rule as to the veto power of permanent members would be to eliminate, in the first category of procedures, the power of veto on the part of any such member involved in a dispute, but to provide that unanimity of the permanent members must prevail before any action can be taken by the Council in the second category of procedures. Under such a formula judicial and quasi-judicial procedures would be based on the traditional Anglo-American principle that a party to a dispute should not be able to prevent consideration of that dispute. At the same time this formula would insure, among other desirable objectives, express statement of the right of the United States to prevent any use of its armed forces without its specific consent.

3. *Soviet and British positions.*

The Soviet Government can be expected to maintain strongly its position that the rule of unanimity of permanent members should prevail in both categories of procedures in the Council.

The British position at Dumbarton Oaks was that in both types of procedures a permanent member, if involved in a dispute, should be deprived of its power of veto. As you are aware, we have received, since the conclusion of the Dumbarton Oaks conversations, information indicating that the British position now coincides with the Soviet position.

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<sup>2</sup> See preceding footnote.

#### 4. *Recommended alternative American position.*

In the event that it should prove impossible to obtain the agreement of both the Soviet and the British Governments to our preferred position, it is recommended that we reluctantly accept the unqualified principle of unanimity of permanent members in both categories of procedures, provided this rule is explicitly adopted only as a provisional and temporary measure. The duration of such a measure might be (1) for a fixed number of years, or (2) subject to reconsideration by the Council after a fixed number of years, or (3) for such time as the present number and distribution of permanent seats on the Council continue. It is believed that such a frankly temporary and provisional arrangement would not be in violation of our principles and, if necessary to obtain establishment of the organization, would be acceptable to public opinion in this country and elsewhere.

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Matthews Files

*The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] November 10, 1944.

#### MEMORANDUM<sup>2</sup>

#### PREPARATION FOR BIG THREE MEETING

3. The questions having to do with the International Organization I shall leave to Leo,<sup>3</sup> but I just want to add my word that if the Russians remain absolutely adamant on the subject of demanding a veto to cover all of Section A of Chapter 8<sup>4</sup> as well as Section B, I think it would be advisable to postpone any meeting of the United Nations for the present, because I just cannot see the United States taking the position of presenting the other United Nations with a proposal of that kind. In the first place, I do not believe that we would have many of the other nations join the organization and if they did so, would do it with a bad grace and would thus gravely injure the whole basic spirit of the organization, which is to be built on the foundation of friendly international cooperation, if it is ever to be a success. I could go on with the Russians in their demand for veto power as it applies to Section B of Chapter 8, and I think it would be a sound position for this Government to take and would be well received by the American people, but if the Russians will not accept a compromise position, then I would propose that all of Section A be completely eliminated from the proposals and that we accept the

<sup>1</sup> Carbon copy.

<sup>2</sup> For other excerpts from this memorandum, see *ante*, p. 42, and *post*, pp. 283-284.

<sup>3</sup> Leo Pasvolsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

<sup>4</sup> Of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.

Russian position with regard to Section B, that is, enforcement action, as Section B is now written.

4. We would not lose anything by dropping Section A out of the document as the principle and purpose and the whole spirit of the document call repeatedly for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and prohibit the use of force or the threat of force in such disputes. We would still have the World Court and the assembly could debate or discuss any situation which they thought might, if continued, give rise to a threat to the peace. So if we eliminate Section A, we would eliminate all the discussion about the voting procedure in connection with the discussion of disputes, while at the same time the discussion could be held in the assembly under the proposals, as now drafted, and we would concentrate the question of voting on the really crucial point of the whole International Organization, which is enforcement action of any kind whatsoever in connection with a threat to, or a breach of, the peace. If you will sit down and read over again the two sections of Chapter 8, Section A and Section B, you will find there is no action provided for in Section A—merely recommendations—so that by eliminating Section A you would merely leave the authority to make recommendations in the assembly, where it now is, up to the time the Council might wish to take a matter over. As you recall, all the enforcement action is in Section B, so, therefore, if Section A were eliminated, as I said before, we could very well accept the Russian position as to Section B, as it is already half of our compromise proposal.

5. *Summary.* Try to have the compromise proposal adopted. If the Russians hold firmly to their position and will not accede to the compromise, then consider eliminating Section A completely from the document, leaving Section B and accept the Russian position as to Section B.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

UNA Files

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*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius)*<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, November 15, 1944.

MATTERS TO DISCUSS WITH THE PRESIDENT

WORLD SECURITY ORGANIZATION

1. *The Next Step*

2. *Open Items*

a. *Voting in Security Council*

1. We recommend acceptance of formula giving each member one vote; procedural matters decided by affirmative vote of 7 members;

<sup>1</sup> Printed from an unsigned copy typed in the Department of State; authorship not indicated. The copy bears the typed heading, "The Under Secretary of State".

on other matters by vote of 7, including concurring votes of permanent members except that a party to a dispute should not vote in decisions involving pacific settlement.

*b. Initial Membership*

1. Try to get "Associated Nations" in Latin America to join United Nations—This means declarations of war.

2. Failing that, stick to our guns that Associated Nations be invited.

3. In any event, oppose X.<sup>2</sup>

*c. Location*

1. We recommend for headquarters an internationalized district comprising a strip of Swiss territory on which League and ILO buildings are located and the adjacent French territory of the Pays de Gex.

*d. International Trusteeships*

1. We be authorized to study further with military and naval authorities and if you approve, to exchange proposals with U. K., U. S. S. R., and China prior to the general conference.

*e. Drafting of Court Statute*

1. We tentatively agreed at Dumbarton Oaks to have experts meet several weeks prior to general conference to draft statute.

*f. Termination of League*

1. British and Chinese studying. They have promised to give us their conclusions.

3. *Congressional Groups*—May I have discussions with them[?]  
Especially on voting procedure.

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<sup>2</sup> "X" refers to the Soviet demand at Dumbarton Oaks that the sixteen Soviet Socialist Republics be included in the initial membership of the proposed international organization.

UNA Files

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*The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 15, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Questions Left Unsettled at Dumbarton Oaks

There are six principal questions which need to be settled in connection with the establishment of the United Nations organization. They are as follows:

1. Voting procedure in the Security Council
2. Initial membership
3. Location of the United Nations Organization
4. Arrangements for International Trusteeships
5. Drafting of Court statute
6. Procedure for the termination of the League of Nations

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<sup>1</sup> Printed from an unsigned copy typed in the Department of State; authorship not indicated. This memorandum and the five following memoranda were prepared for a conference with the President on November 15, 1944. See *post*, pp. 56-57.

There are attached hereto recommendations as regards the first four of these questions.

As regards the Court statute, it was tentatively agreed at Dumbarton Oaks that a group of legal experts would meet two or three weeks prior to the opening of the Conference to draft the document.

As regards procedure for the termination of the League of Nations, the British and the Chinese governments have appointed committees to work on this subject and have promised to communicate their conclusions to us.

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UNA Files

*The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 15, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Voting Procedure in the Security Council

*Background*

There are three issues involved in this connection, as follows:

1. Size of majority
2. Unanimity of permanent members
3. Procedure in the event that one of the permanent members is a party to a dispute

The Russians took the position that the Council should make decisions by a simple majority vote; that unanimity of the permanent members should be required, except on procedural questions; and that the unanimity rule should prevail even when one of the permanent members is a party to a dispute.

The British took the position that the Council's decisions should be by a two-thirds majority vote, except that procedural questions might be settled by a simple majority vote; that unanimity of the permanent members should be required on all substantive matters; and that parties to a dispute should not vote.

The Chinese position was similar to the British.

In accordance with your instructions, our delegation took a position similar to the British, except that we expressed our willingness to accept either a simple majority or a two-thirds majority.

In the course of the Dumbarton discussions, in order to meet the conflicting views, proposals were tentatively made that decisions should require the affirmative votes of seven members, rather than of six members, as would be the case under a simple majority rule, or of eight members, as would be the case under a two-thirds rule;

<sup>1</sup> Printed from an unsigned copy typed in the Department of State; authorship not indicated.

and that unanimity of the permanent members should be required on all substantive matters, except that in decisions of the Council relating to pacific settlement of disputes (Section A of Chapter VIII) parties to a dispute should not vote. These proposals were not accepted, although they were favorably regarded by Sir Alexander Cadogan and his associates and by Dr. Koo and his associates.

### *Recommendation*

It is recommended that

This government accept the formula embodied in the attached draft of a proposal on this subject and seek to obtain the acceptance of that formula by Soviet Russia and the United Kingdom.

The proposed formula is essentially along the lines of the compromise solution discussed at Dumbarton Oaks. It provides that parties to a dispute should abstain from voting in those decisions of the Council which relate to the investigation of disputes, to appeals by the Council for peaceful settlement of disputes, and to recommendations by the Council as to methods and procedures of settlement. It retains the unanimity rule for decisions relating to the determination of the existence of threats to the peace or breaches of the peace and to the suppression of such threats or breaches.

This proposal should be acceptable to this country, since no party to a dispute would sit as a judge in its own case so long as judicial or quasi-judicial procedures are involved, but would participate fully in procedures involving political rather than judicial determination. It should be acceptable to Soviet Russia because it meets her desire that no action be taken against her without her consent.

[Attachment]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 15, 1944.

### PROPOSAL FOR SECTION C OF THE CHAPTER ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

#### *C. Voting*

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Section VIII A and under paragraph 1 of Section VIII C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

UNA Files

*The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 15, 1944.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Invitations to the Conference and Initial Membership

*Background*

There are two issues involved in this connection, as follows:

1. Should only the 35 United Nations be invited to the Conference and decide at the Conference who should be the additional initial members; or should invitations to the Conference be sent also to the nine so-called "associated" nations which participated in the Hot Springs, UNRRA, and Bretton Woods Conferences?
2. Should the sixteen Soviet Republics be admitted to initial membership?

The Soviet delegation took the position that only the signatories of the United Nations Declaration be invited to the Conference. They raised no objection to the inclusion by the Conference of other nations in the list of initial members, but placed themselves on record as insisting on the inclusion of the initial membership of the sixteen Soviet Republics.

In accordance with your instructions, we took the position that invitations should be sent to the forty-four nations which had been invited to the previous conferences (list attached) and that we could not accede to the Soviet demand for the inclusion of the sixteen republics as members of the organization.

The British and Chinese delegations supported our position fully in both respects.

*Recommendation*

It is recommended that

1. We take steps to induce the six American Republics now listed as "associated" nations (Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela) to qualify as United Nations by declaring war on Japan or Germany, or both; and
2. Failing this, we continue to maintain the position taken at Dumbarton Oaks.

<sup>1</sup> Printed from an unsigned copy typed in the Department of State; authorship not indicated.

## [Attachment]

LIST OF NATIONS WHICH PARTICIPATED IN HOT SPRINGS, UNRRA  
AND BRETTON WOODS CONFERENCES

## UNITED NATIONS

Australia	Iran
Belgium	Iraq
Bolivia	Liberia
Brazil	Luxembourg
Canada	Mexico
China	Netherlands
Colombia	New Zealand
Costa Rica	Nicaragua
Cuba	Norway
Czechoslovakia	Panama
Dominican Republic	Philippine Commonwealth
El Salvador	Poland
Ethiopia	Union of South Africa
Greece	U. S. S. R.
Guatemala	U. K.
Haiti	U. S. A.
Honduras	Yugoslavia
India	

## STATES OR AUTHORITIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE WAR

Chile	Iceland
Ecuador	Paraguay
Egypt	Peru
French Committee of National Liberation	Uruguay
	Venezuela

*Observers*

Danish Minister at Washington, attending in a personal capacity

UNA Files

*The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 15, 1944.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Location of The United Nations Organization

*Background*

This question was not formally discussed at Dumbarton Oaks, although there were some exchanges of views. The Soviet delegation objected to Geneva. One of the Soviet delegates very informally suggested Prague. The British and the Chinese raised no objection to Geneva, but had no positive suggestions.

We had a group of our own working on the question. It is recommended that, while the Assembly, the Council, and the various con-

<sup>1</sup> Printed from an unsigned copy typed in the Department of State; authorship not indicated.



ferences should meet in various parts of the world, the headquarters of the Organization should be in Europe. It also examined the following possibilities and recommended number 6: 1. Prague; 2. Vienna; 3. Luxembourg; 4. Geneva; 5. An internationalized district in the vicinity of Lake Como; 6. An internationalized district comprising a strip of Swiss territory on which the League and the ILO buildings are located and the adjacent French territory of the Pays de Gex.

### *Recommendation*

It is recommended that:

This government urge the proposal that the headquarters of the Organization be in an internationalized Swiss-French District as suggested above.

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UNA Files

*The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 15, 1944.

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Arrangements for International Trusteeship

#### *Background*

This question was not discussed at Dumbarton Oaks because of the desire of our Joint Chiefs of Staff that it not be discussed. The Soviet, British, and Chinese delegations expressed a desire that it be taken up at a later date, and we undertook to give consideration to the question of whether the matter should be postponed until the Conference or a preliminary exchange of papers take place before the Conference.

The Department of State has already prepared tentative proposals on this subject.

#### *Recommendation*

It is recommended that

1. The Department of State proceed, in consultation with the military and naval authorities, to a further examination of the tentative proposals; and

2. It be authorized, if you approve the proposals, to transmit them to the British, Soviet, and Chinese Governments prior to the convocation of the Conference.

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<sup>1</sup> Printed from an unsigned copy typed in the Department of State; authorship not indicated.

UNA Files

*The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 15, 1944.

## MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Further Steps with Respect to Items Left Open at the Dumbarton Oaks Meeting

There are two items left open at the Dumbarton Oaks meeting on which agreement is necessary between the Governments of the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain before a Conference of the United Nations can be called to draft a Charter of The United Nations Organization. The Government of China will undoubtedly go along with any agreement thus reached. The two items are:

1. Voting procedure in the Security Council
2. Invitations to the Conference and initial membership

The following alternative steps for seeking agreement on these items appear to be open to us:

1. The most promising method of handling the matter would be at a meeting of the three heads of government.

2. If such a meeting cannot be arranged soon, perhaps it would be possible to arrange a meeting of the three Foreign Ministers—preferably in London, but, if necessary, in Moscow. In the event that the Secretary found it impossible to attend, the United States could be represented by the Under Secretary.

3. If the Russians or the British or both object to a formal meeting of Foreign Ministers, the next best thing might be for the Under-secretary to go to London, and then go to Moscow together with Eden or Cadogan.

4. If none of these procedures appears to be feasible, Ambassador Winant and Ambassador Harriman might be instructed to discuss the matter simultaneously in London and Moscow and attempt to reach agreement.

5. Finally—and this would appear to be the least promising alternative—we might attempt to handle the matter by correspondence, starting with a new statement of our position, made in the light of what has transpired since the Dumbarton Oaks meeting and communicated by cable to the other two governments.

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<sup>1</sup> Printed from an unsigned copy typed in the Department of State; authorship not indicated.

UNA Files

*Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State  
(Pasvolsky)*<sup>1</sup>

[MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 15, 1944.

Subject: Questions Left Unsettled at Dumbarton Oaks

Participants: The President  
The Under Secretary  
Mr. Hackworth  
Mr. Pasvolsky

Mr. Stettinius explained to the President that there are six principal questions left unsettled at Dumbarton Oaks which need attention. Two of these questions—voting procedure in the Security Council and initial membership—must be settled between the United States, Soviet Russia and Great Britain before invitations to the Conference can be issued. In connection with both of these questions, it is necessary for us to determine our own position before we begin conversations with the other governments.

*Voting Procedure*

The President thereupon examined the memorandum entitled "Voting Procedure in the Security Council"<sup>2</sup> and said that he had come to the conclusion that it is necessary for us to accept a compromise solution, in view of the fact that it is unlikely that this country, in the final analysis, would agree to our not having a vote in any serious or acute situation in which we may be involved. He examined the formula attached to the memorandum and approved it as the position which should be taken by our government.

*Invitations to the Conference*

The President then read the memorandum entitled "Invitations to the Conference and Initial Membership."<sup>3</sup> He said that in his opinion it was entirely proper that only the signatories to the United Nations Declaration<sup>4</sup> should be invited to the Conference. He therefore thought that we should take all the necessary steps to induce the six so-called "associated" nations in South America to regularize their position by declaring war and thus making themselves eligible to becoming signatories of the United Nations Declaration.

In reply to the Under Secretary's question as to whether or not he remembered ever authorizing or instructing the Department to tell the American Republics that it was not necessary for them to declare

<sup>1</sup> Printed from an unsigned copy typed in the Department of State. See *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation*, pp. 377-378.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 50-51.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 52-53.

<sup>4</sup> For the text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 3, 1942, vol. vi, pp. 3-4; or *Decade*, pp. 2-3.

war, the President said that he had no recollection of ever having done so and that he was sure that, if the question had ever been brought up, he would not have given any such authorization or instruction.

#### *Location*

On the question of the location of the United Nations Organization,<sup>5</sup> the President reiterated his belief that the meetings of the various bodies should be in different parts of the world, although he recognized the need for a center. He again said that the Empire State Building might fill the bill, but that there was no need to press the question now. It can well be handled at the Conference itself.

#### *International Trusteeship*

With respect to arrangements for international trusteeship,<sup>6</sup> the President said that it was his definite desire that the principle of international trusteeship be firmly established and that the international organization should provide adequate machinery for that purpose. He said that the Army and the Navy have been urging upon him the point of view that the United States should take over all or some of the mandated islands in the Pacific, but that he was opposed to such a procedure because it was contrary to the Atlantic Charter. Nor did he think that it was necessary. As far as he could tell, all that we would accomplish by that would be to provide jobs as governors of insignificant islands for inefficient Army and Navy officers or members of the civilian career service. He has discussed the matter of dependent areas with both Churchill and Stalin and expects to discuss it with them further.

He approved the recommendation that the Department of State proceed, in consultation with the military and naval authorities, to a further examination of tentative proposals on the subject of trusteeship. After the studies have been completed, he wants to take up again the question of our transmitting the papers to the British, Soviet and Chinese Governments.

#### *Further Steps*

The President also read the memorandum entitled "Further Steps with Respect to Items Left Open at Dumbarton Oaks Meeting."<sup>7</sup> He said that there is as yet no definite indication as to when a meeting of the three heads of government might take place. He, therefore, approved the suggestion that a message be sent by him to Churchill and Stalin, stating our present point of view on the question of voting.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, p. 53-54.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, p. 54.

<sup>7</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>8</sup> The following words are here stricken out in pencil: "and suggesting that there be arranged as soon as possible a meeting of the three Foreign Ministers to discuss the matter and to agree on further procedures".

500.CC/12-544: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1944.

2784. For the Urgent and Personal Attention of the Ambassador.

1. Please arrange to call in person on Marshal Stalin in order to deliver the following message from the President to him:

"In view of the fact that prospects for an early meeting between us are still unsettled and because of my conviction, with which I am sure you agree, that we must move forward as quickly as possible in the convening of a general conference of the United Nations on the subject of international organization, I am asking Ambassador Harriman to deliver this message to you and to discuss with you on my behalf the important subject of voting procedure in the Security Council. This and other questions will, of course, have to be agreed between us before the general conference will be possible. I am also taking up this matter with Mr. Churchill.

After giving this whole subject further consideration, I now feel that the substance of the following draft provision should be eminently satisfactory to everybody concerned:

PROPOSAL FOR SECTION C OF THE CHAPTER  
ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

C. *Voting*

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A, and under paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

You will note that this calls for the unanimity of the permanent members in all decisions of the Council which relate to a determination of a threat to the peace and to action for the removal of such a threat or for the suppression of aggression or other breaches of the peace. I can see, as a practical matter, that this is necessary if action of this kind is to be feasible, and I am, therefore, prepared to accept in this respect the view expressed by your Government in its memorandum on an international security organization presented at the Dumbarton Oaks meeting. This means, of course, that in decisions of this character each permanent member would always have a vote.

At the same time, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals also provide in Chapter VIII, Section A, for judicial or other procedures of a recommendatory character which the Security Council may employ in promoting voluntary peaceful settlement of disputes. Here, too, I am satisfied that recommendations of the Security Council will carry far greater weight if they are concurred in by the permanent members.

<sup>1</sup> Drafted by Hiss. The message was sent through the White House Map Room to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. Corresponding messages were sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, for transmittal to Prime Minister Churchill, and to Winant at London for background only (500.CC/12-644).

But I am also convinced that such procedures will be effective only if the Great Powers exercise moral leadership by demonstrating their fidelity to the principles of justice, and, therefore, by accepting a provision under which, with regard to such procedures, all parties to a dispute should abstain from voting. I firmly believe that willingness on the part of the permanent members not to claim for themselves a special position in this respect would greatly enhance their moral prestige and would strengthen their own position as the principal guardians of the future peace, without in any way jeopardizing their vital interests or impairing the essential principle that in all decisions of the Council which affect such interests the Great Powers must act unanimously. It would certainly make the whole plan, which must necessarily assign a special position to the Great Powers in the enforcement of peace, far more acceptable to all nations.

Neither the Soviet nor the American memoranda presented at Dumbarton Oaks contained specific provisions for voting procedure on questions of this nature. Our representatives there were not, of course, in a position to reach a definite agreement on the subject. You and I must now find a way of completing the work which they have so well carried forward on our behalf.

If you should be inclined to give favorable consideration to some such approach to the problem of voting in the Council as I now suggest, would you be willing that there be held as soon as possible a meeting of representatives designated by you, by me, and by Mr. Churchill to work out a complete provision on this question and to discuss the arrangements necessary for a prompt convening of a general United Nations conference?"

2. We assume that you will wish to have a careful Russian translation made of the foregoing message so that you can hand to Marshal Stalin both the English and Russian texts of the President's message.

3. The contemplated meeting referred to in the last paragraph of the President's message would be an informal one in which only two or three representatives of each of the three countries would participate. In other words, we do not have in mind anything in the nature of a reconvening of the Dumbarton Oaks conversations. We have no fixed idea at the present time as to just who these representatives would be or as to where they should meet, although perhaps London might prove to be appropriate and convenient.

4. You may wish to present orally, and perhaps in a separate memorandum, additional observations in support of the President's views which necessarily are stated in restricted compass in the message itself. Among the additional considerations which impress us and some or all of which you should feel free to use as you see fit as representing the views of your Government are the following: Unanimity of thought and action on the part of the great powers in all decisions affecting the maintenance of international peace and security is of the greatest importance. With the great powers unanimous in thought and in action and equally and instantly ready to employ measures of enforcement in behalf of peace and security when and as necessary,

there will be the greatest inducement for parties to disputes to arrive at peaceful settlements. Such an atmosphere of harmony among the great powers and general willingness to resort to measures of peaceful settlement should result in conditions of more assured stability in international relations than has ever before obtained in history. These realizable conditions will mean that all states will look first to the major powers themselves to abide by the obligations contained in the charter of the organization to seek peaceful adjustment or settlement of any differences in which they may be concerned. We can conceive of no more effective justification of the special position of the great powers as principal guardians of the peace than the voluntary undertaking by each of them, along with all other members of the organization, to abstain in any controversy in which it may be engaged from voting on procedures which in the eyes of mankind will partake of an impartial examination of the controversy by the highest tribunal of the world society. This should further make evident that the leadership of the great powers is to be based not alone upon size, strength, and resources, but on those enduring qualifications of moral leadership which can raise the whole level of international relations the world over. The assurance and the enhancing of this leadership is in the interest of each of the great powers, as well as of all the world.

5. We have great confidence in your ability to convince Marshal Stalin of the reasonableness of our views which we feel are fully as much in the interests of the Soviet Union as in those of all other states. We do not, of course, feel that we are in any sense asking simply for a yes or no answer, although we would naturally be highly gratified to ascertain that Marshal Stalin agrees with our views. We agree entirely with the view which you emphasized in Washington that, even if you are not entirely successful at this time in persuading the Marshal to adopt as his own the views expressed in the President's message, it is essential to keep the issue open and to avoid any crystallization of a negative attitude on the part of the Soviet Government on this vitally significant matter.

STETTINIUS

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Moscow Embassy Files : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

[Moscow,] December 19, 1944—11 a. m.

4905. The Foreign Office is evidently trying to puzzle out and understand the meaning and implications of the proposals made in the President's cable to Marshal Stalin regarding voting procedure in the World Security Organization, as Bereshkov has informally called up a Secretary of the Embassy several times to ask for advice. (Secret for the Secretary from Harriman) Last night Bereshkov asked

whether there was not some telegraphic mistake in the inclusion of paragraph one of Chapter VIII Section C. I hope we correctly interpreted the reasons for the inclusion of this paragraph by explaining that it related to peaceful settlements of disputes through regional arrangements such as in the American hemisphere. I may be called over to give a more formal explanation and it would be helpful if I could be informed urgently on this point. I am particularly interested to know whether it is essential that the Soviet Government agrees at this time to the inclusion of this paragraph in connection with the proposed voting procedure or whether, if it agrees to the voting procedure in reference to Chapter VIII Section A, consideration of paragraph one of Section C may be left for future determination.

W. A. H[A RRIMAN]

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Moscow Embassy Files : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 19, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received December 20—11:50 a. m.]

2855. Secret for the Ambassador

1. Your interpretation of the reasons for the inclusion of the reference to paragraph one of Section C of Chapter VIII is correct (Reference your 4905 of December 19, 11 a. m.) but covers only one part of the situation. The paragraph under reference envisages the settlement of local disputes by peaceful means under regional arrangements or agencies. It also envisages scrutiny by the Security Council of such arrangements or agencies and their activities for the purpose of determining whether or not they are consistent with the purposes and principles of the organization. Finally, it envisages specific utilization of such arrangements or agencies by the Security Council, in its discretion, for purposes of peaceful settlement. Accordingly, we regard the Security Council's activities under this paragraph as part of the Security Council's general responsibilities for encouraging peaceful settlement specified in detail in Section A of Chapter VIII. It is not of course practicable to foresee at this time the precise procedures which the Security Council will adopt in the discharge of its functions pursuant to the paragraph under reference. We do however anticipate that such functions will in all probability lead in some instances to formal decisions by the Council which will call for a vote of the Council. In view of the fact that these particular functions are basically similar in nature to the functions specified in Section A of Chapter VIII, it seemed to us logical to provide for a similar voting procedure in the two categories of functions.



2. Section C of Chapter VIII was among the last provisions of the proposals to be drafted at Dumbarton Oaks. It had not been drafted at the time the voting procedure of the Council received intensive consideration and there was in fact no discussion at Dumbarton Oaks of the procedures which the Council might follow in acting under that Section. Consequently we assume that the Soviet officials who are familiar with the Dumbarton Oaks conversations may not have heretofore considered this question and so may have experienced some surprise at noting the President's specific proposal in this respect.

3. For the reasons given in paragraph one above we consider that paragraph one of Section C is so closely related to Section A that the same voting procedure should naturally be followed with respect to cases arising under both sets of provisions. However the clearcut and important issue at this time is the one of principle, namely, that a distinction should be drawn between the peaceful settlement functions of the Council on the one hand and its enforcement functions on the other hand. It seems to us evident that if this issue is resolved in the way in which the President has proposed it will follow as a matter of course that the President's specific proposal as to paragraph 1 of Section C of Chapter VIII will also in due course be adopted. Consequently you should, if you consider it would be helpful, feel free to state to the Soviet officials that in view of the fact that the President's suggestion as to paragraph 1 of Section C is a novel matter from their point of view and relates only to a subsidiary aspect of the voting question, we should be glad to have consideration on that part of the President's suggestion left for future determination if they so desire.

4. The President and I are most anxious for this matter to be settled as rapidly as possible for reasons of which you are of course, aware. We have not yet heard from the British but are urging them to come to a decision as soon as possible. We are confident that you will make every effort which you consider appropriate to bring this to a successful conclusion.

STETTINIUS

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UNA Files

*The Secretary of State to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Pasvolsky)*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] December 22, 1944.

Subject: Voting in the Security Council

I reported orally to the President on the latest developments on this matter and indicated to him that we were doing what we could

<sup>1</sup> Carbon copy.

to press the Russians and British for an early decision. I told him that if we received "yes" that we hoped to send out invitations for a March meeting. He felt that would be entirely appropriate.

He indicated some displeasure at the fact that things were moving so slowly in this field.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

cc: Mr. Edwin Wilson  
Mr. Alger Hiss

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Roosevelt Papers

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt*

TOP SECRET

DECEMBER 27, 1944.

For the President from Stalin. On December 14 I have received from Mr. Harriman your message.<sup>1</sup> I fully share your opinion that prior to convocation of a general conference of the United Nations on the question of establishment of an international organization we should agree upon the principal questions not agreed upon in the course of the Dumbarton Oaks conversations and, in the first place, on the question of procedure of voting in the Security Council. I have to remind you that in the original American draft was specially marked the necessity to work out special rules in regard to the procedure of voting in case of a dispute which involves directly one or several permanent members of the Council. In the British draft it was also stated that the general order of settlement of disputes between Great Powers, should such disputes arise, may prove unfit.

In this connection the first and second points of your proposal meet with no objections and can be accepted, bearing in mind that point two deals with procedure questions mentioned in Chapter 6 Sub-division D.

As regards point three of your proposal I have, to my regret, to inform you that with the proposed by you wording of this point I see no possibility of agreeing. As you yourself admit the principle of unanimity of permanent members is necessary in all decisions of the Council in regard to determination of a threat to peace as well as in respect to measures of elimination of such a threat or for suppression of aggression or other violations of peace. Undoubtedly, that when decisions on questions of such a nature are made there must be full agreement of powers which are permanent members of the Council bearing upon themselves the main responsibility for maintenance of peace and security.

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, pp. 58-59. On December 26 Harriman had discussed with Molotov the President's proposal to Stalin regarding voting procedure in the Security Council and had informed Stettinius that Stalin would reply direct to the President on this subject (500.CC/12-2644).

It goes without saying that the attempt to prevent, on a certain stage, one or several permanent members of the Council from participating in voting on said questions, and theoretically it is possible to assume also a case when the majority of permanent members will find themselves prevented from participation in making decisions on a question, can have fatal consequences for the cause of preservation of international security. Such a situation is in contradiction with the principle of agreement and unanimity of decisions of the four leading powers and can lead to a situation when some great powers are put in opposition to other great powers and this may undermine the cause of universal security. In prevention of this small countries are interested not less than great powers since a split among great powers, united for tasks of maintenance of peace and security for all peace loving countries is pregnant with the most dangerous consequences for all these nations.

Therefore I have to insist on our former position on the question of voting in the Security Council. This position, as it seems to me, will provide the new international organization with the unanimity of four powers, contributing to avoiding of attempts to put certain powers in opposition to other great powers which (unanimity) is necessary for their joint fight against aggression in the future. Naturally, such a situation would secure the interests of small nations in the cause of preservation of their security and would correspond to the interests of universal peace.

I hope that you will estimate the importance of the above stated views in favor of the principle of unanimity of decisions of the four leading powers and that we shall find an agreed upon decision of this question as well as certain other questions which remain still unsolved. On the basis of such an agreed upon decision our representatives could work out a full draft on this question and discuss the measures necessary for an early convocation of a general conference of the United Nations.

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500.CC/12-2844 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

Moscow, December 28, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received December 29—8:15 p. m.]

5043. With the thought that it might be of some use in connection with future discussions with the Russians on the voting procedure of the international security organization, I will give below my present impressions of why the Soviets are insisting on their right to veto consideration by the council of all matters, even peaceful procedures. (ReEmbs 5012 December 26, midnight).<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

One. On analyzing reactions of the Soviets, one must bear in mind that since the revolution the nations of the world have been hostile to or suspicious of them and their objectives. Although the Russians realize that they are now accepted as a powerful world power, they are still suspicious of the underlying attitude of most of the nations toward them.

Thus they lack confidence that the members of the council would be impartial in dealing with disputes in which the Soviet Government might be involved.

Two. The Soviets have definite objectives in their future foreign policy, all of which we do not as yet fully understand. For example, while they have recognized the right of the states bordering the Soviet Union to have their independence, they insist upon "friendly" governments. From Soviet actions so far, the terms "friendly" and "independent" appear to mean something quite different from our interpretation. It is interesting to note that in Iran they appear to justify their recent actions by explaining that they know better what the Iranian people want than the Iranian Government, which does not represent the majority of Iranian opinion. Any political figure, in Iran and elsewhere, who disagrees with Soviet policies is conveniently branded as a "Fascist". The same sort of thing can be said about the Polish situation. It would seem probable that the Russians are as conscious as we are of the difference of interpretation of terms and of concepts. They thus probably come to the conclusion that if their actions are subjected to scrutiny by the representatives of nations with different concepts, their actions and objectives will in all probability be condemned and they will therefore be subjected to public criticism supported by the world's highest authority.

Three. It would appear that they look upon the international security organization as a method by which the Soviet Union can be protected against aggressor nations, but it seems doubtful whether they believe that it can be useful to them in settling disputes between them and other countries through mediatory or judicial processes. The court, they believe, is packed against them. They appear, therefore, to be insisting upon the right of unilateral action in settling disputes of this character.

Four. I fear that we are faced with a very fundamental question of what the effect on the international security organization will be with most of the nations looking to it to develop mediatory or judicial procedures in the advancement of international relations, whereas the Soviet Union appears to view it from a much narrower perspective.

Thus, I believe, the Soviets have made up their minds in regard to their position on voting procedure and the only possibility of getting them to change their position would be if we and the British were prepared to take a firm and definite stand, supported by widespread

reluctance on the part of the smaller nations to join the organization on the Soviet conditions. It would seem that we should face realistically the far-reaching implications of the Soviet position and adjust our policies accordingly.<sup>2</sup>

HARRIMAN

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<sup>2</sup> A copy of this telegram was sent to the President on January 2, 1945, under cover of a memorandum from Stettinius, stressing Harriman's conclusion that "a very firm stand" may have to be taken (500.CC/1-245).

EUR Files

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*Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State  
(Pasvolsky) <sup>1</sup>*

[MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 8, 1945.

Subject: Voting Formula for Security Council

Participants: The President  
The Secretary of State  
Mr. Dunn  
Mr. Pasvolsky  
Mr. Bohlen

Copies to: S, U, A-D, SPA, Mr. Bohlen

At the meeting today in the White House, the Secretary emphasized to the President the urgent need for reaching agreement on the voting formula at the forthcoming meeting with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin. Otherwise, the United Nations conference might be delayed for a long time to come, with resultant slackening of interest and possible growth of opposition.

The President said that he was determined to go forward vigorously and to press for a decision. He said that he was clear in his mind as to how he would handle the matter of initial membership for the Soviet Republics, but that he was puzzled as to how to approach the matter of voting procedure. He said that he was still worried as to what the situation would be if a controversy arose between, say, the United States and Mexico, and the matter was taken up by the Security Council without the United States having a vote in whatever decisions might be taken. He inquired whether, in view of the fact that Marshal Stalin has turned down the formula which we have proposed to him, we have succeeded in finding another formula.

In a reply to the President's question, Mr. Pasvolsky said that in studying the question we have listed the substantive decisions on which the Council would have to vote. They fall into seven categories. In six of these categories the rule of unanimity of the permanent mem-

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<sup>1</sup> See *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation*, p. 384.

bers would, under our proposed formula, prevail throughout. Only in the category of decisions relating to peaceful settlement of disputes would there be an exception to the effect that a permanent member, when a party to a dispute, would not cast its vote. In this manner no member of the organization would be above the law in any quasi-judicial procedures employed by the Council, while, at the same time, the special position of the permanent members would be amply safeguarded in all political decisions calling for action by the Council.

Our discussions with Congressional leaders, with many individuals and groups throughout the country and with representatives of the American Republics and of other United Nations have convinced us that the unanimity rule needs to be modified at least to this extent. Otherwise, we run the risk at home of alienating some of our supporters and of providing powerful ammunition for the opponents of international organization, as well as of getting into trouble with the Latin American countries and the other United Nations.

As regards the possibility of a dispute between us and Mexico coming before the Council, we would abstain from casting our vote only in such decisions as might be involved in the investigation of the dispute, in calling upon the parties to settle it peacefully, and in making recommendations as regards methods and procedures of settlement. No decision for action could be made without our affirmative vote.

The President inquired as to what would happen if there developed a dispute between us and Mexico over oil. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that the Council would presumably go through the conciliation and peaceful settlement procedures without the benefit of our vote, but would not be able to take any substantive action without our consent. He recalled the manner in which an oil dispute between Great Britain and Persia was handled by the Council of the League of Nations.

Reverting to Soviet Russia's position, Mr. Pasvolsky said that in our opinion her case against the formula is extremely weak. Under the formula, she would have veto power—just as would we and each of the other permanent members—in the following decisions of the Council:

1. Admission, suspension and expulsion of members;
2. Determination of the existence of a threat to the peace or of a breach of the peace;
3. Use of force or the application of other measures of enforcement;
4. Approval of agreements for the provision of armed forces;
5. All matters relating to the regulation of armaments;
6. Determination of whether a regional arrangement is consistent with the purposes and principles of the general organization.

We are, therefore, not really asking much of Soviet Russia, from the point of view of her interests and desires, when we propose that the permanent members abstain from voting in the Council's decisions

on peaceful settlement of disputes to which they happen to be parties.

The President then said that he was satisfied that something like our formula was necessary, and that he would make every effort to convince the Russians that it was essential from the point of view of our position. He said that he thought he knew Molotov well enough to speak plainly to him, and was sure that he could work out with him a satisfactory solution to take care of our situation.

Mr. Dunn called the President's attention to the fact that the Russians might be more receptive to our ideas because of what has just happened on the Polish question, on which there is a split among the great powers. The President agreed that the provision of opportunity through constant contact in the new organization to prevent such an occurrence might emphasize to the Russians the need for an international organization.

He also agreed that our proposed formula should take care not only of our position, but of the Soviet position as well, since, as was recalled to him, the original Soviet document called for the unanimity rule only on the kind of questions for which that rule is now proposed in our formula.

The President directed that there be prepared for him a memorandum embodying the main ideas brought out in the discussion, and that some emphasis be put on the reasons why the Latin American countries are objecting to the straight unanimity rule.

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500.CC/1-1145

*Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State  
(Pasvolsky)*

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 11, 1945.

Subject: Conversation with the Soviet Ambassador on the Dumbarton Oaks Document

Participants: Ambassador Gromyko  
Mr. Pasvolsky

Copies to: S, U, A-D, Le, SPA, Mr. Bohlen

Today I had a long talk with the Ambassador which grew out of a conversation we had on New Year's Day at Blair House. The discussion centered primarily around the question of voting procedure in the Council.

The Ambassador said that, as he saw it, the President's proposal to Marshal Stalin represented no change in our position as compared with what had taken place at Dumbarton Oaks and that, as Marshal Stalin indicated in his reply, the Soviet position on this subject remains unchanged. He explained again at great length that what

they are primarily interested in is to avoid even an appearance of disagreement between the great powers, because the whole process of maintaining peace and security must rest upon continuing and unimpaired unity of these powers. He felt that a rift among the great powers might develop from a situation before the Security Council in which, even under the functions of the Council with respect to peaceful settlement of a dispute, one or more of the great powers would be prevented from full participation because it happened to be involved.

I said that from our point of view the President's formula represents a substantial modification of the position which we took at Dumbarton Oaks. While it is true that the President's formula is very similar to the formula which was tentatively worked out at Dumbarton Oaks, the latter formula did not represent an accepted position on our part. The whole idea of differentiating between various categories of voting procedure as regards unanimity of the great powers did not become our accepted position until the President put his proposal before Marshal Stalin.

I said that we have now accepted the proposition that, as a practical matter, it is necessary that the unanimity of the great powers in voting be maintained whenever the Council deals with matters of action. But it is clear to us that the whole organization would be much stronger if the great powers agreed to put themselves on exactly the same footing as all other member states as regards decisions involved in peaceful settlement of disputes. This, I pointed out, relates only to the Council's decisions to investigate a situation or dispute and to determine whether or not its continuation is likely to lead to a threat to the peace, whether or not to call upon the parties to a dispute to settle their differences by peaceful means of their own choice, and whether or not to make a recommendation to the parties. The rule of unanimity, I made clear, would be maintained as regards decisions relating to admission, suspension and expulsion of members; restoration of privileges of suspended members; determination of a threat to the peace or breaches of the peace; the taking of measures to maintain or restore the peace; approval of special agreements for the provision of armed forces and all matters relating to regulation of armaments.

I summarized for the Ambassador the results of our discussions with numerous individuals and groups in this country and with representatives of other United Nations. I said that in all of these discussions the question of voting inevitably came up. As a result we have become even more convinced than we were at the time of the Dumbarton Oaks discussions that in order to obtain whole-hearted support for the projected organization, both in our country and in the smaller United Nations, it is necessary for the great powers to accept at least this much of a modification in the otherwise general unanimity rule.



The Ambassador repeated the arguments which he has so often given us: that what the small countries are primarily interested in is peace; that peace is unobtainable unless unity prevails among the great powers; and that unity among great powers will inevitably be impaired if the unanimity rule is not maintained throughout in the voting procedures of the Security Council. He said that the difference between our two positions, as he saw it, lay in the fact that we are trying to draw a line between the various functions of the Council for the purpose of applying different voting procedures, whereas their position is that no distinction whatever should be made between the functions. After all, he said, the very first decision to be made by the Council—i. e. whether a particular situation or dispute is of such a nature that its continuation may result in a threat to the peace—is of such great importance that, if there is a cleavage of opinion on that question between the great powers, the whole condition of unity among them will be impaired. He thought that we were emphasizing too much moral, juridical, and organizational issues, and paying too little attention to the political side of the question.

I replied that we were, of course, immensely interested in the moral and juridical aspects of the problem, but that we, no less than they, were fully conscious of the political side of the question. We want the organization to succeed. It is clear to us that the organization will succeed only if the great powers have confidence in each other and act in unity. But it is equally clear that it is also essential to the success of the organization that the smaller powers have confidence in the great powers. These are basic political issues, and the real question is whether confidence will be better promoted by: (a) insistence on the part of the great powers that they must retain a veto privilege throughout in any disputes in which they themselves might be involved; or (b) a system under which they would be willing to place themselves, at least as regards judicial or quasi-judicial procedures, on an equal footing with the others. I said that it is difficult for us to see how the appearance of unity would help its substance, or how even the appearance of unity could be guaranteed. After all, even if we adopt the unanimity rule throughout, that would merely mean that no decision would be valid without the concurring votes of all of the permanent members. But there is no device by which the fact of voting or the fact of disagreement in voting could be prevented. We may, therefore, easily run into a situation in which there would be a series of votes on which the great powers would be divided. Obviously, when a question is raised before the Council, a discussion needs to take place and even if the discussion does not result in a vote, the representatives of the great powers might easily take opposite views. And then when some nation asks for a vote, there would have to be a decision as to whether or not to take a vote. Perhaps the only way in which all this

could be avoided would be if the President of the Council were to permit no discussion to take place and to permit no vote to be taken unless he himself were convinced that there will be no disagreement among the great powers in the discussion and no chance of a vote not being unanimous. I said I was sure that this would be putting much too much power in the hands of the President of the Council, and that neither his country nor mine would agree to any such procedure.

From the point of view of maintaining the unity of the great powers, what is really important is that they should take every care not to bring to a vote any questions on which they are really divided, but to try to adjust and harmonize their differences by discussion both inside and outside the Council.

The Ambassador said that he agreed, of course, that no such powers as I described could or should be put in the hands of the President of the Council. On the other hand, he cannot escape the fear that, if we are all to acquiesce in what he considers as "unrealistic" demands of the small powers (i. e. the great powers should abstain from voting in matters which concern them) that would be tantamount to admission that no trust can be put in the declarations and intentions of the great powers. This would merely emphasize suspicions and might discredit the whole idea on which the proposed organization rests.

I replied by saying that we have to consider seriously whether more suspicions will be created by that procedure or by one under which the great powers insist on putting themselves in a position in which none of their acts could be questioned and in which each of them, when involved in a dispute, could put a stop to any public discussion of the matter, thus giving the impression that it was really afraid to face the bar of public opinion. I said that as far as we are concerned, we are impressed not only by the position taken by the smaller countries but also by the fact that in our own country there are large groups of people who find a cause for apprehension in the possibility of the acceptance of a straight unanimity rule. For these reasons, we have come to the conclusion that the strength and effectiveness of the organization, from the point of view of the great powers themselves, would be enhanced rather than diminished by our type of formula.

The Ambassador then said that an idea occurred to him as a result of our discussion which he would like to express personally rather than in any official capacity. That idea was that perhaps a distinction could be drawn between discussions in the Council and formal action involved in voting, and that, perhaps, the situation could be taken care of by some provision under which any matter, whether or not it involves the great powers, could be freely discussed in the Council, while still providing that no decisions of the Council would be valid without the unanimous vote of the great powers.

I said that this was an extremely interesting idea, but that if we go as far as that, why not go one step further and combine it with the kind of voting rule that we proposed. I again emphasized the point that there is no way to prevent, even under their formula, the registering of a disagreement among the great powers, whereas our formula would have a great psychological and, therefore, political importance and would certainly make for better relations and greater confidence. He said that, while he still thought that we are exaggerating this point, the point itself had not occurred to him before and he would like to give it further consideration.

As I had promised him at our earlier meeting, I gave the Ambassador a copy of our translation of excerpts from the Mexican memorandum and a summary of the principal points which had emerged in our discussions with the other American Republics. He was greatly interested in the two documents<sup>1</sup> and asked me if it would be possible for him to have the full English text of the Mexican memorandum and also the full texts of such other memoranda as we felt we could properly place at his disposal. I promised to look into the possibility of our doing so.

He then went on to suggest that it would be a very useful thing for us to exchange such comments as might come our way in order to keep each other better prepared for the eventual conference. We are doing that sort of thing in connection with peace feelers, and this is a comparable case. I said that I was sure that it would be a useful procedure and we ought to talk about it at greater length on another occasion. I said we might also think about the advisability of setting up some informal machinery for that purpose. Such machinery might well be in the form of some sort of preliminary preparatory group for the conference. He was very much interested in the idea, and we agreed that the question might be taken up again after the meeting of the Big Three and after we know more definitely as to when the conference will take place.

He asked me whether we have given any further thought to the question of the representation of the sixteen Soviet Republics. Most of them, he said, are much more important than, say, Liberia or Guatemala. They have their own constitutions and deal independently with their own foreign affairs. I asked him whether he really thought that they are independent countries as we commonly understand the term. He said that, of course, they are, even though they are also very intimately connected as members of a federation. I said that that was obviously a question which would have to be discussed

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed. Regarding discussions with the American Republics, see *Post-war Foreign Policy Preparation*, pp. 399-401. The second document is a two-page memorandum dated January 5, 1945, and entitled "Summary of Principal Comments and Suggestions So Far Made by the Latin American Governments with Respect to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals" (copy in UNA Files).

at the meeting of the Big Three. He readily agreed, but repeated that from their point of view it was an extremely important matter.

He then went back to the question of voting, which was apparently very much on his mind. He asked whether we had heard from the British and recalled that at Dumbarton Oaks Cadogan personally favored the compromise. I said that we had not heard from the British, whereupon he said, smilingly, that perhaps the British will find a way out for us.

The conversation was in Russian throughout and was extremely friendly. As we were saying good-bye, he remarked that he was very grateful, because, although, in large measure, we went over old ground, there were many new aspects brought out which were extremely suggestive. He asked whether I would be willing to have another talk, if any new thoughts occurred to him. I said I should, of course, be delighted.

L[EO] P[ASVOLSKY]

UNA Files

*Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State  
(Pasvolsky)*<sup>1</sup>

#### MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 13, 1945.

Subject: Second Conversation with the Soviet Ambassador on the Dumbarton Oaks Documents

Participants: Ambassador Gromyko  
Mr. Pasvolsky

Copies to: S, U, A-D, Le, SPA, Mr. Bohlen

At the Ambassador's request, we met again today to continue the conversation which took place on January 11.<sup>2</sup> Our meeting lasted over two and one-half hours, and the conversation ranged over a large variety of subjects related to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

The Ambassador opened the conversation by saying that he had given a great deal of thought to the points brought out in our previous discussion and had re-read the President's proposal. He was puzzled by the reference to Chapter VIII, Section C, paragraph 1, and proceeded to read that paragraph from the Russian text of the Dumbarton Oaks documents which he had in his hands. I told him that what we had in mind was the question of whether or not the Council should encourage a regional group or agency to undertake peaceful settlement of a local or regional dispute. He thought that was logical in terms of our general formula.

<sup>1</sup> Carbon copy.

<sup>2</sup> See *supra*.

He said that he was anxious to have another talk because, in view of his imminent departure for Moscow, it had occurred to him that this would be a good opportunity to clarify his mind on a number of points.

There ensued another long discussion of the voting formula, which did not, however, bring out any new points. His evident purpose was to fix clearly in his mind our arguments in favor of the formula.

He then asked me if I would be willing to go over with him the other open items, and proceeded to enumerate them as they occurred to him:

1. The International Court of Justice
2. Dependent areas and international trusteeships
3. Liquidation of the League of Nations
4. Initial membership

With regard to the Court, he said that he considered the matter settled in substance and that agreement on details should not be difficult to reach. The whole subject is being studied in Moscow on the basis of our documents which were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks.

The discussion of the dependent areas matter was rather lengthy. He said that he had been very much interested in the few informal conversations we had on this subject at Dumbarton Oaks, but had never had the opportunity to make a more systematic examination of the subject. He mentioned the memorandum which Secretary Hull had presented at the Moscow Conference<sup>3</sup> and (as Sobolev had told me in September) said that the Soviet Government was very favorably impressed by it. He repeated the statement made by Sobolev that, while the Soviet Government has neither colonies nor experience in colonial administration, it is greatly interested in the subject. He asked me if I would care to outline for him the principal problems in this field as we see them.

I summarized for him the various alternative approaches to such problems as the distinction between trust and colonial areas; the possible declaration of general principles applicable to both; the machinery of international trusteeship for detached areas; the possibilities and structure of regional commissions for colonial areas; the question of international accountability; and the relation between the international organization and the possible regional commissions. I said that our basic thought runs generally in terms of the ideas expressed in Secretary Hull's memorandum, and that we consider our treatment of the Philippines as a desirable type of attitude toward dependent areas.

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<sup>3</sup> For the text of this draft, entitled "Declaration by the United Nations on National Independence" and dated March 9, 1943, see *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation*, pp. 470-472. See also *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York, 1948), vol. II, pp. 1304-1305.

In reply to his question as to whether all of these problems would have to be discussed at the United Nations Conference, I said that only questions relating to international trusteeship properly belong on the agenda of the conference. Colonial problems as such might be touched upon, but probably ought to be taken up in earnest at some special conference or by some other means.

He inquired whether such a discussion of colonial problems would involve only the colonial powers or also the other important powers. Might it not even be appropriate, he asked, that such a discussion be arranged by the future international organization, since the problems raised might well come within the scope of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council? I said that any one of these procedures was possible.

He then said that he was certain that some trusteeship arrangements for detached areas must be provided for in the Charter, and that the matter really ought to be of direct concern to his Government. After all, he pointed out, as a country at war with Italy, the Soviet Union will have to assume responsibilities with regard to Italian colonies, and it may well have to assume responsibilities with regard to territories detached from Japan.

His next question related to the position of Great Britain and of other countries on this subject. I said that we have a tentative arrangement with the British to exchange documents relating to this question, and it is our intention to make our documents available to the Russians. I said I was sure that the British intended to proceed similarly. I recalled the fact that there are very interesting passages on this subject in the Chinese memorandum.<sup>4</sup> He said that they had found the ideas of the Chinese very interesting and would be very glad to study whatever documents we might give them.

We readily agreed that the initiative on the question of the liquidation of the League of Nations should be taken by the members of the League.

On the subject of initial membership, he repeated that the Soviet Government still wishes the Soviet Republics to be included while it wishes the associated nations, as well as the neutrals, to be excluded. I made no attempt to argue the point, saying merely that we have had no new thoughts on either the Soviet Republics or the associated nations.

He then raised the question of the seat of the organization. We talked briefly about the Pays de Gex idea, which he had heard about and found quite interesting, except that a part of the territory would be Swiss. He characterized Switzerland rather contemptuously as

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<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

a neutral, and not a good neutral at that, and hence ineligible. I asked him what ideas he had, and he said he had none. The subject was not pursued further, except that we explored jokingly the possibility of placing the organization in the Caucasus.

After that he turned to the summary of views expressed by certain Latin American governments<sup>5</sup> which I had given him. He said that he had studied it carefully and thought that there should be little difficulty in accepting some of the suggestions. For example, the ideas of political independence, of territorial integrity (with proper provision for possible adjustments), of peaceful change, of revision of treaties, and of promotion of international law could all be worked into the document. He agreed that many of them could be embodied in the preamble.

He said, however, that he was somewhat perturbed by the various suggestions for strengthening the Assembly and the Court at the expense of the Council, since such changes would completely alter the character of our proposals. I agreed. I also agreed that it would be impracticable to make the decisions of the Court enforceable by the Council because the Council would, for one thing, deal only with peace and security, whereas the Court might render decisions on a large variety of subjects. In answer to his inquiry, I explained to him the meaning of compulsory jurisdiction, which he had misunderstood completely.

When he came to the statement that the Latin American countries are against voting by the permanent members on disputes in which they are involved, he again plunged into the subject of how "unrealistic" the smaller countries are in making that demand. I said that we must expect all of the countries at the Conference to urge many ideas of the kind that have emerged in our discussions with the Latin American countries, but that it seems to us that the advocacy of most of them would be greatly weakened by the acceptance of our voting formula. He said he would like to think about that possibility, and then asked if it would be possible for me to give him our analysis of the functions of the Council from the point of view of the voting procedure proposed in the President's formula. I said that I would be glad to put down on paper the points in this respect which I brought out in the discussion.

In conclusion, he again said that our two conversations had been both interesting and useful to him and would certainly be helpful in making his report to his Government. I responded in kind, and we parted on a very friendly note.

LEO PASVOLSKY

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<sup>5</sup> Not printed. See *ante*, p. 72, footnote 1.

500.CC/1-1445

*The Acting Counsellor of the British Embassy (Wright) to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Pasvolsky)*

[WASHINGTON,] 14th January, 1945.

DEAR LEO: In confirmation of my telephone message of yesterday, I am writing, on the Ambassador's instructions, to inform you that His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept the President's proposed compromise on voting on the Security Council of the World Organization.

His Majesty's Government are still not entirely clear as to the precise effect of the application to paragraph 1 Chapter 8, Section C of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals of the rule that parties to a dispute should not vote, but they do not anticipate any difficulty on this score.

The Foreign Office ask us to recall to you that the question of voting is not the only one that remains to be settled before a United Nations Conference could be called, and that all difficulties will not probably have been got out of the way before the next Three Power meeting. This must unfortunately militate against going ahead too precipitately. The Foreign Office also recall that the idea was that the invitation to the Conference should be sent out in the names of the Three (or Four) Powers. Consultation between us would consequently be required before the invitation actually issues.

Yours sincerely,

MICHAEL WRIGHT <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> By memorandum dated January 17, 1945, Stettinius informed Roosevelt of British acceptance of the proposed voting formula (500.CC/1-1445).

UNA Files

*Draft Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President* <sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] January 20, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: International Security Organization

Ambassador Gromyko recently asked Dr. Pasvolsky to have two long talks with him on the International Organization problem.<sup>2</sup> In the conversations the Ambassador asked many questions on the voting issue and seemed to be trying to get into his mind our arguments in favor of the formula which you proposed to Marshal Stalin. Dr. Pasvolsky gained the distinct impression that the Ambassador's mind was not closed on this subject and that he was quite anxious to be in a position to present the matter fully to his government.

<sup>1</sup> This copy of a memorandum which had been drafted by G. Hayden Raynor, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, bears a typewritten notation "Approved by Pasvolsky and Hiss in draft form" and a penciled endorsement: "Hiss note: not sent but taken on the trip".

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, pp. 68-76.



As many of the statements made by the Ambassador were entirely personal ones, we cannot, of course, refer to this discussion in other conversations as to do so might injure the Ambassador but it is most interesting to know that at least the Ambassador, personally, seems to have a very great interest in the subject. For instance, the Ambassador indicated that personally the idea had occurred to him that perhaps a distinction can be drawn between discussions in the Council and formal actions involving voting. This, obviously, is not enough but it is a move in the right direction.

The Ambassador again evidenced keen interest in the subject of international trusteeships. He also reiterated the importance which his Government attaches to the admission as initial members of their republics and the exclusion of the Associated nations and the neutrals. cc to Bohlen and Grew

EUR Files

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*The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 23, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Here is the list of points I tried to make at our meeting yesterday:

*First*

1. The Moscow Conference of November 1, 1943,<sup>1</sup> contemplated two organizations:

a. "A General International Organization based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states and open to membership by all such states, large and small" etc.

b. An interim consultative organization of the four large powers for "maintaining international peace and security pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security".<sup>2</sup>

2. This recognized the self-evident fact that these large powers who have won the war for law and justice will be obliged to maintain the security of the world which they have saved during the time necessary to establish a permanent organization of the whole world, and for that purpose they will have to consult and decide on many questions necessary to the security of the world and primarily their own safety in establishing that security. I have always thought that this interim organization should be formal, subject to rules of consultation similar to Article XI of the old League, and actively at work until the world had gotten stabilized enough to establish and turn loose the large world organization which includes the small nations.

<sup>1</sup> The Conference of Foreign Ministers Hull, Eden, and Molotov at Moscow, October 19-30, 1943.

<sup>2</sup> See the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security signed at Moscow October 30, 1943, Department of State *Bulletin*, November 6, 1943, vol. ix, pp. 308-309; or *Decade*, pp. 11-12.

3. The job of the four big nations is principally to establish a guarantee of peace in the atmosphere of which the world organization can be set going.

This will necessarily include the settlement of all territorial acquisitions in the shape of defense posts which each of these four powers may deem to be necessary for their own safety in carrying out such a guarantee of world peace.

4. For substantially this purpose, at the end of the last war President Wilson proposed a joint covenant of guarantee by Britain and America of the security of France as the pillar of western Europe. But the mistake was made of not securing that guarantee before the second step of creating the League of Nations whose safety was in large part to be dependent upon such a guarantee. As a result the League of Nations lacked a foundation of security which ultimately proved fatal to it.

5. I think we are in danger of making a similar mistake by attempting to formulate the Dumbarton organization before we have discussed and ironed out the realities which may exist to enable the four powers to carry out their mission, and I was much interested to read Senator Vandenberg's recent speech in which he took practically the same ground.

6. Any attempt to finally organize a Dumbarton organization will necessarily take place in an atmosphere of unreality until these preliminary foundations are established. The attitude of the numerous minor nations who have no real responsibility but plenty of vocal power and logical arguments will necessarily be different from that of the large powers who have to furnish the real security.

### *Second*

1. An example of one of these difficulties has already appeared in the problem of the mandated islands. You are proposing to include them under your future principles of "trusteeship" or "mandates". They do not really belong in such a classification. Acquisition of them by the United States does not represent an attempt at colonization or exploitation. Instead it is merely the acquisition by the United States of the necessary bases for the defense of the security of the Pacific for the future world. To serve such a purpose they must belong to the United States with absolute power to rule and fortify them. They are not colonies; they are outposts, and their acquisition is appropriate under the general doctrine of self-defense by the power which guarantees the safety of that area of the world.

2. For that reason you will get into needless mazes if you try to set up a form of trusteeship which will include them before the necessity of their acquisition by the United States is established and recognized.

3. They are of an entirely different nature from the German colonies in various parts of the world, quite unessential to the defense of any protecting power, to which was applied the doctrine of mandates under the League of Nations formula.

*Third*

1. You will find the same clash of fundamental ideas and interests with Russia in regard to certain more difficult problems. She will claim that, in the light of her bitter experience with Germany, her own self-defense as a guarantor of the peace of the world will depend on relations with buffer countries like Poland, Bulgaria, and Rumania, which will be quite different from complete independence on the part of those countries.

2. It is my suggestion that such fundamental problems should be at least discussed and if possible an understanding reached between the big guarantor nations before you endeavor to set up principles in a world organization which may clash with realities.

For all these reasons I think we should not put the cart before the horse. We should by thorough discussion between the three or four great powers endeavor to settle, so far as we can, an accord upon the general area of these fundamental problems. We should endeavor to secure a covenant of guarantee of peace or at least an understanding of the conditions upon which such a general undertaking of mutual guarantee could be based.

If there is a general understanding reached among the larger powers I do not fear any lack of enthusiasm on the part of the lesser fry to follow through with the world organization whenever a general meeting may be called.

The foregoing constitutes a consideration which I believe to be fundamental yet it is no more than the common prudence one would exercise in preparing for the success of any general assembly or meeting in business or political life.

There is another point, however, which relates to the advisability of raising any territorial questions at all during the course of the war or, at least, until after the Russians have clearly committed themselves to their participation in the Pacific war. Any discussions of territorial matters, whether they be in the nature of security acquisitions, trusteeships or outright territorial adjustments, are almost certain to induce controversies which put at risk a united and vigorous prosecution of the war itself. The introduction of these subjects into any general meeting would be most inadvisable, almost certainly provoke a welter of opinion and great jockeying for position. In my judgment it is fanciful to suppose that the subject of "trusteeships" could be introduced with a limitation of the discussion to the mere form of the trust organization. No such discussion could usefully proceed without a consideration of the nature of the specific areas to

be trusted. Immediately the subject is introduced, the various powers would certainly consider the subject in the light of how it would affect the areas in which they are interested or which they covet.

I feel that for us to raise the subject, on the proviso that no areas in the Pacific in which we are interested could be discussed is even more unwise. This would immediately provoke a sense of distrust and discrimination among the other parties to the discussion which would both call marked attention to our aims and poison the general atmosphere of the discussion.

It is my conclusion, therefore, that we should not bring up the subject of territorial adjustments, including "trusteeships" for discussion in any form, at least until the war is much further along and Russian participation in the Pacific war is accomplished. We should also make a determined effort to avoid a discussion of the subject. I realize that some discussion of territorial matters may be inevitable but we should not bring it up and we should avoid it if we can. The subject of "trusteeships" could certainly be avoided until a more suitable time, on the very sound ground that no satisfactory discussion can possibly take place without full knowledge of the types and character of the territories to be dealt with.

HENRY L. STIMSON

UNA Files

*The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Pasvolksy) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] January 23, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Subject: Recommended Action on Points Which Must Be Decided at The Three-Power Meeting

1. *Text of the voting provisions:* Adoption of the President's formula with slight modification as to Chapter VIII, Section C. (Text attached)<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Carbon copy. This memorandum and its attachments are all attachments to the memorandum of Pasvolksy dated January 23, 1945, on the subject of the "Emergency High Commission for Liberated Europe", *post*, p. 101. This memorandum and the attached paper entitled "International Trusteeship" were published in *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation*, pp. 661-663.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This attachment is an intermediate draft between the Briefing Book paper of January 15, 1945, printed *post*, pp. 89-90, and the undated United States Delegation memorandum printed *post*, pp. 648-686. It comprises that portion of the text of the United States Delegation memorandum beginning with the heading and ending with the words "Under the above formula"; and it continues from that point with the text of the Briefing Book paper after the opening phrase of that paper, "Under the voting formula proposed by the President". A penciled endorsement on the attachment, in the handwriting of Alger Hiss, reads, "As given to Brit & Sov. Amb. about Jan. 15 (redrafted order of presentation under II in Marrakech)". The redraft here referred to is presumably the undated United States Delegation memorandum above mentioned.

2. *International Trusteeships*: Decision that provisions for the establishment of trusteeship machinery within the framework of the proposed organization will be included in the Charter and that the sponsoring Governments will consult with each other before the Conference as to detailed proposals on this subject. (Memorandum attached)<sup>3</sup>

3. *Position of France*: Decision that France should become the fifth sponsoring power.

4. *Nations to be Invited*: Decision that invitations be issued to the same 44 nations which had been invited to the Hot Springs, Atlantic City and Bretton Woods Conferences. (List attached)<sup>4</sup>

5. *Time and Place of Conference*: Decision that the Conference be held in the United States (exact location to be left for future determination). Tentative decision as to time, subject to later consultation with China and France and possibly other countries.

6. *Form of Invitation*: Decision that invitations be issued by the United States on behalf of the five sponsoring Powers in the form of the attached draft.<sup>5</sup>

7. *Consultation with China and France*: Authorization for the United States to consult with China and France on behalf of Britain and the Soviet Union to obtain Chinese and French agreement to the above points.

8. *Public Announcements*: Statement at the meeting along the lines of the attached draft.<sup>3</sup> No further publicity until final decision has been reached on the form of invitation, at which time the texts of the invitation and of the completed proposals would be made public upon their transmission to the governments invited.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup> *Infra.*

<sup>4</sup> Not printed as such. This attachment, entitled "List of Nations Which Were Invited to the United Nations Conferences at Hot Springs, Atlantic City and Bretton Woods", is identical with the paper printed *post*, pp. 747-748.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed as such. This attachment, entitled "Draft Invitation", is textually the same as the United States Delegation draft invitation printed *post*, p. 818, without the modifications and insertions introduced therein by Alger Hiss.

<sup>6</sup> Also attached to this memorandum, but not printed, is a memorandum from Pasvolosky to the Secretary of State dated January 23, 1945, on the subject of "Recommended Action to Follow Decisions Made at The Three-Power Meeting", to which two further memorandums are attached, one entitled "Memorandum Concerning Possible Sites for the Security Conference" and the other entitled "Discussion of Composition of United States Delegation".

[Attachment 1]

## INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP

## I

## BACKGROUND

1. A chapter on trusteeship should be included in the Charter of the International Organization for the following reasons:

*a.* The liquidation of the League will require some disposition of the mandated territories which were placed under its supervision as a "sacred trust of civilization".

*b.* At the end of this war there may possibly be other territories detached from enemy states for which international supervision may be considered desirable.

*c.* There may also be other territories which it might be advisable to place under trusteeship by mutual agreement.

*d.* There is a strong feeling in this country that dependent territories should not be the subject of barter but should be the concern of the whole world community.

It was the understanding at Dumbarton Oaks that the question of trusteeship, although not taken up at that time, was a proper subject for discussion among the governments represented there, and that in due course the sponsoring governments would consult with each other and perhaps exchange papers on the subject in order to save time at the Conference itself. Other governments have subsequently suggested the inclusion of arrangements for dependent territories.

2. The view was expressed informally to us by Colonel Stanley that other colonial powers might at this stage be brought into the consultations on international arrangements affecting dependent territories. It is our view, however, that such consultations at this stage should be confined to the states participating in the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations. The British position is clearly designed to win support from other states with colonies in order to offset the support which, they anticipate, the United States will receive from the Soviet Union and China.

3. Our desire that only general principles and procedures relating to international trusteeship be discussed at present is based upon the view that territorial dispositions should be left for consideration until the end of hostilities. We consider it of the utmost importance, nevertheless, to get an agreement on the principle of trusteeship, in order that our basic distinction between trust territories and all other dependencies may be maintained. Colonel Stanley made it clear that the British wish to eliminate this distinction, a procedure which we would regard as retrogressive.

4. We have long felt that, as indispensable parts of an over-all program, a complete system for dependencies would provide for:

*a.* Creation of a trusteeship mechanism by which the International Organization would assume direct responsibility for the administration of certain dependent territories, in order to promote the social, economic, and political advancement of the peoples of trust territories and to enable these territories to contribute to international peace and security;

*b.* Establishment of regional advisory commissions for dependent territories generally, on the model of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, which would include the states administering dependencies in the particular region and other states having major strategic or economic interests therein; and

*c.* Adoption of a general declaration of principles designed to establish minimum political, economic, and social standards for all non-self-governing territories, whether colonies, protectorates, or trust territories.

5. The British probably will propose regional advisory commissions as the sole device for expressing international responsibility with respect to dependent territories. Regional commissions, in their view, could be employed to discharge, through consultation, a limited international accountability for the administration of dependent territories. In our view, regional commissions are desirable, but only as one part of an over-all international system.

## II

### RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that at the forthcoming talks decisions be reached that:

1. There should be included in the Charter of the General International Organization a chapter on Trusteeship Arrangements;

2. The sponsoring governments consult with each other before the Conference as to the detailed proposals which should be made on this subject, and prepare a draft text.

These proposals should deal only with the principles and the mechanism which should govern these trusteeship arrangements. They should not be concerned at this stage with specific territories to be placed under trusteeship or with the disposition or allocation of particular territories.

A general Declaration of Standards and Regional Advisory Commissions should be regarded as additions to and not substitutions for the Trusteeship Arrangement. These, however, may also need to be discussed at the Conference and decisions taken as to how they might be related to each other, and perhaps to the General Organization.

[Attachment 2]

DRAFT <sup>7</sup>COMMUNIQUÉ TO BE ISSUED JOINTLY AND SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT,  
PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL AND MARSHAL STALIN

The proposals for the general international organization resulting from the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks have been considered, and agreed proposals have been worked out on the major points left open at those conversations. Our views are being transmitted to the Government of China and to the Provisional Government of the French Republic for their consideration. When these consultations have been completed, invitations to a United Nations Conference will be issued at which time the full text of the proposals to be laid before the Conference as a basis of discussion will be made public.

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<sup>7</sup> The source text is a typewritten carbon copy which bears penciled alterations in the handwriting of Alger Hiss. The text is here printed as typed. The text as altered in pencil is identical with the text printed *post*, p. 795.

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Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*

## PROBLEM OF VOTING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

SUMMARY <sup>1</sup>1. *President's formula calls for unanimity in most cases.*

Unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council, under the voting formula proposed by the President on December 5, 1944,<sup>2</sup> would prevail in six categories of decisions having political and enforcement character. It would also prevail in the remaining category of decisions involving promotion of peaceful settlement of disputes, except when one of the permanent members is a party to a dispute.

2. *Soviet proposal would increase domestic United States opposition.*

The proposed formula, or its basic principle, seems more clearly essential to us now than heretofore. Our talks with members of Congress, and groups and individuals throughout the country, indicate that its abandonment would gravely alienate many sincere supporters of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, and would provide perfectionists and isolationists with a powerful weapon against American participation in the Organization. It is furthermore disturbing that acceptance by us of the straight unanimity rule would be

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<sup>1</sup> This summary evidently contained one more page, but it has not been found.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 58-59.



interpreted as surrender to Russia, whose rigid advocacy of that rule is widely known.

3. *Soviet proposal is opposed by small nations.*

At the same time, our discussions with representatives of other American republics and United Nations have disclosed the strongest official opposition to the straight unanimity rule. It may be difficult, if not impossible, for their governments to secure popular support for entrance into an international organization which, with such a rule, would bear every earmark of a great-power alliance. It appears that all of them would be bitterly disillusioned, that some may stay out, and that under such a rule various smaller nations after joining the organization may feel obliged to align themselves with great powers, which would render the organization undependable and unstable.

## THE PROBLEM OF VOTING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

### I

To bring the problem into its proper perspective, the question of voting procedure in the Security Council must be considered in relation to the functions and powers to be assigned to the Council and, therefore, to the type of substantive decisions which the Council might be called upon to make. The various types of decisions are listed in the attached memorandum,<sup>3</sup> in which they are grouped into seven categories.

Under the voting formula proposed by the President, unanimity of the permanent members would always be required for all categories of decisions except one: in those decisions involving promotion of peaceful settlement of disputes, a permanent member of the Council would not cast a vote if it is a party to the dispute in question.

This exception is based upon the principle that the procedures involved under the excepted category would be quasi-judicial in character, and in such procedures no nation should be placed above the law in an organization based fundamentally on the principle of equality under the law. The rule of unanimity should always prevail under the other six categories of decisions because the procedures involved are of a political character and may require the use of force. In such procedures there is every justification for placing the permanent members in a special position since they must bear the principal responsibility for action in the maintenance of peace and security.

While it is clear that, in general, the rule of unanimity of the permanent members is necessary, the proposed voting formula—or, at least, its basic principle—is essential from our point of view. It amply safeguards our basic national interests. Its abandonment would weaken rather than strengthen our position, both at home and abroad, and would cause us no end of trouble.

<sup>3</sup> *Infra.*

Our talks with members of Congress and with many individuals and groups throughout the country clearly indicate that failure to provide for at least this much of a modification of the unanimity rule would be profoundly deplored by many sincere supporters of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. There is strong evidence that it would become a powerful weapon in the hands of both the perfectionists and the isolationists. Moreover, acceptance by us of a straight unanimity rule would inevitably be interpreted as surrender to Russia. These factors might well jeopardize our chances for adequate public and Congressional support in this country.

At the same time, our discussions with representatives of the American Republics and of other United Nations have already disclosed their strong opposition to the straight unanimity rule. All of them have indicated that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for their governments to secure whole-hearted support on the part of their peoples for an international organization which would thus, in popular estimation, have every earmark of a great-power alliance. Without at least some such provision as is contained in the proposed voting formula, all of them will be bitterly disillusioned, and some of them may even decide to stay out. Furthermore, under these conditions, the smaller nations, even after joining the organization, might well seek to align themselves with the various great powers and thus render the whole system precarious and unstable.

Taken in conjunction with the fact that we may have to acquiesce in some unsatisfactory peace settlements, all this would inevitably impair both our moral prestige and our political leadership in the world and might come perilously close to defeating the great cause in which we are now exercising so vigorous a leadership.

Soviet Russia's case against the proposed formula is extremely weak. Under the proposal, she—as well as we and each of the other three permanent members—would have veto power in the following decisions:

1. Admission of new members;
2. Suspension and expulsion of members;
3. Determination of the existence of a threat to the peace or of a breach of the peace;
4. Use of force or the application of other measures of enforcement;
5. Approval of agreements for the provision of armed forces;
6. All matters relating to the regulation of armaments;
7. Determination of whether a regional arrangement is consistent with the purposes and principles of the general organization.

So long as this is so, Soviet Russia has more to gain than to lose, just as have we—in stature, in prestige, in leadership, and in prospects for a successful and effective world order—by agreeing to place herself on an equal footing with all other countries before the bar of world opinion as regards efforts on the part of the new organization

to bring about peaceful settlement of whatever controversies may arise between her and other countries.

## II

The manner in which the proposed voting formula would safeguard our basic national interests may be seen from the following concrete example. If the United States were to become involved in a dispute with Mexico, and if Mexico or some other country were to bring the situation to the attention of the Security Council on the plea that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace, the United States would accept the Council's decisions made without its participation, by a vote of the other permanent members and at least two non-permanent members, only on the following questions:

1. Whether the matter should be investigated by the Council;
2. If an investigation is made, whether, on the basis of its results, the dispute should be considered to be of such a nature that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace;
3. Whether the Council should call on the United States and Mexico to settle or adjust the dispute by means of their own choice;
4. Whether, if the United States and Mexico, having failed to settle the dispute by means of their own choice, refer it—as they are obligated to do—to the Council, the latter should make a recommendation to them as to methods and procedures of settlement;
5. Whether the circumstances require that such a recommendation be made by the Council before the dispute is referred to it by the parties;
6. What should be the nature of the recommendation;
7. Whether the legal aspects of the matter before it should be referred by the Council for advice to the international court of justice;
8. Whether the dispute does in fact arise out of a matter which, by international law, is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States when the United States claims that this is the case;
9. Whether, if there exists a regional inter-American agency for peaceful settlement of local disputes, the Council should ask such an agency to concern itself with the dispute in question;
10. Whether the matter should be referred by the Council to the General Assembly for consideration and recommendation.

Once the situation gets beyond the field of conciliation and of efforts at peaceful settlement, and the Security Council is confronted with the question as to whether or not the dispute between the United States and Mexico constitutes a threat to the peace, the United States would resume the right to cast its vote in the Council's decisions. The right of the United States to cast its vote under the unanimity rule in all other substantive decisions of the Council would, of course, remain unimpaired throughout.

Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

JANUARY 15, 1945.

PRINCIPAL SUBSTANTIVE DECISIONS ON WHICH THE SECURITY  
COUNCIL WOULD HAVE TO VOTE

Under the voting formula proposed by the President, all of the decisions listed below would require the affirmative votes of 7 members of the Security Council, including the votes of the permanent members. The only exception would be that, in the event that a permanent member is a party to a dispute or a situation before the Council, that member would not cast its vote in decisions listed under "Promotion of Peaceful Settlement of Disputes" (Category III below).

## I. Recommendations to the General Assembly on

1. Admission of new members;
2. Suspension of a member;
3. Expulsion of a member;
4. Election of the Secretary General.

## II. Restoration of the rights and privileges of a suspended member.

III. Promotion of peaceful settlement of disputes, including the following questions:

1. Whether a dispute or a situation brought to the Council's attention is of such a nature that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace;
2. Whether the Council should call on the parties to settle or adjust the dispute or situation by means of their own choice;
3. Whether the Council should make a recommendation to the parties as to methods and procedures of settlement;
4. Whether the legal aspects of the matter before it should be referred by the Council for advice to the international court of justice;
5. Whether, if there exists a regional agency for peaceful settlement of local disputes, such an agency should be asked to concern itself with the controversy.

IV. Removal of threats to the peace and suppression of breaches of the peace, including the following questions:

1. Whether failure on the part of the parties to a dispute to settle it by means of their own choice or in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council in fact constitutes a threat to the peace;
2. Whether any other actions on the part of any country constitute a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace;

<sup>1</sup> The copy in the Briefing Book carries the notation: "Copies of this document were given informally to the Soviet and British Ambassadors in Washington shortly after January 15, 1945." The document was published in *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation*, pp. 659-660.

3. What measures should be taken by the Council to maintain or restore the peace and the manner in which such measures should be carried out;

4. Whether a regional agency should be authorized to take measures of enforcement.

V. Approval of special agreement or agreements for the provision of armed forces and facilities.

VI. Formulation of plans for a general system of regulation of armaments and submission of such plans to the member states.

VII. Determination of whether the nature and the activities of a regional agency or arrangement for the maintenance of peace and security are consistent with the purposes and principles of the general organization.

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Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*

COMPOSITION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

*Present Proposal*

The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals provide that the Security Council should be composed of eleven members, of which the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China and, in due course, France, would have permanent seats. Six other states would be elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms, which states would not be immediately eligible for reelection.

*Changed Status of France*

The condition attached to French tenure of a permanent seat has been met by virtue of recognition of the French Provisional Government, of that Government's having become a full member of the European Advisory Commission, and of its having signed the United Nations Declaration. The other permanent members should, accordingly, reach prompt agreement that hereafter they will treat France as one of the powers sponsoring the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals if France so desires.

*Possibility of Other Governments Proposing Changes*

It is not believed that the Soviet Union will raise questions about the present Proposals for the composition of the Security Council.

It is considered more likely that Great Britain may advance recommended changes in the present Proposals which would recognize the right of the medium-sized powers to something akin to semi-permanent seats, based on their greater ability to assist in the maintenance of international peace and security through military action. It is believed that any such proposal should be resisted.

Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*

NATIONS TO BE INVITED TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE

During the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations it was assumed that the nations to be invited to the United Nations Conference for the drafting of the Charter of the General International Organization would be the initial or founding members of the Organization, but the question of which nations should be invited was left open.

We took the position that both the United Nations and the nations associated with the United Nations should be invited. The Chinese agreed with us.

The Soviet representatives maintained the position that the Conference should be restricted to the United Nations, but did not rule out the possibility that the associated nations might be admitted to membership in the Organization immediately after the United Nations had signed.

The British representatives did not object to the American position, suggesting only that additional states might desirably be invited to be initial members though not to take part in the Conference.

The British since then have seemed to feel that the problem is particularly an American one; six of the associated nations are American Republics, the other two being Egypt and Iceland. The six American countries are: Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Although we are suggesting to these six countries the desirability of their adhering to the United Nations Declaration, special problems in each country make such action unlikely for some months.

The question of which nations should be invited to the Conference may arise in discussion of the voting problem since, apparently, the Soviet view was advanced chiefly for bargaining in that connection. The question will more certainly arise if the voting problem is solved, since such agreement will remove the main obstacle to calling the Conference.

Should this development occur, it is recommended that this Government maintain its previous position. If we cannot obtain concurrence with it, the preferable alternative would be to invite the associated nations to send observers, if possible with right to present views, and to sign the Charter immediately after the United Nations have signed.

In order to provide for admission of other states, prior to the coming into force of the Charter, it is recommended that the Charter be held open for adherence by certain states, agreed upon through consultation, in the category of adhering signatories.

Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*

## DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

The Department has tentatively formulated, for use when approved, a Draft Plan for International Trusteeship, a Draft Plan for Regional Advisory Commissions for Dependent Areas, and a Draft Declaration Regarding Administration of Dependent Areas.

No discussion with other governments has as yet occurred regarding these papers. While we were prepared to transmit a proposal on trusteeship prior to the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations, this part of our Tentative Proposals was taken out . . . Accordingly, no formal discussion occurred during those Conversations. However, the British, Soviet, and Chinese representatives informally expressed much interest in the matter, and it was understood that this question would be considered later as one of the questions left open.

Our Draft Plans are being submitted to review, in the light of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, by the Secretary's Staff Committee and by the War and Navy Departments for presentation to the President before communication to other governments. Their essential points are summarized below.

*Categories of Dependent Territories.*—Dependent areas should be divided, for reasons of status and corresponding difference in degree and directness of international concern, into two categories: (a) trust (or mandated) territories whose special status makes it desirable to place them under the authority of the general international organization as trustee; and (b) other dependent territories whose control by individual states is recognized pending their development toward self-government to the fullest extent of the capacity of the dependent people.

*Declaration of Principles.*—The authorities responsible for the administration of dependent territories should agree upon a general declaration of principles designed to establish minimum political, economic, and social standards applicable to all non-self-governing territories, whether colonies, protectorates, or trust territories.

These principles should be formulated in accord with two essential assumptions: (1) that the welfare of dependent peoples and the development of the resources of dependent territories should be recognized as of proper concern to the international community at large; and (2) that states responsible for the administration of dependent territories should recognize the principle of some measure of accountability to the international community for such administration.

*A Trusteeship Mechanism.*—A trusteeship mechanism should be provided by which the international organization would succeed to the rights, titles, and interests of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and to the rights and responsibilities of the League of Nations with respect to the mandates. It should also be given authority over certain territories which may be detached from the present enemy states, and over any other territories which by agreement may be placed under its control.

*Regional Advisory Commissions.*—Regional advisory commissions should be established, wherever practicable, in regions in which dependent territories are numerous, to assist the responsible authorities in the discharge of their international accountability for such territories together with their obligation to develop the resources and promote the welfare of these territories and their peoples. The regional advisory commissions should as a general rule have wide membership, including states which hold colonies in a given region, independent states and certain advanced dependent territories in the region, and other states which have major strategic or economic interests in the region. They should be entitled to call on the general organization and on specialized economic or social agencies related to the general international organization for advice and assistance and should make reports available to the general organization and related agencies.

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## LIBERATED EUROPE AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

740.0011 EW/1-845

*The Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson)  
to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 8, 1945.

I urge that consideration be given to a recommendation to the President that he make a proposal along the following lines at his forthcoming meeting with Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill:

1. There shall be established forthwith a Provisional Security Council for Europe to supervise the reestablishment of popular government and the maintenance of order in the liberated states in Europe and in the German satellite states, pending the establishment of the proposed general international organization of the United Nations.

2. The Provisional Security Council for Europe shall be composed of representatives of the Governments of the U. S. S. R., the United Kingdom, the United States and France.

3. The Provisional Security Council for Europe shall remain in continuous session. On the motion of any one of its members the Council will consider the situation in any of the countries over which it shall have provisional jurisdiction. In case of necessity, the Provisional Security Council may arrange itself to meet in or to send special representatives to convene in any country where difficulties are occurring or are threatened.

4. If there is doubt concerning the status of the government in a liberated country or in a satellite country, the Provisional Security Council for Europe may, in its discretion, inquire into the situation. The Provisional Security Council for Europe shall have the authority to require in such a case the establishment of a coalition government, broadly representative of all elements in the population. Such a

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<sup>1</sup> Copies were sent to Matthews, Pasvolsky, Dunn, and Grew. The text here printed is from the signed original.



coalition government shall be constituted under the direct supervision of the Council or a panel of special observers representing each of the four countries.

5. The coalition government thus established shall be regarded as a provisional or care-taker government which, with the support of the Provisional Security Council and the four countries represented thereon, shall maintain public order, take such emergency measures as may be required to care for the population and to make arrangements for a free election to be held on a date which in the judgment of the Provisional Security Council for Europe is a satisfactory date.

6. This free election shall take place under such national and local supervision of the Provisional Security Council for Europe as may in the Council's judgment be necessary. This free election shall take the necessary form as to determine the type of government for the country and the choice of the leaders of the government.

7. The Governments of the U. S. S. R., the United Kingdom, the United States and France should agree to recognize the governments formed following the free elections described in the foregoing paragraph.

8. The Provisional Security Council for Europe shall deal with questions involving actual or potential threats to the peace and aggression in Europe until the establishment of the security council of the United Nations organization; the Provisional Security Council for Europe shall thereupon cease to exist.

It is hoped that the proposed Provisional Security Council for Europe could be established immediately. This would involve exchanges with the French Government in addition to consultation between the Big Three.

It would be exceedingly helpful but not indispensable to have the announcement of the Provisional Security Council for Europe accompanied by a statement that real progress had been made as between the Big Three in settling the remaining 10% of unfinished business at Dumbarton Oaks and that it was expected that a conference of the United Nations would be held at an early date.

It is hoped that the Provisional Security Council for Europe could deal at once with the situations in Greece and Poland. The Soviet Government might well look with favor on the idea of the establishment of the Provisional Security Council for Europe but be reluctant to have it deal with Poland. It would be desirable for every possible effort to be made to induce the Soviet Government to agree to the Provisional Council's dealing with Poland.

We have a pretty clear idea of the Soviet objectives in Eastern Europe. We know the terms of their settlement with Finland. We know that the three Baltic States have been re-incorporated into the Soviet Union and that nothing which we can do can alter this. It is not a question of whether we like it; I personally don't like it although I recognize that the Soviet Government has arguments on its side. The point is it has been done and nothing which it is within the power

of the United States Government to do can undo it. We know that the Russians will insist on the annexation of a substantial portion of East Prussia and a boundary with Poland roughly in accordance with the Curzon line.<sup>2</sup> The Soviet Union has already re-incorporated Bessarabia into its territory. The Soviet Union may insist on minor adjustments in its boundaries with Rumania.

I would favor using any bargaining power that exists in connection with the foregoing matters to induce the Russians to go along with a satisfactory United Nations organization and the proposed Provisional Security Council for Europe to deal with Poland, Greece and other trouble spots. I would favor our agreeing to accept as a fact the re-incorporation of the three Baltic States into the Soviet Union and our recognition of these areas as Soviet territory. This would involve our withdrawing recognition from the three diplomatic representatives of those countries in the United States.

I would favor our agreeing at the appropriate time to accept the transfer of that portion of East Prussia to the Soviet Union which that country insists on having. I would likewise favor our agreeing to accept as a fact at the appropriate time, the Curzon line as a frontier between Poland and the Soviet Union, and to agree to announce publicly such acceptance.

The recognition of the return of Bessarabia to the Soviet Union should present no difficulties to us.

We must have the support of the Soviet Union to defeat Germany. We sorely need the Soviet Union in the war against Japan when the war in Europe is over. The importance of these two things can be reckoned in terms of American lives. We must have the cooperation of the Soviet Union to organize the peace. There are certain things in connection with the foregoing proposals which are repugnant to me personally, but I am prepared to urge their adoption to obtain the cooperation of the Soviet Union in winning the war and organizing the peace. By acting on these things, we may be able to work out a regime which will obtain the cooperation of the Soviet Union for the rest of Europe and the rest of the world. There are good arguments from the Soviet point of view in favor of all of these proposals. I am willing to sponsor and support the Soviet arguments if it will save American lives in winning the war and if it will save the rest of Europe from the diplomacy of the jungle which is almost certain to ensue otherwise.

If the proposals set forth in the foregoing paragraphs should be adopted as the policy of the United States Government, a program should be undertaken immediately to prepare public opinion for them. This would involve off-the-record discussions with Congress, with

<sup>2</sup> For the origin and a description of the "Curzon Line," see *Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. XIII, pp. 793-794.

outstanding newspaper editors and writers, columnists and radio commentators.

JOHN HICKERSON  
*Deputy Director, Office of European Affairs*

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EUR Files

*Memorandum of the Division of International Security and Organization*<sup>1</sup>

SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS OF SENATOR VANDENBERG, SENATOR  
CONNALLY, AND PROPOSED EMERGENCY HIGH COMMISSION FOR  
LIBERATED EUROPE

*Senator Vandenberg's Treaty Proposal*<sup>2</sup>

A treaty to be signed immediately by the major allies to keep Germany and Japan permanently demilitarized.

The Commander in Chief to have instant power to take military action under this treaty without reference to Congress.

*Senator Connally's Interim Council Proposal*<sup>3</sup>

An Interim United Nations Council to be set up at the United Nations Conference with membership of 11 states like that of permanent Security Council.

The Interim Council to act in an advisory capacity on behalf of all the United Nations in dealing with controversies until the coming into force of the Charter.

*Proposed Emergency High Commission for Liberated Europe*

An Emergency High Commission for Liberated Europe to be set up at the Three-Power meeting, composed of the U. S., U. K., U. S. S. R. and France, with provision for *ad hoc* representation by governments and authorities when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

The Commission to assist in Europe in establishing popular and stable governments and in facilitating solution of emergency economic problems in former occupied and satellite states (with no responsibilities for postwar control of Germany), until need removed by the functioning of popular and stable governments and operations of the general organization.

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<sup>1</sup> This undated memorandum was prepared by Dorothy Fosdick early in January 1945.

<sup>2</sup> The reference is to Vandenberg's speech in the Senate on January 10, 1945; see *Congressional Record*, vol. 91, pt. 1, pp. 164-167.

<sup>3</sup> Connally disclosed this proposal in a press interview reported in the *New York Times*, January 15, 1945, p. 10.

## CONTRASTS BETWEEN HIGH COMMISSION AND INTERIM COUNCIL

<i>Establishment:</i>	High Commission at Three-Power meeting; Council at United Nations Conference.
<i>Membership:</i>	High Commission of 4 states with provision for <i>ad hoc</i> representation; Council of 11 states.
<i>Powers and Scope:</i>	High Commission to assist in Europe in establish- ment of popular and stable governments in former occupied and satellite states and in handling emergency economic problems; Council to have advisory powers on any contro- versies arising among United Nations.
<i>Duration:</i>	High Commission until need removed by opera- tion of governments and general organization; Council until coming into force of Charter.

840.00/3-645

*The Secretary of State to the President*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 18, 1945.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Establishment of an Emergency High Commission for Liberated Europe*

I recommend that at your meeting with Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill you propose the immediate establishment of an Emergency High Commission for Liberated Europe, the initial membership to consist of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, and the Provisional Government of France. A proposed draft declaration and protocol are attached for your consideration.

The proposed Emergency High Commission would be set up as a joint, temporary agency of the four governments through which they would act together to assist in establishing popular governments and in facilitating the solution of emergency economic problems in the former occupied and satellite states of Europe. It would not have responsibilities in regard to the conduct of the war, or the post-war control of Germany. Questions regarding Germany would remain solely in the province of the European Advisory Commission,<sup>2</sup> and of such agencies as may be established for control of Germany.

Announcement from your meeting of agreement on the establishment of such a commission would reassure public opinion in the United

<sup>1</sup> This document with its attachments is printed in *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation*, pp. 655-657, under the assumed date of January 16. The text here printed is from the signed original, which bears a penciled endorsement, "Show [Shown?] to President at Sea W[illiam] D L[eahy]".

<sup>2</sup> See *post*, p. 110, footnote 1.

States and elsewhere that these four nations will work together in the solution of pressing problems while further steps are being taken toward the establishment of the General International Organization.

There is urgent need for these four nations to achieve unity of policy, and joint action, with respect to:

1. Political problems emerging in the former occupied and satellite states of Europe, such as the return of certain exiled governments, the setting up of provisional regimes, the maintenance of order within countries, and the arranging of early elections where necessary to establish popular and stable governments;

2. Immediate economic problems such as the care for destitute populations and the restoration of functioning economic life of particular countries.

The proposed Emergency High Commission would constitute the agency for providing for the necessary regular consultation and co-operative action in these matters. Also it would greatly help to remove the difficulties being encountered by United Nations' agencies in related fields.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

[Attachment 1]

DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

The President of the United States of America, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the President of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, having consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe, jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert the action of their four governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and its satellites to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The retreat of the Nazi war machine and the collapse of its puppet regimes, under the relentless blows of the victorious armies and resistance forces of the United Nations, are leaving behind confusion and disorder, and incalculable distress and suffering. The agony of the liberated peoples must be relieved. Swift steps must be taken to help them in the orderly reconstruction of their daily living.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a promise of the Atlantic Charter<sup>3</sup>—the right of all peoples to choose

<sup>3</sup> For the text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 236, or 55 Stat. 1603.

the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic have agreed to establish, for such joint action as may be necessary, an Emergency High Commission for Liberated Europe, as set forth by the protocol of this date.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to the peace and security and the general well-being of all mankind.

[Attachment 2]

EMERGENCY HIGH COMMISSION FOR LIBERATED EUROPE

Pursuant to the Declaration on Liberated Europe, and with a view to concerting their policies with respect to the objectives set forth therein, the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic hereby establish an Emergency High Commission for Liberated Europe.

*A. Functions and Scope*

1. The Emergency High Commission for Liberated Europe shall have responsibility in such former occupied states of Europe and in such former enemy states as in the judgment of the four governments conditions may make necessary:

*a.* To assist where circumstances require in the maintenance of internal order;

*b.* To assist as may be required in the taking of emergency measures for care of the population and for solution of pressing economic problems;

*c.* To assist where circumstances require in setting up governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people;

*d.* To assist as may be appropriate in making arrangements for, and in conducting free elections to determine the type and composition of governments;

*e.* To perform such other duties as may be assigned to it by agreement of the governments represented on the Emergency High Commission.

2. The Emergency High Commission shall have no authority, functions, or responsibilities with regard to the conduct of military operations in the prosecution of the present war against Germany, or the occupation and control of Germany.

3. The Emergency High Commission shall consult with other international agencies as necessary on problems which are of mutual concern.

#### *B. Membership*

1. The membership of the Emergency High Commission shall consist of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, each of which shall appoint one representative. As may be necessary the Emergency High Commission may enlarge its membership.

2. Representatives of other United Nations and of provisional authorities or of governments in Europe shall be invited by the Emergency High Commission to sit with it when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

#### *C. Location and Organization*

1. The headquarters of the Emergency High Commission shall be in [Paris].<sup>4</sup> It may meet in other places as occasion requires.

2. It may designate officials of member governments to represent it in individual countries or areas.

3. The Governments which are members of the Emergency High Commission shall provide such military or other special advisers as may be required to assist it in performing its functions.

4. It shall organize its technical staff and otherwise establish and perfect its organization and procedure. Its chairmanship shall be held successively by representatives of the member governments.

#### *D. Termination*

The Emergency High Commission for Liberated Europe shall terminate when the functioning of popular and stable governments and the operations of appropriate organs or agencies of the general international organization shall have removed the need for its activities.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> The brackets appear in the source text and were apparently intended to indicate the tentative nature of this suggestion.

<sup>5</sup> A penciled notation below this paragraph, apparently in Leahy's handwriting, reads: "Who makes this decision[?]"

UNA Files

*The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Pasvolsky) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] January 23, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Subject: Emergency High Commission for Liberated Europe

In addition to the decisions which are recommended in the attached memoranda,<sup>2</sup> I should like again to urge the necessity, from the point of view of our work on the general international organization, of agreement at the forthcoming meeting on the creation of an Emergency High Commission for Liberated Europe, or whatever it is finally called. This would be the most powerful antidote that we can devise for the rapidly crystallizing opposition in this country to the whole Dumbarton Oaks idea on the score that the future organization would merely underwrite a system of unilateral grabbing.

LEO PASVOLSKY

<sup>1</sup> Carbon copy.

<sup>2</sup> The "attached memoranda" here referred to are the memorandum of Pasvolsky dated January 23, 1945, on the subject of "Recommended Action on Points Which Must Be Decided at The Three-Power Meeting", and its attachments, *ante*, pp. 81-85.

EUR Files

*The Assistant Secretary of State (MacLeish) to the Under Secretary of State (Grew)*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 24, 1945.

You asked me to remind you to speak to the Secretary tomorrow about the inclusion in the forthcoming conversations of a discussion of the problem of provisional governments as, for example, the provisional government to be set up in Yugoslavia. It was suggested at the SCC, as you will recall, that it would be helpful to the formation of a sound world opinion if an agreement could be reached, and a statement issued, to the effect that provisional governments established in liberated areas under war-time conditions are established on the understanding that free elections will be held when elections are possible and that recognition of governments in these areas will depend on the satisfaction of the recognizing powers that such elections have in fact been held.

May I add a word as to my personal conviction that this matter is extremely important. The wave of disillusionment which has distressed us in the last several weeks will be increased if the impression is permitted to get abroad that potentially totalitarian provisional



governments are to be set up without adequate safeguards as to the holding of free elections and the realization of the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

ARCHIBALD MACLEISH

(Copy to Mr. Dunn)

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Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*

[LIBERATED COUNTRIES]

Subject: The necessity of the three principal Allies arriving at a common political program for liberated countries.

Although the principal Allies have been able to work out a generally satisfactory coordination of military strategy and operations in the prosecution of the war against Germany, there has been no such coordination in regard to political policies. Recent events in Europe have demonstrated the very real danger not only to Allied unity during the war but to the hope of a stable peace, as a result of the failure of the Allies to evolve an agreed and mutually acceptable political program.

Growing evidence of Anglo-Soviet rivalry on the continent of Europe and the resulting power politics scramble for position is due less to the difficulties over territorial questions than to the question of the political character of the governments in various countries of Europe beyond the Soviet borders. On the one hand, it is evident that the Soviet Government suspects that Great Britain desires to see installed wherever possible right-wing governments which from the Soviet point of view would be hostile to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the British view with apprehension the possibility that the Soviet Government will endeavor in its turn to install and support left-wing totalitarian governments as far west as possible in Europe.

In actual fact these mutual suspicions appear to be unjustified in that it is not a fixed and calculated British policy to support right-wing elements in Europe, nor on the basis of existing evidence can it be said that the Soviet Government is determined to install Communist regimes throughout Europe. However, these interacting mutual suspicions tend to push British policy, in action, farther to the right and Soviet policy farther to the left. Recent events in Greece will undoubtedly be widely interpreted in Moscow as confirmation of their suspicions of Great Britain's intentions, and the recent events in Poland with the formation of the Lublin Committee into a provisional government will likewise confirm British fears in regard to Soviet policy.

If the situation is to be saved it is essential for the three principal Allies to examine carefully the present political forces at work in the

liberated countries in Europe in order to ascertain if there are not political groups and parties which would be mutually acceptable and to which all three countries could give whole-hearted support. It would be necessary to start by excluding either a right-wing government in which "reactionary" elements regarded by the Soviet Government as intrinsically hostile would predominate, or a single party Communist totalitarian state. Between these two extremes, however, lies the bulk of the political sentiment of the peoples of Europe.

Judging from present indications the general mood of the people of Europe is to the left and strongly in favor of far-reaching economic and social reforms, but not, however, in favor of a left-wing totalitarian regime to achieve these reforms. Until such time as it is possible to hold genuine elections in the liberated areas, in certain countries at least, such as Greece and Poland, it will probably be necessary for the principal Allies, and for this purpose France should be included in that category, to accept and support interim governments. The character and composition of these governments is precisely the place where the Allies must have an agreed political program. These governments must be sufficiently to the left to satisfy the prevailing mood in Europe and to allay Soviet suspicions. Conversely, they should be sufficiently representative of the center and *petit bourgeois* elements of the population so that they would not be regarded as mere preludes to a Communist dictatorship.

In so far as the United States is concerned, the following two criteria could be applied to any proposed interim government: (1) that it should be dedicated to the preservation of civil liberties; (2) that it should favor social and economic reforms.

In order to work out with its Allies for the interim period an agreed, mutually acceptable political basis for coordinated policies, the United States Government should be prepared, when the internal condition of a liberated country so demands, to participate in inter-Allied commissions to act as observers and to insure that at the proper time the people of that country will be given a genuine opportunity to elect their future government.

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Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*

AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

SUMMARY

Much of the underlying paper is a record of the background facts concerning what we know of the spheres of influence arrangement between the British and Soviet Governments in their relations as regards Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia. It is supposed

to have become effective in the early summer of 1944, and, as a result of American objections, to have been limited to a three-month period, which would have expired in September, though in some respects at least it appears still to be operative.

Our position (pp. 2-3) is that while we acknowledge the usefulness of arrangements for the conduct of the war, we cannot give our approval to such plans as would extend beyond the military field and retard the processes of broader international cooperation. The paper refers also to the argumentation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (annex to the paper) setting forth the importance from the point of view of American national interest of preventing if possible a contest for power between the British and Soviet Governments.

#### AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

The American attitude toward spheres of influence took definite and public form as a result of the Moscow Conference. In Mr. Hull's report to the Joint Session of Congress on November 18, 1943 he said:<sup>1</sup>

"As the provisions of the Four Nation Declaration are carried into effect there will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power or any other of the separate alliances [*special arrangements*], through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests."

In the late spring of 1944 the Department was informed of a contemplated arrangement between the USSR and Great Britain whereby Rumanian affairs should be the "main concern" of the Soviet Government and Greek affairs should be the "main concern" of the British Government.<sup>2</sup> Subsequently, the arrangement was extended to include Bulgaria as a Soviet concern, with the British receiving roughly an equal position with the Russians in Yugoslavia. The term "spheres of influence" was sedulously avoided, or disclaimed, in all the correspondence; the term "taking the lead" was occasionally used. In subsequent reports, from London and from Ankara, there was some talk of the arrangement having crystallized to the degree that the distribution of influence was to be on a basis of 80-20 percent (Russian vs. British) in Rumania and Bulgaria, and 50-50 in Yugoslavia, though the Russians thought it should be 60-40. In the message from Ankara the British share was described as "Anglo-American."

The question has since arisen in connection with the Soviet and British interest in the political situation, and with somewhat more precision, in a proposed arrangement between the Soviet and British Governments for the rearmament of Yugoslavia.

<sup>1</sup> Department of State *Bulletin*, November 20, 1943, vol. ix, pp. 341-345.

<sup>2</sup> Relevant communications of Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin are printed in Churchill, pp. 73-81.

Reverting to the earliest communication from the British, upon their learning of our misgivings concerning the proposal, Mr. Churchill suggested to the President that the arrangement be given a three-months' trial, subject then to review by the three Governments, to which the President's assent was given. The British Government then informed the Soviet Government that our assent had been given but that the three-months limit had been set in order not to "prejudice the question of establishing postwar spheres of influence."

The Department had also received a note from the Soviet Embassy<sup>3</sup> inquiring as to our position. Apparently the Soviet Government had supposed that the whole arrangement had had American approval, and on learning of the three-months provision desired to "subject this matter to additional study."

It is thus our reply to the Soviet note, a copy of which was sent also to the British, which best sets forth the American position, which is briefly as follows:

Our assent to the trial period of three-months was given in consideration of the present war strategy. Except for this overriding consideration, this Government would wish to make known its apprehension lest the proposed agreement might, by the natural tendency of such arrangements, lead to the division in fact of the Balkan region into spheres of influence.

It would be unfortunate, in view of the decisions of the Moscow Conference, if any temporary arrangement should be so conceived as to appear to be a departure from the principle adopted by the three Governments at Moscow, in definite rejection of the spheres of influence idea. Consequently this Government hopes that no projected measures will be allowed to prejudice the efforts toward directing the policies of the Allied Governments along lines of collaboration rather than independent action, since any arrangement suggestive of spheres of influence cannot but militate against the establishment and effective functioning of a broader system of general security in which all countries will have their part.

It was supposed that the three-month trial period would enable the British and Soviet Governments to determine whether such an arrangement is practicable and efficacious as applicable only to war conditions and essentially related to the military operations of their respective forces, without in any way affecting the rights and responsibilities which each of the three principal Allies will have to exercise during the period of the reestablishment of peace, and afterwards, in regard to the whole of Europe.

Finally, this Government assumes that the arrangement would have neither direct nor indirect validity as affecting the interests of

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<sup>3</sup> Not printed; but see Churchill, pp. 80-81.

this Government, or of other Governments associated with the three principal Allies.

In somewhat further detail we had stated to the British that we acknowledge that the Government whose military forces are operating in a given territory will in the ordinary course of events take the principal initiative in making decisions affecting that territory, due to the circumstances of the military operations therein. We believe that the natural tendency for such initiatives to extend to other than military fields would be strengthened by the conclusion of an agreement of the type suggested, and that the practical and military advantages sought in resorting to plans of this general nature do not counterbalance the evils inherent in such a system.

The Department's views in opposition to the doctrine of spheres of influence, with particular reference to Great Britain and the USSR, is in full accord with the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as set forth in Admiral Leahy's letter of May 16, 1944, the pertinent part of which is quoted as an attachment to this memorandum.

The evolution of events in recent months indicates that the British and Soviet Governments are in fact operating under such an arrangement, as shown chiefly by the Soviet forbearance in Greece and the teamwork in Yugoslavia where the British seem to feel, however, that the odds are against them. In Albania, where, so far as we know, no arrangement was made, the British have tried to keep a little ahead of the Russians. In Hungary the Russian military position has given the Soviet Government a predominant position, which the British have perforce had to accept. With only a somewhat precarious "lead" in Greece, the British may well feel that the scheme has neither divided in an equitable manner the areas of influence, nor protected the British position in the Mediterranean. This may account for the revival of British interest in a Balkan federation, which, if it includes Albania and Turkey, might limit to a certain degree the Slav power in the area which otherwise seems inevitably to reach toward Salonika and the Aegean coast line.

[Attachment]

EXCERPT FROM LETTER OF ADMIRAL LEAHY  
MAY 16, 1944 <sup>4</sup>

"From the point of view of national and world-wide security, our basic national policy in post-war settlements of this kind should seek to maintain the solidarity of the three great powers and in all other

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<sup>4</sup> The remainder of Admiral Leahy's top-secret letter to Secretary Hull reads as follows:

"My dear Mr. Secretary: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered your memoranda of 26 April, 1 May, and 6 May 1944, enclosing copies of memoranda

respects to establish conditions calculated to assure a long period of peace, during which, it may be hoped, arrangements will be perfected for the prevention of future world conflicts. The cardinal importance of this national policy is emphasized by a consideration of the fundamental and revolutionary changes in relative national military strengths that are being brought about in Europe as a result of the war.

"It would seem clear that there cannot be a world war, or even a great war, which does not find one or more of the great military powers on each side. At the conclusion of the present war, there will be, for the foreseeable future, only three such powers—the United States, Britain and Russia. Since it would seem in the highest degree unlikely that Britain and Russia, or Russia alone, would be aligned against the United States, it is apparent that any future world conflict in the foreseeable future will find Britain and Russia in opposite camps.

"In appraising possibilities of this nature, the outstanding fact to be noted is the recent phenomenal development of the heretofore latent Russian military and economic strength—a development which seems certain to prove epochal in its bearing on future politico-military international relationships, and which has yet to reach the

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exchanged with the President and of two despatches concerning British proposals for the disposition of Italian overseas territories. Although the original despatch has been cancelled by the British, you state that the views of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff would be of assistance to the State Department in formulating definite views concerning the disposition of the territories in question.

"From the narrower view of purely national defense, there is little in the British proposals that directly affects the United States post-war military position. From a broader aspect of national and world-wide security, however, there are involved in these proposals, and others which will follow, implications which the Joint Chiefs of Staff regard with considerable concern.

"Turning now to the specific British proposals in question, it is believed that the above remarks apply in general to the whole of the proposals but with much greater force to those proposals affecting the Dodecanese, Crete, and the general Aegean situation. While Russia might well have a political interest in the disposition of other Italian territory, she has a specific military interest in the disposition of those Mediterranean and Aegean Islands which dominate her exit from the Black Sea. This is merely the extension of her ancient interest in the Straits question, since with the modern submarine and air power, exit from the Black Sea can be denied her almost as effectively by bases in these islands as by actual possession of the Straits themselves.

"As to the question of whether bases should be under national or United Nations' jurisdiction, each case should be examined on its merits—it being important to remember that our policy and interests require that we support the concept of national as distinguished from United Nations' jurisdiction as regards the Japanese Mandates in the Pacific.

"To summarize: from the limited viewpoint of national security, there are no direct objections to the British proposals for the disposition of Italian overseas territories since United States postwar military interests are not directly affected. From the broader view of national and world-wide security, however, the United States should not support any such British proposals prior to ascertaining Russian views, lest post-war disunity of the three great powers be thereby fostered with all of the possibility of ultimate impact upon the military position of the United States which such a disaster would entail." (865.014/5-1644.)

full scope attainable with Russian resources. In contrast, as regards Britain several developments have combined to lessen her relative military and economic strength and gravely to impair, if not preclude, her ability to offer effective military opposition to Russia on the continent except possibly in defensive operations in the Atlantic coastal areas. In a conflict between these two powers the disparity in the military strengths that they could dispose upon that continent would, under present conditions, be far too great to be overcome by our intervention on the side of Britain. Having due regard to the military factors involved—resources, manpower, geography and particularly our ability to project our strength across the ocean and exert it decisively upon the continent—we might be able to successfully defend Britain, but we could not, under existing conditions, defeat Russia. In other words, we would find ourselves engaged in a war which we could not win even though the United States would be in no danger of defeat and occupation.

“It is apparent that the United States should, now and in the future, exert its utmost efforts and utilize all its influence to prevent such a situation arising and to promote a spirit of mutual cooperation between Britain, Russia and ourselves. So long as Britain and Russia cooperate and collaborate in the interests of peace, there can be no great war in the foreseeable future.

“The greatest likelihood of eventual conflict between Britain and Russia would seem to grow out of either nation initiating attempts to build up its strength, by seeking to attach to herself parts of Europe to the disadvantage and possible danger of her potential adversary. Having regard to the inherent suspicions of the Russians, to present Russia with any agreement on such matters as between the British and ourselves, prior to consultation with Russia, might well result in starting a train of events that would lead eventually in [to] the situation we most wish to avoid.”

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## RELIEF ACTIVITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE (UNRRA)

Roosevelt Papers

*The Director General of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (Lehman) to the President*

WASHINGTON, 19 January 1945.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: If it is true, as rumored, that you will soon meet with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin, I hope that you will find it possible to take up with Marshal Stalin the following matters which affect some of the most important operations of UNRRA.

1. UNRRA's plans for assistance in Poland and Czechoslovakia, an area always contemplated to be one of the most important in which UNRRA will serve, have been delayed and made difficult by our inability to obtain requisite information and permission from the Soviet Union for the transit of personnel and supplies through its territory to Poland and Czechoslovakia. Within the last twenty-four hours, however, we have been informed by the Soviet member of the Council that supplies can be shipped into these areas through Rumanian ports; there will be need for continuing arrangements.

2. At the last meeting of the Council of UNRRA, a Resolution was unanimously adopted directing UNRRA to assist persons in enemy or ex-enemy territory who have been displaced from their homes by the enemy because of race, religion or activities in favor of the United Nations. UNRRA's application to the Allied Control Commissions<sup>1</sup> to send representatives to Rumania and Bulgaria for this purpose is now pending, and it has been indicated that the Soviet Union will oppose our undertaking these tasks.

3. To dispose of these and other points over which a mutual understanding has not been developed with the Soviet Union, I proposed in June 1944, as you know, that a mission representing UNRRA visit Moscow and talk with the principal authorities of the Soviet Union. An original invitation to this mission has been postponed since September 1944; its visit to Moscow would, I am sure, facilitate our relations with the Soviet Union.

### *Request*

I hope that you can bring these matters to the attention of Marshal Stalin. The Soviet Government is, of course, an active and important member of UNRRA. We urgently need its full cooperation in all of UNRRA's work, and immediately in undertaking the activities in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria which I have described, and which we have been directed to undertake by unanimous vote of the member governments.

Faithfully yours,

HERBERT H. LEHMAN

<sup>1</sup> Regarding the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, see *post*, pp. 238-240.

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### *Briefing Book Paper*

#### RELATIONS BETWEEN UNRRA AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

It is important that UNRRA obtain the full cooperation of the Soviet Government so that relief in Eastern Europe can go forward. Such cooperation has not been readily forthcoming as evidenced by the delay on the part of the Soviet Government in (a) granting Governor Lehman's request of last June to go to Moscow to work out necessary arrangements; (b) issuing visas to permit UNRRA personnel to go



through Soviet territory to liberated Poland and Czechoslovakia; and (c) making arrangements for the transit of supplies through Soviet territory. Furthermore, UNRRA has recently applied for permission from the respective control commissions to send personnel to Rumania and Bulgaria to help relieve Jews and other victims of war, but the Soviet representative on UNRRA in Washington has indicated complete lack of sympathy with the proposal.

The first concrete development occurred on January 18 when UNRRA was advised officially by the Soviet authorities that two Black Sea ports are available for use in connection with relief and rehabilitation supplies and that the transit of supplies through Soviet territory will be permitted. This may indicate a complete reversal of the Soviet Government's previous position with reference to UNRRA, although there have been no developments as to the transit of UNRRA personnel through Soviet territory or as to the desired permission for Governor Lehman and his mission to visit Moscow.

The difficulties which UNRRA has experienced with the Soviet Government are due in part to faulty handling of relations on the part of UNRRA but primarily it may be due to the inability of the U. S. S. R. to make up its mind as to whether it desires to be a recipient of relief from UNRRA or to continue to receive supplies through the Protocol. It is essential to the success of UNRRA that it receive the active cooperation of the Soviet Government with respect to operations in Eastern Europe.

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## GERMANY

### AGREEMENTS PREPARED IN THE EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION

740.00119 EAC/7-2644

#### *Report by the European Advisory Commission Transmitting a Draft Instrument for the Unconditional Surrender of Germany*

#### REPORT BY THE EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

In virtue of the Terms of Reference of the European Advisory Commission,<sup>1</sup> agreed upon at the Moscow Conference, the Com-

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<sup>1</sup> The European Advisory Commission was established in London pursuant to agreement reached at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of October 1943. Its purpose was to study certain European questions, particularly the matter of surrender terms for Germany, and to submit joint recommendations thereon to the respective Governments. Consisting at first of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, namely Ambassador Winant, Sir William Strang, of the British Foreign Office, and Ambassador Gusev, it was enlarged in 1944 to include a representative of the Provisional Government of France. The Commission was terminated by agreement reached at the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference of 1945.

mission has given attention to the terms of surrender to be imposed on Germany and submits herewith, for the consideration of the three Governments, a draft Instrument entitled "Unconditional Surrender of Germany".

We have individually reported to our respective Governments on the course of the discussions which have resulted in the settlement of the terms of the draft Instrument. It is unnecessary for us therefore to rehearse the history of those discussions. It should be sufficient for us to say that the draft is designed as a predominantly military Instrument, consisting essentially of three parts. The first is the Preamble, which includes unqualified acknowledgment on the part of Germany of the complete defeat of the German armed forces on land, at sea and in the air. The second part is a short series of military Articles, which provide for the cessation of hostilities by all German armed forces, and which will enable the Allied Representatives to carry out the more immediate measures of disarmament in Germany. The third part is a general Article setting forth the supreme authority of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with respect to Germany, including the power completely to disarm and to demilitarize Germany and to take such other steps as the three Governments may deem requisite for future peace and security. The Article further states that the Allied Representatives will present additional political, administrative, economic, financial, military and other requirements arising from the surrender of Germany which the German authorities bind themselves to carry out unconditionally. The Commission will submit in due course, for the consideration of the three Governments, drafts of basic Proclamations, Orders, Ordinances or Instructions laying down additional requirements as provided in the general Article.

There are three matters in the draft upon which the Commission makes supplementary observations and recommendations.

#### I.

The Preamble states that the Allied Representatives, "acting by authority of their respective Governments and in the interests of the United Nations, announce the following terms of surrender, with which Germany shall comply".

The Commission has considered what action it should take or what procedure it should recommend in order to give effect to the statement that the Allied Representatives would be acting "in the interests of the United Nations".

In virtue of the discretion extended to it in its terms of reference, the Commission has, as a first step, addressed a communication, a copy of which is annexed,<sup>2</sup> to the Governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland and

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Yugoslavia and to the French Committee of National Liberation in view of their special interest in the terms of surrender for Germany. After taking into account any views expressed in response to this communication, the Commission will consider further practicable steps lying within its competence for consultation with these Governments and authorities, as well as with Governments of other United Nations.

*Note:* The Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission reserves his position in relation to the Polish Government in London.

## II.

Article 2(b) of the draft Instrument states:—

“The personnel of the formations and units of all the forces referred to in paragraph (a) above, shall, at the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the Allied State concerned, be declared to be prisoners of war, pending further decisions, and shall be subject to such conditions and directions as may be prescribed by the respective Allied Representatives.”

The Commission recommends to the three Governments the following understanding as regards Article 2 (b):—

“Under Article 2 (b) of the draft Instrument of Surrender of Germany, there is no obligation on any of the three Allied Powers to declare all or any part of the personnel of the German armed forces prisoners of war: it is their right. Such a decision may or may not be taken, depending on the discretion of the respective Commanders-in-Chief. Prisoners of war so declared will be treated in accordance with the standards of international law.”

## III.

Article 11 of the draft Instrument states:—

“The Allied Representatives will station forces and civil agencies in any or all parts of Germany as they may determine.”

The Commission will submit for the consideration of the three Governments a draft Protocol on the Zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of “Greater Berlin”.<sup>3</sup>

The Commission will also submit for the consideration of the three Governments a draft Protocol regarding the military occupation of Austria.<sup>4</sup>

JOHN G. WINANT

WILLIAM STRANG

Ф. ГYЦЕВ<sup>5</sup>

LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, S. W. 1.

25th July, 1944.

<sup>3</sup> *Post*, pp. 118–121.

<sup>4</sup> Agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France on Zones of Occupation in Austria and the Administration of the City of Vienna, signed at London July 9, 1945 (Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1600; 61 Stat. 2679).

<sup>5</sup> F. Gusev.

[Attachment]

UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF GERMANY<sup>6</sup>

TOP SECRET

The German Government and the German High Command, recognising and acknowledging the complete defeat of the German armed forces on land, at sea and in the air, hereby announce Germany's unconditional surrender.

The Representatives of the Supreme Commands of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter called the "Allied Representatives," acting by authority of their respective Governments and in interests of the United Nations, announce the following terms of surrender, with which Germany shall comply:—

## Article 1.

Germany will cease hostilities in all theaters of war against the forces of the United Nations on land, at sea, and in the air. The German Government and the German High Command will at once issue instructions to all German military, naval and air authorities and to all forces under German control to cease hostilities at . . . . hours Central European Time on . . . . . (date) . . . . .<sup>7</sup>

## Article 2.

(a) All armed forces of Germany or under German control, wherever they may be situated, including land, air, anti-aircraft and naval forces, the S. S., S. A. and Gestapo, and all other forces or auxiliary organisations equipped with weapons, will be completely disarmed, handing over their weapons and equipment to local Allied Commanders or to officers designated by the Allied Representatives.

<sup>6</sup> A letter from the Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of War (Stimson) dated February 28, 1945, referred to this document as follows:

" . . . Text of surrender terms of Germany was agreed upon in the European Advisory Commission on July 25, 1944. Notification of the President's approval of this document was received by the Department of State on August 8, 1944. Ambassador Winant gave formal notification of the United States Government's approval of the surrender terms on August 9, 1944. In a letter to the Chairman of the European Advisory Commission dated September 21, 1944, Sir William Strang announced the formal approval of the surrender terms by the British Government. In a letter to the Chairman dated December 14, 1944 the approval of the Soviet Government was also announced." (740.00119 EAC/2-2845.)

An agreement of May 1, 1945, between the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France (not printed), amended this agreement to include France within its provisions, as a result of decisions reached at Yalta. The draft instrument of July 25, 1944, as amended on May 1, 1945, was not used, however, on the occasion of the actual surrender of Germany, but was incorporated in large part into the Declaration Regarding Defeat of Germany and Assumption of Supreme Authority by Allied Powers, issued on June 5, 1945. See Walter Bedell Smith, *My Three Years in Moscow* (New York, 1950), pp. 19-20; also *Decade*, pp. 505-511; or Department of State *Bulletin*, June 10, 1945, vol. xii, pp. 1051-1055.

<sup>7</sup> Points appear in the original.

(b) The personnel of the formations and units of all the forces referred to in paragraph (a) above shall, at the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Allied State concerned, be declared to be prisoners of war, pending further decisions, and shall be subject to such conditions and directions as may be prescribed by the Allied Representatives.

(c) All forces referred to in paragraph (a) above, wherever they may be, will remain in their present positions pending instructions from the Allied Representatives.

(d) Evacuation by the said forces of all territories outside the frontiers of Germany as they existed on the 31st December, 1937, will proceed according to instructions to be given by the Allied Representatives.

(e) Detachments of civil police to be armed with small arms only, for the maintenance of order and for guard duties, will be designated by the Allied Representatives.

#### Article 3.

(a) All aircraft of any kind or nationality in Germany or German-occupied or controlled territories or waters, military, naval or civil, other than aircraft in the service of the Allies, will remain on the ground, on the water or aboard ships pending further instructions.

(b) The German authorities will forthwith order all German or German-controlled aircraft in or over territories or waters not occupied or controlled by Germany to proceed to Germany or to such other place or places as may be specified by the Allied Representatives.

#### Article 4.

(a) The German authorities will issue orders to all German or German-controlled naval vessels, surface and submarine, auxiliary naval craft, and merchant and other shipping, wherever such vessels may be at the time of surrender, and to all other merchant ships of whatever nationality in German ports, to remain in or proceed immediately to ports and bases as specified by the Allied Representatives. The crews of such vessels will remain on board pending further instructions.

(b) All ships and vessels of the United Nations, whether or not title has been transferred as the result of prize court or other proceedings, which are at the disposal of Germany or under German control at the time of surrender, will proceed at the dates and to the ports or bases specified by the Allied Representatives.

#### Article 5.

(a) The German authorities will hold intact and in good condition at the disposal of the Allied Representatives, for such purposes and at such times and places as they may prescribe—

(i) all arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and supplies and other implements of war of all kinds and all other war material;

(ii) all naval vessels of all classes, both surface and submarine, auxiliary naval craft and all merchant shipping, whether afloat, under repair or construction, built or building;

(iii) all aircraft of all kinds, aviation and anti-aircraft equipment and devices;

(iv) all transportation and communications facilities and equipment, by land, water or air;

(v) all military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications, installations and establishments;

(vi) all factories, plants, shops, research institutions, laboratories, testing stations, technical data, patents, plans, drawings and inventions, designed or intended to produce or to facilitate the production or use of the articles, materials and facilities referred to in sub-paragraphs (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) above, or otherwise to further the conduct of war.

(b) The German authorities will at the demand of the Allied Representatives furnish—

(i) the labor, services, and plant required for the maintenance or operation of any of the six categories mentioned in paragraph (a) above; and

(ii) any information or records that may be required by the Allied Representatives in connection with the same.

(c) The German authorities will at the demand of the Allied Representatives provide all facilities for the movement of Allied troops and agencies, their equipment and supplies, on the railways, roads and other land communications or by sea, river or air. The German authorities will maintain all means of transportation in good order and repair and will furnish the labor, services and plant necessary therefor.

#### Article 6.

(a) The German authorities will release to the Allied Representatives, in accordance with the procedure to be laid down by them, all prisoners of war at present in their power, belonging to the forces of the United Nations, and will furnish full lists of these persons indicating the places of their detention in Germany or territory occupied by Germany. Pending the release of such prisoners of war, the German authorities will protect them in their persons and property and provide them with adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical attention and money in accordance with their rank or official position.

(b) The German authorities will in like manner provide for and release all other nationals of the United Nations who are confined, interned or otherwise under restraint, and all other persons who may

be confined, interned or otherwise under restraint for political reasons or as a result of any Nazi action, law or regulation which discriminates on the ground of race, color, creed or political belief.

(c) Without prejudice to the foregoing provisions of this Article the German authorities will hand over control of the places of detention there mentioned to such officers as may be designated for the purpose by the Allied Representatives.

#### Article 7.

The German authorities will furnish to the Allied Representatives—

(a) full information regarding the forces referred to in Article 2 (a), and in particular will within twenty-four hours of the time of surrender furnish all information which the Allied Representatives may require concerning the numbers, locations and dispositions of such forces, whether located inside or outside Germany;

(b) complete and detailed information concerning mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by land, sea or air, and the safety lanes in connection therewith. All such safety lanes will be kept open and clearly marked; all mines, minefields and other dangerous obstacles will as far as possible be rendered safe, and all aids to navigation will be reinstated. Unarmed German military and civilian personnel with the necessary equipment will be made available and utilised for the above purposes and for the removal of mines, minefields and other obstacles as directed by the Allied Representatives.

#### Article 8.

The German authorities will prevent the destruction, removal, concealment, transfer or scuttling of, or damage to, all military, naval, air, shipping, port, industrial and other like property and facilities and all records and archives, wherever they may be situated, except as may be directed by the Allied Representatives.

#### Article 9.

Pending the institution of control by the Allied Representatives over all means of communication, all radio and telecommunication installations and other forms of wire or wireless communications, whether ashore or afloat, under German control, will cease transmission except as directed by the Allied Representatives.

#### Article 10.

The forces, nationals, ships, aircraft, military equipment, and other property in Germany or in German control or service or at German disposal, of any other country at war with any of the Allies, will be subject to the provisions of this Instrument and of any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder.

#### Article 11.

The Allied Representatives will station forces and civil agencies in any or all parts of Germany as they may determine.

Article 12.

(a) The United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany, as they deem requisite for future peace and security.

(b) The Allied Representatives will present additional political, administrative, economic, financial, military and other requirements arising from the surrender of Germany. The Allied Representatives, or persons or agencies duly designated to act on their authority, will issue proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions for the purpose of laying down such additional requirements and of giving effect to the other provisions of the present Instrument. The German Government, the German High Command, all German authorities and the German people shall carry out unconditionally the requirements of the Allied Representatives and shall fully comply with all such proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions.

Article 13.

This Instrument will enter into force and effect immediately upon signature. In the event of failure on the part of the German authorities or people promptly and completely to fulfil their obligations hereby or hereafter imposed, the Allied Representatives will take whatever action may be deemed by them to be appropriate under the circumstances.

Article 14.

This Instrument is drawn up in the English, Russian and German languages. The English and Russian are the only authentic texts. In case of any question as to the meaning of any of the provisions of this Instrument, the decision of the Allied Representatives shall be final.

(Date and year) . . . . . (Place) . . . . .  
 . . . . .<sup>8</sup> (Hours—Central European Time).

*Signed by the Allied  
 Representatives:*

*Signed by the Representatives  
 of the German Government  
 and the German High Com-  
 mand thereunto duly author-  
 ized:*

(Name) . . . . .	(Title) . . . . .	(Name) . . . . .	(Title) . . . . .
(Name) . . . . .	(Title) . . . . .	(Highest German civil authority)	
(Name) . . . . .	(Title) . . . . .	(Name) . . . . .	(Title) . . . . .
		(Highest German military authority) <sup>8</sup>	

The above text of the UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF GERMANY has been prepared by the European Advisory Commission on the

<sup>8</sup> Points appear in the original.



instructions of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The text of the Unconditional Surrender, as agreed in the English and Russian languages, consists of fourteen articles and has been unanimously accepted by the Representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission at a meeting of the Commission held on the 25th July, 1944 and is now submitted to their respective Governments for approval.

<p>Representative of the Government of the United States of America on the European Adviso- ry Commission</p>	<p>Representative of the Government of the United Kingdom on the European Advisory Commis- sion</p>	<p>Representative of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commis- sion</p>
<p>JOHN G. WINANT LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON. 25th July, 1944.</p>	<p>WILLIAM STRANG</p>	<p>Ф. ГУСЕВ<sup>9</sup></p>

<sup>9</sup> F. Gusev.

L/T Files

*Protocol Between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union Regarding the Zones of Occupation in Germany and the Administration of Greater Berlin*<sup>1</sup>

#### PROTOCOL

between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of "Greater Berlin".

<sup>1</sup> An undated appendix to J. C. S. 577/28 consists of a draft of a message to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy as follows:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend you advise Secretary of State that there are no reasons from a military viewpoint why the draft Protocol of European Advisory Commission relative to Zones of Occupation in Germany and Administration of Greater Berlin should not be approved."

For the text of the agreement of November 14, 1944, between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union regarding amendments to this protocol, see *infra*.

A letter from the Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of War (Stimson) dated February 28, 1945, referred to the protocol as amended as follows:

"... Notification of the President's approval of the protocol as amended was received by the Department of State on December 4, 1944. Pending the conclusion of conversations between British and American military authorities with regard to the zones, however, it was not until February 1, 1945 in a telegram sent from Malta by the Secretary of State that Ambassador Winant was authorized to inform the European Advisory Commission of this Government's approval of the amended protocol. The official approval of the British Government was announced on December 5, 1944 and the Soviet Government made known its approval on February 6, 1945." (740.00119 EAC/2-2845.) See under Malta Conference, *post*, p. 515.

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have reached the following agreement with regard to the execution of Article 11 of the Instrument of Unconditional Surrender of Germany:<sup>2</sup>—

1. Germany, within her frontiers as they were on the 31st December, 1937, will, for the purposes of occupation, be divided into three zones, one of which will be allotted to each of the three Powers, and a special Berlin area, which will be under joint occupation by the three Powers.

2. The boundaries of the three zones and of the Berlin area, and the allocation of the three zones as between the U. S. A., the U. K. and the U. S. S. R. will be as follows:—

*Eastern Zone (as shewn on the annexed map "A")<sup>3</sup>*

The territory of Germany (including the province of East Prussia) situated to the East of a line drawn from the point on Lübeck Bay where the frontiers of Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg meet, along the western frontier of Mecklenburg to the frontier of the province of Hanover, thence, along the eastern frontier of Hanover, to the frontier of Brunswick; thence along the western frontier of the Prussian province of Saxony to the western frontier of Anhalt; thence along the western frontier of Anhalt; thence along the western frontier of the Prussian province of Saxony and the western frontier of Thuringia to where the latter meets the Bavarian frontier; thence eastwards along the northern frontier of Bavaria to the 1937 Czechoslovakian frontier, will be occupied by armed forces of the U. S. S. R., with the exception of the Berlin area, for which a special system of occupation is provided below.

*North-Western Zone (as shewn on the annexed map "A")*

The territory of Germany situated to the west of the line defined above, and bounded on the south by a line drawn from the point where the western frontier of Thuringia meets the frontier of Bavaria; thence westwards along the southern frontiers of the Prussian provinces of Hessen-Nassau and Rheinprovinz to where the latter meets the frontier of France will be occupied by armed forces of . . . .<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> *Anie*, p. 116.

<sup>3</sup> Map not reproduced.

<sup>4</sup> Points appear in the original.

*South-Western Zone  
(as shown on the annexed map "A")*

All the remaining territory of Western Germany situated to the south of the line defined in the description of the North-Western Zone will be occupied by armed forces of . . . . .<sup>5</sup>

The frontiers of States (Länder) and Provinces within Germany, referred to in the foregoing descriptions of the zones, are those which existed after the coming into effect of the decree of 25th June, 1941 (published in the Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, No. 72, 3rd July, 1941).

*Berlin Area (as shown on the annexed 4 sheets of map "B")<sup>6</sup>*

The Berlin area (by which expression is understood the territory of "Greater Berlin" as defined by the Law of the 27th April, 1920) will be jointly occupied by armed forces of the U. S. A., U. K., and U. S. S. R., assigned by the respective Commanders-in-Chief. For this purpose the territory of "Greater Berlin" will be divided into the following three parts:—

*North-Eastern part of "Greater Berlin"* (districts of Pankow, Prenzlauerberg, Mitte, Weissensee, Friedrichshain, Lichtenberg, Treptow, Köpenick) will be occupied by the forces of the U. S. S. R.:

*North-Western part of "Greater Berlin"* (districts of Reinickendorf, Wedding, Tiergarten, Charlottenburg, Spandau, Wilmersdorf) will be occupied by the forces of . . . . .<sup>5</sup>

*Southern part of "Greater Berlin"* (districts of Zehlendorf, Steglitz, Schöneberg, Kreuzberg, Tempelhof, Neukölln) will be occupied by the forces of . . . . .<sup>5</sup>

The boundaries of districts within "Greater Berlin", referred to in the foregoing descriptions, are those which existed after the coming into effect of the decree published on 27th March, 1938 (Amtsblatt der Reichshauptstadt Berlin No. 13 of 27th March, 1938, page 215).

3. The occupying forces in each of the three zones into which Germany is divided will be under a Commander-in-Chief designated by the Government of the country whose forces occupy that zone.

4. Each of the three Powers may, at its discretion, include among the forces assigned to occupation duties under the command of its Commander-in-Chief, auxiliary contingents from the forces of any other Allied Power which has participated in military operations against Germany.

5. An Inter-Allied Governing Authority (Komendatura) consisting of three Commandants, appointed by their respective Commanders-

<sup>5</sup> Points appear in the original.

<sup>6</sup> Map not reproduced.

in-Chief, will be established to direct jointly the administration of the "Greater Berlin" Area.

6. This Protocol has been drawn up in triplicate in the English and Russian languages. Both texts are authentic. The Protocol will come into force on the signature by Germany of the Instrument of Unconditional Surrender.

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The above text of the Protocol between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of "Greater Berlin" has been prepared and unanimously adopted by the European Advisory Commission at a meeting held on 12th September, 1944, with the exception of the allocation of the North-Western and South-Western zones of occupation in Germany and the North-Western and Southern parts of "Greater Berlin", which requires further consideration and joint agreement by the Governments of the U. S. A., U. K. and U. S. S. R.

Representative of the Government of the U. S. A. on the Eu- ropean Advisory Commission: JOHN G. WINANT	Representative of the Government of the U. K. on the European Advisory Commission: WILLIAM STRANG	Representative of the Government of the U. S. S. R. on the European Advisory Commission: Ф. ГYЦЕВ <sup>7</sup>
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LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, S. W. 1.

12th September, 1944.

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<sup>7</sup>F. Gusev.

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L/T Files

*Agreement Between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union Regarding Amendments to the Protocol of September 12, 1944, on the Zones of Occupation in Germany and the Administration of Greater Berlin*<sup>1</sup>

Agreement regarding Amendments to the Protocol of 12th September, 1944, between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of "Greater Berlin".

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<sup>1</sup> Regarding approval of this agreement, see *ante*, p. 118, footnote 1.

1. In place of the description of the North-Western Zone given in paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned Protocol, the description of the North-Western Zone will read as follows:—

*“North-Western Zone (as shown on the annexed map “C”<sup>2</sup>)*

The territory of Germany situated to the west of the line defined in the description of the Eastern zone, and bounded on the south by a line drawn from the point where the frontier between the Prussian provinces of Hanover and Hessen-Nassau meets the western frontier of the Prussian province of Saxony; thence along the southern frontier of Hanover; thence along the north-western, western and southern frontiers of Hessen-Nassau to the point where the River Rhine leaves the latter; thence along the center of the navigable channel of the River Rhine to the point where it leaves Hessen-Darmstadt; thence along the western frontier of Baden to the point where this frontier becomes the Franco-German frontier will be occupied by armed forces of the United Kingdom.”

2. In place of the description of the South-Western Zone given in paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned Protocol, the description of the South-Western Zone will read as follows:—

*“South-Western Zone (as shown on the annexed map “C”<sup>2</sup>)*

The territory of Germany situated to the south of a line commencing at the junction of the frontiers of Saxony, Bavaria and Czechoslovakia and extending westward along the northern frontier of Bavaria to the junction of the frontiers of Hessen-Nassau, Thuringia and Bavaria; thence north, west and south along the eastern, northern, western and southern frontiers of Hessen-Nassau to the point where the River Rhine leaves the southern frontier of Hessen-Nassau; thence southwards along the center of the navigable channel of the River Rhine to the point where it leaves Hessen-Darmstadt; thence along the western frontier of Baden to the point where this frontier becomes the Franco-German frontier will be occupied by armed forces of the United States of America.”

3. The following additional paragraph will be inserted after the description of the South-Western Zone:—

“For the purpose of facilitating communications between the South-Western Zone and the sea, the Commander-in-Chief of the United States forces in the South-Western Zone will

<sup>2</sup> Map not reproduced.

- (a) exercise such control of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven and the necessary staging areas in the vicinity thereof as may be agreed hereafter by the United Kingdom and United States military authorities to be necessary to meet his requirements;
- (b) enjoy such transit facilities through the North-Western Zone as may be agreed hereafter by the United Kingdom and United States military authorities to be necessary to meet his requirements."

4. At the end of the description of the North-Western part of "Greater Berlin" given in paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned Protocol, insert the following words:—

"the United Kingdom"

5. At the end of the description of the Southern part of "Greater Berlin" given in paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned Protocol, insert the following words:—

"the United States of America"

6. In the English text of the sub-paragraph in paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned Protocol beginning with the words "The frontiers of States (Länder) and Provinces," the words "descriptions to the zones" will read "descriptions of the zones."

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The above text of the Agreement regarding Amendments to the Protocol of 12th September, 1944, between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of "Greater Berlin" has been prepared and unanimously adopted by the European Advisory Commission at a meeting held on the 14th November, 1944.

For the Representative of the Government of the United States of America on the European Advisory Commission:

PHILIP E. MOSELY

Representative of the Government of the United Kingdom on the European Advisory Commission:

WILLIAM STRANG

Representative of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission:

Ф. ГУСЕВ<sup>3</sup>

LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, S. W. 1.

14th November, 1944.

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<sup>3</sup> F. Gusev.

EUR Files

*The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the President*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 25, 1944.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached hereto a photostatic copy of an agreement reached in the European Advisory Commission for submission to the American, British and Soviet Governments, with regard to control machinery in Germany, together with the minutes of the meeting of the Commission on November 14, 1944, at which the agreement was signed.<sup>1</sup>

The Department of State would appreciate being informed whether this agreement, which is the result of careful consideration and close consultation with the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War and Navy Departments, is agreeable to you in order that Ambassador Winant may be informed as soon as possible of the United States Government's approval of this agreement. Copies are also being submitted to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the Navy.

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

[Attachment]

AGREEMENT ON CONTROL MACHINERY IN GERMANY<sup>2</sup>

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have reached the following Agreement with regard to the organisation of the Allied control machinery in Germany in the period during which Germany will be carrying out the basic requirements of unconditional surrender:—

## Article 1.

Supreme authority in Germany will be exercised, on instructions from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the supreme organ of control constituted under the present Agreement.

<sup>1</sup> The minutes of the meeting referred to are not printed herein. The photostatic copy of the agreement was not found attached to the copy of the covering memorandum in the EUR Files. It is reproduced here from the original agreement, which is in the L/T Files.

<sup>2</sup> A letter from the Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of War (Stimson) dated February 28, 1945, referred to this agreement as follows:

“ . . . The Department of State was informed of its approval by the President on January 23, 1945 and on January 24, 1945 Ambassador Winant formally notified the members of the Commission. Approval of the agreement by the British Government was made known on December 5, 1944 and the Soviet Government approved it on February 6, 1945.” (740.00119 EAC/2-2845.)

## Article 2.

Each Commander-in-Chief in his zone of occupation will have attached to him military, naval and air representatives of the other two Commanders-in-Chief for liaison duties.

## Article 3.

(a) The three Commanders-in-Chief, acting together as a body, will constitute a supreme organ of control called the Control Council.

(b) The functions of the Control Council will be:—

(i) to ensure appropriate uniformity of action by the Commanders-in-Chief in their respective zones of occupation;

(ii) to initiate plans and reach agreed decisions on the chief military, political, economic and other questions affecting Germany as a whole, on the basis of instructions received by each Commander-in-Chief from his Government;

(iii) to control the German central administration, which will operate under the direction of the Control Council and will be responsible to it for ensuring compliance with its demands;

(iv) to direct the administration of "Greater Berlin" through appropriate organs.

(c) The Control Council will meet at least once in ten days; and it will meet at any time upon request of any one of its members. Decisions of the Control Council shall be unanimous. The chairmanship of the Control Council will be held in rotation by each of its three members.

(d) Each member of the Control Council will be assisted by a political adviser, who will, when necessary, attend meetings of the Control Council. Each member of the Control Council may also, when necessary, be assisted at meetings of the Council by naval or air advisers.

## Article 4.

A permanent Co-ordinating Committee will be established under the Control Council, composed of one representative of each of the three Commanders-in-Chief, not below the rank of General Officer or the equivalent rank in the naval or air forces. Members of the Co-ordinating Committee will, when necessary, attend meetings of the Control Council.

## Article 5.

The duties of the Co-ordinating Committee, acting on behalf of the Control Council and through the Control Staff, will include:—

(a) the carrying out of the decisions of the Control Council;

(b) the day-to-day supervision and control of the activities of the German central administration and institutions;

(c) the co-ordination of current problems which call for uniform measures in all three zones;



(d) the preliminary examination and preparation for the Control Council of all questions submitted by individual Commanders-in-Chief.

#### Article 6.

(a) The members of the Control Staff, appointed by their respective national authorities, will be organised in the following Divisions:—

Military; Naval; Air; Transport; Political; Economic; Finance; Reparation, Deliveries and Restitution; Internal Affairs and Communications; Legal; Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons; Man-power.

Adjustments in the number and functions of the Divisions may be made in the light of experience.

(b) At the head of each Division there will be three high-ranking officials, one from each Power. The duties of the three heads of each Division, acting jointly, will include:—

(i) exercising control over the corresponding German Ministries and German central institutions;

(ii) acting as advisers to the Control Council and, when necessary, attending meetings thereof;

(iii) transmitting to the German central administration the decisions of the Control Council, communicated through the Co-ordinating Committee.

(c) The three heads of a Division will take part in meetings of the Co-ordinating Committee at which matters affecting the work of their Division are on the agenda.

(d) The staffs of the Divisions may include civilian as well as military personnel. They may also, in special cases, include nationals of other United Nations, appointed in their personal capacity.

#### Article 7.

(a) An Inter-Allied Governing Authority (Komendatura) consisting of three Commandants, one from each Power, appointed by their respective Commanders-in-Chief, will be established to direct jointly the administration of the "Greater Berlin" area. Each of the Commandants will serve in rotation, in the position of Chief Commandant, as head of the Inter-Allied Governing Authority.

(b) A Technical Staff, consisting of personnel of each of the three Powers, will be established under the Inter-Allied Governing Authority, and will be organised to serve the purpose of supervising and controlling the activities of the local organs of "Greater Berlin" which are responsible for its municipal services.

(c) The Inter-Allied Governing Authority will operate under the general direction of the Control Council and will receive orders through the Co-ordinating Committee.

## Article 8.

The necessary liaison with the Governments of other United Nations chiefly interested will be ensured by the appointment by such Governments of military missions (which may include civilian members) to the Control Council, having access, through the appropriate channels, to the organs of control.

## Article 9.

United Nations' organisations which may be admitted by the Control Council to operate in Germany will, in respect of their activities in Germany, be subordinate to the Allied control machinery and answerable to it.

## Article 10.

The Allied organs for the control and administration of Germany outlined above will operate during the initial period of the occupation of Germany immediately following surrender, that is, the period when Germany is carrying out the basic requirements of unconditional surrender.

## Article 11.

The question of the Allied organs required for carrying out the functions of control and administration in Germany in a later period will be the subject of a separate Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The above text of the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has been prepared and unanimously adopted by the Representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission at a meeting held on 14th November, 1944, and is now submitted to their respective Governments for approval.

For the Representative of the Government of the United States of America on the European Advisory Commission:

PHILIP E. MOSELY

LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, S.W.1.

14th November, 1944.

Representative of the Government of the United Kingdom on the European Advisory Commission:

WILLIAM STRANG

Representative of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission:

Ф. ГYЦЕВ<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> F. Gusev.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

LONDON, 10 January 1945.

Personal and Secret for the President from Winant. Number 2047.

I have been informed by the State Department that the agreement on control machinery<sup>2</sup> recommended by the European Advisory Commission, and the protocol on zones of occupation in Germany and area of Berlin,<sup>3</sup> likewise recommended by the European Advisory Commission, will shortly be before you for final approval by the U. S. Government.

The control machinery agreement has been approved by the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I understand similar approval will be given to the German occupation protocol when the Combined Chiefs of Staff have come to an agreement on the U. S. control of Bremen and Bremerhaven, which includes rail, highway and canal facilities for the supply of our troops in the American zone. Both these papers have had governmental approval by the U. K. Government. Gousev tells me the Russians are favorably considering them, and I believe they are waiting action by us.

It has been my hope that these together with the surrender instrument,<sup>4</sup> might be agreed upon by the three Governments prior to January 14th, which marks the completion of one year of work of the European Advisory Commission. These are the three basic agreements which are necessary to Allied control of Germany. Their acceptance will release many other papers of secondary importance that have been considered during the past year. I also believe it would be very useful to have these agreements an accomplished fact before your meeting with Churchill and Stalin.

The only basic policy directive that we have received from the heads of the three governments was agreement on unconditional surrender. The surrender terms were based on that directive and are in conformity with it. They provide for the three Allies taking complete military and civil power over Germany.

The agreement on control establishes the necessary machinery to implement the surrender terms but in no way prejudices the policy which may be applied toward Germany. It simply establishes the

<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

A copy of this message was sent from the White House to the Department of State with a memorandum of January 10 "for preparation of a draft reply". A notation by Bohlen on the memorandum reads: "Admiral Leahy informed that we having [have] been awaiting Pres' O. K. on control machinery for Germany & therefore could not answer Winants cable until Pres had made his decision." (740.00119 EAC/1-1045.)

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 118-123.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, pp. 113-118.

mechanics essential to any program that may be determined by those responsible for policy.

The German occupation protocol is an agreement on the delineation of zones of occupation in Germany and the division of areas for joint occupation of Berlin. It also defines the agreed area of Berlin. Again this paper in no way prejudices policy with respect to the treatment of Germany.

The unconditional surrender instrument is drawn so that surrender can be signed by both civil and military German authorities, or can be signed by either the civil or the military. If the defeat of Germany, on the other hand, can only be accomplished by the surrender of local commanders, the instrument can, with few verbal changes, be issued as a surrender proclamation.

All these three documents were recommended by the European Advisory Commission prior to the admission of a French representative. Whatever changes may be asked for by the French, and agreed to by the three Governments, can be accomplished by later amendment. The important thing in my judgment is to get agreement by the three major powers.

740.00119 EAC/1-1945

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*The Secretary of State to the President*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 19, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Agreement with regard to control Machinery for Germany

There is attached hereto a copy of my memorandum of November 25, 1944<sup>1</sup> recommending that you approve the agreement reached in the European Advisory Commission with regard to control machinery for Germany.<sup>2</sup>

The members of the Commission were formally notified of the approval of this agreement by the British Government on December 5, 1944 and similar approval by the Soviet Government is expected momentarily. It is, therefore, a matter of the utmost urgency that Ambassador Winant be advised forthwith whether this basic document has the approval of the United States, if we are to avoid placing ourselves in an embarrassing position in the European Advisory Commission. It is for this reason that I urge you to give me your decision on this agreement at your earliest convenience.

The Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy in a letter dated December 27, 1944,<sup>3</sup> which was received by the Department of State on January 5, 1945, have recommended its approval.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 124.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 124-127.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

Roosevelt Papers

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the President*

SECRET

LONDON, January 28, 1945.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: At a conference called by Mr. Eden at the Foreign Office nearly three years ago, to which he invited Maisky and myself, the idea of a coordinated policy of the three great Powers in relation to Europe was discussed. At that meeting Maisky stated that there were two ways of approaching the European problem. One was to agree that all questions affecting Eastern Europe and within the area of Russian military action could be the primary consideration of his country and that problems affecting Western Europe within an area of future Anglo-American military control could be a responsibility of Great Britain and the United States, or (two) that the three nations should work together to destroy Fascist and Nazi domination and to restore and rehabilitate Europe to conditions of peace. Maisky went on to say that his Government supported the concept of tripartite action.

I believe it was in part as a result of these informal conversations that the idea of the Moscow Conference emerged. One of the results of that Conference was the establishment of the European Advisory Commission. It was while we were at Teheran, fourteen months ago, that you made me a member of that Commission. The Russians were not members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and the creation of the European Advisory Commission gave them representation on a continuing body to study and recommend joint policies for the treatment of Germany and Austria and of the satellite states.

Each of the three countries appointed Advisers to their respective representatives from their State Departments and from the three branches of their armed services—Army, Navy and Air. The responsibility for appointment of the Advisers rested on the respective services. The conclusions and recommendations reached by the Commission have been by unanimous agreement and with the concurrence of the Advisers.

When I returned to London to take up my duties on the Commission, I understood from you that there was agreement at Teheran on the basic principle of unconditional surrender, and that you supported the principle of tripartite responsibility following unconditional surrender. You also told me that you wished United States troops to occupy the northwestern zone in Germany following unconditional surrender. These directions which you gave me as guidance I followed without compromise. Holding to your instruction to insist on the northwestern zone was responsible for delay in reaching agreement on zones of occupation.

By last November 14 three basic agreements had been reached in the European Advisory Commission: the Unconditional Surrender Instrument, the Control Machinery for Germany, and the Protocol on Zones of Occupation.<sup>1</sup> The Control Machinery Agreement and the Protocol on Zones also provide for the assignment of areas for occupation in Greater Berlin and for tripartite control of the administration of Berlin. Each and all of these Agreements contains a larger share of the United States' position than of those advanced by the British or the Russians.

All three Governments have agreed on the Unconditional Surrender Instrument. The United States Government and the United Kingdom have agreed on the Control Machinery. U. S. approval of the Protocol on Zones in Germany and Areas in Berlin has been waiting until the British conceded the control of Bremen and Bremerhaven and of rail, road and canal facilities for our use in supplying our troops in the southern zone. I understand that the British and U. S. Chiefs of Staff have now reached agreement on these facilities.<sup>2</sup> It is my hope that you and the Prime Minister, or the two Secretaries of State, will get Russian governmental confirmation of the two Agreements on Zones and on Control Machinery.

Other matters that are before the European Advisory Commission I hope I will have an opportunity to discuss with you after your meeting at ARGONAUT. Harry Hopkins told me, while in London, that you were arranging for my meeting you before your return to the United States.

Control machinery was worked out within the Commission with the understanding that in the first phase of occupation after unconditional surrender there would be military control in Germany. It was understood that the commanding general of each of the three forces would both serve as a member of the Control Council and be in command of his own zone with, of course, authority to delegate such powers as he saw fit. If the French, who have been admitted to the European Commission, are to sign the Unconditional Surrender Instrument and be admitted to the Control Council and be given a zone of occupation, you would then have quadripartite instead of tripartite participation. The British have conceded this; neither the Russian representative nor myself has as yet been authorized to state a position on the French proposal.

The theory on which we have proceeded is that broad overall policies in matters affecting Germany as a whole would be arrived at by agreement between the participating Powers, either in the form of general orders or directives, and that the residue of powers would

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, pp. 113-118, 118-123, and 124-127 respectively.

<sup>2</sup> Agreement was reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Yalta on February 6 (see *post*, pp. 635-636, 639).

remain with the commanders in the zones. These general authorities affecting Germany as a whole would be agreed between the Governments in broad terms, leaving all detailing to the Control Council. The necessity for governmental agreement is due to the fact that neither the Russians nor the British are willing to delegate political authority to generals in the field. You can do this because you are not only the Chief of State but also, under the Constitution, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States. Stalin might do so but does not choose to do so. An illustration of this is the authority given by him to Vyshinsky in supervising the execution of the armistice terms in Rumania. This fact has also been made very clear to me by Gousev in the European Advisory Commission.

The converse of this is that agreements by the generals, even in the Control Council, would be subject to interference by the Governments. It is true, the generals could ask for governmental agreement, but our experience in dealing with the Russians has shown that it is easier to get agreement prior to occupation than after occupation.

If the position stated by the British and Russian Governments in the European Advisory Commission is in any way a criterion of the position of their respective Governments, they mean to force the central German government agencies, after stripping them of Nazi political leadership, to carry out their will in Germany. The question of an orderly decentralization of political Germany can come later. Both the Russian and British concept is to prevent disorder and disease, for the protection of Allied occupying forces, by making full use of German administrative functionaries. This has nothing to do with a "hard" or "soft" policy that may be adopted toward Germany.

The suggestion in the overall Civil Affairs Directive . . .,<sup>3</sup> which has just been sent to me, runs counter to this concept, and, as far as I can understand it, sets up an economic control within each of the three or four separate military zones without taking account of the existing nationalized transport system and without prior provision for common utilization of the food surpluses, most of which will be in the Russian zone, and of coal, all of which will be in the British and Russian zones. These are only examples of problems that must be faced.

There are two other considerations that I believe should not be lost sight of. One, that contradictory basic regulations in the separate zones are likely to lead to serious friction between the Allied forces of occupation and would encourage the Germans to try to play one Ally against another. Two, since we have insisted in the Surrender Instrument that the signatory Powers are "acting in the interests of the United Nations", we have taken on a trustee obligation to other

<sup>3</sup> Dated January 6, 1945; not printed. For an earlier version of this paper, see *post*, pp. 143-154.

European United Nations which we will fail to discharge unless we get agreement, for example, on freezing of property until equitable arrangements can be made to protect the rights of our other Allies to restitution and reparation.

I hope I may have an opportunity to discuss these problems with you when we meet.

Sincerely,

JOHN GILBERT WINANT

Matthews Files

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

[Excerpts]<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

LONDON, January 28, 1945.

DEAR ED, Since I have not had an opportunity to see you, there are two matters that I would like to bring to your attention before the coming Conference.

The other matter I want to take up with you has to do with the European Advisory Commission. I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I am sending to the President,<sup>2</sup> and also a copy of an Economic Directive which I received this week from the Department and was told to present to the Commission.<sup>3</sup> If you read it you will find that it is in contradiction with the position of the State Department as it relates to Germany, according to the most recent policy statement, which I am also enclosing.<sup>4</sup> This latter paper is in line with the position taken informally by the Russians and the British in the Advisory Commission.

The proposal in the Economic Directive forwarded to me is so contrary to the Russian position and to that of the British that I am postponing introducing it into the Commission until I have had an opportunity to talk with the President. If I did introduce it, the Russian Government might fail to confirm either the Control Machinery Agreement or the Protocol on Zones of Occupation recommended by the European Commission to the respective Governments. Failure to get agreement on zones of occupation in Germany, with the Russians one hundred miles from Berlin, might lead to frictions and disagreements, which would affect not only the occupation of that country but the future of Allied unity. The Control Machinery Agreement is equally necessary.

JOHN G. WINANT

<sup>1</sup> For other portions of this letter, see *post*, pp. 419-420.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. For an earlier version of this paper, see *post*, pp. 152-154.

<sup>4</sup> This enclosure is a copy of the summary, *post*, pp. 190-191.



POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES TOWARD GERMANY <sup>1</sup>

740.0011EW/9-2044

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs  
(Matthews)* <sup>2</sup>

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 20, 1944.

## MEMORANDUM

The Secretary had a meeting in his office this morning attended by Secretary Morgenthau and Secretary Stimson. The Secretary of the Treasury gave an account of what took place at Quebec while he was present.<sup>3</sup> Mr. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. White of the Treasury, and I were also present.

Secretary Morgenthau said that the question of the economic treatment of Germany came up at dinner on Wednesday night, September 13th, and Prime Minister Churchill was violently opposed to the policy eventually set forth in the President's memorandum to the Secretary of State.<sup>4</sup> He quoted Mr. Churchill as inquiring with annoyance whether he had been brought over to Quebec to discuss such a scheme as that and as stating that it would mean "England would be chained to a dead body" (Germany). Secretary Morgenthau turned to Secretary Stimson and said: "He was even more angry than you Harry". The discussion broke up apparently with the suggestion that Mr. Morgenthau (and apparently Mr. White) should discuss the question with Lord Cherwell, which they apparently did on the basis of the Treasury's memorandum.<sup>5</sup> Having convinced Lord Cherwell, the latter discussed the question again with the Prime Minister. The proposal apparently appealed to the Prime Minister on the basis that Great Britain would thus acquire a lot of Germany's iron and steel markets and eliminate a dangerous competitor. In any event, he came around completely and proved to be an advocate of the Treasury

<sup>1</sup> See also *post*, pp. 400-413.

<sup>2</sup> Carbon copy.

<sup>3</sup> For information on the Quebec Conference of September 11-16, 1944, and the so-called "Morgenthau Plan", see the forthcoming volume in this series; also *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation*, pp. 244-245; *New York Times*, September 17, 1944; *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, vol. I, pp. 207-208, vol. II, pp. 1602-1622, 1701; Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York, 1947), pp. 568-583; Henry Morgenthau, Jr., *Germany Is Our Problem* (New York, 1945); Henry Morgenthau, Jr., "Our Policy Toward Germany", *New York Post*, November 24-29, 1947; Sherwood, pp. 813-819; Leahy, pp. 259-266; Churchill, pp. 146-161.

<sup>4</sup> The President's memorandum of September 15, 1944, quoted the text of the so-called "Morgenthau Plan", which had been approved by Roosevelt and Churchill at the Second Quebec Conference.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

policy. Mr. Morgenthau said that several attempts were made to write up the understanding, none of which pleased Mr. Churchill. At Mr. Morgenthau's suggestion, the Prime Minister thereupon called in his secretary and dictated his understanding of what had been agreed. The result is the document quoted in the President's memorandum to the Secretary of State, dated September 15th. Mr. Morgenthau insisted that this was entirely the Prime Minister's drafting.

In reply to a question from Secretary Stimson, Mr. Morgenthau denied that there was any connection between the Prime Minister's acceptance of the German policy embodied in the memorandum and his eager desire to obtain a commitment on Lend-Lease in Phase 2. Mr. Morgenthau admitted, however, that the latter was clearly the Prime Minister's principal objective (in the non military field) at Quebec and that his interest in the Far Eastern campaign was to a great extent motivated by Lend-Lease.

The next day Mr. Eden arrived and, said Mr. Morgenthau, was very much upset at the decision taken on the economic treatment of Germany. He had quite a heated discussion with the Prime Minister and the latter instructed Mr. Eden not to take it up in the War Cabinet until he (Churchill) returned; that he was bent on pushing it through. Mr. Morgenthau seemed surprised at Mr. Eden's opposition as he had gained the opposite impression in his conversation with the Foreign Secretary in London a short time ago.

Mr. Morgenthau said that there was no discussion whatsoever in his presence of the partition of Germany or of German territorial amputations.

On Lend-Lease Mr. Morgenthau said that he found the President was prepared to accept the Prime Minister's thesis without question, but he (Mr. Morgenthau) had insisted that a committee be set up to work it out. Neither Mr. Morgenthau nor Mr. White seemed to feel that the committee would be any too effective in the long run in obtaining British cooperation in the field of commercial policy and other economic questions, but they felt that at least it gave us a foot in the door. In answer to my specific question, Mr. Morgenthau said that the President at no time raised any question as to what policy the British should pursue in return for our Lend-Lease assistance.

The Secretary expressed his shocked feelings at the way such vital matters were settled without any consultation with our Government experts or regard for what has gone before.

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

Treasury Files

*Memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury (White)*

[WASHINGTON, undated <sup>1</sup>]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY'S FILES

Meeting in Secretary Hull's Office 9:30 a. m., September 20, 1944

Present: Secretary Hull,  
Mr. Matthews of State Department.  
Secretary Stimson,  
Mr. McCloy of War Department.  
Secretary Morgenthau,  
Mr. White of Treasury Department.

The Secretary had requested the meeting for the purpose of reporting to Secretaries Hull and Stimson and [on?] his (Secretary Morgenthau's) participation in the Quebec Conference.

The meeting began by Secretary Hull pointing to a letter <sup>2</sup> which he had on his desk which he said was an intercept from a high South American official to his Government describing a meeting at Welles' home of high Latin American officials in which American policy toward Latin America and toward the Argentine was discussed. Hull appeared to be quite angry at the fact that Welles "seemed to be operating a second State Department" unofficially and that the President could stop him but didn't.

Secretary Morgenthau described in some detail the sequence of developments and the highlights of the discussions that took place at Quebec in which he (Secretary Morgenthau) participated. He gave Secretary Stimson and Secretary Hull a copy of the memorandum on Germany initialed by Churchill and Roosevelt <sup>3</sup> and described how the memorandum had been drafted. After his review of the discussions on the German matter he said that he would be happy to answer any questions but that he had given them the gist of all that had happened in the discussions bearing on Germany in which he participated.

Secretary Hull asked whether the question of dismemberment had been discussed and Secretary Morgenthau replied that it had not been discussed in his presence. Mr. McCloy handed a map <sup>4</sup> to Secretary Hull on which were drawn the boundary lines of the zones in Germany that were to be placed under control of U. S., U. K. and the U. S. S. R. Secretary Morgenthau said that the President had stated that he had held up the matter of agreeing on the zones until the last minute not-

<sup>1</sup> The date "9/25/44", which appears at the end of the memorandum, is evidently the date of typing.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> For the text of this memorandum, see Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, pp. 576-577.

<sup>4</sup> Not reproduced.

withstanding the pressure from the military people below. The President had wanted the British to be in charge of the Ruhr and the Saar so that they would have to implement the policy which was outlined in the memorandum initialed by Churchill and himself. Mr. McCloy added that Austria was to be governed by a combined commission of U. S., U. K., and the U. S. S. R.

Secretary Hull wanted to know how important decisions on Germany could be reached without participation of the Russians. He said he didn't know how many important decisions were being reached of that character without the knowledge of the Russians, and that that might make things very difficult. Mr. Matthews said that it was his understanding that the Russians had agreed with the U. K. and the U. S. authorities as to the boundary lines of their zone of control and that the remaining area was to be divided between American and British governments. Secretary Stimson mentioned, however, that the decision with respect to the Ruhr was a matter of broad economic ramifications and he presumed that Russia would be interested.

Secretary Morgenthau made clear that Churchill at first opposed the Treasury plan of handling the Ruhr and the Saar and described how Churchill reversed himself the following day and how Eden had objected strenuously to Churchill's reversal. He repeated Churchill's remark to Eden that "If it is between the British and German people, I am for the British . . .<sup>5</sup> and I don't want you running back to the war cabinet trying to unsell this proposal before I get there. I want to talk to them first about this."

The Secretary handed Secretary Stimson and Secretary Hull copies of the memorandum on lend-lease aid to Britain<sup>6</sup> and the accompanying directive initialed by the President.<sup>6</sup> The Secretary pointed out that the memorandum on lend-lease aid was not drafted until the final day, and that Churchill had agreed to the policy on Germany prior to the final drafting of this memorandum. He explained that the President was about to approve of the request which the British made for lend-lease aid when he interposed and recommended that a committee be appointed to consider the matter. The Secretary pointed out that he was successful in getting the matter turned over to a committee though the committee would have to act in accord with the oral conversations between Roosevelt and Churchill on the matter. The Secretary said that if he had not been there the decision would have been made right there without being referred to a committee. Hull commented that that was a good piece of work—to have the work turned over to a committee. Secretary Morgenthau informed them that the President had, in writing and orally, asked him to be chairman

<sup>5</sup> Points appear in the source text.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed.

of the American committee. The Secretary invited Mr. McCloy to attend the meeting that afternoon at 2:30<sup>7</sup> as an observer.

Secretary Morgenthau described that Churchill seemed to be interested solely in the lend-lease arrangements whereas the President was thinking of policy toward Germany and was not very interested in lend-lease arrangements.

Secretary Hull was very disturbed by the fact that the President made the decision on lend-lease with Britain without prior consultation with the men who had been working on the problem for a long time. He said that there were a number of matters with respect to commercial policy which they were trying to get from the British and which the British were running away from, and that they were delaying decisions on the lend-lease aid to Britain during Phase 2 in the hope of getting the other matters settled first. Now, however, the President had given away that bait.

I said that the directive and the accompanying memorandum could be interpreted so as to permit some flexibility of decision so far as the Americans were concerned in the amount and character of lend-lease aid that could be given the British. I mentioned that the British wanted to leave as little flexibility as possible for the committee's decision because they were quite content with the President's promise of the specific magnitude mentioned in the memorandum. Secretary Stimson, reading the memorandum over, said: "Yes, there may be some flexibility, but not much."

Secretary Morgenthau then briefly described what happened with respect to the letter of recommendation<sup>8</sup> that this Government go ahead with consummation of the negotiations of lend-lease aid to the U. S. S. R. The Secretary said that he was in a fog on these matters; that he had not been following them personally and had not raised the question at the Conference but that the President had asked him to discuss the matter with Secretary Hull. He said he thought that from what Harry Hopkins had told him some time previously that he (Harry Hopkins) had drafted the letter which went to various departments. His understanding was that the cause of the letter was the cancellation of some lend-lease material to Russia by the Army. Matthews said that that was his understanding also. The President had asked Secretary Morgenthau to discuss the matter with Secretary Hull [and Secretary Stimson].<sup>9</sup> Secretary Hull said that the negotiations had gone so far he didn't see how they could be stopped nor did

<sup>7</sup> A meeting in Secretary Morgenthau's office of members of the United States group who were about to participate in the new series of United States-United Kingdom lend-lease conversations.

<sup>8</sup> Not printed.

<sup>9</sup> Brackets appear in the source text.

he think that the letter referred to above meant to stop the concluding of the negotiations with Russia on the matter under consideration. Mr. Matthews said that on receipt of the letter they had checked with Harry Hopkins and Hopkins had said that the letter was not meant to apply to those negotiations.

Secretary Morgenthau then referred to the memoranda which had been sent to the President on lend-lease to France<sup>10</sup> involving substantial amounts of lend-lease aid to France which seemed to be for purposes of reconstruction rather than for conducting the war.

The Secretary said that the State Department had sent a memorandum to the President recommending the signing of agreements and that Harry Hopkins had also sent a note to the President recommending the agreements. The Secretary said that he wasn't up on the matter and so he had asked to telephone Bell to ask where the Treasury stood. Dan Bell had sent him a cable<sup>10</sup> stating the Treasury's disapproval of going through with the proposal. The Secretary said that there was some confusion inasmuch as Hopkins had taken the position that the signing of the agreement did not tie the President's hands whereas Bell in the cable said that it would tie the President's hands. Moreover, the Treasury felt that it was not the intent of Congress to permit lend-lease funds to be employed for relief or reconstruction purposes after the cessation of hostilities. Secretary Stimson said that he participated in the committee hearings in the first Lend-Lease Act and subsequent ones<sup>11</sup> and that it was his opinion that the purpose of the Lend-Lease Act was not to provide funds for reconstruction and rehabilitation. The fighting will have virtually stopped in France soon and to provide large sums for relief or reconstruction would, in his judgment, be not in accord with the purposes for which the Lend-Lease bill was passed. The Secretary pointed out that that was the Treasury's position. Mr. McCloy said that the President himself had directed and approved negotiations with the French calling for negotiations on lend-lease aid such as was contemplated. He said that the Treasury likewise had approved the draft of the specified arrangements with the French. Secretary Morgenthau said that there was apparently a good deal of confusion about the matter and so he had recommended to the President that decision on the matter be postponed until an opportunity was had to reexamine the matter. Secretary Morgenthau also added that the President did not want his hands tied in his dealings with the French and that Churchill, who was present at the discussion, was also strongly opposed to giving lend-lease aid to the French. Secretary Hull commented that we would have to watch that situation because that might

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<sup>10</sup> Not printed.

<sup>11</sup> Acts approved March 11, 1941 (55 Stat. 31), March 11, 1943 (57 Stat. 20), and May 17, 1944 (58 Stat. 222).

mean that the British were cooking up something with the French; that Churchill in the past had talked against De Gaulle, on different grounds to be sure, but at the same time the Foreign Office was going ahead with negotiations of a different character.

The Secretary asked Secretary Hull how he would like to proceed on this. Secretary Hull responded, rather bitterly, that he was rapidly losing interest in the whole matter; that if he was to be kept out of the discussions and the decisions on matters of such an important character that he was losing interest in the whole business. The Secretary replied that he had wanted to report to Secretary Hull and Secretary Stimson as quickly as possible all that had happened in Quebec and that he had participated in. He said that, as he had told Secretary Hull upon his return from London,<sup>12</sup> he would continue to interest himself to play an active part in considerations of policy toward Germany and the like so long as the President encouraged him to continue, and he proposed to continue until the President ceased to encourage him.

The Secretary said that he wanted to ask Secretary Hull's advice on a point; that in all of these discussions up there and here no mention was made of Secretary Forrestal. He wanted to know what Secretary Hull advised with respect to bringing Forrestal in on these matters. Secretary Hull replied that he would tell Forrestal "that his name has been mentioned." Secretary Morgenthau said that he thought Secretaries Hull, Stimson and Forrestal met once a week to discuss matters. The matter was left hanging.

Secretary Morgenthau suggested that White, McCloy and Matthews act as a committee to examine lend-lease matters with regard to France and Russia and to be prepared to report back to Secretaries Hull, Morgenthau and Stimson the following week. Secretary Hull commented that no time should be lost and the time was set for next Tuesday morning in Secretary Hull's office. Secretary Hull commented: "Well, the President has made these big decisions and it is up to us to help him out as much as we can."

The Secretary later told Mr. Matthews that if he would come over to Mr. White's office Mr. White would be glad to let him go over the file that he had in his hands and make any notes on it that he would care to make.

I told Jack McCloy that the directive<sup>13</sup> which they had drafted was an excellent job and that we were quite pleased with it. He said, "You like it?", and I said, "Yes, very much." He said, "I have been

<sup>12</sup> August 17, 1944.

<sup>13</sup> "Directive to SCAEF Regarding the Military Government of Germany in the Period Immediately Following the Cessation of Organized Resistance (Post-Defeat)", *post*, pp. 143-154.

talking to State Department yesterday on it and they are in agreement on all points except one, namely, the paragraph on economic control." I said, "That is a vital paragraph." He agreed. He asked the State Department to draft the paragraph as they wanted it and said that he would send a copy to us and we could go over the State draft with them. I asked what was the next step. He said that they were going to give a copy to the British and that they could give them everything except that paragraph. Then the British would offer their suggestions at the CCAC meeting, and he said, "I will ask you to be present so that you can participate in the discussions with the British." I said that that would be quite satisfactory.

H. D. WHITE

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Matthews Files

*The Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 23, 1944.

At a meeting yesterday in the War Department on the interim directive for Germany in which representatives of State, War and Treasury participated, there were several developments of which I think you should be apprised.

The Treasury representatives were Messrs. Pehle, Luxford and Taylor. In the course of the discussions, they made it altogether clear that in their opinion the Treasury Department, as a result of the establishment of the Cabinet Committee on Germany, should be consulted on all phases of German problems, including both political and economic. They participated vigorously in the discussion on the political directive and insinuated that the Treasury plan for the treatment of Germany had received the approval of the Cabinet Committee and the blessing of the President. They stated flatly that the economic documents, as approved by the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy, had been repudiated both by Secretary Morgenthau and Secretary Hull and that no further attention was to be given to these papers. They requested that certain other confidential memoranda be transmitted to them at once and implied that henceforth all such material should be immediately made available to the Treasury Department. In general, they took the line that henceforth the Treasury must be consulted on all important matters respecting Germany and that that was the purpose of the Cabinet Committee.

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<sup>1</sup> Carbon copy.



Matthews Files

*The Secretary of State to the President*

[WASHINGTON,] 25 September 1944.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring to your memorandum of September 15 from Quebec<sup>1</sup> on the postwar treatment of Germany which received the agreement of the Prime Minister and yourself, it occurs to me that several steps should be considered in connection with the adoption of the policy which will be carried out in Germany after its surrender or collapse.

It would seem highly advisable to have the firm agreement of the Governments of Great Britain and the Soviet Union to the policy to be adopted as we have thus far acted on the basis that every action followed with respect to Germany, particularly in the post-hostilities period, would be on an agreed tripartite basis. It has been our understanding that the Soviet Government has also acted on this general assumption, and of course the European Advisory Commission, established by the Moscow Conference, was set up for the purpose of working out the problems of the treatment of Germany. We must realize that the adoption of any other basis of procedure would enormously increase the difficulties and responsibilities not only of our soldiers in the immediate military occupational period but also of our officials in the control period following.

Our information up to the present has been to the effect that the British Government no doubt has ideas of its own with respect to the application of economic controls to Germany, and we have not yet had any indication that the British Government would be in favor of complete eradication of German industrial productive capacity in the Ruhr and Saar. We have no idea as yet what the Soviet Government has in mind. Would it not be well at this time for the State Department to sound out the British and Russian views on the treatment of German industry either through the European Advisory Commission or otherwise?

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 134, footnote 4.

862.01 AMG/9-2744

*The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge of the American Mission  
in the United Kingdom*

TOP SECRET  
No. 4583

[WASHINGTON,] September 27, 1944.

The Secretary of State encloses, for the background information and guidance of the Ambassador, a copy of "Directive to SCAEF regarding the Military Government of Germany in the Period Im-

mediately Following the Cessation of Organized Resistance (Post Defeat)", which has been prepared by the War and State Departments and concurred in by the Treasury Department. This directive has not as yet been approved by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee. It is not transmitted for submission to the European Advisory Commission.

The enclosed directive is intended to cover the interim period which may result after the defeat or surrender of Germany but before a directive has been prepared containing the policies agreed upon by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

J. W. R[IDDLEBERGER]

[Enclosure]

[WASHINGTON,] September 22, 1944.

DIRECTIVE TO SCAEF REGARDING THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE CESSATION OF ORGANIZED RESISTANCE (POST-DEFEAT)<sup>1</sup>

1. In the event that RANKIN "C" conditions obtain in Germany or that the German forces are either defeated or surrender before you have received a directive containing policies agreed upon by the three governments of the U. S., U. K., and U. S. S. R., you will be guided by the following policies, principles and instructions.

2. Prior to the defeat or surrender of Germany the primary objective of your civil affairs administration has been to aid and support your military objective: the prompt defeat of the enemy. Your objective now is primarily the occupation and administration of a conquered country with such military operations as are necessary for the complete elimination of all resistance.

3. Pending the receipt of directives containing long range policies, your objectives must be of short term and military character, in order not to prejudice whatever ultimate policies may be later determined upon. Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated enemy nation. The clear fact of German military defeat and the inevitable consequences of aggression must be appreciated by all levels of the German population. The German people must be made to understand that all necessary steps will be taken to guarantee against a third attempt by them to conquer the world. Your aim is not oppression, but to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world. In the

<sup>1</sup> This directive was circulated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as J. C. S. 1067. It was the basis upon which was developed the final directive to General Eisenhower, issued in April 1945. For the text of the final directive, as released in October 1945, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 21, 1945, vol. XIII, pp. 596-607.

accomplishment of this objective the elimination of Nazism and militarism in any of their forms and the immediate apprehension of war criminals for punishment are essential steps.

4. Your occupation and administration will be just but firm and distant. You will strongly discourage fraternization between Allied troops and the German officials and population.

5. You will establish military government over all parts of Germany under your command. Your rights, powers and status in Germany are based upon the unconditional surrender or the complete defeat of Germany.

6. *a.* By virtue of your position you are clothed with supreme legislative, executive and judicial authority in the areas occupied by forces under your command. This authority will be broadly construed and includes authority to take all measures deemed by you necessary, desirable or appropriate in relation to military exigencies and the objectives of a firm military government.

*b.* You are authorized at your discretion to delegate the authority herein granted to you in whole or in part to members of your command and further to authorize them at their discretion to make appropriate sub-delegations.

*c.* You should take the necessary measures to enforce the terms of surrender and complete the disarmament of Germany.

*d.* The Military Government shall be a military administration which, until you receive further advices, will show the characteristics of an Allied undertaking acting in the interests of the United Nations.

7. The administrative policies shall be uniform throughout those parts of Germany occupied by forces under your command subject to any special requirements due to local circumstances.

8. Representatives of civilian agencies of the U. S., U. K. and U. S. S. R. governments shall not participate unless and until you consider such participation desirable. Representatives of the civilian agencies of other Allied Governments or of UNRRA may participate only upon your recommendation and the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

9. It is contemplated that a tripartite administration by the U. S., U. K. and U. S. S. R., covering the whole of Germany will be established. You have previously received advices in this connection.

10. You are authorized as SCAEF to enter into arrangements with the U. S. S. R. military commanders as may be necessary for the occupation of Germany by the three powers.

11. Military administration shall be directed toward the promotion of the decentralization of the political structure of Germany. In the administration of areas under your command, all dealings in so far as possible should be with municipal and provincial government officials rather than with Central government officials;

12. Appendix "A", Political Directive; Appendix "B", Financial Directive; Appendix "C", Economic Directive; and Appendix "D", Relief Directive, are attached hereto. At Appendix "E" there is a chart suggestive of the tripartite form which military government for Germany might take.<sup>2</sup> At Appendix "F", there is attached the draft instrument of unconditional surrender for Germany.<sup>3</sup>

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 22 September 1944.

## APPENDIX "A"

## POLITICAL DIRECTIVE

1. You will search out, arrest, and hold, pending receipt by you of further instructions as to their disposition, Adolf Hitler, his chief Nazi associates, all persons suspected of having committed war crimes, and all persons who, if permitted to remain at large, would endanger the accomplishment of your objectives. The following is a list of the categories of persons to be arrested in order to carry out this policy. If after you have entered the country and in the light of conditions which you encounter there you do not believe all of these persons should be subjected immediately to this treatment, you should report back giving your recommendations and the reasons therefor.

(a) Officials of the Nazi party and of units or branches of the Nazi party, down to and including the leaders of local party units, as well as officials of equivalent stature in associations affiliated with the Nazi party;

(b) All political police, including the Gestapo and Sicherheitsdienst der S. S.;

(c) The officers and non-commissioned officers of the Waffen S. S. and all members of the other branches of the S. S.

(d) All high officials of the police and of the SA;

(e) The leading officials of all ministries and other high political officials of Germany and those persons who have held high positions, either civil or military, in the administration of German occupied countries;

(f) Nazis and Nazi sympathizers holding important and key positions in (1) National and Gau<sup>4</sup> civic and economic organizations; (2) corporations and other organizations in which the government has a major financial interest; (3) industry; (4) finance; (5) education; (6) judiciary; (7) the press, publishing houses and other agencies disseminating news and propaganda. It may generally be assumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary that any persons holding such positions are Nazis or Nazi sympathizers;

(g) All judges, prosecutors and officials of the People's Court;

(h) Any national of any of the United Nations who is believed to have committed offenses against his national law in support of the German war effort;

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 113-118.

<sup>4</sup> District.

(i) Any other person whose name or designation appears on lists to be submitted to you or whose name may be notified to you separately.

Of equal if not greater importance in the ultimate destruction of German Militarism is the elimination of the German Professional Officer Corps as an institution. All General Staff Corps officers who are not taken into custody as prisoners of war should therefore be arrested and held pending receipt of further instructions as to their disposition. You will receive further instructions as to how to deal with other members of the German Officers Corps.

2. If in your opinion it would be of aid in carrying out the above program and the other purposes of your occupation, you may issue such regulations dealing with the registration and identification of persons within Germany as you deem advisable.

3. You will issue a proclamation dissolving the Nazi party and its affiliates. Every possible effort should be made to prevent any attempts to reconstitute them in underground or disguised form. You will abrogate the laws establishing the political structure of National Socialism and will take all necessary measures to uproot and discredit Nazi doctrines. No secret organizations or societies of any kind shall be permitted. Property, real and personal, of the Nazi party and its affiliates, wherever found, shall be taken into custody and may be used for such purposes as you may direct. You may require health or welfare organizations which were set up by the Party but which are of direct benefit to the people to transfer their functions and personnel, purged of Nazi elements and practices, to new organizations formed to carry out such functions.

4. You will make special efforts to preserve from destruction all records and plans of the following:

(a) The central German government, German military organizations, organizations engaged in military research, and such other governmental agencies as you may deem advisable.

(b) The Nazi party and affiliated organizations.

(c) All police organizations, including security and political police.

(d) Nazi economic organizations and industrial establishments.

(e) Institutes and special bureaus established in Germany, devoting themselves to race, political, or similar research.

You may seize and remove such of these records as you may deem desirable or as you may be instructed by subsequent directive.

5. You will take immediate steps to abrogate all laws, decrees, regulations or aspects thereof, which discriminate on the basis of race, color, creed, or political opinions. All persons who are detained or placed in custody by the Nazis on these grounds will be released, subject to the interests of the individuals concerned. You will take steps to insure that such people, if not released, are provided with adequate clothing, food and quarters.

6. The criminal and civil courts of Germany will be closed. After the elimination of all Nazi elements, at such time and under such regulations, supervision and control as you may determine, you may permit the courts to resume functioning. You will retain full power of review and veto of all courts which are allowed to function. All politically objectionable courts; e. g., People's Courts, will be abolished. Criminal and ordinary police, and such others as it may be proper to retain, under appropriate supervision, must be purged of Nazi or otherwise undesirable elements, who will also be arrested and held for disposition.

7. No person in Germany, other than United Nations nationals as authorized by you, shall be permitted to possess arms of any character except that such local police as you may utilize to maintain order may be armed with such law enforcement weapons as you may deem appropriate.

8. *a.* All members of the Nazi party and ardent supporters of Naziism will be removed immediately from all government positions (other than clerks and non-policy making functionaries) and from all leading positions in industry, banking, education, judiciary, and other public services. Under no circumstances shall such persons be retained in such offices for the purpose of administrative convenience or expediency.

*b.* You will decide whether the objectives of military government are better served by the appointment of officers of the occupation forces or by the use of the services of Germans who have been cleared by the security branches of the Allied armies. Failure by such Germans as are permitted to fill Government posts to conform with Allied directives and instructions will be cause for removal and such punishment as you may deem advisable.

9. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 11 and to the extent that military interests are not prejudiced, freedom of speech and press, and of religious worship, will be permitted. Consistent with military necessity, all religious institutions will be respected and all efforts will be made to preserve historical archives, classical monuments and fine arts, except that all archives, monuments and museums of Nazi inception, or which are devoted to the perpetuation of German militarism shall be seized, closed, and their properties held pending further instructions.

10. *a.* Prisoners of war belonging to the forces of the United Nations and associated nations will be freed from confinement and placed under military control or restriction as may be appropriate pending other disposition.

*b.* All allied nations nationals who have been removed to Germany under duress to serve in labor battalions, or any other units organized by the Nazis, after identification will be repatriated in accordance with

the regulations to be established after consultation with the government of the country concerned. Pending repatriation, such persons should be adequately taken care of and, if you deem it advisable, their freedom of movement restricted. Former prisoners of war released by the Axis may be found among the forced laborers. They should be identified and requests addressed to their respective military commands for instructions as to their disposition.

*c.* All allied civilians resident or interned in Germany as a result of their presence in that country upon the outbreak of war shall be identified, examined closely and may, if you deem it advisable, be placed under restricted residence. These people will be dealt with in accordance with instructions to be furnished you by their respective governments. In general, all practical measures will be taken to insure the health and welfare of United Nations nationals, including provision for employment as authorized and practicable, and repatriation should be undertaken as rapidly as military conditions permit.

*d.* All Japanese diplomatic and consular officials will be taken into protective custody and held for further disposition. All other Japanese nationals will be interned. All nationals of other countries with which any of the United Nations are or have been at war (except Germany) will be identified and registered and may be interned or their activities curtailed as may be necessary under the circumstances. Diplomatic and consular officials of such countries will be taken into protective custody and held for further disposition.

*e.* All German diplomats and consular officials and other agents will be recalled. If their recall cannot be effected or if their recall is not practicable by reasons of nationality, their authority as agents for Germany will be terminated. All records and files of these agents and officers will be ordered returned to Germany or otherwise made available for appropriate inspection.

*f.* Nationals of neutral countries must register with the appropriate military authorities. Every facility and encouragement will be given these people to return to their home countries, except those neutrals who have actively participated in any way in the war against any one of the United Nations in which event they will be detained, pending receipt by you of further instructions as to their disposition. Neutral nationals will be accorded no special privileges of communication or business relationships with their home countries or people resident outside Germany. You shall place such restrictions on neutrals entering Germany as you deem advisable. Diplomatic and consular officials of neutrals are to be dealt with in accordance with instructions which will hereafter be issued.

11. *a.* Propagation of Nazi doctrines and Nazi propaganda in any form shall be prohibited. All schools and universities will be closed. Elementary schools should be reopened as soon as Nazi personnel have

been eliminated and text-books and curricula provided which are free of Nazi or militaristic doctrines. Steps should be initiated to prepare satisfactory text-books and curricula and obtain teaching personnel free of any taint of Naziism or militarism for secondary schools. You should report to the C. C. S. prior to reopening secondary schools. Further guidance on German education and schools will be given to you in a separate directive.

b. No political activities of any kind shall be countenanced unless authorized by you. No political personalities or organized political groups shall have any part in determining the policies of the military administration. It is essential to avoid any commitments to any political elements.

c. The publication of all newspapers, magazines, journals and other publications and the operation of all German radio stations and the dissemination of news or information by mail, movies, telephone, cable or other means throughout the area under your command will be suspended. Thereafter, you will permit the dissemination of news or information subject to such censorship and control as you consider necessary in the interests of military security and intelligence and to carry out the principles laid down in this directive.

12. No person shall be permitted to leave or enter the area under your command without your authority.

13. No German parades, military or political, civilian or sports, shall be permitted anywhere in Germany. No German military music, or German national or Nazi anthems shall be played or sung in public or before any groups or gatherings. Public display of German national or Nazi flags and other paraphernalia of Nazi or affiliated organizations shall be prohibited. All flags, publications, other paraphernalia, records, documents and publications in the offices of the Nazi party or affiliated organizations shall be seized and amounts shall be set aside to distribute to approved foreign museums and the remainder will be held for disposition under the direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staffs.

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 22 September 1944.

#### APPENDIX "B"

#### FINANCIAL DIRECTIVE

1. United States, British and other Allied forces will use Allied Military marks and Reichsmark currency or coins in their possession. Allied Military marks and Reichsmark currency and coin now in circulation in Germany will be legal tender without distinction and will be interchangeable at a rate of 1 Allied Military mark for 1 Reichsmark. Records will be kept of the amounts of the German



marks used by the forces of each nation. Reichskreditkassenscheine and other German Military currency will not be legal tender in Germany.

2. In the event, however, that for any reason adequate supplies of Allied Military marks and/or Reichsmarks are not available, the United States forces will use yellow seal dollars and regular United States coins and the British forces will use British Military authority notes and regular British coins. Records will be kept of the amounts of currencies used by the United States and British forces.

3. If it is found necessary to use U. S. yellow seal dollars and BMA notes, the following provisions will apply to such use:

a. The rate of exchange between the U. S. yellow seal dollar and the BMA notes will be 4.035 dollars to one pound, and the two currencies will be interchangeable at that rate. The United States Treasury will make the necessary arrangements with the British Treasury.

b. You will issue a proclamation, if necessary, requiring all persons to accept U. S. yellow seal dollars and BMA notes at the decreed rates. Transactions at any other rates will be prohibited.

c. The issuance of yellow seal dollars and BMA notes will cease and Allied Military mark and/or Reichsmark currency will be used in their place as soon as available.

d. U. S. yellow seal dollars and BMA notes will be withdrawn from circulation as soon as such withdrawal can be satisfactorily accomplished.

e. Records will be kept of the amounts of such currencies used by the United States, British and other Allied forces.

4. The rate of exchange to be used exclusively for pay of troops and military accounting purposes will be — marks to the dollar and — marks to the pound sterling. A general rate of exchange may be furnished to you later. Holders of mark currency or deposits will not be entitled to purchase foreign exchange without special permission. They will obtain dollars or pounds, or any other foreign currency or foreign exchange credits, only in accordance with exchange regulations issued by you.

5. The Financial Division of the Civil Affairs Section for Germany will include in its functions the control of all funds to be used by the Allied Military Forces within the area, except yellow seal dollars and BMA notes which will be under the control of U. S. and British forces respectively. It will maintain all the accounts and records necessary to indicate the supply, control, and movement of these currencies including yellow seal dollars and BMA notes, and other funds, as well as financial data required for the determination of expenditures arising out of operations or activities involving participation of Allied Military forces.

a. Insofar as operations relate to the provisions of currencies for the pay and other case [cash?] requirements of military components of

the Allied forces, the Financial Division will supply Allied Military marks from currency on hand and will record the debit against the military force concerned at the rate of exchange prescribed in paragraph 4 above.

*b.* Insofar as operations relate to the provision of currencies for civil administration, the Finance Division will supply Allied Military marks from currency on hand and will record the debit against the Allied Military Government.

*c.* If found practicable and desirable, you will designate, under direct military control and supervision, the Reichsbank, or any branch thereof, or any other bank satisfactory to you, as agent for the Financial Division of the Civil Affairs Section. When satisfied that the Reichsbank, or any branch thereof, or other designated bank, is under adequate military control and supervision, you may use that bank for official business. It is not anticipated that you will make credits available to the Reichsbank or any other bank. However, if in your opinion, such action becomes essential, you should report the facts to the C. C. S. for further instructions.

*d.* The records of the Financial Division of the Civil Affairs Section established within the area will indicate in all cases in what currency receipts were obtained or disbursements made by the Financial Division.

6. You will take the following steps and will put into effect only such further financial measures as you may deem to be necessary from a strictly military occupation standpoint:

*a.* Banks should be placed under such control as deemed necessary by you in order that adequate facilities for military needs may be provided and to insure that instructions and regulations issued by military authorities will be fully complied with. Banks should be closed only long enough to introduce satisfactory control, to remove Nazi elements and other objectionable personnel, and to issue instructions for the determination of accounts to be blocked under paragraph *c* below.

*b.* You may at your discretion close all stock exchanges and similar financial institutions for such period as you may deem desirable.

*c.* Pending determination of future disposition, all gold, foreign currencies, foreign securities, accounts in financial institutions, credits, valuable papers and all similar assets held by or on behalf of the following, will be impounded or blocked and will be used or otherwise dealt with only as permitted under licenses or other instructions which you may issue:

(1) German national, state, provincial, and local governments, and agencies and instrumentalities thereof.

(2) Other enemy governments, the agencies and instrumentalities thereof and their Nationals.

(3) Owners and holders, including neutral and United Nations Governments or national authorities, absent from the areas of Germany under your control.

(4) Nazi party organizations, including the party formations, affiliates, and supervised associations, and the officials thereof and key figures in public or party life who actively supported Naziism.

(5) Persons under detention or other types of custody by Allied Military authorities and other persons whose activities are hostile to the interests of the military government.

*d.* No governmental or private bank or agency will be authorized to issue banknotes or currency except that, if found practicable and desirable, you may so authorize the Reichsbank and the Rentenbank when they are under adequate military control and supervision.

*e.* You may, at your discretion, issue a proclamation prohibiting or prescribing regulations regarding transfers of or other dealings in private or public securities.

7. All dealings in gold and foreign exchange and all foreign financial and foreign trade transactions of any kind, including all exports and imports of currency, will be prohibited except as permitted under such regulations as you may issue relative thereto. Except as you may otherwise authorize, local banks will be permitted to open and operate only mark accounts, but if yellow seal dollars and BMA note are legal tender, they may be accepted at the decreed general rate of exchange and will be turned in as directed by you in exchange for mark currency at the decreed general rate of exchange.

8. Non-yellow seal U. S. dollar notes and regular British pound notes will not be legal tender. No person, agency or bank engaged in the exchange of money will acquire or otherwise deal in those notes except as you may so authorize. U. S. Army and Navy Finance Officers and British Paymasters may, however, be authorized to accept non-yellow seal U. S. dollar notes and regular British pound notes from United States and British Military or authorized personnel for conversion into Allied Military mark or Reichsmark currency at the decreed general rate of exchange, after satisfying themselves as to the source of the notes.

9. No military pensions (except for physical disability limiting the pensioner's ability to work) shall be paid. Nor shall any pensions or other emoluments be paid for membership in or services to the Nazi party or affiliated organizations.

10. The railways, postal, telegraph and telephone service, radio and all government monopolies will be placed under your control and their revenues made available to the military government.

11. Taxes discriminating on the basis of race, color, creed, or political opinions shall be abolished.

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 22 September 1944.

#### APPENDIX "C"

#### ECONOMIC DIRECTIVE

1. You shall assume such control of existing German industrial, agricultural, utility, communication and transportation facilities, supplies, and services, as are necessary for the following purposes:

a. Assuring the immediate cessation of the production, acquisition or development of implements of war;

b. Assuring, to the extent that it is feasible, the production and maintenance of goods and services essential (1) for the prevention or alleviation of epidemic or serious disease and serious civil unrest and disorder which would endanger the occupying forces and the accomplishment of the objectives of the occupation; and (2) for the prosecution of the war against Japan (but only to the extent that specific directives of higher authority call for such goods or services).

c. Preventing the dissipation or sabotage of German resources and equipment which may be required for relief, restitution, or reparation to any of the allied countries, pending a decision by the appropriate Allied governments whether and to what extent German resources or equipment will be used for such purposes.

Except for the purposes specified above, you will take no steps looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany nor designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy. Except to the extent necessary to accomplish the purposes set out above, the responsibility for such economic problems as price controls, rationing, unemployment, production, reconstruction, distribution, consumption, housing or transportation will remain with the German people and the German authorities.

2. You will make a survey to determine the extent to which local productive capacity and local supplies are or can be made available for export for relief and rehabilitation in the devastated areas of Europe or for such other purposes as may later be determined.

3. You will take such steps as are necessary to protect from destruction by the Germans, and maintain for such ultimate disposition as you may be directed to make by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, all plants, property, patents and equipment and all books and records of large German industrial companies and trade and research associations that have been essential to the German war effort and the German economy. In this connection you will pay particular attention to research and experimental establishments of such concerns.

4. You should take measures to prevent transfers of title of real and personal property intended to defeat, evade or avoid the orders, proclamations or decrees of the military government or the decision of the courts established by it.

5. Substantial amounts of private and public property of various categories have been seized, looted or otherwise improperly acquired by various Nazi officials and organizations. While it is contemplated that a suitable commission will ultimately deal with this problem, you should take such steps as may be practicable to collect any available information as to property of this kind and to preserve any such property found in the area under your control.

6. *a.* All property in the German territory belonging to any country with which any of the United Nations are, or have been at war may be controlled, subject to such use thereof as you may direct.

*b.* Your responsibility for the property of the United Nations, other than U.K. and U.S., and their nationals, in areas occupied by Allied forces shall be the same as for the property of U.K. and U.S. and their nationals, except where a distinction is expressly provided by treaty or agreement. Within such limits as are imposed by the military situation you should take all reasonable steps necessary to preserve and protect such property.

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 22 September 1944.

APPENDIX "D"

RELIEF DIRECTIVE

1. You will be responsible for the provision and distribution of supplies for civilian relief only to the extent necessary to prevent disease and such disorder as might endanger or impede military occupation. For this purpose you will make maximum use of supplies, stockpiles and resources available within Germany in order to limit the extent to which imports, if any, will be required. German import requirements shall be strictly limited to minimum quotas of critical items and shall not, in any instance, take precedence over fulfillment of the supply requirements of any liberated territory.

2. German food and other agricultural supplies will be utilized for the German population. However, it will be necessary to hold German consumption to a minimum so as to increase to the maximum the surplus of agricultural products which can be made available to the devastated countries of Europe. You will report on any surpluses that may be available with regard for which separate instructions will be issued.

3. You will permit the German authorities to maintain or reestablish such health services and facilities as may be available to them under the circumstances. In the event that disease and epidemics should threaten the safety of Allied troops or endanger or impede military occupation, you shall take such steps as you deem necessary to protect the health of Allied troops and to eradicate sources of contamination.

Matthews Files

*The President to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

PRIVATE

WASHINGTON, September 29, 1944.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I do not think that in the present stage any good purpose would be served by having the State Department or any other department sound out the British and Russian views on the treatment of German industry. Most certainly it should not be taken up with the European Advisory Commission which, in a case like this, is on a tertiary and not even a secondary level.

The real nub of the situation is to keep Britain from going into complete bankruptcy at the end of the war.

Somebody has been talking not only out of turn to the papers or on facts which are not fundamentally true.

No one wants to make Germany a wholly agricultural nation again, and yet somebody down the line has handed this out to the press. I wish we could catch and chastise him.

You know that before the war Germany was not only building up war manufacture, but was also building up enough of a foreign trade to finance re-arming sufficiently and still maintain enough international credit to keep out of international bankruptcy.

I just can not go along with the idea of seeing the British empire collapse financially, and Germany at the same time building up a potential re-armament machine to make another war possible in twenty years. Mere inspection of plants will not prevent that.

But no one wants "complete eradication of German industrial productive capacity in the Ruhr and Saar".

It is possible, however, in those two particular areas to enforce rather complete controls. Also, it must not be forgotten that outside of the Ruhr and Saar, Germany has many other areas and facilities for turning out large exports.

In regard to the Soviet government, it is true that we have no idea as yet what they have in mind, but we have to remember that in their occupied territory they will do more or less what they wish. We cannot afford to get into a position of merely recording protests on our part unless there is some chance of some of the protests being heeded.

I do not intend by this to break off or delay negotiations with the Soviet government over lend-lease either on the contract basis or on the proposed Fourth Protocol basis.<sup>2</sup> This, however, does not immediately concern the German industrial future.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

<sup>1</sup> The memorandum did not reach the Department of State until October 3. The source is a copy typed in the Department.

<sup>2</sup> The Fourth Protocol pertained to Lend-Lease supplies to be made available to the Soviet Mission during the period from July 1, 1944, to June 30, 1945. For text, see *Soviet Supply Protocols*, Department of State Publication 2759 (Washington, Government Printing Office, no date).

Matthews Files

*The Secretary of State to the President*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, September 29, 1944.]<sup>1</sup>

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Cabinet Committee has not been able to agree upon a statement of American policy for the post-war treatment of Germany. The memorandum presented by the Secretary of the Treasury<sup>2</sup> is decidedly at variance with the views developed in the State Department. In the meantime, I have received your memorandum of September 15,<sup>2</sup> with the statements of views respecting the Ruhr, Saar, etc., and the conversion of Germany into an agricultural and pastoral country, which was formulated at Quebec. This memorandum seems to reflect largely the opinions of the Secretary of the Treasury in the treatment to be accorded Germany. I feel that I should therefore submit to you the line of thought that has been developing in the State Department on this matter.

*1. Status of Negotiations With the British and Russians*

The instrument of unconditional surrender of Germany<sup>3</sup> has been recommended by the European Advisory Commission and has been formally approved by this Government. It is anticipated that British and Russian approval will be forthcoming. The question of the American and British zones of occupation was, according to your memorandum, worked out at Quebec and there will presumably be no more difficulty over this matter. In the meantime, the European Advisory Commission is going ahead on plans for a tripartite control machinery and military government for Germany during the occupation period. All three governments have submitted proposals which are similar in their general outline. The American proposal contemplates a Supreme Authority consisting of the three Commanding Generals of the U.S., the U.K. and the U.S.S.R., which would coordinate Allied control of Germany and supervise such centralized governmental functions and economic activities as the three powers deem essential. A Control Council, composed of representatives in equal numbers from each of the three Allied Governments, would be established by the Supreme Allied Authority and will coordinate the administration of military government throughout Germany, including detailed planning for the execution of directives received from the three governments. We expect to have a recommended plan on this from the European Advisory Commission in the near future.

<sup>1</sup> The copy indicates that the memorandum was drafted on September 29, 1944. It was presented to the President on October 1, 1944. (See *post*, p. 161.)

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 113-118.

## 2. *Important Problems For Which High Policy Decisions Must Be Worked Out by the Three Governments*

The fundamental question to be decided is what kind of a Germany we want and what policy should be put into effect during occupation to attain our objectives. The most important of these problems are set forth below with an explanation of the State Department's views. It should be emphasized, however, that these objectives will have to be worked out with our principal Allies if they are to be applied throughout the German Reich.

(a) Demilitarization of Germany. The complete dissolution of all German armed forces and all Nazi military, para-military and police organizations, and the destruction or scrapping of all arms, ammunition and implements of war should be effected. Further manufacture in Germany of arms, ammunition and implements of war should be prohibited.

(b) Dissolution of the Nazi party and all affiliated organizations. The Nazi Party should be immediately dissolved. Large groups of particularly objectionable elements, especially the SS and the Gestapo, should be arrested and interned and war criminals should be tried and, if found guilty, executed. Active party members should be excluded from political or civil activity and subject to a number of restrictions. All laws discriminating against persons on grounds of race, color, creed or political opinion should be annulled.

(c) Extensive controls should be maintained over communications, press and propaganda for the purpose of eliminating Nazi doctrines or similar teachings.

(d) Extensive controls over German educational system should be established for the purpose of eliminating all Nazi influence and propaganda.

(e) No decision should be taken on the possible partition of Germany (as distinguished from territorial amputations) until we see what the internal situation is and what is the attitude of our principal Allies on this question. We should encourage a decentralization of the German governmental structure and if any tendencies toward spontaneous partition of Germany arise they should not be discouraged.

(f) Economic Objectives. The primary and continuing objectives of our economic policy are: (1) to render Germany incapable of waging war, and (2) to eliminate permanently German economic domination of Europe. A shorter term objective is to require the performance by Germany of acts of restitution and reparation for injuries done to the United Nations.

To achieve the first two objectives, it will be essential (1) to destroy all factories incapable of conversion to peaceful purposes and to prevent their reconstruction, (2) to enforce the conversion of all other plants, (3) to eliminate self-sufficiency by imposing reforms that will



make Germany dependent upon world markets, (4) to establish controls over foreign trade and key industries for the purpose of preventing German rearmament, and (5) to eliminate the position of power of large industrialists and land-owners.

This Government has little direct interest in obtaining reparations from Germany and no interest in building up German economy in order to collect continuing reparations. However, the U. S. S. R. and a number of other states which have been victims of German destruction and exploitation may press claims for German production and labor service for rehabilitation and construction.

Extensive controls over industry and foreign trade will be essential during the immediate period of demilitarization and dismantlement, as well as during the period of reparations. After this phase, a system of control and supervision of German industry and trade will have to be worked out in the light of world security developments. This system should be of such a character that the victor powers will be able and willing to enforce it over a considerable period.

It is of the highest importance that the standard of living of the German people in the early years be such as to bring home to them that they have lost the war and to impress on them that they must abandon all their pretentious theories that they are a superior race created to govern the world. Through lack of luxuries we may teach them that war does not pay.

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740.00119 Control (Germany)/10-2044

*The President to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 20, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

In regard to your memorandum of September twenty-ninth, I think it is all very well for us to make all kinds of preparations for the treatment of Germany but there are some matters in regard to such treatment that lead me to believe that speed on these matters is not an essential at the present moment. It may be in a week, or it may be in a month, or it may be several months hence. I dislike making detailed plans for a country which we do not yet occupy.

Your memorandum paragraph No. 1

I agree except for going into too much detail and directives at the present moment, and we must emphasize the fact that the European Advisory Commission is "Advisory" and that you and I are not bound by this advice. This is something which is sometimes overlooked and if we do not remember that word "advisory" they may go ahead and execute some of the advice, which, when the time comes, we may not like at all.

Your memorandum paragraph No. 2

In view of the fact that we have not occupied Germany, I cannot agree at this moment as to what kind of a Germany we want in every detail.

In regard to the problems involved, there are some which are perfectly clear and which can be approved now.

Sub-paragraph (a) on the Demilitarization of Germany is, of course, correct but should include everything to do with aircraft. This should be made specific. It must apply not merely to the assembly of aircraft but to everything that goes into an aircraft. We must remember that somebody may claim that the aircraft is for non-military purposes, such as a transport plane. Germany must be prevented from making any aircraft of any type in the future.

I am in hearty agreement with Sub-paragraph (b) Dissolution of the Nazi Party and all affiliated organizations.

In the same way, I agree with Sub-Paragraph (c) Extensive controls should be maintained over communications, press and propaganda.

Sub-paragraph (d) Extensive controls over German educational system. I should like to talk with your experts in regard to just what this means.

I agree with Sub-paragraph (e) No decision should be taken on the possible partition of Germany.

Sub-paragraph (f) Economic Objectives. I should like to discuss this with the State Department in regard to some of the language. I agree with it in principle, but I do not know what part of it means. Much of this sub-head is dependent on what we and the Allies find when we get into Germany—and we are not there yet.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 22 October 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Top Secret Number 801.

Para 6. We<sup>2</sup> also discussed informally the future partition of Germany. U. J. wants Poland Czecho and Hungary to form a realm of independent anti-Nazi pro-Russian states, the first two of which might join together. Contrary to his previously expressed view, he would be glad to see Vienna the capital of a federation of south-

<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels. For other excerpts from this telegram, see *ante*, p. 10, and *post*, pp. 206, 328, 400.

<sup>2</sup> Churchill and Stalin in Moscow.

German states, including Austria, Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden. As you know, the idea of Vienna becoming the capital of a large Danubian federation has always been attractive to me, though I should prefer to add Hungary, to which U. J. is strongly opposed.

Para 7. As to Prussia, U. J. wished the Ruhr and the Saar detached and put out of action and probably under international control and a separate state formed in the Rhineland. He would also like the internationalization of the Kiel canal. I am not opposed to this line of thought. However, you may be sure that we came to no fixed conclusions pending the triple meeting.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> In reply (No. 632, dated October 22, 1944) Roosevelt commented: "Your statement of the present attitude of U. J. towards war criminals, the future of Germany, and Montreux convention is most interesting. We should discuss these matters together with our Pacific war effort at the forthcoming three party meeting." (Roosevelt Papers.)

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862.50/9-2844

*The Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger)  
to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September [October] 28, 1944.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FORMULATION OF AMERICAN POLICY FOR  
THE POST-WAR TREATMENT OF GERMANY

On September 1, 1944, Mr. Harry Hopkins informed the Secretary of the President's desire to establish a Cabinet Committee on Germany and, with the Secretary's permission, arranged for a meeting in his office on September 2 of officials of State, War and Treasury Departments. At this meeting Mr. McCloy and General Hilldring of the War Department, Dr. Harry White from the Treasury, and Mr. Matthews and Mr. Riddleberger from the State Department, and Mr. Harry Hopkins were present.

It was at this meeting that Dr. White produced the Treasury plan for Germany and gave a lengthy interpretation of this plan which, in its general tenor, was more extreme than the memorandum itself. The plan contemplated the internationalization of the Rhineland together with a strip of German territory extending through Westphalia, Hannover and Holstein to and including the Kiel Canal. Poland would receive East Prussia and Upper Silesia; France would receive the Saar and German territory bounded by the Rhine and Moselle rivers. The remainder of the Reich would be divided into two independent states. In explaining this plan, Dr. White insisted that no trade would be permitted between the proposed international zone and the rest of the Reich, and he emphasized that the produc-

tivity of this zone should not in any way contribute to German economy. No recurrent reparations deliveries would be demanded and reparations would be dealt with by transfer of territory, equipment and labor service.

A lengthy discussion followed, in which Mr. Matthews and Mr. Riddleberger presented a State Department memorandum<sup>1</sup> and explained at some length how our views fitted into the British and Russian ideas to the extent which we were aware of them. After a lengthy discussion in which Mr. McCloy pointed out the difficulties which would arise for the military authorities under the Treasury plan, he stated that on many subjects there was a large area of agreement and he suggested that Mr. Riddleberger draft a memorandum for the Cabinet Committee which would include all points on which there was obvious agreement. These points related primarily to the dissolution of the Nazi Party; the demilitarization of Germany; controls over communications, press and propaganda; and reparations. Mr. Riddleberger accordingly drafted this memorandum, which was discussed by the three Secretaries on September 5.

At this meeting of the three Secretaries, Mr. Stimson and Mr. Hull were in general agreement on the paper and Mr. Morgenthau seemed to acquiesce in most of it. The next day the three Secretaries met with the President, at which time the Secretary of State presented the memorandum, dated September 6, which had been drafted by Mr. Riddleberger.<sup>1</sup> The Secretary of War presented a memorandum of his own,<sup>2</sup> which was largely in line with the State Department's, and the Secretary of the Treasury submitted the same memorandum which Dr. White had originally presented. The discussion was apparently inconclusive and no joint decisions were taken.

There the matter rested until the Quebec Conference to which Mr. Morgenthau was summoned. Shortly thereafter, the President's memorandum of September 15<sup>1</sup> was received, which embraced the idea of separating the Ruhr, the Saar, etc. from the Reich, with a program for eliminating their war-making industries and looking forward to converting Germany into a country "primarily agricultural and pastoral". It was stated that the President and the Prime Minister were in agreement with this program.

In the meantime, a reply to the President's memorandum of September 15 was prepared in the State Department under date of September 29 and was presented by the Secretary to the President on October 1, 1944.<sup>3</sup> This memorandum of September 29 is presumably the basic statement of this Department on the treatment of Germany.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> For the text of this memorandum, "nearly in full", see Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, pp. 571-573.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 156-158.

This memorandum stated that the Cabinet Committee had not been able to agree on American policy for the post-war treatment of Germany and that the memorandum presented by the Treasury was decidedly at variance with the views developed in the State Department.

After reviewing the status of the negotiations in the European Advisory Commission, this memorandum advocated the following objectives which, it was emphasized, would have to be worked out with the British and Russians if they are to be applied throughout the German Reich. The objectives are: (a) Complete demilitarization of Germany; (b) Dissolution of the Nazi Party and all affiliated organizations; (c) Extensive controls over German communications, press and propaganda, (d) Extensive controls over the German educational system; (e) No decision at present on the possible partition of Germany; and (f) economic objectives which are: (1) to render Germany incapable of waging war, (2) to eliminate permanently German economic domination of Europe; and (3) to require the performance by Germany of acts of restitution and reparation. (This was regarded as a shorter term objective.)

A memorandum, also under date of September 29, from the President to the Secretary of State was received in the Department on October 3, 1944.<sup>4</sup> This memorandum modified appreciably the President's views as set forth in his memorandum of September 15, and in it the President stated that no one wants "complete eradication of German industrial productive capacity in the Ruhr and Saar". The White House replied to the State Department's memorandum of September 29 by a communication dated October 20, 1944.<sup>5</sup> In this memorandum the President approved many of the proposals for the treatment of Germany made by the State Department and approved in principle the economic objectives as described by us. However, the President desires more information on control of German education and on some of the economic questions involved. The Department is preparing to submit another memorandum to him in the near future.

Realizing that the European Advisory Commission might not have agreed directives ready by the time Germany collapsed, both Mr. Hopkins and Mr. McCloy insisted early in September that an interim directive to General Eisenhower should be prepared. On September 22 (?), 1944 a meeting was held in Mr. McCloy's office in which representatives of State, War and Treasury participated and, after an all day session, a tentative agreement was reached on the provisions of this interim directive.<sup>6</sup> A few days later approval was given by the three Departments and the directive has been transmitted to General

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 155.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, pp. 158-159.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, pp. 143-154.

Eisenhower and to Ambassador Winant. This directive does not cover all the points which have been raised in the European Advisory Commission but does give a basis of American policy as it has developed to date. In the meantime, the State and War Departments are continuing to clear a number of draft directives for presentation to the European Advisory Commission for joint agreement.

Matthews Files

*The Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 3, 1944.

DEAR ED: I am sending you herewith Memorandum on the British Draft of Policy Directive for Germany.

This was shown to the War Department, and with their approval<sup>2</sup> I gave a copy of it to Lord Cherwell just before he left.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY

[Enclosure]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 1, 1944.

MEMORANDUM ON THE BRITISH DRAFT OF POLICY DIRECTIVE  
FOR GERMANY\*

1. Examination of the British document suggests that it was intended as a long range program. We are not prepared to make decisions on these long range issues at this time. Moreover, the British document does not cover the major questions involved. If, on the other hand, the British document is only intended as an interim program it prejudices the long range decision on important issues. In any event, its 97 pages of detailed instructions, often on unimportant points, is not a satisfactory medium for a high level policy determination. The document confuses principles with details of administration, and thus does not provide a basis on which decisions can be readily reached through the exchange of views. We feel strongly that we should confine our discussions now to the major policy decisions needed for the interim period and leave the details to be worked out at a staff level.

2. The appropriate document for immediate discussion is the American interim directive document.<sup>3</sup> This document is to the large

<sup>1</sup> Printed from a copy presumably typed in the Department of State.

<sup>2</sup> For the War Department position, see the memorandum by Matthews of November 4, 1944, *post*, p. 165.

\*Germany and Austria in the Post-Surrender Period—Sept. 1944. [Footnote in the source paper. The British document in question is not printed herein.]

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 143-154.

part a statement of principles which after agreement would provide the basis for the preparation of handbooks containing full details for administration. The failure of the British Government to present its views on this document is preventing further progress of combined discussions on the treatment to be accorded Germany. We are faced with the danger that the prolongation of the period in which the military directive operates will seriously prejudice the situation within Germany and limit the effectiveness of long range policies which may be found to be desirable by the three governments.

3. The following are some of the major policy issues which the British document fails to deal with adequately and which must be dealt with in any long range program:

(a) The elimination or destruction of heavy industry in Germany, specifically the metallurgical, chemical and electrical industries in Germany.

(b) Future boundaries of Germany.

(c) Partitioning of Germany.

(d) Disposition of the Ruhr through internationalization or otherwise.

(e) Restitution.

(f) Reparations, including whether there will be reparations in the form of recurring payments.

(g) A comprehensive educational program.

(h) A positive program for political decentralization.

(i) The character of controls to be employed in preventing re-emergence of a powerful industrial Germany.

(j) Agrarian reform including the breaking up of the Junker estates.

(k) The punishment of war crimes and the apprehension of war criminals.

(l) The extradition of war criminals to the scene of their crimes.

4. While it is difficult to evaluate the significance of the detailed policy questions without an understanding of the underlying objectives, the following comments on the British group of directives may indicate the difference in approach:

(a) Administrative convenience is frequently placed above principle in dealing with problems of German occupation.

(b) In defining specifically certain of the powers which the Occupation Commander will have, the document tends to obscure the fact that the Commander-in-Chief will have all the powers of government and has the power to do whatever is necessary to carry out the program determined by the Allies.

(c) In connection with the punishment of infractions of regulations and instructions of the occupying forces, there is a tendency in the directive to rely on inadequate and indirect punishments and sanctions when there is no occasion for avoiding direct penalties.

(d) The Allied Commanders are given too much responsibility for the well functioning of the German economy.

(e) The list of persons to be detained and placed under guard for political and security reasons is totally inadequate and vests too

much discretion in the Allied Commander-in-Chief. It gives an appearance of an attempt to shift responsibility.

(f) There is too much political freedom given to the Germans.

(g) The program for keeping the German schools and universities open at any cost ignores the need for a fundamental reorientation of German educational institutions.

(h) We see no point in giving the Allied Military Commander discretion in making it possible for the German "police" to be able to retain tanks and heavy weapons. This sounds like the beginning of the rearmament of Germany.

(i) If Austria is to be given substantially better treatment than Germany, the treatment to be accorded Austria should be dealt with in a separate set of directives.

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Matthews Files

*The Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)* <sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 4, 1944.

The attached enclosure to Secretary Morgenthau's letter to you of November 3 <sup>2</sup> could be most disturbing if there were any danger of its being taken seriously by the British, but I do not believe that this is likely. Incidentally, Mr. McCloy tells me he did his best to dissuade Mr. Morgenthau from giving any such paper to Lord Cherwell. Hence the assertion that his action was with War Department "approval" does not seem to be entirely accurate.

Mr. McCloy tells me that Mr. Morgenthau indicated to him at dinner the other night that after the elections he intended to get back into the German picture in a big way. I very much fear that he will do just that unless the President calls him off.

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

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<sup>1</sup> Carbon copy.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

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862.50/11-1144

*The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the President* <sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, November 11, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Economic Treatment of Germany

As agreed in our conversation yesterday afternoon, I am sending to you herewith, as you requested in your memorandum to the Secretary of October 20, <sup>2</sup> a draft copy of a memorandum on the economic

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<sup>1</sup> Signed original.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 158-159.



treatment of Germany. You will note as I promised, it is only seven pages. I wish, however, to call particular attention to Section 3, beginning on page 5 which, I am sure, you will wish to study with great care.

If this draft does not accurately set forth your views, perhaps you will let us talk to you again in order that the memorandum may be redone in accordance with your desires.

As I stated yesterday, it is rather important that we give the European Advisory Commission our views on this matter promptly since the treatment of Germany must be coordinated with our British and Russian allies.

E R STETTINIUS, JR

[Attachment]

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 10, 1944.

DRAFT

#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There are presented in the following paragraphs the recommendations of the Department of State for American policy with regard to economic treatment of Germany:

##### 1. *Urgency of Tripartite Agreement*

It is essential that economic policies with respect to Germany be directed toward the central aim of disarming Germany and keeping her disarmed through an effective international security organization. To achieve this aim, preliminary agreement is necessary among the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union on certain basic policies governing economic treatment of Germany.

The matter is urgent because present British, Russian and American attitudes on the question show major divergencies which, if allowed to persist, would begin to be reflected in widely different policies at an early stage in the occupation of Germany. Such differences, in turn, would lay the basis for new European rivalries and endanger the effectiveness of an international security organization. Without effective security organization, no economic program alone can be relied upon to keep Germany disarmed. It is of urgent importance, therefore, that a substantial measure of agreement be obtained in advance on economic policies toward Germany, and that such policies be so framed as to remove this potential source of new European rivalries.

Complete identity of methods and objectives in the several zones of occupation is unnecessary and unattainable; it is essential, however, in the economic as in other fields, that the policies carried out in each zone be such as to facilitate a solution of the German problem in a

fashion which is acceptable to all major powers and to Germany's neighbors.

The need for such compatibility of policies has been accepted in principle by the three powers. It is probable, therefore, that existing divergences in attitude concerning economic treatment of Germany can be progressively narrowed through discussion and negotiation, if the subject is taken up promptly.

## *2. Present Tendencies of British and Russian Policy*

Policies with respect to economic treatment of Germany are not definitely fixed but will progressively crystallize over a period of years. Moreover, our knowledge of the present tendencies of British and Russian policy is largely inferential, owing to the absence, so far, of any official discussion of these questions. Nevertheless, available information is sufficient to reveal certain general tendencies of policy which should be taken into account in determining our own course of action.

In the economic field, the principal differences between present British and Russian attitudes are as follows:

a) The Russians apparently intend to go much farther than the British in removing industrial executives and large landowners from their present positions of control.

b) The British are more interested in restraining future German competition with British exports than in collecting large reparation. The Russians apparently wish to extract from the German economy, as reparation, the largest practicable contribution to Russian reconstruction and industrial development, and this contribution, although including labor services and transfers of existing capital equipment, is expected to come largely from current German production.

British policy envisages the retention, during the occupation period, of as large a part of the existing organization and structure of the German economy as is compatible with the destruction of the Nazi regime. The main elements of the present machinery of economic control would, so far as conditions permit, be held together after eliminating their discriminatory, Nazi feature; the existing executive and managerial personnel of private industry would continue in their positions, after removal of active Nazis who had held governmental or party posts. The aims of this policy are to prevent economic breakdown and to preserve a situation in which control over the economy can be exercised.

One important British objective in controlling the German economy is to limit German competition with British exports. In relation to this objective Britain's interest as a reparation claimant is distinctly secondary. Britain's program for accomplishing this objective is, however, moderate and restrained, relying primarily upon controls rather than upon basic economic impairment of Germany. There

have been no proposals, even from the "hard peace" group, for elimination of German heavy industry, since Britain would necessarily have to bear the chief onus for enforcement of such a policy. Apart from specialized facilities for the manufacture of land and naval armament and all types of aircraft, the British are apparently considering dismantling of productive facilities in only a few other industries, such as synthetic oil and rubber. Destruction of a few such industries would neither significantly weaken the German economy nor lengthen appreciably the time required for war preparation if enforcement of disarmament broke down. Such destruction would, however, restore the German market for important British products. Britain is also prepared to support a program of restitution and of reparation in kind, confined to a specified list of export commodities, but is justifiably interested in preventing Germany from getting a head start, through reparation, in export markets of crucial importance to the British.

Britain appears to envisage a continuation of certain indirect controls over the German economy, primarily through exports and imports, beyond the period of military government. Such controls, although proposed partly as a means of enforcing disarmament, are also desired as a method of regulating German competition. A leading British industrialist has suggested that in the long run this problem of restraining German competition might best be handled through cartel-type arrangements with German industry on terms which would assure British goods a larger share of common markets than before the war but would still leave Germany sufficient export opportunities to meet her essential requirements.

Russian policy seems to envisage removal from positions of control of most industrialists and large landowners. The legal basis for such action is provided in the Russian declaration that Germans who employed Russian labor are war criminals. This will open the way for designation of new managers to operate under direction of the occupation authority. While the British look to the retention of much of the existing organization and personnel as a means of exercising control over the German economy, the Soviet Union intends to effect its control by selection of new German personnel for managerial posts in industry. Both powers apparently intend to exercise comprehensive control over the German economy.

One major Russian objective of economic control will be energetic exploitation of the German economy for Russian reconstruction and development. Russia has no economic interest in restraining German competition. Although reparation will be collected in part through transfer to Russia of usable German capital equipment and through labor services, Russian semi-official statements have indicated

that Russia intends to rely primarily on reparation from current production. Russia would doubtless join in a policy of destroying specialized facilities for the manufacture of armaments (including all aircraft) and would perhaps consent to carrying this policy somewhat farther—to synthetic oil and rubber, for example. It is pretty clear, however, that sweeping deindustrialization would be regarded by Russia as incompatible with her interest in Germany as a source of supply of industrial goods.

It is apparent that these divergent tendencies of policy could result in markedly different economic developments in the British and Russian zones of occupation.

a) The Russian zone—a food surplus area, with little bomb damage, and under energetic Russian exploitation—might have relatively moderate unemployment and tolerable food conditions. The British zone—a food deficit area, with extensive bomb damage, and with limited markets—might have much unemployment, and very bad conditions of food and shelter.

b) The Russian zone might witness a sweeping out of present economic ruling groups; in the British zone these groups might be largely retained in positions of control.

It is difficult to foresee the final results of these divergent tendencies, but it is clear that they seriously endanger long-run cooperation between Britain and the U. S. S. R.

In addition to the basic interest of both countries in sustaining cooperation, certain economic factors are present which increase the prospects for adoption of compatible policies.

First, there appears to be agreement on important points of economic policy.

a) Both Britain and Russia favor exercise of extensive responsibility by the occupation authorities for control of the German economy.

b) Both countries seem to oppose sweeping deindustrialization of Germany. Agreement could probably be reached on a program of industrial dismantling—to include specialized facilities for production of munitions and aircraft and, perhaps, a few synthetic materials.

In the second place, both countries have an important interest in maintaining inter-zonal movement of goods during the occupation period. The British zone is heavily deficient in foodstuffs, and the industries of the Russian zone can be operated only at a reduced level without imports of basic industrial materials, notably coal and steel.

### 3. *United States Policy toward Economic Treatment of Germany*

The foregoing analysis of present tendencies in British and Russian policies has important implications for American policy toward economic treatment of Germany. In addition to thorough disarmament, it is essential that we strive for such an orientation of the German economy as will remove the danger of new rivalries from this

source. Sustained enforcement of disarmament depends upon the avoidance of such rivalries.

A program of sweeping deindustrialization does not provide an adequate basis for sustained international security cooperation, nor does it provide a satisfactory alternative to such cooperation. A program designed to impose lasting restraint on Germany's industrial exports to Western markets also involves the danger of generating serious, new rivalries in Europe and of weakening the basis for international security cooperation.

In the Department's view, our long-term objectives with respect to economic treatment of Germany must be (1) abolition of German self-sufficiency, and (2) elimination of German economic domination over Europe. These two objectives conform to the general economic foreign policy of the United States. More important, however, it is only through the kind of orientation of the German economy which is envisaged in these objectives that the basis for international security organization can be protected.

These two objectives are closely related. Abolition of self-sufficiency requires the removal of all protection and subsidies to high-cost domestic production. Elimination of German economic domination over Europe requires the prohibition of all discriminatory trade controls, clearing agreements and international cartel arrangements.

The basic objectives can be carried out only gradually, and in short-run they will have to be qualified to conform to the immediate requirements of the occupation and transition period. Their adoption, even over the longer term, will be dependent upon our general success in achieving world trade expansion under liberal conditions of trade.

It is recommended that in discussion with the British and Russians, we should adopt the policies given below as a basis for agreed action during the period of Allied control.

a) We shall be obliged to go along with the British and Russians in accepting large responsibilities for the guidance and reorientation of German economic life. It is altogether unlikely that a "hands off" policy would be accepted and adhered to by all three powers. Consequently, we must be prepared to take all possible steps in the initial phases of occupation to prevent development of a chaotically unmanageable economic situation, since this is a prerequisite to the exercise of effective economic control.

b) Economic disarmament should include prohibition of the manufacture of land and naval armament and all types of aircraft; destruction of specialized facilities used for the manufacture of these items; and establishment of permanent or semi-permanent controls to detect surreptitious preparation for rearmament and stockpiling of key materials. Decisions regarding the synthetic oil and rubber industries should only be taken as part of an agreed, general program for abolishing German self-sufficiency.

c) With respect to treatment of the German population, we should favor, in the initial period, the lowest standards of health, diet and shelter compatible with the prevention of disease and disorder. This standard should be maintained until it is agreed that political tendencies within Germany justify some relaxation; the needs of liberated countries should, in any event, receive priority.

d) We should favor the conversion of the remainder of German industry to peacetime purposes, including particularly the production of reparation goods required to effect a large, early contribution to the rehabilitation of liberated countries. Reparation in kind should include any types of manufactured goods that claimant countries desire and Germany is fitted to produce. In addition to restitution of looted property, liberated countries may receive—as reparation—such German capital equipment as they can promptly put to effective use in the initial period of rehabilitation. We should favor a short program of heavy reparation payments, derived largely from current German production. Reparation should not be allowed to provide a pretext for building up German productive power as a means of increasing her “capacity to pay”.

e) We should advocate the establishment of machinery to assure inter-zonal movement of foodstuffs, industrial materials and finished goods, in order to foster production for reparation and to prevent large inter-zonal disparities in diet and employment.

f) We should attempt to reach agreement with Britain and Russia regarding policies for the control of large industrial firms and the elimination of Nazis from positions of influence. We should advocate a policy more drastic than the British now favor, but less drastic than Russia might be inclined to apply.

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Matthews Files

*Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State  
(Pasvolsky)*<sup>1</sup>

[MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 15, 1944.

Subject: Treatment of Germany

Participants: The President  
The Under Secretary  
Mr. Hackworth  
Mr. Pasvolsky

In reply to the Under Secretary's question, the President said that he had read the memorandum submitted to him on the treatment of Germany<sup>2</sup> and thought that it was entirely satisfactory except for one point.

As he saw the picture, the system that would become established would be that General Eisenhower and the British and Russian Commanders would be in charge of their respective zones. In addition,

<sup>1</sup> Carbon copy.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

there would be a commission in Germany which would consist of military men of a lower rank. What bothers the President is that on this commission in Berlin there would be insufficient representation of a tough civilian point of view. He, therefore, wants to have something worked out that would take care of this situation, possibly by way of giving a general's commission to some outstanding civilian and making him the U. S. member of the Berlin commission.

Mr. Stettinius asked the President whether or not he would now be willing to send copies of the memorandum to the War, Navy and Treasury Departments as a Department of State proposal which he considers satisfactory but on which he would like to have their comments. The President said that he thought this to be the right procedure and that the necessary transmitting memoranda should be prepared for him.<sup>3</sup> He then added that the Secretary of the Treasury was lunching with him today and that he would show him the memorandum, indicating his general approval of it.

The President said he was still in a tough mood and that he is determined to be tough with Germany. After some discussion, he agreed that the memorandum was sufficiently tough. He said that what he liked about it particularly was that it did not dot all the i's and cross all the t's. There are many questions that must be left for future determination, since we have no way of knowing what we shall find in Germany. He himself used to know Germany well, having studied there. But he would not want to rely on that as a basis of reliable judgment as to what Germany will be like after the termination of hostilities.

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<sup>3</sup> The Department immediately prepared and sent to the President the requested memoranda, but the President indicated that he wished to redraft the policy paper on economic treatment of Germany. Apparently this redraft was never prepared. The file was returned from the White House to the Department of State on March 6, 1945. (862.50/11-1144.)

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740.00119 EW/11-2244

*The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the President*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 22, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Economic Treatment of Germany

At the time that you redraft the memorandum on the Economic Treatment of Germany you might find the attached memorandum useful.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

[Attachment]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 22, 1944.

Subject: Summary of Department's Views on Economic Treatment of Germany

The Department of State believes:

(1) The German economy should be operated as nearly as possible as a unit during the occupation period.

(2) Allied occupation policy should be severe—

(a) a rock-bottom standard of living for the Germans;

(b) labor services for the rehabilitation of devastated parts of Europe;

(c) transfer of such industrial equipment and stockpiles as liberated countries can put to effective use, limited only by necessity for maintaining a minimum German economy;

(d) conversion of the German economy to peacetime production, including production for minimum German needs and for reconstruction of rest of Europe on reparation account;

(e) elimination from positions of control of those industrial and financial leaders who have been closely identified with the Nazi regime or who have derived large benefit from Aryanization or spoilation of occupied countries.

(3) We must rely on an effective international security organization to keep Germany disarmed. We can't make Germany so weak that it will be impossible for her to recover. A look at Russia in 1920 and in 1940 demonstrates how quickly industrial strength can be built up if a country is left alone "to stew in its own juice". Disarmament requires prohibition of arms and aircraft production and destruction of specialized facilities for their manufacture. Some other permanent or semi-permanent industrial restrictions and controls may be necessary, but if the security organization is prepared to use force to prevent rearmament, we don't have to cut deep into the German economy, and if it isn't, no amount of once-and-for-all economic destruction will make much lasting difference.

(4) In the long run, we should look forward to a German economy geared into a liberal world economy on the basis of efficient specialization. This will imply equitable German access to export markets, abolition of German self-sufficiency, and abandonment of instruments of German economic aggression—private international cartels, bilateral barter arrangements, etc. This alone is compatible with the emergence of a stable non-aggressive Germany. This may prove to be unattainable, but for the present we should take no action which would permanently preclude peaceful development of Germany.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.



862.50/11-2244

*The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the President*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON], November 29, 1944.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: British Views on the Economic Treatment of Germany

For your convenience I have summarized below a series of telegrams received from the Embassy in London on the British views on the economic treatment of Germany.

The reports generally confirm the statement of the British position which was outlined in the Department's draft of November 10 on the economic treatment of Germany.<sup>1</sup> British officials seem strongly opposed to sweeping measures of de-industrialization and extreme impoverishment of Germany. They are continuing to explore selective economic controls and restrictions, but detailed examination of specific proposals has served to make clear the difficulties and limitations of most such measures.

The British emphasize the need for selecting measures which will enjoy lasting public support and which will be enforceable a generation hence, after the emotions of wartime have cooled down.

They advocate conversion of the German economy to peacetime production and payment of reparation in kind.

They are eager to begin discussions on restitution of looted property even if discussion of broader economic questions is not yet practicable, and they intend to introduce shortly into the European Advisory Commission a proposal on machinery to handle restitution.

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, pp. 166-171.

Matthews Files

*The President to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WARM SPRINGS, GEORGIA,] December 4, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR HON. E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

I have yours of November 29th on the Economic Treatment of Germany. There are two things which I think the State Department ought to keep in the linings of their hats. (1) That in the Economic Treatment of Germany we should let her come back industrially to meet her own needs, but not to do any exporting for sometime and we know better how things are going to work out.

(2) We are against reparations.

(3) We do want restitution of looted property of all kinds.

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<sup>1</sup> Carbon copy.

Matthews Files

*Memorandum From the Department of the Treasury*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON], January 19, 1945.

## MEMORANDUM

Re: *Long Range Program for Germany.*

1. The single objective of any long range program towards Germany is that of doing all that we can now to prevent Germany from starting a third World War in the next generation. To accomplish this objective, the following principles are clear:

(a) Germany must be rendered weak politically, militarily and economically and must be kept weak for many years to come.

(b) Any program which has as its purpose the building up of Germany as a bulwark against Russia and communism will inevitably lead to a third World War.

(c) It is impossible to devise a program for Germany today which will guarantee peace in the years to come. We can not expect to find a panacea. There are certain minimum steps which we must take now. Developments in the next five or ten years may require that we take additional steps at that time. So long as the German people retain the will to wage war, we must be ever vigilant to see to it that they do not obtain the means to exercise this will.

(d) Since the stakes are so high, our goal must be that of seeing how far we can go in making certain that Germany is unable to embark upon another war rather than trying to find a minimum program which would convince most people that we had solved the problem.

2. There are many essential facets to a long range program for Germany. Without intending at all to exclude from consideration the other essential elements of the program, it is desired at this time to emphasize the importance of dealing effectively with German heavy industry because industry represents an indispensable means by which Germany can exercise her will to wage war again. Although political, military and economic controls over Germany in the post-war period are essential, they afford no reasonable assurance that a strong industrial Germany could not within twenty to thirty years again plunge the world into war. In order to make reasonably sure that we have deprived Germany of the ability to make war again within the next generation, it is absolutely essential that she be deprived of her chemical, metallurgical and electrical industries. Although this does not mean that other measures are unnecessary, the elimination of heavy industry is one of the essential steps we must take now.

At the same time that German heavy industry is eliminated in Germany every effort should be made to build up heavy industry in the liberated countries surrounding Germany. The industrial equipment moved from Germany as well as the resources in the Rhine and Ruhr

<sup>1</sup> Unsigned carbon copy bearing the notation in pencil: "Treasury memo".

areas could make a real contribution toward such a program. In this way the whole balance of industrial power in Europe will be shifted so that Germany will no longer be the dominating power in Europe.

3. After careful study, we completely reject the following propositions:

- (a) The fallacy that Europe needs a strong industrial Germany.
- (b) The contention that recurring reparations (which would require immediate reconstruction of the German economy) are necessary so that Germany may be made to pay for the destruction she has caused.
- (c) The belief that the removal or destruction of all German war materials and the German armament industry would in itself prevent Germany from waging another war.
- (d) The illogical assumption that a "soft" peace would facilitate the growth of democracy in Germany.
- (e) The fallacy that making Germany a predominantly agricultural country, with light industries but no heavy industries, would mean starving Germans.

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Roosevelt Papers

*Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*

[Moscow,] January 20, 1945.

Conversation

Present: The American Ambassador, Mr. Harriman  
I. M. Maiski, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

Subject: German Questions

By prearrangement I called on Maiski this morning to discuss German questions. Maiski is more ready to exchange preliminary views than any other member of the Foreign Office. He said that no conclusion had been reached by the Soviet Government on any precise details. The following were their present attitude:

1) Germany should be broken up although no agreement had been reached on the precise method. He did not go into detail but indicated that the Rhineland, including the Ruhr, might be an independent state and there might be a Catholic republic including Bavaria and Württemberg.

2) Germany should be demilitarized industrially. Steel production should be limited too, but should include sufficient production to give Germany the necessary steel and iron products to maintain her economy, with perhaps a small export. He spoke about a cut to 25% of Germany's previous production. Heavy industry should be allowed to furnish electrical equipment, etc. for her own needs. German economy should be encouraged to expand agricultural production and

her light industries. It should be recognized that she must have an export trade in order to purchase required imports.

3) In connection with reparations the Soviet Government had security in mind first and therefore would not ask for reparations which would call for strong heavy industries. Their demands would be to strip Germany's heavy industries of their machinery and equipment and other products not involving heavy industry. The Soviet Government did not have in mind payments over a long period but spoke of ten years.

4) He classified German labor as part of reparations. No definite numbers had been agreed upon as a demand but it would run into the millions. He said the Government was more conservative than the Russian people on this point. Later on, but without definite significance, he mentioned two or three millions. In reply to my question he said that of course the group taken to Russia to work should be carefully selected; in the first instance the lesser war criminals as well as those active in the Nazi Party. If these were not sufficient, men could be selected from other categories, perhaps those that did not appear likely to find employment. He said they had been talking principally about men but some women might be required. They should come to Russia or other countries to work for a definite period and they considered it should be the same period as the reparations payments, say ten years.

It was the Russians' hope that this experience, although partly punishment and partly reparations for damage caused, should be handled in such a way as to reeducate the Germans. If they showed signs of becoming more reasonable in their attitude greater freedom and a fuller life might be provided. These were questions that only experience could decide. It was the Russians' hope that they would go back to Germany in a better frame of mind. It was not the intention of the Soviet Government to treat them badly but rather to attempt to educate them.

5) He did not warm up much to a discussion of an Austrian or Danube Basin confederation. He said this was out of his immediate study. He himself was spending his time on all aspects of reparations as described above.

6) He emphasized that the principal objective of the Soviet Government was security and that if they were satisfied with that aspect they would not have to support as large an army. This aspect would be taken into account in connection with the size of reparations. I assumed he particularly had in mind such things as breaking up Germany into smaller states and production of the heavy industries and those industries such as aviation and chemicals which could be put to war use.

7) He said they thought Germany might have a small merchant shipping but the Soviet Government would be quite satisfied to have much of Germany's trade carried in foreign bottoms.

8) In talking about reparation demands of other countries he said that certain principles ought to be set down as to priorities of claim such as first priority should be for damage caused by enemy action. Also the contribution in the defeat of Germany should be taken into account. Those who had done the most fighting should get the most. Another consideration should be the percentage of damage in relation to national wealth. He mentioned France for example. He had noted in the papers they were building up enormous claims but that France had not done any fighting. They would not want any German labor. He did not seem to have too much sympathy for her claims in relation to Russia's.

When Maiski spoke about France's difficulty in being unwilling to take labor and the opposition of the French industry to taking reparations in kind, I said I thought a principle should be made clear that reparations in kind should be used by the receiving country and not re-exported, otherwise it might disrupt the proper development of international trade and we would get back into the same sort of a mess we had after the last war. He appeared to agree.

As to the British, he did not know what their ideas would be but spoke sympathetically of their rights. Also for Poland. He thought perhaps the United States could be paid by taking over German property in the United States. This part of the conversation was very general.

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Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*

THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY

SUMMARY

SECRET

JANUARY 12, 1945.

I. *Policy for the Period Immediately Following the Cessation of Organized Resistance*

It is recommended that the draft "Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany"<sup>1</sup> submitted by the European Advisory Commission be accepted without reservation, and that the authority of the projected Control Council be made paramount throughout Germany.

It is recommended that immediate security measures include (1) expeditious disbandment and future prohibition of all German military and para-military forces, (2) seizure and destruction of all existing

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, pp. 124-127.

German arms, ammunition and implements of war, including airplanes, and the prohibition of further manufacture, (3) and the destruction of industrial plants and machinery incapable of conversion to peaceful uses.

It is recommended that the National Socialist system be destroyed through the dissolution of Party organizations, abrogation of Nazi laws and Nazi public institutions, and the elimination of active Nazis from public office and from positions of importance in private enterprise.

It is recommended that direct inter-allied military government supplant the central government of the Reich but that, in the interest of simplifying the tasks of the military, use be made of the German administrative machinery.

It is recommended that the Control Council assume authority over all German informational services and cultural activities and that schools be reopened as soon as objectionable text-books and teaching personnel can be replaced.

## II. *Long-Range Objectives and Measures*

The attached paper also discusses our long-range objectives in Germany.

## III. *Frontier Settlements*

It is recommended that this Government adopt, as its basic principles in the settlement of territorial disputes, (1) the most reasonable prospect of general acceptance and stability, and (2) the maximum contribution to the orderly development of general international order.

It is recommended that: (1) the Danish-German frontier remain unchanged, (2) that the water-boundary between the Netherlands and Germany be moved to the main channel of the Ems Estuary and that further consideration be given to any Netherlands claims on German territory as compensation for war damage, (3) that the 1920-1940 boundary between Belgium and Germany be restored, (4) that Alsace-Lorraine be returned to France, (5) that the pre-1938 Austro-German frontier, with a slight rectification, be restored, (6) that the pre-Munich frontiers between Czechoslovakia and Germany be in principle restored, subject to any minor rectifications which the Czechoslovak Government might wish to propose, and (7) that Poland acquire East Prussia (except for the Koenigsberg area), the Free City of Danzig, German Upper Silesia, and Pomerania.

It is recommended that although this Government should not oppose a general transfer of the German minorities from neighboring states, it should, wherever possible, favor a selective transfer. Such action, if carried out gradually, in an orderly manner, and under international supervision, would contribute to better relations between the states concerned.

## THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY

I. *Policy for the Period Immediately Following the Cessation of Organized Resistance*A. *Control Machinery*

1. The Department of State recommends that the draft "Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany" should be accepted without reservation.

This proposal provides for the exercise of supreme authority over Germany by the American, British and Soviet generals, each in his own zone of occupation and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of a supreme organ of control designated as the Control Council. The functions of this Council would be (a) to ensure uniformity of action in the several zones of occupation, (b) to initiate plans and make agreements, within the powers granted by the respective Governments, for dealing with questions involving the whole of Germany, (c) to control and direct the central German administration, and (d) to direct the administration of the joint zone of Greater Berlin. Appropriate sub-agencies would be organized on a tripartite basis to carry out the administrative and supervisory functions of the Control Council.

2. The Department of State recommends that the directives given to the commanding generals should so define their duties that the Control Council's authority would be paramount throughout Germany and that the zones of occupation would become, in so far as feasible, areas for the enforcement of the Council's decisions rather than regions in which the commanders would possess a wide latitude of autonomous power.

This recommendation rests on two convictions: (1) that it is highly desirable, even at the expense of curtailing to some degree the freedom of action of the commander of the United States zone, to prevent any of the occupying powers from dealing as it pleases with its zone of occupation, and (2) that it is essential, in the interest of effective military government to maintain such parts of the normal administrative unity of Germany as will have survived the defeat. The problem, for example, of providing sufficient food for the German people to prevent epidemics and disorders would be seriously complicated if the Control Council could not direct the transportation and distribution of the total food supply within Germany. Should the surplus supplies of the eastern zone be denied to the southern and northwestern zones, the United States and British Governments would be faced with the choice between delivering large quantities of foodstuffs from their own stores or allowing wholesale starvation.

## B. *Functions of Military Government*

### 1. *Security Measures*

The Department of State recommends the adoption of the following policies with respect to immediate security measures:

a. Demobilization and disbandment of the German armed forces, including para-military organizations.

This recommendation would not exclude the detention of individuals and units of the Waffen SS and other Nazi military formations for security reasons or for employment in special services or for trial as war criminals.

b. Dissolution and prohibition of all military and para-military agencies including the General Staff, party military and quasi-military organizations, reserve corps, military academies and military training, civilian administrative units performing purely military functions, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany.

c. Seizure and destruction of all German arms, ammunition and implements of war.

The recommendation for the destruction of these categories of war material, which are in general not convertible to peace-time purposes, is based on belief that the rearming of the European nations with surrendered German equipment would complicate the problem of restoring political stability, render future general disarmament more difficult, tend to make the countries acquiring the equipment look to Germany and to German technicians for spare parts and replacements, and might inaugurate an armaments race detrimental to the hopes for international peace and security.

d. Confiscation of military archives and military research facilities and vesting authority over them in the Control Council.

e. Immediate prohibition on the manufacture of arms, ammunition and implements of war.

f. Destruction of industrial plants and machinery incapable of conversion to peaceful uses.

g. Dismantlement of aircraft industry and prohibition on manufacture of aircraft.

### 2. *Political Actions*

#### a. *Destruction of the National Socialist System.*

The Department of State recommends the following measures designed to destroy the Nazi tyranny in Germany:

(1) Dissolution of the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organs with the transfer to public agencies of such social services now performed by the Nazi groups as it may be found desirable to continue.



(2) Abrogation of the Nazi laws which provided the legal basis of the régime and which established discriminations on the basis of race, creed and political opinion.

(3) Abolition of Nazi public institutions, such as the People's Courts and the Labor Front, which were set up as instruments of Party domination.

(4) The elimination of active Nazis from public and quasi-public office and from positions of importance in private enterprise.

The Department of State believes it desirable to distinguish between the total membership of the Nazi Party, numbering probably more than 6 million, and those Germans, numbering about 2 million, who have been Party leaders at all levels of its organization. This latter group can be easily identified in a preliminary way by office-holding in the various Party organizations. So many Germans have joined the Party for so many different reasons that nominal membership is no serious index of political conviction. Selective expulsion of the proposed sort would effectively destroy the structure and influence of National Socialism and would immeasurably lighten the administrative burden of military government.

(5) The selection of personnel for labor reparation, in case certain of our Allies insist on that form of reparation, from the ranks of active Nazis and of Nazi organizations such as the SS rather than by an indiscriminate draft.

This recommended procedure would place the burden where it most justly belongs and would remove from Germany some of the most dangerous political influences during the period when an effort must be made to establish an acceptable government.

(6) The arrest and punishment of the principal political malefactors and of war criminals.

*b. The Government of Germany*

The Department of State recommends that, after the destruction of the Nazi régime, no central German government be recognized and that tripartite military government, as envisaged in the surrender instrument,<sup>2</sup> exercise supreme power over Germany. The Department further recommends the use of German administrative machinery in so far as it can serve the purposes of the occupation authorities and does not perpetuate Nazi abuses and the use of German civil servants, not identified as active Nazis, in so far as they are efficient and obedient to the occupation authorities.

Direct military government will be desirable as a means of reinforcing the reality of defeat on the German mind. It will probably be necessary in any case because of internal confusion. Since there is little prospect that the Nazi and militaristic groups who should bear the onus of defeat will survive, it is politically undesirable to

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<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 113-118.

allow anti-Nazi groups immediately to take over political authority and thenceforth be identified as tools of the conqueror's military government.

The establishment of comprehensive military government would prevent the equally undesirable development of the importation into Germany of a substantially ready-made provisional government perhaps recognized by and functioning under special foreign auspices.

*c. Future Change to Civilian Control.* The Department of State recommends that, as soon as military considerations cease to be paramount, the control machinery in Germany should be transferred to inter-allied civilian hands.

*d. German Political Activity and Association.*—The Department of State recommends that, when security conditions permit, political parties opposing Nazi and other kinds of ultra-nationalistic ideologies be permitted to organize and to engage in public discussion.

This recommendation is based on the conviction that the German people will need information, public debate and political organization before they are prepared to decide their future form of government, and that there is advantage in the Germans beginning these activities while National Socialism is perhaps in greatest discredit under the immediate impact of defeat.

3. *Control over Information and Cultural Activities.*

*a. Public Information.*—The Department of State recommends that, under the direction and supervision of the Control Council, there be established throughout Germany a system of control over all media for the dissemination of public information.

This proposal is designed to insure against the further dissemination of Nazi propaganda, to facilitate the Control Council's presentation of instructions and information to the German people, and, as security permits, to allow responsible Germans to carry on an orderly discussion of political reform.

The Department of State wishes to emphasize the importance of placing this control function under the authority of the Control Council rather than leaving it to the discretion of the zonal commanders.

*b. Educational Policy.*—The Department of State recommends a system of control over German education designed to eradicate Nazi doctrines and to inculcate democratic values. To this end it is recommended, as the first step, that the German schools, beginning at the elementary level, be reopened as soon as military considerations permit and when objectionable text-books and teaching personnel can be satisfactorily replaced. The Department believes that it should be the policy of military government to work as unobtrusively as possible through existing German educational machinery after Nazi influences have been removed, and likewise to leave the initiative of positive educational reform to the Germans themselves, subject to review by

the Control Council. It would, therefore, oppose Allied imposition of new curricula and the introduction of foreign teachers.

The desirability of keeping changes in German education to a common procedure throughout the Reich points to the necessity of maintaining, at least temporarily, the national machinery of educational supervision. Maintenance of this machinery would simplify the problem of holding to a uniform policy as well as the task of systematic control. It is deemed injudicious to return education to a decentralized basis until more rational units of federal government can be worked out than have existed heretofore and until the need for close supervision is less insistent.

The Department believes it urgent to reopen the schools as promptly as possible in order that the younger children can be looked after and the youth can be kept from the streets and subject to discipline which may be otherwise lacking because of the break-up of families and the dissolution of the Nazi youth organizations.

In the Department's opinion the Control Council's role must be largely in terms of prohibiting certain things and in consenting to changes proposed by the Germans. A new direction of German education and a new positive content will necessarily be the work of German educators and the victors can do little more than encourage the adoption of a set of beliefs and objectives to take the place of the perverted concepts now being inculcated. The problem for the victors, consequently, is (1) to determine what kind of teaching in Germany would be most conducive to our long-range aims of world security, and (2) to consider what means could be employed to foster that teaching.

The Department is well aware of the difficulties but sees no constructive alternative, as an ultimate objective, to a German school system promoting the psychological disarmament of the German people and reflecting a democratic outlook in which a humanitarian and international outlook will supersede the current ultra-nationalism.

This program is recommended as a contribution toward that end. The Department foresees, however, that no fundamental change in the German mentality can be effected by the schools alone. The hope for a transformation of educational values will depend less on what is done in the school room than on the whole experience of the German people in the occupation and post-war periods.

*c. Religious Activity.*—The Department of State recommends that the Nazi legislation and organizations for maintaining the Party's tyranny over German religion should be terminated and that full religious freedom, including the rights of teaching, publishing and conducting social service, should be established as quickly as security needs will permit.

## II. *Long-Range Objectives and Measures*

The Department of State recommends that the measures applied during the period of military government should from the beginning be worked out and applied in the light of long-range objectives with respect to Germany and Germany's ultimate place in the projected world order.

The enduring interest of the United States is peace, and so far as Germany is concerned the basic objective of this Government must be to see to it that that country does not disturb the peace.

Security against a renewal of German aggression must be guaranteed during the foreseeable future by a rigorously enforced prohibition of a German military establishment and by a vigilant control of German war potential.

An indefinitely continued coercion of so many millions of technically resourceful people, however, would be at best an expensive undertaking. There is, moreover, no certainty that the victor powers will be willing and able indefinitely to apply coercion. In the long run, therefore, the best guaranty of security, and the least expensive, would be the assimilation of the German people into the world society of peace-loving nations.

These considerations urge the search for a continuing policy which will prevent a renewal of German aggression and, at the same time, pave the way for the German people in the course of time to join willingly in the common enterprises of peace.

### A. *Security Controls*

The Department of State believes that it would be premature at present to attempt to specify the nature of the long-term security controls to be established over Germany beyond the general principles of complete disarmament and control of war potential.

In determining the exact manner in which Germany's ability to make war is to be destroyed, the Department of State believes that the various proposals should be judged by their prospective effectiveness and the possibility of their continued enforceability. There are several ways in which Germany could be effectively made militarily impotent. The most obvious method would be the prohibition of a military machine through forbidding military training and the possession or acquisition of arms. Manifestly a Germany without soldiers and without weapons would be no menace to the peace of the world. Various kinds of intervention in German industry and commerce would likewise add further effective restraints.

With such latitude in the choice of measures afforded by the test of effectiveness, the crucial test is that of enforceability over a period of years or even decades.

There is involved in this second criterion the problem of devising controls which would be relatively inexpensive and simple in operation, particularly with respect to detecting German attempts at evasion. There is involved also the more dangerous problem of choosing a series of measures which the victor powers will be willing to maintain after war passions have cooled. Experience during the period between the two great wars suggests that the crucial issue is not so much the exact nature of the controls as the determination of the Allies to maintain them. Experience likewise indicates that once the process of giving up controls has begun, it is difficult to halt the disintegrating process short of war.

Since it believes that the more complex and the more numerous the controls the greater the danger of their being abandoned, the Department of State recommends that the controls over Germany should be as simple and as few in number as would be compatible with safety.

### B. *Political Reconstruction of Germany*

1. *The Ultimate Objective.*—Germany's repudiation of militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideologies will in the long-run depend on the psychological disarmament of the German people, tolerable economic conditions, and the development of stable political conditions.

The most plausible hope for lasting political reconstruction and orderly development lies in the establishment of democratic government despite the fact that serious difficulties will beset such an attempt. The Department of State therefore recommends that it be made the aim of United States policy to prepare the German people for self-government as soon as self-government is possible in terms of internal conditions and security considerations.

The successful establishment of a democratic régime will depend in considerable measure not only on a tolerable standard of living but also on a moderation of the ultra-nationalistic mentality now dominant. A democratic experiment will labor under a heavy burden because of its necessary submission to the will of the victors and it must, if it is to survive, be able to offer some claim to the loyalty and to the patriotism of the German people. In order to encourage a constructive fresh start in political life, the Department of State recommends that there be offered to the Germans the assurance that a democratic Germany which demonstrates its intention and ability to live at peace can earn an honorable place in the society of nations. In order to avoid raising an issue similar to that which, after 1919, was exploited by the nationalists to discredit democracy and international cooperation, the Department of State opposes writing into the peace settlement a war-guilt clause directed against the German people as a whole.

2. *Partition*.—The Department of State recommends that this Government oppose the forcible partition of Germany.

An imposed dismemberment of Germany would not obviate the necessity for enforcing the same security controls that should be set up if Germany is left intact. Because of the high degree of economic, political and cultural integration in Germany, it must be anticipated that partition would not only have to be imposed but also maintained by force. The victor powers, by imposing partition, would take on themselves a burdensome and never-ending task of preventing surreptitious collaboration between the partite states and of restraining the nationalistic determination to reunite which would, in all probability, be the response of the German people. The economic aspects of partition, finally, would create a serious dilemma. A political dismemberment which left the German economy substantially unified would have little significance as a security measure; the disruption of German economy, on the other hand, would carry with it an unnecessary decline of the European, as well as the German, standard of living.

3. *Decentralization*.—The Department of State recommends that encouragement be given to a return to federal decentralization, including the division of Prussia into several medium-sized states, but it would oppose the imposition of a decentralization more sweeping than that acceptable to moderate groups.

Such an action, like an imposed partition, would provide a ready-made program for nationalistic agitators. A decentralization extensive enough to make the central government of the Reich harmless would, in all probability, render it unable to cope adequately with the social and economic problems which must be resolved in the interest of internal stability.

A return to wide provincial autonomy might again offer to undesirable elements an advantageous means of capturing the various state governments, as happened prior to 1933, when the National Socialists gained control of several of the smaller states and carried on their terroristic agitation in complete immunity from Reich interference.

Decentralization, even if successfully imposed, is not necessary as a security measure and would not of itself be an insurmountable barrier to unified national action if at some future time the German people wanted to organize their forces for new aggression. The military effectiveness of Germany under the cumbersome Bismarckian constitution might illustrate this observation. It remains to be remarked that the traditional democratic groups in Germany have generally favored a greater unification of the Reich.

4. *Steps in Political Reconstruction*.—While the character of developments in Germany cannot be foreseen, the Department of State

believes it desirable to formulate a tentative and general policy toward the political reconstruction of Germany. It therefore recommends that the process be begun, when military necessities permit, by the establishment of democratic self-government in local communities rather than by the reconstitution of a national federal government. Decision as to when local governments could be joined into provincial units and when the provincial units could form a Reich government would, under this plan, depend on the success with which the Germans took the several steps in building sound institutions and developing reliable political leaders.

The Department of State believes that, in this process of positive reconstruction, external influence should be limited to the encouragement of popular self-government and should not be exerted to determine the precise form of government to be established. At the same time it is a dictate of security that the victor powers, and after them the international organization, should reserve the right, and be prepared to intervene in Germany to prevent the re-emergence of dangerous nationalistic activities and to hold Germany to the observance of the obligations imposed by the peace settlement and by the post-war security system.

### III. *Frontier Settlements*

The Department of State believes that in establishing the post-war boundaries of Europe it should be the policy of this Government to seek a solution of each dispute based on the merits of the specific problem and on the relation of that problem to the whole settlement. The Department believes the chief criteria to be (1) the most reasonable prospect of general acceptance and stability and (2) the maximum contribution to the orderly development of general international order.

#### A. *Recommendations*

In the light of such considerations, the Department of State submits the following recommendations with respect to the frontiers of Germany:

1. That the Danish-German frontier should remain unchanged.
2. That the water-boundary between the Netherlands and Germany should be moved from the western shore of the Ems Estuary to the main channel and that subsequent consideration be given to any Netherlands claims on German territory as compensation for damage to Netherlands soil.
3. That the Belgian-German frontier should be returned to the 1920-1940 line.
4. That Alsace-Lorraine should be returned to France.
5. That the present administrative boundaries be maintained as the frontier between Austria and Germany.

This recommendation would restore the pre-1938 frontier except for a small area in the Sonthofen district which was transferred to

Bavaria for administrative convenience and which should remain in Bavaria unless there is convincing evidence that the inhabitants wish to return to Austrian rule.

6. That the pre-Munich frontiers between Czechoslovakia and Germany be in principle restored, subject to any minor rectifications which the Czechoslovak Government might wish to propose.

7. That Poland acquire East Prussia (except for the Königsberg area), the former Free City of Danzig, German Upper Silesia, and the eastern portion of Pomerania possessing an area of approximately 6,812 square miles.

The Department of State proposes this solution of an extremely difficult frontier problem as the one representing in the light of present circumstances the most equitable settlement and the one offering the best promise of international tranquillity in eastern Europe. It is realized, however, that there may well be strong pressure for the acquisition by Poland of a still larger portion of German territory. If this is the case it is not believed that it would be feasible for the United States to oppose such a proposal.

The solution just recommended would mean the addition for Poland of an area of about 21,000 square miles containing approximately 4,200,000 inhabitants. The Polish-German frontier north of Upper Silesia would be straightened and shortened by 130 miles. Poland's sea coast would be lengthened to some 200 miles with adequate port facilities in Gdynia and Danzig. The annexation of Upper Silesia would substantially strengthen Poland's industrial resources and would make possible a unified and rationalized operation of the greater Upper Silesian district.

Because of the importance of this question, a special study of it, prepared in the Department, is attached.<sup>3</sup>

#### *B. The Transfer of German Minorities*

The cessions to Poland recommended above would bring under Polish sovereignty approximately 3,400,000 Germans in addition to more than 700,000 resident there before the present war. Both the Polish Government-in-exile and the Lublin Committee have expressed the desire to expel this German population. In addition the Government-in-exile of Czechoslovakia wishes to remove more than 1,500,000 Sudeten Germans.

During the final stages of war, and during the early post-war period, it is the belief of the Department of State that an indiscriminate expulsion of so many people would add enormously to the confusion likely to exist in that area, threatening the public health of much of Europe and jeopardizing the peace and good order of the continent. Nevertheless, it is not considered that it would be ex-

<sup>3</sup> See the Briefing Book paper entitled "Suggested United States Policy Regarding Poland", *post*, pp. 230-234.



pedient for the United States to oppose such general transfers if they are insisted upon by the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments having the support of the British and Soviet governments. The Department of State believes, however, that in so far as possible this government should endeavor to obtain agreement on selected transfer of those portions of the German minority from Poland and Czechoslovakia whose transfer would contribute to the improvement of relations between the countries concerned and to a greater stability in that part of Europe. The Department favors a policy whereby these transfers would be held to a minimum, would take place gradually in an orderly manner and under international auspices agreed upon by the Principal Allies on the one hand and Poland and Czechoslovakia on the other.

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Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*

ECONOMIC POLICIES TOWARD GERMANY

SUMMARY

1. Our eventual objectives with respect to economic treatment of Germany should be (1) abolition of German self-sufficiency, and (2) elimination of the instruments for German economic aggression.

For a prolonged period of control and surveillance, however, economic policies with respect to Germany will have to be largely based upon other objectives, namely, (1) reduction of Germany's economic war potential, and (2) assisting the economic reconstruction and development of the victorious countries.

2. The following policies recommended for adoption in discussion with British and Russians:

*a.* We should advocate allied acceptance of large responsibilities for guidance and reorientation of German economic life, including prevention of an unmanageably chaotic economic situation in the initial period after defeat.

*b.* Economic disarmament should include prohibition of the manufacture of land and naval armament and all types of aircraft; destruction of specialized facilities for their manufacture; establishment of controls to detect any forms of surreptitious preparation for war.

*c.* Consideration should be given to selective prohibitions upon the manufacture of key industrial items and of broader restraints on exports within the field of metals, metal products and chemicals.

*d.* During the early post-defeat period, the occupation authorities should take no steps to provide a higher living standard than is required for prevention of disease and disorder. Agreement should be sought on definition of this minimum and the measures to be taken, if necessary, to assure such a minimum.

*e.* We should favor conversion of remainder of German industry to peacetime production, particularly reparation goods for rehabilitation of European countries.

f. Payment for such current imports as are allowed by control authorities should be a first charge on German exports.

g. We favor full restitution of identifiable looted property.

h. We advocate establishment of machinery to assure inter-zonal essential goods.

i. We should seek agreement with Britain and Russia regarding policies for control of large industrial firms and elimination of active Nazis from influential positions in industry and finance.

### ECONOMIC POLICIES TOWARD GERMANY

#### 1. *Need for Multilateral Determination of Policies*

It is essential, in the economic as in other fields, that policies with respect to Germany be directed toward the central aim of keeping her disarmed through an effective international security organization. A substantial measure of agreement must be obtained in advance on economic policies toward Germany, and such policies must be so framed as to minimize the danger of new European rivalries from this source.

#### 2. *Policy Recommendations*

In the Department's view, our eventual objectives with respect to economic treatment of Germany should be (1) abolition of German self-sufficiency, and (2) elimination of the instruments for German economic aggression. These two objectives conform to the general economic foreign policy of the United States. More important, however, it is only through the kind of orientation of the German economy which is envisaged in these objectives that the basis for international security organization can be permanently assured.

These two objectives are closely related. Abolition of self-sufficiency requires the removal of all protection and subsidies to high-cost domestic production. Elimination of the instruments for German economic aggression requires the prohibition of all discriminatory trade controls, clearing agreements and international cartel arrangements.

The eventual objectives imply the assimilation—on a basis of equality—of a reformed, peaceful and economically non-aggressive Germany into a liberal system of world trade. During the period of military government, and over a control period of much longer duration, economic policies with respect to Germany will have to be largely based upon other objectives, namely, (1) reduction of Germany's economic war potential, and (2) assisting the economic reconstruction and development of the victorious countries. Although these latter objectives must be over-riding, it is important that development of the German economy should not be so drastically restricted as to prevent the maintenance of a basic livelihood for the German people.

It is recommended that in discussion with the British and Russians we should adopt the policies given below as a basis for agreed action during the period of Allied control.

a) We should go along with the British and Russians in accepting large responsibilities for the guidance and reorientation of German economic life. It is altogether unlikely that a "hands off" policy would be accepted and adhered to by all major powers. Consequently, we must be prepared to take all possible steps in the initial phases of occupation to prevent development of a chaotically unmanageable economic situation, since this is a prerequisite to the exercise of effective economic control.

b) Economic disarmament should include prohibition of the manufacture of land and naval armament and all types of aircraft; destruction of specialized facilities used for the manufacture of these items; and establishment of permanent or semi-permanent controls to detect surreptitious preparation for rearmament, research on new weapons and stockpiling of key materials.

c) In addition, consideration should be given to selective prohibitions during the control period upon the manufacture of a few key industrial items, such as synthetic gasoline, synthetic rubber and certain types of machine tools and precision apparatus, and general prohibitions or restrictions on certain categories of German exports, particularly in the field of metals, metal products and chemicals. Sweeping measures of economic impairment are unnecessary if effective security organization is maintained, and are unenforceable in the absence of such security organization. However, the heavy industry sector of the German economy could be substantially contracted during a control period in ways which will aid the recovery and industrial development of other European countries without crippling Germany's capacity to meet the basic needs of her population. Within a broad range, therefore, the problem is largely one of judging what measures will receive the support and contribute to the solidarity of the victors.

d) With respect to treatment of the German population, no steps should be taken by the occupation authorities for the purpose of providing a higher standard of living than is required for the prevention of disease and disorder. Agreement should be sought on a uniform quantitative definition of this standard and on the measures which the victorious powers might be prepared to take if necessary to assure such a minimum. This agreed minimum should not be raised until it is agreed that political tendencies within Germany justify some relaxation; the needs of liberated countries should, in any event, receive priority.

e) We should favor the conversion of the remainder of German industry to peacetime production, including particularly the production of reparation goods required to effect an early contribution to the rehabilitation of European countries. The reparation program should be of short duration, and should consist predominantly of payments in kind, with, perhaps, some labor services. Its size must depend upon the scope of the measures undertaken under (c) above. Extensive restrictions on heavy industrial exports imply a comparatively small reparation program, with emphasis on transfer of existing German capital equipment rather than of current German output.

f) Payment for such current imports as the control authorities allow to Germany, and other similar current expenses should become a first charge on German exports, ranking above reparation payments. Unless this principle is accepted, we run the danger of being called upon to pay for Germany's imports while other countries are extracting reparation payments from Germany.

g) We should favor full restitution of identifiable looted property. Restitution should be handled at an inter-governmental level and should be returned to the government having jurisdiction over the place from which the property was looted.

h) We should advocate the establishment of machinery to assure inter-zonal movement of foodstuffs, industrial materials and finished goods, in order to limit import requirements, foster production for reparation, and prevent large inter-zonal disparities in diet and employment.

i) We should attempt to reach agreement with Britain and Russia regarding policies for the control of large industrial firms and the elimination of active Nazis from positions of influence. We should advocate a policy more drastic than the British now favor, but less drastic than Russia might be inclined to apply.

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Executive Secretariat Files

### *Briefing Book Paper*

## REPARATION AND RESTITUTION POLICY TOWARD GERMANY

### SUMMARY

#### 1. *Nature of American Interest.*

A mistaken reparation policy may not only have adverse effects on the future economic stability of Europe but may jeopardize the political and economic objectives of this country with respect to Germany. For this reason German reparation should be supported only to the extent that it does not conflict with more important objectives.

#### 2. *Policy Recommendations.*

a) Reparation should consist of the entire surplus above the output needed to maintain a minimum prescribed standard of living and to pay for relief, occupation costs and other prior charges. It should be made clear that the U. S. will not finance the transfer of reparation either directly or indirectly.

b) To minimize interference with normal trade the reparation period should be short: if possible five years, and in any event not over ten.

c) Reparation should be payable predominantly "in kind." Labor services within reasonable limits should not be opposed provided a distinction is made in the treatment accorded to formerly active Nazis and politically passive Germans, respectively.

d) The principal basis of apportionment should be damage to non-military property exclusive of current output. A supplementary basis, admissible only at a lower weighting, should be occupation costs. The reparation settlement should be considered as clearing finally all claims against Germany arising out of the war.

e) Germany should be obliged to restitute all identifiable stolen property. Gold and unique objects (but not other property) should be replaced with equivalents from German stocks if lost or destroyed.

f) United Nations should have the option of retaining and disposing of German property within their territories, the proceeds to be applied against reparation claims.

## REPARATION AND RESTITUTION POLICY TOWARD GERMANY

JANUARY 16, 1945.

### 1. *Nature of American Interest*

It is dangerous to assume, because the reparation claims of this country are likely to be very small, that we have little interest in the subject of reparation. Not only can an ill-conceived reparation policy give rise to mischievous consequences in itself but, what is even more important, it may jeopardize the achievement of the political and economic objectives of this country vis-à-vis Germany. For these reasons the reparation settlement with Germany is an issue of major importance to the United States.

Accordingly, the guiding principle of U. S. policy in regard to reparation should be that the reparation claims of our Allies should be supported only if, and to the extent that, such claims do not conflict with the other elements of the settlement with Germany. Reparation policies must conform and be subordinate to the security and economic measures adopted with respect to Germany; these measures should not be modified or weakened to enable Germany to pay more reparation.

Conceived thus as a "residual", the reparation program will be determined, in its main outlines, by prior decisions with regard to industrial controls, export restrictions, territorial adjustments, etc. which may be imposed on Germany. For example, if chief reliance for economic security is placed on selective prohibitions and controls, Germany may be able (barring extreme war damage) to deliver a large volume of reparation goods out of current production. If, on the other hand, large sections of German industry are to be permanently dismantled, the bulk of reparation payments would necessarily take the form of transfers of existing German capital equipment, rather than of current output, and the total volume of reparation deliveries is likely to be comparatively small. Similarly, restriction of exports for commercial reasons, or important transfers of territory, would likewise affect the amount and form of reparation.

The following recommendations with regard to reparation are intended to be consistent with the proposals of the State Department for the economic treatment of Germany.<sup>1</sup> They make no assumption with respect to territorial changes.

## 2. *Reparation Policy Recommendations*

The most important elements of the German reparation program will be (a) its "weight", (b) its duration, (c) its form, (d) the allocation of payments.

(a) In principle, the entire surplus above the output needed (1) to maintain a minimum prescribed standard of living, and (2) to pay for occupation costs, relief, and other prior charges, should be appropriated for reparation.

It would probably be desirable to make it clear to the other interested powers that the U.S. will not finance the transfer of reparation either directly by extending loans or credits to Germany, or indirectly by assuming the burden of supplying at its own expense essential goods or equipment to Germany.

In order to avoid difficulties with public opinion in the Allied countries, which is likely to regard any given amount of reparation as inadequate to compensate for the damage and suffering inflicted by Germany, as well as for other reasons, the statement of the reparation obligation in terms of a specific monetary amount should be avoided.

(b) It is essential for the early recovery of normal trade that the reparation program should be of relatively short duration. The uncompensated, one-way, transfers of reparation goods from Germany must necessarily interfere with the export trade of other countries. The longer reparation lasts, moreover, the more strongly is Germany likely to become entrenched in the markets of the claimant states; the more difficult, also, will be the readjustment of both paying and receiving countries at the end of the reparation period. The interference with normal trade may be relatively slight in the first two or three years after the war when trading conditions are in any case apt to be highly abnormal and the overall supply of goods may fall short of reconstruction needs and deferred demands. Beyond that time, however, the interference with normal trade will become progressively greater. It is recommended, accordingly, that the reparation period should be limited, if possible, to five years, and in any event should not exceed ten years.

(c) To avoid "transfer" difficulties, the reparation obligation should be payable preponderantly "in kind", i. e., in goods and services, rather than in foreign exchange. The goods should be such as Germany is able to deliver and the claimant countries are willing to receive, both conditions being necessary for "transferability".

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<sup>1</sup> The footnote in the original at this point refers to the preceding paper entitled "Economic Policies Toward Germany".

United Nations claiming reparation from Germany, in addition to being entitled to payments in kind, should have the option of retaining and disposing of all German property and rights within their territories and to apply the proceeds against their reparation claims.

The Soviet Government will probably demand, in satisfaction of part its reparation claim, the performance of labor services by German manpower in Russia. There is no compelling reason for the United States to oppose such claims within reasonable limits, provided that in the conscription of the labor force a distinction is made between formerly active Nazis and politically passive Germans, with minimum standards of treatment and a relatively short period of service for the latter.

(d) The principal basis for the apportionment of reparation among the claimant states should be the amount of damage to and loss of non-military property, exclusive of current output, caused by or incident to hostilities. As a supplementary basis of allocation, occupation costs (including for this purpose clearing balances accrued in Germany during the occupation period) should also be allowed as an admissible claim, but at a lower weighting than property losses. The reparation settlement should be considered as clearing finally all outstanding claims against Germany arising out of the war.

### 3. *Restitution*

The following policy recommendations are made:

(a) In principle there should be an unlimited obligation on Germany to restore identifiable stolen property. In practice, however, official efforts to locate such property will have to be confined to a limited number of categories such as art treasures, securities, machinery, rolling stock, et cetera.

(b) Looted property should be returned by a Restitution Commission to the Government having jurisdiction over the territory where the property had its situs and not to the former owners individually. The Commission should not be burdened with the task of deciding disputes with respect to ownership, liens, etc. Such questions, whether intra-national, or involving two or more countries, should be adjudicated in the place from which the property was taken.

(c) All property transferred to Germany during the period of German occupation should be presumed to have been transferred under duress and accordingly treated as looted property.

The British Government has been pressing in the European Advisory Commission for the early establishment of a Restitution Commission to cope with the complex problems of restitution which will arise as soon as enemy territory is occupied to any appreciable extent. This Government has indicated its general approval of the British proposal, subject to certain reservations.

The French have also introduced a proposal for restitution into the European Advisory Commission. Their concept of "restitution", however, apparently goes far beyond the mere restoration of identifiable objects and would include the replacement of lost or destroyed objects with similar or equivalent goods found in Germany at the time of surrender. It is believed that such a broad application of the principle of replacement is undesirable. Claims for lost or destroyed property should be embraced in the reparation settlement; "replacement" should be confined to unique objects such as art treasures, and possibly gold.

#### 4. *German Foreign Holdings*

"German" property in neutral and satellite countries can be divided into three categories:

1. *Looted Property.* This is not properly German property, and the principle of restitution has already been indicated.

2. *Flight Capital.* This is property which is and has been leaving Germany for refuge from post-hostilities Allied control. Efforts are now being made to have the neutrals prevent ingress of such property, and to segregate and control that which has already left Germany.

3. *German Foreign Investment.* Control over this property is essential to the control of the German economic system. Cooperative U. S. and U. K. efforts are being made to conduct a census of such property, to have it segregated, and make it available for such disposition as may be agreed on among the Allies.

A coordinated effort, particularly directed at the neutrals, to control these classes of property is being made. The United States, United Kingdom, and USSR, among others of the United Nations, have cooperated in the issuance and endorsement of the following documents: Declaration of January 5, 1943, declaring a policy of refusal to recognize Axis acts of dispossession, in whatever form;<sup>2</sup> Gold Declaration of February 22, 1944, declaring a policy of refusal to purchase gold from nations which have not ceased gold purchases, directly or indirectly, from the Axis;<sup>3</sup> Bretton Woods Resolution VI, calling on neutrals to take appropriate action with respect to loot, flight capital, and German foreign investment.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Department of State *Bulletin*, January 9, 1943, vol. VIII, pp. 21-22.

<sup>3</sup> Treasury Department Notice, published in the *Federal Register*, February 23, 1944, vol. 9, p. 2096.

<sup>4</sup> *Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1-22, 1944* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948), vol. I, pp. 939-940.



## THE BREMEN-BREMERHAVEN ENCLAVE

740.00119 Control (Germany)/1-545 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

TOP SECRET  
U. S. URGENT  
NIACT

WASHINGTON, January 5, 1945—7 p. m.

116. . . . Formal action [on proposals for control of Bremen area] has not been taken only because of desire to avoid sharp issue and in hope that attempts to work out solution would be successful. Yesterday at conference with Lord Halifax and General Macready War Department officials and Joint Chiefs of Staff representatives worked out formula which British stated they would recommend to London. If this is agreed to by London War Department advise that they will remove objections to signing protocol. The formula follows:

“The Bremen and Bremerhaven enclave as described will be under complete American control including military government but will be generally administered as a subdistrict of a larger British-controlled area. It is understood that the American military government will conform to the general policies pursued in the administration of the larger district subject always to the right of the American commander to vary the administration of the enclave in any particular that he may find necessary on military grounds.

“The United States interest in transit passage from the Bremen area to the southwestern zone is so dominant and the British interest in possible movement through the American zone to Austria so evident that obligation to carry stores and personnel for the one Government through the zone controlled by the other is mutually recognized. To better achieve responsible service, it is proposed that each military zone commander will accept a deputy controller of movement and transport from the other to assist in the coordination of the movement and transport involved in such essential traffic.”

We will have large army deep in enemy country with a great redeployment problem to deal with. It is vital therefore that we have the full use of the port which in turn involves authority over labor, telephone traffic and other communication systems within the area. There is no half way point of control that can be worked out, certainly not at high level. In view of our predominant and important interest as well as of the fact that we relinquished control of the northwest zone on this condition real control is essential. As Halifax and Macready are in accord we hope that matter can now be quickly disposed of on above basis.

STETTINIUS  
H. F. M[atthews]

J. C. S. Files

*The Head of the Army Delegation of the British Staff Mission in Washington (Macready) to the Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy)*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 20 January 1945.

DEAR MR. MCCLOY:

BREMEN ENCLAVE

1. I am now glad to be able to inform you that the British Chiefs of Staff are prepared to accept the formula which was arrived at [at] our meeting in the War Department on the 5th January subject to the American Chiefs of Staff confirming their interpretation of one or two points.

For convenience I attach a copy of the formula with two small amendments inserted which I have underlined. These amendments are proposed in order to ensure that the British and American interpretations of the formula are the same.

2. I think you will agree that the interpretation by the British Chiefs of Staff as indicated by these amendments is correct. With regard to the amendment in paragraph 2 the British Chiefs of Staff understand the "Deputy Controller" to be an officer deputed to a functional control office situated outside his national zone, which controls the agents of that office situated within his national zone. He controls such agents only, and does not, in the absence of the "Controller" assume authority over any other portion of the area within the sphere of that Controller.

3. The British Chiefs of Staff would also like confirmation that administrative questions such as wage rates, which raise points of principle, will necessarily fall into line with the general policies of the Governments or of the Control Commission.

4. The British Chiefs of Staff understand that the proposed formula will have to be read in conjunction with paragraph 7 of C. C. S. 320/34<sup>1</sup> which will in practice be modified by the principles enunciated in the formula.

It would appear that such modification, however, will be in favor of American interests and providing that it is understood that paragraph 7 of C. C. S. 320/34 is modified by the formula, the British Chiefs of Staff do not consider it necessary to amend C. C. S. 320/34.

5. If you can confirm that the American Chiefs of Staff agree [to] the interpretation of the formula in paragraphs 1 to 4 above, the British Chiefs of Staff propose:

(a) That the American and British Chiefs of Staff respectively issue instructions that the United States group, and the British

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

element, of the Control Council for Germany should jointly proceed forthwith with the detailed planning of the arrangements in connection with the Bremen enclave.

(b) That the American and British Chiefs of Staff should issue instructions that the naval elements of the two Control Council groups should examine the extent of the naval command to seaward referred to in paragraph 7 (b) of C. C. S. 320/33<sup>2</sup> and should submit their joint proposals to the Navy Department and Admiralty.

(c) That the American Chiefs of Staff should now recommend that the United States Government ratify the occupation protocol for Germany<sup>3</sup> (E. A. C. (44) 12th Meeting).

(d) That the American Chiefs of Staff should now approve:

(i) Paragraphs 1 to 6 of C. C. S. 320/33.

(ii) C. C. S. 320/34.

6. If the United States Chiefs of Staff agree [to] the above proposals, perhaps you will initiate the issue by the United States Chiefs of Staff of the appropriate instructions in accordance with paragraph 5 above.

Yours sincerely,

G. N. MACREADY

[Attachment]

#### THE BREMEN ENCLAVE


1. The Bremen and Bremerhaven enclave as shown on the attached map will be under complete American control including military government and responsibility for disarmament and demilitarization but will be generally administered as a subdistrict of a larger British controlled area. It is understood that the American military government will conform to the general policies pursued in the administration of the larger district subject always to the right of the American commander to vary the administration of the enclave in any particular that he may find necessary on military grounds.

2. The U. S. interest in transit passage from the Bremen area to the southwestern zone is so dominant and the British interest in possible movement through the American zone to Austria so evident that obligation to carry stores and personnel for the one government through the zone controlled by the other is mutually recognized. To better achieve responsible service, each military zone commander will accept a Deputy Controller for United States (or British) requirements of Movement and Transport from the other to assist in the

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.


<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 118-123.

# BREMEN AND BREMERHAVEN ENCLAVE



ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION "TOP SECRET"

# BREMEN AND BREMERHAVEN ENCLAVE



Scale: 1:50,000  
Date: 1945

coordination of the movement and transport involved in such essential traffic.

3. The map referred to is that attached to C. C. S. 320/29.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> C. C. S. 320/29 is not printed, but the map in question is reproduced facing p. 200.

EUR Files

*The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Secretary of State*

[Excerpt]<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 23 January 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

OCCUPATION ZONES IN GERMANY—BRITISH-AMERICAN

This is the matter of the so-called Bremen enclave. We have sought ever since Quebec to get the matter of our control of the Bremen area clarified. It was hedged about by the British after we had agreed to relinquish the Northwest section of Germany to the British. After representations were made to Halifax he recommended a proposal which seemed to solve the situation. London has just replied to the proposal but this introduced some reservations which go pretty deep. I am inclined to think they can be straightened out without much difficulty after the logistic people get together but the staff still do not want to authorize the ratification of the protocol<sup>2</sup> now before the EAC till the matter is further clarified.

If you could get the staff people at the conference to clear up the major difficulties, the protocol can be ratified and all details thereafter can be dealt with by the respective local commanders. I have asked the Army people to do their utmost to reach an understanding and it may be possible to have the thing cleared up before the conference. In any case, you should inquire about the status of it at the conference because it ought to be got out of the way in order to permit Winant to go ahead at the EAC level. The British have already ratified the protocol.

J J Mc[CLOY]

<sup>1</sup> For another excerpt from this memorandum, see *post*, pp. 423-424.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 118-123.

## POLAND: GOVERNMENT AND BOUNDARIES

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 14 October 1944.

Personal and Top Secret for the President from Harriman.

Stalin and Churchill met with Mikolajczyk and his associates yesterday afternoon.<sup>2</sup> Molotov and Eden were present. I was invited as an observer and took no part in the discussion. Mikolajczyk was first given the opportunity to outline his position. He presented the memorandum of his proposals of August 30 handed to the Soviet Ambassador in London. With some difficulty Churchill forced Mikolajczyk to allow Grabski to outline the oral statement he had made at that time to the Soviet Ambassador. I understand you have copies of the memorandum and oral statement<sup>3</sup> referred to. Stalin stated that there were 2 great defects in the memorandum which would prevent an understanding on that basis. First it unrealistically ignored the existence of the Polish Committee of National Liberation. Second it failed to accept the Curzon Line as the Soviet-Polish boundary. He said that there were good points in the memorandum especially the emphasis on friendly relations with the Soviet Union in the future. Churchill supported unequivocally Stalin's position in regard to the Curzon Line as the basis for settlement. Mikolajczyk denied that he intended to ignore the Committee but indicated that in his memorandum it was intended that the settlement should go deeper than one between the members of the Committee and of the Government in London and that the new government should be based on the 5 democratic parties in Poland. He explained at great length why he could not accept the Curzon Line. The cession of territory must be decided by the Polish people. Churchill told Mikolajczyk that he must accept the Curzon

<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. A notation on the telegram reads, "Paraphrased copy to Sec State for information."

<sup>2</sup> At this time Churchill and Eden and a Polish Delegation headed by Mikolajczyk were in Moscow to discuss with Stalin and Molotov matters relating to Poland. For minutes of meetings and reports of conversations between October 13 and 18, 1944, written by members of the Polish Delegation, together with that Delegation's "timetable" and certain other related papers, all in English translation, see *Appendix to Committee Report on Communist Takeover and Occupation of Poland: Polish Documents Report of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression*, House of Representatives Report 2684, pt. 4, 83d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 106-146.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. A pen-written notation on the telegram reads, "Not in Map Room nor Miss Turner's files." Copies are in the Moscow Embassy Files, now in the Department.

Line as the *de facto* line of demarcation. He suggested a formula on this basis which would allow the Poles to present their case for adjustment and final settlement at the peace table. He warned Mikolajczyk however that he and the British Government were committed to support the Curzon Line as the basis for settlement and bluntly told him that this was no time for the Poles in London and the British Government to separate.

Both Churchill and Stalin committed themselves to support the claims of Poland in the west including East Prussia and west of Königsberg and the line of the Oder including Stettin. Molotov interjected that the Curzon Line had the support of the 3 major allies since at Teheran you had indicated that you considered that the Curzon Line was right although you did not consider it advisable to make your position public. He added that he recalled no objection on your part to the Polish claims in the west as outlined. Molotov did not refer to me for confirmation and I decided it would only make matters worse if I being present as an observer had attempted to correct his statement. I talked to Churchill about Molotov's statement afterwards at dinner. He recalls as clearly as I do that although you showed interest in hearing the views of Stalin and Churchill in the boundary question you had expressed no opinion on it one way or the other at Teheran. I intend to tell Molotov privately at the next opportunity that I am sure you will wish that your name not [be] brought into the discussions again in regard to the boundary question.

In reply to these statements Mikolajczyk said that he was not authorized to accept the Curzon Line and that he understood that the members of the Committee even still hoped for Lwów. Stalin said that a major adjustment of this kind could not be possible if the economic systems of the Soviet Union and Poland were different. It would cause great hardship to socialize these areas and then go back to another system. He said that the Curzon Line must be the basis for settlement. He agreed that there could be minor adjustments up to say 7 or 8 kilometers when the boundary was finally fixed.

The meeting broke up with the understanding that Mikolajczyk would consider the situation and have a talk with Eden. Churchill made it very plain that his government would consider it had fulfilled its obligations to Poland by providing a home for the Poles within the territory that was now proposed and that a strong free independent Poland was the objective not only of the British Government but also the Soviet Government. Stalin unequivocally endorsed this declaration.



Moscow Embassy Files

*Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*

SECRET

Moscow, October 16, 1944.

Conversation.

Present: The Polish Foreign Minister, Mr. Romer  
The American Ambassador, Mr. Harriman

Place: Spaso House

Subject: The Polish Boundary Situation.

Mr. Romer called on me October 16 to discuss the situation generally and to hand me the attached letter from Mr. Mikolajczyk regarding Molotov's statement about the position the President had taken at Teheran.<sup>1</sup>

I told Mr. Romer that I preferred to answer Mr. Mikolajczyk's letter verbally and would be glad to call on him. I explained to him that the President had not agreed to the Curzon Line at Teheran as the boundary between Russia and Poland, in fact the President had made it plain that he did not intend to take any position on the boundary question either privately or publicly. I said further that I could not comment on Mikolajczyk's account of his talk with the President. I said that I had not taken issue with Mr. Molotov's statement as I was present at the meeting as an observer, as Mr. Molotov had not referred to me for confirmation, and as the meeting was not the proper place for me to discuss with Mr. Molotov what the President had or had not said at Teheran. I said I personally appreciated the fact that Mikolajczyk had not entered into an argument over the President's position and I felt that his restraint had been wise in his own interests as well.

I told Mr. Romer that I was convinced Mr. Mikolajczyk would serve his interests best by not repeating Molotov's statement regarding the President's position to his associates in London as it would only raise further issue publicly which would lead to difficulties adverse to Polish interests.

Mr. Romer said he believed that Mr. Mikolajczyk would be satisfied with my oral statement to him (Romer) and would not request me to confirm it to him (Mikolajczyk) personally.

I told Romer that I would not discuss with him at all the question of the boundary but on the question of getting together with the Lublin Poles I personally felt that he would never again have as good

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<sup>1</sup>See *supra*.

an opportunity as now, on account of the presence of the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden. As so much depended on the details of how the relationships could be worked out I felt that the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden could be of great assistance to him. If he went home he would find that the relationship between the Poles in Lublin and Moscow would become more and more cemented, bitterness within Poland would be accentuated and nothing but difficulties could be looked forward to. My impression is that Romer sees much more clearly than Mikolajczyk the need for an early solution.

[Attachment]

*The Prime Minister of the Polish Government in London (Mikolajczyk)  
to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*

Moscow, 16th October 1944.

MR. AMBASSADOR, I learned with the shock of surprise from Mr. Molotov's statement at the meeting on October 13th that at the Teheran Conference the representatives of all the three Great Powers had definitely agreed that the so-called Curzon Line should be the frontier between Poland and the Soviet Union.

In this connexion I should like to recall that during the conversations which I had the honour to have with the President in Washington, in June 1944, I was told that only Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill had agreed on the Curzon Line. In particular, the President indicated that the policy of the U. S. Government was contrary to the settlement of territorial problems before the end of the war. The President said that at the Teheran Conference he had made it clear that he held the view that the Polish-Soviet conflict should not be settled on the basis of the so-called Curzon Line and he assured me that at the appropriate time he would help Poland to retain Lwów, Drohobycz and Tarnopol and to obtain East Prussia, including Königsberg, and Silesia. On the other hand, the President expressed the view that Marshal Stalin would not give his consent to the return of Wilno to Poland.

I would be most grateful to you, Mr. Ambassador, if you could help to clear this misunderstanding on a subject of such vital importance to Poland.

Accept, Mr. Ambassador, the expression of my high consideration and esteem.

STANISŁAW MIKOŁAJCZYK

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

[Excerpt]

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 22 October 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Top Secret Number 801.

Many thanks for your number 631.<sup>2</sup>

Para 1. On our last day at Moscow Mik<sup>3</sup> saw Bierut who admitted his difficulties.<sup>4</sup> Fifty of his men had been shot in the last month. Many Poles took to the woods rather than join his forces. Approaching winter conditions behind the front could be very hard as the Russian army moved forward using all transport. He insisted however that if Mik were premier he must have 75% of the cabinet. Mik proposed that each of the five Polish parties should be represented, he naming four out of the five of their best men whom he would pick from personalities not obnoxious to Stalin.

Para 2. Later at my request Stalin saw Mik and had one and one-quarter hours, very friendly talk. Stalin promised to help him and Mik promised to form and conduct a government thoroughly friendly to the Russians. He explained his plan but Stalin made it clear that the Lublin Poles must have the majority.

Para 3. After the Kremlin dinner we put it bluntly to Stalin that unless Mik had 50/50 plus himself the western world would not be convinced that the transaction was bona fide and would not believe that an independent Polish government had been set up. Stalin at first replied he would be content with 50/50 but rapidly corrected himself to a worse figure. Meanwhile Eden took the same line with Molotov who seemed more comprehending. I do not think the composition of the government will prove an insuperable obstacle if all else is settled. Mik had previously explained to me that there might be one announcement to save the prestige of the Lublin government and a different arrangement among the Poles behind the scenes.

Para 4. Apart from the above Mik is going to urge upon his London colleagues the Curzon line including Lwów for the Russians. I am hopeful that even in the next fortnight we may get a settlement. If so I will cable you the exact form so that you can say whether you want it published or delayed.

<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels. For other excerpts from this telegram, see *ante*, pp. 10, 159-160, and *post*, pp. 328, 400.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> Stanisław Mikołajczyk.

<sup>4</sup> It appears that this conversation between Mikołajczyk and Beirut took place on October 17, that Mikołajczyk informed Churchill and Eden of the substance of the conversation on October 18, and that Churchill and Eden left Moscow on October 19 (House of Representatives Report 2684, pt. 4, above cited, pp. 113, 114, 137, 145).

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 22 October 1944.

PRIORITY

Number 632, Personal and Top Secret, from the President to the Prime Minister.

Your 795,<sup>2</sup> 796,<sup>2</sup> 797,<sup>2</sup> 799,<sup>2</sup> 800<sup>2</sup> and 801<sup>3</sup> received.

I am delighted to learn of your success at Moscow in making progress toward a compromise solution of the Polish problem.

When and if a solution is arrived at, I should like to be consulted as to the advisability from this point of view of delaying its publication for about two weeks. You will understand.

Everything is going well here at the present time.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> *Supra*.

Roosevelt Papers

*The Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) to the Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius)*

TOP SECRET

The Polish Ambassador has received today a telegram from Premier Mikolajczyk dated London, October 26th, instructing him immediately to communicate to the President the following personal appeal of Premier Mikolajczyk. Premier Mikolajczyk would greatly appreciate it if he could receive at the President's earliest convenience the reply and decisions of the President in view of the great urgency of the situation.

Text of Premier Mikolajczyk's telegram to the President reads as follows:

Mr. President: From Ambassador Harriman you undoubtedly know the pressure being exercised on the Polish Government definitely to accept already at present and without any reservations the so-called Curzon Line as the basis of the future frontier between Poland and Soviet Russia. In all my political activities I have proved how fully I realize the necessity of Polish-Soviet understanding and how sincerely I desire to achieve it, not only in the interest of my own country, but also in that of the common cause of the United Nations and of future peace.

I am no less convinced, however, that the Polish nation would feel itself terribly deceived and wronged if, as the response to all its sacrifices, to its indomitable attitude, and its uninterrupted part in the fight in the course of this war it were faced as a result with the loss of nearly one-half of its territory on which are situated great centers of its national and cultural life and considerable economic values. The Polish Government cannot give its agreement to such a solution,

as it realizes that it would thereby lose the confidence and following of its nation to such an extent that this would close its way to the exploration of possibilities of reaching understanding with the Government of the USSR in other fields. It would in fact deprive the activities of the Polish Government of practical value.

In the course of the Moscow conversations I have applied all my best efforts to convince Marshal Stalin and Premier Churchill of the importance of the above considerations. In particular I stressed that it would constitute a great conciliatory and amicable gesture on the part of Russia towards Poland,—a gesture which would be regarded as such by the Polish people and make it easier for the Polish nation to reconcile itself with the other already so great territorial sacrifices demanded of it, if the City of Lwów and the East Galician oilfields were left with Poland in accordance with the so-called Line "B". This line would not infringe on the principle of the Curzon Line, as the latter did not formally extend through East Galicia.

However, my endeavors in this direction have hitherto remained unsuccessful. I cannot, in the face of my great responsibility, regard these endeavors as exhausted as long as you, Mr. President, have not expressed your stand in this matter. I retain in vivid and grateful memory your assurances given me in the course of our conversations of June, last, in Washington, pertaining particularly to Lwów and the adjacent territories. The memory of these assurances has not been dispelled even by Mr. Molotov's onesided version about your attitude in Teheran, which he gave me during the last conversations in Moscow. I have no doubt that in your attitude, Mr. President, purely objective arguments have played the most important part. It is known that for the last six hundred years Lwów has been a Polish city no less than Cracow and Warsaw, and one of the sources of Polish civilization. On the other hand, the production of the East Galician oil fields, so important to the economic system of Poland, constitutes barely one per cent of the oil production of the USSR.

I fully realize how deeply absorbed you are in your duties at this time and in the course of the next days. I believe, however, that in the face of the great importance of the decisions facing the Polish Government, which will bear on the entire future of the Polish Nation, and in a great measure on world relations as a whole, you will not refuse, Mr. President, my fervent prayer once more to throw the weight of your decisive influence and authority on the scales of events.

I am firmly convinced that if you, Mr. President, will consider it possible immediately to address a personal message to Marshal Stalin, pointing out that it is of consequence to you that the Polish question should be settled in such a way that the City of Lwów and the oil field basin of East Galicia should be left in Poland,—such a demarche, as foreseen by you, would have chances of being effective.

By removing from the way the chief and basic difference of opinions in the present negotiations between the Polish and the Soviet Governments,—such a demarche would render possible the achievement of an over-all Polish-Soviet understanding and would bring to you, Mr. President, not only a new title to the warm gratitude of the Polish people, but likewise an agelong merit of having solved one of the capital difficulties on the way of collaboration of the United Nations and of the future peace of Europe and the world.

I place in your hands, Mr. President, this matter with the greatest confidence and I shall await your decision. Signed: Mikolajczyk.

WASHINGTON, October 27th, 1944.

Roosevelt Papers

*The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the President*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 15, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following suggestions as to policy in regard to the Polish question and in particular to Prime Minister Mikolajczyk's message of October 26 and recent conversations with the Polish Ambassador are predicated on the possibility that you do not expect to meet with Mr. Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill before the end of the year.

The Polish issue is so acute that we believe some statement of this Government's position on general lines is due Premier Mikolajczyk. I therefore suggest for your approval the attached letter for your signature to Prime Minister Mikolajczyk. It covers the points on which from our information we know the Polish Government is especially anxious to learn our attitude.

I suggest that Ambassador Harriman, who is shortly returning to Moscow via London, present this letter to Prime Minister Mikolajczyk in person and at the same time discuss the question of Lwów. If as a result of this discussion Ambassador Harriman is convinced of the necessity of our making a last attempt to persuade the Soviet Government to leave Lwów and the oil fields within the frontiers of Poland, I hope you will authorize him on his return to Moscow to take up orally on your behalf the question of Lwów with Mr. Stalin.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

Enclosure:

Suggested letter to Premier Mikolajczyk.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The text of the letter as sent is *infra*.

Roosevelt Papers

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Mikolajczyk*

WASHINGTON, November 17, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I have had constantly in mind the problems you are facing in your endeavors to bring about an equitable and permanent solution of the Polish-Soviet difficulties and particularly the questions which you raised in your message of October 26. I have asked Ambassador Harriman, who will bring you this letter, to discuss with you the question of Lwów.

While I would have preferred to postpone the entire question of this Government's attitude until the general postwar settlement in Europe, I fully realize your urgent desire to receive some indication of the position of the United States Government with the least possible delay. Therefore, I am giving below in broad outline the general position of this Government in the hope that it may be of some assistance to you in your difficult task.

1. The United States Government stands unequivocally for a strong, free and independent Polish state with the untrammelled right of its Polish people to order their internal existence as they see fit.

2. In regard to the future frontiers of Poland, if a mutual agreement on this subject including the proposed compensation for Poland from Germany is reached between the Polish, Soviet and British Governments, this Government would offer no objection. In so far as the United States guarantee of any specific frontiers is concerned I am sure you will understand that this Government, in accordance with its traditional policy, cannot give a guarantee for any specific frontiers. As you know, the United States Government is working for the establishment of a world security organization through which the United States together with the other member states will assume responsibility for general security which, of course, includes the inviolability of agreed frontiers.

3. If the Polish Government and people desire in connection with the new frontiers of the Polish state to bring about the transfer to and from the territory of Poland of national minorities, the United States Government will raise no objection and as far as practicable will facilitate such transfer.

4. The United States Government is prepared, subject to legislative authority, to assist in so far as practicable in the post-war economic reconstruction of the Polish state.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

860C.01/11-2544 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

LONDON, November 25, 1944—6 p. m.  
[Received November 25—9:52 p. m.]

POLES 125. From Schoenfeld.

I saw Mikolajczyk this morning. He told me he had resigned as Premier (my 124 November 24<sup>1</sup>) because he felt a Polish-Soviet agreement was a necessity at this time, whereas the three major political parties other than his own felt that the question of frontiers should be left until the end of the war.

He realized the attack he would have been subjected to if the Government had made the concessions desired by the Soviets but he

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

reasoned that without an agreement, Poland would risk not only the loss of its eastern territories but probably also real compensation in the West. Once the war was over, he believed British and American public opinion would not support radical compensation for Poland in the West. Moreover, without an agreement, Poland was sure to be subjected to severe efforts at communization. The Lublin Committee was already largely Communist and those elements which were not Communist were being rapidly eliminated. If members of the London Government could return to Poland soon, they might succeed in preventing the country's communization. He could agree with those who doubted Soviet intentions, but if there was the slightest chance of success, he thought they should at least try. Furthermore, without an agreement and in view of Soviet advances from the north and the southeast, the Polish Government was faced with the prospect of increasing difficulty in maintaining its communications with and supplying the underground organization of Poland.

[If] He could have had more time, he would also have wished to gather up and preserve the "capital of energy" that Poland still disposes of abroad. If the parties could have united on a policy this would have been a source of strength in withstanding efforts to produce a Communist Poland. But divided they were necessarily ineffective. Furthermore, there were several hundred thousand Poles in western Europe and perhaps even a million in Germany. A surprising number had already been found in prison camps in recently captured German territory. He would have liked to recruit them for military service both in the interest of the war effort and of their own rehabilitation and to use them as a nucleus to build up Poland anew. But the Supreme Allied Command felt it was too late to train them for the war effort and would permit only the numbers necessary to replace losses in existing Polish military units. Without unity among the parties and without greater support from the Allies, he could not hope to bring about this conservation of Polish energies.

In all the circumstances, he had felt obliged to resign.

Mikolajczyk referred to his recent conversation with Harriman and said he was grateful for the President's willingness to intervene with Stalin regarding Lwów and the oil areas in Galicia, but he had not felt he could take advantage of it since he could not in any case secure his own government's support for the general boundary settlement proposed by the Soviet Government.

Mikolajczyk said that perhaps he was wrong in this estimate of the future and "the others" right, but this was his honest conviction and in the circumstances he had not felt he could stay on as Prime Minister.

As for his immediate plans, Mikolajczyk said he did not know what he would do. I asked him whether, in case Kwapiński failed to form



a government, he would perhaps undertake to do so. He said he would not.

He spoke throughout with quiet simplicity and, though somewhat more subdued than usual, retained all his normal calm and self-possession. Only as I took leave of him and told him how sorry I was that he had given over, did he show any emotion. He expressed deep appreciation of the understanding that had always been shown him from the American side and asked me to express his appreciation and great admiration to the President.

WINANT

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Roosevelt Papers

*The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the President*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 25, 1944.

TELEGRAM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Resignation of Prime Minister Mikolajczyk

I assume that you have read Ambassador Harriman's report of the 23rd (No. 10326) from London,<sup>1</sup> regarding his conversation with Mikolajczyk, and that you have noted that Mikolajczyk's decision to resign was because he was unable to obtain the support of his Government to his program of a settlement of the territorial issue with the Soviet Union.

Mikolajczyk's resignation will, in our opinion, render the Polish question much more acute and difficult. The Polish Government in London without him, and possibly his like-minded colleagues, will have no basis whatsoever for continued negotiations with the Government or the Lublin Committee. We must anticipate, therefore, that the Soviet Government will be quick to take advantage of Mikolajczyk's resignation in order to proceed more vigorously with the establishment of the Lublin Committee as the sole representative authority of Poland. We could easily be faced with a most difficult problem in regard to Poland. On the one hand, we would have the Lublin Committee backed by the Soviet Government but which, according to all our information, has very little support inside Poland; and on the other, the Government in London which we recognize, probably led by Polish socialists who adamantly refuse to consider the Soviet proposals.

We are following the situation with the closest attention and we recommend that for the moment our best policy is to take no action but carefully watch developments.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

860C.01/11-2644

*The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the President*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 28, 1944.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Resignation of Mikolajczyk

I think you will be interested in looking at the two enclosed telegrams in regard to the Polish situation, the first reporting a conversation between Mikolajczyk and Schoenfeld in which the former explained in some detail his reasons for resigning<sup>1</sup> and the latter quoting extensively from British press discussion of the subject.<sup>2</sup> You will notice that a number of British papers erroneously attribute Mikolajczyk's resignation to our refusal to guarantee Polish frontiers.

In order to counteract the London news stories regarding the frontier guarantee, the Department on November 25 released the following statement:

The specific question of the guarantee of the Polish frontier by this Government was not and could not have been an issue since this Government's traditional policy of not guaranteeing specific frontiers in Europe is well known.

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, pp. 210-212.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

865.01/12-144

*The Secretary of State to the President*

[WASHINGTON,] December 1, 1944.

## SPECIAL INFORMATION FOR THE PRESIDENT

[Excerpts]<sup>1</sup>

These international developments of the past two or three days will be of especial interest to you:

*New Polish Cabinet.* Schoenfeld reports that the new Polish Government is generally considered to be made up of the anti-Russian wing of the London Poles. The Chairman of the Lublin Committee, Osobka-Morawski, in a speech reported by the Soviet press, has indicated the willingness of his organization to cooperate with Mikolajczyk but only on the platform supported by the Lublin Committee.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

<sup>1</sup> For other excerpts from this memorandum, see *post*, pp. 250, 266, 430.

860C.01/12-544 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*<sup>1</sup>SECRET  
URGENT

[WASHINGTON,] December 13, 1944.

2828. In view of the apparent impossibility of the present Polish Cabinet to work out any agreement with the Soviet Government regarding the future of Poland (your 4656, December 5<sup>2</sup>), the Department does not contemplate that relations will be more than "correct". Ambassador Lane is remaining until January but we do not wish to have his remaining here for the present given any political significance.

In any discussions you might have with Soviet officials, you should be guided by the fact that this Government has continued recognition of the Polish Government in London. While it is realized that the Soviet Government can and may accord full recognition to the Lublin Committee, you may, if you feel it would be helpful, indicate that we would not look favorably on such a step by the Soviet Government.

It is possible that the present Polish Government will be unable to make any headway in solving Polish problems and therefore may fall. Mikolajczyk may then be induced to form a new Cabinet composed of persons who fully support his policies, which eventuality might make it possible for us to take a more positive attitude in favor of the Polish Government in London.

STETTINIUS

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<sup>1</sup> Transmitted by Army channels.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 15 December 1944.

For the President from the Secretary of State.

You have undoubtedly seen the press reports on Mr. Churchill's statement in the House of Commons regarding the Polish problem<sup>1</sup> in which he emphasized his general agreement with the Soviet proposals on Polish frontiers and apparently he implied that it was difficult to reach a solution to the problem since the United States Government has not clearly defined its attitude. Since I have seen only the early newspaper reports I have declined to comment on the statement;

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<sup>1</sup> For Churchill's statement, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th ser., vol. 406, cols. 1478-1489, December 15, 1944.

You will recall that on November 15 [17] you sent by Ambassador Harriman a letter to Mikolajczyk outlining our policy in regard to Poland.<sup>2</sup> This letter was shown to Mr. Churchill before Ambassador Harriman delivered it to Mikolajczyk. The following is a summary of the United States position on the Polish question laid down in that letter:

1. We stand unequivocally for a strong, free and independent Poland with the untrammelled right of the Polish people to order their internal existence as they see fit.

2. Regarding the future frontiers of Poland, this Government would offer no objection if a mutual agreement on this subject including proposed compensation for Poland from Germany was reached between the Polish, Soviet and British Governments. As regards a United States guarantee of any specific frontier, it was stated that this Government, in accordance with its traditional policy, did not give guarantees for any specific frontier. But it was pointed out that the United States Government is working for the establishment of a world security organization through which we with other members of the United Nations will assume responsibility for general security which of course includes the inviolability of agreed frontiers.

3. If the Polish Government and the people desire in connection with the new frontiers to bring about a transfer to and from the territory of Poland of national minorities the United States Government will raise no objection and as far as practicable will facilitate such transfer.

4. It was indicated that we were prepared, subject to legislative authority, to assist in so far as practicable in the postwar economic reconstruction of Poland.

I am sending a full summary of these four points so that you will have them before you, since you will undoubtedly be questioned at your first press conference on your return. I hope to talk over with you the possible necessity of some public statement making clear our position along the lines of the four points.

It is not clear from the reports we have so far received on Churchill's statement whether he is endeavoring to force a change in the present Polish cabinet and bring Mikolajczyk back or whether he may plan to follow a Soviet lead and recognize the Lublin Committee as the government of Poland. In this connection there are definite indications that the Lublin Committee is planning to declare itself as the provisional government of Poland, and other indications point to the probability that it will be recognized as such by Stalin, possibly at an early date.

In view of the uncertainty as to Churchill's plans, it is suggested you might care to send the attached telegram<sup>3</sup> to him.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 209-210. Harriman showed this letter to Churchill and Eden on the evening of November 21 in London and delivered it to Mikolajczyk the following morning (Roosevelt Papers, telegram from Harriman to Roosevelt, November 22, 1944).

<sup>3</sup> The telegram as sent is printed *infra*.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

[WARM SPRINGS, GEORGIA,] 15 December 1944.

Number 674, Personal and Top Secret, from the President for the former Naval Person.

I have seen the newspaper reports of your statement in the House on the Polish question. In order that we may cooperate fully in this matter I would appreciate receiving the benefit of your ideas as to what steps we can now take in regard to this question. Particularly I would like to have your evaluation of the possibility of Mikolajczyk's coming back into power with sufficient authority to carry out his plans and what action you feel we should take in the event the Lublin Committee should declare itself to be the provisional government of Poland and Stalin should recognize it as such.<sup>2</sup> In view of this possibility I wonder if it would be helpful if I should send a message to Stalin suggesting that he postpone any positive action on the Polish question until the three of us can get together.

You will recall the contents of the letter I sent to Mikolajczyk by Mr. Harriman which he showed to you and which outlines our policy in regard to Poland. I anticipate strong pressure here for the position of this Government to be made clear, and I may therefore have to make public in some form the four points outlining our position contained in my letter to Mikolajczyk referred to above.

Knowing that we have in mind the same basic objectives in regard to Poland I want to be sure to coordinate with you any steps which I may contemplate in this matter.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> Churchill replied in his telegram No. 854, dated December 16, 1944 (not printed), that the Arciszewski government had established itself and that the British Government saw no immediate prospect of Mikolajczyk's return to power. This telegram further stated that the British Government did not intend to recognize the Lublin Committee, but would continue to regard the London Government as the legal Government of Poland. (Roosevelt Papers.)

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

[Excerpt]

[LONDON,] 16 December 1944.

853. I thank you cordially for your telegram Number 674 about Poland. I trust you will carry out your proposal to send a message to Stalin suggesting that he postpone any positive action on the Polish

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission not indicated on copy.

question until the three of us can get together. This suggestion is most valuable and also I feel extremely urgent. Would it be possible for you to do this today, as I apprehend Stalin may make some move recognizing the Lublin Committee as the government of Poland.

PRIME

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[WARM SPRINGS, GEORGIA,] 16 December 1944.

PRIORITY

Number 136, Personal and Top Secret, from the President for Marshal Stalin.<sup>2</sup>

In view of the interest raised in this country by Prime Minister Churchill's statement in the House of Commons yesterday and the strong pressure we are under to make known our position in regard to Poland, I believe it may be necessary in the next few days for this government to issue some statement on the subject. This statement, if issued, will outline our attitude somewhat along the following lines:

"1. The United States Government stands unequivocally for a strong, free, independent and democratic Poland.

2. In regard to the question of future frontiers of Poland, the United States, although considering it desirable that territorial questions await the general postwar settlement, recognizes that a settlement before that time is in the interest of the common war effort and therefore would have no objection if the territorial questions involved in the Polish situation, including the proposed compensation from Germany, were settled by mutual agreement between the parties directly concerned.

3. Recognizing that the transfer of minorities in some cases is feasible and would contribute to the general security and tranquility in the areas concerned, the United States Government would have

<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> A draft of this message to Stalin had been sent to the President by Stettinius with a telegram of December 16 which included the following explanation:

"We feel that it is necessary for me to make a statement reemphasizing and perhaps clarifying our position on the Polish matter along the lines of your letter to Mr. Mikolajczyk. I feel also that the general statement of position will in truth be welcomed by Marshal Stalin, and you will note that it is very much in harmony with the sentiments expressed by the Prime Minister yesterday in the House of Commons.

"I believe that by giving Stalin advance notice of this statement the chances would be increased of his withholding any sudden move in regard to the Lublin Committee pending the meeting." (Roosevelt Papers.)

The message was communicated to Churchill as No. 675, of the same date (Roosevelt Papers).

no objection if the Government and the people of Poland desire to transfer nationals and would join in assisting such transfers.

4. In conformity with its announced aim, this Government is prepared to assist, subject to legislative authority, and in so far as may be practicable, in the economic reconstruction of countries devastated by Nazi aggression. This policy applies equally to Poland as to other such devastated countries of the United Nations.”<sup>3</sup>

The proposed statement, as you will note, will contain nothing, I am sure, that is not known to you as the general attitude of this Government and is I believe in so far as it goes in general accord with the results of your discussion with Prime Minister Churchill in Moscow in the autumn, and for this reason, I am sure, you will welcome it.

I feel it is of the highest importance that until the three of us can get together and thoroughly discuss this troublesome question there be no action on any side which would render our discussions more difficult. I have seen indications that the Lublin Committee may be intending to give itself the status of a provisional government of Poland. I fully appreciate the desirability from your point of view of having a clarification of Polish authority before your armies move further into Poland. I very much hope, however, that because of the great political implications which such a step would entail you would find it possible to refrain from recognizing the Lublin Committee as a government of Poland before we meet, which I hope will be immediately after my inauguration on January 20. Could you not until that date continue to deal with the Committee in its present form. I know that Prime Minister Churchill shares my views on this point.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>3</sup> Because this message from Roosevelt to Stalin did not reach the Embassy in Moscow until December 20, and because in the meantime, on December 18, the Department of State had issued a press release regarding Poland (*infra*) which differed somewhat from the statement here quoted, Ambassador Harriman, in transmitting the message to Stalin, omitted these four paragraphs and sent instead the text of the press release, with the explanation that an outline of its substance had been contained in the message (760C.61/12-2344, White House memorandum for Stettinius quoting a paraphrase of a message from Harriman to Roosevelt, December 21, 1944).

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*Department of State Press Release, December 18, 1944*<sup>1</sup>

The United States Government's position as regards Poland has been steadfastly guided by full understanding and sympathy for the interests of the Polish people. This position has been communicated on previous occasions to the interested governments, including the Government of Poland. It may be summarized as follows:

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<sup>1</sup> Reprinted from Department of State *Bulletin*, December 24, 1944, vol. xi, p. 836.

1. The United States Government stands unequivocally for a strong, free, and independent Polish state with the untrammelled right of the Polish people to order their internal existence as they see fit.

2. It has been the consistently held policy of the United States Government that questions relating to boundaries should be left in abeyance until the termination of hostilities. As Secretary Hull stated in his address of April 9, 1944,<sup>2</sup> "This does not mean that certain questions may not and should not in the meantime be settled by friendly conference and agreement." In the case of the future frontiers of Poland, if a mutual agreement is reached by the United Nations directly concerned, this Government would have no objection to such an agreement which could make an essential contribution to the prosecution of the war against the common enemy. If, as a result of such agreement, the Government and people of Poland decide that it would be in the interests of the Polish state to transfer national groups, the United States Government in cooperation with other governments will assist Poland, in so far as practicable, in such transfers. The United States Government continues to adhere to its traditional policy of declining to give guarantees for any specific frontiers. The United States Government is working for the establishment of a world security organization through which the United States together with other member states would assume responsibility for the preservation of general security.

3. It is the announced aim of the United States Government, subject to legislative authority, to assist the countries liberated from the enemy in repairing the devastation of war and thus to bring to their peoples the opportunity to join as full partners in the task of building a more prosperous and secure life for all men and women. This applies to Poland as well as the other United Nations.

The policy of the United States Government regarding Poland outlined above has as its objective the attainment of the announced basic principles of United States foreign policy.

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<sup>2</sup> For the text of this address, on the foreign policy of the United States, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 15, 1944, vol. x, pp. 335-342.

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Moscow Embassy Files : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

[Moscow,] December 19, 1944--7 p. m.

4913. (Secret for the Secretary)

I am somewhat concerned over the expanding concept of the Soviet Government in connection with the future western frontier of Poland.



The first Soviet proposal indicated a willingness that Poland should have East Prussia except the Koenigsberg area and an expansion of her western frontier perhaps even as far as the Oder and possibly including the cities of Stettin and Breslau. Subsequently the Soviet intention appeared fixed that the western boundary should be the line of the Oder including Stettin and Breslau. In discussions with De Gaulle, Stalin now proposes the line of the Oder to the confluence of the lower Neisse and then south along the Neisse to the Czech border near the city of Gorlitz. (This proposal was confirmed by the recent *Pravda* article.) In this connection Stalin indicated to De Gaulle that the Czechs might wish to expand their boundaries to the north somewhat into Silesia, although this suggestion was not defined precisely. Benes, in talking with me a year ago, did not appear to be interested in taking German territory which would increase his problems.

When Mikolajczyk was in Moscow he indicated that he was not at all certain that it was wise for the Polish boundary to go as far as the Oder and particularly to include the cities of Stettin and Breslau, as these cities and certain of the area were almost completely German. The Lublin Poles, however, showed complete readiness to assume these new responsibilities. Churchill indicated that he was willing to have the Polish frontiers go as far as the Poles wished, but I believe that at that time he had in mind only the line up to the Oder, but not beyond. What the British position is on the question of the lower Neisse line I do not know.

Both the Lublin Poles and Mikolajczyk indicated in the October talks that they did not wish any German population to remain within Polish territory because of the acute minority problem that this would create. The Russians and British accepted this principle. Churchill in his recent speech mentions the transfer of six million Germans out of territory to be given to the Poles. The new suggested boundary to the Neisse would evidently necessitate the transfer of several million more Germans.

Stalin also agreed with Benes in December 1943 that some if not all of the Sudeten Germans should be transferred.

We have not here exact information on the total transfers of Germans involved in these various areas nor have we information on where these people could be re-established within Germany. We have little information to appraise the consequences to European economy and stability if so large an area were to be occupied by Poles presumably evacuated largely from the backward districts incorporated into the Soviet Union and to answer the question of where the technical skill could be found to administer and operate these highly developed and industrialized areas.

The Soviet policy towards Poland superficially appears to be that the Soviets are attempting to justify their annexation of old Polish territory and their domination of the internal affairs of Poland by expandingly generous offers of territory in the West at the expense of Germany.

I fully recognize our policy is not to commit ourselves in boundary questions until the peace settlement. The question I have in mind however is whether, if we have reservations in the present case, they should not be registered on an appropriate occasion with the British and Soviet Governments before these concepts become so fixed that they are virtually a *fait accompli*.

W. A. H[ARRIMAN]

Roosevelt Papers

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

Translation<sup>2</sup>

PERSONAL AND SECRET

I have received your message on Polish matters<sup>3</sup> on December 20. As regards Mr. Stettinius' statement of December 18, I would prefer to express myself about this during our personal meeting. In any case the events in Poland have considerably moved ahead than it is reflected in the said statement.

A number of facts which took place during the time after the last visit of Mikolajczyk to Moscow and, in particular the radio-communications with Mikolajczyk's government intercepted by us from arrested in Poland terrorists—underground agents of the Polish *émigré* government—with all palpability proves that the negotiations of Mr. Mikolajczyk with the Polish National Committee served as a screen for those elements who conducted from behind Mikolajczyk's back criminal terrorist work against Soviet officers and soldiers on the territory of Poland. We cannot reconcile with such a situation when terrorists instigated by Polish emigrants kill in Poland soldiers and officers of the Red Army, lead a criminal fight against Soviet troops which are liberating Poland, and directly aid our enemies, whose allies they in fact are. The substitution of Mikolajczyk by Arzyshewsky [*Arciszewski*] and, in general, transpositions of ministers in the Polish *émigré* government have made the situation even worse and have created a precipice between Poland and the *émigré* government.

Meanwhile the Polish National Committee has made serious achievements in the strengthening of the Polish state and the apparatus of governmental power on the territory of Poland, in the expansion

<sup>1</sup> Presumably transmitted by the Soviet Embassy, Washington.

<sup>2</sup> Appears on the original.

<sup>3</sup> No. 136, December 16, 1944, *ante*, pp. 217-218.

and strengthening of the Polish army, in carrying into practice of a number of important governmental measures and, in the first place, of the agrarian reform in favor of the peasants. All this has led to consolidation of democratic powers of Poland and to powerful strengthening of authority of the National Committee among the wide masses in Poland and among wide social Polish circles abroad.

It seems to me that now we should be interested in the support of the Polish National Committee and all those who want and are capable to work together with it and that is especially important for the Allies and for the solution of our common task—the speeding of the defeat of Hitlerite Germany. For the Soviet Union, which is bearing the whole burden for the liberation of Poland from German occupationists, the question of relations with Poland under present conditions is the task of daily close and friendly relations with a power which has been established by the Polish people on its own soil and which has already grown strong and has its own army which together with the Red Army is fighting against the Germans.

I have to say frankly that if the Polish Committee of National Liberation will transform itself into a Provisional Polish Government then, in view of the above-said, the Soviet Government will not have any serious ground for postponement of the question of its recognition. It is necessary to bear in mind that in the strengthening of a pro-Allied and democratic Poland the Soviet Union is interested more than any other power not only because the Soviet Union is bearing the main brunt of the battle for liberation of Poland but also because Poland is a border state with the Soviet Union and the problem of Poland is inseparable from the problem of security of the Soviet Union. To this we have to add that the successes of the Red Army in Poland in the fight against the Germans are to a great degree dependent on the presence of peaceful and trustworthy rear in Poland, and the Polish National Committee fully takes into account this circumstance while the *émigré* government and its underground agents by their terroristic actions are creating a threat of civil war in the rear of the Red Army and counteract the success of the latter. On the other hand, under the conditions which exist in Poland at the present time there are no reasons for the continuation of the policy of support of the *émigré* government, which has lost all confidence of the Polish population in the country and besides creates a threat of civil war in the rear of the Red Army, violating thus our common interests of a successful fight against the Germans. I think that it would be natural, just and profitable for our common cause if the governments of the Allied countries as the first step have agreed on an immediate exchange of representatives with the Polish National Committee so that after a certain time it would be recognized as the lawful government of Poland after the transformation of the National Committee into a provisional

government of Poland. Otherwise I am afraid that the confidence of the Polish People in the Allied powers may weaken. I think that we cannot allow the Polish people to say that we are sacrificing the interests of Poland in favor of the interests of a handful of Polish emigrants in London.

DECEMBER 27, 1944.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Roosevelt's No. 681 to Churchill, dated December 29, 1944, quoted the text of this message, with the request, "I should like your comments before making a reply." Churchill's No. 864, dated December 30, 1944, included the following statement: "Your Number 681 enclosing Stalin's reply about Poland shows how serious will be the difficulties we shall have to face. I have consulted the Foreign Secretary and the Cabinet about it and their clear view is that we shall continue to press Stalin not to recognise the Lublin Committee as the government of Poland and tell him plainly that we shall not do so. The matter should be reserved for the coming conference." (Roosevelt Papers.)

860C.01/12-1944

*The Secretary of State to the President*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 29, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Suggested Reply to Stalin's Message on the Lublin Committee

I have seen Stalin's reply dated December 27<sup>1</sup> to your message of December 17 [16]<sup>2</sup> in regard to Poland in which he said that he cannot accede to your request to postpone recognition of the Lublin Committee as the provisional government of Poland but on the contrary suggests that this Government and those of the other Allied countries should accord similar recognition.

According to our information, the recognition of the Lublin Committee as the provisional government of Poland is expected to occur on December 31. For this reason, while I would have much preferred to have had an opportunity to discuss a reply to Stalin with you following your return tomorrow, we feel that it would be most important to get an answer in his hands before the expected date of recognition. I am, accordingly, attaching a proposed reply to Stalin.<sup>3</sup> You will note that the position which this Government takes in the reply is along the same lines as the attitude of the British Government, set forth in the Prime Minister's telegram no. 854, December 16, to you.<sup>4</sup> If you approve this message, it can go tonight and be repeated to Prime Minister Churchill for his information.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

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<sup>1</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 217-218.

<sup>3</sup> The reply as sent is printed *infra*.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed; but see *ante*, p. 216, footnote 2.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin* <sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 30 December 1944.

153. I am disturbed and deeply disappointed over your message of December 27 in regard to Poland <sup>2</sup> in which you tell me that you cannot see your way clear to hold in abeyance the question of recognizing the Lublin Committee as the provisional government of Poland until we have had an opportunity at our meeting to discuss the whole question thoroughly. I would have thought no serious inconvenience would have been caused your Government or your Armies if you could have delayed the purely juridical act of recognition for the short period of a month remaining before we meet.

There was no suggestion in my request that you curtail your practical relations with the Lublin Committee nor any thought that you should deal with or accept the London Government in its present composition. I had urged this delay upon you because I felt you would realize how extremely unfortunate and even serious it would be at this period in the war in its effect on world opinion and enemy morale if your Government should formally recognize one Government of Poland while the majority of the other United Nations including the United States and Great Britain continue to recognize and to maintain diplomatic relations with the Polish Government in London.

I must tell you with a frankness equal to your own that I see no prospect of this Government's following suit and transferring its recognition from the Government in London to the Lublin Committee in its present form. This is in no sense due to any special ties or feelings for the London Government. The fact is that neither the Government nor the people of the United States have as yet seen any evidence either arising from the manner of its creation or from subsequent developments to justify the conclusion that the Lublin Committee as at present constituted represents the people of Poland. I cannot ignore the fact that up to the present only a small fraction of Poland proper west of the Curzon Line has been liberated from German tyranny, and it is therefore an unquestioned truth that the people of Poland have had no opportunity to express themselves in regard to the Lublin Committee.

If at some future date following the liberation of Poland a provisional government of Poland with popular support is established, the attitude of this Government would of course be governed by the decision of the Polish people.

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<sup>1</sup> Presumably sent to Harriman via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 221-223.

I fully share your view that the departure of Mr. Mikolajczyk from the Government in London has worsened the situation. I have always felt that Mr. Mikolajczyk, who I am convinced is sincerely desirous of settling all points at issue between the Soviet Union and Poland, is the only Polish leader in sight who seems to offer the possibility of a genuine solution of the difficult and dangerous Polish question. I find it most difficult to believe from my personal knowledge of Mr. Mikolajczyk and my conversations with him when he was here in Washington and his subsequent efforts and policies during his visit at Moscow that he had knowledge of any terrorist instructions.

I am sending you this message so that you will know the position of this Government in regard to the recognition at the present time of the Lublin Committee as the provisional government. I am more than ever convinced that when the three of us get together we can reach a solution of the Polish problem, and I therefore still hope that you can hold in abeyance until then the formal recognition of the Lublin Committee as a government of Poland. I cannot, from a military angle, see any great objection to a delay of a month.

ROOSEVELT<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Roosevelt's No. 684 to Churchill, dated December 30, 1944, quoted the text of this message, with the comment, "You will see that we are in step" (Roosevelt Papers).

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] 4 January 1945.

Number 691. Top Secret and Personal from the President for the Prime Minister.

There is quoted herewith following for your information Stalin's reply to my message in regard to the Polish situation, my No. 684. I am not replying to Stalin, but we may discuss the matter at the meeting:

"1 January 1945. I have received your message of December 31 [30].

I am extremely sorry that I did not succeed in convincing you of the correctness of the position of the Soviet Government on the Polish question. Nevertheless, I hope that events will convince you that the Polish National Committee has all the time rendered and is continuing to render the Allies, in particular the Red Army, important assistance in the fight against Hitlerite Germany whereas the *émigré* Government in London is bringing disorganization into this struggle and thus is aiding the Germans.

Of course, your suggestion to postpone for a month the recognition of the Provisional Government of Poland by the Soviet Union is per-

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

fectly understandable to me. But there is one circumstance which makes me powerless to fulfill your wish. The fact is that on December 27 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to an appropriate request of the Poles has already informed them that it intends to recognize the Provisional Government of Poland as soon as it is formed. This circumstance makes me powerless to fulfill your wish.

Permit me to congratulate you on the New Year and to wish you health and success."<sup>2</sup>

I have not told Stalin that my message to him was shown to you.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>2</sup> This message from Stalin had been communicated to the President by the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 6 January 1945.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Top Secret Number 876, yours number 691.<sup>2</sup>

Thank you for the information and it is interesting to see that the "Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR" has now been brought up into the line.

Stalin has communicated to me your message to him, of which you sent me a copy in your number 691. We have not ourselves communicated with him on this subject since you sent us a copy of your original message to him (number 675)<sup>3</sup> but had already made it clear in earlier telegrams, and I in fact mentioned it in parliament, that we continue to recognize the London Poles as the Government of Poland. I have now replied to Stalin as follows:—"Naturally I and my war cabinet colleagues are distressed at the course events are taking. I am quite clear that much the best thing is for us three to meet together and talk all these matters over, not only as isolated problems but in relation to the whole world situation both of the war and the transition to peace. Meanwhile our attitude as you know it remains unchanged. I look forward very much to this momentous meeting and I am glad that the President of the United States has been willing to make this long journey. We have agreed, subject to your concurrence, that the code-name shall be called "ARGONAUT" and I hope you will use that in any messages that may be interchanged by the staffs who will be consulting about the arrangements."

You may rest assured of our entire support.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 217-218.

Roosevelt Papers

*Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*

[Excerpt]

[Moscow,] January 20, 1945.

## Conversation

Present: The American Ambassador, Mr. Harriman

I. M. Maiski, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs

\* \* \* \* \*

In connection with Poland we got on the political question. He said he thought the London Government had "missed the bus". Many opportunities had been given to them including last October. Mikolajczyk in his view was not a strong leader. If he had been one he would have returned to London and announced to his associates that he was returning to Poland and asked who would go with him. Instead he attempted to argue and got nowhere. He saw nothing ahead now except the present Provisional Government in Lublin, which incidentally has now moved to Warsaw.

Maiski said there had been a number of calculations of the Germans that would have to be taken out of territory that was to be given to Poland. The calculations came to between six and eight million Germans but Maiski thought six million was nearer right. I did not discuss the Polish question with him because of the coming meeting except to emphasize its importance as an issue that must be settled, and its effect on our relations.

\* \* \* \* \*

760C.61/1-2345

*The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the President*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 23, 1945.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Polish-Soviet Difference

The Polish Ambassador called at the Department on January 22 to deliver the attached note containing his Government's proposals for the solution of the Polish-Soviet difference. He asked that the proposals be sent to you immediately. The proposals do not appear to offer any real basis for an approach to the Soviet Government. They may be outlined as follows:

1. While the Polish Government would prefer to defer territorial settlements until the end of the war, it apparently is willing to discuss this question with the Soviet Government now provided it involves



compensation in the North and West for territories lost in the East. The extent of this compensation is not indicated.

2. The Polish Government desires to conclude an alliance with the Soviet Government guaranteeing the security of both states within the framework of the International Security Organization.

3. It will not recognize any unilateral solutions and it demands the right to regulate its own internal life.

4. If the Soviet Government does not agree to negotiate with the Polish Government, the latter suggests that an inter-Allied military commission be created to control in Poland the local administration (those loyal to London) apparently until free elections are held.

5. The hope is expressed that the United States Government will not take any decisions concerning Poland without the consent of the Polish Government and will not recognize the Lublin Government.

JOSEPH C. GREW,  
*Acting Secretary*

[Attachment]

*The Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) to the Secretary of State*

MOST URGENT

[WASHINGTON,] January 22, 1945.

The Polish Ambassador has today received instructions from his Government immediately to communicate to the Secretary of State the following memorandum from the Polish Government:

"Foreseeing that matters concerning Poland will be discussed at the forthcoming meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the three great Powers, and having full confidence in the intentions of the President of the United States of ensuring the Polish State real independence and the guarantee of its rights,—the Polish Government would like to take this opportunity to express the following views:

"I—The Polish Government shares the attitude taken by the Governments of the United States and Great Britain that territorial questions should be settled only after the termination of hostilities. The Polish Government is ready to reach an amicable settlement of the Polish-Soviet controversy which has arisen as a result of the claims of the USSR to the eastern territories of the Polish Republic and will accept any one of the methods foreseen by international law for the just and fair solution of the controversy with the participation of both parties concerned. Moreover, the Polish Government is decided to conclude with the USSR an alliance guaranteeing the security of both states and closely to collaborate with the USSR in the framework of a general international organization of security and of the economic organization of the States of Central-Eastern Europe.

"Under no circumstances will the Polish Government recognize unilateral solutions, mindful of the fact that Poland, belonging as she does to the family of United Nations in the common struggle for

freedom of the world, has made enormous sacrifices of her most precious values and has lost practically one-fifth of her population fallen in battle, murdered in penal camps, in Ghettos or deceased in prisons, in exile or in labor camps.

"The Polish Government is convinced that the simultaneous establishment and guaranteeing of the over-all territorial status of the Polish State, the solution of the controversy with the USSR, the grant to Poland of territories to which she has rightful claim situated to the North and the West of her frontiers, the insurance of her real independence and full right to organize her internal life in accordance with the will of the Polish Nation untrammelled by any foreign intervention,—is a vital matter not only for Poland, but for the whole of Europe.

"II.—Should the Soviet Government, notwithstanding the insistent efforts of the Polish Government, refuse to enter into a voluntary understanding, the Polish Government, desirous of insuring internal peace and freedom to its country, suggests that a Military Inter-Allied Commission should be created under whose control the local administration of Poland could perform its functions until it will be possible for the legal Polish Government to take over authority.

"Such a Commission should have at its disposal military contingents of the States represented on it. The statutes of the Commission and the principles upon which the local administration would be based should be established in detail in agreement with the Polish Government. The Polish Government additionally stresses that the authorities of the Polish Republic, abolished by the German occupying authorities in violation of the stipulations of the IV-th Hague Convention of 1907,<sup>1</sup> in effect continued to function underground and should constitute the foundation of the administration of the country.

"After the return to Poland of her Supreme State Authorities as well as of her citizens who are at present outside her frontiers due to war events, elections will be held on the basis of a universal, secret, equal, direct and proportional electoral law, giving to all political parties full freedom of electoral action, and to all citizens equal and free right of expressing their will.

"The Polish Government will retain its authority until the convocation of the Parliament (Sejm) on the above mentioned principles and the creation in Poland of a new legal government.

"III.—The Polish Government trusts that the United States Government will not take part in any decisions concerning the Allied Polish State taken without the participation and consent of the Polish Government.

"The Polish Government is convinced that at the meeting of the three great Powers the United States Government will express its decision of not recognizing in Poland accomplished facts and particularly of not recognizing a 'puppet government'. The recognition of such a 'government' in Poland would be equivalent to the cancellation of the recognition of an independent Poland, for the maintenance of which the present war started."

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<sup>1</sup> For the text of this convention regarding the laws and customs of war on land, signed at The Hague October 18, 1907, see Department of State Treaty Series No. 539, or 36 Stat. 2277.

Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*

## SUGGESTED UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING POLAND

## SUMMARY

With regard to Poland, we should continue to maintain our announced policy which has for its objective the eventual establishment by the Polish people of a truly democratic government of their own choice. In the attainment of this end, we should endeavor to prevent any interim regime from being established which would exclude any major element of the population and threaten to crystallize into a permanent government before the will of the population could become manifest. In pursuance of this policy, we should not recognize the Provisional Government of Lublin, at least until more conclusive evidence is received that it does in fact represent the basic wishes of the Polish people. With the same objective in view, we should use our full influence to see that the Polish Peasant Party, the largest in the country, and its leader, Mikolajczyk, are given an opportunity to take a leading role in any interim arrangements which may be made pending full liberation and free elections. In order that the eventual elections may achieve the objective we seek, we should sponsor United Nations arrangements for their supervision.

With respect to the Polish frontier, we should use our influence to obtain a solution of this problem which would minimize future points of friction, possible Irredentism and the number of minority groups which would have to be transferred as a part of the settlement in order that the solution would contribute to the fullest possible extent to the peace and future tranquility of Europe. In pursuance of this objective, we should support a frontier settlement which in the east would take the Curzon Line as a basis but would, if possible, include the Province of Lwów in Poland in order that this predominantly Polish city and the economically important oil fields to the southwest would remain within the frontiers of the Polish state. In the north, Poland should receive the bulk of East Prussia and, in the west, the only changes in the 1939 frontier we should support should be the inclusion of a small strip of Pomerania west of the so-called Polish Corridor and Upper Silesia. We should resist the exaggerated claims now being advanced by the Provisional Government of Lublin for "compensation" from Germany which would include the cities of Stettin and Breslau in Poland and make necessary the transfer of from eight to ten million Germans. In connection with the frontier settlement, we should, in so far as practicable and in collaboration with the other United Nations, be prepared to assist in the orderly transfer of minority groups provided the Polish Government so desires.

## SUGGESTED UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING POLAND

It is not known how representative of the basic desires of the Polish people the present Polish cabinet in London may be, or how representative a new cabinet which Mikolajczyk might form would be. On the other hand, much evidence has been received indicating that the so-called provisional government at Lublin is having considerable difficulty establishing itself and gaining real prestige in the liberated areas in Poland. It would appear that what prestige it may have is based, to a considerable extent, on that of the Red Army and the NKVD, the Soviet secret police.

Given the fact that less than half of Poland has already been liberated, and that consequently the majority of Poles are not in a position to express an opinion, it would be against our announced policies to recognize the provisional government of Lublin at least until more conclusive evidence is received that it does in fact represent the basic wishes of the Polish people.

Because of the activities of diverse groups, interim regimes of various sorts are springing up in liberated countries. These regimes may well crystallize into permanent governments through the power they may wield during the period of bewilderment after liberation. It would appear highly desirable, therefore, if the influence of the United States is to be felt and if the types of truly democratic governments the American people hope to see established in Europe are to be set up, for the United States Government now to take an active part in seeing that in each liberated country liberal democratic groups are given a full opportunity to participate in the activities of their interim regimes. If we do not use our influence to this end, it may not be possible later to establish permanent democratic regimes based on the four freedoms.

It is for this reason that in regard to Poland we should use our influence in an effort to see that the Polish Peasant Party, the largest in the country, and its head, Mikolajczyk, are given an opportunity to take a leading role in any interim arrangements which may be made pending the full liberation of the country and the election of a truly representative government.

Moreover, in order to assure, in conformity with our announced policies, that the Polish people shall be permitted eventually to express their preference as to the permanent government they desire and in actual fact regulate their own internal affairs, we should continue during the interim period to exert our influence to assure that the Polish people have the full possibility at a later date freely to express their will in the choice of their government and that they have the right to establish a truly democratic government which would foster and maintain freedom of expression, freedom of the press and infor-

mation, and personal liberty. In order to assist in the attainment of this end, we should sponsor United Nations arrangements for this supervision of elections in liberated countries.

### *Frontier Question*

Although the frontier question has figured prominently in the discussion of the Polish-Soviet dispute, it is felt that this matter is definitely secondary to the major problem, the establishment of a viable and truly independent Polish Government.

In this regard it is felt that the United States Government should use its influence to obtain a solution of this problem which would minimize future points of friction, possible Irredentism and minimize the number of minority groups which would have to be transferred as part of the settlement in order that the solution would contribute to the fullest possible extent to the peace and future tranquility of Europe.

The provisional government of Lublin and its predecessors including the Moscow-sponsored Union of Polish Patriots have for more than a year and a half been steadily increasing their demands for "compensation" for Poland from Germany. While the motivation for these increased demands is not clear, it is possible that the following factors may have figured in making these increased demands:

1. By including a large section of German territory in Poland and the probable transfer of some eight to ten million Germans, the future Polish state would in all probability be forced to depend completely on Moscow for protection against German Irredentists' demands and in fact might become a full-fledged Soviet satellite.

2. If it should not prove possible to establish a world security organization and the Soviet Union should thus be forced to rely on its own resources for its security, the advantages are obvious of having the Polish frontier as far West as possible, particularly if the future Polish Government should be more or less under the domination of Moscow.

3. By giving the future Polish state maximum compensation in the West, it may be the hope of the Soviet authorities that the Polish people would more willingly accept the loss of forty-two percent of former Polish territory in the East.


While it appears that the Soviet Government is now sponsoring "compensation" for Poland from Germany, up to the so-called Oder-Neisse River Line (line (a) on attached map<sup>1</sup>) which would include the cities of Stettin and Breslau in Poland and make it necessary to transfer from eight to ten million Germans from these areas, and while the British Government may not object to "compensation" for Poland up to the Oder Line (line (b) on attached map), the United States Government should use its influence to obtain the less radical solution outlined below which it is felt would, from a long range point

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<sup>1</sup> A reproduction of this map faces p. 233.



# GERMANY - POLAND : PROPOSED TERRITORIAL CHANGES



of view, contribute materially to the future peace and tranquillity of Europe. Moreover, the suggested solution would in all probability be much more acceptable to world opinion and increase the prospects of American acceptance of membership in a world security organization, the existence of which would not be jeopardized from the start by having to back up possible untenable settlements such as that suggested by the Lublin group.

It is believed, therefore, that every effort should be made to persuade the British Government and, if necessary, the Polish Government to stand for a frontier settlement along the following lines in order that efforts could be made to persuade the Soviet Government to accept this solution.

In regard to the Eastern frontier, efforts should be made to effect a solution with the Curzon Line as a basis but including the province of Lwów in Poland in order that that predominantly Polish city and the economically important oil fields to the southwest would remain within the frontiers of the Polish state. In the North, Poland should receive the bulk of East Prussia and in the West, the only rectification of the 1939 frontier should be to include in Poland a small strip of Pomerania west of the so-called Polish Corridor in order to eliminate the German salient in this area and Upper Silesia which is predominantly Polish in population and is particularly important from an industrial point of view.

While this solution would reduce considerably the size of Poland compared to its prewar frontiers, it would include only areas which are predominantly Polish, would make for a viable Polish state from an economic point of view and would reduce to a minimum the problems of the transfer of populations (these boundaries are indicated on the attached map).

In regard to the British attitude on this question, Mr. Churchill has already indicated that he would not oppose the suggested Soviet solution in the East with Lwów and the oil fields included in the Soviet Union rather than in Poland and has indicated that he favors compensation for Poland in the West. While he did not define exactly the extent of compensation Poland should receive from Germany, he stated in Parliament on December 15 that the new Poland would stretch broadly along the Baltic on a front of two hundred miles.<sup>2</sup> This statement would indicate that the British Government's plan for compensation from Germany would correspond roughly with Line (c) on the attached map (which approximates the suggested American solution outlined above).

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<sup>2</sup> For the relevant portion of Churchill's statement, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th ser., vol. 406, col. 1483 December 15, 1944.



Before discussing the proposal for a frontier solution with the Soviet authorities, it might be well to make an effort to obtain tentative concurrence with the British on this proposed solution.

If our full efforts determined to attain this solution fail, we should then concentrate on obtaining a solution of the Polish frontier which would minimize the possibility of Irredentism and population transfers and should resist any proposals for a solution based on either the Oder or the Oder-Neisse Line (line (b) and (a) on the attached map).

In connection with any final frontier settlement agreed upon, we should in so far as practicable and in collaboration with the other United Nations be prepared to assist in the orderly transfer of minority groups provided the Polish Government so desires.

### *Reconstruction*

In order to implement our efforts to establish a truly free democratic Polish state, we should be prepared, subject to legislative authority, to assist through credits or otherwise in the reconstruction of the country. As a corollary to this we should insist upon the establishment of a policy of equal opportunity for private American firms to carry on business activities in Poland.

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Executive Secretariat Files

### *Briefing Book Paper*

## RECONSTRUCTION OF POLAND AND THE BALKANS: AMERICAN INTERESTS AND SOVIET ATTITUDE

### SUMMARY

1. United States economic interests in the reconstruction of Poland and the Balkan states are general, the early return of trade to a multilateral basis and the achievement of European economic stability and prosperity. Politically, while this Government probably would not oppose predominant Soviet influence in the area, neither would it wish American influence to be completely nullified.

2. All of the nations require assistance in improving present primitive agricultural methods. All will probably require reconstruction of their railways, replacement of rolling stock, and rehabilitation of road-bed and bridges. Whether Poland will require extensive industrial reconstruction will depend on the future course of the war and whether the Germans "scorch" the area.

3. The United States will share in such reconstruction by Export-Import Bank credits, by technical aid especially to agriculture, and by participation in loans by the proposed International Bank.

4. The Soviet attitude towards United States participation in this area is uncertain. She may feel so strong that American financial aid will not be unwelcome, although she would probably prefer to act as the intermediary or to see the loans made by the International Bank.

## RECONSTRUCTION OF POLAND AND THE BALKANS: AMERICAN INTERESTS AND SOVIET ATTITUDE

### 1. *Interests of the United States*

#### *Economic*

a. Interest in the early return of trade to a multilateral basis under the freest possible conditions. The pattern of Europe's future commercial policy will be strongly influenced, if not largely determined, by policies and procedures established during the period of reconstruction. Whether postwar conditions lead back to bilateralism, restriction and autarchy, or are resolved in a manner which will permit the progressive growth and liberalization of trade and investment will depend in no small measure on the ability of the wartorn countries to obtain outside (i. e., mostly American) help in reconstruction.

b. Interest in general European economic stability. This stability depends on the maintenance of sound economic conditions and reasonable prosperity in all parts of the Continent.

#### *Political*

It now seems clear that the Soviet Union will exert predominant political influence over the areas in question. While this Government probably would not want to oppose itself to such a political configuration, neither would it desire to see American influence in this part of the world completely nullified.

In the situation which is likely to prevail in Poland and the Balkan states after the war, the United States can hope to make its influence felt only if some degree of equal opportunity in trade, investment, and access to sources of information is preserved. American aid in the reconstruction of these areas would not only gain the good-will of the populations involved, but would also help bring about conditions which would permit the adoption of relatively liberal policies of this nature.

### 2. *Types of Reconstruction Needs*

The reconstruction needs of the areas under reference will, of course, vary from country to country. Poland is the only country that may require extensive industrial reconstruction. This will depend almost entirely on the future course of the war over Polish territory. If the extensive industrial installations in the west remain intact, Poland may be able to supply almost all of her reconstruction requirements from internal resources. Should these districts be "scorched", however, not only would the amount of damage be enormously increased,

but there would also be destroyed, in whole or in great part, Poland's ability to repair the damage by herself.

All of the countries involved are likely to stand in need of reconstruction of their railway systems, owing to the large-scale, thoroughgoing looting of rolling stock by the retreating enemy, destruction of road-bed and bridges, etc.

The economies of both Poland and the Balkan states, particularly of the latter, are predominantly agricultural, and in the field of agriculture it is difficult to draw a sharp line between "reconstruction" and "development." Much of the agriculture in these countries is conducted by primitive methods, and improvement in this sector of the economy holds out the greatest hope for raising standards of living from their present very low level.

### 3. *Possible Forms of American Participation*

The United States can share in the reconstruction of Poland and the Balkans in several different ways, prominent among which would be direct loans from the Export-Import Bank and participation in loans by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Private American investment is unlikely in this area for some years to come at least.

Probably one of the most useful and at the same time least expensive forms in which the United States can aid in the reconstruction of Poland and the Balkan states is by making available to them technical assistance, especially in the field of agriculture.

### 4. *The Soviet Attitude toward United States Participation*

The attitude of the Soviet Union toward American participation in the reconstruction of Poland and the Balkans is uncertain. It seems clear that, for security reasons, the Soviet Government is seeking to make sure that these countries will be oriented to the East both politically and economically.

However, in the case of one or another of the border countries, Poland for example, the Russians might have grounds to feel at an early date that an Eastern political orientation was more or less assured in any case and that foreign loans to such countries could have no decisive influence in this respect. Furthermore, the Soviet Union will have some interest in seeing that her neighbors prosper under her tutelage.

The Soviet Union probably would like most to borrow herself the money that might be available for the border countries, and to finance from the resources available to her their reconstruction and development needs. The Soviet Union might prefer, in any case, to have the reconstruction and development of the border countries financed through the International Bank rather than through direct loans from the United States.

THE BALKANS<sup>1</sup>

Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*

## GENERAL BALKAN POLICY

It is the desire of this Government that the three principal Allies should consider the problems of Southeastern Europe in their relation to general European welfare and security. The distinctions between Allied and enemy states are gradually merging into a single problem as the "satellites" come under the administration of Allied Control Commissions, with some participation in the war against Germany in a status approaching co-belligerency.

An important aspect of this problem is the tendency of one or another of the principal Allies to exert a particular influence in a given country, or to come to an arrangement defining the regions where such influence would be admitted as paramount (See separate paper on American Policy toward Spheres of Influence<sup>2</sup>). The mere dissociation of the United States from such arrangements does not constitute a policy unless an effort is made to impress upon the other principal Allies the need for restraint, if the several peoples are really to be left free to determine the kind of democratic institutions best suited to their needs.

In a recent consideration of these problems the Department agreed on certain basic principles by which the policy of this Government should be guided. They are:

1. The right of peoples to choose for themselves without outside interference the type of political, social, and economic systems they desire, so long as they conduct their affairs in such a way as not to menace the peace and security of others.

2. Equality of opportunity, as against the setting up of a policy of exclusion, in commerce, transit and trade; and freedom to negotiate, either through government agencies or private enterprise, irrespective of the type of economic system in operation.

3. The right of access to all countries on an equal and unrestricted basis of bona fide representatives of the recognized press and information agencies of other nations engaged in gathering news and other forms of public information for dissemination to the public in their own countries; and the right to transmit information gathered by them to points outside such territories without hindrance or discrimination.

4. Freedom for American philanthropic and educational organizations to carry on their activities in the respective countries on the basis of most favored-nation treatment.

5. General protection of American citizens and the protection and furtherance of legitimate American economic rights, existing or potential.

<sup>1</sup>See also *supra*.

<sup>2</sup>*Ante*, pp. 103-108.

The United States should also be prepared to participate through recommendations in territorial settlements of questions involving general security.

Since each of the Balkan countries presents separate problems, the solution of which would carry forward the ideas expressed above, separate papers have been prepared discussing them.

There are two correlated questions which may shortly require attention, with reference to the whole Southern European region; namely, the project for a union of Bulgaria with Yugoslavia, and the agitation for an integral Macedonia. Both of these questions really involve consideration of the scheme for a Balkan federation. The British Government has just informed us that it would welcome such a grouping, to include both allied and enemy states, and possibly to include Turkey, but would not favor an exclusive union or federation involving only Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, since this would be unlikely to promote the larger grouping and would also isolate Greece and endanger her position. As regards Macedonia the British Government is willing to acquiesce in the formation of a Macedonian state as a federal unit in Yugoslavia provided only territories previously belonging to Yugoslavia are involved leaving the "Macedonia" parts of Bulgaria and Greece to these respective countries. The British have also communicated these views to the Soviet Government. The Department is now considering its reply to this communication. Our present thinking is generally in line with the British attitude.

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Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*

AMERICAN POSITION ON ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSIONS IN RUMANIA,  
BULGARIA AND HUNGARY

The United States is represented on the Allied Control Commissions established to control the execution of the armistice agreements with Rumania and Bulgaria. The Commissions are organized on the same general pattern as the Allied Commission in Italy with Russia playing the leading role which Great Britain and the United States have in Italy. The Commission for Rumania operates under statutes drawn up by the Soviet Government. So far as the Department is aware, no similar statutes govern the operations of the Commission for Bulgaria. The organization of the Commission for Hungary is now under discussion at Moscow.

The United States Government has not taken exception to the Soviet view that the actual operation of the Commissions should be in the hands of the Soviet military authorities, at least in the period before the surrender of Germany. The Department believes strongly, however, that policy directives should not be issued to the local

Governments by the Soviet authorities in the name of the Commissions without prior consultation with the American and British representatives. Otherwise the United States is in the public mind associated with actions of which it has no official knowledge.

Following Germany's surrender the United States would like to see the Control Commissions become genuinely tripartite in character, with all three Allied Governments having equal participation.

In Rumania, the Soviet Chairman of the Commission has accepted the principle of prior consultation with the American delegation before the issuance of directives. Notwithstanding this apparent improvement there is now before us a new example of the Soviet unilateral method; namely, the orders issued to the Rumanian Government to prepare lists of racial Germans in Rumania for deportation to Soviet Russia for labor service. This matter is now being taken up in Bucharest, and representations will also be made in Moscow, both as to the substance of the order, and as to the unilateral procedure adopted.

In the case of Bulgaria the Department has been informed that prior consultation does not take place. In the case of Hungary we have proposed a protocol to the armistice clearly defining the rights of our representatives. At the present moment of negotiation it appears that our proposed text of this protocol may not be accepted, but the discussion now taking place at Moscow will doubtless result in more satisfactory provisions as regards our representation in Hungary, than had been proposed by the Soviet Government, and will probably serve also to remove some of the sources of complaint in Rumania and Bulgaria.<sup>1</sup>

With respect to the second part of the armistice period the Department has taken no action regarding the Commission for Rumania. In the case of Bulgaria, on which our views were made clear during the discussion of armistice terms, the British and Soviet Governments have been informed that we reserve the right to reopen discussion of the matter at a later date. As for Hungary, we are seeking to have our equal participation stipulated in the armistice agreement period, failing which we shall make a similar reservation as in the case of Bulgaria.

In addition to its military representation on the Control Commissions, this Government has in Rumania and Bulgaria civilian "United States Representatives", who have the personal rank of Minister and who maintain informal relations with the Rumanian and Bulgarian Governments, respectively. The United Kingdom has similar representatives in Rumania and Bulgaria, and, according

<sup>1</sup> For the texts of the armistice agreements signed September 12, 1944, with Rumania, signed October 28, 1944, with Bulgaria, and signed January 20, 1945, with Hungary, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series Nos. 490, 437, and 456 respectively, or 59 Stat. 1712, 58 Stat. 1498, and 59 Stat. 1321.

to present plans, both the United States and the United Kingdom will be so represented in Hungary.

The United States Representatives have no connection with the work of the Allied Control Commissions except in so far as they may be consulted by the American representatives on those Commissions on matters of American foreign policy. Both delegations have of course instructions for close cooperation in the protection of American interests.

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Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*

PRINCIPAL BULGARIAN PROBLEMS

SUMMARY

With the signing of the Bulgarian Armistice terms at Moscow on October 28, 1944, a completely new orientation of Bulgarian affairs in the international scheme of things was initiated. The present stage through which Bulgaria is passing is of great importance not only because of its probable future influence on the Balkans generally but also because Bulgaria in certain respects is a testing ground in the relations of the three principal Allies.

The United States Government does not expect or desire a responsibility or participation fully equal with that of the Soviet Government in the Control Commission for Bulgaria, but does expect a better definition of the Allied Control Commission's authority, with provisions safeguarding the proper functions and rights of the American delegation. It may be possible to work this out on the spot. We have reserved the right to reopen, at some later date, the question of making the Allied Control Commission more genuinely tripartite in the period after hostilities with Germany are terminated.

We are anxious that Bulgarian reparation and restitution deliveries to Greece be expedited, but we anticipate some reluctance on the part of the Soviet authorities in the Allied Control Commission to carry out this program.

If any of these questions are to be discussed on a high level, it is recommended:

(a) That it be made clear that we expect American representatives to have the necessary freedom of movement, foreknowledge of the plans of the Allied Control Commission, access to sources of information, et cetera, to enable them to participate intelligently and with appropriate dignity in the work of the Allied Control Commission, even though the executive power remains largely in Soviet hands;

(b) That we maintain our position as desiring at some later time to discuss the apportionment of authority on the Allied Control Commission in the period after the termination of hostilities against Germany;

(c) That we press for the immediate commencement of Bulgarian reparation and restitution shipments to Greece.

### PRINCIPAL BULGARIAN PROBLEMS

#### *Allied Control Commission*

Pursuant to Article 18 of the Armistice terms, an Allied Control Commission has been set up to govern Bulgaria pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace. The article by its terms gives the Soviet Union a large measure of control over Bulgaria during the period from the signing of the Armistice until the termination of hostilities against Germany. The Soviet Government expects such control to continue also after this period, but the United States has not accepted the Soviet position. We maintain, and have so advised the Soviet Government, that we wish to make the division of powers among the members of the Control Commission during the second period a matter of future discussion.

Thus far the Soviet rôle in the Control Commission has even exceeded the proportions assigned it by Article 18. Developments have reached a stage disquieting to ourselves and alarming to the British. The latter have communicated their grievances to Moscow in the form of a personal note from Mr. Eden to Mr. Molotov. Bearing in mind that the range of our complaints is not so wide as that of the British, we have taken a more moderate course, hoping to adjust some of the difficulties on the spot.

We are preparing an approach to Moscow designed principally to effect a modification of the present Soviet practice of making decisions and instituting measures in the name of the Allied Control Commission, without consultation with the American and British representatives. We also expect to effect the removal of restrictions on the movements of our representatives in Bulgaria, and better facilities for clearance of personnel and aircraft entering Bulgaria.

#### *Conditions within Bulgaria*

The country is ruled—aside from the Soviet Chairman of the Allied Control Commission—by a coalition government known as the "Fatherland Front", composed of representatives of the Communist Party and the Agrarian and Union-Zveno parties, in which it appears that the Communists are steadily gaining the ascendancy, aided covertly by Russian occupation authorities. Although the Regency ostensibly perpetuates the monarchical form of government, there have been reports that the safety of the Queen Mother, and perhaps the boy-King, Simeon II, may be endangered.

#### *Bulgarian Relations with Greece and Yugoslavia*

Bulgarian foreign relations are in effect under the supervision of the Control Commission, meaning, for practical purposes, the Soviet



authorities. Thus far we have not learned much about these relations, but we consider certain public statements and other manifestations relating to Greece and Yugoslavia to be of great significance.

The Armistice and its accompanying Protocol provide for the delivery of reparation and restitution goods from Bulgaria to Greece, but no appreciable progress has been made as yet. Two Greek delegations arrived in Sofia, but neither of them could show proper credentials or authority, and a duly accredited official representative to the Allied Control Commission has not yet been sent to Sofia, due probably to the political difficulties in Greece. While the Soviet chairman of the Allied Control Commission has indicated a willingness to have a Greek representative at Sofia, there may well be opposition, on the part of the Russians, to deliveries from Bulgaria to Greece on any such scale as the Greeks demand. Bulgarian relations with Greece are further complicated by the reported incursions of Bulgarian irregular forces into Greek Thrace and Macedonia.

In marked contrast to her relations with Greece, Bulgarian relations with Tito's National Liberation Front in Yugoslavia are of a most friendly nature. Thus, Bulgarian atrocities in Serbia appear to have been forgiven by Tito and Bulgarian measures for Yugoslav relief have been announced, probably resulting from direct Yugoslav-Bulgarian negotiations sanctioned by the Soviet authorities in the name of the Allied Control Commission.

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Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*

PRINCIPAL HUNGARIAN PROBLEMS

SUMMARY

The long-range interest of the United States in the maintenance of peace and stability in central Europe may be involved in the issues now arising in connection with terms of armistice for Hungary, with the control of Hungary during the armistice period, and with the territorial settlement. The two most pressing problems are (1) the share which the United States will have in the work of the Allied Control Commission, and (2) the payment of reparation by Hungary.

It is possible that Soviet and American policy may not be in harmony if the Soviet Union uses its position as the power in actual control of the execution of the armistice to intervene in Hungarian domestic affairs, to dominate Hungary, or to pursue a severe policy on the reparation question which would cripple Hungarian economy and thus delay the economic recovery of Europe and the restoration of

normal economic relationships based on equal treatment for all nations.

While American and British interests are more or less the same in these questions, we prefer an independent approach to the Russians and should seek agreement on solutions and procedures which take account of the interests of all these and of the other United Nations. It would be desirable to secure the agreement of the British and Soviet Governments to the following principles:

1. Participation of the American and British Governments in the execution of the armistice to the maximum degree consistent with leaving to the Soviet High Command decisions connected with the conduct of military operations; after Germany's surrender all three Governments should have equal representation and responsibility;

2. An Allied economic policy toward Hungary which will reconcile legitimate claims of Allied nations to reparation with the general interest in promoting the rapid economic recovery of Europe;

3. The desirability of reaching a settlement of the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier dispute and of encouraging an eventual settlement between Hungary and Czechoslovakia and perhaps between Hungary and Yugoslavia, by friendly mutual negotiation, which would take into account the Hungarian ethnic claims.

#### PRINCIPAL HUNGARIAN PROBLEMS

##### *Long-Range American Interest in Hungary*

The long-range interest of the United States in Hungary centers in our desire to see established peaceful and stable relationships among European nations. The United States has an interest in the achievement of solutions of Hungary's boundary disputes and its political and economic problems which will promote orderly progress and peace with neighboring states. We believe this interest would be served by a territorial settlement which would rectify the frontier with Rumania in favor of Hungary on ethnic grounds. While Hungary must of course renounce the territorial gains made at the expense of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia with German help, the United States would favor, for example, an eventual negotiated settlement which would transfer to Hungary some of the predominantly Hungarian-populated districts of southern Slovakia. Economically, the United States has an interest in maintaining equal treatment and opportunity in Hungary for all nations. The largest single private American interest in Hungary is the petroleum company "Maort", owned by the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey; the fields in its concession have excellent prospects for future development.

At present Hungary, as an enemy state which has been associated with Germany's aggressions since 1938 and the last satellite to desert the Axis, has no valid claim to leniency on the part of the Allies. During the period of the armistice Hungary must be subjected to

Allied control and must be required to make some reparation for war damages. It is not in the interest of the United States, however, to see Hungary deprived of its independence or of any of its pre-1938 territories or saddled with economic obligations which would cripple its economy and thus delay general European economic recovery.

*American Policy on Immediate Questions concerning Hungary*

The "Provisional National Government of Hungary" formed on December 23, 1944, at Debrecen in the Soviet-occupied portion of Hungary, has asked the Allies for an armistice and has declared war on Germany. This body appears to represent the significant pro-Allied political forces in Hungary today. While the United States has not yet recognized it as a provisional government, it is probable that it will be so recognized and that the armistice terms, upon which the three principal Allies are now reaching agreement, will be presented to it.

The United States has agreed that the general pattern of the Rumanian armistice terms should be applied in the case of Hungary, with two important exceptions:

1. In the matter of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary, this Government is attempting to secure Soviet agreement to a clear definition of the rights and powers which the American representatives on the Commission will have. Lack of such an understanding at the start in the cases of Rumania and Bulgaria has made the position of our representatives on the Control Commissions for those two countries difficult. This Government desires to avoid a state of affairs whereby it becomes a signatory to the armistice and by accepting representation on an "Allied" Control Commission assumes some responsibility for its execution, but is in fact without influence and may not even be consulted on the decisions taken by the Soviet authorities acting in the name of the Allied Control Commission. We believe that, at the very least, our representatives should be consulted on such decisions. The United States has proposed also that after the termination of hostilities against Germany the three principal Allies should have equal participation in the operation of the Control Commission.

2. The second important point is the reparation settlement with Hungary. In the negotiations on armistice terms, the United States Government is attempting, so far without success, to secure Soviet agreement to American and British participation, through membership on a reparation section of the Control Commission, in the actual working out and supervision of the reparation deliveries and payments by Hungary to members of the United Nations.

Consideration is being given to the advisability of standing firm on the questions of the Control Commission and of reparation to the point of signing the armistice with a formal reservation on one or both of them.

*American Policy in the Armistice Period*

While the United States would not, of course, take the position of supporting Hungary against the Soviet Union, it is possible that American and Soviet policies toward Hungary during the armistice period may not be in harmony, especially if there is an absence of agreement on some of the important armistice terms or if the position gained by the Soviet Union by virtue of its military campaign and under the armistice agreement is used to dominate Hungary or to strip it of a great part of its resources.

The United States Government recognizes that the Soviet Union's interest in Hungary is more direct than ours. We have had no objection to the Soviet Government's taking the lead in the negotiations for the armistice and in the control of Hungary in the armistice period until the surrender of Germany. We do not, however, consider that the Soviet Union has any special privileged or dominant position in Hungary. In the armistice period we expect to have a civilian mission in Hungary headed by Mr. H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld, who will have the personal rank of Minister and will maintain informal relations with the Hungarian Government. Soviet agreement to this representation seems assured.

The interests of the United States would be served by the conclusion of peace with Hungary at the earliest practicable date. Such a step would put an end to many of the powers of control which under the armistice will be exercised by the Soviet Union, and by opening the way to the resumption of normal diplomatic relations between the United States and Hungary would give the United States Government a better opportunity to protect American interests in that country.

It is also in our interest that free elections be held and that Hungary be left to manage its own internal affairs as soon as possible.

Note: There is attached a copy of the armistice terms for Hungary now under discussion at Moscow. Substantial agreement has been reached on all articles except Article 12 and Article 18. Those two articles appear in this text in the form suggested by the Soviet Government.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed; see *ante*, p. 239, footnote 1.

*Briefing Book Paper*

## PRINCIPAL RUMANIAN PROBLEMS

## SUMMARY

The long-range interest of the United States in the maintenance of peace and stability in eastern Europe may be involved in the issues

now arising in connection with the control of Rumania during the armistice period and with the eventual peace settlement. The fundamental problem is the degree to which the United States will acquiesce in the exercise by the Soviet Union of a dominant or exclusive influence in Rumania. The British seem to fear that present Soviet policies threaten Rumania's existence as an independent state and may block the British plans to restore their pre-war political and economic position in Rumania. Prominent Rumanians have made direct appeals to American representatives in Bucharest for an indication of the policy of the United States on the matter of possible Soviet domination of Rumania.

Under the armistice agreement, to which all three principal Allied Governments were parties, the Allied Control Commission operates under the general direction of the Soviet High Command. The Soviet authorities have taken a number of unilateral decisions, such as those involving the property of American-owned petroleum companies, on matters which the Department believes should have been made the subject of consultation and agreement among the three Allied Governments.

It would be desirable to secure the agreement of the British and Soviet Governments to the following principles:

1. Respect for the Rumanian people's right to independence and to the choice of their own government;
2. An Allied economic policy toward Rumania, under the armistice and the peace settlement, which will reconcile the legitimate claims of Allied nations to reparation with the general interest in promoting the rapid economic recovery of Europe;
3. The desirability of finding a solution of the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier dispute which will give some satisfaction to Hungary's legitimate claims and promote peaceful relations between the two states.

#### PRINCIPAL RUMANIAN PROBLEMS

##### *Long-Range American Interest in Rumania*

The principal long-range American interest in Rumania is that that country should once more become a peaceful member of the community of nations, and should not, either through its relationships with larger powers or through the policies of its own rulers, become a menace to peace. It is our belief that this aim is most likely of attainment if Rumania is an independent state, with a government of its own choosing, and if solutions of its territorial, minority and economic problems are found which represent a maximum contribution to the stability of the region. Economically, the United States has an interest in maintaining equal treatment and opportunity in Rumania for all nations.

*Execution of the Armistice Agreement*

Rumania has been within the Soviet theater of military operations. The United States did not object to the Soviet Union's taking the leading role in the negotiation of the armistice with Rumania and in the control of Rumania during the armistice period. We have not objected to the Soviet view that the executive functions of the Allied Control Commission should be exercised by the Soviet military authorities, nor do we deny that the Soviet Union has a more direct interest in Rumania than do the other Allied powers.

The United States, however, as a signatory to the armistice agreement, bears some responsibility for its execution. We have taken the position that the principal American representative on the Control Commission, Brigadier General Schuyler, has the right to be informed of the policy directives issued in the name of the Commission before they are communicated to the Rumanian Government and to refer the matter to Washington when he believes a directive to be inconsistent with the policies of the United States Government.

A recent illustration of this point is the Soviet proposal to deport "racial" Germans from Rumania for labor service in the USSR, issuing the necessary orders to the Rumanian Government in the name of the Allied Control Commission. The United States Government does not desire to be associated with this action, on the ground that it is not justified under the Armistice Agreement with Rumania and involves certain general questions, such as payment of reparation by Germany in the form of labor service and the transfer of national minorities, on which an agreed Allied policy has not yet been formulated. The American representatives in Rumania have been instructed to make our position clear to the Soviet authorities and to the Rumanian Government.

The tendency of the Soviet authorities to take unilateral decisions on matter of direct concern to other Allied states, as, for example, in the removal of petroleum refinery equipment from the premises of oil companies, including the American-owned Romano-Americana, is a cause of some concern to the Department. Ambassador Harriman has taken up with the Soviet Government the question of the removal of the refinery equipment, stressing our interest in the rapid rehabilitation of the Rumanian oil industry and in the protection of American property. The Soviet Government has given no satisfactory reply.

*Soviet Policy and American Interests*

The United States has a civilian representative in Rumania, Mr. Burton Y. Berry, who has the personal rank of Minister and maintains informal relations with the Rumanian Government. This arrangement was agreed to by the Soviet Government and thus far has worked out well.

Rumania has several times requested co-belligerent status and permission to send diplomatic representatives to United Nations capitals. The Department has taken the position that there should be no official statement declaring Rumania to be a co-belligerent, although the wording of the Armistice Agreement, statements made at the time it was presented to the Rumanian delegation in Moscow, and the actual contribution of Rumania to the military operations against Germany give Rumania a good basis to claim such a status. The Department has seen no reason for Rumania to be represented in Washington until the conclusion of peace between the United States and Rumania. Any decision to grant either of the Rumanian requests should be made only after agreement among the three principal Allied Governments.

The strong influence of the Soviet Union in Rumania has been the cause of some alarm, especially in British circles which fear that it will block the British plans to restore their pre-war political and economic position in Rumania. Prominent Rumanian leaders, including Mr. Iuliu Maniu, the Peasant Party Chief, whose devotion to democratic principles throughout his long career is well known, have made known to the official American representatives in Bucharest their fear that the Soviet Union's present policies in Rumania are aimed at the eventual domination and annexation of that country; they have asked for an indication of the attitude of the United States Government. The Department does not believe that the evidence at hand supports their view, although there have been some indications of Soviet intervention in internal Rumanian affairs and of a Soviet policy of stripping Rumania economically.

It would be advantageous if reassurances could be obtained from the Soviet Government that:

1. The Soviet Union does not seek to dominate Rumania and that it will consult with the other principal Allied Governments before taking actions which affect the latter's interests in Rumania;
2. In exacting reparation deliveries from Rumania, the Soviet Union will take account of American property interests and of the interest of all the United Nations in the rapid economic recovery of Europe;
3. The Soviet Government will agree to work with the other principal Allied Governments for a just and stable solution of the boundary dispute between Rumania and Hungary.

The United States should favor the conclusion of peace between Rumania and the Allies at the earliest possible date permitted by military and political conditions. American interests in Rumania would probably be better protected if normal diplomatic relations should replace the present system of control under the armistice which gives such wide powers to the Soviet authorities. It is also in our interest that free elections be held and that Rumania be left to manage its own internal affairs as soon as possible.

Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*

## GREECE

BULGARIA'S RESTITUTION OF GREEK PROPERTY AND DELIVERY TO  
GREECE OF SUPPLIES FOR RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

JANUARY 6, 1945.

The Germans, in withdrawing from Greece, deliberately destroyed the economy of the country. The Corinth Canal was blocked, railways and bridges blown up, port facilities wrecked, and enormous quantities of transport removed, including draft animals. Only five locomotives and forty cars are left in all Greece. The country has been stripped of livestock and agricultural machinery. Although much of the looted material has been taken to Germany, some probably remains in Bulgaria, and any delay in restoring it to Greece will make its identification more difficult. Two Greek delegations have already attempted to present claims to the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission in Bulgaria but have been turned back for lack of proper credentials. The U. S. and U. K. Governments agree that Greek needs could be met more effectively by the accreditation of a Greek liaison officer or military mission to ACC Bulgaria, than by actual membership on the Commission as originally requested by the Greek Government.

It is to the interest of this Government that, on the basis of the Bulgarian Armistice, measures should be taken for the prompt restitution of Greek property in Bulgarian hands and the immediate shipment to Greece on reparations account of the maximum obtainable quantities of foodstuffs, livestock, agricultural implements, and transport equipment. The Bulgarian Armistice, unlike the Finnish or the Rumanian, provides for no direct reparations to Russia, nor are any specific demands included, though both Greece and Yugoslavia are recognized as claimant countries for damages suffered by Bulgarian aggression. Yugoslavia, of course, has legitimate claims against Bulgaria, but Greece has been the main victim and should, therefore, have first priority on Bulgaria's capacity to make restitution.

As Greek needs are most urgent, and as any postponement in demanding restitution and reparations would give Bulgaria an opportunity to conceal stolen property or to plead that her effort in the prosecution of the war should reduce the claims against her, it is advisable to press for immediate aid to Greece. Careful analyses indicate that without unduly upsetting her economy, Bulgaria could deliver to claimant countries within the next six months appreciable quantities of supplies, including 150 locomotives, 200 passenger cars, 3,000 freight cars, 1,000 motor trucks, 500 motor cars, 500,000 tons of



coal, 888,000 tons of foodstuffs, as well as farm animals and agricultural equipment. The foodstuffs alone represent more than twice the total Anglo-American military relief allocations for a six-month period.

Although the U. S. Government is not participating in the military operations in Greece, it is committed to a comprehensive program of relief and rehabilitation involving heavy outlays of supplies and shipping. Any supplies similar to those scheduled from Anglo-American sources which can be made available to Greece from Bulgaria will proportionately reduce American financial responsibilities and release shipping space for other vital war needs.

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## YUGOSLAVIA: THE TITO-ŠUBAŠIĆ AGREEMENT

865.01/12-144

*The Secretary of State to the President*

[WASHINGTON,] December 1, 1944.

SPECIAL INFORMATION FOR THE PRESIDENT

[Excerpts] <sup>1</sup>

These international developments of the past two or three days will be of especial interest to you:

. . . . .  
*Tito-Subasic Agreement.* Brigadier MacLean has told Ambassador Kirk that Mr. Churchill is expected to urge King Peter to accept the agreement recently formulated by Tito and the Yugoslav Premier and to send a British Ambassador to Belgrade as soon as the agreement becomes effective.

. . . . .  
 E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

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<sup>1</sup> For other excerpts from this memorandum, see *ante*, p. 213, and *post*, pp. 266, 430.

860H.01/12-1644

*The Ambassador Near the Yugoslav Government in London (Patterson)  
 to the Secretary of State*

RESTRICTED

LONDON, December 16, 1944.

No. 7

Subject: Agreements between Dr. Subasic and Marshal Tito.

SIR: I have the honor to report that Prime Minister Subasic today handed me translations of the following agreements between himself and Marshal Tito:

1. Agreement of November 1, 1944.
2. Agreement entitled "Elections for the Constituent Assembly and Organization of Public Powers", dated December 7, 1944.

3. Agreement entitled "Property of H. M. the King and Regency Council", dated December 7, 1944.

4. Communiqué dated December 7, 1944.

Copies of these translations are enclosed. The translation of the agreement of November 1, 1944 is apparently a revision of the undated draft submitted by Mr. R. E. Schoenfeld in his despatch (Yugoslav) No. 18 of November 8, 1944,<sup>1</sup> and the two versions are not essentially different. Enclosures Nos. 2, 3 and 4 comprise the "supplemental agreements" referred to in my telegram Yugoslav 8 of December 12, 1944.<sup>1</sup> The wording of these agreements is far from precise in some instances and would seem to permit considerable latitude in interpretation.

Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD C. PATTERSON, JR.

[Enclosure 1]

RESTRICTED

#### AGREEMENT

between the President of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, and the Prime Minister of the Royal Yugoslav Government, Dr. Ivan Subasic.

In compliance with the principle of the continuity of the Yugoslav State from the point of view of international law, and the clearly expressed will of all Yugoslav nations, demonstrated by their four years' struggle for a new, independent and federal State, built up on the principles of democracy, we desire and make every effort for the people's will to be respected at every step and by everybody, both with regard to the internal organization of the State and to the form of government, and therefore intend to comply with the fundamental and general principles of constitutional government proper to all truly democratic States.

Yugoslavia being acknowledged among the United Nations in its established form, and functioning as such, we shall continue to represent our country abroad and in all acts pertaining to foreign policy in the same way, up to the time when our State, the democratic, federative Yugoslavia of the future, assumes, by a free decision of the people, the definite form of its government.

In order to avoid any possible tension of relations in the country, we have agreed that King Peter II shall not return to the country until the people have pronounced their decision in this respect, and that in his absence the Royal Power should be wielded by a Regency Council.

The Regency Council will be appointed by a constitutional act of the King, on the proposal of the Royal Government, and in agree-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

ment with the President of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia, Marshal J. B. Tito, and the President of the Royal Government, Dr. Ivan Subasic. The Regency Council take their oath to the King, while the Government take their oath to the people.

The President of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, and the President of the Royal Yugoslav Government, Dr. Subasic, with the full concurrence of the Anti-Fascist Council of Liberation of Yugoslavia, agree that the Government be formed as follows:

1. President;
2. Vice-President;
3. Minister of Foreign Affairs;
4. Minister of the Interior;
5. Minister of National Defense;
6. Minister of Justice;
7. Minister of Education;
8. Minister of Finance;
9. Minister of Trade and Industry;
10. Minister of Communications;
11. Minister of Post, Telegraphs and Telephones;
12. Minister of Forests;
13. Minister of Mines;
14. Minister of Agriculture;
15. Minister of Social Welfare;
16. Minister of National Health;
17. Minister of Public Works;
18. Minister of Reconstruction;
19. Minister of Food;
20. Minister of Information;
21. Minister for Colonization;
22. Minister for the Constituent Assembly;
23. Minister of State for Serbia;
24. Minister of State for Croatia;
25. Minister of State for Slovenia;
26. Minister of State for Montenegro;
27. Minister of State for Macedonia;
28. Minister of State for Bosnia and Hercegovina.

This form of government in Yugoslavia shall remain in force up to the decision of the Constituent Assembly, i. e., until the final constitutional organization of the State will be established.

The new Government will publish a declaration proclaiming the fundamental principles of the democratic liberties and guaranteeing their application. Personal freedom, freedom from fear, freedom of worship, liberty of conscience, freedom of speech, liberty of the press, freedom of assembly and association, will be specially emphasized and guaranteed; and, in the same way, the right of property and private initiative. The sovereignty of the national individualities within the State and their equal rights will be respected and safeguarded, as

decided at the Second Session of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia. Any predominance of one nation over another will be excluded.

NOVEMBER 1, 1944.

The President of the  
Royal Yugoslav Government:

The President of the National  
Committee of Liberation of  
Yugoslavia:

DR. IVAN SUBASIC

J. B. TITO

[Enclosure 2]

ELECTIONS FOR THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AND ORGANIZATION OF  
PUBLIC POWERS

1. Elections for the Constituent Assembly will be decided upon within three months of the liberation of the whole country. The elections will be held in accordance with the Law on Elections for the Constituent Assembly which will be enacted in good time. This law will guarantee complete freedom of elections, freedom of assembly and speech, liberty of the press, franchise for all and a secret ballot, as well as the right of independent or united political parties, corporations, groups and individuals—who have not collaborated with the enemy—to present lists of candidates for the election. All those whose collaboration with the enemy will have been proved, will be deprived of both the right to elect and to be elected.

2. The Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia will wield the legislative power until the Constituent Assembly will have completed its task.

3. The Government will be responsible for the organization of the executive power.

4. One of the first and foremost tasks of the new Government will be to organize the judiciary power in the country in a democratic spirit. The Courts of Justice will be independent in their proceedings and the judges will decide according to the law and to their conscience.

DECEMBER 7, 1944.

J. B. TITO

DR. IVAN SUBASIC

[Enclosure 3]

PROPERTY OF H. M. THE KING AND REGENCY COUNCIL

1. H. M. King Peter II can dispose of his estates and property in the country during his absence. The superintendence of the Royal Estates will for that period be under the supervision of the Regency Council.

2. Regular intercourse between H. M. the King and the Regency Council will be established and guaranteed.

3. In case of disability, ill-health, death or resignation of one of the Regents, H. M. the King will, on the proposal of the Government, appoint one other Regent in his place.

BELGRADE, December 1944.

J. B. TITO

DR. IVAN SUBASIC

(Note by Embassy: The Croatian copy of the above agreement is dated December 7, 1944)

[Enclosure 4]

#### COMMUNIQUÉ

In the course of the negotiations which have taken place in Belgrade between the President of the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, and the Prime Minister of the Royal Yugoslav Government, Dr. Ivan Subasic, before and after Dr. Subasic's visit to Moscow, and completed on December 7, 1944, both the question of the formation of a single Yugoslav Government and the question of the transitional regime of the Yugoslav State, pending the decisions of the Constituent Assembly, have been exhaustively discussed.

At that occasion, it was decided that a single Yugoslav Government be formed, consisting of representatives of all nations and federal units of Yugoslavia and including individuals of various political opinions supporting the fundamental aspirations of the national liberation struggle. This Government would be expected, as early as may be, to establish civic authorities in the country, to proceed to economic reconstruction, and to prepare and carry out elections to the Constituent Assembly.

Decisions were also taken making it possible for the nations of Yugoslavia to express, in these elections, their true will in full freedom.

During the talks, Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic discussed the provisional regime to be set up in the transitional period before the elections, bearing in mind the achievements in the struggle for national liberation, conditions and feelings throughout the country, as well as the international status of Yugoslavia among the United Nations.

BELGRADE, December 7, 1944.

860H.01/12-1944

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1944.

## MEMORANDUM

As suggested by Mr. Eden in his telegram to Lord Halifax dated December 19, 1944,<sup>1</sup> a copy of which has been handed to the Department, instructions have been sent to Mr. Patterson, the American Ambassador to Yugoslavia, authorizing him to inform King Peter of certain observations which the Department has made regarding the proposed agreement between Dr. Subasic and Marshal Tito looking toward the formation of a new Yugoslav Government.

Mr. Patterson has been requested to inform King Peter that the Department has examined with attention the series of documents embodying the new proposals, and that the principles enunciated in these documents, taken as a whole, are in general accord with those to which this Government subscribes both in its dealings with other governments and in the particular relations connected with the conduct of the war. At the same time he should indicate that since so much will depend on the good will, mutual respect, and cooperation with which the personalities who may be designated to conduct the affairs of the new Government approach their admittedly difficult problems, this Government would not undertake to express an opinion as to the prospects for securing an effective and loyal implementation of the principles set forth in the agreements. As regards the general American attitude he has been authorized to say that his Government has consistently defended the rights of the various peoples of Yugoslavia to work out their forms of government without the exercise of foreign influences or the imposition of the rule of any one national or political group within the country over other elements.

Mr. Patterson has also been informed that the Department feels that he should not enter into discussion concerning the particulars of the agreement and its supplementary texts, both because of the general nature of the language used and the technicalities of Yugoslav law which may be involved as, for example, in the project for a Regency and the provisions for elections. In the Department's opinion it would not be appropriate to discuss these matters since they involve a decision to be made by the King and the Yugoslav authorities themselves, taking into account the realities of the situation in Yugoslavia, the good will of the parties involved, and the King's conception of his responsibilities to his people.

Since Mr. Eden has expressed an interest in the Department's reaction to the proposed basis of settlement, in view of the conversa-

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

tions which Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden intend to have with King Peter, the following additional observations may be useful in outlining the attitude of this Government toward the questions now in discussion.

As for the terms of the proposed agreement, it may be said in amplification of the observations communicated to Mr. Patterson as set forth above, that the language of the texts is so vague that the real test would seem to be an evaluation of the good will of the parties to the agreement. Stripped of its generalities the agreement provides for a thoroughgoing recording of administrative, legislative, electoral and institutional procedures, in which one group, even though it may be the strongest in the country, would have practically complete and exclusive power. The gesture toward the Government in exile, in the person of Dr. Subasic, seems hardly more than a concession considered sufficient to acquire recognition by other Governments, on grounds of an apparent continuity.

While provision is made for the representation of various parties and national groups, there is no indication of any change in Tito's present requirement that all must belong to the Liberation Front. Arrangements for the elections for the proposed Constituent Assembly will be made in accordance with a law "which will be enacted in good time"; meanwhile the anti-Fascist Council will exercise legislative powers and the Government, composed almost entirely of Partisan representatives, will organize the executive powers and the judiciary. Considerable significance attaches also to the provisions concerning the right of suffrage, or to hold office. A misuse of the broad authority implicit in these provisions might well serve to circumvent democratic processes of government.

Account must be taken of course of the actualities of the situation. The Partisan organization appears in fact to be in effective control of the liberated parts of Yugoslavia. Its present armed strength, the presence of Soviet armies under a formal agreement with Marshal Tito, and the political support of the British and Soviet Governments, over a period of many months, have created a situation in which the Partisan leaders have taken advantage of their achievements in guerrilla warfare for the creation of a powerful political organization. It is comprehensible that among a ravaged and demoralized people who have lost faith in their leadership abroad this movement should have found at least temporary popular acceptance, and its opponents for the time being are reduced to sullen impotence. Thus, the Partisan political program, including such radical innovations as the reorganization of the State as composed of "six nations", with perhaps even the eventual addition of Bulgaria, appears to be taken as a matter of course, though the implications are of fundamental importance to the political organization of Southeastern Europe.

This Government has consistently defended the rights of the various peoples of Yugoslavia to work out their own forms of Government without the exercise of any foreign influence or the imposition of the rule of any one national or political group within the country, even though claiming majority support, over other elements. It has favored the extension of military aid to those resistance forces actively engaged against the Germans, without political distinction, and has avoided giving political support to either the nationalists or the Partisans. It deplors the cleavages and controversies which have taken place within Yugoslavia amounting at times to active civil war, and between the Yugoslavs at home and their representatives abroad. It thinks that many of these problems are an outgrowth of the diverse national and social elements, and exposure to the stress and hardships of war conditions, and that the desire for democratic government is today general in the country, and not the monopoly of any one group or party.

As forces within the country assume a greater share of responsibility in the Government it is the hope of this Government that genuine efforts will be made to assemble representatives with sound claim to speak for the broad masses of the population, to consider, without other influence, the relations among various elements in Yugoslavia and their respective projects of governmental reform.

In evaluating the problems now present the Department has given some thought to the fact that the Soviet and British Governments have acted as advisers in the negotiations between Prime Minister Subasic and Marshal Tito. It is not clear to what extent these discussions may be related to understandings between the British and Soviet Governments with regard to their respective interests or operations in Southeastern Europe. At the time the British Embassy informed the Department of the joint messages sent by Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov to Dr. Subasic and Marshal Tito, and requested an indication of this Government's approval of the projected arrangements, Mr. Hull replied that since this Government had not been informed of the nature of the proposed solutions of the Yugoslav problems then in discussion it could hardly undertake to become associated with recommendations regarding the negotiations. At the stage to which the matter has meanwhile advanced, as indicated by the arrangements for the forthcoming conversations of the British Prime Minister and Mr. Eden with King Peter to bring about a definitive solution, the Department therefore feels that the exercise of its influence, except as set forth above, would involve responsibilities which this Government considers it should not take in the circumstances, as regards decisions by which the future of Yugoslavia may be so vitally affected.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.



860H.01/1-1145 : Telegram

*The Ambassador Near the Yugoslav Government in London (Patterson)  
to the Secretary of State*

US URGENT

LONDON, January 11, 1945.

[Received January 11—5:05 p. m.]

7. From Ambassador Patterson. Chancellery of Royal Yugoslav Court in connection with present Yugoslav situation has issued following communiqué:

“King Peter II of Yugoslavia has closely studied draft agreement prepared by Dr. Subasic Prime Minister of Royal Yugoslav Government and by Marshal Tito President of National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia for solution of pending problems. Faithful to democratic traditions of his forefathers King Peter II approves basic proposals laid down in draft agreement and its amendments whereby future constitution and form of Government of his country shall be determined solely by free decision of peoples of Yugoslavia. The King will accept such a decision but as a constitutional monarch it is his sacred duty to see to it that the people shall be consulted and their freely expressed will given full respect.

King of Yugoslavia wholeheartedly welcomes interest with which the great Allied nations envisage reorganization of postwar Europe. On basis of freely recorded will of its peoples he fully agrees with their established policy that widest possible grouping of democratic parties and movements from left to right is the only guarantee of really free expression of popular will. He is deeply convinced that same path must be followed in his own country and even more so than in other countries where population is more homogeneous.

In consequence His Majesty has raised two essential objections to agreement in its present form. First concerns suggested form of regency and second the provisions of Article 2 of amendment by which anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation would wield unrestricted legislative power until Constituent Assembly had finished its work. This suggests transfer of power in Yugoslavia to single political group. King Peter believes on contrary that setting up of all-party government comprising every political movement would furnish sole valid guarantee for new and better future in country to which he hopes shortly to return.

King Peter who brought his country into this war on side of his great Allies like whole population of Yugoslavia has followed with keenest sympathy and admiration magnificent prowess of Russian armies under Marshal Stalin. Fraternity with Russia is basic sentiment of Slav peoples and King has the greatest regard for Marshal Stalin whose name has meant so much to the Yugoslav people in their heroic resistance. Peter II R”<sup>1</sup>

WINANT

<sup>1</sup> Churchill informed Roosevelt by telegram No. 888, dated January 14, 1945 (not printed), that King Peter had issued this statement without consulting either the British Government or his own Prime Minister, Šubašić (Roosevelt Papers).

860H.01/1-2245

*The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)*

SECRET

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the British Ambassador and acknowledges the receipt of the Embassy's note of yesterday's date<sup>1</sup> referring to an *aide-mémoire* of January 20<sup>1</sup> on the subject of the negotiations now in course at London for the establishment of a unified Yugoslav Government. The Embassy requests the observations of this Government with respect to the course which the British Government now proposes to follow, in the event that King Peter fails to declare his acceptance of the Tito-Subasic agreement before midday today.

The substance of the Department's telegram to Ambassador Patterson of January 18 [17]<sup>1</sup> has already been communicated orally to the Embassy. It referred to the general lines of American policy, as had been communicated in greater detail in the Department's memorandum of December 23, 1944,<sup>2</sup> and observed that the real merits of some of the questions connected with the reservations made by King Peter could better be determined if the Government returns to Yugoslavia, and if the diplomatic missions of friendly governments can be established at an early date at Belgrade.

In substance, therefore, the Department is in agreement with the objective under which the Yugoslav Government would return to the country to work together with the various elements within Yugoslavia. When that time comes, the Department would prefer of course, that the regular American diplomatic and consular establishment should accompany or shortly follow the returning Government.

The question has meanwhile arisen as to the attitude of the principal Allied Governments in the event that Dr. Subasic should proceed along the lines of his agreement, notwithstanding the difficulties which arose yesterday evening.

In this connection the Department has examined the Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of even date<sup>1</sup> reporting (1) that the British Government is not prepared in the present circumstances to recognize a new Yugoslav Government which might be formed by King Peter as a result of yesterday's events; (2) that it has informed Dr. Subasic this morning that King Peter's action does not affect the intention of the British Government to see the Tito-Subasic agreement carried out; (3) that for this purpose the British Government is ready to transport him and his Government to Belgrade together with all the Yugoslav

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 255-257.

leaders who desire to go there; (4) that the British Government is also informing Marshal Tito to this same effect; and (5) that it is the suggestion of the British Government that pending the formation of a united Government in accordance with the Subasic-Tito agreement recognition should not be accorded to any government formed either by King Peter or Marshal Tito alone.

As regards the Embassy's suggestion that the three principal Allies should agree that it is desirable for the agreement to come into force and should inform Marshal Tito that, if he will concert with Dr. Subasic and his Government to carry out the agreement, the three principal Allies will recognize the united government and accredit ambassadors to the Regency, the Department would observe that it would be difficult for this Government under these conditions to go beyond a provisional representation in Yugoslavia. It is nevertheless the Department's opinion that some arrangement should be made for such provisional representation at Belgrade in the near future. Assuming that a truly representative administration will be established, with provision for free elections as set forth in the agreement—assurances to this effect being fundamental to the whole agreement—the Department would be prepared to use the regular diplomatic mission for this provisional representation to the interim Government, in order to have facilities for an examination of conditions in Yugoslavia, and consultation with other Governments with regard to the situation then prevailing.

C. W. C[ANNON]

WASHINGTON, January 23, 1945.

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740.0011 EW/1-2745 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State*

[Excerpt]

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 27, 1945.

*Yugoslav situation.* Subasic has agreed to King Peter's latest proposal which calls for the resignation of the government and its immediate reconstitution under Subasic on a wider basis. Thereafter the new government would bring into operation the Tito-Subasic agreement taking into consideration the King's two objections. If the King's counter proposal is not accepted he will agree to regency clause. Tito has agreed to Subasic's coming to Belgrade to implement the agreement including the appointment of a regency. Subasic plans to leave for Belgrade on January 29.

740.0011 EW/1-2745: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 28, 1945.

Patterson telegraphed yesterday that Ambassador Stevenson, at Eden's request, was pressing him to obtain instructions "to say something helpful" to King Peter to persuade him to approve the Tito-Subasic agreement. At noon the British Embassy here handed us a memorandum reporting that Stalin would like to see the agreement come into force at once with recognition by the three principal Allies with "no reservations of any kind" and asking us to send immediate instructions to Patterson which might be helpful in deciding King Peter "to play his part". Later in the afternoon Halifax telephoned to me about it and in the evening Winant telegraphed that Cadogan at Eden's request had called to say that they both very much hoped we would join the British and Soviet Governments in recognition of the united Yugoslav Government and that they were troubled by our suggestion in our *aide-mémoire* of January 23<sup>1</sup> of provisional representation at Belgrade. Cadogan said he felt that the possibility of a rift between the United States on the one hand and the British and Soviet Governments on the other was an influence in King Peter's holding out against the agreement.

We telegraphed to Patterson that since in accordance with our instructions he had seen to it that both King Peter and Dr. Subasic now have a clear understanding of our attitude and intentions it is neither necessary nor desirable that Patterson should take the responsibility of trying further to influence decisions on major Yugoslav political questions now in discussion between the King and the Yugoslav Government.

In my telegram to Winant, the content of which I telephoned to Halifax, I said that I felt we had gone a long way in our *aide-mémoire* to the British to meet the position which they had taken with respect to the new governmental authority in Yugoslavia, and that our position had the President's approval. I continued "In the light of the President's message to Congress it would be difficult for us to foreclose our position with respect to the expected developments in Yugoslavia by a commitment at this time which might be at variance with the declared policy of this Government toward liberated countries in general. The President's message has had warm public approval here and I do not believe the American public would support our going out in advance of the developments before we know what the circumstances are. It does not seem to me that there is any possibility of interpreting our action as a rift between us and the British and Soviet Governments, as we have stated our willingness to send our diplomatic

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, pp. 259-260.

mission to Belgrade on the assumption that the agreement between Tito and Subasic would be carried out and Ambassador Patterson has received orders to hold himself in readiness to proceed to Belgrade upon the transfer of the Government to Yugoslavia. Both King Peter and Dr. Subasic have been informed in clear terms of our intentions along the foregoing lines”.

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Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*

PRINCIPAL YUGOSLAV PROBLEMS

SUMMARY

The Partisan organization appears in fact to be in effective control of the liberated parts of Yugoslavia. Its present armed strength, the presence of Soviet armies under a formal agreement with Marshal Tito, and the political support of the British and Soviet Governments, over a period of many months, have created a situation in which the Partisan leaders have taken advantage of their achievements in guerrilla warfare for the creation of a powerful political organization. Its active opponents, such as the Nationalist movement under such leaders as General Mihailovic, and the less coherent opposition groups such as the Croatian Peasant Party and the Slovenian clericals, for the time being are reduced to sullen impotence. All indications point to the intention of the Partisans to establish a thoroughly totalitarian regime, in order to maintain themselves in power.

The Tito-Subasic agreement, now awaiting the King's approval in London, would transfer the effective powers of government to the Tito organization, with just enough participation of the Government in exile to facilitate recognition by other governments. The Soviet and British Governments have firmly advocated an acceptance of this agreement. This Government has refused to exert influence on the King, and has pointed out that while the language of the agreement is in line with our ideas, the real test will be the good will of the new administration in its execution.

We have also placed on record our uncertainty as to what extent the proposed agreement, in the formulation of which both Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin seem to have had a part, may be related to the arrangements between the British and Soviet Governments defining their respective interests in Southeastern Europe.

If an effort is made to associate this Government with this Yugoslav arrangement, it is recommended: (1) that we should emphasize our complete independence of action in dealing with the Yugoslav situation, despite any commitments which may be or may have been made

by the British and Soviet Governments; and (2) that we should make any endorsement of a new administration in Yugoslavia contingent on freedom of movement and access to public opinion in Yugoslavia for our observers to survey the situation.

We could say frankly that Marshal Tito and his subordinates have not shown a disposition toward cooperation or even common civility in recent weeks. His refusal to cooperate in military plans is beyond the scope of this paper, but the attitude on questions of relief negotiations, censorship restrictions, refusal to grant travel facilities for Allied observers, the Partisan territorial demands, and propaganda policies, all show that the Partisan leadership is not disposed to work in loyal cooperation toward the general aims of the United Nations.

Note: The above summary and attached statement were based on the situation existing before King Peter had given any public indication of his attitude with respect to the Tito-Subasic agreement. It has just been announced that the King has refused to accept the agreement in its present form because of (1) the suggested form of the regency and (2) the provision that the Partisan Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation would wield unrestricted legislative powers until the proposed constituent assembly had finished its work. The King feels that these provisions would transfer the power in Yugoslavia to a single political group, Marshal Tito's National Liberation Front.

At this writing we do not know whether negotiations on the agreement will continue (the King has indicated his approval of the agreement's basic proposals) or whether Marshal Tito will refuse to continue the conversations and request recognition of his organization as the *de jure* government of Yugoslavia.

#### PRINCIPAL YUGOSLAV PROBLEMS

*Tito-Subasic Negotiations.* Conversations are now in progress in London between the British and Royal Yugoslav Governments concerning ratification of agreements concluded during recent months between Yugoslav Prime Minister Dr. Subasic and Marshal Tito, the leader of the National Liberation Front (Partisan movement) in Yugoslavia, looking toward the establishment of a united, federal government in Yugoslavia.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Churchill is now pressing King Peter for ratification of the agreements, which would set up (1) a Royal Regency designed to exercise royal prerogatives pending a decision as to the future of the Monarchy, (2) a legislative body consisting of delegates to the Partisan Anti-Fascist Council, which would also enact a law providing for later elections to a constituent assembly, and (3) an executive group or cabinet composed almost

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, pp. 251-254.

exclusively of Partisan representatives, which would also be charged with establishing a new judicial system.

We have been asked by the British Government to state our position with reference to the agreements mentioned, in connection with the London conversations. We have instructed Mr. Patterson not to enter into a discussion of the proposed agreements, because of the vagueness of the terminology and the technicalities of Yugoslav law involved, and have indicated that (1) if the King accepts the agreements, the question of our "recognition" of the fusion Government would not arise, and (2) should the King reject the agreements and Marshal Tito request recognition of his own organization as the *de jure* government, we would wish to re-examine the situation within Yugoslavia.

Our instructions to Mr. Patterson have been communicated to King Peter and Prime Minister Subasic, as well as the British Government, which has also been furnished a re-statement of our Yugoslav policy, namely: (1) our desire that the Yugoslav people work out their own forms of government, without foreign influence or imposition of the rule of any one national or political group, (2) our willingness to extend military aid to all resistance forces, without political distinction, (3) our conviction that desire for reform is general in Yugoslavia and not the monopoly of any one group, (4) our hope that genuine representatives of the people will be assembled to speak for them, and (5) our uncertainty as to the part played in the Yugoslav problem by British-Soviet understandings with respect to their respective interests in Southeastern Europe.

*American Representation.* We recently instructed Mr. Kirk in his capacity as Political Adviser to the Mediterranean Commander, to send two members of his staff to Belgrade to look after American interests informally. Thus far Partisan authorities have refused to allow these representatives to enter Yugoslavia, but Mr. Kirk is pressing the matter very firmly.

*Relief Negotiations.* Negotiations for the conclusion of a relief agreement to operate in Yugoslavia during the military period preceding the assumption by UNRRA of relief responsibilities were interrupted last November by the departure of the principal Partisan delegate to seek instructions, particularly with reference to the question of Allied observers to oversee the distribution of supplies.

We have insisted on observers with a view to insuring the impartial distribution of supplies and to avoid allowing such supplies to be used as a weapon of political coercion.

The Partisan delegate did not return to Bari, and while the negotiations have been resumed at Belgrade a Partisan propaganda campaign has been emphasizing that Allied relief was being withheld from starving Yugoslavs by the Anglo-American insistence on sending

observers into Yugoslavia in derogation of Yugoslav sovereignty, and that the Soviet Union, on the other hand, was making generous shipments of wheat available for Yugoslav consumption, to which the only obstacle was the Allied failure to furnish necessary shipping for its transportation from Black Sea ports. Supplementing this propaganda campaign was one initiated by certain organizations in the United States calling for the release of Yugoslav ships from the Allied shipping pool for the transportation of relief goods to Yugoslavia.

The CCAC has agreed to transport American relief goods to Yugoslavia, but has declined to assign specific ships for this purpose.<sup>2</sup> The negotiations for a relief agreement have recently been resumed, with good prospects for success.

*Mihailovich.* General Mihailovich, the leader of the Nationalist movement which opposes the Partisans, was forced to retreat from Serbia into Bosnia following the entry of Soviet forces into Serbia late in September 1944. He has made repeated appeals for supplies to enable him to continue the fight against the Germans under Allied direction, all of which have been ignored by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre. Supporters of Mihailovich report that his army and the refugees who accompanied him are suffering great privations in the Bosnian mountains, and are under constant attack by Germans and Partisans.

It should be noted that reports of American observers tend to refute the charges against Mihailovich of collaboration with the Germans, and indicate that the Partisans, with the help of Allied military supplies, are fighting the nationalists and otherwise establishing a repressive political hegemony in Yugoslavia. The Allied observers attached to the Partisans do not have the freedom of movement which would enable them to evaluate the real situation.

*Partisan Excesses.* Official and unofficial reports received from Yugoslavia point to the probability that large-scale executions and confiscations of property of persons opposed to the Partisan movement are taking place. We have already received two inquiries from Congressmen regarding this question. Moreover, the present complaints originate from Serb elements in the United States, who form a decided minority of the Yugoslav-American population; if such terrorism is practiced in Croatia and Slovenia, when those areas are liberated from the enemy, we may expect vigorous protests not only from the large Croatian and Slovenian population in the United States but perhaps from Roman Catholic elements in general.

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<sup>2</sup> The assignment of ships was a function of the Combined (American and British) Shipping Adjustment Board and the shipping authorities of the two Governments, not of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee.



## THE ITALIAN CABINET CRISIS

865.01/12-144

*The Secretary of State to the President*

[WASHINGTON,] December 1, 1944.

## SPECIAL INFORMATION FOR THE PRESIDENT

[Excerpt]<sup>1</sup>

These international developments of the past two or three days will be of especial interest to you:

*Italian Political Crisis.* Bonomi has been informed by Ambassador Kirk of the concern of the American Government over the prolonged Governmental crisis in Italy. Kirk has been instructed that we do not wish to pass upon the composition of the new Italian Government but that it should be required to abide by previous Italian undertakings to the Allies. The British Ambassador has clearly stated to Bonomi that the appointment of Sforza as Foreign Minister would be unacceptable. Kirk considers this an undue interference in Italian internal affairs which, since Italy is a theater of combined operations, to some extent involves the United States. Winant has therefore been instructed to express our regret to the Foreign Office that it felt it necessary to intervene in an internal Italian political crisis particularly without prior consultation with us, pointing out that this intervention has complicated the crisis by angering the Left parties and has occasioned widespread critical comment in the U. S. press.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

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<sup>1</sup> For other excerpts from this memorandum, see *ante*, pp. 213, 250.

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*Department of State Press Release, December 5, 1944*<sup>1</sup>

The Department of State has received a number of inquiries from correspondents in regard to the position of this Government concerning the recent cabinet crisis in Italy.

The position of this Government has been consistently that the composition of the Italian Government is purely an Italian affair except in the case of appointments where important military factors are concerned. This Government has not in any way intimated to the Italian Government that there would be any opposition on its part to Count Sforza. Since Italy is an area of combined responsibility, we have reaffirmed to both the British and Italian Governments that

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<sup>1</sup> Reprinted from Department of State *Bulletin*, December 10, 1944, vol. XI, p. 722.

we expect the Italians to work out their problems of government along democratic lines without influence from outside. This policy would apply to an even more pronounced degree with regard to governments of the United Nations in their liberated territories.

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865.01/12-544

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 5 December 1944.

MY DEAR ED: I send you a copy of a personal telegram I had last night from the Prime Minister, that will set out the feeling of His Majesty's Government about Sforza more completely perhaps than you have yet had it before you.

I have, of course, made plain to London that I supposed the principal point on which the State Department had felt disturbed, had been the fact that we had said what we had in regard to Sforza without previous consultation with you.

The feeling of London on this would be, I think, that the thing came up very suddenly and Noel Charles had to express an opinion almost immediately, having regard to the undesirability of allowing the Italians to go on with their Cabinet making, without knowledge of how His Majesty's Government felt about Sforza.

I am going off to New York and will call you up and come and see you, if I may, when I get back in two days time.

Yours ever,

EDWARD

[Attachment]

PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO LORD HALIFAX,  
DATED DECEMBER 4TH, 1944

TOP SECRET

"1. There is no question of His Majesty's Government putting a veto on the appointment of Count Sforza to be Prime Minister or Foreign Minister of Italian Government. What is certain however is that he will not command the slightest trust or confidence from us, and that the Italian Government might be thought ill-advised in making difficulties for themselves in this matter with one of the two Great Powers to whom Italy has unconditionally surrendered and whose armies are still skirmishing on a large scale in their country. We felt ourselves fully entitled to make the Italian Government aware of our view upon this matter because we have been accorded command in the Mediterranean, as the Americans have command in France, and therefore we have a certain special position and responsibility. Before Italian personalities take their decision about the

appointment of Count Sforza, they ought surely to have been put in possession of our thoughts upon such a subject.

2. The reasons why we have lost all confidence in Count Sforza arise primarily from his letter to Mr. Berle of September 23rd 1943.<sup>1</sup> This letter was written at a moment when we were deprecating to the State Department his being sent to Italy at all. We felt sure that he was only going to make trouble with the struggling community and administration, of whose help, though they were defeated, we had military need. The arrival of this letter which was communicated to us, decided His Majesty's Government to withdraw our objections to Count Sforza's repatriation. On his way to Italy, Count Sforza lunched with me and I took occasion to show him a copy of his letter to Mr. Berle and asked him to say on his honour, as a gentleman, whether these were his sentiments or not. He gave me the most positive assurances. Witnesses can be produced.

3. No sooner however had he returned to Italy than he began violent and continuous intrigues against the Badoglio Government. This Government, it may be remembered, had effected surrender to us of the Italian fleet. So great an importance did we attach to this surrender that, rather than divide it up with the Russians we provided 13 ships out of 14 from the Royal Navy to satisfy the Russian claim, the United States providing the cruiser "Milwaukee".

4. When the Badoglio Government fell in the circumstances which both our great Allies, the United States of America and U. S. S. R. have admitted were irregular, Signor Bonomi took office under the prescribed conditions. Count Sforza figured as Minister for the purge, and it was under his administration that the far from edifying incident of two hour lynching of Donato Carretta took place in Rome. All the time Count Sforza has been intriguing against Signor Bonomi, with the formation of whose Government he had been prominently concerned. In particular he had interfered so much with the work of the Italian Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Visconti Venosta, that the latter declined to continue in office. The opinion of the Italian Government and of its Prime Minister has been clearly shown by their marked wishes to have Count Sforza's civil capacities win their full play at a very considerable distance from the shores of Italy. The Count has, for some time past, been weighing honourable employment of Ambassador to the United States against his chance of getting something better out of a political upset in Rome. He has played a leading part in making Signor Bonomi's position so impossible that he had to resign.

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

5. In short, if I were compelled, which I should regret, to state my objections to Count Sforza as Prime Minister or Foreign Minister, I should be forced to tell the House of Commons, in my own defence, that I regard him as a man who has broken his word of honour to me, as set forth in a document which I put to him categorically. I should also be forced to disclose the fact that I consider him not only a man who has broken his word but also an intriguer and mischief-maker of the first order, and that there was a very strong suspicion that in these evil courses consideration for his own advancement played an important, if not a decisive part. It should also be remembered that he, like these other Italian Ministers who are put in as stop gaps till the will of the Italian people can be expressed, has absolutely no popular mandatory or democratic authority of any sort or kind, and that this would have to be pointed out too. These would certainly not prove favourable auspices for his future relationships with His Majesty's Government.

6. Finally, you should remind our friends, as I shall, if necessary, remind the President, of the great trouble I have taken personally to secure mitigations of Italy's position. At Quebec I laid before the President a series of proposals, all of which have been carried out and some improved upon, for easing the Italian situation, especially before the Presidential elections. I consider therefore that I am entitled to expect considerate treatment from the State Department."

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800.0146/12-044

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State*

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 6, 1944.

Mr. Wright called on me at his request late this afternoon. He stated that Lord Halifax had to leave for New York to give a speech, but the matter he wished to discuss was so important that he had asked Mr. Wright to come in his place.

Mr. Wright then talked for a few minutes, stating that he had been very much hurt by my statement on Italy, and that it had caused great embarrassment; and that the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden were aroused. He went on to say that a debate would start in Parliament on Friday about Greece and he wished to call attention to that part of my statement which had referred to other liberated countries. Mr. Wright pointed out that London was very

disturbed as it was felt that my remarks on Italy also referred to Greece.

Mr. Wright then asked if he might read to me a message from Mr. Eden, which was one page long. He declined to leave it with me as he said it was very personal. It said, in brief, that the British had been surprised and hurt that I would make a statement that had been so damaging to them at home and abroad. The Prime Minister had remarked that he had been wounded by the State Department's communiqué. In his message Eden spoke of the manner in which the British had supported our position on Italy at Quebec and afterward, which had been hard for them to do but which they had done out of loyalty to the President.

Mr. Wright thinks that the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden were in a difficult position facing this debate on Friday, and it would be most helpful if I could make a statement promptly. He asked if I were going to have a press conference tomorrow (Thursday) and if so, if I might issue something along the following lines: a question could be asked at the press conference as to our position on Greece. I could reply that we are in close touch with the British, relative to Greece; that I had noted Churchill's statement in Parliament, which I could then quote, in which he spoke of the importance of democratic principles prevailing; after which I could add that we saw eye to eye with the British on this whole question of Greece.

I then explained that in our views, all we had done was to reiterate the policy which had been agreed upon by our respective governments at Moscow, and that there was nothing new in my statement. We had been somewhat put out by the action they had taken without consulting us, and I offered it as my opinion that the whole incident should never have occurred. Mr. Wright immediately agreed that we should have been consulted, but he urged that when differences arose they should be settled in private and not in public; and he thought that we should have consulted the British before releasing my statement. I then referred to American public opinion which had questioned our policy and to adverse comment in Congress, and remarked that my statement of Tuesday had been well received in these circles.

I then told Mr. Wright that I would like to send a message to Mr. Eden tonight; he said that he would send one himself, to confirm that I would be making a helpful statement sometime before the debate started on Friday. I then asked Mr. Wright to see Mr. Dunn and Mr. Matthews before returning to the Embassy.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

Roosevelt Papers:Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[WARM SPRINGS, GEORGIA,] 6 December 1944.

PRIORITY

Number 669, Top Secret and Personal from the President for the Prime Minister.

Your 845.<sup>2</sup>

As you know, the letter to Berle merely transmitted Sforza's message to Badoglio and in no way involved this Government. I see no reason why you should not use the message itself in any way you see fit. I believe the message has already been made public, having been given to the press by Badoglio at the time of its receipt.

I deplore any offense which the press release on Italy may have given you personally or any implication of my lack of understanding of your responsibility before your country. You must recognize, however, the untenable position in which we were put by Mr. Eden's prior statement in the House<sup>3</sup> regarding the British Government's representations to the Italian Government on the position of Sforza in any new government. While military operations continue, Italy is an area of combined Anglo-American responsibility and our silence on this step made it appear that we agreed with the action taken. Actually this move was made without prior consultation with us in any quarter and it is quite contrary to the policy which we have tried to follow in Italy, since the Moscow Conference last year, in accepting democratic solutions in government worked out by the Italian people themselves. In the circumstances we had no other choice than to make our own position clear.

You will remember my feeling on this score expressed to you at the time Bonomi succeeded Badoglio in forming a Government last June.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed as such, but see the description of this message in the Stettinius Record, *post*, p. 431, and in Sherwood, pp. 838-839.

<sup>3</sup> For Eden's statement, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th ser., vol. 406, cols. 305-308, December 1, 1944.

800.0146/12-744

*The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 7, 1944.

DEAR LORD HALIFAX: Michael Wright will tell you of our talk yesterday. I am sure you know that it is a source of deep personal regret to me that any differences between our two countries should have arisen during my first few days in office. I am sending you a

copy of a personal private message which I sent Anthony last night in reply to his message to me. It expresses my concern and I have endeavored to stress therein the importance I attach to maintaining the closest and most friendly personal relationship.

I am sure you know how much I value your friendship; as long as we can talk things out freely and frankly with each other at all times, there can be no serious differences between us.

With assurances of my respect and esteem,

Sincerely yours,

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

[Attachment]

*The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden)*

[WASHINGTON, December 6, 1944.]

"Your personal message was read to me this afternoon and I wish to let you know without delay that it is a source of deep regret to me that so soon after taking office a difference should have arisen between us. I have always worked so closely with you and my British friends, both as Lend-Lease Administrator before coming into the State Department and more particularly since I have been here. We must keep up the close and intimate association which has always been so helpful in getting over even points of difficult discussion in dealing with our respective countries' interests. I count upon, as one of my greatest supports in the tasks ahead, your close friendship. I know, and you must feel, that anything which we put up to each other for cooperative working out can be solved to the entire satisfaction of both our responsibilities. Let us resolve that we will see that everything of any importance comes right up to the two of us for approval.

If the reaffirmation of our policy with regard to Italy has caused you embarrassment I am truly sorry. The feeling is such in this country, however, and the inquiries from all quarters so pressing, following your public statement in the House of Commons, that we had no other choice than to make clear our position. I am sure that had there been prior consultation we could have worked the matter out together as we have done in the past and, I feel sure, we will be able to do in the future. Michael Wright has told me of the debate on Greece which has been set for Friday and which you anticipate will cause the Prime Minister and you some embarrassment. We are working up a friendly statement to be given out tomorrow which I sincerely hope will be helpful."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This message was sent to the Embassy in London in the Department's telegram No. 10226, dated December 6, 1944, for delivery to Eden; and a copy was sent to the President on December 10 (865.01/12-644). The text of the "friendly statement" made by Stettinius at his press conference on December 7 is printed *post*, p. 433.

865.01/12-444

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 8, 1944.

## AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Instructions have been sent to the United States representative in Rome to inform Signor Bonomi of this Government's concern over the prolonged crisis in the Italian Government. Mr. Kirk was instructed to emphasize its deplorable effect on public opinion in the United States, particularly at the time when the Congress is considering the resumption of diplomatic relations with that Government. Mr. Kirk expressed this Government's earnest hope that the representative character of the preceding Italian Government would be preserved in any solution. He went on to say that while his Government viewed the composition of the Italian Cabinet as purely an Italian problem it was interested in the measure of cooperation and friendship which any new Government would extend to the United Nations in the prosecution of the war against Germany and would expect it, of course, to assume all previous Italian undertakings with respect to the United Nations. The United States representative was advised that all these factors would be considered before he would be instructed to present letters accrediting him to the Italian Government.

He was further instructed for his guidance, that when the new Italian Cabinet should be submitted to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre, for approval, this Government was of the opinion that individual nominations might be approved or disapproved by the Supreme Allied Commander solely on important military grounds, and that further reference to Allied authorities or Governments by the Supreme Allied Commander was not necessary or desirable.

The Department also expressed to Mr. Kirk its approval of a statement of policy which Allied Force Headquarters recently made to the Chief Commissioner in response to his request for guidance in the present crisis. It was along the following lines: Allied policy and objectives continue to be to welcome democratic political solutions worked out by the Italian people themselves in the furtherance of the war effort.

All of these instructions seem to be in general agreement with the instructions to Sir Noel Charles recited in the Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of December 4, 1944<sup>1</sup> (paragraph 2) and it would appear that Mr. Kirk has already received sufficient guidance to enable him to adopt a similar course in speaking to the Italian Government.

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



With regard to granting Allied "approval" of any Italian Government which may evolve, the Government of the United States is of the opinion that objection to individuals should be made by the Supreme Allied Commander only on important military grounds. This Government, however, does consider the representative character of a new Government to be of major importance and concern to the Allied Governments and will wish to give careful consideration to this aspect of the political solution, when found, before extending recognition to the new Government.

It is anticipated that there will be consultation in this regard between the British and American Governments at the appropriate time.

C. W. C[ANNON]

865.01/12-944

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1944.

MY DEAR ED: I have just received a telegram asking me to convey to you the enclosed personal message from Anthony, in reply to yours of December 7th.

Yours ever,

EDWARD

[Enclosure]

PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM MR. EDEN TO MR. STETTINIUS

Thank you so much for your helpful and understanding message which I received through Winant. It is my keen desire that we should work close together.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Copies of the Stettinius-Eden messages were sent to the President on December 10, 1944.

865.01/12-1444

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1944—8 p. m.

I want you to know of the reply which Eden made to me to the personal message which you delivered to him for me, outlined in 10226 of December 6.<sup>1</sup> In essence, his message thanked me for mine which he termed helpful and understanding. He added that he wished keenly for us to work closely together.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed as such; but for the message of Stettinius to Eden of December 6, see *ante*, p. 272.

For your background on this matter, you should know that our statement<sup>2</sup> was issued as a result of considerable pressure on us from our domestic press and that generally speaking, it was received very well in this country by the press and also by the Congress. In conversations with us, the British representatives here admit that they should have consulted us before taking the Italian action, but they blame us in turn for not consulting them before we issued the statement. We would not have issued a public statement had not Eden's public declaration on the floor of the House compelled us immediately to disassociate ourselves with that policy publicly.

STETTINIUS

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, pp. 266-267.

*Department of State Press Release, December 14, 1944*<sup>1</sup>

The American and British Ambassadors in Rome have been in close contact during the recent developments in Italy. The American Ambassador, Alexander C. Kirk, has kept the Department of State carefully informed. He reports that the new Government of Italy is supported by a majority of the political parties, comprising the Committee of National Liberation, and thus maintains a representative character.

The United States Government, in accord with the British Government, is happy to see the new Italian Government under Signor Bonomi take office.

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<sup>1</sup> Reprinted from Department of State *Bulletin*, December 17, 1944, vol. XI, p. 760.

740.00119 Control (Italy)/1-3045 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Grew)*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS,  
CASERTA, ITALY, 30 JANUARY 1945.

7016. For Acting Secretary of State only from Secretary Stettinius, for delivery to Assistant Secretary of State Eyes Only.

I hope you will hold up any action with regard to proposed joint statement on Italy<sup>2</sup> prepared by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee. I have not seen the text but feeling here is that its issuance in its present form would be most unfortunate. Please cable full text and status.

ALL-STATE HORSESHOE.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent via Army channels.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

740.00119 Control (Italy)/1-3045 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON, February 1, 1945.]

For the Secretary from the Acting Secretary.

Proposed joint statement on Italy drafted in CCAC is at present being considered by British Foreign Office. (Your Telegram 7016, January 30, from AFHQ) As soon as British have received a reply from London and agreed text available, we will telegraph it. CCAC plan to submit agreed text to Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval before releasing to press.

In any event we will not agree to release without your approval.

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<sup>1</sup> The Department's copy of this telegram indicates that it was drafted in the Division of Southern European Affairs on January 31, 1945. No transmission date or telegram number appears on the copy, which is a flimsy-paper carbon attached to the preceding telegram. The text of this message in the Defense Files, however, bears the date February 1, 1945, as the date on which it was transmitted.

Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*

[UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD ITALY]

[SUMMARY]

United States policy toward Italy is, briefly, to encourage the development of Italy into a democratic and constructive force in the future Europe and to assist Italy to become politically independent and economically self-supporting as quickly as possible. The steps which this Government has taken to date to implement these policies are recounted.

Major questions of policy which might be taken up with the British and Soviet Governments and their concurrence obtained are:

(1) Supersession of the Italian instrument of surrender (long and short terms) by a convention to terminate the state of war between Italy and the United Nations;

(2) Italian request for the participation in United Nations international bodies and conferences as an associated nation;

(3) Italian participation, as an associated nation, in the German surrender instrument;

(4) Italian Committee of National Liberation as a basis for representative government during the interim period;

(5) Italian national elections, after the Germans have been expelled, to determine the form of government and constitution which the Italian people desire;

(6) Italian participation in the war against Japan.

Questions which the British or Soviet Governments may raise concerning Italy requiring this Government to take a position are as follows:

- (1) Allied support of the House of Savoy during the interim period;
- (2) Territorial dispositions and reparations;
- (3) Progress of defascistization in Italy;
- (4) Use of Allied forces to support the Italian Government in the event of civil war.

#### UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD ITALY

##### *Summary of Present United States Policy*

During a time when the United States has a peculiar position of authority in Italy, as a result of military operations, it is supporting and encouraging elements and aspirations which will develop the Italian nation into a democratic and constructive force in the future Europe. Since the economic dependence of one State upon another is not conducive to internal stability and peaceful relations with other states, it is sound American policy to help Italy become self-supporting and financially independent as quickly as possible.

The United States does not accept the theory of economic and political "spheres of influence". While, for geographic reasons, this country's interest in Italy may not be as great as that of certain other powers, it has, nevertheless, very real interest in the development of normal and mutually profitable trade relations, in the protection of American property and investments in Italy and in insuring that Italy becomes a positive force for peace and cooperation in the post-war world. The blood sacrifices made by American men from Sicily to the Alps cannot be ignored in the determination of our interest in, and our policy toward, Italy.

To implement these policies, this Government has, in addition to the encouragement and support that has been given to develop a representative government in Italy, taken the following steps in the political field: it has assumed the lead in attempting to modify the prisoner of war status in which many Italian soldiers continue to be held in United Nations territory (as a result of this initiative it is believed that Italian prisoners of war in Italy will soon be released from that status); it suggested that we invite the Italian Government to send a representative to the Financial and Monetary Conference at Bretton Woods last year but was unable to carry out this proposal because of strong British and French opposition; it encouraged the International Business Conference held at Rye, New York, November last, to invite representatives of Italian business (a representative of the International Chamber of Commerce in Rome attended); it has instructed the United States delegate to the International Labor Organization to support the Italian application for readmission to the

Organization at its meeting this month; it recently permitted a representative of the Italian Red Cross to come to the United States to study American Red Cross procedures in connection with relief work in Italy; and it agreed to receive an Italian economic and financial mission to discuss urgent questions in this field (these discussions are presently going on between the Italian Mission and experts in the Departments of State, Treasury and Agriculture and the Foreign Economic Administration). As a result of the Hyde Park statement of September 26 concerning Italy<sup>1</sup> this Government, after consultation with other American Republics, announced the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Government of Italy. The word "control" has been removed from the title of the "Allied Control Commission", and a civilian has been appointed as Acting President of the Commission. The Combined Civil Affairs Committee (Combined Chiefs of Staff) is at present preparing a directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, to modify the structure of the Allied Commission and its relationship to the Italian Government in the light of the Hyde Park statement.

On the economic side the United States Government participates in the Allied Commission, which among other things, provides for the distribution of civilian supplies in Italy. Since the invasion of Sicily in July 1943 the Allied military authorities had spent, up to November 1, 1944, approximately \$158,000,000 for civilian supplies for Italy. The American share of this total has been approximately \$120,000,000. In October 1944 the President informed the War Department that in spite of the current shipping situation he had decided to assume the responsibility for directing the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, to increase the bread ration to 300 grams throughout all of Italy occupied by Allied forces (a directive to this end is being prepared in the Combined Civil Affairs Committee—Combined Chiefs of Staff—to Marshal Alexander). The President announced in October<sup>2</sup> that the United States Government was making available to the Italian Government the dollar equivalent of the United States troop pay spent in Italy since the invasion, the dollar proceeds of remittances made by individuals in this country to friends and relatives in Italy and the dollar proceeds of Italian exports to the United States. This dollar credit which amounted to something more than \$100,000,000 could be used by the Italian Government to pay for essential civilian supplies purchased in the United States for use in liberated Italy. It was due to United States initiative at the UNRRA Conference in September that the Council agreed to a limited aid program for Italy, not to exceed

<sup>1</sup> For the text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1, 1944, vol. xi, p. 338.

<sup>2</sup> For the text of this statement by the President, which was released October 10, 1944, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 15, 1944, vol. xi, p. 403.

\$50,000,000 worth of medicine and other supplies to supplement the Italian civilian supply program.

In appraising Allied economic policy toward Italy it must be remembered that the various relief measures and civilian supply programs are all subject to the present severe limitations placed upon United Nations' shipping. In view of the heavy military commitments throughout the world, it has not been possible to allocate to the Mediterranean theatre sufficient shipping to carry the civilian supplies available. While United States declarations of policy in the economic field have consistently shown an enlightened view, the implementation of this policy continues to be severely handicapped by the actual physical factors of acute worldwide shipping shortage.

*Major Questions of Policy on which Soviet and British Concurrence is Desired*

1. *Supersession of Italian Armistice Terms by Convention to Terminate State of War.*<sup>3</sup> The present discussions in the Combined Civil Affairs Committee concerning the implementation of the Hyde Park declaration of September 26 involve a United States proposal that the present Italian armistice terms be superseded by a convention to terminate the state of war existing between Italy and the United Nations (preliminary peace) and by a Civil Affairs agreement to protect the Allied military position in Italy. Indications are that the British members will be instructed to reject this proposal.

The basic ambiguity in the present relations between Italy and the United Nations stems principally from the technical state of war which still exists and the *de facto* relations of Italy with the United Nations as a co-belligerent in the war against Germany. Italy's status as a co-belligerent is obviously incompatible and inconsistent with its status as an enemy. Elimination of the armistice and of the status of "enemy" would bring the legal relationship of the United Nations to Italy into line with the present practical working relationship that has developed in the last fifteen months. Because there are many questions, such as colonies, frontiers, fleet, reparations, et cetera, which should be considered in the general peace settlement with Germany and Japan, it is not possible to conclude a definitive peace with Italy at the present time. All of these questions could, however, be specifically reserved for later settlement. Sixteen months having elapsed since the end of hostilities with Italy, it is clear that the unconditional surrender instrument and enemy status are outmoded and that adjustment of our legal position should be no longer delayed. The Supreme Allied Commander would of course embody within his Civil Affairs agreement with the Italian Government all military clauses required to protect his operations.

<sup>3</sup> For the text of the Italian armistice, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604, or 61 Stat. 2740.

2. *Italian Request for Participation in United Nations International Bodies and Conferences as an Associated Nation.* One of the steps which the Italian Government considers most important in its moral and political rehabilitation is participation in international conferences and organizations, particularly those dealing with post-war problems. It is therefore desirable that the Italians should not be isolated from the current United Nations' thinking and discussions as expressed in the new bodies and organizations which are being set up. The Secretary of State last August expressed to the Italian Prime Minister this Government's sympathy and support for the Italian Government's aspirations in this regard. Sympathetic consideration of the Italian position on this question by all the United Nations is essential if Italy is to become a constructive force in Europe.

3. *Italian Participation in the German Surrender as an Associated Nation.* Italy has been at war with Germany for fifteen months. During that period it has suffered heavy destruction of lives and resources. Italy is naturally interested in the armistice arrangements for Germany and the whole problem of the Italian position is involved in whether or not Italy will be permitted by the United Nations to participate in their armistice arrangements for Germany. We think that Italian views should be considered and Italy should be permitted to associate herself with the United Nations armistice with Germany at the time of the German surrender.

4. *Italian Committee of National Liberation as Basis for Representative Government during Interim Period.* The Italian Committee of National Liberation is composed of six anti-Fascist political parties ranging from right to left as follows: Christian Democrat, Liberal, Labor Democrat, Action, Socialist and Communist. Since the first broad-based Italian Government was formed under Marshal Badoglio in April, last year, Italian governments have been drawn from representatives of the six parties in the Committee. There are also Committees of National Liberation, with what appear to be identical political composition, in the important cities of Northern Italy, still occupied by the enemy. As long as Italian governments, regardless of changing personnel, continue to be based upon the foundation of the Committee and to reflect in a generally equal manner the political parties represented therein, Allied basis for recognition will continue to be sound.

It would be a stabilizing factor, during the interim period before Italy is free to hold national elections, if the three principal Allies would agree that they would continue to recognize only those governments in Italy which continue to be representative of the parties in the Committee of National Liberation.

5. *Italian National Elections, after the Germans have been Expelled, to Determine Form of Government and Constitution.* In view of

American, British and Soviet commitments to the Italian people on this subject, expressed in various public statements, Allied troops should not be withdrawn from Italy until after national elections have been held to determine the form of government and constitution desired by the Italian people. It would seem essential to the fulfillment of our pledge in this regard, that Allied representatives supervise the first national election in Italy after its liberation.

6. *Italian Participation in the War against Japan.* The present Italian position of co-belligerency was recognized by the three powers on October 13, 1943, as a result of the Italian declaration of war against Germany.<sup>4</sup> The Italian Government has not declared war against Japan nor has it made its position clear to the United Nations on this question.

In the first instance the United Nations must decide whether they desire Italian participation in the war against Japan. If so, Allied authorities in Italy should be instructed to take steps to obtain undertakings of the Italian Government to this effect.

Italy should not be expected to participate in the war against Japan unless her status vis-à-vis the United Nations is clarified. She should be recognized as an Ally in that struggle or be permitted to adhere to the United Nations pact.

Italy might be used as a "Mediterranean work shop" in the prosecution of the war against Japan, after Germany has been defeated, in view of its many large ports and surplus skilled laborers. Consideration should be given to paying Italy for goods furnished and services rendered in the war against Japan, as distinct from goods and services it is now furnishing, in the prosecution of the war against Germany, under the armistice terms. Aside from any Italian contribution to the war in the Pacific such a program would prove a timely factor in Italian economic rehabilitation.

*Questions which may be Raised by the British or the Soviet Governments concerning Italy*

1. *Support of the House of Savoy.* At the present time the Allied Commission for Italy has followed the custom of extracting from each succeeding Italian government a pledge that it will not raise the institutional question (monarchy) until all of Italy has been liberated. Thus far the various Italian governments have given this undertaking without question, since this is also the present program of the Italian Committee of National Liberation. While it is to be hoped that the question will not become an issue as eventual succeeding governments may be formed prior to the first national elections, the liberation of the northern industrial areas such as Milan and Turin might well precipitate the monarchical question before all Italy is liberated.

<sup>4</sup> See Department of State *Bulletin*, October 16, 1943, vol. ix, pp. 253-254.



If the subject is raised by one of our Allies we should not agree at this time to any course of action which would bind us to support the Italian Monarchy in the event the present compromise and working agreement between the Monarchy and the political parties should become unacceptable to the latter. We should reserve complete freedom of action, subject of course always to consultation with the British and Soviet Governments and without prejudice to our pledge that ultimately all the Italians will be able to express their will on the issue.

2. *Territorial Dispositions and Reparations.* Should the question be raised, we should not agree directly or indirectly at this time to final disposition of any Italian territories, colonies or fleet, or to boundary rectifications or final claims against Italian assets or to any interim arrangements prejudicing the final settlement. It is considered desirable to reserve all of these questions for the general peace settlement at which time all the United Nations will be in a better position to judge Italy's contribution to their war effort.

3. *Progress of Defascistization in Italy.* The threat of the purge continues to be a paralyzing factor in Italian public life, affecting even the police force and army. The recent crisis was largely due to disagreement over the purge, Bonomi refusing to accede to Communist demands for control of the program. The conflict between those who desire to place the purge in non-partisan judiciary hands and those who wish to retain political control continues.

The Moscow Declaration called for the removal of "all Fascist or pro-Fascist elements . . .<sup>5</sup> from the administration and from institutions and organizations of a public character."<sup>6</sup> It was recognized that as long as active military operations continued, the time of application of the various principles contained in the declaration would be determined by the Commander-in-Chief under directives from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. We should like to see the purge program completed quickly but with absolute impartiality. Defascistization should not become the political instrument of any group to the detriment of the war effort and of Italian recovery. A further Allied declaration on defascistization at this time would probably aggravate an already serious situation.

4. *Use of Allied Forces to Support Italian Government in Event of Civil War.* This Government should support, by force if necessary, any truly representative Italian Government during such period as Italy continues to be a theatre of combined Anglo-American military responsibility.

<sup>5</sup> Points appear in the original.

<sup>6</sup> For the text of the Moscow Declaration Regarding Italy (November 1, 1943), see *Decade*, pp. 12-13.

It may be assumed that any Italian Government in office would possess the representative requisites which the Allied Governments would have considered essential before according it recognition in the first instance. Nevertheless we should reexamine the composition of any government carefully, from the standpoint of its representative character, in the event of crisis requiring Allied armed assistance to support its authority. Our best measure would be the Italian Committee of National Liberation.

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## THE ROLE OF FRANCE

Matthews Files

*The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)*<sup>1</sup>

[Excerpt]<sup>2</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] November 10, 1944.

### MEMORANDUM

#### PREPARATION FOR BIG THREE MEETING

2. There is another matter which should be brought to the attention of the President and that is the request of the British Embassy here for our opinion as to whether France, Belgium, and Holland should be rearmed at this time with a view to (a) permitting their troops to take part in the occupation of Germany and (b) to making those countries militarily strong within the British idea of a "defensive" confederation composed of Great Britain and the Western European countries. We have asked the opinion of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and find that from a purely military point of view they are in favor of this rearming. The British propose that they rearm the Dutch and the Belgians and that we undertake to rearm the French to an extent of somewhere between eight and twelve divisions. This would be all new armament and supplementary to the rearming of the several French divisions we have provided so far and which are now in action. The British say that the divisions we have already armed would not be suitable for the occupation of Germany because they are colonial and colored troops and that new divisions formed of recruits from metropolitan France should be activated for this new purpose. The President would have to decide whether, from the point of view of major policy, we wish to rearm France. This new rearming would, of course, be carried out on the basis of cash payment and not lend-

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<sup>1</sup> Carbon copy.

<sup>2</sup> For other excerpts from this memorandum, see *ante*, pp. 42, 47-48.

lease, as it would be for post-war and not during the war operations. Doc Matthews will give you any further details on this question.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 16 November 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Top Secret. Number 822.<sup>2</sup>

3. Thank you for your kind wishes about the Paris-De Gaulle trip.<sup>3</sup> I certainly had a wonderful reception from about half a million French in the Champs Élysées and also from the party opposition centre at the Hôtel de Ville. I reestablished friendly private relations with De Gaulle, who is better since he has lost a large part of his inferiority complex.

4. I see statements being put out in the French press and other quarters that all sorts of things were decided by us in Paris. You may be sure that our discussions on important things took place solely on an *ad referendum* basis to the three great powers, and of course especially to you who have by far the largest forces in France. Eden and I had a two-hours talk with De Gaulle and two or three of his people after luncheon on the 11th. De Gaulle asked a number of questions which made me feel how very little they were informed about anything that had been decided or was taking place. He is of course anxious to obtain full modern equipment for eight more divisions which can only be supplied by you. SHAEF reasonably contends that these will not be ready for the defeat of Germany in the field and that shipping must be devoted to the upkeep of the actual forces that will win the battles of the winter and spring. I reinforced this argument.

5. At the same time I sympathize with the French wish to take over more line, to have the best share they can in the fighting or what is left of it, and there may be plenty, and not to have to go into Germany as a so-called conqueror who has not fought. I remarked that this was a sentimental point which ought never the less to receive consideration. The important thing for France was to have an army prepared for the task which it would actually have to discharge,

<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

<sup>2</sup> Paragraph 2 of this telegram is printed *ante*, p. 15.

<sup>3</sup> The reference is to Roosevelt's No. 648, of November 14, 1944, *ante*, p. 14.

namely their obligation first to maintain a peaceful and orderly France behind the front of our armies, and secondly to assist in the holding down of parts of Germany later on.

6. On this second point the French pressed very strongly to have a share in the occupation of Germany not merely as subparticipation under British or American command but as a French command. I expressed my sympathy with this, knowing well that there will be a time not many years distant when the American armies will go home and when the British will have great difficulty in maintaining large forces overseas, so contrary to our mode of life and disproportionate to our resources, and I urged them to study the type of army fitted for that purpose, which is totally different in form from the organization by divisions required to break the resistance of a modern war-hardened enemy army. They were impressed by this argument but nevertheless pressed their view.

7. I see a Reuter message, emanating no doubt unofficially from Paris, that it was agreed France should be assigned certain areas, the Ruhr, the Rhineland, etc., for their troops to garrison. There is no truth in this and it is obvious that nothing of this kind can be settled on such a subject except in agreement with you. All I said to De Gaulle on this was that we had made a division of Germany into Russian, British and United States spheres: roughly, the Russians had the east, the British the north and the Americans the south. I further said that, speaking for His Majesty's Government, the less we had of it the better we should be pleased and that we would certainly favour the French taking over as large a part as their capacity allowed, but that all this must be settled at an inter-Allied table. I could of course issue something which would be a disclaimer of any loose statements made by Reuter, but you may not think this necessary in view of the obvious facts. I am telegraphing to U. J. in the same sense. We did not attempt to settle anything finally or make definite agreements.

8. It is evident however that there are a number of questions which press for decision at a level higher than that of the high commands, without which decisions no clear guidance can be given to the high commands. Here is another reason why we should have a triple meeting if U. J. will not come, or a quadruple meeting if he will. In the latter case the French would be in on some subjects and out on others. One must always realize that before five years are out there must be made a French army to take on the main task of holding down Germany. The main question of discussion between Eden and Bidault was Syria, which was troublesome, lengthy and inconclusive but primarily our worry.

9. I thought I would give you this account at once in case of further tendentious statements being put out in the press.

10. I thought very well of Bidault. . . . He made a very favourable impression on all of us and there is no doubt that he has a strong share in the power. Giraud was at the banquet apparently quite content. What a change in fortunes since Casablanca. Generally I felt in the presence of an organized government, broadly based and of rapidly-growing strength, and I am certain that we should be most unwise to do anything to weaken it in the eyes of France at this difficult, critical time. I had a considerable feeling of stability in spite of communist threats, and that we could safely take them more into our confidence. I hope you will not consider that I am putting on French clothes when I say this. Let me know your thoughts. I will cable you later about the meeting and the meat.

PRIME

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>[Excerpts]<sup>2</sup>TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] 18 November 1944.

Number 649, Personal and Top Secret from the President for the Prime Minister.

Regardless of available shipping and availability of material in the United States, I have no authority at present to equip an eight division post war French army. I, of course, sympathize with the French point of view and hope that we may all be able to help her meet post war responsibilities. You know, of course, that after Germany's collapse I must bring American troops home as rapidly as transportation problems will permit. . . .

ROOSEVELT

<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.<sup>2</sup> Other portions of this telegram are printed *ante*, pp. 16-17.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>[Excerpts]<sup>2</sup>

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 19 November 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, Personal and Top Secret number 825.

<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.<sup>2</sup> Other portions of this telegram are printed *ante*, p. 17.

6. Para two of your 649<sup>3</sup> causes me alarm. If after Germany's collapse you "must bring the American troops home as rapidly as transportation problems will permit" and if the French are to have no equipped post-war army or time to make one, or to give it battle experience, how will it be possible to hold down western Germany beyond the present Russian occupied line? We certainly could not undertake the task without your aid and that of the French. All would therefore rapidly disintegrate as it did last time. I hope, however, that my fears are groundless. I put my faith in you.

PRIME

<sup>3</sup> *Supra.*

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>[Excerpts]<sup>2</sup>TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] 26 November 1944.

Number 658. Top Secret and Personal from the President for the Prime Minister.

In regard to paragraph six of your 825,<sup>3</sup> there should be no difficulty for us in equipping so much of a French occupation force as they may need in a disarmed Germany from the military equipment that we will take from the German Army when it surrenders or is destroyed.

In any event, I have at the present time no authority under which it would be possible for me to equip any post-war foreign army, and the prospect of getting such authority from the Congress is more than doubtful.

ROOSEVELT

<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.<sup>2</sup> Other portions of this telegram are printed *ante*, p. 18.<sup>3</sup> *Supra.*

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>[Excerpts]<sup>2</sup>

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 27 November 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Top Secret Number 834.

3. Your last paragraph.<sup>3</sup> We have not got to this point yet and I agree with you we should collect a good many arms from the Germans.

<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.<sup>2</sup> Other portions of this telegram are printed *ante*, p. 19.<sup>3</sup> *Supra.*

Still, I think when American divisions begin to return home there would be a strong case for their leaving some of their heavy weapons and equipment behind for the French to take over the job.

PRIME

Roosevelt Papers

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

Strictly Confidential and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to President Roosevelt.

According to all data General De-Gaulle and his friends who arrived in the Soviet Union, will put two questions.

1. About the conclusion of Franco-Soviet pact of mutual assistance similar to Anglo-Soviet pact.<sup>2</sup>

It is difficult for us to object. But I would like to know your opinion on this question. I ask you to give me your advice.

2. Probably General De-Gaulle will raise a question about the change of the eastern frontier of France with the expansion of the French frontier to the left bank of the Rhine. It is also known that there is a project about the establishment of the Rhine-Westphalian region under the international control.

It is possible that this control provides the participation of France. Thus the proposal of the French concerning the shift of the frontier to the Rhine will compete with the project of establishment of the Rhine region under the international control.

I ask your advice on this question as well.

I sent a similar message to Mr. Churchill.<sup>3</sup>

DECEMBER 2, 1944.

<sup>1</sup> Apparently transmitted by the Soviet Embassy, Washington.

<sup>2</sup> Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed at London May 26, 1942. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 26, 1942, vol. VII, pp. 781-783.

<sup>3</sup> Printed in Churchill, pp. 256-257.

Roosevelt Papers

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to President Franklin Roosevelt.

The meeting with General De-Gaulle gave the possibility for the friendly exchange of opinions on the questions of Franco-Soviet relations. In the course of the conversation, as I had supposed, General De-Gaulle touched two main questions: about the frontier of

<sup>1</sup> Apparently transmitted by the Soviet Embassy, Washington.

France on the Rhine and about the conclusion of Franco-Soviet pact of mutual assistance similar to the Anglo-Soviet Treaty.

As to the frontier of France on the Rhine I expressed the idea that this question cannot be solved without knowledge and consent of our main Allies, whose forces are carrying on the struggle for liberation against the Germans on the French territory. I stressed the complexity of the solution of this question.

In connection with the proposal of Franco-Soviet pact I pointed out the necessity of close study of this question, the necessity of clarification of juridical nature of such pact, in particular such question as who will ratify this pact in France under the present conditions. Thus the Frenchmen should still give some explanations which we have not yet received from them.

In sending you this message I would appreciate your reply and your comments on these questions.

Similar message I sent to Mr. Churchill.<sup>2</sup>

I send you my best wishes.

DECEMBER 3, 1944.

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<sup>2</sup> Printed in Churchill, p. 257.

Roosevelt Papers

*The President's Chief of Staff (Leahy) to the President*

[WASHINGTON,] 5 December 1944.

Admiral Leahy to the President:

Stettinius suggests that the following be sent to Prime today:

President to Prime.

I have received from U. J. messages dated second and third December<sup>1</sup> regarding his talks with de Gaulle and am informed he sent you identical messages.

I would like to have your views before I reply to Stalin. Roosevelt.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>2</sup> A White House notation on the original reads: "Sent to PM as No. 667."

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 6 December 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and Top Secret Number 846.

I have replied as follows to Stalin's enquiry for my advice on the two questions raised with him by De Gaulle:—

"1. Your telegram about De Gaulle's visit and the two questions he will raise. We have no objection whatever to a Franco Soviet

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.



fact of mutual assistance similar to the Anglo Soviet pact. On the contrary, His Majesty's Government consider it desirable and an additional link between us all. Indeed, it also occurs to us that it might be best of all if we were to conclude a tripartite treaty between the three of us which would embody our existing Anglo Soviet treaty with any improvements. In this way the obligations of each one of us would be identical and linked together. Please let me know if this idea appeals to you as I hope it may. We should both of course tell the United States.

2. The question of changing the eastern frontier of France to the left bank of the Rhine or alternatively of forming a Rhenish-Westphalian province under international control, together with other alternatives ought to await settlement at the peace table. There is, however, no reason why, when the three heads of government meet, we should not come much closer to conclusions about all this than we have done so far. As you have seen, the President does not expect De Gaulle to come to the meeting of the three. I would hope that this could be modified to his coming in later on when decisions, especially affecting France, were under discussion.

3. Meanwhile, would it not be a good thing to let the European Advisory Commission sitting in London, of which France is a member, explore the topic for us all without committing in any way the heads of governments?

4. I am keeping the President informed."

2. There seems much to be said for a tripartite Anglo Franco Soviet pact. In that way we can be sure that our mutual obligations to each other are harmonised from the beginning. Public opinion too would think such a joint agreement more satisfactory than an arrangement whereby relations between the French and ourselves were governed by agreements which each of us had entered into separately with Russia.

3. I should welcome your views.

PRIME

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Roosevelt Papers

*The President's Chief of Staff (Leahy) to the President*

[WASHINGTON,] 6 December 1944.

For the President from Admiral Leahy.

The following quoted reply to Stalin approved by State Department is forwarded for your consideration.

I think it should be quoted to Prime for his information. We are now preparing a draft reply <sup>1</sup> to Prime's 846.<sup>2</sup>

"Personal and Secret from the President to Marshal Stalin.

Thank you for your two informative messages of December 2 and December 3.

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<sup>1</sup> The reply as sent is printed *infra*.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

In regard to a proposed Franco-Soviet pact along the lines of the Anglo-Soviet pact of mutual assistance, this Government would have no objection in principle if you and General de Gaulle considered such a pact in the interests of both your countries and European security in general.

I am in complete agreement with your replies to General de Gaulle with regard to the post-war frontier of France. It appears to me at the present time that no advantage to our common war effort would result from an attempt to settle this question now and that its settlement subsequent to the collapse of Germany is preferable.”<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> This message was transmitted without change subsequently the same day, and it was quoted in a telegram of Roosevelt to Churchill of even date, printed in Churchill, pp. 258-259.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

[WARM SPRINGS, GEORGIA,] 6 December 1944.

Number 670, Top Secret and Personal from the President for the Prime Minister.

Your 846.

You will have seen from my reply<sup>2</sup> to Stalin on his talks with De Gaulle that our views are identical on the two questions which he raised.

I still adhere to my position that any attempt to include De Gaulle in the meeting of the three of us would merely introduce a complicating and undesirable factor.

In regard to your suggestion to Uncle Joe that the question of France's postwar frontiers be referred to the European Advisory Commission I feel that since the Commission is fully occupied with questions relating to the surrender of Germany, it would be a mistake to attempt to bring up at this stage before it any questions of postwar frontiers. It seems to me preferable to leave this specific topic for further exploration between us.

I fully appreciate the advantages which you see in a possible tripartite Anglo-Franco-Soviet pact. I am somewhat dubious, however, as to the effect of such an arrangement on the question of an international security organization to which, as you know, I attach the very highest importance. I fear that a tripartite pact might be interpreted by public opinion here as a competitor to a future world organization, whereas a bilateral arrangement between France and the Soviet Union similar to the Soviet-British Pact would be more understandable. I realize, however, that this is a subject which is of primary concern to the three countries involved.

ROOSEVELT

<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

Roosevelt Papers

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt*Translation <sup>1</sup>

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to President Franklin Roosevelt.

Thank you for your reply <sup>2</sup> on the French question. Together with General De-Gaulle we came to a decision that the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet Pact of mutual assistance will be beneficial to the cause of the French-Soviet relations as well as for the European security in general. Today the Franco-Soviet Pact was signed.<sup>3</sup>

As to the post-war border of France, the consideration of this question, as I have already written to you,<sup>4</sup> has been postponed.

DECEMBER 10, 1944.

<sup>1</sup> Appears on the original.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 290-291.

<sup>3</sup> For the text in translation, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 7, 1945, vol. XII, pp. 39-40.

<sup>4</sup> Message of December 3, 1944, *ante*, pp. 288-289.

740.0011 EW/1-245: Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET  
US URGENT

PARIS, January 2, 1945—7 p. m.  
[Received January 3—4:31 a. m.]

16. General de Gaulle asked me this morning to send a letter (which I am transmitting by air) to President Roosevelt and he suggested that I telegraph the text thereof.

The letter reads in translation as follows:

“Mr. President, events have proved that we will not defeat Germany completely without throwing in new forces; now, France, in spite of the loss or absence of 3,000,000 men, is in a position to increase her military forces powerfully and rapidly. I might add that she ardently desires to do so.

We are trying to put our armament factories back into operation. But this takes a great deal of time because our machine tools have seriously suffered and above all we lack raw materials.

You have already furnished us in North Africa armament and equipment for eight divisions. It is an effort which I believe you know was not lost.

You have recently agreed to send United States armament and equipment for eight divisions. Thank you most sincerely, but I ask you, in our common interests, to hasten the shipment of this material, all of which the French Army is in a position to use on the battlefield within the next three months.

If I were sure that you would afterwards send us more armament and equipment material, and if I could know in advance, even approximately, the quantities, the nature and the rhythm of these shipments,

this information would be of great assistance to the French Government in preparing its plans for mobilization.

We could have before the end of this year about 50 good French divisions if we were able to arm and equip them. If you could give me a favorable reply in principle, all details could be settled with your technical services by General Juin, Chief of the General Staff of National Defense, whom I would send at once to Washington.

With my deeply sincere wishes for this year 1945 which will be hard but glorious for our two countries, I beg of you to accept, Mr. President, the expression of my feelings of devoted friendship, De Gaulle."

(I assume in paragraph four he is speaking of the conversations mentioned in my 1146, December 30, 6 p. m.)<sup>1</sup>

CAFFERY

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<sup>1</sup> 740.0011 EW/12-3044; not printed.

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740.00119 EAC/1-445

*The Secretary of State to the President*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 4, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposals Regarding French Participation in Certain Tripartite Plans for the Occupation of Germany.

The Embassy at London reports that the French representative on the European Advisory Commission has circulated a memorandum giving the views of his Government concerning the instrument of surrender for Germany, the protocol and amendment on the zones of occupation in Germany, and the agreement on control machinery.<sup>1</sup> The memorandum expresses approval of these agreements but specifically advances the following five proposals:

- (1) French participation in the Supreme authority of Germany.
- (2) French participation in signing the instrument of surrender.
- (3) Allocation to the French Army of a zone of occupation in Germany and a part of greater Berlin.
- (4) Substitution of quadripartite for tripartite agencies in the agreement on control machinery.
- (5) Preparation of a French text of the instrument of surrender to be equally authentic with the Russian and English texts.

Subject to the approval of the military authorities, it is recommended that this Government approve the French requests. The following reasons suggest this course.

It is in the interests of the United States to assist France to regain her former position in world affairs in order that she may increase her contribution in the war effort and play an appropriate part in

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, pp. 113-118, 118-123, and 124-127 respectively.

the maintenance of peace. The Dumbarton Oaks proposal that France should in due course become one of the five permanent members of the Security Council was a natural corollary of this policy. Furthermore, France's vital interest in the solution of the German problem and the realization of the part she will inevitably play in maintaining the future peace of Europe were acknowledged in the statement made on November 11, 1944 by the Acting Secretary of State when France was invited to become a full member of the European Advisory Commission.<sup>2</sup> In the circumstances it was obviously only a question of time when France would put forward the requests now under consideration.

There is every likelihood that the British and Soviet Governments will support the French. Consequently, disapproval by this Government would probably result in our being placed in the position of being the only Government to stand in the way of French aspirations. It would seem the part of wisdom to accept the proposals now, when credit can be obtained for that action, rather than to wait until it is made to appear that the concessions are won from us grudgingly.

Acceptance of full French participation will probably prove popular with the other small countries of Europe which profess to fear the results of a peace imposed by non-European powers.

Acceptance of the proposals now may help to create a cooperative spirit among the French who may as a consequence be less inclined to raise objections to many of the arrangements which have already been agreed to.

This Government may well wish, after the early period of occupation, to withdraw a considerable proportion of its troops from Germany. It would be logical to assume that they would be replaced by French forces and this replacement is likely to be facilitated if the French are fully associated with plans for the occupation from the outset.

It can be justifiably argued that the French requests are out of all proportion to France's power today and that the acceptance of a fourth country on an equal basis may only serve to make more complicated an already complex problem. It is not believed, however, that these considerations can outweigh the arguments in favor of the move. In the long run this Government will undoubtedly gain more by making concessions to French prestige and by treating France on the basis of her potential power and influence, than we will by treating her on the basis of her actual strength at this time.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

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<sup>2</sup> See Department of State *Bulletin*, November 12, 1944, vol. XI, p. 583.

740.00119 EAC/1-245

*The Secretary of State to the President*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 5, 1945.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposals Regarding French Participation in Certain Tripartite Plans for the Occupation of Germany.

In my previous memorandum on the above subject I indicated that the French Provisional Government, through its representative on the European Advisory Commission, had put forward five specific proposals, the purposes of which were to place France on a footing of equality with the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union with regard to German affairs.

I recommended that subject to the approval of our military authorities, this Government approve the French request. The views of the War and Navy Departments are being sought through the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

A subsequent telegram from the Ambassador at London (No. 59 of January 2, 1945<sup>1</sup>) states that the British Government has considered the French memorandum and, through its representative on the European Advisory Commission, approved the French proposals in principle, at the same time reserving its final position until it has had an opportunity to examine the draft amendments to the existing agreements which the French intend to present.

I think that it would be useful if we could take the same position at an early date prior to detailed consideration with the War and Navy Departments of the specific French proposals when they are received.

Ambassador Winant states that so far M. Massigli has taken a helpful part in the discussions of the European Advisory Commission.

E. R. STETTINIUS, Jr.

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<sup>1</sup>Not printed.

740.00111 EW/1-1645

*The Secretary of State to the President*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 18, 1945.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: French Request for Participation in Big Three Meeting

I am transmitting herewith a copy of a telegram from Caffery setting forth the full text of the formal request of the French Provisional Government that it be permitted to participate in the forth-

coming conference of representatives of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

cc to Mr. Grew and Mr. Bohlen

[Enclosure]

*The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

PARIS, January 16, 1945—noon.

[Received January 17—7:12 a. m.]

215. Reference my telegram 214,<sup>1</sup> January 16, 9 a. m.

The Provisional Government of the French Republic has learned through public information of a proposed conference between the representatives of Great Britain, the United States of America and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for the purpose of determining precisely the conditions of their cooperation in the war.

In this connection the Provisional Government of the French Republic believes it should bring to the attention of the Government of the United States of America the following observations: The Military operations in the West are taking place at the present time on French territory or in the immediate neighborhood of its frontiers. France is making to the full extent of its present possibilities, an important and increasing contribution thereto, not only by its land, sea and air armed forces, but also by certain resources indispensable to the struggle, especially its means of transport and its ports.

Moreover, it appears, in the light of recent military events, that the continuation of the struggle to victory necessitates a constantly increasing participation of France in the common war effort. This participation cannot be assured under satisfactory conditions without a revision of the program of production, supply and transport which are [is] in effect at the present time between the Allies, a revision which cannot be advantageously undertaken without the direct participation of the Provisional Government of the French Republic.

Moreover, it must be observed that the conferences held between the other great allied powers lead these to decide in advance, without the participation of France, the settlement of certain questions of a political or economic character which, however, interest France directly or indirectly, in which case the Provisional Government of the French Republic evidently could not consider itself bound by any of the decisions taken without it and, consequently, such decisions lose some of their value.

Independently of motives of high political and moral propriety, it therefore appears opportune to the Provisional Government of the French Republic to make it known that its participation in such conferences is, in its eyes, necessary in matters relating to problems

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. Telegram 214 gave the "substance of points made in" the French note of January 13, the text of which is herein set forth in translation. This note was delivered by Bidault to Caffery, and also to the British and Soviet Ambassadors, Duff Cooper and Bogomolov, on the evening of January 15. (740.0011-EW/1-1645.)

concerning the general conduct of the war, as well as those, the settlement of which concerns the future of peace—problems in which the responsibility of France is obviously engaged.

The Provisional Government of the French Republic cannot doubt that its point of view will be shared by the other great allied powers.

January 13, 1945.

CAFFERY

EUR Files

*The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 19, 1945.

With reference to your coming conversation with the President on Sunday with regard to French views on the Rhineland and on a French zone of occupation in Germany, the following may be of use:

I *General*. You will recall that the French have proposed, and the President has already approved in principle, the following:

- a) French participation in the supreme authority in Germany.
- b) French participation in signing the German instrument of surrender.
- c) Allocation to the French army of a zone of occupation in Germany and a part of greater Berlin.
- d) Substitution of quadripartite for tripartite agencies in the agreement on control machinery.
- e) Preparation of a French text of the instrument of surrender to be equally authentic with the Russian and English texts.

In a note dated January 13,<sup>1</sup> the French have formally notified the American, British and Soviet Governments of their desire to participate in the coming "Three Power" conference. We have no knowledge of any decision which may have been reached by the British and Soviet Governments regarding this request. It can be safely assumed, however, that the British will inform the French that they are favorably disposed. If the Soviet Government were sure that we would oppose an invitation to General de Gaulle, it can also be assumed that they would take a similar line with the French in order to leave us with the onus.

II *French Zone of Occupation in Germany*. So far, the French have given no indication concerning the boundaries of the zone that they would like to have, although they have indicated informally that they would be satisfied with a small zone at the outset, provided it was made clear that this zone could be expanded at a later date. It seems safe to assume, however, that they will eventually wish to occupy all German territory touching the boundaries of France, and

<sup>1</sup>See *supra*.



they may well seek to occupy all German territory up to the Rhine. This would involve taking over a part of the British zone and a part of the American Zone as presently envisaged (a map showing these zones is attached<sup>2</sup>). While such a solution would appear logical it would present a problem with respect to our communications with the American zone, since to reach it we would have to pass through either the British or French zone.

When he was in Paris, Mr. Churchill informed General de Gaulle that he would be willing to cede "a small part" of the British zone to the French, and expressed a hope that the United States would be willing to do the same.

III *French Views on the Rhineland.* Only last week General de Gaulle informed Ambassador Caffery that France is not interested in annexing German territory, but firmly hopes that an international organization, in which France will play a prominent part, will be set up for governing the well-known Rhine regions. General de Gaulle added that within that region no semblance of war industry or near war industry would be retained. This is the same view which Foreign Minister Bidault has expressed over a considerable period of time. It should be borne in mind, however, that as long ago as July 10, 1944, General de Gaulle stated in Washington that "the flag of the French army" will have to fly over the Rhineland for a long time, and that on November 21, Mr. Bidault publicly referred to the Rhine as "this French river". Furthermore, Ambassador Winant reports that in the opinion of all British officials who have studied the so-called "Massigli Plan", the French proposals involve separatism and "can only be considered seriously on that basis".

It is possible that the French have not yet definitely formulated their views on the Rhineland. It is also likely that even if they favored annexation, they would deem it prudent not to put forward such an extreme claim at this time. It is clear, however, that they at least envisage a military occupation of so long duration that it might easily lead to annexation if the French consider that feasible in the light of future developments.

Although there are increasing indications, (in spite of official denials) that the French are thinking of the Rhineland in terms of eventual assimilation, it is believed that as far as the Ruhr is concerned they may be satisfied with the establishment of some form of permanent international control in which France will, of course, have an important part.

H. F. M[ATTHEWS]

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<sup>2</sup> Not reproduced.

851.20/1-2745

*The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Ambassador in France  
(Caffery)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 27, 1945.

328. Please hand the Minister for Foreign Affairs the following letter from the Acting Secretary of State:

"I wish you to know promptly that General de Gaulle's recent letter to the President with regard to the further arming of French forces, which has been received from Ambassador Caffery, is deeply appreciated and is now before the United States Chiefs of Staff for their consideration and advice. It is hoped that a definitive reply to General de Gaulle's letter may soon be possible.

"In this interim manner, however, I wish to assure you that this Government fully understands the fervent desire of the French Government to contribute to the fullest extent possible to the defeat of Germany. The French forces already fighting at the side of their allies are making an outstanding contribution to the Allied cause. It is a source of gratification to this Government to know that the United States, despite the strain placed upon it of equipping American as well as Allied forces, has been able to assist France by equipping French forces in action against the common enemy. It appreciates General de Gaulle's reference in this regard to the earlier arming of French forces in North Africa and to the recent approval given to the arming of eight additional French divisions. Every effort is being made to send armament and equipment for these latter divisions at the earliest date possible.

"I am sure that you will understand that the assistance we are gladly giving to our many allies places the utmost strain on our production capacity. At the same time, I wish you to know that it is the hope of this Government that further assistance can be given."

GREW

740.0011 EW/1-3045 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET

PARIS, January 30, 1945—5 p. m.  
[Received January 31—10:33 p. m.]

427. Bidault's luncheon was a great success (my telegram 399, January 28, 11 p. m.<sup>1</sup>) Hopkins and I saw Bidault in his office for about 45 minutes before luncheon: Bidault set out the French position on post-war control of Germany which he and General de Gaulle have frequently set over to me before: elimination of all war industry and near-war industry in Germany, an international body to be set up to govern and control the Rhine region, the southern part thereof to be controlled exclusively by the French, the northern part under mixed control; Germany to be reduced to a status making it impossible

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

for her to wage war again ("however," he added, "I would not like to see a red flag over Germany succeeded by a black flag (the pirate's flag of course)").

There was then some discussion in regard to the suggested voting procedure of the security council of the United Nations organization and also of the suggested emergency high commission for liberated Europe. In both cases Bidault was sympathetic.

At luncheon we were with the Ministers of Finance, Communication and Transportation also. Hopkins was in very good form and gave them a frank and useful talk; he repeated what he had said to de Gaulle and Bidault (my telegram 399, January 28<sup>2</sup>) and expanded thereon.<sup>3</sup>

He talked also about the next big three conference; told them that he knew that President Roosevelt would like to see de Gaulle sometime, somewhere before he returned to the United States. After a little discussion during which it was clear that the members of the cabinet were afraid of de Gaulle's reaction, hurt feelings, etc. in case he were not invited to join the big three conference, it was decided to let the matter rest for the moment; and I will endeavor to find out what the score is and keep Hopkins informed so that he can decide whether or not to advise the President to suggest a meeting.

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<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> In his conversation with De Gaulle and Bidault, Hopkins had stressed his desire to assist in restoring cordial relations between the United States and France.

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Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*

FRANCE

SUMMARY

1) *Role in United Nations Councils*

American interests require that every effort be made by this Government to assist France, morally as well as physically, to regain her strength and her influence, not only with a view toward increasing the French contribution to the war effort, but also with a view toward enabling the French to assume larger responsibilities in connection with the maintenance of peace. It is likewise in the interest of this Government to treat France in all respects on the basis of her potential power and influence rather than on the basis of her present strength.

2) *Zone of Occupation in Germany*

The President has already approved in principle five proposals forwarded by the French which are designed to place France on a

footing of equality with the United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union with regard to German affairs. It is not known what zone the French will ultimately ask for, but they have expressed continued interest in the Rhineland and there is every likelihood that they will favor an occupation of the Rhineland over so long a period that it may easily become permanent.

### 3) *Control Machinery for Germany*

One of the French proposals approved by the President in principle is that the French will have an equal part in the control machinery for Germany.

### 4) *Attitude Toward Future German Economy*

Indications are that the French do not wish to see Germany reduced to economic misery since they believe that this would inevitably breed trouble. They do, however, favor the elimination of all German war industries and near war industries. General de Gaulle is also known to favor an international administrative and economic regime for the Ruhr.

## FRANCE

### (1) *Role in United Nations Councils*

Since liberation, France has made enormous strides in regaining her former position of influence and may now be regarded as occupying a place in the United Nations Councils directly after the United States, Soviet Russia, Great Britain and China. This development has been high-lighted by such events as the recognition of General de Gaulle's regime as the Provisional Government of France, the visits of Mr. Churchill to Paris and of General de Gaulle to Moscow, the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet mutual assistance pact, and the adherence of France to the United Nations declaration. Cognizance was also taken of France's new status by her inclusion as a permanent member of the European Advisory Commission, and by the Dumbarton Oaks proposal that she should in due course have a permanent seat on the Security Council.

The best interests of the United States require that every effort be made by this Government to assist France, morally as well as physically, to regain her strength and her influence, not only with a view toward increasing the French contribution to the war effort, but also with a view toward enabling the French to assume larger responsibilities in connection with the maintenance of peace. The vital interest of France in the solution of the German problem and the importance of the part she should and will inevitably play in maintaining the future peace in Europe were publicly acknowledged by this Government on November 11, 1944 when France was invited to accept full membership in the European Advisory Commission.

It is recognized that the French Provisional Government and the French people are at present unduly preoccupied, as a result of the military defeat of 1940 and the subsequent occupation of their country by the enemy, with questions of national prestige. They have consequently from time to time put forward requests which are out of all proportion to their present strength. It is believed that it is in the interest of the United States to take full account of this psychological factor in the French mind and to treat France in all respects on the basis of her potential power and influence rather than on the basis of her present strength.

(2) *Zone of Occupation in Germany*

The United States, United Kingdom, and the U. S. S. R. have agreed that any nation which takes part in military operations against Germany may contribute troops for the occupation. It has been further agreed that Great Britain shall have the right to use "auxiliary contingents" from the other United Nations under British command. This special provision was not to prejudge the more extensive participation by other nations and it was clear from the outset that France would never be satisfied with such a position. In this connection Foreign Minister Bidault declared on October 16 that France should be given a voice in deciding the methods and policies to be followed in occupied Germany, and not merely representation in the forces of occupation.

The French have now proposed the following in the European Advisory Commission:<sup>1</sup>

- (1) French participation in the Supreme authority for Germany.
- (2) French participation in signing the instrument of surrender for Germany.
- (3) Allocation to the French Army of a zone of occupation in Germany and a part of Greater Berlin.
- (4) Substitution of quadripartite for tripartite agencies in the agreement on control machinery.
- (5) Preparation of a French text of the instrument of surrender to be equally authentic with the Russian and English texts.

These proposals have been approved in principle by the President.

So far the French have given no indication concerning the boundaries of the zone of occupation which they would like to have, although they have suggested that they would be satisfied with a small zone at the outset with provision for increasing its size at a later date. It is likely that they will eventually ask for the entire area bounded by the west bank of the Rhine. If granted, long standing French ambitions in this area may lead to more or less open efforts to favor separatism, as was done in 1919. There is no official indication that France at this time desires to annex German territory, and official spokesmen have made

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 293.

the point that the French do not wish to take on an added problem of assimilating large numbers of Germans. Present indications are that French official thought now envisages at least a long military occupation of the Rhineland. In this connection General de Gaulle stated on July 10, 1944 that "the flag of the French Army will have to fly over certain areas for a long occupation". On November 21 M. Bidault referred to the Rhine as "this French river", and General de Gaulle is known to desire that France remain permanently on the Rhine. Other examples can be cited to support the view that although France does not today make a claim for German territory she will favor an occupation of the Rhineland of such length that it might easily become permanent.

There is no indication that the U. S. S. R. has made definite commitments to support the French with regard to the western boundary of Germany, although Stalin is reported to have told de Gaulle that he recognized that the Rhine was a natural frontier.

The British are not known to have made any definite commitments to the French except that Churchill informed de Gaulle that he would be willing to cede "a small part" of the British zone of occupation to France and hoped that the United States would be willing to do the same.

This Government may well wish, after the early period of occupation, to withdraw a considerable proportion of its troops from Germany. It would be logical to assume that they would be replaced by French forces and this replacement is likely to be facilitated if the French are fully associated from the outset with plans for the occupation. In general, this would appear to be entirely in harmony with our efforts to assist the French to gain in strength and influence in order that they may be in a position to assume larger responsibilities in connection with the maintenance of peace.

### (3) *Control Machinery for Germany*

The reasons in favor of permitting the French to have an equal part with the United States, Great Britain and the U. S. S. R. in the control machinery for Germany are similar to those relating to the question of a zone of occupation.

### (4) *Attitude toward Future German Economy*

In a memorandum presented to the European Advisory Committee on January 8,<sup>2</sup> the French Provisional Government called for the determination of a general economic policy towards Germany which will balance, for the better protection of Allied interests, the relation between economic activities maintained for purposes of reparation and activities which must disappear for security reasons, without prejudg-

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

ing the economic status of certain parts of German territory which may be subjected to a special regime.

The French Foreign Minister indicated a short time ago that the Government did not wish to see Germany reduced to economic misery because this would inevitably breed trouble. They did feel, however, that all German war industries and near war industries should be eliminated. General de Gaulle is known to favor an international regime for the Ruhr, to control that important industrial area administratively as well as economically.

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Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*

REARMING OF FRENCH FORCES

Last August the British Embassy raised with the Department of State the question of equipping the armed forces of certain Western European Allies to enable them to maintain security in their own countries and to take part in the occupation of Germany. At that same time the British Chiefs of Staff placed the same proposal before the American Joint Chiefs of Staff. The British proposed that in view of the fact that French ground military units were presently furnished with American arms, that the United States should furnish arms and equipment to the French forces for the purposes indicated. The British, on the other hand, would furnish arms and equipment to the Belgians, Dutch, Norwegians and eventually the Danish. The British proposed that they furnish the French with air equipment. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Department of State that the British proposals, from a military point of view, were acceptable to them, but that the matter should be handled on a Government to Government level and not on a Combined Chiefs of Staff level.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also indicated their view that the Soviet Government should be informed of the proposed action. Two memoranda (copies attached) on the subject were submitted to the President for his approval.<sup>1</sup> That approval has now been received. The armament involved in these proposals is for post-European war delivery and is not involved in the present arrangements now under execution for the equipping of eight additional French divisions. The manner in which the equipment involved in the British proposal is to be supplied to the French Government is one to be worked out with the War Department and not at the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As soon as the mechanical arrangements can be made with

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<sup>1</sup> These memoranda were apparently prepared in the Department of State, not by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

the War Department it is proposed to discuss the matter first with the French authorities at a Government [level?] and at the same time to inform both the British and the Soviet authorities of the action we have taken.

The manner in which payment may be made by the French Government for the supplies thus envisaged is to be determined in discussion with the French authorities.

The British Embassy has informed the Department of State that the Departments of the French Government concerned in this matter are considering the complicated question of how far the mutual aid agreements between the United Kingdom Government and the countries in question are applicable to the equipment and training of Allied forces for the post-hostilities period. The British Embassy states that when final conclusions have been reached the Department of State will be informed. The equipping and training by the United Kingdom Government of Belgian, Norwegian and Dutch forces are at present governed by mutual aid agreements in force between the United Kingdom and the Governments in question.

[Attachment 1]

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

TOP SECRET

Subject: Arming of French Forces.

In late August, the British Embassy approached the State Department, and the British Chiefs of Staff approached the Combined Chiefs of Staff, with reference to the adequate equipment of the forces of the Western European Allies, to enable them to maintain security in their own countries and to take part in occupying Germany. The question was asked whether the United States Government would be willing to re-equip a French Army for such purposes from American sources during the next few years, having in mind that present French land forces are provided with American munitions and matériel. British Chiefs of Staff suggested a continuance of British supply to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium.

The United States Chiefs of Staff, through Admiral Leahy, stated to the Department that there was no objection on military grounds to the division of responsibility proposed but that no commitments should be made that will be rigidly exclusive for the future.

The authority to deliver supplies for security or occupation forces is given by the Lend-Lease Act, and these munitions could be furnished on straight lend-lease or on credit under Section 3 (c) of the Act. We could also furnish such supplies for cash, but cash purchases might use on [up?] dollars needed for civilian supply and reconstruction.



I recommend that we accept the British proposal, but suggest dealing directly with the French. Our present policy toward France is based on the belief that it is in the best interests of the United States that France resume her traditional position as a principal power capable of playing a part in the occupation of Germany and in maintaining peace in Europe. The recruiting and equipping of French land forces would be a natural corollary of this policy, and politically such a move could be portrayed as a further evidence of American friendship for France and a proof of our desire to see her as a strong nation. . . . However, it must be borne in mind that France will make every effort to obtain arms from any source.

We are presently in the process of preparing a lend-lease agreement to be proposed to the French, and under that proposal these military supplies could be furnished on a straight lend-lease basis. However, unless the British are agreeable to furnishing comparable military supplies to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Belgium on a similar basis, we may have to reconsider the implementation of our proposal in order to standardize the terms of our arrangements with the French and those made by the British with the other four countries in question.

I recommend further that the Soviet Government be informed of what the British and the American Governments propose to do, and that it be pointed out that the arming of the Western European Allies is on a non-restrictive basis.

(The foregoing proposal and recommendation are not of course related to the equipment and maintenance of French ground forces by General Eisenhower for utilization in the present campaign against Germany for which the General has full authority.)

[Attachment 2]

#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

TOP SECRET

DECEMBER 27, 1944.

Subject: Desire of British Government to Assist in Re-equipping the French Air Force

A communication has been received from the British Embassy relative to the desire of the British Government to make an immediate offer to the French authorities to assist in re-equipping the French Air Force. A copy of the communication in question is attached herewith.<sup>2</sup>

As indicated in the British *aide-mémoire*, the specific proposal now advanced was considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Leahy informed the Secretary of State that "from the military point of view

<sup>2</sup> Not with the copy of this memorandum in the Briefing Book and not printed.

there is no objection" to the British proposal whereby the British would undertake to equip certain French air units.

The "certain French air units" referred to in Admiral Leahy's letter<sup>3</sup> are the same as those described in the attached *aide-mémoire*.

The British attach importance to proceeding with this matter as soon as possible and in view of the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is recommended that we notify the British that we approve.

The question of our supplying equipment for French land forces, which was the main subject of Admiral Leahy's letter under reference, is being dealt with in a separate memorandum.

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<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

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Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*

FRENCH VIEWS ON THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY

*General Observations*

A very considerable proportion of the French population—possibly a majority—still holds that some Germans are not beyond salvation and that a purged and chastened Germany must eventually regain an important position in Europe. The most consistent exponents of this viewpoint have been the Socialists. However, the Socialists have few illusions about the Germans and regard a European federation as primarily designed to keep Germany in check. During the past year the attitude of the Socialists has hardened on the German problem.

The Communists, while generally avoiding comment on the German problem, have shown some tendency to distinguish between "good" and "bad" Germans.

The elements commonly referred to as Christian Democrats are probably in accord with Foreign Minister Bidault, whose view has been that Germany should not be enslaved but should be rendered incapable of waging another war.

General de Gaulle recently declared that for France, the German problem is "the center of the universe" and the country may be said to be unanimous in demanding effective security measures. There is still considerable division regarding the method of achieving this objective. Dismemberment has considerable support in political Conservative circles, and possibly among the rank and file of Frenchmen as well. The majority of prominent Frenchmen, however, appear to consider dismemberment impractical.

Even those Frenchmen who outspokenly oppose dismemberment appear willing to see extensive territorial transfers carried out. For

instance, it is reliably reported that General de Gaulle was disposed to approve the potential cessation of Trans-Oder region to Poland. The separation of Austria from Germany is also taken for granted and the Provisional Government is committed to the restoration of the Sudeten areas to Czechoslovakia. Some sentiment has been expressed for additional frontier rectification in favor of the Czechoslovakians.

The French agree that Germany, whether dismembered or not, must be subjected to a long military occupation, coupled with rigid economic controls. The exact nature of these controls remains a subject of discussion and has not been greatly clarified by the so-called "Massigli Plan". Foreign Minister Bidault believes that industrial controls might be modeled after those used by the Germans in France and believes that German industries and university laboratories should remain indefinitely under Allied supervision. The Communists have been fulminating against the trusts, but are apparently inclined to leave German industry in German hands. The French Communist line at present appears to harmonize with that followed by the Soviet-sponsored "Free Germany Committee", which holds out the hope that the Germans may continue to run their own affairs once they have repudiated the Hitler regime.

While both Right and Left in France demand direct security measures in Germany, the Socialists are the most inclined to persist in their old faith that collective security, organized on both a European and world scale, will in the long run be of equal importance in curbing German aggression. They are particularly attracted to the idea of a European federation.

With regard to the Rhineland and the Ruhr, virtually every Frenchman who has expressed an opinion favors special measures of some sort in that area. These views range from outright annexation of all or part of the area to measures of international economic control which single out this region from the rest of Germany. Recently, there has been increasing evidence of a desire to sever the Rhineland from main German state.

General de Gaulle's statements on the Rhineland have been growing increasingly frank. Latest information indicates that he prefers outright French annexation rather than French control of an autonomous state. He is believed to favor the establishment of an international control for the Ruhr.

Those who favor international rather than French control of the Rhineland believe that such a policy would commit other nations to the maintenance of French security. They are therefore against annexation by France, either outright or disguised.

### *Conclusions*

Although a consistent French program for defeated Germany is still in process of gestation, the following tentative conclusions seem justified:

1) The French will contend that their security requires, as a minimum, a long occupation and effective economic controls, the nature of which remains to be defined.

2) A general dismemberment of the Reich will not be advocated by the French, although they would not be likely to oppose such dismemberment if it were suggested by other powers. The French will not sponsor the destruction of German industry and the reduction of Germany to an agrarian state.

3) The French seem prepared to approve the transfer of German territory east of the Oder to Poland and the U. S. S. R. and the possible cession of border areas to Czechoslovakia. Extensive territorial transfers in the east would tend to strengthen potential French claims in the west, for the principle of German sovereignty over German populations would thus be partially abandoned, and the French could match any strategic arguments which might apply to cession of territory to the Poles.

4) The present French Government apparently aims to secure the annexation of the Rhineland to France. French policy may, however, remain flexible until the three major powers have clarified their positions as regards Germany. Adapting themselves to circumstances, the French may consider it advisable to propose disguised rather than open annexation. Such a proposal would probably involve the creation of a Rhenish state or "mandated area", separated from Germany by political and economic barriers, and occupied by the French. The latter program might be accompanied by a demand for outright annexation of the Saar and perhaps some adjoining territory. As for the Ruhr, it appears likely that a share in international economic control of the area will satisfy the French.

5) The spirit of French policy toward Germany will be influenced by the distribution of party strength within France. The Provisional Government as now constituted represents what might be described as a moderate-conservative attitude in respect to the German settlement. Strong Communist influence in the Government, if it should appear in the near future, would introduce a relatively unknown factor, since Communist policy toward Germany remains to be defined. Finally, a shift of power to the parties of the less extreme Left (notably the Socialists) would probably result in a more moderate French attitude, especially if an effective international security system is established.

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## PROPOSED UNITED STATES LOAN TO THE SOVIET UNION

861.24/1-345

*The Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) to the President*

[WASHINGTON,] January 1, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: During the last year I have discussed several times with Ambassador Harriman a plan which we in the Treasury have been formulating for comprehensive aid to Russia

during her reconstruction period.<sup>1</sup> We are not thinking of more Lend-Lease or any form of relief but rather of an arrangement that will have definite and long range benefits for the United States as well as for Russia.

Ambassador Harriman has expressed great interest and would like to see the plan advanced. I understand from him that the Russians are reluctant to take the initiative, but would welcome our presenting a constructive program.

You will recall that at Quebec Mr. Churchill showed every evidence that his greatest worry was the period immediately following V-E Day. We have now worked out a Phase 2 Lend-Lease program with the British after two months of very hard work.

I am convinced that if we were to come forward now and present to the Russians a concrete plan to aid them in the reconstruction period it would contribute a great deal towards ironing out many of the difficulties we have been having with respect to their problems and policies.

If a financial plan of this nature interests you at this time, I would appreciate an early opportunity to discuss it with you and Mr. Stettinius.

I am sending Mr. Stettinius a copy of this letter.

Sincerely,

H. MORGENTHAU, JR.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For a Treasury Department memorandum of March 7, 1944, on the proposed loan to the Soviet Union, see *Accessibility of Strategic and Critical Materials to the United States in Time of War and for Our Expanding Economy*, Senate Report No. 1627, 83d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 370-372.

<sup>2</sup> In reply to Morgenthau's message to Stettinius of January 1, 1945, transmitting a copy of this letter, Acting Secretary Grew stated on January 15 that the Department had been considering these matters and would be pleased to discuss them with Morgenthau and members of the Treasury staff (861.50/1-245).

861.24/1-1145:Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, January 4, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received January 4—9:15 p. m.]

29. At Molotov's invitation I called on him last night. He handed me an *aide-mémoire* dated January 3 the substance of which was as follows:

"In Gromyko's note of October 31st concerning the fourth protocol,<sup>1</sup> it was stated that the Soviet Government would put forward for our government's consideration its proposals for a long term credit to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government accordingly wishes to state the following: Having in mind the repeated statements of American public figures concerning the desirability of receiving extensive large

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 155, footnote 2.

Soviet orders for the postwar and transition period, the Soviet Government considers it possible to place orders on the basis of long term credits to the amount of six billion dollars. Such orders would be for manufactured goods (oil pipes, rails, railroad cars, locomotives and other products) and industrial equipment. The credit would also cover orders for locomotives, railroad cars, rails and trucks and industrial equipment placed under Lend Lease but not delivered to the Soviet Union before the end of the war. The credits should run for 30 years, amortization to begin on the last day of the 9th year and to end on the last day of the 30th year. Amortization should take place in the following annual payments reckoned from end of 9th year: First 4 years  $2\frac{1}{2}\%$  of principal; second 4 years  $3\frac{1}{2}\%$ ; third 4 years  $4\frac{1}{2}\%$ ; fourth 4 years  $5\frac{1}{2}\%$ ; last 6 years  $6\%$ . Soviet Government will be entitled to pay up principal prematurely either in full or in part. If the two governments decide that because of unusual and unfavorable economic conditions payment of current installments at any time might not be to mutual interest, payment may be postponed for an agreed period. Annual interest to be fixed at  $2\frac{1}{4}\%$ .

The United States Government should grant to Soviet Union a discount of 20% off the government contracts with firms, of all orders placed before end of war and falling under this credit. Prices for orders placed after the end of the war should be left to agreement between the American firms in question and Soviet representatives."

After reading the memorandum, I stated that there would be no use in my making any general comments thereon and that I would report it at once to my government. I called Molotov's attention, however, to the fact that at the present time our government has authority from Congress to deal only with that part of this proposed credit which concerns the period of Lend Lease. I explained that this authority stops with the termination of hostilities and that thereafter new authority from Congress would be a prerequisite. I said that as he knew we had been trying for months to come to an agreement with the Soviet Government with respect to financing those requests which we had received from them for industrial equipment under the fourth protocol. I pointed out that the interest rate we had offered was  $2\frac{3}{4}\%$  not  $2\frac{1}{4}\%$ . I stated that I did not recall the figures on price adjustments but it was not 20%.

Molotov stated that he understood my position and the necessity for my referring this matter to my government but wished to know whether I personally considered the present moment appropriate for raising this question. I answered, speaking entirely personally, that I thought the moment entirely favorable for arriving at a final agreement about the Lend Lease orders for the war period and for the opening of preliminary discussions on the question of credits after the war. I pointed out that it would take some time to work out an agreement and to obtain the required authority from Congress and that for this reason discussions should be begun before the war was over.

I added that I was sure that my government would wish to divide into two parts the proposal advanced in the memorandum namely the Lend Lease period and postwar. With respect to the Lend Lease period, I was satisfied that our answer would be the final terms that had already been submitted to the Soviet Government.

Molotov agreed that of course the Lend Lease questions must be settled and stated that an answer had been sent through Gromyko that same day but he thought that the remainder of the question should also be given consideration. The future development of Soviet American relations he said must have certain vistas (prospectus) before it and must rest on a solid economic basis. The question of the Lend Lease credit under the fourth protocol was only a small part of the question now before us. The Soviet Government considered the present moment appropriate to raise the broad question of postwar credits in general. The Soviet Government was of course interested in this question itself but it seemed to him that American industry and the American Government must also be interested in knowing in advance what the wishes of the Soviet Union are in this respect.

I asked him over what period the Soviet Government would expect to obtain delivery of these six billion dollars worth of goods. He said over a period of several years, the limits of which would have to be determined by agreement between the two governments.

In conclusion I reminded Molotov that it would take some time to study and work out a solution to this question. In answer to his remark about American industry, I called his attention to the fact that we were now short of labor in the United States and looked at the present Lend Lease requests entirely from the standpoint of giving assistance to the Soviet Union.

I will send the Department in a subsequent cable my comments on this proposal extraordinary both in form and substance.

HARRIMAN

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861.24/1-645

*The Secretary of State to the President*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 8, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Soviet Request for Long-Term Credits

Molotov has presented to Harriman an *aide-mémoire* requesting from the United States six billion dollars in post-war credits to run for thirty years at an interest rate of two and one-half percent. In transmitting the text of the *aide-mémoire*, Harriman has also in the enclosed telegram submitted his own reactions thereto which I believe you would be interested in reading in full.

Harriman indicates his belief that the Russians will expect this subject to be discussed at the forthcoming meeting and states his view that (1) it is to our interest to assist in the development of the economy of the Soviet Union, (2) the Russians should be given to understand that our cooperation in this respect will depend upon their behavior in international matters, and (3) the discussion of these long-term credits should be wholly divorced from the current lend-lease negotiations.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

[Enclosure]

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, January 6, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received January 6—11:30 p. m.]

61. Now that I have recovered from my surprise at Molotov's strange procedure in initiating discussions regarding a post-war credit in such a detailed *aide-mémoire*, I believe the Department will be interested in receiving my reactions. (ReEmbs 29, January 4, 2 p. m.)

One. I feel we should entirely disregard the unconventional character of the document and the unreasonableness of its terms and chalk it up to ignorance of normal business procedures and the strange ideas of the Russians on how to get the best trade. From our experience it has become increasingly my impression that Mikoyan has not divorced himself from his Armenian background. He starts negotiations on the basis of "twice as much for half the price" and then gives in bit by bit expecting in the process to wear us out.

Two. Molotov made it very plain that the Soviet Government placed high importance on a large postwar credit as a basis for the development of "Soviet-American relations". From his statement I sensed an implication that the development of our friendly relations would depend upon a generous credit. It is of course my very strong and earnest opinion that the question of the credit should be tied into our overall diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and at the appropriate time the Russians should be given to understand that our willingness to cooperate wholeheartedly with them in their vast reconstruction problems will depend upon their behavior in international matters. I feel, too, that the eventual Lend-Lease settlement should also be borne in mind in this connection.

Three. It would seem probable that the timing of the delivery of this note had in mind the prospects of "a meeting". I interpret it therefore to indicate that should there be a meeting the Russians would expect this subject to be discussed.



Four. It would seem that the time had arrived when our government's policy should be crystallized and a decision reached on what we are prepared to do provided other aspects of our relations develop satisfactorily.

Five. It is my basic conviction that we should do everything we can to assist the Soviet Union through credits in developing a sound economy. I feel strongly that the sooner the Soviet Union can develop a decent life for its people the more tolerant they will become. One has to live in Russia a considerable period of time to appreciate fully the unbelievably low standards which prevail among the Russian people and the extent to which this affects their outlook. The Soviet Government has proved in this war that it can organize production effectively, and I am satisfied that the great urge of Stalin and his associates is to provide a better physical life for the Russian people, although they will retain a substantial military establishment.

Six. I believe that the United States Government should retain control of any credits granted in order that the political advantages may be retained and that we may be satisfied the equipment purchased is for purposes that meet our general approval.

Seven. I notice in the note<sup>1</sup> recently delivered to the Department by Gromyko accepting the Fourth Protocol the request by the Soviet Government that we should put into production industrial equipment "which the Soviet Government agrees to pay for under the terms of the long term credit". No reference, however, is made to the terms of this credit and I assume therefore that the Soviet Government refers to the terms proposed in the *aide-mémoire* handed me. If this is correct, it would seem that the Soviet Government is attempting to improve our proposals for the three C credit under Lend-Lease<sup>2</sup> in this new proposal for combining the Lend-Lease and postwar credits.

Eight. Quite apart from the question of the postwar credits, I recommend that the Department inform the Soviet Government promptly, either through Gromyko or through me to Molotov, or both: A/ that the credit under Lend-Lease must be segregated from the consideration of postwar credits; B/ that the Department has already given its final term for the credit under three C; C/ that agreement must be reached on the terms of this Lend-Lease credit before any further long range industrial equipment can be put into production. From the experience we have observed in the length of time the Russians are taking to erect the tire plant and oil refineries there is little likelihood that equipment for long range projects now put into production will have a direct influence on the war, and unless the Soviet Government is willing to accept the generous terms of our

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> The reference is to section 3(c) of the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941 (55 Stat. 31), as amended.

offer of financing it would not appear that the equipment for these projects is urgently needed at this time.

HARRIMAN

EE Files

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*The Secretary of the Treasury to the President*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] January 10, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

A \$10 BILLION RECONSTRUCTION CREDIT FOR THE U. S. S. R.

I suggest consideration be given to a financial arrangement with the U. S. S. R. to provide her with \$10 billion credits for the purchase of reconstruction goods in the U. S., with provision for repayment to us chiefly in strategic raw materials in short supply in the U. S.

1. The interest rate could be 2%, amortized over a period of 35 years. A schedule of repayments is attached.<sup>2</sup>

2. The Russians have more than adequate means to assure full repayment. There are three principal sources from which she can obtain the necessary amount of dollars.

(a) Selling to us strategic raw materials which are in short supply in the U. S. because of our depleted natural resources. (See attached memorandum)<sup>3</sup>

(b) Russia will be able to develop substantial dollar assets from tourist trade, exports of non-strategic items to the U. S., and from a favorable balance of trade with the rest of the world.

(c) Russia has a stock of gold estimated at \$2 billion now and is reported to be able to produce from \$150 to \$250 million per year. These gold resources can be used to pay her obligations to the United States to the extent that her other dollar sources are not adequate.

3. An important feature of this proposal is that we will be conserving our depleted natural resources by drawing on Russia's huge reserves for current needs of industrial raw materials in short supply here. We would be able to obtain a provision in the financial agreement whereby we could call upon Russia for whatever raw materials we need without giving a commitment on our part to buy.

4. This credit to Russia would be a major step in your program to provide 60 million jobs in the post-war period.

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<sup>1</sup> Original not found. The source paper is a copy typed in the Department of State.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. The attachments are printed in *Accessibility of Strategic and Critical Materials to the United States in Time of War and for Our Expanding Economy*, Senate Report No. 1627, 83d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 373-376.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

861.24/1-1345

*The Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration (Crowley)  
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 13, 1945.

DEAR ED: Ambassador Harriman's cables of January 4, 1945<sup>1</sup> and January 6, 1945,<sup>2</sup> concerning Molotov's proposal for a long-term credit arrangement with the Soviet Union raise a number of questions which may be discussed with the President at the forthcoming conference.

These questions are so important I would like to suggest that you and I speak with the President about them for a few minutes.

I am enclosing a rough draft of the points which we would like to see made in the reply of this Government to Molotov's proposal and Ambassador Gromyko's note of January 4, 1945.<sup>3</sup>

I know that you appreciate the importance of having the President informed of our united views on this subject.

Sincerely yours,

LEO T. CROWLEY  
*Administrator*

[Enclosure]

DRAFT REPLY TO MOLOTOV'S PROPOSAL FOR LONG-TERM CREDIT  
ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND AMBASSADOR  
GROMYKO'S NOTE ON THE FOURTH PROTOCOL

1) Projects financed under the Lend-Lease Act are part of this Government's war supply program. They must be segregated and processed entirely apart from projects which may be financed under long-term credits for postwar requirements.

2) With regard to the question of long-term credits for postwar projects, this Government is now making a study as to the ways and means of accomplishing this. However, it will require some time to effect the necessary legislative enactments and a determination of the amounts that may be available for this purpose. These are conditions precedent to the formalization of a definite agreement. This Government feels that such long-term credits will be an important element in the development of postwar relations between the two countries and is pleased to receive from the Soviet Union at this time as much information as possible as to the magnitude and scope of Soviet requirements and terms of repayment the Soviet Government is prepared to offer.

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, pp. 310-312.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 313-315.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. This note concerned the supplying of Lend-Lease items under the Fourth Protocol.

3) The proposed amendment to the Master Agreement offered the Soviet Government some months ago provides the only method now possible for this Government to render greater aid to the Soviet Union than is being currently rendered under Protocol arrangements.

4) Within the authority contained in the Lend-Lease Act and taking into account the amount of lend-lease funds available at that time, this Government offered in the proposed amendment the maximum program of projects which could then be undertaken to meet the requirements of the Soviet Government. The terms of credit, the price of the goods and other conditions set forth in the amendment were arrived at after giving due consideration to the views of the Soviet representative, Mr. Stepanov, who registered his non-concurrence. On more than one occasion it was indicated to Mr. Stepanov that the terms offered were final.

5) This Government does not understand Ambassador Gromyko's request that we should put into production industrial equipment which the Soviet Government agrees to pay for under terms of long-term credit, inasmuch as no agreement has been reached with the Soviet Government with respect to the terms of the lend-lease credit offered in the amendment to the Master Agreement. It has been and is the position which this Government must necessarily take that before any further long-range industrial equipment can be put into production under the Lend-Lease Act, agreement must be reached on the terms of the credit proposed in the amendment.

6) Much time has elapsed since the amendment to the Master Agreement was offered to the Soviet Government. Since then, the increased tempo in the war both in Europe and the Pacific has brought about greatly increased demands on the internal economy of this country in the categories of manpower, production facilities and raw materials. The diversion of these to the production of capital goods and semi-finished products to meet Allied requirements has become increasingly difficult.

7) To guide our future approach to these problems we should receive without further delay a definite indication from the Soviet Government as to its acceptance or rejection of the proposed amendment to the Master Agreement. The answer will have a definite bearing on the extent of Soviet requirements it will be possible to include in the war production program for the next fiscal year and on estimates of the required funds now being prepared for early submission to the Congress.

EUR Files

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] January 20, 1945.

MR. SECRETARY: I feel that it would be helpful, in connection with any discussions you may have with the President or Secretary Morgenthau, to have the following comments on the proposals recently made by Mr. Morgenthau<sup>2</sup> in regard to postwar trade with the Soviet Union:

*Proposed 3 (c) supplementary agreement to the Master Lend-Lease Agreement.*

1. In regard to the Treasury proposal that we should now offer the Soviet Government the proposed 3(c) agreement without interest charges, it is felt that, if at this time we should change our ground, it, in all probability, would cause definite repercussions in other political or economic negotiations we may have with the Soviet Government. In this connection, we told the Soviet negotiators, in full good faith and with definite Treasury concurrence, that the last 3(c) proposals we made to them were our final offer, and that because of legal and other grounds, we could not grant them any better terms. If we should now make the same proposals except for the exclusion of interest charges we could not help but give the impression to the Soviet authorities that what we said last summer was not true, and thus we might unwittingly kindle the fire of suspicion which they have had in the past as to our good faith. Moreover, by making this new proposal, we would definitely give the impression that we were most anxious, almost on any terms, to make available postwar goods to the Soviet Union. While we are naturally desirous to increase our trade with the Soviet Union to the maximum, and it is in our interest to do so, it would be tactically harmful to deepen the impression they already have that no matter what happens we are going to have to sell goods to the Soviet Union in order to keep our own economy going.

2. Apparently one of the reasons motivating the Treasury suggestion that the 3(c) agreement should bear no interest rate is tied with certain suggested proposals which may be made to the British and French providing for delivery of certain types of goods on a deferred-payment basis with no interest charges. I understand that in the case of the British these proposals only involve food stuffs which may be in the "pipeline" after the termination of hostilities and therefore would not amount to a great deal, and that the deferred payments, in all probability, would cover a comparatively short period. Moreover, the British are paying for all capital goods now delivered under Lend-Lease including many items offered to the Soviet Government

<sup>1</sup> Ribbon copy, bearing the following notation dated January 22, 1945, from Hayden Raynor to Hiss: "I think you will want to have this with you."

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 315.

in Schedule 1 of the 3(c) agreement (locomotives, freight cars, machine tools, etc.). In regard to the French negotiations, it is understood that Mr. Monnet has suggested arrangements by which they would obligate themselves on a deferred-payment basis to compensate the United States for all capital goods furnished during hostilities as well as subsequently. It will be seen, therefore, that the propositions which may be suggested to the British and French are not comparable to the proposals made under the Soviet 3(c) agreement. In view of this, the French and British proposals would not appear to be precedents for the Soviet case.

For the above reasons, it is felt that we should accept Ambassador Harriman's suggestions that the Soviet Government be informed again that the proposals made in our 3(c) agreement are final.

#### *Postwar Credits.*

In regard to Secretary Morgenthau's proposal to offer the Soviet Government at the present time ten billion dollars at two percent interest coupled with an option to the United States to receive in repayment strategic raw materials, it is believed that the following factors make it impossible at this moment to accept the suggestions:

1. Because of legislative restrictions, it is impossible to offer postwar credit to the Soviet Union until these restrictions have been lifted by Congress.

2. From a tactical point of view, it would seem harmful for us to offer such a large credit at this time and thus lose what appears to be the only concrete bargaining lever for use in connection with the many other political and economic problems which will arise between our two countries. Ambassador Harriman concurs in this opinion.

3. The Soviet Government itself has only proposed a credit of six billion dollars, and there is some question as to their ability to pay interest and amortization charges on a ten billion dollar loan as well as finance future trade after the initial purchases are made. Moreover, there is also some question as to the amount of surplus strategic materials which the Soviet Union will have available for sale abroad, and whether they would be willing to bind themselves categorically to furnish these strategic materials over a long period. Before making any proposals of this kind, careful studies must be made to ascertain the probable amounts of such strategic materials as might be available.

W[ILLIAM] L. C[LAYTON]

[Attachment]

TOP SECRET

#### MEMORANDUM

PROPOSALS MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF TREASURY TO SECRETARY OF STATE REGARDING POSTWAR TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION

During the course of the conversation in Mr. Stettinius' office on January 17, 1945, Secretary Morgenthau and Mr. Harry White of

the Treasury Department outlined the following proposal for postwar trade with the Soviet Union:

Mr. Morgenthau referred to the long delay which had taken place in connection with the negotiations for a 3(c) supplementary agreement to the Master Lend-Lease Agreement by which it was proposed to make available at this time to the Soviet Union certain industrial plants which have both a wartime and peacetime use. He stated that he felt it was too bad more than nine months had passed since negotiations were started and still no agreement had been reached. He attributed this to the fact that we had endeavored to bargain and bicker with the Soviet negotiators instead of making a clear-cut, very favorable proposal which would be considered by the Soviet Government as a concrete gesture of our good will. He added that he did not agree with Ambassador Harriman's suggestions in his telegram no. 61 of January 6, 1945,<sup>3</sup> which recommended that we remain firm in the stand that we have already taken in regard to the 3-(c) negotiations and indicate to the Soviet Government that this continues to be the most favorable offer we could make.

Instead of this course of action, Mr. Morgenthau stated that Treasury experts have been giving consideration to this entire question and have come to the conclusion that we should make new proposals for the 3-(c) agreement which would offer to the Soviet Union the same amount of goods on approximately the same terms except that we should charge them no interest on the credit extended, but on the other hand we should not accept any reduction in cost as proposed by the Soviet Government.

Because of the position we had taken with the Soviet representatives in the 3(c) negotiations, which was to the effect that we could not accept a rate of interest lower than that at which the United States Government could borrow money, and because of the fact that the delays in reaching an agreement with the Soviet Government on this question had been due primarily to the Soviet Government's reluctance to accept the terms offered, Mr. Acheson pointed out the following facts in regard to these negotiations:

He stated that early last year when representatives of the State Department, Treasury, Foreign Economic Administration, and other interested agencies were endeavoring to work out a scheme by which the Soviet Government could be immediately furnished under Lend-Lease industrial plants which took a long time to produce, had a long life, and which could be used for both wartime and peacetime purposes, it had been suggested that we might be able to offer these plants under Lend-Lease on a deferred-payment basis at no interest. This suggestion had, at that time, been vetoed by representatives of the Treasury Department who stated that we could not offer such long-term credits

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<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 313-315.

at a lower rate of interest than that at which the United States Government itself had to pay in order to borrow money. With this criteria [*sic*] in mind, there had been worked out a proposed agreement which was submitted to the Soviet Government on May 24, 1944. Mr. Acheson pointed out that it was not until the Soviet delegate to the Bretton Woods Conference brought up the subject that we received any concrete indication that the Soviet Government was interested in the suggested agreement. Mr. Acheson then gave a brief summary of the protracted negotiations emphasizing the extremely liberal terms offered in the final agreement proposed by us which, however, the Soviet Government has not seen fit as yet to accept. Mr. Morgenthau indicated that, nevertheless, he felt that it would be advisable, from a good will point of view, to make a new 3(c) offer without interest. It was indicated that this matter would be given consideration.

Apart from this proposal for the immediate extension of approximately a billion dollars credit at no interest, Mr. Morgenthau referred to a memorandum to the President prepared by Treasury which proposed the granting of an immediate credit of ten billion dollars to the Soviet Government in order to finance postwar trade.<sup>4</sup> He stated that he felt that we should go beyond the suggestion recently made by the Soviet Government to grant a six billion dollar thirty-year credit at two and one-fourth percent interest by offering them a ten billion dollar thirty-five year credit at two percent interest with the proviso that the United States Government would be given the option to take in re-payment certain strategic materials, a supply of which was becoming greatly depleted in the United States. Mr. Morgenthau indicated that he felt that such a gesture on our part would reassure the Soviet Government of our determination to cooperate with them and break down any suspicions the Soviet authorities might have in regard to our future action.

Mr. Morgenthau suggested to the Secretary that he is of the opinion that they should both suggest to the President that he make such a concrete proposal to Stalin at the forthcoming meeting.

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<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 315.

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861.24/1-645 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 26, 1945—11 p. m.

173. Everyone here—State, Treasury, and FEA—is agreed that the matter of aid to the U. S. S. R. in acquiring industrial equipment of war significance (that involved in the proposed 3-C agreement) must



be separated from true postwar reconstruction credits (your telegrams 29 and 61).<sup>1</sup> Separate telegrams will be sent to you regarding our reply to Ambassador Gromyko's note of January 4,<sup>2</sup> indicating that we will proceed with the Fourth Protocol; and instructing you to reply to Molotov's *aide-mémoire* with special reference to the 3-C agreement. The present message is to provide you with background information regarding Washington views on post-war credit possibilities.

A study prepared in the Department which will be sent to you for comment highlights the following points in Russia's interest in foreign credits:

(a) Russia's war loss is estimated at \$16 billion of fixed capital or about one-quarter of the pre-war total. Inventory losses may total an additional \$4 billion.

(b) It is estimated that Russia with no foreign loans and only limited use of its gold reserves (estimated at \$2-2½ billion) and production (\$200 million a year), plus reparations deliveries, could reattain by 1948 the pre-war level of capital investment.

(c) Thus the U. S. S. R. will be in a position to take a highly independent position in negotiations regarding foreign credits, especially since \$2 billion in credits would only speed up reconstruction by some 3 or 4 months.

(d) Pre-war exports from the U. S. S. R. to the U. S. averaged only \$26 million annually, enough to pay for only limited amounts of capital goods, special machines, and know how.

(e) The annual gold production could service about \$3 billion of credits at 4 percent and 20 years; or \$6 billion at 2 percent and 40 years.

(f) Russia may be expected to borrow only up to the amount which she is sure she can service; only if the terms appear satisfactory to her (she has demanded exceptional terms in the 3-C negotiations); and she will repay unless she feels it politically desirable not to do so.

The Treasury has suggested a \$10 billion credit at 2 percent, 35 years, coupled with an option for United States purchases at reasonable world prices of petroleum and minerals from the Soviets over a like period.

Preliminary views of the Department are that such a proposal can of course be made only after Congressional action of some sort; that it would be preferable to obtain blanket loan authority rather than seek specific loan authorization for the U. S. S. R. or any particular nation; that the rate of interest entails many complications in our relations with other countries, with general Export-Import Bank

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, pp. 310-312, 313-315.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

operations, with proposed transactions of the Bretton Woods bank, and with private investment; that from a tactical point of view it would seem harmful at this time to offer such a large credit and lose what little bargaining exists in future credit extensions; and that the suggested commodity arrangement would probably not be as strong an argument with the Congress as the Treasury believes, would arouse the opposition of petroleum and mineral interests, would not provide a fully distinctive basis for offering special credit terms to the U. S. S. R., and might raise questions of general commercial and commodity policy.

The general matter of credits to Russia has been discussed with the President who has displayed a keen interest and believes that it should not be pressed further pending actual discussions between himself and Marshal Stalin and other Soviet officials. Meanwhile the Department would appreciate your further comments on the Soviet proposal and your views on the Treasury suggestion.

GREW, *Acting*  
W. L. C[layton]

740.0011 EW/1-2745 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State*

[Excerpt]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 27, 1945.

*Post-war credits to Russia.* In the collection of papers given to Hiss on postwar credits and 3-C arrangements with Russia, there are included two draft replies <sup>1</sup> to Ambassador Harriman's cables nos. 29 of January 4 and 61 of January 6.<sup>2</sup> The Treasury having withdrawn its suggestion that new 3-C terms providing for no interest be offered to the Soviet Government, the Department has sent to Kennan the instruction <sup>3</sup> relating to 3-C, suggesting that he should take no action on this telegram until he receives further instructions from the Ambassador or the Department. The other reply <sup>4</sup> providing information relating to postwar credits has also been transmitted with only minor verbal changes. (This is first message from Grew)<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 310-312, 313-315.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>5</sup> i. e., from the Acting Secretary to the Secretary since the departure of the latter from Washington, in this series of messages sent via Army channels.

Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*RUSSIAN REQUEST FOR FINANCING OF ACQUISITIONS OF CAPITAL  
EQUIPMENT DURING AND AFTER THE WARSUMMARY <sup>1</sup>

1. The Russians have requested a \$6 billion credit at 2½% with amortization concluding in the thirtieth year to cover both immediate and true postwar acquisitions of industrial equipment.<sup>2</sup>

2. The Department proposes to inform the Soviets through Ambassador Harriman that no long range industrial equipment can be put into production until agreement be reached on the terms of the lend-lease 3-C agreement which has been under discussion since May 1944, that we desire action on the 3-C agreement before signing the Fourth Protocol (but we should not stand too strongly on this point), and that consideration of postwar credits must be separated from the 3-C negotiations. The Department is now considering with Treasury and FEA proposed final terms.

3. With respect to true postwar credits the Department is considering with the Treasury the lending agency or authority under which such credits might be extended; the effect of extensions of credits to Russia on special terms upon general operations of the Export-Import Bank, the proposed Bretton Woods bank, and possible revival of private lending; the possibility of setting the Russian credit apart by some distinctive feature in order to avoid the establishment of restrictive precedents; and the amount of the credit.

4. The Department believes the U. S. S. R. will contract only such credits as it can service. Current Russian gold production of about \$200 million a year could service the \$6 billion credit on the terms proposed by the Soviets; about \$3 billion on usual Export-Import Bank credits.

5. Postwar credits to the U. S. S. R. can serve as a useful instrument in our overall relations with the U. S. S. R.

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<sup>1</sup> The following note was attached to this summary: "The subjects treated in this memorandum—credits to Russia and the 3-C negotiations—have been merged because current developments have merged them. The present summary is all that can be prepared today as several proposals are under discussion and no policy decisions have been made. Early next week it will be possible to decide whether to give the President a general background with alternative suggestions or whether it will be possible to report that definitive instructions have been sent to Harriman with respect to 3-C and to make inter-agency agreed recommendations to the President on postwar credits."

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, pp. 310-311.

## POST-WAR TRADE POLICY

Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING POST-WAR TRADE POLICY  
(ARTICLE VII OF THE MUTUAL-AID AGREEMENTS)

## SUMMARY

In Article VII<sup>1</sup> we and the British and the Russians pledged ourselves to early agreed action to reduce trade barriers as part of a broad program to maintain high levels of employment and expand the production, consumption and exchange of goods.

The pledge on trade barriers was put in Article VII because it is essential to all the rest: to carry out our own and Britain's full employment programs, to assure the success of the Monetary Fund and International Bank, to make possible eventual repayment of the large loans we will need to extend, directly and indirectly, to the rest of the world.

Unless we and the British get together urgently, while the political and trade situation is favorable, on adequate measures in the field of commercial policy (including cartels and commodity arrangements), there is grave danger that our whole foreign economic program may be undermined. While satisfactory exploratory talks on a commercial-policy plan were held with the British (on the technical level) in late 1943, the British have not appeared eager to resume discussions.

We are convinced that unless you bring your strong personal influence to bear on the Prime Minister and urge him to get these discussions started promptly, on the ministerial level and on a more definitive basis than those held earlier, the British cabinet will continue to postpone these matters indefinitely. This would be fatal to all our hopes.

To date, the Russians have not accepted any of our invitations to conduct exploratory Article VII 'conversations. We are prepared to hold such exploratory talks immediately and when we are ready to have formal discussions with the British we will be in a position to schedule formal discussions with the Russians and others.

*Recommendations*

It is strongly recommended (1) that you point out to Mr. Churchill and Mr. Stalin your personal interest in, and the critical importance and urgency of, commercial-policy measures to implement Article VII; and (2) that you urge them to facilitate the necessary inter-

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<sup>1</sup> i. e., Article VII of the Lend-Lease Agreements. For the text of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom, signed at Washington February 23, 1942, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 241, or 56 Stat. 1433.

governmental discussions preparatory to a United Nations international trade conference.

DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING POST-WAR TRADE POLICY  
(ARTICLE VII OF THE MUTUAL-AID AGREEMENTS)

The status of post-war trade discussions with the British and Russians is as follows:

*With the British*

Informal and exploratory Article VII conversations, covering trade barriers, commodity arrangements and cartels, were held with British experts over a year ago. Although these talks have not been resumed, our Economic Counselor at London is currently sounding out the direction of recent British thinking on the various topics.

When discussions are resumed, they should be on a more definitive and formal basis than the exploratory talks in 1943. What is needed now is a meeting between full delegations, headed by persons of ministerial rank (Mr. Clayton for the U. S. delegation), which will be in a position to speak authoritatively with regard to the policies which their respective governments will support in wider United Nations discussions and before their legislatures.

With regard to the position of the United States in these discussions, the President has already approved the policy recommended by the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy with respect to intergovernmental commodity agreements. The President has also received from the Executive Committee a tentative statement of policy with regard to international cartel practices. The Committee now has under consideration detailed proposals dealing with trade barriers and it is expected that recommendations can be submitted to the President shortly.

Renewal of discussions of these matters with the British as soon as possible is of the greatest importance. However, there is reason to believe that the British cabinet will be reluctant to give the necessary clearance, primarily because of the opposition of a few members to the trade-barrier objectives of Article VII and because of the failure to perceive that these objectives are an essential and integral part of the broader plan, set out in Article VII, for measures "directed to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods." It is believed that even though the majority of the cabinet may be favorable to these discussions, they are unlikely to make a strong stand unless they are convinced that the United States objectives in the trade barrier field are not limited to the State Department but are also shared by the President and have

an important place in his general economic program, and unless the Prime Minister, who has been preoccupied with war and political problems, gives the matter his personal attention.

#### *With the Russians*

Although we have issued repeated invitations, we have made no headway in getting together with the Russians, even on an exploratory basis. We are ready to have exploratory talks with the Russians now, at the technical level. When we are ready to have formal discussions with the British we will also be in a position to schedule formal discussions with the Russians and others.

#### *Recommendations*

1. It is recommended that the President express to Mr. Churchill his strong personal interest in Article VII and that he stress with him the critical importance of early discussions between ourselves and the British, on the more definitive basis indicated above, in preparation for a United Nations trade conference. It is recommended that the President urge upon Mr. Churchill the view that action in the trade-barrier field is essential to the attainment of all our other mutual economic goals: of maintaining high levels of employment here and in other countries, which we, for our part, are determined to do; of assuring, through the International Bank and otherwise, the capital assistance necessary to the adequate development of the world's resources; of helping the devastated areas to get back on their feet and go forward to increased levels of production and consumption and better living standards. These programs mean that the United States will be called upon for substantial credits to the rest of the world. The only way these credits can be justified is by making their eventual repayment possible through increased opportunities for trade. It is obvious that the United States cannot reduce its trade barriers unilaterally—action must be on the joint basis contemplated in Article VII. If that action is to be taken, on the necessary broad scale, it must be taken soon while the political and trade situation is favorable to it. If we delay too long the favorable opportunity which now exists may be lost, and the experience after the last war may be repeated.

2. It is recommended that the President endeavor to obtain the agreement of Mr. Stalin to go forward promptly with exploratory Article VII conversations at the technical level, pointing out to him that we have already had such talks with the British and Canadians and are preparing for more definitive discussions with the British.

## THE TURKISH STRAITS

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 22 October 1944.

[Excerpts]

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Top Secret Number 801.

Para 9. U. J. also raised formally<sup>2</sup> the Montreux Convention, wishing for modification for the free passage of Russian warships. We did not contest this in principle. Revision is clearly necessary as Japan is a signatory and Inonu missed his market last December. We left it that detailed proposals should be made from the Russian side. He said they would be moderate.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels. For other excerpts from this telegram, see *ante*, pp. 10, 159-160, 206, and *post*, p. 400.

<sup>2</sup> In the Churchill-Stalin conversations at Moscow in October.

<sup>3</sup> In reply (No. 632, dated October 22, 1944) Roosevelt commented: "Your statement of the present attitude of U. J. towards war criminals, the future of Germany, and Montreux convention is most interesting. We should discuss these matters together with our Pacific war effort at the forthcoming three party meeting." (Roosevelt Papers.)

Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*

## MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE QUESTION OF THE TURKISH STRAITS

This Government hopes that no question regarding the Turkish Straits will be raised because:

(a) The Montreux Convention (signed July 20, 1936; signatories: Belgium, France, Great Britain, Greece, Japan, Rumania, Turkey, U. S. S. R., Yugoslavia)<sup>1</sup> has worked well, and the Soviet Government so declared to the Turks jointly with Great Britain on August 10, 1941. Non-use of the Straits as an avenue of supply to Russia during this war was due to Axis command of Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and the Aegean, not to the Montreux Convention.

(b) Any major changes in the regime of the Straits probably would violate Turkish sovereignty and affect adversely the strategic and political balance in the Balkans and the Near East. By and large Turkey has been a good custodian of the Straits.

<sup>1</sup> For the text in French, together with an English translation, of this convention regarding the regime of the Straits, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXIII, pp. 213-241.

(c) The Convention was drafted to fit into the League of Nations' collective security system and consequently can be adapted to the Dumbarton Oaks pattern.

This Government might not object if minor changes in the Convention are suggested by the U. S. S. R. (the Great Power primarily at interest), or Great Britain. Such proposals should, of course, be carefully considered by the Navy and War Departments.

No valid claim can be made for altering the Convention so far as merchant vessels are concerned, because, under its provisions, defensively armed merchant vessels of any flag, with any cargo, are free to transit the Straits subject to certain Turkish security provisions.

Under its terms the Montreux Convention can be reconsidered in 1946—it would be preferable to leave all changes until then and to have them made within the framework of the Convention itself.

“Internationalization” of the Straits is not a practical solution at this time because, if that is done, the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal logically should receive the same treatment. Turkey would strongly resist such a proposal.

If asked whether the United States would be willing to participate in a revised Montreux Convention in 1946 or some other future regime of the Straits, the reply might be that we, having in mind Dumbarton Oaks, would be prepared to give sympathetic consideration to the idea.

Note: Navy and War Departments concur with the above.

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## IRAN: OIL CONCESSIONS AND SOVIET PRESSURE

891.6363/10-1044 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

TEHRAN, October 10, 1944—6 p. m.  
[Received October 11—9 :40 a. m.]

749. Prime Minister confirmed to me last night that oil concession negotiations had been postponed until after war (ReEmbstel No. 744, October 9<sup>1</sup>). He further stated he was immediately informing Soviet representatives here as well as representatives of American and British Oil Companies now in Tehran of this postponement.

MORRIS

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



891.6363/10-1044 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 16, 1944—4 p. m.

622. You are requested to inform the Iranian Government (Urtel 749, October 10, 6 p. m.) that the American Government has taken note of the decision of the Iranian Government to postpone all petroleum development negotiations. While the two American firms which have gone to considerable effort and expense in pursuing these negotiations during the past year are naturally disappointed, having been given to understand that the Iranian authorities contemplated entering into a contract at this time, we are confident that the Iranian authorities were acting in good faith. The American Government naturally expects that if and when the Iranian Government is in a position to consider applications for such concessions, the applications of American nationals will receive no less favorable treatment than the applications of the nationals or government of any other country. Furthermore, the American Government expects that the Iranian Government will inform us or the interested American companies immediately the Iranian Government is ready to consider applications. Sent to Tehran. Repeated to London and Moscow.

HULL

891.6363/10-3044 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1944—10 p. m.

2566. You are requested to inform the Soviet authorities that the Government of the United States has observed indications of Soviet annoyance, as demonstrated by articles in the Soviet press and statements by Mr. Kavtaradze, following the recent announcement by the Government of Iran that all negotiations concerning petroleum concessions in Iran have been suspended for the duration.

In this connection the American Government desires to let the Soviet authorities know that the American Embassy in Tehran was instructed<sup>1</sup> some days ago to inform the Iranian Government that the American firms which have been negotiating for an oil concession in southern Iran during the past year, at considerable expense and effort, have naturally been disappointed at the Iranian Government's decision. We have expressed confidence, however, that the Iranian authorities have been conducting these negotiations in good faith,

<sup>1</sup> Department's No. 622 to the American Embassy, Tehran, October 16, 1944; *supra*.

and have let it be known that when negotiations are resumed we expect American firms to be accorded no less favorable treatment than that given to any other foreign national or government.

Our policy in this case is based on the American Government's recognition of the sovereign right of an independent nation such as Iran, acting in a nondiscriminatory manner, to grant or withhold commercial concessions within its territory. We are particularly concerned with the strict application of this policy in Iran, in view of the Declaration signed in Tehran as recently as December 1, 1943, by President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill,<sup>2</sup> containing assurances of respect for Iranian sovereignty. In the light of that Declaration, the American Government would not be able, for its part, to concur in any action which would constitute undue interference in the internal affairs of Iran.

Sent to Moscow. Repeated to Tehran and London.

STETTINIUS  
*Acting*

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<sup>2</sup> *Post*, pp. 748-749.

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761.91/11-244 : Telegram

*The Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the  
Secretary of State*

SECRET

LONDON, November 2, 1944—7 p. m.  
[Received November 2—11:44 p. m.]

9503. In discussing the impasse between the Iranian and Soviet Government on oil concessions, a Foreign Office official today said that the British Government is gravely concerned over the Russian attitude. If the Iranian Government should give in and allow the Russians to have the concession they desire it would simply be a major step in the inclusion of northern Iran permanently in the Russian orbit as a sphere of influence.

The Soviet request for the concession was unlimited in scope, said the official, adding that when the British or Americans negotiate for such concessions they have always stated what royalties they will pay and other details of that nature. The Russians however have never said that they will pay anything to the Iranian Government.

The Foreign Office official continued to describe in the following terms other Russian activities in Iran:

The Soviets have bought up a lot of the less important or cheap newspapers, which of course contain Russian propaganda; and these papers have now taken the attitude of attacking the Persian Prime

Minister over the oil concession troubles. The Anglo-American Soviet Censorship Committee in Iran passes on the news allowed out of Iran and the Russian representative has refused to allow the journalists to send out anything that reflects on the Russian attitude. The official told us in strict confidence that the article in today's London *Times* (ReEmbtel 9505, November 2<sup>1</sup>) was sent out through the British Embassy at Tehran.

GALLMAN

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

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761.91/12-844

*The Secretary of State to the President*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December [6,] 1944.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Soviet-Iranian Relations

As agreed in our recent conversation, I present below for your convenience, a summary of the status of Soviet-Iranian relations and a recommendation as to this Government's attitude.

The British Government has taken up again with the Soviet Government the question of Soviet pressure on Iran which has resulted in the resignation of the Iranian Prime Minister and which, while it appeared to have relaxed for a brief time, is now apparently being renewed. The British are basing their plea for the respect of Iranian sovereignty on the Declaration of Iran of December 1, 1943 <sup>1</sup> and on the tripartite British-Soviet-Iranian treaty.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Eden hopes very much that the American Government will also press the Russians to respect Iranian sovereignty.

We are of course following the developments in Iran with the closest attention, and should be prepared to make representations to the Soviet Government if the situation appears to warrant such a step. I am not yet convinced that we should immediately take up the question with the Russians as the British request but would like to have your approval in advance in order that we may be able to take quick action if that appears necessary.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

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<sup>1</sup> *Post*, pp. 748-749.

<sup>2</sup> For the text of the Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom, Iran, and the Soviet Union, signed at Tehran January 29, 1942, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 21, 1942, vol. vi, pp. 249-252.

761.91/12-844

*The President to the Secretary of State*

[WARM SPRINGS, GEORGIA,] December 8, 1944.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I think this Soviet-Iranian matter should be taken up by Harriman with Stalin in person. The Teheran agreement was pretty definite and my contribution was to suggest to Stalin and Churchill that three or four Trustees build a new port in Iran at the head of the Persian Gulf (free port), take over the whole railroad from there into Russia, and run the thing for the good of all. Stalin's comment was merely that it was an interesting idea and he offered no objection.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

761.91/12-844

*The Secretary of State to the President*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 18, 1944.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Soviet-Iranian Relations

Your memorandum of December 8, 1944 suggested that Harriman take up with Stalin the question of difficulties between the Soviet Union and Iran. Fortunately, a telegram from Ambassador Morris in Teheran dated December 8,<sup>1</sup> reports that since the Iranian Government resigned last month, Morris has heard of no action by the Russians which could clearly be construed as further undue interference in internal Iranian affairs.

An approach by us to the Russians at this moment might aggravate the situation, causing the Russians to flare up with a harder policy against Iran than ever. I believe it would be a mistake for Harriman to approach Stalin at the moment, as long as there is a possibility that the tension in Iran is easing. We are following the developments minutely, and are keeping Harriman posted. If you concur, we will instruct him to stand by, to be ready to act when the proper moment comes.

I should like to talk with you about the free port-railway trusteeship plan at one of our early meetings.<sup>2</sup>

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> As a result of the Department's objections (see *post*, pp. 344-345), the President was dissuaded from reviving his plan and the subject was not discussed with the British or the Russians at Malta or Yalta.

891.6363/12-2844

*The Soviet Ambassador (Gromyko) to the Secretary of State*[Translation]<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, December 28, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In connection with the note of November 1, of the Chargé d'Affaires of the U. S. A. in Moscow, Mr. Kennan, concerning the question of Iran,<sup>2</sup> I have the honor, by direction of the Soviet Government, to convey to you the following:

In September the Soviet Government dispatched to Iran an official commission headed by the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, S. I. Kavtaradze, for negotiating with the Government of Iran regarding the granting of an oil concession for the Soviet Union in the northern regions of Iran. The conditions of a possible agreement, which the Soviet Government had in view to conclude on that subject with the Government of Iran, were very profitable and advantageous for Iran, and, of course were in no degree infringing its sovereignty or independence. It was intended also to consider any suggestions of the part of Iran, and to start practical discussion of the conditions of the agreement in the spirit of the friendly and allied relations existing between the two countries.

In the beginning of the negotiations the head of the Government of Iran, Mr. Saed, declared that his attitude was favorable to the Soviet proposals. On this basis the Soviet Commission started the preliminary work connected with the coming negotiations. However, a month later, the attitude of the Government of Mr. Saed changed, under hidden influences and Mr. Saed declared suddenly to the Soviet Commission his refusal to grant the concession. The Government of Mr. Saed did not even make an attempt to familiarize itself with the Soviet conditions of the concession, which as deemed by the Soviet Government, should have been passed on by the representatives of both sides on the basis of free negotiations and with allowance for mutual interests.

Thus the Government of Mr. Saed was obviously disloyal, with respect to the Soviet side, in the conduct of the negotiations. This disloyal attitude of Mr. Saed toward the proposals of the Soviet Government, which was sincerely looking for ways for a practical achievement of an important economic agreement with Iran, that would be to the advantage of both countries and would lend to Iran considerable economic assistance, as well as other facts, manifesting the hostile attitude of Mr. Saed on a series of questions of Soviet-Iran collaboration, could not but evoke a corresponding negative reaction in the Soviet public opinion and press.

<sup>1</sup> Original note in Russian; translation prepared in the Department of State.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed, but see the Department's No. 2566 to Moscow, *ante*, pp. 330-331.

As can be seen from the events which followed in Iran, the hostile attitude taken toward the U. S. S. R. by the former Prime Minister, Mr. Saed, met with disapproval of many Iranian political leaders and wide circles of Iranian public opinion.

Such are the circumstances of the case concerning the Soviet proposals pertaining to the oil concession in Iran. The Soviet Government considers it its duty to mention these circumstances, so that the Government of the United States of America may have correct information on this question.

At the same time the Soviet Government cannot overlook the unsympathetic attitude taken by America with regard to Soviet-Iran negotiations regarding the oil concession. As appears from the information set forth above, any statements about interference on the part of the Soviet in the internal affairs of Iran have no foundation whatever.

The Soviet Government cannot agree with arguments that the granting of an oil concession to the Soviet Union can in any degree affect the sovereignty of Iran. If these arguments were recognized as sound, they would in the first place affect Great Britain which, as is known, has for a long time had an important oil concession in Iran.

In the opinion of the Soviet Government, there are not sufficient reasons to assert either that the question of the granting of an oil concession to the Soviet Union cannot be settled at the present time, and that this question must be postponed until the post-war period.

The former Government of Saed was not able to offer any convincing argument to that effect. The Soviet proposals concerning the oil concessions are in no measure in contradiction with the declaration concerning Iran made on December 1, 1943 by the three Powers.<sup>3</sup> On the contrary, they are in complete accord with this declaration, which contemplates the necessity of lending economic assistance to Iran by the Allies. It is obvious that a positive solution of the question of an oil concession to the Soviet Union would contribute to a further development of good Soviet-Iran relations, and at the same time would become one of the means of lending important economic assistance to Iran. In this respect the Soviet proposals concerning the concession agree entirely with the obligations assumed by the Allies according to the declaration of the three Powers concerning Iran.

The above might be supplemented by the following.

Early in December, concealed from public opinion and in violation of the Iranian Constitution, the former Prime Minister Mr. Saed in concert with a certain Seyid Zia-ed-din succeeded in having passed by the Majlis a resolution forbidding the members of the Iranian Government from entering into negotiations with anyone concerning oil concessions.

<sup>3</sup> *Post*, pp. 748-749.

In connection with this, the Deputy People's Commissar, S. I. Kavtaradze, paid a visit to the new Prime Minister of Iran and by direction of the Soviet Government made a statement containing the remark, that in the opinion of the Soviet Government the above-mentioned resolution concerning oil concessions must be revised, because it was adopted under the influence of intriguing by hostile elements of the kind of Saed, Seyid Zia-ed-din, and others.

Apart from that, this resolution contradicts the fact of the existence on the territory of Iran of an important oil concession belonging to a foreign country. After having made this statement, S. I. Kavtaradze left for Moscow.

Informing the Government of the United States of America of the above, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to remark that on the question concerning the oil concession in Iran it continues to maintain the attitude expressed in this note, in particular in the statement of the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, S. I. Kavtaradze, cited, made by him to the Prime Minister of Iran mentioned.

Sincerely yours,

A. GROMYKO

891.00/1-945 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

LONDON, January 9, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received January 9—4:45 p. m.]

296. In a general discussion of Iranian matters today at the Foreign Office, the official dealing directly with Iranian affairs said that serious consideration was being given by the British to the thought that at the next "Big Three" meeting the general question of Iran be raised, particularly with reference to Soviet pressure in connection with the recent incidents over oil concessions.

WINANT

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 15 January 1945.

President Roosevelt from Prime Minister. Number 890. Personal and Top Secret.

1. One of the questions which I think should be discussed at our meeting with Stalin, or between the Foreign Secretaries, is that of Persia.

<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

2. In the declaration about Persia which we and Stalin signed at Teheran in December 1943, it is stated that "The Governments of the United States of America, the USSR and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran."<sup>2</sup>

3. You will have seen reports of the recent attitude of the Russians in Persia. We here feel that the various forms of pressure which they have been exerting constitute a departure from the statement quoted above. They have refused to accept the Persian decision to grant no concessions until after the war: and they have brought about the fall of a Persian Prime Minister who, believing that there could be no free or fair negotiations so long as Russian (or other foreign) troops were in Persia, refused the immediate grant of their oil demands. The new Persian Prime Minister, supported by the Parliament, has maintained his predecessor's attitude on this question. But the Russians have indicated that they do not intend to drop their demands.

4. This may be something of a test case. Persia is a country where we, yourselves and the Russians are all involved: and we have given a joint undertaking to treat the Persians decently. If the Russians are now able not only to save their face by securing the fall of the Persian Prime Minister who opposed them, but also to secure what they want by their use of the big stick, Persia is not the only place where the bad effect will be felt.

5. Please let me know whether you agree that this should be taken up with the Russians: and if so, whether you feel that it should be handled by ourselves with Stalin (as signatories of the Teheran declaration) or by the Foreign Secretaries. I think it should be our object to induce the Russians to admit that the Persians are within their rights in withholding a concession if they wish to do so. We could agree, if necessary, that the oil question should be further reviewed after the withdrawal of foreign troops from Persia.

6. We do not wish the Russian Government to represent that they were not warned in time of the strength of our feelings on this matter. If, therefore, you agree generally with my suggestion, I propose that we should separately or jointly let Stalin know now that we think Persia should be discussed at our next meeting (or by the Foreign Secretaries).

7. Before replying to this telegram, I think that you should see Soviet note of December 29 to Foreign Office, which we have communicated to State Department.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> For the full text of this declaration, see *post*, pp. 748-749.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed; this note is very similar to the note of December 28, 1944, from the Soviet Ambassador to the Secretary of State, *ante*, pp. 334-336.



891.6363/1-1745

*The Secretary of State to the President*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 17, 1945.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The Iranian Question

There is enclosed in accordance with your directions a suggested reply to the Prime Minister's telegram no. 890, January 15, 1945, regarding the Iranian oil concession controversy. You will note that we in the Department feel that the subject should be discussed at the forthcoming meeting, as the Prime Minister suggests, and that the talks should be among you, Churchill and Stalin as signatories to the Declaration signed at Tehran. We do not recommend, however, that advance notice be given of an intention to discuss it, since this would give the matter undue importance.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

[Enclosure]

## THE IRANIAN QUESTION

1. I concur fully that the Iranian question should be discussed at our next meeting and feel that it should be with Stalin as a signatory to the Declaration signed at Tehran.

2. We have not seen sufficient evidence in Iran during recent days to demonstrate conclusively that Russia intends to insist upon an oil concession now or even upon the repeal of the Iranian law which forbids concession negotiations during the war, but Russia's continued and avowed dissatisfaction with the law arouses apprehension which should be quieted.

3. The Soviets also replied to our note<sup>2</sup> on the question with a lengthy explanation of Soviet action and a reference to the American Government's "unsympathetic" attitude in the matter. There seems little reason to doubt, therefore, that the Soviets are fully aware of the attitude of both our Governments. I do not think it would be advisable to single out the Iranian question by giving notice in advance of an intention to discuss it since no agenda is being planned and advance reference to this question alone would tend to accord it undue importance.

I concur that a test case may well arise in this matter which may

<sup>1</sup> A White House status sheet attached to the original of this memorandum in the Roosevelt Papers indicates that it "was taken to Yalta by the President, but not read by him until his return to U. S., when he read it at Hyde Park and sent it to file without action".

<sup>2</sup> The United States note is not printed as such, but see the Department's No. 2566 to Moscow, *ante*, pp. 330-331. The Soviet reply, of December 28, 1944, is printed *ante*, pp. 334-336.

have important bearing on the Dumbarton Oaks plans for postwar collaboration. For this reason we must make every effort, firm but conciliatory, to reach a just solution.

761.91/1-1845

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*Memorandum by the Secretary of State*

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 18, 1945.

Participants: Iranian Minister called upon Mr. Stettinius

Copies to: NEA, U, A-D, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. A. Hiss, Mr. Hyde, Mr. Savage ME

The Iranian Minister called upon me at his request today. He said that he had been instructed by his Government to call upon me and to call to my attention the great concern that the Persian people had relative to the attitude and actions of Russia toward their country. They were very apprehensive and hoped that the United States would take a firm hand in insisting on a strong independent Iran at the forthcoming Conference.

I assured the Minister that we had constantly in mind the welfare of the Persian people and that I was confident that the President in his forthcoming conversations with Churchill and Stalin would constantly keep their interests in mind.

The Minister then stated that he had been instructed by his Government to offer the facilities of his Government for the forthcoming meeting of the Big Three. I told the Minister that we greatly appreciated this gesture of friendship and I would immediately pass on this kind offer to the President.

The Minister seemed very pleasant and cooperative.

[Attachment]

[WASHINGTON,] January 18, 1945.

MR. SECRETARY: The Iranian Minister wants to emphasize to you his Government's fear that Russia will use forceful methods to obtain concessions and political control in the northern part of his country. Iran hopes the United States and Great Britain will support Iran's independence at the forthcoming high level conversations.

We have already assured the Minister that you and the President are well aware of the situation.

GEORGE V. ALLEN

Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*

## MEMORANDA CONCERNING IRAN

[SUMMARY]

JANUARY 6, 1945.

I *American Policy in Iran*

The U. S. supports Iranian independence and seeks to strengthen the country internally, so that excuses for outside interference will be minimized. Iran is considered a testing ground for U. S., U. K., and U. S. S. R. cooperation and for the principles of Dumbarton Oaks.

American, British and Soviet Ambassadors in Iran should be authorized and instructed to cooperate and consult closely on all questions of mutual interest. Allied wartime controls in Iran should be removed as rapidly as possible.

II *Problem of Oil Concessions in Iran*

We should dispel any idea in Soviet minds that U. S. officials or individuals prompted Iran to refuse the Soviet request for an oil concession. Effort should be made, however, to persuade the Soviet authorities that pressure on Iran to grant a concession would be contrary to assurance of respect for Iranian sovereignty contained in the Declaration on Iran.<sup>1</sup>

III *Desirability of Limiting or Removing Allied Military Censorship in Iran*

The progress of the war no longer requires the strict censorship now in force.

IV *Suggested International Trusteeship to Operate Iranian Railways and Free Port on Persian Gulf*

While the aims of the proposal are excellent, the Department sees no possibility of its being made acceptable.

## [MEMORANDA CONCERNING IRAN]

I *American Policy in Iran; Continued and Growing American Interest in Iran as a Testing Ground for the Atlantic Charter and for Allied Good Faith*

The basis of our policy toward Iran is a desire to contribute to the maintenance of the independence of Iran and to increase its internal strength. This policy is based on four principal desires:

- (1) to carry out the pledges of assistance we have given Iran;
- (2) to insure a nondiscriminatory position for the United States in Iran with regard to commerce, shipping, petroleum and aviation;

<sup>1</sup> *Post*, pp. 748-749.

- (3) to contribute toward postwar security by helping to construct a strong and independent Iran, free from the internal dissensions and weaknesses which invite foreign intervention, and
- (4) to develop U. S., U. K. and U. S. S. R. cooperation there, as a testing ground for postwar relations and a demonstration of Dumbarton Oaks in action.

This policy was crystallized and given emphasis by the Declaration on Iran signed at Tehran on December 1, 1943, by the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin. This document acknowledged Iran's contribution toward the war effort, expressed desire for the maintenance of Iran's sovereignty and integrity, and pledged allied economic assistance to Iran both now and after the war.

Our policy toward Iran has been implemented in various ways: by the development of a comprehensive American adviser program, by American participation in the Middle East Supply Center program of meeting Iran's essential needs, by supplying the Iranian Army and *Gendarmerie* with the military supplies necessary to maintain internal security, and by other similar means. The cornerstone of this program has been the American adviser program, under which we have assisted Iran in finding, always on specific Iranian request, a large number of American citizens to advise them in the fields of finance, economy, public health, army, *gendarmerie*, and irrigation. The largest of these advisory missions is that headed by Dr. A. C. Millspaugh in the fields of finance and economy, with a present strength of some 45 American citizens.

The Allies have a unique opportunity in Iran, common meeting place of the three great powers, to set a pattern of cooperation and develop a mode of conduct in dealing with small nations which will serve as a model in the postwar world. Since the sincere cooperation of the British and Russians must be obtained if this objective is to be realized, we should endeavor constantly to bring about allied consultation and common action in all matters of mutual interest regarding Iran. In the development of our own policy toward Iran, we should bear in mind the special historic interests of the British and Russians in that country. We should avoid the impression that we stand at Iran's side as a buffer to restrain other countries or that we have undertaken a unilateral obligation to defend Iran by armed force. Toward this end, we should make a special effort to bring the Russians and British into common allied deliberations regarding Iran and should seek their active collaboration in carrying out an agreed policy. Moscow should be requested to instruct the Soviet Ambassador at Tehran to consult fully with his American and British colleagues on all questions of mutual interest. The three Ambassadors might

constitute an Allied Advisory Commission in Iran, with a secretariat, to bring about constant collaboration on matters of mutual concern.

Effort should be made to remove two specific causes for allied friction in Iran. They are: the oil concession controversy; and the continuance of allied censorship. Each subject is discussed in a separate paper.

## II *The Problem of Oil Concessions in Iran* and the Disturbing Effect recent Negotiations have had on Soviet-Iranian Relations

Soviet displeasure at the action of the Iranian Government in suspending, until after the war, all negotiations for oil concessions is an ominous development which should be carefully followed.

A brief summary of the immediate background of this matter follows. American and British oil companies began negotiations with the Iranian Government in early 1944 for a petroleum concession in southern Iran. The American and British Embassies in Iran were aware of these negotiations but regarded them as private commercial ventures and in no way participated in the negotiations. The negotiations seemed about to terminate successfully in September when a large Soviet delegation, headed by Vice Commissar Kavtaradze, appeared in Tehran and demanded that a concession be granted to the Soviet Government for the five northern provinces of Iran. The Iranian Government, alarmed by the sweeping Soviet demands, disturbed by Soviet refusal to discuss terms or conditions, and fearful that Iranian sovereignty would be jeopardized if a foreign government should obtain such wide and lasting control in the country, announced that all petroleum negotiations were suspended until the end of the war.

The United States Government promptly informed the Iranian Government that, while American companies were disappointed, we recognized the sovereign right of Iran to grant or withhold concessions within its territory. We asked that, when negotiations are resumed, American companies be informed and be placed in no less favorable position than granted to any foreign company or government. The British followed a similar policy although they made no formal statement to the Iranian Government, as far as we are aware. The Russians showed great annoyance, taking the Iranian action as an affront. The Soviet press began a strong and concerted attack on Iranian Prime Minister Saed and his Government, accusing Iranian officials of being "disloyal" and Fascist-minded. These attacks and the strong statements of displeasure by Vice Commissar Kavtaradze in Tehran brought about the resignation of the Saed Government.

The American Embassy in Moscow informed the Soviet Government on November 1, 1944,<sup>2</sup> of the attitude we had taken and stated

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<sup>2</sup> This note is not printed as such, but see the Department's No. 2566 to Moscow, *ante*, pp. 330-331.

that our action had been based on the Declaration on Iran signed at Tehran by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin on December 1, 1943. The Soviet Government, in a reply addressed to us on December 28, 1944<sup>3</sup> strongly supported the action taken by Vice Commissar Kavtaradze, again accused the Iranian Government of unfriendly and "disloyal" action, denied that the granting of an oil concession to the Soviet Government would affect Iranian sovereignty, and declared that the concession would in no way be in contradiction to the Declaration on Iran. The note described the American attitude toward this Soviet-Iranian dispute as "unsympathetic" to the Soviet Government.

The British Government, for its part, subsequently called the attention of the Soviet Government to the harmful effects of Soviet action in Iran and has asked the Russians to state frankly their designs and intentions in this matter. The British have asked us to make similar representations in Moscow but we have taken no action other than our original note of November 1.

The situation is potentially dangerous, not only as regards Iranian sovereignty but in the more important bearing it may have on allied relations. The British, however willing they may be to make concessions to the Russians in Eastern Europe, will probably refuse to consider concessions in the Middle East, which is so vitally important to Empire communications. The consequences of this dispute, if it is allowed to continue, may be serious.

The American Government should continue to maintain the reasonable and tenable position we have taken; that we recognize the sovereign right of Iran to grant or withhold concessions within its territory. We should stress to the Russians, at the highest possible level and in the most friendly and constructive manner, the harmful effects of their action in Iran. While British opposition to the Soviet action may be based primarily on strategic grounds, our chief concern is that the assurances of the great powers of respect for Iranian sovereignty be not violated. The confidence of the world in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals could be seriously affected by action to force Iran to grant an oil concession.

### III *Desirability of Limiting or Removing Allied Military Censorship in Iran*

When Russian and British troops entered Iran in August 1941 the British and Russian military authorities agreed upon a joint censorship arrangement under which each could exercise a veto over the release in Iran or dispatch from that country of any information considered harmful to the war effort. When American troops entered Iran in 1942, the American military authorities were invited to participate,

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<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 334-336.

to the extent of the American interests involved, in the censorship arrangements.

In actual practice, the arrangement has given the Russian a veto over the dissemination of news in Iran from American and British sources and over the dispatch from Iran of any news contrary to Soviet interests, while the British and American authorities have had no such veto, due to the fact that Tass despatches between Moscow and Tehran in both directions are sent over the Soviet Embassy wire and are consequently uncensored.

As a result of this situation, the Soviet authorities were able to prevent the facts regarding the recent oil concession controversy between Russia and Iran from being disseminated abroad, and even prevented the Iranian Government from telegraphing to its diplomatic representatives in Moscow, London and Washington.

The censorship has been irksome, not only to the Iranian Government but also to foreign newspapermen and civilians in Iran, who have frequently been denied American and British publications addressed to them by mail. Both the British and American authorities have complained about the operation of the censorship, but the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran claims that it is a matter of military censorship which he cannot control.

Iran is not a zone of military operations, and the excuse for military censorship there has practically disappeared. There is no excuse whatsoever for this censorship to be extended to political information. Its operation during the past two years has been a serious infringement of Iranian sovereignty and is no longer justifiable. Ambassador Morris feels strongly that a solution can be reached only through discussion by the highest officials of the U. S., the U. K., and the U. S. S. R.

Soviet control of news in Iran is an important phase of the larger question of the freedom of information in which this Government is so greatly interested. A solution would be to eliminate the veto feature and to require American, British, Soviet and Iranian concurrence before items are censored and to restrict censorship to strictly military questions. The remoteness of Iran from the war and the rapidly diminishing importance of Iran as a corridor for military supplies justify this move. An alternative would be to remove allied censorship, placing censorship responsibilities in the hands of Iran, one of the United Nations.

#### IV *Suggested International Trusteeship to Operate Iranian Railways and Free Port on Persian Gulf*

The Department has given careful study to a suggestion that the Iranian railways and an Iranian port on the Persian Gulf might be

operated under an international trusteeship.<sup>4</sup> The purpose of the trusteeship would presumably be (a) to provide to Russia an assured economic outlet to the Persian Gulf; (b) to assist Iran economically by developing transit of goods through the country; (c) to avoid more forceful methods by Russia to gain an outlet to the Gulf; and (d) to develop international cooperation rather than rivalry in Iran.

The aims of the proposal are excellent. A properly conducted trusteeship of this kind would bring advantages to Iran and to the world. The Department regrets that there are not, in its view, any feasible means for accomplishing the results desired.

No matter how drawn up or proposed, the plan would appear to Iran, and doubtless to the world, as a thinly disguised cover for power politics and old-world imperialism. Iranians are highly suspicious of foreign influence in the country and would unquestionably resent any extension of foreign control there. The railway, built by their own strenuous efforts at a cost of some \$150,000,000, without foreign borrowing, is a source of especial and intense patriotic pride. The Department's judgment is that the trusteeship could only be imposed on Iran, a sovereign, allied nation, by force of arms.

There is little reason to believe that Soviet Russia would be interested, at least for the present, in participating in an international trusteeship in Iran in the genuine manner contemplated, particularly if it included an element of non-Russian control in northern Iran.

The British, we feel, would almost certainly raise equally strenuous objections. British policy for more than a hundred years has been pointed toward preventing any other great power, and especially Russia, from gaining a foothold on the Persian Gulf. There is no indication that this policy has been altered. If we proceed on the assumption that the continuance of the British Empire in some reasonable strength is in the strategic interest of the United States, it might be considered wise, in protection of vital British communications in this important area, to discourage such a trusteeship. The British also will probably continue to endeavor to keep the Russians away from the vital South Iranian oil fields.

The laudable ends contemplated by the proposal might be accomplished in some measure through the employment by Iran of foreign technicians to assist them in operating the railway and port. The Iranians would prefer to employ Americans or the nationals of small European countries (Sweden or Switzerland) for this purpose, if they should agree to the idea.

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<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 333.



## CHINA

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram <sup>1</sup>*The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the President* <sup>2</sup>

TOP SECRET

[CHUNGKING, January 14, 1945—3 p. m.]

(ComNavGr China sends this top secret from Hurley for the eyes of the President alone.)

NCR 6810. In continuation of my various telegrams,<sup>3</sup> I wish to give you a résumé of the latest negotiations between the National Government and the Chinese Communist Party. You will recall that following the fruitless discussions between the [Government] and the Communist Party at Sian and Chungking, I proceeded to Yen-an and returned with a five point proposal <sup>4</sup> for agreement signed by Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. General Chou En-lai, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, returned to Chungking with me. The Government countered with a three point proposal <sup>5</sup> which was not acceptable to the Communist Party. Chou En-lai returned to Yen-an after having spent a month in Chungking. Chou En-lai's conference[s] with officials of the National Government and myself were satisfactory and it looked as though a settlement would be achieved. Chou En-lai finally conferred with the Generalissimo. I was not present at that conference. Chou En-lai told me the conference was not satisfactory. However, the G[eneral]issimo is now prepared to make all the concessions requested in the five points except that he does not want a coalition government or a coalition military council. He will, however, give the Communists representation in the government, in a war cabinet and in the military council which, in my opinion, would have been accepted by the Communists if offered at the time Chou En-lai was here. The G[eneral]issimo's position was that while he would be willing to give representation and recognition as a political party to the Communists he would be adverse to a coalition government. He explained to me that he would not like a situation created similar to that existing in Yugoslavia and Poland. On December 8th Chou

<sup>1</sup> Bracketed insertions in message indicate text as sent, according to microfilmed copy of message in Embassy files (893.00/1-1049).

Hurley sent the substance of this message to the Department of State in a series of three telegrams, and under date of February 2, 1945, Grew relayed a brief summary of the telegrams to Stettinius, who was then at Malta (740.0011 EW/1-2745).

<sup>2</sup> Copy in Roosevelt Papers bears following handwritten notations:

☐ "Hold for President—per Adm[iral] Leahy[']s instructions."

☐ "Extracts sent to Gen[eral] Marshall by Adm. Leahy."

☐ <sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Quoted in *United States Relations with China*, Department of State Publication 3573 (Washington, 1949), pp. 74-75.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 75.

En-lai advised me <sup>6</sup> that he was unable to return to Chungking as the National Government had rejected the Communist Party's five point proposal. I urged him to reconsider but on December 16th he replied <sup>6</sup> that since the Kuomintang authorities appeared to lack sincerity in the negotiations he would not return to Chungking. Upon my further persuasion for resumption of negotiations, Mao Tse-tung telegraphed on December 22nd that Chou En-lai was preparing for an important conference and could not come to Chungking and that he would suggest a conference with the government representatives to be held at Yen-an and would like Colonel Barrett, our military representative at Yen-an, to be present at the conference. I sent Barrett to Yen-an. He returned December 28 with a letter from Chou En-lai <sup>6</sup> claiming that the telegram of December 22 was inaccurate due to "mistakes in paraphrasing" and that in effect he did not want to suggest that the government representatives come to Yen-an or that Barrett could [*should*] be present at the conference. In this letter he stated that before further negotiations could take place between the Communist Party and the Nationalist Government, the government should first voluntarily carry out four additional points. At that time I was unable to account for the drastic change in position of the Communists. I subsequently discovered that the cause was within our own ranks which is explained later in this report.

I consulted the G[eneral]issimo on the situation and on January 7 I wrote Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai requesting [*regretting*] that in addition to their previous five-point proposal they should ask the government first to voluntarily carry out four new points. I stated that since General Chou could not come to Chungking, I wished to suggest to them, with the approval of the government, that Doctor Soong, Acting President of the Executive Yuan, Doctor Wang Shih-chieh, Minister of Information, General Chang Tse-chung, Director of Political Board of Military Affairs Council, and myself would visit Yen-an to discuss a settlement and that if an agreement was reached in principle Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai should come to Chungking to conclude the agreement.

For your information, the Government was prepared to offer at the proposed Yen-an Conference the following:

1. Formation of a War Cabinet with inclusion of Communists and other non-Kuomintang men. [( This would be in fact but not in name recognition [*a coalition*] war cabinet.)]
2. Establishment of a committee of three, composed of a representative of the Government, the Communists and an American army officer, to work out details of [re-] incorporating the Communist troops in the National Army.

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<sup>6</sup> Not printed.

3. An American officer to have over-all command of Communist troops.

4. Recognition of the Communist Party as a legal political party.

Mao Tse-tung replied on January 11 that the Government shows no sincerity, that, in future, negotiations should be conducted in public and suggesting the calling of a National Affairs Conference, the preparatory conference to be made up of delegates from the Kuomintang, the Communists and the so-called Democratic Federation, that the proceedings of the conference shall be made public and that the delegates should have equal standing. If the proposal were agreed to in advance by the National Government, Chou En-lai would come to Chungking for discussions in the National Convention.

Since the Generalissimo had already on New Year's Day announced the calling of a National Assembly for the adoption of a constitution this year, this fresh condition coming on top of the original five points and the subsequent four points, the G[eneral]issimo could not entertain.

Since my arrival in China, in accordance with your policy, I have exerted my utmost to help bring about Chinese national unification. The G[eneral]issimo was at first cold to the plan but after your suggestions the G[eneral]issimo has shown himself ready to grant concessions to the Communists far beyond what he had been willing to grant in the past. He is now favorable to unification, reformation and agreement with the Communists.

I had a meeting with the G[eneral]issimo this morning to discuss the Communist reply. He agreed that with or without Communist participation he will immediately take steps to liberalize the Government in spite of the war situation. He is considering with members of the Government the announcement next Monday of the formation of a war cabinet with inclusion of representative members of other parties besides the Kuomintang. He intends to invite the Communists to participate in it, disregarding the latest rebuff from them. By means of the war cabinet he intends to start liberalizing and cleansing the government even before the convocation of the National Assembly and the adoption of a constitution, a measure which I consider a substantial step forward in the organization of a stable, unified and democratic government in China. This program has one weakness. It gives the Communists what they have demanded but it does not require submission of Communist troops to the National Government which I had provided in the five point agreement. Therefore during the reformation of the government and after reformation there would still be the threat of civil war by the armed Communist Party.

I have heretofore recited to you the elements which constitute the opposition to the unification of China. Briefly again they are:

1. The standpat element in the Kuomintang party;
2. Serious opposition in the Communist Party;
3. The opposition of the representatives of all of the imperialist governments;
4. Doctor Soong was not favorably inclined in the beginning but is now wholeheartedly in favor of an agreement with the Communists. He would like to have credit for having avoided civil war and unified China.
5. In addition to these, we have had constant opposition from some of our own diplomatic and military officials who sincerely believed that the Chiang Kai-shek government must fall.

We had overcome all of these elements of opposition when the Communists walked out on us. It has taken from the first of January until now to find the fundamental cause of the break. Here it is. During the absence of General Wedemeyer from headquarters, certain officers of his command formulated a plan for the use of American paratroops in the Communist-held area. The plan provided for the use of Communist troops led by Americans in guerilla warfare. The plan was predicated on the reaching of an agreement between the United States and the Communist Party, by-passing completely the National Government of China and furnishing American supplies directly to the Communist troops and placing the Communist troops under command of an American officer. My directive, of course, was to prevent the collapse of the National Government; sustain the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek; unify the military force[s] of China, and, as far as possible, to assist in the liberalization of the government and in bringing about conditions that would promote a free, unified, democratic China. The military plan as outlined became known to the Communists and offered them exactly what they wanted, recognition and Lend-lease supplies for themselves and destruction of the National Government. If the Communists, who are an armed political party, could succeed in making such arrangement with the United States Army, it would be futile for us to try to save the National Government of China. While I had some inkling of the plot [*plan*], I did not know it had been presented to the Communists until that was made apparent by the Communists applying to Wedemeyer to secure [secret] passage for Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai to Washington for a conference with you. They asked Wedemeyer to keep their proposed visit to you secret from the National Government and from me. I might interpolate here that Wedemeyer has my confidence and I have his. We are cooperating completely. The Communists are not yet aware that I know of their effort to bypass me and go directly to you. Our present difficulties with the Communists were brought about by an American plan for the unification of American and Communist forces without passing through the National Govern-

ment of China. With Wedemeyer's able assistance we are clearing up the situation but we have not yet advised the Communists that I am familiar with the military plan or with their attempt to bypass the National Government of China and me and go directly to you. Having discovered the real reason for the change of attitude of the Communists toward negotiations with the National Government and toward me I will use every effort to continue negotiations until we have convinced the Communists again that they cannot use the United States in their effort to supplant the National Government of China.<sup>7</sup> Notwithstanding all this, I am still in favor of every concession that we can get from the National Government for the participation in that government by the Communists.

I, therefore, suggest the following program. In your heralded forthcoming meeting, secure the approval of Churchill and Stalin of your plan for:

1. Immediate unification of all military forces in China and
2. A postwar free, unified, democratic China.

When you have secured that agreement we will be able to place in your hands complete plans for the unification of the military forces of China; for the recognition of the Chinese Communist Party as a legal political party; for representation of all parties in the administration of the Chinese Government; for the liberalization of the Chinese Government; for the promotion of democratic processes and the establishment of fundamental individual rights and the reconstruction of a free, united, democratic China. We should then offer a meeting with you to both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung on the condition that they must, prior to the meeting, reach an agreement between themselves for the unification of China which will be promulgated when they meet you.

The overall of the military situation indicates that the Japanese offensive capabilities remain as they were a month ago. Wedemeyer feels that the success of MacArthur will act as a deterrent to an immediate, strong westward offensive in China. This gives Wedemeyer time for changes of strategy and tactics and reorganization of the defenses of Kunming and Chungking areas. Wedemeyer is doing a first-class job both in the military field and in his relations with Chiang Kai-shek and the Government.

I am sending this report to you but I have no objection to giving it to the State Department if you approve. I have complete confidence in Stettinius but we have been reading and hearing so much about the reorganization of the State Department and the leaks that

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<sup>7</sup> As a result of Ambassador Hurley's efforts, the Communists decided to send Chou En-lai to Chungking for additional conferences (see *United States Relations with China*, p. 78).

have been and are occurring that I thought best to send this to you so that it would enjoy the protection that my messages have always received from the White House. If you think best not to send this report to the State Department, I hope you will let Stettinius read it.

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Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*

POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION IN CHINA IN THE EVENT THE  
U. S. S. R. ENTERS THE WAR IN THE FAR EAST

*Background:*

Territory now controlled by the Chinese Communists covers large portions of North China and disconnected areas to the east and south. Reports also indicate that Communist underground strength in Manchuria is considerable. The Communists claim to have 500,000 regular troops and 2,000,000 militia. The soldiers are poorly equipped but are well-trained in guerrilla warfare and are in good physical condition.

Inner Mongolia lies between Outer Mongolia and the northern areas under Chinese Communist control. The Chinese armies in Inner Mongolia are of poor quality. They are passively hostile to the Communist armies.

It is reasonable to anticipate, or one must at least be prepared for the eventuality, that one line of attack by Russian armies would be from Outer Mongolia, where military strength could be amassed in advance of hostilities, through Inner Mongolia toward Shanhaikuan, the principal gateway between North China and Manchuria. After traversing Inner Mongolia, the Russians would have on their right flank Chinese Communist armies.

(When he returned from Chungking last spring, the Chinese Ambassador made the disturbing comment to Mr. Vincent that, in the event Russian troops attacked Japan through north China, the Chinese Government had plans which would prevent contact between Russian troops and Chinese Communist troops. However, it may be assumed that the Russians would not be deterred from making use of Chinese Communist forces by any attitude or actions of the Chinese Government.)

*Solution:*

It is of course highly desirable that embarrassment and difficulties, political or military, be avoided in the event of Russian military operations in north China. The obvious and reasonable solution would be a working agreement between the Chinese Government and the

Communists which would establish a unified Chinese military command to work with the Russian command. There is, however, doubt that such a working agreement will be reached.

An alternative solution would be an over-all American command of Chinese troops. If Russia enters the war in the Far East, it would be highly advantageous to have in China such a command rather than a disunited Chinese command. Furthermore, it would make practicable supply of ammunition and demolition material to the Communists and would obviate political difficulties in the event of coastal landings adjacent to areas under Communist control. And finally, an American command could serve as a stabilizing influence in the period immediately following the conclusion of hostilities in China.

*Recommended Action:*

Continuation of efforts to bring about a settlement between Chinese Government and Communist leaders which would bring about united military command and action.

At the same time negotiations looking toward the establishment of an over-all American command in China directly under the Generalissimo. Institution of such a command may not be immediately feasible but the groundwork should be laid to enable smooth establishment of such a command if and when developments make such a step advisable.

In the event neither of these courses of action bring about the desired results, it is recommended that this Government, and the British Government, lend no support to a policy by the Chinese Government which might impede Russian military action against Japan. On the positive side, the two Governments should make every effort to bring about cooperation between all Chinese forces and the Russian military command in order to prevent military developments from further widening the gap between the Communists and the Chinese Government and increasing the possibility of a disunited China after hostilities.

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Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*

UNITY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN-SOVIET POLICY TOWARD CHINA

SUMMARY

There exist areas of potential discord between our policies and those of the United Kingdom and the U. S. S. R. toward China. There appear to be elements among the British who, out of imperial considerations, desire a weak and possibly disunited China in the post-war period. Some apprehension has been voiced lest the Russians

may utilize the Chinese Communists to establish an independent or autonomous area in north China or Manchuria.

We recommend that we assume the leadership in assisting China to develop a strong, stable and unified government in order that she may become the principal stabilizing factor in the Far East. We also recommend that we seek British and Russian cooperation to achieve this objective.

#### UNITY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN-SOVIET POLICY TOWARD CHINA

There exist areas of potential discord between our policies and those of the United Kingdom and the U. S. S. R. toward China. At present, the British recognize that China is a theater of primary concern to us in the prosecution of the war, and the Russians desire to see established in China a government friendly to them. But the progress of events during the war and in the immediate post-war period may develop discords detrimental to the achievement of victory and peace—detrimental to our objective of a united, progressive China capable of contributing to security and prosperity in the Far East.

An unstable, divided, and reactionary China would make stability and progress in the Far East impossible, and would greatly increase the difficult task, which will be largely ours, of maintaining peace in the western Pacific. A strong, friendly China would do much to lighten our task and to promote mutually beneficial cultural and commercial intercourse.

It is not enough that we merely hope for a strong, friendly China or that we simply pursue the negative policies of the pre-war period. We should assume the leadership in the development of the kind of China that will contribute toward peace in the Pacific in cooperation with the United Kingdom and the U. S. S. R. We may reasonably expect that a strong, united China will cooperate with the United States, the United Kingdom and the U. S. S. R. in dealing with post-war Japan.

There is now Kuomintang China, Communist China, and puppet China. Kuomintang China is being weakened by dissident elements and widespread popular discontent. Communist China is growing in material and popular strength. Puppet China is filled with pockets of Communist guerrilla resistance. A partial settlement between the Kuomintang and the Communists would not eliminate the fundamental struggle for power, one aspect of which will be competition to win over the puppet troops as Japan is driven from China. The only hope of preventing civil war and disunity will lie in the creation of a democratic framework within which the opposing groups can reconcile their differences on a political level.



There are reports that elements among the British out of imperial considerations desire a weak and possibly disunited China in the post-war period. The British are undoubtedly less optimistic—more cynical—than we are regarding the future of China but neither the British Government nor the British people will derive benefit from an unstable China in the post-war period.

Some apprehension has been voiced lest the Russians may utilize the Chinese Communists to establish an independent or autonomous area in north China and Manchuria. There is nothing in Russia's present attitude as officially disclosed to us to substantiate those fears. But if Russia comes into the war in the Far East, or if an open break between the Kuomintang and the Communists occurs, Russia may be strongly tempted to abandon its policy declared in 1924 of non-interference in China's internal affairs.

It is our task to bring about British and Russian support of our objective of a united China which will cooperate with them as well as with us. The British attitude is characterized by skepticism and is influenced by a residue of nineteenth century thinking. We hope that the British, given a clear knowledge of our objective and assurance that we mean to work consistently and energetically for that objective, will support our efforts. The Russians primarily want a China friendly to them. We should give Russia definite assurance that we too desire and are working for a united China friendly to all its neighbors.

Our policy toward China is not based on sentiment. It is based on an enlightened national self-interest motivated by considerations of international security and well-being. Unless the United Kingdom and the U. S. S. R. are in substantial agreement with us it is doubtful whether we can accomplish the objective of our policies.

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Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*

OUTLINE OF SHORT-RANGE OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO CHINA

The principal and immediate objectives of the United States Government are to keep China in the war against Japan and to mobilize China's full military and economic strength in the vigorous prosecution of the war. To accomplish these objectives the United States Government has undertaken the following measures:

(a) *Direct Military Assistance to China and the Chinese Armed Forces*

We are keeping China in the war by supplying war materials to the Chinese armed forces, by maintaining an effective air force in China and an American expeditionary force based in India but

operating in northern Burma with the participation of Chinese units, and by flying into China a substantial quantity of munitions and war materials. It is this Government's policy to encourage and to assist, in so far as transportation of supplies permits, effective participation by Chinese armies in the war against Japan. To this end we are also engaged in training numbers of Chinese troops.

*(b) Promotion of Effective Sino-American Military Cooperation*

Sino-American military cooperation has been strengthened since the appointment of General Wedemeyer as commander of the China area and we hope that it will become increasingly effective. There would be advantages from a political and probably from a military point of view if an American officer should be given command of all Chinese and American forces in China.

*(c) Encouragement to the Chinese to Contribute their Maximum Effort in the War*

Internal disunity, economic instability (including severe inflation), lack of supplies and general war weariness are greatly impeding China's war effort. It is this Government's policy to support and encourage all measures designed to resolve these difficulties. Through the exercise of friendly good offices our Ambassador is endeavoring to promote greater internal unity, including the reconciliation of the fundamental differences between the Chungking Government and the Communist group. The establishment of a Chinese WPB as a result of Mr. Donald Nelson's mission should result in increased production of certain types of military equipment and in an improvement in the problem of supply. Arrangements are being completed for the shipment of increased quantities of Lend-Lease materials into China, including spare parts for industrial equipment, raw materials, several thousand heavy trucks, a complete oil refining unit and a substantial number of small power plants. Inflation in China, which has been a serious obstacle to maximum war effort, may be partially checked by such measures and by the shipment into China of small quantities of consumer goods.

This Government believes that China can and should make every effort to collaborate with us to the full extent of her capabilities in the vigorous prosecution of the war. We consider that the Generalissimo should continue earnestly to seek to bring about internal unity, that he should take immediate measures adequately to feed and clothe his troops and that he should strengthen national morale and increase popular participation in the war by the introduction of fundamental governmental reforms.

Executive Secretariat Files

*Briefing Book Paper*

## OUTLINE OF LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO CHINA

## SUMMARY

The American Government's long-range policy with respect to China is based on the belief that the need for China to be a principal stabilizing factor in the Far East is a fundamental requirement for peace and security in that area. Our policy is accordingly directed toward the following objectives:

1. *Political*: A strong, stable and united China with a government representative of the wishes of the Chinese people.
2. *Economic*: The development of an integrated and well-balanced Chinese economy and a fuller flow of trade between China and other countries.
3. *Cultural*: Cultural and scientific cooperation with China as a basis for common understanding and progress.

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1. *Political*: A strong stable and united China with a government representative of the wishes of the Chinese people:

a. We seek by every proper means to promote establishment of a broadly representative government which will bring about internal unity, including reconciliation of Kuomintang-Communist differences, and which will effectively discharge its internal and international responsibilities. While favoring no political faction, we continue to support the existing Government of China as the central authority recognized by the Chinese people and we look for the establishment within its framework of the unified and effective type of government that is needed.

b. Should these expectations fail of achievement and the authority of the existing government disintegrate, we would reexamine our position in the light of the manifested wishes of the Chinese people and regard sympathetically any government or movement which gave promise of achieving unity and of contributing to peace and security in eastern Asia.

c. We regard Sino-Soviet cooperation as a *sine qua non* of peace and security in the Far East and seek to aid in removing the existing mis-

trust between China and the Soviet Union and in bringing about close and friendly relations between them. We would interpose no objection to arrangements voluntarily made by China and the Soviet Union to facilitate the passage of Soviet trade through Manchuria, including the possible designation by the Chinese Government of a free port.

*d.* We consider cooperation between China and Great Britain to be an essential part of United Nations' solidarity and necessary for the development of China as a stabilizing factor in the Far East. We would welcome the restoration by Great Britain of Hong Kong to China and we are prepared in that event to urge upon China the desirability of preserving its status as a free port. Should other territorial problems arise between the two powers, we would hope to see them settled by friendly negotiation.

*e.* We favor the establishment by China of close and friendly relations with Korea, Burma, Thailand, Indochina and other neighboring areas. We do not favor Chinese domination or political control over such areas.

*f.* We believe that China's territorial integrity should be respected, including her claim to sovereign rights over such outlying territories as Tibet and Outer Mongolia. We would not oppose, however, any agreements respecting those territories reached by process of amicable negotiation between China and other interested governments. We hope that the Chinese Government will meet the aspirations of the native peoples of such territories for local autonomy.

*g.* In line with the policy enunciated at Moscow and the pattern outlined at Dumbarton Oaks, we offer and seek full collaboration with China as an equal among the major sovereign powers entitled and needed to share primary responsibility in the organization and maintenance of world peace and security.

2. *Economic:* The development of an integrated and well-balanced Chinese economy and a fuller flow of trade between China and other countries. Toward these objectives we intend to:

*a.* Continue to give to China all practicable economic and financial assistance which she may request within the framework of our traditional principles of equality of opportunity and respect for national sovereignty and the liberal trade policies to which this Government is endeavoring to secure general adherence.

*b.* Negotiate with China a comprehensive treaty relating to commerce and navigation on the basis of unconditional most-favored-nation treatment and looking toward the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment.

*c.* Give practicable assistance to China in connection with her efforts to plan an integrated and well-balanced economy, with particular reference to agriculture, transportation, communication and industry. Such assistance would be extended at China's request.

*d.* Make available such technical assistance as may be desired by China, including the training of Chinese technicians in the United States.

*e.* Provide such financial assistance as may be appropriate in the light of conditions obtaining in China, largely through private financing and investment.

*f.* Promote American trade with China by all practicable means to the mutual benefit and advantage of China and the United States.

In extending such forms of support, we propose to take careful cognizance of the commercial policies of the Chinese Government and of actual conditions affecting American trade with and in China.

3. *Cultural:* Cultural and scientific cooperation with China as a basis for common understanding and progress:

*a.* We consider most essential closer association between China and other United Nations in cultural and scientific fields. Toward that end we are undertaking in various ways to promote between the Chinese and American peoples a better appreciation of each other's thought and culture and to make available to China scientific knowledge and assistance which she needs for her development and contribution to international progress.

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## POST-WAR STATUS OF KOREA

Executive Secretariat Files

### *Briefing Book Paper*

#### INTER-ALLIED CONSULTATION REGARDING KOREA

##### SUMMARY

It is desirable that an understanding be reached with the British and Chinese Governments and depending upon developments, with the Soviet Government, on the question of what countries should participate (1) in the military occupation of Korea and (2) in an interim international administration or trusteeship for Korea if it is decided that such an administration should be established.

In reference to the first part of the question it is the view of the Department that the problems of Korea are of such an international character that with the completion of military operations in Korea, (1) there should be, so far as practicable, Allied representation in the army of occupation and military government in Korea; (2) such representation should be by those countries which have a real interest in the future status of Korea, such as the United States, Great Britain, and China and the Soviet Union if it has entered the war in the Pacific; and (3) the representation of other states should not be so large as to reduce the proportionate strength of the United States to a point where its effectiveness would be weakened.

As regards the second part of the question, it is the Department's tentative opinion that (1) an interim international administration or trusteeship should be established for Korea either under the authority of the proposed international organization or independently of it; and that (2) the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union should be included in any such administration.

### [INTER-ALLIED CONSULTATION REGARDING KOREA]

#### *The Problem*

Which countries should participate 1) in the military occupation of Korea and 2) in an interim international administration or trusteeship for Korea if it is decided that such an administration should be established?

#### *Discussion*

(1) Joint action in connection with the establishment of Korean independence is both important and necessary for the following reasons:

- 1) China and the Soviet Union are contiguous to Korea and have had a traditional interest in Korean affairs;
- 2) The United States, Great Britain and China have promised in the Cairo Declaration that in due course Korea shall become free and independent;
- 3) The military occupation of Korea by any single power might have serious political repercussions.

While the questions relating to the operations of Allied military, naval and air forces are admittedly of a purely military character and hence are not of direct concern to the Department, military operations and subsequent military occupation in Korea by any single state alone might have far-reaching political consequences. China would fear that exclusive Soviet responsibility for military government in Korea might lead to the growth of a Soviet sphere of influence in Manchuria and north China. Likewise, the Soviet Union would be resentful of any arrangement whereby China would have exclusive responsibility for military government in Korea after the cessation of hostilities. It is our view, therefore, that with the completion of military operations in Korea, there should be, so far as practicable, Allied representation in the army of occupation and in military government in Korea and that such military government should be organized on the principle of centralized administration with all of Korea administered as a single unit and not as separate zones. Such representation should be by those countries which have a real interest in the future political status of Korea, but the representation of other states should not be so large as to prejudice the effectiveness of American participation in that occupation. An

important element in American participation consists of the trust which Koreans will place in the United States not to harbor imperialistic designs. The United States, therefore, should play a leading role in the occupation and military government.

Studies on post-war Korean problems are now being undertaken by the Department and the British and Chinese Foreign Offices, based on a draft questionnaire which relates to various political, military and economic aspects of post-war Korea. When these studies have been completed, papers on these questions will be exchanged informally without in any way committing the respective Governments on matters of policy. Informal bilateral parallel discussions will then be held to clarify points of difference.

The question of which countries should participate in the military occupation of Korea is of immediate importance and should receive careful consideration because 1) at the request of the British Foreign Office, the problems of military occupation in Korea are not included among those questions now being studied in the Department and by the British and Chinese Foreign Offices, 2) the entrance of the Soviet Union in the war against Japan would result in the presence of Soviet forces in Korea which would be an important factor in determining the composition of the occupational forces, and 3) the traditional interest of the Soviet Union in Korea raises the possibility that it will wish to participate in the military occupation of Korea even though the Soviet Union may not enter the war in the Pacific.

(2) The second important question concerning Korea prior to independence is what countries should participate in an interim international administration or trusteeship for Korea if it is decided that such an administration should be established. In order to reduce to a minimum the period of military occupation of Korea and at the same time to prepare the Korean people for the responsibilities which will come with independence, it is our present opinion that there should be in Korea, following the period of occupation and prior to the establishment of Korean independence, some form of international administration or trusteeship, such administration or trusteeship to function until such time as the Koreans are able to govern themselves.

If an interim international administration or trusteeship is established for Korea under the authority of the projected international organization, that organization would presumably appoint as trustees those countries principally interested in Korea including the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union. Moreover, even if an interim administrative authority for Korea is established independently of the projected international organization, the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union would naturally take an active part in such an administration. The position of the

Soviet Union in the Far East is such that it would seem advisable to have Soviet representation on an interim international administration regardless of whether or not the Soviet Union enters the war in the Pacific.

The studies on problems of post-war Korea have not yet progressed far enough to enable the Department to make recommendations on either the exact structure of any interim international supervisory authority for Korea, or the time when Korea should be granted independence. However, it is the view of the Department that an agreement should be reached at an early date among the principal interested powers on the question of whether an interim international supervisory authority is to be established for Korea and if so what powers are to be represented thereon in order to avoid the possibility of an extended period of occupation and to prevent an unnecessary postponement of Korean independence.

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### ENTRY OF THE SOVIET UNION INTO THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN<sup>1</sup>

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)* <sup>2</sup>

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 4 October 1944.

PRIORITY

Number 76. Top Secret and Personal from the President to Ambassador Harriman.

. . . . .  
Will you please deliver the following message to Marshal Stalin at once:

. . . . .  
You will, by this time, have received from General Deane, the statement of our Combined Chiefs of Staff position relative to the war against Japan<sup>3</sup> and I want to reiterate to you how completely I accept the assurances which you have given us on this point. Our three countries are waging a successful war against Germany and we can surely join together with no less success in crushing a nation that I am sure in my heart is as great an enemy of Russia as she is of ours.

. . . . .  
ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> See also the paper entitled "Political and Military Situation in China in the Event the U. S. S. R. Enters the War in the Far East", *ante*, pp. 351-352.

<sup>2</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. For the full text of the message, see *ante*, pp. 6-7.

<sup>3</sup> The President evidently was referring to the Joint Chiefs of Staff position alluded to *infra*.



Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] 4 October 1944.

Number 626, 4 October 1944, Top Secret and Personal from the President for the Prime Minister.

I am asking our military people in Moscow to make available to you our Joint Chiefs' statement to Stalin.<sup>2</sup>

ROOSEVELT

<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels. For the full text of the message, see *ante*, pp. 7-8.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. The statement referred to was a message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Deane dated September 28, 1944, setting forth the Joint Chiefs' strategic concept of Soviet participation in the war against Japan. The missions for Soviet forces envisaged in this concept were: (1) securing the Trans-Siberian Railroad and the Vladivostok Peninsula; (2) setting up American and Soviet strategic air forces for operations against Japan from the Maritime Provinces and the Kamchatka Peninsula; (3) interdiction of lines of communications between Japan proper and the Asiatic mainland; (4) destruction of Japanese ground and air forces in Manchuria; and (5) securing the Pacific supply route, in which Soviet participation would include (a) making Petropavlovsk available for United States use as a naval base and areas on the Kamchatka Peninsula as air bases; (b) neutralization by air of southern Sakhalin and Hokkaido; (c) improvement of port facilities and inland transportation at and from Nikolaeusk, Magadan, Petropavlovsk, and Sovietskaya Gagan; (d) military occupation of southern Sakhalin; and (e) Soviet naval cooperation with the United States Navy as the situation dictated. See Deane, pp. 241-242. A substantially similar restatement of these views appeared in J. C. S. 1176/6, dated January 18, 1945, enclosure A, section 6b. See *post*, pp. 392-393.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 10 October 1944.

Personal and Top Secret for the President from Harriman.

4. As to the Far East I am a little concerned that the Prime Minister's talks with Stalin may minimize the importance of the conferences that have been agreed to between General Deane and the Red Army Staff. We now have a full agreement from Stalin not only to participate in the Pacific war but to enter the war with full effort. The important thing now therefore is to ascertain what are the Russians' capabilities in the East. In this the limiting factors are of course the

<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

logistics about which we know so little. General talks are no longer needed and full discussions by General Deane are therefore the next essential step. The Prime Minister's talks therefore with Stalin should emphasize the importance of the detailed Staff discussions. I will try to see that the Prime Minister's conversations take this line. I have already General Ismay's agreement.

It would be helpful to have your reaction to any of the above for my guidance.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 11 October 1944.

Personal and Top Secret for the President from Harriman.

I had a satisfactory talk with Churchill last night regarding the proposed conversations with Stalin about the Far East. We have agreed subject to your approval that there should be a meeting on Friday<sup>2</sup> afternoon with Stalin and his military on one side and Churchill Brooke Ismay General Deane and myself on the other. Churchill is agreed that the primary objective of the talk should be for us to draw Stalin out on the broader subjects raised by the Chiefs of Staff in their cable to Deane<sup>3</sup> namely how soon after the collapse of Germany Stalin will be ready to take active measures against Japan and in general what Russia's capabilities will be. I believe that we can get from Stalin out of this meeting a general picture of the Soviet position which will be a useful preliminary to detailed conversations to follow between General Deane and the Red Army Staff. I believe you will wish it understood however that these subsequent conversations are to be Soviet-American and not three cornered, the British being kept informed. The Prime Minister is anxious to know from you how far he can go in outlining our general Pacific strategy. He feels that Stalin would wish to know in general at least about our intentions since we are asking for his. I am satisfied that such a meeting with Stalin at the present time as described above will develop information of great importance that cannot be obtained in any other way at the present time and will materially assist rather than interfere with Deane's subsequent conversations. Churchill will of course make plain to Stalin that although the British will participate fully in the Pacific the planning is now primarily an American responsibility. I recommend that you approve the conversation outlined above.

<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> October 13. The meeting under reference actually took place on the evening of October 14. See *post*, pp. 364-368.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*<sup>1</sup>

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 11 October 1944.

Number 83. Top Secret and Personal. From the President for Ambassador Harriman.

Regarding our war plans for the Pacific, I understand that Deane has all the information as to American plans that are available and that he has given, or will give, this information to the Soviet Staff.

If Deane has already informed the Soviet Staff and unless Deane should consider it inadvisable at the present time, I have no objection to your giving this information to Churchill.

You are correct in assuming that the Pacific campaign will remain an American command and there is no objection to Churchill's informing the Soviet that the British Fleet and British Land and Air Forces will participate in those areas, at present undetermined, where their services will be of the greatest value to the war against Japan.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 15 October 1944.

(Personal and Top Secret for the eyes only of the President from Harriman)

At a military conference last night General Brooke assisted by the Prime Minister presented the military situation and the allied plans on the Western and Italian fronts. Stalin expressed his opinion that the attack on the Ruhr was the knockout blow for Germany but again argued for the turning of the Siegfried Line to the south through Switzerland. Churchill explained the impracticability of such a move and expressed confidence that Allied preponderance of strength resulting from United States reinforcements gave promise of success for the drive in the north. In connection with the Italian campaign Stalin showed great interest in the proposed amphibious operations on the Istrian Peninsula, indicating the possibility of Allied and Soviet forces joining hands in Austria. General Antonov, Deputy Chief of the Red staff, presented the Red Army position. An offensive is now under way in the extreme north. The Red Army is only 2 miles from Petsamo, which is expected to be taken very soon. Rem-

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

nants of the 3 German divisions in this area may withdraw to Norway. An offensive is planned against the 5 German divisions in North Central Finland who may also attempt to withdraw to Norway. Stalin suggested a joint British and Russian operation against Norway to cut these units off. The Prime Minister explained that the British have no ground forces available but was ready to discuss naval cooperation. Antonov explained that about 30 divisions were now isolated in the Western Latvian Peninsula which will take some time to liquidate. Next he explained the developments in Hungary and Yugoslavia, stating that the Red Army would not advance further west in Yugoslavia after Belgrade is captured and would concentrate on occupying Hungary and encircling as much as possible of the German force of 23 divisions in Hungary. Stalin explained that the drive in this sector will be their immediate major offensive, advancing through Austria to take Vienna. This will open a new route into Germany to the west of Czechoslovakia and then to the northwest in the direction of the Oder at Breslau. On the central sector from Lithuania to the Carpathians, where the Germans have some 120 divisions, the Russians are maintaining constant pressure. The timing of the attack against East Prussia and the encircling of Warsaw will depend upon the progress of the operations on the 2 flanks. Stalin emphasized that the developments in the south had offered a new approach to Germany which appeared attractive because of the lack of German prepared defences in that area. The final outcome may be a drive from both the central sector and penetrating of Germany from the south or from either of them depending on the developments of the situation. Stalin stated he had in all 300 divisions at his disposal in the European theater. In discussing when Germany might be expected to be defeated he stated that after the campaign in January "we will be able to judge". Going back to an earlier inquiry of Churchill, Stalin said that Churchill could now see that the Germans would be unable to withdraw forces from the east to reinforce the west.

General Brooke described the situation in Burma. General Deane then outlined the developments of the war in the Pacific and the role that Russia might play.<sup>2</sup> He asked for the information desired by the Chiefs of Staff as to Russian intentions and capabilities. The Prime Minister limited his remarks to explanation of the forces the British would be able to place at the disposal of the United States command in the Pacific after the defeat of Germany. Marshal Stalin showed great interest, grasp, and general approval throughout General Deane's presentation. Lieut. General Shevehenke [*Shevchenko*], Chief of Staff to the Far Eastern Commander, was present. As the hour was late even for Moscow, it was agreed that the Russian position in the Far East should be presented at a meeting today.

<sup>2</sup> See *infra*.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane), to the Joint Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 15 October 1944.

NCR 4463. (To AGWAR for the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their eyes only Top Secret. From Deane.)

Tonight<sup>2</sup> attended a meeting between the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin at which were present Field Marshal Brooke, Ismay, Burrows and Jacob on the British side, Molotov, General Antonov and the Chief of Staff of the Soviet Far East Forces on the Soviet side and the Ambassador and I on the American side.

The meeting opened with Field Marshal Brooke presenting a résumé of the European situation and the situation in Italy. It was a very fair presentation and presented a good picture of British and American collaboration.

With regard to the situation in France Marshal Stalin suggested the possibility of an invasion through Switzerland in order to outflank the Siegfried Line. In connection with the Italian campaign Marshal Stalin said that Soviet forces did not intend to advance westward through Yugoslavia and indicated he thought we might join up eventually in the vicinity of Vienna.

The Prime Minister then gave a complete résumé of British participation in the war indicating that they had the equivalent of 90 divisions involved including of course all the home forces and separate and foreign garrisons.

Field Marshal Brooke then explained the Burma campaign tying it in closely with our operations over the hump and the ground and air operations in China. Again he made a very fair presentation.

I was then called upon to discuss the Pacific campaign. My summary was along the following lines. First a brief description of the period of Japanese aggression, the strategy which has been consistently approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the turn of the tide at Coral Sea and Midway and the operations in the Aleutians, and a description of the southern approach through the Solomons and New Guinea and the central Pacific approach thus bringing the situation up to date.

I then gave them the information about proposed operations which you sent to me in your last telegram.<sup>3</sup> In this connection I emphasized that with regard to the "invasion of Japan phase" our Chiefs of Staff thought it was important that the plan to be selected and applied

<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> The evening of October 14.

<sup>3</sup> Dated October 12, 1944; not printed.

should be concerted with plans for operations against Japan from the north.

I then gave them the strategic objectives which you authorized me to suggest to them as coming from you.<sup>4</sup> This of course included the part they might play in securing the lines of communications across the north Pacific. I told them that the United States was prepared to assist the Soviet Union to the extent consistent with our commitments in the war against Germany by supplying munitions and particularly B-24 aircraft for building up of a Soviet air force. I stated that from the military point of view our Chiefs of Staff were hopeful that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan as soon as possible after the defeat of Germany. However that in the meantime you considered it to be of urgent importance that combined planning be started at once and that whatever preparatory measures were practicable should be started now suggesting what some of the preparatory measures might be.

I concluded by stating that the Chiefs of Staff were most concerned in the answers to the following questions:

(1) How soon after the defeat of Germany may we expect Japanese-Russian hostilities to begin?

(2) How long will it take to build up Soviet forces to take the offensive?

(3) What part of the Trans-Siberian Railroad can be devoted to the building up of a Soviet-American air force?

(4) Is the Soviet Union prepared to agree to the building up of Soviet strategic air force and undertake a training program? I stated again that we were prepared to allocate the four engined bombers at once.

Marshal Stalin apparently agreed with the strategy adopted and indicated once a blockade is effective Japanese southern conquests will fall of their own weight. He said they were in a serious plight with all their lines of communications exposed.

It was agreed that Marshal Stalin and the Soviet General Staff will state the Soviet position on the Far East at a meeting tomorrow night.

Following my talk General Antonov gave a résumé of the present situation on the Soviet front. In brief he said that operations were going to continue in the Baltic States where 30 divisions were cut off from any escape except by sea. These divisions are to be entirely liquidated. They are going to continue these operations and also occupy Hungary before they start an offensive for the invasion of Germany from the eastern front. He said the situation in Hungary opens a new possibility of attacking Germany from the south. He

<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, p. 362, footnote 2.

said the attack might be simultaneous from the east and south but the south offered possibilities because of the lack of German prepared defenses in that direction immobilizing forces on the eastern front and maintaining constant pressure and General Antonov states definitely that the Germans are unable to withdraw forces from the front. They place Axis strength at 180 German and 26 Hungarian divisions. Apparently the peace feelers by Hungary are not going well and they are not complying with the conditions that have been laid down prior to the consideration of armistice terms.

Marshal Stalin said they will either comply in two days or the Soviets will continue operations in Hungary. Apparently the direction of the main attack in Hungary is to be in the direction of Budapest and Vienna although they are going to continue the encirclement of German forces trapped in Transylvania by continuing the attack northeast from the Diebretzen [*Debrecen?*] area.

When pressed by the Prime Minister as to when the invasion of Germany proper would start Marshal Stalin seemed more optimistic than General Antonov but even he said he thought the Germans would not be defeated this year and that a winter campaign would be necessary.

At the conclusion of the meeting Marshal Stalin and Mr. Churchill were talking about the German divisions in Finland. Stalin indicated that there were 3 divisions in the Petsamo area which probably were withdrawing to Norway. He suggested in a general way that the British and Russians might collaborate in an operation in northern Norway. The Prime Minister said the British could not send any divisions but could assist in operation by naval action. The subject was dropped with the understanding that both principals would think it over.

Tomorrow night's meeting on the Pacific should be productive of information we have been seeking for a long time and I shall record it fully.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 15 October 1944.

[Received 16 October.]

Personal and Top Secret for the eyes of the President only from Harriman.

Eden substituted for the Prime Minister today in our meeting with Stalin to hear the outline of the Soviet position in the Far East. General Antonov presented the Soviet intelligence information re-

<sup>1</sup>Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

garding Japanese strength in Manchuria and the Japanese capacity to reinforce in the event of hostilities with Russia. This was greater than we give the Japs. Antonov then explained the possible avenues of attack open to the Russians and explained that it would be necessary before attacking Japan to build up the Russian forces by 30 divisions which with the 30 they now have in the Far East would give a total strength of 60 divisions. This build up can be accomplished it was stated within two and a half to three months after the collapse of Germany. Stalin then personally answered the questions which we put to him. It developed that he would like to build up beginning at once a 2 to 3 months' stock of food for the army fuel for the air force and ground transport also rails and railroad equipment to complete the Sovgavan-Komsomolsk Railroad.<sup>2</sup> A detailed explanation of the logistic was not given but it was stated that the Trans Siberian Railroad could handle about 25,000 tons a day eastbound of which about 30 per cent was needed to supply the civilian population and for the operation of the railroad. Stalin expressed the opinion that the Japanese war would be of short duration after Russia attacked and if stores could be built up now the attack could be made 2 or 3 months after Germany's collapse. He said he was not ready to give a definite date but that planning should begin at once. Furthermore there were political aspects which would have to be given consideration. Stalin expressed confidence that with the present Soviet forces accumulated stocks could be protected and indicated that he would be pleased if the Japs attacked as although there might be early reverses it would assist the morale of the Russian people. Stalin said that he would be glad to receive 4-engine bombers and instructors to train a strategic airforce for Soviet use in the war against Japan. I told him that I understood that the training of crews could commence and the planes be provided promptly as soon as an understanding was reached regarding their use. Stalin indicated that air fields at Petropavlovsk would be provided for our use as well as in the maritime provinces. He said that the air fields housing and supplies for a strategic air force should be built up in advance of hostilities and the planes brought in immediately before action was started. We got no clear indication however as to just what air force in addition to the ground forces available supply lines could support and it was agreed that a further conference should be held with Stalin and his Staff by General Deane and myself tomorrow or the next day. Eden agreed that there was no need for British participation. The conversation although inconclusive was encouraging because of Stalin's willingness to pursue planning promptly and to begin accumulating stocks now for the war against Japan.

<sup>2</sup> i. e., The Sovietskaya Gavan-Komsomolsk division of the Far Eastern Railroad.



Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 17 October 1944.

[Received 18 October.]

Personal and Top Secret for the eyes of the President only from Harriman.

General Deane and I had a long session this evening with Marshal Stalin and General Antonov on the subject of detailed planning for Soviet participation and cooperation in the Pacific war. Stalin gave us in considerably greater detail the Soviet strategy indicating quite frankly his weakness in certain areas in the event of premature attack by Japan and on the other hand outlining his general plans for a strong land offense to encircle and knock out the Japanese forces in Manchuria. General Deane will send a fuller cable to the Chiefs of Staff<sup>2</sup> and I will report to you and them on my return.

One subject that he asks be given urgent consideration is cooperation from us in the build up of supplies and equipment in the Far East through Pacific ports prior to the outbreak of hostilities. He gave us the detailed list of requirements for both ground forces and tactical and strategic air forces for two months' stocking of certain items and provision of necessary equipment totaling in all about a million tons. Other supplies he is planning to stock from the west. He will let us know within two weeks when he wishes the flow of 4-engine bombers and training of his crews to begin. He unqualifiedly asserted that this strategic air force would be built up for use only in the Far East. He hopes for help from our Navy and specifically offered us the use of Petropavlovsk as a base. He is prepared to proceed with detailed planning of all aspects of our mutual cooperation ground, air and naval and agreed to authorize his army and navy staffs to proceed accordingly with our military mission in Moscow.

He emphasized the need for secrecy and the mutual disadvantage of arousing prematurely Japanese suspicions. He referred to Harry's<sup>3</sup> talk with Gromyko regarding a meeting with you in the latter part of November and said that you and he could then come to a definite agreement on the political as well as the military aspects. In the meantime he agreed that planning should proceed preparatory to your meeting.

He generally approved our Chiefs of Staff's suggestions presented by Deane for Russian role in the war although he placed greater immediate emphasis on the action of his ground forces. He is evidently already beginning to strengthen his forces in the Far East.

<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> *Infra*.

<sup>3</sup> Hopkins. See Sherwood, pp. 844-845.

He showed that he had clearly grasped Deane's presentation of our general strategy and expressed approval and appreciation. He spoke emphatically about his determination to assist in ending the war quickly and said "Break Japan's spine". I plan to leave Thursday morning and with a break in the weather should arrive in Washington early Saturday morning, Oct 21.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane), to the Joint Chiefs of Staff*

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY

Moscow, 17 October 1944.

[Received 18 October—6:50 a. m.]

To AGWAR for Joint Chiefs of Staff for their eyes only {topsec M 21412. Tonight Mr Harriman and I had a meeting with Marshal Stalin, Mr Molotov, General Antonov and another general officer from the General Staff. Marshal Stalin first handed us a list of the supplies that would be needed from America for the build up of a two months stockage in the Far East. It included petroleum products, the biggest items of which were 120,000 tons of 100 octane gasoline, 70,000 tons of automobile gasoline, 12,000 tons of collapsible storage tanks; a list of food stuffs totalling about 180,000 tons; items of clothing and hospital supplies, totalling 14,500 tons; 500 amphibious jeeps; 1,000 dukws; 30,000 trucks; miscellaneous airdrome equipment such as snow plows and bull dozers; 400 C-47 aircraft; 100 C-54 aircraft; engineer and signal equipment of all types totalling 20,000 tons; 10 escort vessels, frigate; and 20 escort vessels, corvette; 2 mine layers; 30 mine sweepers, 50 sub chasers 110 ton, and numerous other boats.

In railroad equipment they need 500 locomotives and 5 or 6,000 cars of various types as well as about 800 kilometers of rail.

Marshal Stalin emphasized that this equipment would have to come by the Pacific route as the Soviets will be using all of the east-bound capacity of the trans-Siberian railroad for the build up in the Far East starting at once with the movement of ammunition and bombs. The total tonnage involved in the list given us is 1,056,000 tons. I will have the entire list translated and cabled to you and in addition the Ambassador will bring you copies. Of the total tonnage, 850,000 tons is dry cargo and 206,000 tons is liquid cargo.

Mr. Harriman and I had gone over the subjects that we wished to draw the Soviets out on and he did a great job in directing the discussion with a view to getting the information we wanted.

He first asked if the strategic objectives we had given, those suggested by you, met with Marshal Stalin's concurrence. Marshal Stalin replied that they did except that he thought that the offensive ground operations that we envisaged were limited too much to Manchuria. He said that their plan as worked out now is to put on the direct pressure in Manchuria but making an envelopment from the southern part of Lake Baikal through Kalgan and Peking with a view to cutting off and encircling Japanese Manchurian forces and preventing them from being reinforced from China. He plans to do this as soon as he has built up his ground strength to 60 divisions, which he estimated could be done in three months.

Marshal Stalin said that he would give equal priority to his ground and air forces and to the Soviet and American strategic air forces. He said that the tonnages that he had asked for in the build up included the gasoline and oil requirements for the United States Strategic Air Force. However, when these figures are reviewed I think you will find they are low for a two months reserve.

He is prepared to start the flow of aircraft for the build up of their strategic air force as soon as fields are prepared to receive the airplanes. Meanwhile, he feels that we should deliver the first 20 airplanes which would be used for training purposes and the training thus acquired would facilitate in delivery of the flow once it starts. He said that he would let us know in about two weeks when the flow of planes should be started. He is prepared to start a training program with our instructors for the training in the operation of a strategic air force.

Marshal Stalin is greatly concerned about secrecy in connection with all of our preparations even to the point of having nothing in writing concerning them. He feels that if the Japanese were aware of our plans they would immediately attempt to take the Vladivostok area which would be unfortunate for all of the Allies. He agreed heartily to a suggestion from the Ambassador that a cover plan should be developed which will cover delivery of the aircraft to the Soviet Union. He suggested that the aircraft be flown at night over Canada, possibly with Soviet crews. He was prepared to guarantee the secrecy once the aircraft arrived in the Soviet Union.

He seems to fear a premature Japanese attack but repeated several times that once the build up is accomplished he will remove most of the restrictions of secrecy. I gained the impression that he wanted to start the build up at once. He thinks that stock piling would be safe in a valley about 150 miles north of Vladivostok and also in the Komsomolsk area.

In speaking of the Japanese intentions he said that their first and major effort would be against Vladivostok and expected both a land

and sea attack. He said the Soviets have strong defenses in the area but that it was possible that they might lose Vladivostok if the attack occurred before they were fully prepared. He put Kamchatka as the Japanese second objective and particularly Petropavlovsk, a third objective Sakhalin. He did not venture an opinion as to when or under what conditions the Japanese would take the offensive except as noted above that they probably would attack if information of our plans leaked out. He did say that the Japanese were usually inclined to take the initiative.

Marshal Stalin emphasized the importance of the Pacific supply and spoke of the Kuriles as being the key of the situation. He agreed that we should have a naval base at Petropavlovsk and that our Naval staffs should get busy in the planning at once. He was particularly anxious that we have an operation against the north Kuriles of sufficient magnitude to insure passage through them. He thought it would be desirable if we could control the Kuriles before the Soviet Government was at war with Japan, as it would greatly decrease their chances of a successful attack against Kamchatka, which he listed as their second priority objective. He agreed that we could send naval officers there with great secrecy to make a survey of our requirements for airports and a naval air base. He said he would be willing to have us put air bases on Kamchatka for super-fortresses if we wished to.

Stalin said he planned great improvements of port facilities at Sovietskaya-Gavan and that they are already at work on the railroad from that port to Konsomolsk. It is on this railroad that much of the railway supplies that he is asking for are to be used.

I told Marshal Stalin that our present thought for the build up of the Soviet Air Force, depending, of course, on the concurrence of the Soviets, called for providing them with four groups of heavy bombers with 200 operational and a 50 per cent reserve, or a total of 300 heavy bombers; also 300 long range fighters with a 50 per cent reserve, or a total of 450. I emphasized that once Germany is defeated the size of the air force that we would be prepared to put into the Soviet Union would be limited only by the fuel that could be made available for their operation and by the number of airfields that could be made available. He agreed that fuel was certainly a limiting factor and seemed satisfied as to the size of the air force outlined. I also called attention to the fact that Soviet ground operations against the Japanese forces as the situation looked now would be closely timed with our plan of invasion of the Japanese Islands and indicated the great advantage that our combined effort would have to both

of us in preventing the shift of Japanese reserves. He agreed that the operations should be coordinated as to time.

The Ambassador then pressed Marshal Stalin for indication as to how we would go about planning of all details and initiation of all arrangements. Marshal Stalin replied that in the first place he was most anxious to have the list of requirements studied in Washington quickly with a view to starting prompt delivery. I recommend that this be given a high priority and that work on the list be expedited in Washington. Stalin then said that Mr. Hopkins, with the approval of the President, had talked with Mr. Gromyko and he had indicated that the President was anxious to meet with Marshal Stalin somewhere in the Black Sea area. He said unequivocally that he would be delighted to meet the President and was prepared to so do toward the end of November. He said that undoubtedly they would discuss the Far East situation and that they would come to definite agreements. He said, however, that the build up of supplies, the delivery of aircraft, the training of crews, should proceed. He also said that his Army, Navy and Air people and perhaps Mr. Mikoyan for Foreign trade should meet with me and other representatives from the Mission and work out the details or plans that could be presented for the President and himself when they meet. It was arranged that I would get in touch with General Antonov and we would work out a method of procedure.

Inasmuch as note taking was "Taboo" I have dictated this from memory. However, our interpreter did take notes and as soon as I obtain a copy of them I may be able to supplement this cable. In any case, the Ambassador will be in Washington at the end of the week and will go into more detail.

I feel most encouraged by the meeting tonight and would like to add that I feel the trip of the Prime Minister has resulted in expediting the discussions. The British have done everything possible to assist us in presenting the matter in the way we thought best.

Action: Gen McFarland (JCS)

Info : Adm Leahy  
Gen Arnold  
Gen Handy  
Adm King  
C of S

J. C. S. Files

*The Commanding General of the Army Air Forces (Arnold) to the  
Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (McFarland)*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 5 December 1944.

J. C. S. 1176/1

## JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

## RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Reference: J. C. S. 1176 <sup>1</sup>

## NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

The enclosed memorandum from the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, dated 3 December 1944, has been referred to the Joint Staff Planners in collaboration with the Joint Logistics Committee for necessary action.

A. J. McFARLAND

E. D. GRAVES, JR.

*Joint Secretariat*

Distribution	Copy No.	Distribution	Copy No.
Admiral Leahy	1	Captain Campbell	13
General Marshall	2 & 17	Colonel Lincoln	14
Admiral King	3	Admiral McCormick	15
General Arnold	4	Admiral Cassady	16
Admiral Edwards	5	General Wood	18
General Handy	6	General Tansey	19
General Somervell	7	Captain Tobin	20
Admiral Horne	8	Colonel Benner	21
Admiral Cooke	9	Secy, JCS	22
General Hull	10	Secy, JPS	23
Admiral Duncan	11	Secy, JSSC	24
General Lindsay	12		

Enclosure

WAR DEPARTMENT

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES

WASHINGTON

3 DECEMBER 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: Russian Participation in the War against Japan

Reference: JCS 1176

1. I approve JCS 1176 with the recognition that it is a basic paper limited to an expression of broad principles and policies.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed as such, but see J. C. S. 1176/6, *post*, pp. 388-394, and the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President, January 23, 1945, *post*, pp. 396-400.

2. I am aware that detailed planning in some cases cannot be realistically undertaken until fuller information is available concerning Russia's capabilities and intentions. Additional facts are also required on the Far Eastern-Siberian area. There are nevertheless a number of phases of Russian participation in the war which in my opinion should be anticipated and studied without delay on the basis of information now at hand. I have in mind such problems as:

- a. Creation of a stockpile in the Maritime Provinces.
- b. Securing passage through the Kurile Islands.
- c. Securing passage through La Perouse straits, with possible consideration to Russian occupation of Karafuto.
- d. Creation, training and supply of a Russian strategic bomber force.
- e. Development and use of the port of Petropavlovsk.
- f. Creation and supply of an air transport line through Petropavlovsk to the Maritime Provinces.
- g. Establishment of bases for strategic air operations from Kamchatka.
- h. Preparation for movement of Army Air Forces and other units to the Maritime Provinces, and means of supplying these units.

3. It seems to me that these and other operations, some of which are already under consideration, must be carefully gone into immediately by the Joint Staff Planners, the Joint Logistics Committee, and other agencies concerned, with a view to submitting appropriate reports and recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Those operations which are accepted should be developed and plans prepared as to when they must be done, who is going to do them, how they are going to be done, and what supplies and forces will be required. This line of action will make it possible to negotiate more realistically with the Russians, and to inform them for example that a particular operation will take twelve months to mount, which accordingly requires a decision by the Russians at once.

4. I consider that on short notice we should be prepared to present a paper to the Russians at the next staff meeting, setting forth the point of view of the United States Chiefs of Staff. A paper of this kind obviously cannot be completed far in advance, as the situation is fluid and subject to change in the light of the work of the Roberts Mission and further facts that may become available. The Joint Staff Planners should nevertheless have ready at all times studies which are as complete as possible under existing circumstances so that a single paper can be quickly prepared setting forth our objectives, capabilities and requirements as well as those of the Russians.

H. H. ARNOLD  
*General, U. S. Army*  
*Commanding General, Army Air Forces*

J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet  
(King)*

TOP SECRET  
J. C. S. 1176/2

[WASHINGTON,] 11 December 1944.

## JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

## OPERATIONS IN THE KURILES

References: *a.* J.C.S. 1176 <sup>1</sup>*b.* J.C.S. 1176/1 <sup>2</sup>

MEMORANDUM BY THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES FLEET, AND  
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

10 DECEMBER 1944.

1. Reference (*a*) presents various aspects of prospective Russian participation in the war against Japan. In this paper possible operations in the Kuriles and the necessity therefor are considered. In reference (*b*), General Arnold points out a number of specific problems in connection with operations in the Northwestern Pacific. It is my understanding that these are under study by the joint Staff Planners and other joint agencies. I am in agreement that the time has arrived for more concrete action in developing our plans for this area.

2. I have previously expressed my view that we must broaden the base for operations leading to the accomplishment of the first phase of our overall objective in the Pacific Theater. Insofar as our capabilities will permit, it will be to our advantage to keep the Japanese spread out. To this end, diversionary operations, particularly those which keep his air power from being concentrated, I believe will be found most helpful. From this standpoint, as well as from others which have been examined in connection with the establishment of an alternate sea route to the Maritime Provinces, it appears that an operation in the Kuriles, preferably in the month of May, should be planned.

3. It is recognized that unless the war in Europe ends at an early date, we probably shall not have the resources to conduct a Kuriles operation unless we depart from the concept of operations which we have adopted for planning purposes. This applies particularly to ground and service troops (it appears probable that the Naval forces, including amphibious craft, and probably air forces could be found). However, it is my opinion that we should make a decision now to carry out an operation in the Kuriles in the month of May on the

<sup>1</sup> Not printed as such, but see J. C. S. 1176/6. *post*, pp. 388-394, and the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President, January 23, 1945, *post*, pp. 396-400.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.



assumption that the European war will be concluded in time to make possible the provision of the required forces. Such an operation, diversionary in character, would, I believe, have the following effect.

(a) Threaten the Japanese from the northward, causing diversion from our main line of advance of Japanese air forces and possibly ground forces.

(b) Encourage the Russians to enter the war.

(c) Facilitate the provision of an alternate sea route to the Maritime Provinces.

(d) Broaden the base for air operations against Japan in furtherance of the first phase of our overall objective in the Pacific.

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761.93/12-1544: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

Moscow, December 15, 1944.

Personal and Top Secret for the President from Harriman.

In my talk with Stalin last night I said that you were anxious to know what political questions he had indicated in October should be clarified in connection with Russia's entry in the war against Japan. He went into the next room and brought out a map. He said that the Kurile Islands and the lower Sakhalin should be returned to Russia. He explained that the Japanese now controlled the approaches to Vladivostok, that we considered that the Russians were entitled to protection for their communications to this important port and that "all outlets to the Pacific were now held or blocked by the enemy". He drew a line around the southern part of the Liaotung Peninsula including Port Arthur and Dairen saying that the Russians wished again to lease these ports and the surrounding area.

I said that I recalled that you and he had discussed this question at Teheran and that, if my memory was correct, you had in fact initiated yourself the question of the need for Russia to have access to a warm water port in the Pacific but that on the other hand I thought you had in mind an international free port rather than the lease of this area by the Russians; that this method, you felt, would give the Soviets the needed protection and was more in the line with present day concepts of how international questions of this kind could best be dealt with. He said "This can be discussed". Stalin said further that he wished to lease the Chinese-Eastern Railway. I asked him to define the exact lines in Manchuria in which he was interested and he pointed out the line from Dairen to Harbin thence northwest to Manchuli and east to Vladivostok. He answered affirmatively when I asked if these were the only railroad lines in Manchuria in which he was

<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

interested. In answer to my question he specifically reaffirmed that he did not intend to interfere with the sovereignty of China in Manchuria. There is of course no doubt that with control of the railroad operations and with the probability of Russian troops to protect the railroad Soviet influence will be great. He said the only consideration he had not mentioned at Teheran was the recognition of the *status quo* in Outer Mongolia—the maintenance of the Republic of Outer Mongolia as an independent identity.

This latter did not surprise me as I have been convinced for many months that this would be the Soviet attitude because of their desire for protection for their long southern Siberian boundary.

Except for my remarks regarding the ports I made no comment. I will not bring the subject up again unless you instruct me to do so. I feel that if you wish more detailed information it might be useful for me to obtain it prior to your meeting.

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FEC Files

*Memorandum of the Division of Territorial Studies*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

CAC-302

[WASHINGTON,] December 28, 1944.

JAPAN:  
TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS:  
THE KURILE ISLANDS

I. *The Problem*

The problem is the future disposition of the Kurile Islands.

II. *Basic Factors*

The Kurile Islands have strategic importance for Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States. They also have appreciable economic value for Japan.

A. *Description*

The Kuriles form a chain of 47 sparsely inhabited volcanic islands extending for about 690 miles in a northeasterly direction from Hokkaido, the northernmost of Japan's main islands, to the Russian peninsula of Kamchatka. They have an area of approximately 3,944 square miles. The permanent population 17,550 (1940), all Japanese, is increased during the summer months by 20,000 to 30,000 seasonal workers in the fishing industry. Japan has been in possession of the southern Kuriles since about 1800. Russia, which

<sup>1</sup> Prepared by George H. Blakeslee. This memorandum was not included in the Yalta Briefing Book and no evidence has been found to indicate that it was brought to the attention of Roosevelt or Stettinius.

was advancing into the northern islands from Kamchatka, recognized Japan's title to these southern islands in 1855; in 1875 Russia withdrew from all the Kuriles in return for Japan's withdrawal from Southern Sakhalin. The Kuriles are considered to be a part of Japan proper and for administrative purposes are under the Hokkaido prefecture.

The economic importance of the islands is due almost entirely to the fishing industry, whose output in 1938 was estimated at about \$9,000,000. Fish products are essential in the Japanese diet and form an important item in Japan's export trade. The Kurile fishing industry will be of increasing importance to Japan if the Soviet Union further restricts or closes to the Japanese access to the inshore fishing grounds of Eastern Siberia.

The Kuriles are important strategically to both Japan and the Soviet Union because they are a connecting chain between the two countries and provide bases for both defense and attack. They are also important to the Soviet Union because they form a military screen to the ocean approach to the Okhotsk Sea and the Maritime provinces. They are important to the United States because they are near the Aleutians, form part of the land-bridge between Japan and Alaska, and are situated on the great-circle route between the United States and Japan. Japan has established a number of fortified air and naval bases on the islands.

The Kuriles may be divided into three groups: southern, central and northern. The southern group, which extends about 235 miles north from Hokkaido up to and including the island of Etorofu, contains 90 percent of the total population of the Kuriles and has been admittedly Japanese territory since about 1800. The nearest point in the group is only about 12 miles from Hokkaido. The people are Japanese and their life is the same as that in the main islands of Japan. The strategic value of these islands is limited by the fact that for about half of the year the waters of Okhotsk Sea to the west of the Kuriles is largely filled with ice and almost impassable.

The central group, beginning with the large island of Uruppu, extends north about 375 miles, is largely unpopulated and has almost negligible economic value. It is important strategically; the islands lie across the entrance into Okhotsk Sea, and Shimushiru, 31 miles long and 5 miles wide, encloses Broughton (Buroton) Bay, which can be developed into an important base and possible fleet anchorage. The *Handbook on the Kurile Islands*, issued in November, 1943 by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, says of this bay: "If the entrance has been improved, Broughton Bay is now a magnificent harbor." The *Survey of the Kurile Islands*, issued by the Military Intelligence Service of the War Department, states: "This bay would be one of the critical factors in operations in the Kurile Islands." The

entrance to the bay, which was only six feet deep, is apparently being deepened. The engineering task of making the entrance passable for any ships is not insurmountable. The area of the bay is not fortified. The central islands have the further strategic value of constituting stepping stones from the southern to the northern group.

The northern group, comprising three principal islands, Paramushiro, Shimushu and Araitō, is important both for its fisheries and for its air and naval bases. The value of the fisheries and of other marine products in and around the northern group amounted in 1938 to \$7,000,000 of the total \$9,000,000 for all of the Kuriles. Geographically, the group represents a continuation of Kamchatka, the strait separating Shimushu from Kamchatka being only seven miles wide.

Important factors which may affect the decision as to the disposition of the Kuriles are (1) the desire of the American Navy that a United Nations base or bases should be established on some of the islands, (2) possible pressure from the Soviet Government, whether or not it enters the war against Japan, for the acquisition of the northern and central groups and possibly of all the Kuriles, and (3) the desirability of extending the principle of international control to all of the islands detached from the Japanese Empire as a result of the war.

## *B. Claims and Possible Solutions*

### *1. Japan*

Japan has a strong claim to the southern group of the Kuriles on the basis of nationality, self-determination, geographic propinquity, economic need and historic possession.

Japan's claim to the central islands is based almost solely on the ground of possession. If, as it may be assumed, the southern and central islands should be demilitarized and subject, for such a period as may appear adequate, to a system of military inspection by an international agency, their retention by Japan would appear not to constitute a threat to other states.

To the northern group Japan's claim is based primarily on its need to retain the fishing industry centered on those islands. Ownership of the islands would be more satisfactory to Japan than a grant of fishing rights in territory under control of one or more other powers. However, whatever disposition may be made of the Kuriles, Japan might be permitted to continue to carry on its fishing industry throughout the islands.

### *2. The Soviet Union*

The Soviet Union has a substantial claim to the northern group, Shimushu, Paramushiro and Araitō, on the grounds of propinquity and the consequent desirability of controlling these islands to prevent them from becoming a military menace if in the possession of a hostile power.

The Soviet Government may ask not only for the northern islands, but also for the central and possibly even for the southern group. Possession of the northern and central islands would give the Soviet Union control of passages into the Okhotsk Sea which are practically ice-free throughout the year. There would seem, however, to be few factors which would justify a Soviet claim to the southern islands; this transfer to the Soviet Union would create a situation which a future Japan would find difficult to accept as a permanent solution. It would deprive Japan of islands which are historically and ethnically Japanese and of waters which are valuable for fishing. If the southern islands should be fortified they would be a continuing menace to Japan.

The situation may be complicated by a Soviet demand that the other United Nations agree to the transfer to the Soviet Union of the northern group or of both the northern and central groups as a *quid pro quo* for the Soviet Union's entering the war against Japan.

### 3. *The United States*

The United States Navy wishes a base on the Kuriles which it might use in case of naval operations in this area. It is not clear whether such a base would be under international administration or whether it would be a Russian base open to American ships and planes under designated conditions.

### 4. *The Projected International Organization*

The northern group or both the northern and central groups might be placed under the authority of the projected international organization. This solution would most completely remove the military menace from their use by any one power. It would also make possible the establishment on the northern group, which is of particular strategic importance, of an international base or bases.

The international organization might designate as administering authority either an international mixed commission, or more likely the Soviet Union. In the latter case the Soviet Union would doubtless establish the base or bases which, it is hoped would be available for the use of the United States and other United Nations.

It would appear undesirable for the United States to be sole administrator of these islands or to have sole possession of bases, since it would place this country in a distant and dangerous position in case of future difficulties with the Soviet Union.

If the northern and central groups should be placed under the projected international organization rather than given to the Soviet Union in full sovereignty it would be more likely that Japan might obtain the right to continue to carry on the fishing industry in and around the northern islands, an important factor in Japan's national economy; and (2) it would be easier to obtain general American support for the recommendations that Japan's Mandated Islands and

Marcus Island be placed under the authority of the projected international organization and administered by the United States.

### III. Recommendations

It is recommended that:

(1) the southern Kuriles should be retained by Japan subject to the principles of disarmament to be applied to the entire Japanese Empire,

(2) the northern and central Kuriles should be placed under the projected international organization which should designate the Soviet Union as administering authority, and

(3) in any case, the retention by Japan of fishing rights in the waters of the northern group should be given consideration.

Prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East.

Defense Files

*The Commanding General, Manhattan District Project (Groves), to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall)*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
WASHINGTON, December 30, 1944.

Subject: Atomic Fission Bombs

To: The Chief of Staff

It is now reasonably certain that our operation plans should be based on the gun type bomb, which, it is estimated, will produce the equivalent of a ten thousand ton TNT explosion. The first bomb, without previous full scale test which we do not believe will be necessary, should be ready about 1 August 1945.<sup>2</sup> The second one should be ready by the end of the year and succeeding ones at . . . intervals thereafter.

<sup>1</sup> A separate typewritten notation dated December 30, 1944, which is attached to this communication, reads: "Pencilled markings made by Secretary of War for emphasis in presentation to the President at our conference in the White House. L. R. G[roves]." The mentioned markings are the underscorings as shown herein.

<sup>2</sup> Stettinius (pp. 33-34) indicates that he was given information about the atomic bomb by Roosevelt a few weeks before the trip to the Crimea. In response to a telegram dated June 25, 1951, from Senator B. B. Hickenlooper, William S. Considine (formerly with the Manhattan District Project) indicated that a few days before the Yalta Conference he had delivered certain papers to Stettinius at Malta and had discussed their effectuation. In his telegram Considine then stated: "Discussion also involved questions of certainty of explosion, possible date of use and power potential of A-bomb. I advised him that my information from General Groves was that bomb would explode, that Groves had double-checked scientists on this, that probable date would be about August 1st in accordance with statement in August 1944 that bomb would be ready in year and that explosion of bomb would wreck a large city." (*Military Situation in the Far East*, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 1st sess., pt. 4, p. 3120.) It has not been possible to identify with certainty the papers that Considine delivered to Stettinius at Malta. No available records, however, contain any indication that atomic-energy matters were discussed with the British at Malta or with either the British or the Russians at Yalta.

Our previous hopes that an implosion (compression) type of bomb might be developed in the late spring have now been dissipated by scientific difficulties which we have not as yet been able to solve. The present effects of these difficulties are that more material will be required and that the material will be less efficiently used. We should have sufficient material for the first implosion type bomb sometime in the latter part of July. This bomb would have an effect which would be equivalent to about 500 tons of TNT. During the remainder of 1945 it is estimated that we can produce . . . additional bombs. The effectiveness of these should increase towards 1000 tons each as development proceeds and, if some of our problems are solved, to as much as 2500 tons.

The plan of operations while based on the more certain more powerful gun type bomb also provides for the use of the implosion type bombs when they become available. . . . The time schedule must not be adversely affected by anything other than the difficulties of solving our scientific problems. The 509th Composite Group, 20th Air Force has been organized and it is now undergoing training as well as assisting in essential tests.

The time has now come when we should acquaint the Assistant Chief of Staff OPD and possibly one of his assistants and the Chief of Staff of the 20th Air Force, Brigadier General Lauris Norstad with sufficient information so that the formulation of adequate plans and the necessary troop movements may be carried out without difficulty and without loss in security. It is proposed also that General Norstad, who is about to visit the Southwest Pacific, be authorized to give general information to the Deputy Commander 20th Air Force, Lt. Gen. M. F. Harmon, and limited information to the Commanding General of the 21st Bomber Command, Brig. Gen. H. S. Hansell, Jr. I also feel that it would be advisable for Admiral Nimitz to be informed of our general plans in order that we will be assured the essential Navy assistance in the area. This could best be accomplished by means of a letter from Admiral King to Admiral Nimitz to be delivered by one of the naval officers now on duty under my command.

The need for security will be emphasized to the officers whom it is proposed to alert.

I have consulted with General Arnold and he feels the above proposals are desirable.

Your approval is recommended.

L. R. GROVES,  
*Major General, USA*

[Endorsements:]

To S/W I think the foregoing proposal should be approved with your concurrence G. C. M[arshall]

The Sec. of War and the President both read this paper and approved it. 12/30/44 L R G[roves]

FEC Files

*Memorandum of the Division of Territorial Studies*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

CAC-306b Preliminary  
[WASHINGTON,] January 10, 1945.

## JAPAN:

## TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS:

## JAPANESE KARAFUTO (SOUTHERN SAKHALIN)

I. *The Problem*

The problem is the future disposition of Japanese Karafuto or Southern Sakhalin.

II. *Basic Factors*

The problem arises from the probable presentation of Soviet claims to re-annex this territory. Factors which favor the transfer of Japanese Karafuto to the Soviet Union are 1) the probability that the Soviet Union will enter the war against Japan and that it will have occupied Japanese Karafuto and hence will be in a strong position to press demands for acquisition of that territory, 2) the strategic location of Japanese Karafuto in relation to the Siberian Maritime provinces and 3) its comparatively recent acquisition by Japan. On the other hand, the completely Japanese character of the population of Japanese Karafuto, its close economic integration with Japan proper, and its questionable strategic value if Japan is disarmed would seem to be logical reasons for its retention by Japan, but political factors may make such a solution impossible.

Sovereignty over Sakhalin has long been a cause of friction between Russia and Japan. In 1875 Japan gave up all claims to Sakhalin in exchange for full title to the Kuriles, but by the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905)<sup>2</sup> Japan was granted that portion of Sakhalin south of the 50 degree parallel, known as Japanese Karafuto. The Treaty also provided that both Russia and Japan engaged not to take any military measures which might impede the free navigation of the Straits of La Perouse and Tartary. Since that time Japan has been active in the colonization and exploitation of Japanese Karafuto. After November 1942 Japanese Karafuto ceased to be considered as a colony and was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Japanese interest in Sakhalin in recent times has not been restricted to the southern portion of the island. In 1920, Japan occupied Russian Sakhalin and held it until 1925. By the convention signed at

<sup>1</sup> Prepared by Hugh Borton. This memorandum was not included in the Yalta Briefing Book and no evidence has been found to indicate that it was brought to the attention of Roosevelt or Stettinius.

<sup>2</sup> Treaty of Peace between Japan and Russia signed at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, September 5, 1905. For the text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1905, pp. 824-828.



Peking on January 20, 1925,<sup>3</sup> Japan agreed to withdraw from Russian Sakhalin in return for Soviet recognition of the validity of the Portsmouth Treaty and for the right to limited oil and coal concessions in that area. Japanese fishing rights, originally provided for in an annex to the Portsmouth Treaty, were clearly defined in 1928.<sup>4</sup> On March 30, 1944, however, Japan and the Soviet Union signed a pact<sup>5</sup> whereby Japanese operations of its concessions in northern Sakhalin ceased and Japanese fishing rights were restricted.

The population of Japanese Karafuto totalled 415,000 in 1940 and was almost exclusively Japanese (99.4 percent). This total, while substantial, equals less than one percent of the population of Japan proper. The area of Japanese Karafuto of nearly 14,000 square miles is equal to 9 percent of the homeland.

Economically, Japanese Karafuto is closely integrated with Japan and practically all trade is with the homeland. By 1937 coal production amounted to seven percent and pulp and paper accounted for 16 percent of the total Japanese production, and the output of timber reached 14 percent of that of the main islands of Japan. About ten percent of the arable land in Japanese Karafuto has been under cultivation, but if the remaining portion were developed, it might sustain an increased population of nearly half a million persons.

From the point of view of the future security of the Soviet Union, Japanese Karafuto is of strategic importance. It lies athwart the most direct airline to Shanghai and Singapore from San Francisco via Dutch Harbor, Petropavlovsk and Vladivostok. It commands the approaches from the northeast to the Japan Sea, the Maritime Province of the Soviet Union and Vladivostok.

The Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943<sup>6</sup> makes no specific mention of Japanese Karafuto. It states, however, that "Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed". If Japanese Karafuto is considered to be a territory taken by violence and greed, such an interpretation would call for the abrogation of the provisions of the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905 which granted Southern Sakhalin to Japan.<sup>7</sup>

If Japan were expelled from Japanese Karafuto, the half million Japanese inhabitants now living there would either have to be repatriated, which would increase the population pressure within Japan

<sup>3</sup> Convention of Friendship and Economic Cooperation between Japan and the Soviet Union. For the text in English translation, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxxxii, pp. 894-905.

<sup>4</sup> By the Fisheries Convention between the Soviet Union and Japan signed at Moscow January 23, 1928. For the English official text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. lxxx, pp. 341-399.

<sup>5</sup> For the text in English translation, see Andrew Rothstein, *Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War* (London, etc., 1945-1946), vol. II, pp. 59-61.

<sup>6</sup> For the text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 4, 1943, vol. ix, p. 393; or *Decade*, p. 22.

<sup>7</sup> This sentence is indicated in pencil for possible deletion or alteration.

proper, or they would remain as a real threat of future irredentism. However, if all military installations in Japanese Karafuto are dismantled and it continues to be demilitarized, it would not seem likely to become a serious threat to security even though it remained as part of Japan. Furthermore, it could supply Japan with important though limited amounts of products necessary for a peacetime economy and would provide future homesteads for possibly an additional half million Japanese settlers.

However, a claim of the Soviet Union for Japanese Karafuto will make a strong appeal. It may claim, though doubtless incorrectly, that voiding the Treaty of Portsmouth would automatically restore southern Sakhalin to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, as this territory was part of the Russian Empire prior to 1905, its transfer to the Soviet Union would not necessarily fall within the usual category of conquest and annexation.<sup>8</sup> In this situation, the application of the general principle on the one hand of "no annexation" and on the other of the "return of territories acquired by aggression" is not clear.

In view of these circumstances,<sup>9</sup> consideration should<sup>10</sup> be given to the advisability of designating Southern Sakhalin as a trust area to be placed under the authority of the proposed international organization with the Soviet Union as administrator. Such a course of action would be advantageous because 1) it would abide by the principle of no annexation of territory, 2) it would give the Soviet Union control over an area which might be a danger to the security of the North Pacific if left with Japan, 3) it would assure the inhabitants of the territory the economic and social advantages envisaged for all trust areas, and 4) it would probably be less objectionable to Japan than outright cession of Japanese Karafuto to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, this alternative would have the following disadvantages: 1) The Soviet Union would doubtless prefer outright annexation;<sup>11</sup> 2) Japan would resent the loss of this territory and would be deprived of a region which would be of real value to its peacetime economy; 3) The great majority of the populace of nearly half a million Japanese would doubtless resent Soviet administration of Japanese Karafuto and many of them would seek repatriation.

### III. *Recommendations*

It is recommended that:

1) If the Soviet Union demands the retrocession of Karafuto either (a) as a prerequisite to the Soviet Union's entering the war against

<sup>8</sup> Several verbal changes for the second and third sentences of this paragraph are written in pencil in the margin. Their connection with the text is not clear enough to be indicated.

<sup>9</sup> This phrase is indicated in pencil for possible deletion.

<sup>10</sup> The word "also" is inserted in pencil.

<sup>11</sup> A marginal notation at this point reads: "difficult see how trusteeship works".

Japan or (b), having entered the war against Japan, as a recompense for the Soviet Union's military contribution, the United States endeavor to satisfy the Soviet Union with the promise of United States support at the peace table in a proposal whereby Karafuto would be designated as a trust area and placed under the authority of the projected international organization which would appoint the Soviet Union as administering authority.

2) If the Soviet Union in circumstances outlined under 1) is not satisfied with the proposed disposition in paragraph 1) or if the Soviet Union makes demands for the retrocession of Karafuto without having entered the war against Japan or without having offered commitments in regard thereto the position of the United States should depend upon circumstances existing at that time.

3) If the Soviet Union does not press demands for the retrocession of Japanese Karafuto, whether or not it enters the war against Japan, Japanese Karafuto should be retained by Japan subject to the principles of disarmament to be applied to the whole Japanese Empire and to the following provisions:

- a) The United Nations to be given facilities for civil aviation;
- b) La Perouse Strait should continue to be open to international shipping at all times.

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J. C. S. Files

*Report by the Joint Staff Planners*

TOP SECRET

J. C. S. 1176/6

(SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION)

[WASHINGTON,] 18 January 1945.<sup>1</sup>

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Reference: J. C. S. 1176 Series

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

1. The attached report (Enclosure "A"), prepared by the Joint Staff Planners on their own initiative, is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. A memorandum by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces is attached as Enclosure "B."<sup>2</sup>

A. J. McFARLAND,  
E. D. GRAVES, JR.,  
*Joint Secretariat*

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<sup>1</sup> The text here printed is as amended and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 24.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This memorandum dealt with technical aspects of the locations of weather stations.

Distribution	Copy No.	Distribution	Copy No.
Adm. Leahy	1	Capt. Campbell	14
Gen. Marshall	2 & 24	Col. Lincoln	15
Adm. King	3	Adm. McCormick	16
Gen. Arnold	4	Adm. Cassidy	17
Adm. Edwards	5	Gen. Wood	18
Gen. Handy	6	Gen. Tansey	19
Gen. Somervell	7	Capt. Tobin	20
Adm. Horne	8	Col. Benner	21
Adm. Cooke	9	Secy., JCS	22
Gen. Hull	10	Secy., JPS	23
Gen. Kuter	11	Secy., JSSC	25
Adm. Duncan	12	Secy., JWPC	26
Gen. Lindsay	13		

## Enclosure A

## RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

1. The coming Allied staff conference offers a favorable opportunity for advancing U. S. planning based on Russian participation in the war against Japan. In recent negotiations between General Deane and Soviet representatives to obtain much needed information and agreements for planning, it has not been possible to reach a solution on a number of important points. Further agreements are needed, and in view of the difficulties experienced in talks between General Deane and General Antonov, it appears that it would be advantageous for the President to present certain questions to Marshal Stalin for agreement.

2. A summary of important statements attributed to the Russians, briefed from messages from our military mission in Moscow, is contained in Appendix "C" (page 90).<sup>3</sup>

3. In the Enclosure to J. C. S. 1176,<sup>4</sup>

a. Paragraph 32 states:

"32. It is concluded that:

"Basic principles regarding our policy toward Russia's entry into the war against Japan are:

"a. We desire Russian entry at the earliest possible date consistent with her ability to engage in offensive operations and are prepared to offer the maximum support possible without prejudice to our main effort against Japan.

"b. We consider that the mission of Russian Far Eastern Forces should be to conduct an all-out offensive against Man-

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed as such, but the present paper is a revised version thereof.

churia to force the commitment of Japanese forces and resources in North China and Manchuria that might otherwise be employed in the defense of Japan, to conduct intensive air operations against Japan proper and to interdict lines of communication between Japan and the mainland of Asia."

*b.* Paragraph 33 states:

"33. In furtherance of these principles we should adopt the following courses of action to assist the Russians in preparations for war:

"*a.* Deliver maximum possible supplies to Russia.

"*b.* Provide full assistance to the creation and training of a Russian strategic air force and the provision and preparation of adequate bases for strategic air forces in eastern Siberia and Kamchatka."

*c.* Paragraph 34 states:

"34. We should enter into immediate negotiations with Russia to determine the feasibility, practicability, desirability and necessity for undertaking any or all of the following courses of action:

"*a.* To establish air and naval forces in Kamchatka, including the naval base at Petropavlovsk.

"*b.* To base U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Kamchatka and the Maritime Provinces.

"*c.* To develop an air transport route from Kamchatka to eastern Siberia.

"*d.* To seize one or more positions in the Kurile Islands.

"*e.* To permit Russian submarines and light naval craft to operate from our bases in the Aleutians."

4. The special planning group headed by General Roberts has gone to Moscow under arrangements to meet with a corresponding special planning group from the Red General Staff. However, no meeting has yet been scheduled by the Russians. This group should obtain much needed information as to Russian intentions and capabilities so that realistic planning can go forward rapidly. A U.S. party will leave shortly to make a technical survey of southern Kamchatka.

5. Previous staff studies have developed the following factors in regard to any operations on our part in the northwestern Pacific.

*a.* Any Russian act of war or suspicion thereof by the Japanese or any operations of ours to occupy Kamchatka or seize positions in the Kuriles would cause the Japanese to prohibit the free access of Lend-Lease or MILEPOST cargoes to Siberian ports. Thus any operations on our part in the above areas should not be undertaken until Russia's entry is imminent.

*b.* The routes to Sea of Okhotsk-Amur River ports are probably the only ones which will be available for continued use after hostilities begin. Any shipping to the Sea of Okhotsk is possible only during the months of June through October due to ice conditions. The amount of post-hostility shipping required over such routes cannot at present be estimated. It depends on Russian needs beyond the

capacity of the trans-Siberian routes and also as to whether or not the United States is to operate air forces from eastern Siberia.

*c.* In regard to the latter the Russians have recently taken the stand, contrary to previous statements, that their own requirements preclude basing any United States air or naval forces in the Maritime Provinces. However, efforts should continue towards securing Russian agreement to the principle of eventual U.S. strategic air operations from eastern Siberia, following which detailed discussions should be undertaken.

*d.* In order to open a sea route to the Sea of Okhotsk it is necessary to secure control of one of the northern Kurile straits. In spite of strong Japanese forces in Paramushiro-Shimushu it may be that this control can be achieved from air and naval forces based on Kamchatka without the necessity of undertaking the difficult and costly amphibious operations incident to the seizure of key points in the Kuriles. Should the results of current studies including the report of the Kamchatka survey party, indicate that Kamchatka alone will not secure the straits then, in any event, we should first develop air bases in Kamchatka before attempting an assault in the Kuriles. In this connection any assistance that Russia could render in regards to developing housing, airfields and communications in Kamchatka before her entry in the war and without arousing Japanese suspicions would make our task much easier. Finally in this connection it should be noted that considering the extreme winter weather and extensive summer fogs, by far the most favorable period for an assault on the Kuriles is May-June.

*e.* The state of the war in Europe and our lack of resources in the Pacific render it most doubtful that we can undertake a Kuriles operation during 1945, although establishment of our forces in Kamchatka after the defeat of Germany remains a possibility depending upon the amount of assistance Russia would require for defense and development.

*f.* It might be possible to base B-29's in Kamchatka to assist in the strategic bombing of Japan. However, the poor weather, distances involved (1500 statute miles from the Petropavlovsk area to Tokyo) and difficulties of airdrome construction indicate that Kamchatka is the least desirable as a possible very heavy bomber (VHB) base area of all those within range of Japan.

*g.* Further plans and information may show that the total requirements across a Pacific line of communications to Siberia may turn out to be beyond the capacity of a route across the Sea of Okhotsk. In this event major operations would be required to open the straits north of Hokkaido. This would involve a complete change in our concept of operations and is unacceptable.

#### CONCLUSIONS

"6. We conclude that:

*a.* In negotiations with the Russians we should determine as soon as possible:

(1) Any new factors as to the optimum timing from the Russian viewpoint of her entry into the war against Japan, particularly with respect to her logistic capabilities.

(2) Latest information as to the concept of Russian operations after hostilities are opened.

(3) The extent to which Russian operations on the mainland of Siberia will depend on a Pacific supply route after outbreak of war.

(4) Whether or not the Russian estimate of air forces to be based in the Maritime Provinces includes a Russian strategic air force, and if so, its strength and composition and Russian plans for pre-hostility base development.

(5) Potentialities of Kamchatka for the basing of defensive ground forces, air and light naval forces, and Russia's capabilities and intentions toward the developing of bases for such forces prior to her entry into the war.

(6) Russian requirements, if any, for United States assistance in the defense of Kamchatka, particularly as regards ground forces.

*b.* We should:

(1) State the basic principles as to Russian entry into the war against Japan as follows:

(a) Basic principles regarding our policy toward Russia's entry in the war against Japan are:

(i) We desire Russian entry at the earliest possible date consistent with her ability to engage in offensive operations and are prepared to offer the maximum support possible without prejudice to our main effort against Japan.

(ii) We consider that the mission of Russian Far Eastern forces should be to conduct an all-out offensive against Manchuria to contain Japanese forces and resources in North China and Manchuria that might otherwise be employed in the defense of Japan; to conduct, in conjunction with U. S. strategic air forces based in Siberia, intensive air operations against Japan proper; and to interdict lines of communication between Japan and the mainland of Asia.

(b) In furtherance of these principles, we should deliver the maximum possible supplies without detriment to our own war effort.

(c) We should enter into immediate negotiations with Russia to determine the feasibility, practicability, desirability and necessity for undertaking any or all of the following courses of action:

(i) To establish air and naval forces in Kamchatka, including the naval base at Petropavlovsk.

(ii) To base U. S. strategic air forces in Eastern Siberia.

(iii) To develop an air transport route from Kamchatka to Eastern Siberia.

(iv) To open a North Pacific line of communication to Siberia.

(v) To permit Russian submarines and light naval craft to operate from our bases in the Aleutians.

(2) Indicate to the Russians that any operations by us to open sea routes to Sea of Okhotsk-Amur River ports will be extremely costly and at the expense of our own efforts toward Japan from the south; that because of limitation of means, the probability of amphibious operations in the North Pacific in 1945 is remote.

(3) Emphasize that if we are to conduct a difficult campaign to open a sea route of only limited capacity the U. S. and U. S. S. R. should insure that the use made of the route will be that which will bring about earliest defeat of Japan.

(4) Indicate clearly that if a supply route is opened and maintained by the diversion of U. S. forces and resources, in order to gain full advantage of this effort, we expect Russian agreement to the basing of U. S. strategic air forces in eastern Siberia.

c. The points discussed above have to do with U. S.-U. S. S. R. matters essentially, and should be taken up if possible in U. S.-U. S. S. R. meetings; details should be worked out between U. S. and U. S. S. R. staff representatives. If taken up at the tripartite meetings they should be covered only in the broadest terms. (A proposed message to General Deane is attached as Appendix "B"; its purpose is to set before the Russians the points we propose to discuss bilaterally and to give them opportunity to make additions or amendments to these subjects.)"

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

7. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

- a. Present to the President the memorandum in Appendix "A."<sup>5</sup>
- b. Dispatch to General Deane the message in Appendix "B."
- c. Approve the conclusions in paragraph 6 above and note the summary of important statements in Appendix "C."

#### Appendix "B"

#### DRAFT

#### MESSAGE FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO COMMANDING GENERAL U. S. MILITARY MISSION TO U. S. S. R.

In WAR \* , U. S. proposals for the agenda for the U. S.-British-U. S. S. R. tripartite military conference were furnished to you. The United States Chiefs of Staff propose the following subjects for discussion between the U. S. and U. S. S. R. staffs at the time of the tripartite conference:

a. Timing, general plan, and requirements for U. S. assistance for Russian operations in Manchuria, eastern Siberia, Kamchatka and Sakhalin.

b. Use by U. S. forces including strategic air forces of bases in Kamchatka-eastern Siberia areas, and Soviet capabilities of providing bases and logistic support to these forces.

c. Provision of weather and communication facilities in Siberia for the United States.

d. MILEPOST requirements and progress.

<sup>5</sup> For the text of appendix A, see the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President, January 23, 1945, *post*, pp. 396-400.

\* Appendix "B" to J. C. S. 1227/2. [Footnote in the source paper. The paper in question is not printed herein.]



e. Requirements for trans-Pacific supply of Russian and U. S. forces operating in Siberia.

The United States Chiefs of Staff would welcome Soviet suggestions as to additions or modifications to the above.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> An endorsement below this paragraph indicates that the message was sent on January 23, 1945. The agenda was presented by Deane to Antonov on January 24.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane)*

TOP SECRET  
WAR 23255

[WASHINGTON,] January 18, 1945.

This replies to your M 22261.<sup>1</sup>

In such further discussions with the Russians as you consider profitable in the limited time prior to ARGONAUT you will be guided by the following:

a. Determine from the Russians, without giving any impression whatsoever of commitments, if any trans-Pacific aid will be required to sustain Russian effort after she enters the war, assuming that MILEPOST has been completed.

b. Indicate to the Russians that any operations by U. S. to open sea routes to Sea of Okhotsk—Amur river ports will be costly and at the expense of our own efforts toward Japan from the south; that because of limitation of means amphibious operations in the North Pacific in 1945 are remote.

c. Emphasize that if a difficult campaign were conducted to open a sea route of only limited capacity the U. S. and U. S. S. R. should insure that use made of the route will be that which will bring about earliest defeat of Japan.

d. Stress the desirability of the early employment and exploitation of the combined Russian and U. S. air superiority over the Japanese. Point out limitations of island air bases available to U. S. within air range of Japan and the availability immediately after hostilities of experienced U. S. Strategic Air Force Units. In view of Soviet opposition to basing U. S. Forces in the Maritime Provinces, point out that surely in eastern Siberia, there must be areas from which U. S. Air Forces, either heavy or very heavy bombers could operate. Emphasize that there is no intention of displacing Russian Air Forces by U. S. Units, or of interfering with the Russian campaign on the Asiatic mainland. Emphasize that operations of U. S. Strategic Air

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Forces from eastern Siberia would assist in denying munitions to the Jap Manchurian Army and consequently directly support the Russians on that front.

e. Because detailed plans for the employment of U. S. Air Forces in eastern Siberia, such as the one you propose have not been fully examined, particularly as to logistics, you will not submit any such plans to the Russians at this time, or propose the basing in Russia of a U. S. Air Force of definite composition.

Finally therefore you should endeavor to secure agreement in principle by the Russians to the eventual employment of U. S. Air Forces from eastern Siberian bases in the event future developments indicate this employment to be both practicable and advantageous.

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J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 22 January 1945.

C. C. S. 417/11

OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

1. The agreed over-all objective in the war against Japan has been expressed as follows (C. C. S. 417/9<sup>2</sup>):

To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:

(1) Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength.

(2) Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff have adopted the following as a basis for planning in the war against Japan:

The concept of operations for the main effort in the Pacific is (C. C. S. 417/10):

a. Following the Okinawa operation to seize additional positions to intensify the blockade and air bombardment of Japan in order to create a situation favorable to:

b. An assault on Kyushu for the purpose of further reducing Japanese capabilities by containing and destroying major enemy forces and further intensifying the blockade and air bombardment in order to establish a tactical condition favorable to:

c. The decisive invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through the Tokyo Plain.

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<sup>1</sup> Quoted by W. Averell Harriman in statement submitted to a Joint Senate Committee, August 17, 1951; printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, September 3, 1951, vol. xxv, p. 373. This document constituted appendix B to the final report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister at Yalta. See *post*, p. 830.

<sup>2</sup> This document (not printed herein) came from the Quebec Conference of 1944.

3. The following sequence and timing of operations have been directed by the United States Chiefs of Staff and plans prepared by theater commanders:—

<i>Objectives</i>	<i>Target Date</i>
Continuation of operations in the Philippines (Luzon, Mindoro, Leyte)	—
Iwo Jima	19 February 1945
Okinawa and extension therefrom in the Ryukyus	1 April–August 1945

4. Until a firm date can be established when redeployment from Europe can begin, planning will be continued for an operation to seize a position in the Chusan-Ningpo area and for invasion of Kyushu-Honshu in the winter of 1945–1946.

5. Examination is being conducted of the necessity for and cost of operations to maintain and defend a sea route to the Sea of Okhotsk when the entry of Russia into the war against Japan becomes imminent. Examination so far has shown that the possibility of seizing a position in the Kuriles for that purpose during the favorable weather period of 1945 is remote due to lack of sufficient resources. The possibility of maintaining and defending such a sea route from bases in Kamchatka alone is being further examined.

6. The United States Chiefs of Staff have also directed examination and preparation of a plan of campaign against Japan in the event that prolongation of the European war requires postponement of the invasion of Japan until well into 1946.

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J. C. S. Files

*The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 23 January 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been guided by the following basic principles in working toward U.S.S.R. entry into the war against Japan:

Russia's entry at as early a date as possible consistent with her ability to engage in offensive operations is necessary to provide maximum assistance to our Pacific operations. The U. S. will provide maximum support possible without interfering with our main effort against Japan.

The objective of Russia's military effort against Japan in the Far East should be the defeat of the Japanese forces in Manchuria, air operations against Japan proper in collaboration with U. S. air forces based in eastern Siberia, and maximum interference with Japanese sea traffic between Japan and the mainland of Asia.

The following paragraphs set forth the status to date of negotiations with the Russians and indicate the objectives which we believe should be achieved at the coming conference.

*a. Assistance prior to hostilities.* The project to stockpile supplies in eastern Siberia in preparation for Russian entry into the war against Japan is making excellent progress. Of the  $\frac{1}{4}$  of a million tons of dry cargo required in this initial project, it is estimated  $\frac{1}{4}$  of a million tons will be available in U. S. ports by 1 March. The date of the Russian entry is of great importance to the U. S. both in planning the delivery of supplies and also in planning our operations. The Russians have recently made intensive staff studies which should enable them to give us at the coming conference a better estimate than we have received to date of the timing and planning of their operations.

*b. Opening of a sea route to eastern Siberia.* The required capacity of any sea route across the North Pacific to eastern Siberia has not yet been determined. Such a route must be through one of the northern Kuriles straits, across the Sea of Okhotsk, and around northern Sakhalin to eastern Siberian ports, although it is possible that by moving supplies overland between Petropavlovsk and Ust Bolsheretsk a route of limited capacity could be established without having to pass convoys through the Kuriles. Because of ice, either route would only be navigable from June through October. The requirements of the war in Europe and our shortage of resources in the Pacific make remote any possibility of conducting amphibious operations in the Kuriles during 1945. The Russians have indicated a willingness to allow us to establish our forces in southern Kamchatka at the proper time. This measure alone may permit sufficient neutralization of Jap forces in the northern Kuriles to allow convoys to pass through the chain. It appears now that the bulk of supplies for any U. S. strategic air forces in eastern Siberia would have to come across the North Pacific rather than over the trans-Sib.<sup>1</sup> Lacking definite information from the Russians as to their requirements for supply across the Pacific and firm commitment for the operation of U. S. strategic air forces from eastern Siberia, the necessity for opening a sea route to eastern Siberia has not yet been demonstrated.

In view of the fact that the route to Vladivostok will be closed by the Japanese at the beginning of war and in order to make plans and preparations, we should at this conference determine from the Russians the extent to which their operations against the Japanese will depend on supplies continuing to be brought across the North Pacific. However, no commitment to undertake an operation in the North Pacific should be made at this time. Also, all possible information

<sup>1</sup> Trans-Siberian Railroad.

should be obtained concerning the distribution facilities for these supplies.

*c. Operations of U. S. strategic air forces from Russian bases.* Entry of Russia into the war against Japan will provide additional areas from which our seasoned European strategic air forces can be utilized. Shortage of suitable heavy bomber bases elsewhere and the desirability of increasing the number of directions from which we strike Japan indicate we should make every effort to exploit the potential of Russian bases. At the Churchill-Stalin meetings in October, Stalin gave assurance that he would provide Maritime bases for U. S. strategic air forces. Recently, however, this agreement has, on a staff level, been withdrawn on the ground that Russian operations from the area in question would preclude the establishment therein of American air and naval forces. The United States Chiefs of Staff feel, however, that the availability, after victory in Europe, of large numbers of trained heavy bomber units; the scarcity of bases elsewhere, and the potential of the Russian bases, indicate we should press for agreement in principle to the establishment of U. S. air forces in eastern Siberia.

*d. Russian strategic air forces.* The United States Chiefs of Staff do not propose to raise the question of Russian strategic air forces at the forthcoming conference. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces, has offered to the Russians some 200 heavy bomber type aircraft, implying that these should be used as a Russian strategic air force employed jointly with a U. S. strategic air force of equal size; has offered to provide a nucleus establishment for the organization and training of a Russian strategic air force; and has further indicated that additional aircraft might be forthcoming if desired. To date the Russians have not accepted these proposals and we have not pressed the matter. It should not be raised on our part, but, if brought up, we should say that the matter will be further examined by the two military staffs.

*e. U. S. assistance in Kamchatka.* At the Churchill-Stalin meetings in Moscow in October, Stalin stated his willingness to give the U. S. air bases, including B-29 bases, on Kamchatka and to allow the U. S. to use Petropavlovsk as a naval base. He also agreed to a U. S. survey party entering Kamchatka. This party is now formed and will depart as soon as Russian visas are received. In planning, it is necessary to consider what, if any, U. S. assistance the Russians may require to defend Kamchatka against the Japs as well as what can be done in developing it as a base for U. S. operations. It may be desirable to use Kamchatka as a base for an air transport route to eastern Siberia and for transshipment to shallow draft vessels of supplies destined for Amur River ports.

At the conference, we should determine the Russian ideas on any U. S. assistance that they might need to defend Kamchatka, particularly as regards ground forces. In this connection any assistance that Russia could render in regards to developing housing, airfields and communications in Kamchatka before her entry in the war and without arousing Japanese suspicions would make our task much easier.

*f. Use of Aleutian naval bases by the Russians.* At the Churchill-Stalin meetings, the U. S. offered the Russians use of our Aleutian naval bases for their submarines and light naval craft. To date, the Russians have not indicated their desire in this matter. If the Russians raise this question at the conference, we should ask for their estimate as to what their requirements might be, but make no commitments.

*g. Installation of U.S.A.A.F. Weather Reporting Stations in the U.S.S.R.* The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it highly important that additional weather reports be made available from Far Eastern U.S.S.R. to support our approved operations and future planned operations against the Japanese. Weather pertinent to our operations against Japan is formed in Eastern Siberia and the Mongolian Plateau. Marshal Stalin should be asked to agree to the provision of adequate weather stations in these areas to furnish us with the necessary weather information upon which we could base weather forecasts. The Russians should be told that the U. S. are prepared to furnish the necessary equipment and personnel or to assist in the training of Russian personnel to equip and operate these stations.

*h. Improvement of U.S.-U.S.S.R. collaboration.* The working efficiency of U.S. and U.S.S.R. collaboration to date has been low, even though there appears to have been quick agreement on general principles pertaining to military problems on the highest level. This inefficiency is largely attributable to administrative delays on the part of the Russians and a reluctance on staff levels to exchange with the U.S. the information essential to the carrying out of broad decisions. Any specific example is a detail but the cumulative effect of the failure of the Russians to act on reasonable requests—space for couriers on airlines, movement of mail and dispatches, securing of visas for military personnel, replies in a reasonable time to requests from the Joint Chiefs of Staff addressed to the Soviet General Staff, and many others—all these make progress difficult. The Chiefs of Staff suggest that Marshal Stalin be asked that necessary administrative steps be taken to make collaboration between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. work more efficiently and more rapidly, and that he also be asked to state what inefficiencies and delays his own people have experienced in working with the U. S. in order that we may make necessary corrections on our side.

A special planning mission headed by Brigadier General Frank N. Roberts is now in Moscow and arrangements have been made for them to meet with a corresponding special planning group from the Red General Staff. No meeting has yet been scheduled by the Russians. It is felt that the combined efforts of these planning groups can be of great benefit to both General Staffs in expediting exchange of planning information and they should be given every assistance in their work.

The Chiefs of Staff feel that all the above points, if raised at the tripartite conference, should be discussed on the broadest basis; the details should be worked out separately between the staff representatives of the U. S. and U. S. S. R.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:  
[GEORGE C. MARSHALL]<sup>2</sup>  
*Chief of Staff, U. S. Army*

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<sup>2</sup> Printed from an unsigned carbon copy.

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## WAR CRIMINALS

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 22 October 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Top Secret Number 801.

Para 5. Major war criminals U. J. took an unexpectedly ultra-respectable line. There must be no executions without trial otherwise the world would say we were afraid to try them. I pointed out the difficulties in International law but he replied if there were no trials there must be no death sentences, but only life-long confinements. In face of this view from this quarter I do not wish to press the memo I gave you which you said you would have examined by the State Department. Kindly therefore treat it as withdrawn.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels. For other excerpts from this telegram, see *ante*. pp. 10, 159-160, 206, 328.

<sup>2</sup> In reply (No. 632, dated October 22, 1944) Roosevelt commented: "Your statement of the present attitude of U. J. towards war criminals, the future of Germany, and Montreux convention is most interesting. We should discuss these matters together with our Pacific war effort at the forthcoming three party meeting."

The text of Churchill's paragraph 5 was communicated to the Department of State (740.00116 EW/10-2544).

740.00116EW/1-345

*The President to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, January 3, 1945.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Please send me a brief report on the status of the proceedings before the War Crimes Commission, and particularly the attitude of the U. S. representative on offenses to be brought against Hitler and the chief Nazi war criminals. The charges should include an indictment for waging aggressive and unprovoked warfare, in violation of the Kellogg Pact.<sup>2</sup> Perhaps these and other charges might be joined in a conspiracy indictment.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

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<sup>1</sup> Original not found. The text here printed is from a copy typed in the Department of State.

<sup>2</sup> For the text, see Department of State Treaty Series No. 796, or 46 Stat. 2343.

740.00116 EW/1-645

*The Secretary of State to the President*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 6, 1945.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: War Crimes Commission

The following is in response to your memorandum of January 3:

Briefly the status of the work of the War Crimes Commission is as follows—

The Commission has compiled two lists of war criminals, one German, the other Italian. They contain over seven hundred names, including Hitler, Goebbels, Goering, Himmler, Streicher, etc. It has recommended (1) that, generally speaking, the cases should be tried in the national courts of the countries against which the crimes have been committed; (2) that a convention be concluded providing for the establishment of a United Nations court to pass upon such cases as are referred to it by the Governments; and (3) that pending the establishment of such a court there be established mixed military tribunals to function also in addition to the United Nations court when the latter is established.

The American representative on the Commission has gone along with these recommendations and thinks, as do all of us, that Hitler and the chief Nazi war criminals should be included.

The question whether the Nazi leaders and members of the Gestapo, the SS, etc. could be covered under an indictment, based upon conspiracy, which would include charges of criminal intent on the part of the leaders and members of such organizations, including the launch-



ing of a war of aggression, has been receiving the serious consideration of this Department, the War and Navy Departments, and more recently the Attorney General. Judge Rosenman, whose advice is being sought, is informed of the nature of the proposals, and a meeting of the interested officials is to be held in his office on Monday. It is our purpose to come to some common understanding on the matter and to submit a report to you.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

740.00116 EW/1-2245

*The Legal Adviser (Hackworth) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 22, 1945.

THE SECRETARY: There are attached two memoranda, marked A and B, regarding War Crimes.

Memorandum A is the one which you, Secretary Stimson, and the Attorney General have signed. It states the problem and suggests possible procedure.

Memorandum B is a suggested draft in which the basic ideas of the first-mentioned paper are brought together in a form which can be signed or initialed, if it is approved. It would constitute the first step toward putting machinery into operation. A copy has been delivered to Judge Rosenman.

The international tribunal referred to would be short-lived. It would try and adjudge the principal culprits and would lay the foundation for the subsequent trial of the other offenders. The latter would be tried in the occupation courts or tribunals and in the national courts—civil or military—of the different countries as might be decided.

The plan would implement the Moscow Declaration<sup>2</sup> and other Declarations on this subject by the United Nations.

You will see from my short memorandum to Judge Rosenman, dated January 20,<sup>3</sup> that it was not thought desirable to try to cover certain questions at this time, principal among which is the question of the majority by which the tribunal should give decisions. A simple majority would be in keeping with the usual practice in such cases.

GREEN H. HACKWORTH

<sup>1</sup> A notation on the file, written by Katherine B. Fite, of the Office of the Legal Adviser, and dated March 21, 1949, states: "The attached is the Secretary's copy of the memo of Jan. 22, 1945, on Nazi war criminals sent to the President. This is the copy which went with the Secretary to Yalta."

<sup>2</sup> Printed in *Decade*, pp. 13-14; also in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 6, 1943, vol. ix, pp. 310-311.

<sup>3</sup> *Post*, p. 408.

[Attachment 1—Memorandum A]

[WASHINGTON,] January 22, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT <sup>4</sup>

Subject: Trial and Punishment of Nazi War Criminals.

This memorandum deals with ways and means for carrying out the policy regarding the trial and punishment of Nazi criminals, as established in the statements on that subject which are annexed (Tabs A to F <sup>5</sup>).

## I. THE MOSCOW DECLARATION

In the Moscow Declaration (Tab D) the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union took note of the atrocities perpetrated by the Germans and laid down the policy: (1) that those German officers and men who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in these atrocities "will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free governments which will be created therein"; and (2) that the above declaration "is without prejudice to the case of the major criminals, whose offenses have no particular geographical localization and who will be punished by the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies."

## II. UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

The United Nations War Crimes Commission is located in London, and consists of representatives of some fifteen of the United Nations. The Soviet Government is not a member.

This Commission has been charged with the collection of lists of the criminals referred to, the recording of the available supporting proof, and the making of recommendations as to the tribunals to try and the procedure for trying such criminals. The Commission has no investigative or prosecuting authority or personnel. It has no authority to try offenders of any kind.

The War Crimes Commission receives its lists of war criminals from the investigating authorities, if any, set up by the respective United Nations. The first unofficial meeting of the Commission was held in London on October 26, 1943, and the first official meeting was held there on January 18, 1944. Up to this time, the cases of approximately 1,000 offenders have been docketed with the Commission.

<sup>4</sup> This memorandum is printed in *Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials*, Department of State Publication 3080 (London, 1945), pp. 3-9.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed herein, but published in the Jackson Report referred to in the preceding footnote. Each of the tabs was a statement denouncing German atrocities.

The labors of the Commission have not resulted in any governmental agreement as to the tribunals to try or the procedures for trying war criminals.

The Commission has been widely and publicly criticized for the paucity of the results of its work. In recent months its activities have been marked by dissensions. The British representative, who was also Chairman of the Commission, and the Norwegian member, have resigned.

### III. SCOPE AND DIMENSIONS OF THE WAR CRIMES PROBLEM

*The crimes to be punished.* The criminality of the German leaders and their associates does not consist solely of individual outrages, but represents the result of a systematic and planned reign of terror within Germany, in the satellite Axis countries, and in the occupied countries of Europe. This conduct goes back at least as far as 1933, when Hitler was first appointed Chancellor of the Reich. It has been marked by mass murders, imprisonments, expulsions and deportations of populations; the starvation, torture and inhuman treatment of civilians; the wholesale looting of public and private property on a scale unparalleled in history; and, after initiation of "total" war, its prosecution with utter and ruthless disregard for the laws and customs of war.

We are satisfied that these atrocities were perpetrated in pursuance of a premeditated criminal plan or enterprise which either contemplated or necessarily involved their commission.

*The criminals to be punished.* The outstanding offenders are, of course, those leaders of the Nazi Party and German Reich who since January 30, 1933, have been in control of formulating and executing Nazi policies.

In addition, the Nazi leaders created and utilized a numerous organization for carrying out the acts of oppression and terrorism which their program involved. Chief among the instrumentalities used by them are the SS, from the personnel of which the Gestapo is constituted, and the SA. These organizations consist of exactly screened volunteers who are pledged to absolute obedience. The members of these organizations are also the personnel primarily relied upon to carry on postwar guerilla and underground operations.

### IV. DIFFICULTIES OF AN EFFECTIVE WAR CRIMES PROGRAM

*Difficulties of identification and proof.* The names of the chief German leaders are well known, and the proof of their guilt will not offer great difficulties. However, the crimes to be punished have been committed upon such a large scale that the problem of identification, trial and punishment of their perpetrators presents a situation without parallel in the administration of criminal justice. In thousands of cases, it will be impossible to establish the offender's identity or to

connect him with the particular act charged. Witnesses will be dead, otherwise incapacitated and scattered. The gathering of proof will be laborious and costly, and the mechanical problems involved in uncovering and preparing proof of particular offenses one of appalling dimensions. It is evident that only a negligible minority of the offenders will be reached by attempting to try them on the basis of separate prosecutions for their individual offenses. It is not unlikely, in fact, that the Nazis have been counting on just such considerations, together with delay and war weariness, to protect them against punishment for their crimes if they lost the war.

*Legal Difficulties.* The attempt to punish the Nazi leaders and their associates for all of the atrocities committed by them also involves serious legal difficulties. Many of these atrocities, as noted in your statement on the subject of persecution dated 24 March 1944 (Tab E), were "begun by the Nazis in the days of peace and multiplied by them a hundred times in time of war." These pre-war atrocities are neither "war crimes" in the technical sense, nor offenses against international law; and the extent to which they may have been in violation of German law, as changed by the Nazis, is doubtful. Nevertheless, the declared policy of the United Nations is that these crimes, too, shall be punished; and the interests of postwar security and a necessary rehabilitation of German peoples, as well as the demands of justice, require that this be done.

#### V. RECOMMENDED PROGRAM

After Germany's unconditional surrender the United Nations could, if they elected, put to death the most notorious Nazi criminals, such as Hitler or Himmler, without trial or hearing. We do not favor this method. While it has the advantages of a sure and swift disposition, it would be violative of the most fundamental principles of justice, common to all the United Nations. This would encourage the Germans to turn these criminals into martyrs, and, in any event, only a few individuals could be reached in this way.

We think that the just and effective solution lies in the use of the judicial method. Condemnation of these criminals after a trial, moreover, would command maximum public support in our own times and receive the respect of history. The use of the judicial method will, in addition, make available for all mankind to study in future years an authentic record of Nazi crimes and criminality.

We recommend the following:

The German leaders and the organizations employed by them, such as those referred to above (SA, SS, Gestapo), should be charged both with the commission of their atrocious crimes, and also with joint participation in a broad criminal enterprise which included and intended these crimes, or was reasonably calculated to bring them

about. The allegation of the criminal enterprise would be so couched as to permit full proof of the entire Nazi plan from its inception and the means used in its furtherance and execution, including the prewar atrocities and those committed against their own nationals, neutrals, and stateless persons, as well as the waging of an illegal war of aggression with ruthless disregard for international law and the rules of war. Such a charge would be firmly founded upon the rule of liability, common to all penal systems and included in the general doctrines of the laws of war, that those who participate in the formulation and execution of a criminal plan involving multiple crimes are jointly liable for each of the offenses committed and jointly responsible for the acts of each other. Under such a charge there are admissible in evidence the acts of any of the conspirators done in furtherance of the conspiracy, whether or not these acts were in themselves criminal and subject to separate prosecution as such.

The trial of this charge and the determination of the guilty parties would be carried out in two stages:

The United Nations would, in the first instance, bring before an international tribunal created by Executive Agreement, the highest ranking German leaders to a number fairly representative of the groups and organizations charged with complicity in the basic criminal plan. Adjudication would be sought not only of the guilt of those individuals physically before the court, but also of the complicity of the members of the organizations included within the charge. The court would make findings adjudicating the facts established, including the nature and purposes of the criminal plan, the identity of the groups and organizations guilty of complicity in it, and the acts committed in its execution. The court would also sentence those individual defendants physically before it who are convicted.

The above would complete the mission of this international tribunal.

Thereafter, there would be brought before occupation courts the individuals not sent back for trial under the provisions of the Moscow Declaration, and members of the organizations who are charged with complicity through such membership, but against whom there is not sufficient proof of specific atrocities. In view of the nature of the charges and the representative character of the defendants who were before the court in the first trial, the findings of that court should justly be taken to constitute a general adjudication of the criminal character of the groups and organizations referred to, binding upon all the members thereof in their subsequent trials in occupation courts. In these subsequent trials, therefore, the only necessary proof of guilt of any particular defendant would be his membership in one of these organizations. Proof would also be taken of the nature and extent of the individual's participation. The punishment of each

defendant would be made appropriate to the facts of his particular case. In appropriate cases, the penalty might be imprisonment at hard labor instead of the death penalty, and the offenders could be worked in restoring the devastated areas.

Individual defendants who can be connected with specific atrocities will be tried and punished in the national courts of the countries concerned, as contemplated in the Moscow Declaration.

#### VI. NATURE AND COMPOSITION OF TRIBUNALS

We favor the trial of the prime leaders by an international military commission or military court, established by Executive Agreement of the heads of State of the interested United Nations. This would require no enabling legislation or treaty. If deemed preferable the tribunal could be established by action of the Supreme Authority (Control Council for Germany).

The court might consist of seven members, one each to be appointed by The British Commonwealth, the United States, the Soviet Union and France, and three to be appointed by agreement among the other United Nations who become parties to the proposed procedure.

The court may consist of civilian or military personnel, or both. We would prefer a court of military personnel, as being less likely to give undue weight to technical contentions and legalistic arguments.

The subsequent trials would be had, as noted, in occupation courts; or in the national courts of the country concerned or in their own military courts; or, if desired, by international military courts.

#### VII. PREPARATION OF CASE

A successful prosecution of the basic charge will manifestly depend upon early, careful, and thorough compilation of the necessary evidence. This is particularly important with regard to so much of the case as involves the basic criminal plan. Success will depend, further, upon cooperative action in this regard among the interested United Nations, and the early establishment of a competent executive and technical staff to carry out the project.

In our opinion, the United Nations War Crimes Commission cannot be satisfactorily employed for this purpose, and having performed its mission, may now be dissolved.

We recommend that there be set up a full time executive group consisting of one military representative each of the British Commonwealth, the United States, the Soviet Union, and France. This group should have under it an adequate staff of attorneys and research personnel to search out the available data, analyze them, prepare the charges to conform to the proof, and arrange the evidence for presentation to the international military tribunal.

## VIII. SOVIET ATTITUDE

The Soviet attitude, we believe, is indicated in the Note of M. Molotov attached hereto as Tab F. The position taken therein is that the Soviet Union is ready to support all practical measures on the part of the Allied and friendly governments in bringing the Hitlerites and their accomplices to justice, and favors their trial before "the courts of the special international tribunal" and their punishment in accordance with applicable criminal law.

## IX. BRITISH ATTITUDE

In an *Aide-Mémoire* from the British Embassy to the Department of State dated October 30, 1944,<sup>6</sup> the British Foreign Office indicates that it is prepared to agree and to cooperate in establishing Mixed Military Tribunals to deal with cases which for one reason or another could not be tried in national courts. This would appear, according to the *Aide-Mémoire*, to include those cases where a person is accused of having committed war crimes against the nationals of several of the United Nations.

[Attachment 2]

*The Legal Adviser (Hackworth) to the Special Counsel to the President (Rosenman)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 20, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR JUDGE ROSENMAN  
The White House

There is attached the implementing instrument which you asked the Attorney General to have me draw up and send to you.

In my opinion the effect of thus putting together in one paper the implementing provisions without discussion or explanatory matter, is to clarify the nature of the project and how it will work out.

You will observe that the enclosed does not go into questions such as the procedure to be followed by the tribunals, or by what majority decisions should be reached. If the basic plan is approved by the interested parties, such questions will naturally arise. However, in my opinion, their introduction here might tend to bog down the project on details. While fully realizing the importance of such questions and the extent to which differences of opinion may arise about them, I am in favor of not trying to cover them at this time.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed.

## [Attachment 3—Memorandum B]

## PUNISHMENT OF WAR CRIMINALS

The United Nations have on various occasions expressed their abhorrence for the unspeakable crimes and atrocities of which the German leaders and their associates are guilty, and have pledged themselves that those responsible for such crimes and atrocities shall not escape retribution.

The United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union in the Declaration issued at Moscow November 1, 1943 stated:

(1) that those German officers and men who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in these atrocities "will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free governments which will be created therein"; and

(2) that the above declaration was "without prejudice to the case of the major criminals, whose offenses have no particular geographical localization and who will be punished by the joint declaration of the Governments of the Allies."

The criminality of the German leaders and their associates does not consist solely of individual outrages, but represents the result of a systematic and planned reign of terror within Germany and within the areas occupied by German military forces, in connection with which the crimes and atrocities referred to were committed. We are satisfied that these crimes and atrocities were perpetrated pursuant to a premeditated criminal plan.

For the carrying out of the acts of oppression and terrorism which their program involved, the Nazi leaders and their associates created and utilized a numerous organization, chief among which are the SS, the Gestapo, and the SA.

Having in view the foregoing, and in order to press on with the necessary practical measures to bring to justice the criminals referred to, the President of the United States of America, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union have agreed upon the following:

## I

The German leaders and their associates, and the organizations employed by them, such as those referred to above, will be charged with both the commission of their atrocious crimes, and also with joint participation in a broad criminal enterprise which included and intended these crimes, or was reasonably calculated to bring them about. The allegation of the criminal enterprise will be so couched as to permit full proof of the entire Nazi plan from its inception and the means used in its furtherance and execution, including the pre-war atrocities and those committed against their own nationals, neutrals,



and stateless persons, as well as the waging of an illegal war of aggression with ruthless disregard for international law and the rules of war. There will be invoked the rule of liability, common to all penal systems and included in the general doctrines of the laws of war, that those who participate in the formulation and execution of a criminal plan involving multiple crimes are jointly liable for each of the offenses committed and jointly responsible for the acts of each other. In support of this charge there will be admitted in evidence the acts of any of the conspirators done in furtherance of the conspiracy, whether or not these acts were in themselves criminal and subject to separate prosecution as such.

## II

The trial of the charge described in Article I and the determination of the guilty parties will be carried out in two stages:

(a) There will be brought before an international tribunal to be created the highest ranking German leaders to a number fairly representative of the groups and organizations charged with complicity in the basic criminal plan. Adjudication will be sought not only of the guilt of those individuals physically before the tribunal, but also of the complicity of the members of the organizations included within the charge. The tribunal will make findings adjudicating the facts established, including the nature and purposes of the criminal plan, the identity of the groups and organizations guilty of complicity in it, and the acts committed in its execution. The tribunal will sentence those individual defendants physically before it who are convicted.

The above will complete the mission of this international tribunal.

(b) Thereafter, other individuals charged with specific atrocities and members of the organizations who are charged with complicity through such membership in the basic criminal plan but against whom there is not sufficient proof of specific atrocities shall, unless held for trial by one of the United Nations or sent back for trial under the provisions of the Moscow Declaration, be brought before occupation or other appropriate tribunals. The findings of the tribunal in the trial provided for in paragraph (a) of this Article will be taken to constitute a general adjudication of the criminal character of the groups and organizations referred to, binding upon all the members thereof in their subsequent trials in occupation tribunals or in other tribunals established under this instrument. In these subsequent trials the only necessary proof of guilt of any particular defendant, as regards the charge of complicity, will be his membership in one of those organizations. Proof will also be taken of the nature and extent of the individual's participation.

(c) The defendant in each case shall, upon conviction, suffer death or such other punishment as the tribunal may direct, depending upon the gravity of the offense and the degree of culpability of the defendant.

## III

The tribunal for the trial of the basic crime referred to in Article II (a) shall consist of seven members, to be appointed as follows: one each by the British Commonwealth, the United States, the Soviet Union, and France, and three by agreement among the other United Nations who become parties to this instrument.

The members of the tribunal may be civilian or military as the appointing authority in each case may prefer.

## IV

(a) There shall be created a full time executive group consisting of one military representative each of the British Commonwealth, the United States, the Soviet Union, and France. This group shall be assisted by an adequate staff of attorneys and research personnel to compile and analyze data, prepare the charges to conform to the proof and arrange the evidence for presentation to the international tribunal.

(b) The presentation of the case before the international tribunal shall be made by persons designated by the British Commonwealth, the United States, the Soviet Union, and France, each of these countries being entitled to designate one person, who may be its member of the executive group referred to in paragraph (a) of this Article.

## V

(a) The emoluments and expenses of those members of the tribunal provided for in Article III, designated by the British Commonwealth, the United States, the Soviet Union, and France, and of the executive group provided for in Article IV (a), shall be borne by the respective Governments just mentioned.

(b) The emoluments and expenses of the other three members of the tribunal shall be borne by the Governments of the other United Nations parties to this instrument.

(c) The emoluments and expenses of the staff assisting the executive group, and of secretarial staffs for the tribunal and the executive group, and incidental expenses, such as rent, heat, light, stationery and printing, shall be borne by the parties to this instrument in equal shares.

## VI

All members of the United Nations shall be invited by the Government of the United Kingdom, acting on behalf of the other signatories hereto, to adhere to this instrument. Such adherence shall in each case be notified to the Government of the United Kingdom which shall promptly inform the other parties to this instrument.

Done at \_\_\_\_\_ this the \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 1945.

EUR Files

*The Executive Director of the War Refugee Board (Pehle) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, January 22, 1945.

I have noticed in the press that you are to participate in the forthcoming international conference. Recently, the War Refugee Board has received several urgent requests from Jewish organizations in this country for the issuance of a United Nations' warning to the German Government and the German people against further extermination and other forms of persecution of Jews in Germany and German-occupied territory. It occurs to me that, if you find it feasible to do so, this matter might be raised by you at the conference.

As you know, we have never been able to get the Russians to join us in any of our past statements, other than the Moscow Statement on Atrocities issued on November 1, 1943. It is my feeling that if a new warning to the Germans were issued by President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin, it might have a marked effect, particularly at this stage of the war.

For your convenience, alternative drafts of such a warning are attached.

J. W. PEHLE

[Attachment 1]

DRAFT A

A declaration released by us on November 1, 1943, has warned Germans and their remaining satellites against continuing their ruthless campaign of atrocities, massacres, and mass-executions. Since that time, new evidence has been discovered in territories liberated by the United Nations, indicating that these cruelties are being continued. In liberated United Nations territory—in the Soviet Union, in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, in Yugoslavia, in Greece, in Norway, in the Netherlands, in Belgium, in Luxemburg, and in France, as well as in the territories of Germany's former allies—in Italy, in Hungary, in Bulgaria, and in Rumania, evidence has been piling up of brutal treatment and barbarous murder of nationals of the United Nations and of Jews of whatever nationality. There are indications that German troops and officials, previous to retreating, prepare to exterminate large numbers of local inhabitants and of Jewish deportees and internees in the territories still occupied by Germany, and that they prepare to extend this policy of mass-extermination to foreign deportees and to Jews of whatever nationality within German territory.

In the face of this evidence and of these indications, we consider it our solemn duty once more to issue this solemn warning that all participants in this savage scheme of mass-murder, whether they are

in high station or in low, will be fully and promptly punished. All those who share the guilt will share the punishment. Once more we repeat: Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three allied Powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done. Our common determination to see justice accomplished is and will be supported by the full strength of our military might and the will of an aroused mankind.

[Attachment 2]

DRAFT B

Despite the protests of the whole civilized world, the Nazis, in their hour of defeat, apparently are preparing to complete in frenzied hatred the systematic mass murder of the Jews regardless of nationality and other groups in German and German-occupied territory. We, in the hour of victory, again call upon the German Government and the German people to cease these acts of unspeakable savagery.

Let the Germans and their collaborators understand that all participants in this program of persecution and death shall receive full and prompt punishment; that all who share the guilt shall share the punishment. Let them know that this warning is supported by the determination and the full military might of outraged and victorious peoples.

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LIBERATED PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIANS

740.00114 EW/11-2744:Telegram

*The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, November 27, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received November 27—10:35 p. m.]

4526. At the request of General Deane I sent a letter to Molotov on November 6 on the question of reciprocal arrangements for treatment of prisoners of war.<sup>1</sup> I referred to Mr. Harriman's letter of August 30 (ReEmbs 3298, September 4, midnight)<sup>2</sup> to which no

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. Harriman and Deane wrote on August 30 similar letters to Molotov and to the Soviet Deputy Chief of Staff, respectively, proposing that the two Governments agree, first, to work out plans in advance for the prompt return of mutually liberated prisoners; secondly, that there should be prompt and continued exchange of information regarding the location of prisoner-of-war camps; thirdly, that American and Soviet officers should always be available to proceed without delay to such camps in order to institute repatriation operations; and finally that individuals or small groups claiming Soviet or American nationality should be promptly reported by name reciprocally. Soviet assistance in connection with the planned evacuation to Istanbul of American war prisoners liberated in Rumania was also requested. (711.71114A/9-444.)

answer had been received and stated that since the advance of the Soviet armies had already enveloped the location of one prisoner of war camp known to have formerly held American war prisoners and since Soviet forces were apparently approaching another such camp in the Budapest area it was desirable that we should not delay any longer arriving at an understanding along the lines proposed by the Ambassador.

I have now received a reply from Molotov dated November 25, the pertinent sections of which read in paraphrase translation as follows:

“The immediate rendering of assistance and return to their homes of Soviet prisoners and also Soviet citizens forcibly deported by the Germans to Germany and German occupied countries who have been liberated as a result of Allied military operations in the west is of interest to the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government is prepared to accept in principle the proposals which Mr. Harriman set forth in his letter of August 30 concerning measures regarding the return of American and Soviet war prisoners to their homeland.

The Soviet Government is prepared to designate representatives to study plans with American representatives concerning the reciprocal repatriation of war prisoners and interned nations [*nationals*] of both countries and also concerning the evacuation to the Soviet Union of Soviet citizens who have been forcibly deported by the Germans.

In this respect the Soviet Government has in mind that the above mention should also cover fully all those Soviet war prisoners and other Soviet nations [*nationals*] who have been previously set free, some of whom were sent to the United States and are there at the present time.

The Soviet Government in this respect desires to bring to the attention of the American Government the inadmissibility, in relations between Allied countries, of a situation in which the above mentioned Soviet citizens are held in American prisoner of war camps together with German war prisoners—our common enemies—and subordinated to administrations of these camps which are appointed from German prisoners.

The American Government is requested by the Soviet Government to see that this situation is immediately corrected and that the Soviet Ambassador in Washington is furnished by the appropriate American authorities full information regarding these Soviet Nationals, such information to contain data on the number of such prisoners, their whereabouts and living conditions. In this respect, the Soviet Government considers that these citizens should be regarded not as war prisoners but as free nationals of an Allied power and that they should consequently be placed in barracks separate from enemy war prisoners and that they should be accorded normal living conditions in the United States until they are repatriated. The hope is expressed, furthermore, that all questions connected with the appointment of the administrations at the residence of the Soviet nationals and with their movements on American territory until they are returned to their homeland be reached in agreement with the Soviet Embassy.

Until these Soviet nationals are repatriated to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government hopes that the American authorities will furnish them sufficient food, medical-sanitary services and clothing

in agreement with Soviet representatives. The Soviet Government will reimburse the American Government for expenses undergone in this respect.

It goes without saying that those special questions regarding American prisoners in the Budapest and Rumanian areas, brought up in the Ambassador's and Mr. Kennan's letters, may be discussed at the meeting of our representatives authorized to study the question of repatriation of American-Soviet nationals.

It would be appreciated if you would transmit the contents of this letter to the American Government and inform me of the reply to the questions raised in it."

Deane has requested that this information be made available to the War Department.

Deane is already authorized to discuss these matters, and I feel I would be justified in replying to Molotov that he has been designated by my Government to conduct these discussions.<sup>3</sup> In view, however, of Molotov's specific request that I transmit the contents of his letter to "the American Government" and his evident desire to keep the matter on a government to government plane, I have thought it appropriate to consult the Department first, and I will await an indication of the Department's approval before taking this step.

KENNAN

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<sup>3</sup> For an account of the discussions, see Deane, pp. 188-189.

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740.00114 EW/12-2944: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, December 29, 1944—5 p. m.  
[Received December 30—4:30 a. m.]

5053. I have received a letter from Vyshinski (ReEmbs 4645 December 5, 1 p. m.)<sup>1</sup> stating that Lieutenant General K. D. Golubev and Major General N. V. Slavin have been appointed by the Soviet Government to conduct negotiations with General Deane on questions connected with the plan mutually to repatriate American and Soviet prisoners of war and civilians in accordance with the principles set forth in Molotov's letter to Kennan of November 25. The pertinent sections of Molotov's letter were repeated to the Department in Embassy's telegram 4526 of November 27.<sup>2</sup>

HARRIMAN

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

740.00114 EW/12-2944: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 3, 1945—9 p. m.

18. Department is extremely anxious that in any discussion concerning the repatriation of American and Soviet prisoners of war and civilians that there be no connection between the return of Americans found in German prisoner of war and civilian internment camps on the one hand, and Soviet nationals found among German prisoners of war taken by the American forces on the other hand. ReEmbs 5053, December 29 and War's telegram November 29 to Military Mission.<sup>1</sup> Some difficulty has arisen here in the determination of claimants to Soviet nationality whom this Government is prepared to turn over to the Soviet authorities for return to the Soviet Union.

Among the persons found fighting with the German troops are a few with Slavic names who disclaim Soviet nationality. Over 1100 Soviet nationals found fighting with German troops were turned over to the Soviet authorities at a west coast port last week. A further report of the problems which have arisen in this connection will be sent to you for your information.

STETTINIUS  
(E. A. P[litt])

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<sup>1</sup> Neither printed.

740.00114 EW/2-545

*Soviet Draft of an Agreement Regarding the Treatment of Soviet Citizens and British Subjects Liberated From the Germans*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

## SOVIET DRAFT OF RECIPROCAL AGREEMENT

In reply to Embassy's note of December 11th,<sup>2</sup> People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs have the honour to state that Soviet Government are prepared to conclude an agreement concerning the principles governing the treatment of liberated Soviet and British prisoners of war, but they consider that such an agreement should extend also to Soviet citizens and British subjects interned and forcibly deported by the Germans. In addition it would be desirable somewhat to extend

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<sup>1</sup> This undated copy was found among papers attached to the note of February 5, 1945, from Eden to Stettinius, *post* pp. 691-692. This draft was apparently presented to the British Embassy at Moscow on January 20, 1945. According to Deane (pp. 188-189) a similar draft for the repatriation of United States and Soviet citizens was submitted to him on January 19, 1945, and was forwarded by him for the consideration of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Eisenhower, and McNarney.

<sup>2</sup> No copy of this British note has been found in the Department's files.

and define several paragraphs of British draft set out in above-mentioned note. In that connexion Soviet Government suggest that the above principles should be formulated as follows:

"1. All Soviet citizens liberated by Allied Armies and British subjects liberated by the Red Army will, without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until repatriation.

British and Soviet military authorities will respectively take necessary measures for protection of camps and points of concentration from enemy bombing, artillery fire, etc.

2. Both sides shall ensure that their military authorities shall without delay inform the competent authorities of the other side of Soviet or British citizens or subjects respectively found by them, at the same time taking the steps which follow from this agreement. Soviet and British repatriation representatives will immediately be permitted into the concentration camps and points where citizens of their country are located and they will have the right to appoint the internal administration, establish internal order and administration in accordance with laws of their country.

The Commandant's organisation of the camp and civilian protection will be established in accordance with the directions of the military commandant within the zone in which the given camp is located.

The removal of camps as well as transfer from one camp to another of liberated citizens will be accomplished only in agreement between competent Soviet and British authorities. Enemy propaganda directed against the contracting sides or against United Nations will not be allowed among liberated citizens.

3. The competent British and Soviet authorities will supply liberated Soviet citizens and British subjects with food, clothing, housing and medical attention both in camps or points of concentration and en route, and with transport until they are handed over to the authorities at the other side at places agreed upon between the sides on the following basis:

(a) Ex-prisoners of war shall be provided with all forms of supply (stores and food) on a basis laid down respectively for privates, noncommissioned officers and officers.

(b) Civilians will be supplied on a basis laid down for privates.

The parties will not mutually demand compensation for these or other services which their authorities may respectively supply to liberated Soviet citizens or British subjects.

4. Soviet and British military authorities shall make such advances on behalf of respective governments to liberated British subjects and Soviet citizens as competent Soviet and British authorities shall agree upon between themselves beforehand.

Advances made in currency of any enemy territory or in currency of Allied occupation authorities shall not be liable to compensation.

In the case of advances made in currency of liberated non-enemy territory, the Soviet and British governments will effect, each for advances made to their citizens, necessary settlements with the



governments of respective territory who will be informed of the amount of their currency paid out for this purpose.

5. Ex-prisoners of war (with the exception of officers) and civilians of each of the parties until their repatriation may be employed on work in aiding the common war effort as to which competent Soviet and British authorities shall agree among themselves. The question of payment and other labour conditions shall be determined in agreement between these authorities.

6. Both parties shall use all means at their disposal to ensure the evacuation to the rear of the above-mentioned citizens or subjects of the other party if this proves necessary and quickest possible repatriation of these persons.

7. If the British Government agree to these principles the Soviet Government suggests presentation of note and British reply to it should constitute an agreement which would guide the parties in this matter."

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740.00114 EW/1-2745: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 27, 1945—12 p. m.

US URGENT

NIACT 683. For Murphy. British Embassy has made available to Department series Foreign Office telegrams regarding proposed Soviet agreements with British and ourselves for treatment of American, British and Soviet prisoners of war and civilians liberated by our respective forces. One British message indicates SHAEF is working out combined British-American text of agreement to be submitted to Big Three meeting. Suggested British text of this agreement is at considerable variance with proposals State, Army, Navy Committee<sup>1</sup> is proposing to Joint Chiefs of Staff. Please inform American representatives working on SHAEF draft that Department considers it important that before making any commitments on our behalf they await further instructions which it is hoped will be sent through Joint Chiefs on January 29.<sup>2</sup>

Repeat to Moscow.

GREW, *Acting*  
(E. D[urbrow])

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<sup>1</sup> The reference is apparently to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC).

<sup>2</sup> The considerations of SWNCC and certain other Washington agencies were subsequently forwarded to Yalta. They are reflected in the telegram of February 7 [8], 1945, from Grew to Stettinius, *post*, p. 697.

Matthews Files

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

LONDON, January 28, 1945.

DEAR ED: Since I have not had an opportunity to see you, there are two matters that I would like to bring to your attention before the coming Conference.

One has to do with Prisoners of War. The Russians feel deeply about this problem, which affects hundreds of thousands of their people who have been brutally treated by the Germans and who are now being liberated in growing numbers by the Allied Armies. As you know, the Russians are pressing the American and British Governments, through their Military Missions in Moscow, to sign bilateral agreements providing for reciprocal treatment by each Government of each other's liberated nationals on the standard applied to its own soldiers. In this respect the Russians regard both soldiers and civilians as being in the same category.<sup>1</sup>

One of the factors which have made this question difficult to handle with the Russians, and which has great psychological and political importance for future Allied relations, is that we have been unable to get to grips with it in the European Advisory Commission. At the end of November the British, the Russians and the French were ready to discuss it in a special subcommittee set up by the Commission. The subcommittee was unable to meet since I was left totally without instructions. Other Delegations were naturally unwilling to treat with an American Delegation which could only sit and listen.

In October I sent back a draft directive on United Nations Prisoners of War,<sup>2</sup> based on the latest and most authoritative JCS policy papers, thinking that it would be quickly cleared for my use. On December 1 I sent an urgent appeal for instructions,<sup>3</sup> and was informed that they were held up by disputes within the War Department. Since then I have cabled repeatedly, trying to get some action in a matter which has such great humanitarian importance and which may deeply affect our relations with our Allies. Only yesterday I received a message from the Department, sent on January 26,<sup>3</sup> that it expected to transmit a statement of policy on prisoners of war "within a few days". I realize that the delay has not been due to the Department, but the political consequences are equally important for all parts of our Government, civil and military alike.

Concurrently, ten commissioned and ten noncommissioned U. S. officers are waiting in London for visas to go to Russia and look after

<sup>1</sup> See Deane, pp. 188-189.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This draft was designed as a general policy directive to be implemented by the Allied Commanders in Chief in Germany after the German surrender (740.00119 EAC/10-2344).

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

the welfare of our liberated prisoners of war in Soviet-occupied areas. If their Soviet visas have not come through by the time of your meeting (General Deane and Harriman are pressing for them in Moscow), you may want to take this up directly with Molotov.

It is also very important for us to have an instruction or an approved draft directive on treatment of Displaced Persons, since the Russians and our other continental Allies are also deeply concerned about their civilian deportees and political prisoners in Germany and will want to deal with this question along with that of Prisoners of War. I have been asking Washington for an instruction on Displaced Persons since November, and have had no indication that it is being prepared there for presentation in the European Commission along with the Prisoners of War paper. <sup>4</sup>

I wish you every success in the coming Conference.

Sincerely,

JOHN G. WINANT

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<sup>4</sup> For the paragraphs here omitted, see *ante*, p. 133.

## SHIPPING

840.24/1-1345

### *Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States and the United Kingdom Concerning the Shipment of Supplies to Liberated European Countries During the First Six Months of 1945*

#### MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

The following represents the agreed views of the respective United States and United Kingdom authorities concerning the shipment of supplies to liberated European countries during the first six months of 1945;

1. The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force has signified his willingness to allocate to the French Provisional Government and to the Belgian Government certain port facilities and inland clearance for national government import programs separate from and additional to military programs.

2. A four-party committee consisting of representatives of the French Provisional Government, the United States and the United Kingdom Governments and Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force has reviewed and recommended an import program put forward by the French Provisional Government. It is expected that the import program of the Belgian Government will be recommended through a similar procedure in the near future.

3. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration has submitted a program for Italy. The Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean has endorsed it provided that its implementation

does not affect his ability to meet his operational and basic civil affairs requirements.

4. It is expected that in due course import programs will be put forward in a similar manner for other liberated European countries by their governments or by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration on their behalf.

5. The French import program and the other import programs when received are endorsed for planning purposes and the United States and United Kingdom agencies concerned should as necessary facilitate, through the established procedures, procurement against these programs so that supplies will be readily available for shipment.

6. Subject to military necessity, ships are to be allocated against these programs for January, February and March loading from North America as follows:

	<i>January</i>			<i>February</i>			<i>March</i>		
	Total.	MWT.	WSA.	Total.	MWT.	WSA.	Total.	MWT.	WSA.
France	6			10			10		
Belgium	1			2			2		
UNRRA (Italy)	—			1			1		
Total	<u>7</u>			<u>13</u>			<u>13</u>		

7. There is attached a Table showing for the period January through June 1945 the overall shipping deficiency. The deficit cannot be met by minor adjustments and calls for decision at the coming conference of heads of Governments. In the meantime the responsible United States and United Kingdom civilian and military authorities should consider what recommendations they can make to the coming conference of the heads of Governments to reduce the deficit either by downward adjustment of programs or more effective use of shipping.

8. Pending the final decision the allocations referred to in Paragraph 6 are not to be reduced except in the face of military necessity and not without prior discussion with Mr. Harry Hopkins. The appropriate agencies should be notified accordingly.

9. The theater commander, the Allied governments, the combined Boards and the departments and agencies concerned of the United States and United Kingdom Governments are to be notified of the action agreed under paragraphs 5 and 6.

10. Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to alter any present procedures whereby the availability of shipping tonnage shall be determined by the appropriate shipping authorities after clearance with the appropriate Chiefs of Staff. It is also understood that the determination of port and inland clearance capacity shall be certified by the theater commander.

H[ARRY] H[OPKINS] by D[ean] A[cheson]  
R[ICHARD] L[AW]

[WASHINGTON,] 14 January 1945.

[Attachment]

## COMBINED SHIPPING DEFICIENCIES

	<i>Feb.</i>	<i>Mar.</i>	<i>Apr.</i>	<i>May</i>	<i>June</i>
<i>Atlantic</i>					
British Ministry of War Transport (BMWt) . . . . .	30	45	50	50	50
War Shipping Administration (WSA) . . . . .	43	36	40	49	37
Combined . . . . .	<u>73</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>87</u>
<i>Pacific</i>					
War Shipping Administration. . . . .	35	51	45	72	56
Total . . . . .	<u>108</u>	<u>132</u>	<u>135</u>	<u>171</u>	<u>143</u>

12 January 1945.

840.24/1-1445

*The British Minister of State (Law) to the Special Assistant to the President (Hopkins)*

[WASHINGTON,] 14 January 1945.

DEAR MR. HOPKINS:

## MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

In initialling this agreement on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, I must refer to the interpretation of clause 10 which I should have liked to see clarified if time had permitted and if all those concerned had been accessible.

I interpret this clause as a "no prejudice" clause leaving present procedures for the determining of shipping availability as they stand and making it clear that this document in no way compromises any position or claim of anyone as to what those procedures are or should be. I do not interpret it, and I feel sure that it cannot reasonably be interpreted, as introducing any change whatever in current procedures. As you know, my understanding is that these procedures do not provide for "clearance" in the sense of a veto by the military authorities on civilian shipping allocations, but do in practice result in the fullest exchange of information and consultation between the shipping authorities and the Chiefs of Staff.

Yours sincerely,

RICHARD LAW

EUR Files

*The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 23, 1945.

[Excerpt]<sup>1</sup>

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

## THE SHIPPING SITUATION AND THE LAW MISSION

Harry Hopkins, who is completely familiar with the genesis and the accomplishments of the Law Mission, is going to be at the conference, and so is Justice Byrnes, who knows something about it.

There is, therefore, no need to go into it in any detail here. The statement of the need for a civilian rehabilitation program for Europe and particularly for France and Belgium, was made by Mr. Law very forcibly and M. Monnet succeeded him with another appeal.

There are grave political dangers in a large unemployed population, which is also hungry and ill-clothed, and these dangers may affect the military situation as well. All this the armed services realize but they take this position, and I do not see how it can be successfully attacked:

1. While there is a critical need for ships in order to carry out existing operations approved by the Heads of State you must not allocate to a new series of separate national import programs ships which could otherwise be used for the support of those operations.

2. Allocations can be made on a quarter to quarter basis unless there is a new intervening military necessity in a quantity which will produce a measurable amount of rehabilitation shipments for Europe, which is in addition to the very substantial civilian supplies and industrial rehabilitation items of the military program.

3. Before any ships are allocated to a separate national import program above those which the services and WSA agree can be allocated on a quarterly basis, the shipping people must permit the Chiefs of Staff to assert their need and show their capacity to use the additional ships for the military operations.

The overall shipping survey has shown a substantial deficit of ships for military purposes. The war is in a critical stage where if it can be shortened by as much as a month the boon to civilian populations will be immeasurably greater than any intervening allocations of ships can induce. The point is that there can not be set up any fixed programs such as the Russian protocols for European or other relief areas while ships are short items and the war is at its present pitch. Do it on a spot basis in consultation with the military and naval authorities in spite of the inconveniences this may cause in long range planning and the chances are greatly in favor of there being a substantial number of ships in addition to the military-civilian programs.

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<sup>1</sup> For another excerpt from this memorandum, see *ante*, p. 201.

The only alternative is to cut out some approved operations and that would not be palatable to the people of this country or desirable from the point of view of the intended beneficiaries.

I believe this matter will be brought up at the conference—probably on a high level—but I believe that no satisfactory solution can be reached which does not recognize the above principles.

I attach a copy of the Hopkins-Law paper.<sup>2</sup>

J. J. Mc [CLOY]

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<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 420-422.

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## AGENDA FOR MILITARY DISCUSSIONS <sup>1</sup>

J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 17 January 1945.

C. C. S. 765/1

SUBJECTS FOR CONSIDERATION AT THE NEXT U. S.-BRITISH-U. S. S. R.  
STAFF CONFERENCE

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff suggest that the following subjects be considered at the next U. S.-British-U. S. S. R. staff conference:

*a. The War Against Germany*

(1) Enemy dispositions, capabilities and intentions.

(A discussion and exchange of information.)

(2) Coordination of operations in western Europe and Italy with operations in eastern Europe.

(a) Timing and scope of offensive on the various fronts.

(b) Establishment of effective liaison at Chiefs of Staff level and between Anglo-American-U. S. S. R. field commanders.

(c) A determination of policy on bomblines and air liaison parties if not resolved prior to a tripartite conference.

(3) Shuttle bombing and arrangements for staging and/or basing units of Fifteenth Air Force in Vienna-Budapest area.

(4) Military aspects of Zones of Occupation in Germany and Austria.

(Discussion of the necessity that the areas allotted each nation, particularly in Berlin and Vienna, contain adequate military admin-

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<sup>1</sup> For the proposed agenda for the United States-Soviet military staff discussions, see *ante* pp. 393-394.

istrative facilities and access by rail, road and air, with a view to recommending adoption by the Heads of State of a policy for guidance of the European Advisory Commission.)

*b. War Against Japan*

(1) Japanese dispositions, capabilities and intentions in the Far East.

(A discussion and exchange of information.)

(2) Russian participation in the war against Japan:

2. In this connection General Deane has been asked to present the above proposed agenda to the Chief of the Soviet General Staff requesting that he indicate any other military subjects the U. S. S. R. may consider desirable for discussion by the staff conference.

3. Aside from discussion at the conference concerning broad strategic objectives of the U. S. S. R. in the Pacific war, the Russians may wish to discuss with the U. S. staff representatives the operational details such as the supply project now under way for stockpiles in Siberia and other operational details.

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J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 20 January 1945.

C. C. S. 765/4

SUBJECTS FOR CONSIDERATION AT THE NEXT U. S.-BRITISH-U. S. S. R.  
STAFF CONFERENCE

1. The British Chiefs of Staff agree with the subjects proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff for discussion at the next U. S.-British-U. S. S. R. staff conference, as set out in C. C. S. 765/1.

2. With reference to Item *a.* (4) in paragraph 1 of C. C. S. 765/1, the British Chiefs of Staff point out that the French are now represented on the European Advisory Commission and have already expressed their views on French participation in control of Germany and Austria. Thus it would seem to the British Chiefs of Staff that any conclusions reached at the conference on the military aspects of the Zones of Occupation in these countries, should either take into account French aspirations or else be subject to discussion with the French after the conference.



J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff*TOP SECRET  
C. C. S. 765/8

[WASHINGTON,] 25 January 1945.

## AGENDA FOR THE NEXT U. S.-BRITISH STAFF CONFERENCE

The British Chiefs of Staff suggest the following agenda for the discussions at CRICKET and further suggest that it would save time in starting the discussions when we assemble if this agenda could be agreed before the United States Chiefs of Staff leave Washington.

1. *The War Against Germany*

## (A) Strategy in Northwest Europe

(i) Discussion with General Eisenhower.

(ii) Draft directive to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force will be tabled by the British Chiefs of Staff.

## (B) Strategy in the Mediterranean

(i) Discussion with Field Marshal Alexander.

(ii) Draft directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean will be tabled by the British Chiefs of Staff.

(C) Coordination of Operations on the Three European Fronts Bomblines and air liaison with the Russians.

## (D) The U-Boat Threat

Memorandum may be tabled by the British Chiefs of Staff.

(E) The Combined Bomber Offensive (Unless disposed of separately)

(F) Planning Date for the End of the German War

2. *The War Against Japan*

## (A) Strategy in Southeast Asia Command (SEAC)

Draft directive to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command will be tabled by the British Chiefs of Staff.

(B) Allocation of Resources between SEAC and China

## (C) Pacific Operations

Proposals tabled by the United States Chiefs of Staff.

(D) Planning Date for the End of the Japanese War

3. *Review of Cargo Shipping*

Consideration of report in the light of discussions on strategy.

4. *Basic Undertakings in Support of Over-All Strategic Concept*

## SUBJECTS FOR THE CONFERENCE COMMUNIQUÉ

EUR Files

*The Assistant Secretary of State (MacLeish) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 19, 1945.

About the draft we discussed over the phone this noon.<sup>1</sup>

It seems to me the communiqué might well begin with a restatement of Allied war aims, in which it would be declared that our purpose was not the destruction of a nation or of a people, but the destruction of the military might of our enemies and preventive measures which would assure the world that our enemies would not be able to renew their threat to the peace of the world. These objectives will be attained by the unconditional surrender of the German armies, the disbanding of those armies, the destruction or removal of military equipment, the neutralization, so far as military production is concerned, of German industry, the punishment of war criminals, and the termination of the propaganda of international hatred and of racial superiority to which the German people had been subjected. This list of the measures to be taken is, of course, incomplete. I put it here merely to suggest the desirability of restating the unconditional surrender principle in a context which will make its meaning clear—viz, the fact that unconditional surrender is a means to obtain the liquidation of the German military menace rather than a means to destroy the German nation or its people. This can best be done, in my opinion, by an affirmative statement rather than a negative statement.

The communiqué would then go on to state the Allied peace aims, putting first among those aims the completion of the world organization discussed at Dumbarton Oaks, but referring, at the same time, to the negotiation of bilateral agreements, such as were contemplated in and by the Dumbarton Oaks conversations. This part of the communiqué should reaffirm, in the most emphatic language possible, the purpose of the Allies, not merely to win a peace, but to create one—and, above all, their purpose to create the peace in terms of international organization. The references to international organization should not be limited to the security organization only, but much should be made of the intention to remove the causes of war in the economic and social field and to improve the lot of humanity through advances in education, in health, in food, etc., in living standards generally, etc. etc. This part of the communiqué would gain great strength if it included an announcement of the date of the next

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<sup>1</sup> Draft not found.

United Nations meeting for the purpose of the continuation of the conversations begun at Dumbarton Oaks.

The point should be made that actions taken with reference to Germany will be taken by the three principal belligerents in their capacity as nations allied for the prosecution of the war, whereas the creation of the peace will be the work of the three allied powers acting in concert with the United Nations.

A third part of the communiqué would deal with the policy of the Allies toward liberated areas. It would be a blessing to the world if we could walk straight up to this question. If the Allies are agreed on the two points which have been repeatedly made by the President and the Secretary of State, and if the two points could be stated in conjunction, it would go far to clear up one of the most potentially dangerous spots in the whole public opinion picture. The two points are, first, that the peoples of the liberated areas are to have an opportunity, when conditions permit them to express their will, to decide for themselves what kind of government they want; second, that they can have any kind of government they want, so long as it is not a government, the existence of which would endanger the peace of the world—and a fascist government, in our opinion, does endanger the peace of the world by its mere existence.

ARCHIBALD MACLEISH

[This memorandum was discussed with Mr. Dunn on January 23. Mr. Dunn suggested the inclusion of the brief paragraph inserted as the first full paragraph on Page 2 of the memorandum.<sup>2</sup> Otherwise Mr. Dunn approved the document for the purpose for which it was prepared.]<sup>3</sup> A MACL[EISH]

<sup>2</sup> This is the paragraph beginning with the words "The point should be made . . .".

<sup>3</sup> Brackets appear in the original.

### 3. THE STETTINIUS "RECORD", DECEMBER 1, 1944- JANUARY 23, 1945

#### *Editorial Note*

The Department of State has the typewritten ribbon copy (Top Secret) of what is entitled "Record of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Secretary of State". Mr. Stettinius' prefatory note contains the following pertinent remarks on the nature of this Record:

"While I was Secretary of State I maintained a Record of my principal official activities in Washington, believing that a view of the immediate past can be a guide for the future. This record is based on personal conversations, letters, cables, press reports and considerable other material. It is a straight factual account, omitting any personal comments except for my own conversations. . . .

"In order to focus important features of the wide panorama of world affairs, the Record is for the most part divided into weekly Sections, with these Sections further divided into topical subsections. . . . In the course of developing the Record, Sections One to Five were set down in the third person, while the first person has been used in the remainder of the narrative."

Since the Record was maintained only for the periods during which Stettinius was in Washington, it contains no entries for the conferences at Malta and Yalta, for which Stettinius left the Department on January 23, in preparation for taking off by plane early on January 25, 1945.

The excerpts from this Record which are reproduced on the following pages represent those portions from the period December 1, 1944-January 23, 1945 which concerned preparations for the conferences at Malta and Yalta or dealt with negotiations on subjects that came up for discussion at those conferences. (As noted in the introduction, p. xiii, the Stettinius papers for these conferences have not been made available to the Department of State.)

The Record contains a considerable number of references to sources from which the Record was compiled, such as "Secretary's appointments", "Summaries of Telegrams", and "News Digests". In the portions of the Record presented herein, these source references have been omitted and have been replaced, wherever appropriate, by cross-references to pertinent documents contained in this volume.

*Week of 1-9 December 1944*

TROUBLE IN ITALY AND GREECE

A statement of "Special Information for the President" which I had signed December 1, carried the following item:<sup>1</sup>

"The British Ambassador has clearly stated to Bonomi that the appointment of Sforza as Foreign Minister would be unacceptable. Kirk considers this an undue interference in Italian internal affairs which, since Italy is a theatre of combined operations, to some extent involves the United States."

On Monday, December 4, according to Mr. Byington's memorandum to Mr. Savage, "the Department of State was deluged with questions from correspondents in regard to reports from London that the United States supported the British opposition to the appointment of Count Sforza in the Italian Government." . . .<sup>2</sup> "I<sup>3</sup> took these questions up." . . .<sup>2</sup> "I submitted the draft of the statement thus prepared to Mr. McDermott who approved it and I then took it up with Mr. Matthews who suggested some changes."

"The next morning I informed the Secretary of State by telephone in regard to the great number of queries now pending before the Department and read him the statement as drafted for his approval with the suggestion that it be released prior to the Press Conference in order that he would not be subjected to the very embarrassing questions which were being put to the Department by the correspondents. The Secretary after hearing the statement, which he had me repeat several times, instructed me to take it to Mr. Dunn, have him go over it and after it received Mr. Dunn's approval, he authorized me to release the statement. I took the statement up with Mr. Dunn and then after receiving his approval, I gave it to the press at about 10:45 on the morning of December 5."<sup>4</sup>

Questioned at his noon press conference shortly afterward, Secretary Stettinius said there was nothing he could say on the Italian situation in addition to the statement. He received a phone call from Dr. Matthews Office of European Affairs, that good reports were coming in on the statement.

A letter dated December 5 from Ambassador Halifax reached Mr. Stettinius next day enclosing a "personal telegram" which Halifax had received on the night of December 4, from Prime Minister

<sup>1</sup> For other excerpts from this memorandum, see *ante*, pp. 213, 250, 266.

<sup>2</sup> Points appear in the original.

<sup>3</sup> Byington.

<sup>4</sup> At this point the Record contains the text of the press release printed *ante*, pp. 266-267.

Churchill.<sup>5</sup> Churchill said that he felt "fully entitled to make the Italian Government aware of our view upon this matter because we had been accorded command in the Mediterranean, as the Americans have command in France, and therefore we have a certain special position and responsibility," and attributing the loss of "all confidence in Count Sforza's letter to Berle dated September 23, 1943."<sup>6</sup> Churchill felt that, if necessary, he would defend himself in Commons by saying that he considered Sforza "not only a man who has broken his word, but also an intriguer and mischief maker" and that he was chiefly motivated by "consideration for his own advancement." Finally Churchill had made proposals to the President at Quebec, "all of which have been carried out and some improved upon, for easing the Italian situation, especially before the Presidential elections."

On the morning of Wednesday the 6th, Mr. Stettinius phoned Mr. Dunn that "in view of the big splash" which the Italian statement had made in London, Mr. Matthews should call Mr. Michael Wright at the British Embassy. Mr. Dunn said that Eden had made a statement saying that his position was unchanged in the light of everything that had been said up to that moment and assured the Secretary that the position he took in the statement was the President's policy. Nevertheless, the Secretary said a wire should have gone out to the President on the 5th telling of the statement, that he was asking that a memorandum be sent to the President immediately.

Meanwhile Prime Minister Churchill had cabled the President<sup>7</sup> asking permission to quote "Count Sforza's letter to Mr. Berle of September 23, 1943," because it was on the basis of this letter that the British had allowed Sforza to return to Italy. He had later broken "a gentleman's word of honor" according to Churchill, in repudiating this position which had been personally discussed with Churchill. The Prime Minister continued "I was much astonished at the acerbity of the State Department's communiqué to the public, and I shall do my best in my reply to avoid imitating it." He then reminded the President of his support during "the Darlan affair," during the proposals to divide the Italian Navy and in general in proposing "mitigation for Italy." He was, therefore, hurt that the State Department should "attempt to" administer a public rebuke to His Majesty's Government.

The President in replying to Churchill<sup>8</sup> permitted him to quote from Sforza's letter to Berle since it "merely transmitted Sforza's message to Badoglio and in no way involved this Government."

While deploring any difference, the President pointed to the "untenable position in which we were put" by Eden's statement in the

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, pp. 267-269.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *ante*, p. 268.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed; but see *ante*, pp. 267-269, 271.

<sup>8</sup> *Ante*, p. 271.

House and that in spite of Italy being "an area of combined Anglo-American responsibility" the disapproval of Sforza as Premier or Foreign Minister "was made without prior consultation with us in any quarter."

On inquiring of Dr. Matthews whether he had seen the above wire from the Prime Minister to the President, Mr. Stettinius learned that Mr. Michael Wright of the British Embassy "is bringing in a document from Eden<sup>9</sup> which he must present to ERS personally." The Secretary agreed to see him late that afternoon. Mr. Wright was Counselor of the British Embassy and handled the situation because Lord Halifax was compelled to be out of town. Indicating that the British reaction had been prompt and violent, he said that the Italian statement "had caused great embarrassment and that the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden were aroused." He particularly feared the application of the statement to other "liberated territories" especially Greece. Wright had a message from Eden which he would not leave with the Secretary because it was "very personal" and "too unpleasant." After supporting "our position on Italy following Quebec, which was hard for them," Wright said the British felt that they should have been consulted and that in view of a Parliamentary debate the following Friday "it would be most helpful if we could make a statement promptly."

The Secretary replied (having decided with Mr. Dunn just before Wright's visit on "a very firm stand") that he especially regretted the incident because during lend-lease and as Under Secretary his relations with the British had been "happy and harmonious" and it was unfortunate to have this happen during his first week in office. Tea was then brought into the Secretary's office, and the Secretary's calendar notes report that Wright became "very pleasant and calm." Explaining that there was nothing in the statement except what had been agreed upon between the British and United States Government at Moscow, the Secretary continued "the big point I must make in your mind is that it is another case of lack of consultation on your part, since if you had consulted us this incident would never have occurred." Wright agreed to that, but added that our inevitable mistakes should be aired in private and not in public and that the British should have been consulted about the statement "because two wrongs don't make a right."

The Secretary concluded, "I must send a message to Eden tonight" and Wright responded "I will send one too and say you have been reasonable about this matter . . .<sup>10</sup> and that you will make a statement to be used to help them out of a corner on Friday." The Secretary's long, informal and personal wire to Mr. Eden<sup>11</sup> ended: "We

<sup>9</sup> *Ante*, pp. 269-270.

<sup>10</sup> Points appear in the original.

<sup>11</sup> *Ante*, p. 272.

are working up a friendly statement to be given out tomorrow which I sincerely hope will be helpful." Consequently, at his press conference at noon the next day (December 7) the Secretary said:

"I was interested to note that in his statement on the Greek situation on December 5 Prime Minister Churchill told the House of Commons the following: 'Our own position, as I have said is extremely clear. Whether the Greek people form themselves into a monarchy or republic is for their decision. Whether they form a government of the right or left is for their decision. These are entirely matters for them.' With this statement I am in full agreement. It is also our earnest hope that the people and authorities of Greece and our British Allies will work together in rebuilding that ravished country."

A wire from the Secretary to the President early that afternoon referred to Eden's "personal message to me," in response to which the Secretary had made a statement for which "the quotation selected for endorsement was selected by the British Embassy here."

Mr. Stettinius also signed a letter on the 7th to Lord Halifax,<sup>12</sup> ending "I am sure you know how much I value your friendship; as long as we can talk things out friendly and frankly at all times and keep no differences between us [*sic*]."

An *aide-mémoire* was drafted that day<sup>13</sup> saying that instructions had been sent to our representative in Rome, that the U. S. Government was concerned "over the prolonged crisis in the Italian Government," outlining the Government's past actions and re-assuming our position and concluding that there would be consultation "between the British and American Governments at the appropriate time."

Toward the end of the week Lord Halifax, back in Washington, called on the Secretary and "complimented me on my message to Eden (on Italy) of the night before last—which he thought was excellent. 'I must tell you, Ed, I see your point and my Government should have consulted you before acting.' " Incidentally, he also discussed fears of the British Ambassador in Rome regarding "the possible arrest and execution of Badoglio," and urged that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff direct Marshal Montgomery<sup>14</sup> in Italy to give orders for Badoglio's protection. Secretary Stettinius directed that "Dunn and Matthews immediately discuss the proposal with our Joint Chiefs of Staff this afternoon in order that they could express an opinion to Lord Halifax or to Michael Wright not later than tomorrow."<sup>15</sup> Finally the Secretary suggested to the President that

<sup>12</sup> *Ante*, pp. 271-272.

<sup>13</sup> *Ante*, pp. 273-274.

<sup>14</sup> Stettinius evidently meant Field Marshal Alexander, who was Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean.

<sup>15</sup> The Department of Defense has supplied the information that there is no record that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked formally to consider this matter.



matters be arranged so that the Marshal could "intervene on behalf of Badoglio, only as the last resort to prevent his arrest."

THE SIXTH OF DECEMBER

Wednesday the sixth was destined to be an active day, full of complications. The first appointment was on US-UK handling of mandated territories with Sir Frederick Eggleston, who declared that joint trusteeship "would be a diplomatic error" and handed Mr. Stettinius the following significant paragraph:

"Powers responsible for dependent territories should accept the principle of trusteeship, already applicable in the case of mandated territories. In such dependent territories the purpose of the trust is the welfare and advancement of the native peoples. Colonial Powers should undertake to make regular reports to an international body analogous to the Permanent Mandates Commission, set up within the framework of the General Organization. This body should be empowered to publish reports of its deliberations and to inspect dependent territories." (underlining supplied)

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*Week of 10-16 December 1944*

ITALY, GREECE, AND THE SOVIET-POLISH BORDER

Churchill's message to Tito in Yugoslavia was "almost threatening" and protested against the "rude attitude of Tito and the partisans toward the British." Meanwhile, U. S. Ambassador Kirk suggested that "we might well re-examine and clarify our position in respect to Yugoslavia" because "the present ruling group means to make use of every opportunity to enhance the prestige of the Soviet Union while seeking to discredit the western allies."<sup>1</sup> Prime Minister Subasic, considering that his visit to Moscow had been a failure, placed the blame partly "on us and the British."

On Saturday the sixteenth Mr. Stettinius discussed "the Polish thing" with a group of Departmental officials in his office, for he had signed a wire to Ambassador Harriman in Moscow the preceding Tuesday<sup>2</sup> that "in view of apparent impossibility of present Polish Cabinet working out any agreement with the Soviet Government regarding the future of Poland, the Department does not contemplate

<sup>1</sup> Telegram No. 1696, December 11, 1944 (860 H. 01/12-1144), from Ambassador Kirk at Caserta. Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> December 12, 1944. This telegram, dated December 13, is printed *ante*, p. 214.

that relations will be more than correct . . .<sup>3</sup> that we would not look favorably on full recognition of the Lublin Committee by the Soviet."

On Friday, Mr. Stettinius told Secretary Forrestal that Harriman had a letter in which our attitude toward Poland was "crystal clear" and that "to say we haven't got a position isn't quite on the beam."

In Italy, Badoglio, after finding temporary sanctuary in the British Embassy, was possibly to be flown to Malta—or again, he might enter the Vatican. Meanwhile, Count Sforza "expresses his gratitude for the American position in favor of Italian dignity and independence," saying that Churchill's speech against him was contrary to the truth. The Bonomi Government in Italy was considered to be representative but weakened by failure to include the Socialist and Action parties.

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<sup>3</sup> Points appear in the original.

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*Week of 17-23 December 1944*

#### SOVIET-POLISH BORDER

On Sunday, December 17 the Secretary received a phone call from Mr. Bohlen that a wire had just come in from the President "approving the press release on Poland." That day the Secretary "talked to Dr. Bowman for half an hour and discussed all aspects of the Polish statement to be issued Monday."<sup>1</sup> With certain reservations "he thought it was all right." Secretary Stettinius also had Mr. Durbrow, Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, check that morning with Mr. Hackworth at home and Dr. Pasvolsky in New York at the Harvard Club to clear with them the Polish statement.

Phoning Lord Halifax Monday morning the eighteenth the Secretary read him the statement and "he said he thought it sounded very well. . . .<sup>2</sup> Halifax was very appreciative of my having called him. . . .<sup>2</sup> Halifax said that Eden had called him in the middle of the night and said he had sent all sorts of nice messages to me which he now gave me. He wanted to thank me on what I had done on the Palestine matter." Eden wished included in the statement a paragraph about Polish frontiers, and Mr. Stettinius said that he would "be delighted to consider the matter." He told him, however, that "this whole activity in Greece and in Poland was causing great resentment in this country and we should definitely have a private

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, pp. 218-219.

<sup>2</sup> Points appear in the original.

talk." United States military people were going so far as to say that we ought to withdraw from Europe and "go to the Pacific now and win the war there".

Mr. Harry Hopkins also approved the statement, likewise Senator Connally. Leaving no stone unturned, the Secretary read the statement on the phone to Vandenberg, who linked the Polish situation and other political developments to "the hold-out on our nominees and it was just pouring water on the wheel for these fellows who were trying to make trouble." Incidentally, on the same day Mr. Edgar Mowrer in a visit to the Secretary told him that "we are letting the British and Russians ride roughshod over us . . .<sup>3</sup> I asked Mr. Mowrer to be patient."<sup>4</sup>

After issuance of the release, the Secretary told Mr. Hopkins "that the Polish statement went well" and the Ambassador of Poland was enthusiastic about it when talking to Mr. Stettinius on the phone, saying that it agreed perfectly with their policy. Next day the Secretary called Mr. Byington to ask about editorials on the statement and was informed that "they are favorable as a whole. . . .<sup>3</sup> the *Post* has a very good editorial on it," which acclaimed the statement as "based squarely on war aims of the United Nations."

In a memorandum to the President on Friday after an overly enthusiastic reaction by the Poles to Monday's statement, the Secretary submitted a proposed letter to go to the Polish Prime Minister emphasizing that "we believe an early settlement of the frontier question would be a great benefit to the Polish nation and people."

#### VARIOUS DEVELOPMENTS ABROAD

Lord Halifax advised the Secretary on Tuesday that an agreement had been reached between Tito and Subasic in Yugoslavia,<sup>5</sup> that Eden "hopes we will go along with this." In response, a wire went to London saying, "This Government would not undertake to express an opinion" because it was a question of personalities involved and also "because of the nature of the language used and the technicalities of Yugoslav law. The Ambassador should not enter into discussions of the questions involved."

On the eighteenth a memorandum to the President<sup>6</sup> pointed out that since resignation of the Iranian government in November, the Russians have not done anything to interfere in internal Iranian

<sup>3</sup> Points appear in the original.

<sup>4</sup> At this point there appears a paraphrase of the press release printed *ante*, pp. 218-219.

<sup>5</sup> For the text of this agreement, see *ante*, pp. 251-254.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, p. 333.

affairs. "It would be a mistake for Harriman to approach Stalin as long as there is a possibility that the tension in Iran is easing."

#### CIVILIAN SUPPLY

At 11 o'clock Monday morning, Secretary Stettinius received Mr. Richard Law, Minister of State of the British Foreign Office. He stated he was here to discuss only economic matters, shipping and feeding of liberated countries. While the Secretary told him at first that his opposite in our Government would be Mr. Acheson, it was decided later in the week that, because Law's project cut across several Departments and also because he represented "His entire Government", Mr. Harry Hopkins should work with Mr. Law, in close consultation with Mr. Acheson. Lord Halifax, Mr. Harry Hopkins and Mr. Law met with the Secretary in his office Tuesday noon in regard to shipping. Mr. Hopkins stated that "this thing would have to be handled in an extremely delicate way" because of military and other pressures. . . .<sup>7</sup> "The central theme of the discussion was that immediate relief for civilians to keep them happy and contented was a part of modern war." Hopkins and Law went to lunch together to talk this matter over, and were finally to put it up to the Secretary regarding "what our next step would be."

#### WAR CRIMES

Mr. Herbert Pell reported that he had been "working under a great hardship in London" with insufficient staff and that "the Australian representative was about to resign . . .<sup>7</sup> in disgust." Pell found it hard to operate because he had "practically no instructions. . . .<sup>7</sup> He appealed for clarification of our policy toward war criminals." Secretary Stettinius told him "I would undertake the responsibility of having the policy clarified." The Department's Legal adviser, Mr. Hackworth, had just informed the Secretary that "Army, Navy and Justice are studying the policy matter not yet established."<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Points appear in the original.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *ante*, pp. 401-402.

*Week of 24-31 December 1944*

[Stettinius had a talk with Lord Halifax on Tuesday.] . . . The question of a joint British-American position on possible Soviet recognition of the Lublin Committee was also mentioned.

## UNITED NATIONS (BIG-THREE CONFERENCE)

On Saturday, December 30, newspapers reported that "Stettinius has no plans at present for going to London," although the day before a rumor ran that "Stettinius will meet Eden in London to get first-hand account of the Greek situation." It was said that at the next Big-Three Meeting the President would have to put aside his usual "one big happy family" approach and that "Stettinius' recent statement regarding Italy and Greece showed that the White House now believed we should use 'plainer, blunter speech'." Newspapers interpreted remarks by Secretary Stettinius at the Tuesday press conference as showing that efforts had been useless toward solving the "veto problem" in voting in the Security Council and this was one of the main reasons for the impending Big-Three Meeting. But the Secretary noted in his private calendar that "the President did mention to me that he is not too worried about Stalin's position on voting procedure."

## SOVIET AND POLISH PROBLEMS

Late Friday afternoon (December 29) Secretary Stettinius held a meeting in his office with Messrs. Grew, Dunn, Bohlen, Durbrow and Hayden Raynor, to confront the situation that the Lublin Poles would probably "declare themselves to be a provisional government which might be so recognized by the Soviet Union, and perhaps by certain other countries, such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia." It was the consensus that the President should "send Stalin a cable expressing disappointment" over his taking such action prior to the Big-Three meeting and expressing hope for deferment. Mr. Stettinius phoned Hyde Park "about sending a message to 'Young [Uncle] Joe' on Poland" and Miss Tully arranged for him to talk to President Roosevelt the next day.

Saturday morning (December 30) Ambassador Halifax phoned and asked if the Department had given thought to "what we should say about Lublin."

MR. STETTINIUS: Yes. We worked through the night on it. I am seeing the President today. We must say the same thing. . . .<sup>1</sup> this Lublin thing might break Monday.

The Secretary then called Mr. Matthews and "wanted to know if the boys were keeping in touch with things." Indicating complete agreement with the British, Mr. Matthews said that the Prime Minister in his last message declared "he didn't intend to recognize at this time." . . .<sup>1</sup>

After "the President agreed with Bohlen and myself this afternoon that it would be perfectly proper for us to make the statement over

<sup>1</sup> Points appear in the original.

the weekend," the Secretary instructed Bohlen to "dictate that message before he goes home this evening." At three o'clock Saturday afternoon, December 30, the President therefore sent Stalin a cable, as drafted in the Department:<sup>2</sup>

The message was repeated to the Prime Minister with the notation: "You will see we are in step." This reference was in response to an earlier plea for cooperation voiced by Mr. Churchill.<sup>3</sup>

#### VARIOUS DEVELOPMENTS ABROAD

The hapless position of King Peter of Yugoslavia was presented to the Department through . . . [a] report which included Peter's long fervent appeal to Prime Minister Churchill, complaining that his "Royal Constitutional rights" were not being protected, and ending with the plea that "we may together . . .<sup>4</sup> find a solution," even if that meant King Peter would have to "remain abroad for awhile." (However, within several days the King was destined to submit to a regency with which he was ill-pleased.) . . .<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> At this point there appear excerpts from the text of the telegram printed *ante*, pp. 224-225.

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 225, footnote 3.

<sup>4</sup> Points appear in the original.

#### *Week of 1-6 January 1945*

#### NEW YEAR'S DAY

The Secretary told Mr. Harry Hopkins that the purpose of his 12:30 appointment with the President next day was to "bring with him people who will be involved in the forthcoming conferences." The President, Mr. Stettinius explained, did not want to have anyone accompany him in an advisory capacity, but he felt Messrs. Bowman and Alger Hiss ought to go. Hopkins promised to discuss the matter with the President that afternoon. . . .

#### UNITED NATIONS

On Wednesday<sup>1</sup> the Secretary talked over with Dr. Pasvolsky "what transpired at the White House yesterday" and said "we would have to prepare to see the President soon again on voting procedure." The press was endeavoring to pry out of the Department and Congress various details about the impending conference, and

<sup>1</sup> January 3.

Senator Connally told the Secretary that it was useless to discuss it because "It is the voting procedure and the President wants to sit down himself with Churchill and Stalin and see what we can get." In the Secretary's conversation Friday with Senator Connally both felt that regarding the Dumbarton Oaks proposals "nothing could be done now until the big meeting." Assuming that agreement would then be reached on voting and on membership, Mr. Stettinius was hopeful "we could have a United Nations Conference in the spring."

#### VARIOUS DEVELOPMENTS ABROAD

*Soviet and Polish Problems.* During the New Year weekend, Soviet Russia announced its recognition of the Lublin Committee, and there was widespread alarm that this meant another division among the Allies. However, the Secretary on Friday arranged with the President that he could "tell the press that we were consulted re Russia's recognition of the Lublin National Committee in Poland."

. . . Meanwhile, discussions continued regarding handling of Soviet prisoners of the Germans captured by Allied armies.<sup>2</sup>

As for Germany, the Department's proposal<sup>3</sup> had "been in the White House for several weeks." Chief problem was American control of Bremen and Bremerhaven in the British area to enable ingress and egress to and from the American zone. Also the French wanted equal participation with the Big Three in the occupation of Germany and a memorandum went to the President on Thursday<sup>4</sup> recommending acceptance of the French proposals "subject to the approval of the military authorities."

*War Crimes.* In asking for a report on the status of the War Crimes Commission, the President told Secretary Stettinius that "The charges should include an indictment for waging aggressive and unprovoked warfare, in violation of the Kellogg pact."<sup>5</sup> The Secretary in his reply<sup>6</sup> listed the Commission's recommendations regarding courts for trying war criminals, and added that next Monday a meeting was scheduled in Judge Rosenman's office, "to come to some common understanding . . .<sup>7</sup> and to submit a report to you."

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 416.

<sup>3</sup> Presumably the memorandum printed *ante*, pp. 166-171.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 295.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, p. 401.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, pp. 401-402.

<sup>7</sup> Points appear in the original.

*Other.* Ambassador Winant in reviewing the first year's activities of the European Advisory Commission to be completed on January 14, called attention to the fact that "only one paper has been finally approved" and suggested ineffectiveness.<sup>8</sup>

. . . . .

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<sup>8</sup> This review by Winant has not been found; but see his telegram to the President dated January 10, 1945, *ante*, pp. 128-129.

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7-23 January 1945

UNITED NATIONS

Preparation for the other conferences—the Big-Three Chiefs of State—occupied much of my thought during these weeks. After attending the annual meeting of the American Red Cross on the morning of the eighth, I saw Messrs. Dunn, Pasvolsky, Alger Hiss and Hayden Raynor in my office, regarding a noon meeting at the White House with the President.<sup>1</sup> (At a dinner that evening with Ambassador and Madame Gromyko, the Ambassador advised me he was being "recalled to Moscow for consultation.") Next morning I met with Messrs. Blanchard, Foote, Matthews, Alger Hiss, Bohlen, Conn, and Lynch to speed up preparations, and Colonel Ireland called me to talk about the project and to "get the information straight," as he said. I asked him if he had talked with Colonel McCarthy, as he knew more about it. Colonel Ireland said that he wanted to discuss my separate itinerary. In view of the secrecy of the undertaking, I called him back on my White House phone and told him that I had to get to the rendezvous before "number one" and discussed details, including the question of an aide.

On Wednesday the tenth I told the members of my Staff Committee to speed up preparation of memoranda for the President to take to the meeting of the Big-Three, that the material should be ready on January 18th, and all memoranda in the hands of Mr. Alger Hiss not later than January 15th. As for the binder of material which I would take along with me, I wished to have that by Tuesday, the sixteenth. I was advised by Mr. Dunn that the memoranda on the Near East were ready and that questions on Europe could be ready as soon as he had discussed a few policy matters with me. I told Mr. Dunn that he would have to take the responsibility for those papers. I agreed with his suggestion that everything be written up in final form by Saturday, the thirteenth, subject to any modification which could be introduced by revising certain pages in the book before it went to the President. (By January 19th, I was able to arrange an

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, pp. 66-68.



appointment with the White House for Mr. Bohlen to present the completed binder, including the ten points.)<sup>2</sup>

I told Mr. Rockefeller in answer to his question at a Staff meeting that the memoranda should not only be background, but contain policy guidance. For instance, the President would have to have a private talk with Mr. Churchill on British meat purchases in Argentina.

On the same occasion I explained that if things went well at the Big-Three meeting, I wanted to be able to cable Mr. Pasvolsky to start the machinery for calling a United Nations Conference. Assuming the President could clear up unsettled issues, I wanted to have the make-up of the American Delegation all ready and the proposed date and place agreed upon in advance so that there would be no delay later. I passed on to the Committee my impressions from the President of how encouraged he felt about pressing the American view on voting procedure with Stalin, as well as his general determination to see that we actually got a world organization.

Of course, the major matter outstanding from the Dumbarton Oaks Conference to be considered at the conference was the procedure for voting, and on the tenth I asked Mr. Harry Hopkins to set a time "when a couple of guys can come" to see the President about voting procedure. He said that he would arrange it with Mr. Bohlen. I wrote President Roosevelt on the seventeenth informing him the British would accept the proposed compromise formula on voting in the security council as sent to the Prime Minister some time ago.<sup>3</sup> However, in a meeting which the President had with certain members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 11th, he had been said by Mr. Acheson to have gone "further than expected towards agreement with the Russian view . . .<sup>4</sup> of requiring unanimity." The President felt we would probably have to yield to the Russians on this point but that they would yield on their proposals for seventeen votes. Just before he left on the morning of the seventeenth, Ambassador Gromyko phoned me to say good-bye and to express his regret at not being able to call on me before leaving. I told him that I would see him there.

When the forthcoming conference of the Big-Three first became known to the public, it was not stated that I would accompany the President. A good deal of newspaper comment began to develop. Arthur Krock on January 9th said, in summary, that "If Stettinius attends Mexico City meeting of American foreign ministers, he cannot also be present at Big-3 meeting. Undoubtedly his prestige and State Depart.'s would be enhanced if Stettinius should go with President

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, pp. 42-43.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 77.

<sup>4</sup> Points appear in the original.

to Big-3 meeting . . .<sup>5</sup> However, it is good practice for President to keep State Secretary in constant touch with formulation of policy. Example of this good practice would be Stettinius' presence at the Big-3 meeting."

Senator Brewster made a speech in Congress suggesting the President was "passing over Mr. Stettinius" in not taking me to the Big-3 meeting. This was brought up in the meeting of my Staff Committee while I was out of town and the Committee felt "secrecy on this point was undesirable and unnecessary" and an announcement should be made to the effect that I was going. The Committee suggested I take the matter up with the President. I discussed with him a number of secret items involving the conference, on the morning of Thursday, the eighteenth, and next morning I checked with the President's Secretary, Mr. Early, about my making a statement to the press on my trip abroad. Early said that he had just cleared this with the President for the second time and urged me to make the announcement as soon as possible. I told Early exactly what I was going to say and he approved. At noon that day in answer to questions I revealed that the President had invited me several weeks before to accompany him on his forthcoming trip. And I added that this would not conflict with the meeting at Mexico City, that I would attend that conference also.

Details and plans for the big trip were discussed on the eighteenth with Major Tyson and Major Richmond—who would respectively be my aide and pilot—together with Alger Hiss of the Department. I instructed Major Tyson to report to Colonel McCarthy for briefing. Later that day I had a visit from the French Ambassador and Mr. René Mayer, French Minister for Transportation and Public Works, who told me of their anxiety that General de Gaulle should attend the Big-3 meeting. Without giving them much encouragement, I advised them that the whole question was receiving our very careful consideration. The British also required a little handling. Lord Halifax had requested that we give him certain preparatory information for relaying to London, but after consultation within the Department I telephoned Lord Halifax that Mr. Hopkins would have private talks in London on his arrival. Lord Halifax thought this was a very satisfactory answer. The British also appeared likely to press a proposal that Russia be informed of the urgency of the Iranian proposals in advance of the Big-3 Conference, but our position was that this would lend the Iranian situation undue importance.<sup>6</sup>

At 3:30 on Tuesday the 23rd I held a small off-the-record meeting of the members of the party in final preparation for our departure.

A hopeful sign for international cooperation appeared in a successful

<sup>5</sup> Points appear in the original.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, p. 338.

draft proposing a Four-Power Committee to supervise "the return of democratic government" in liberated and satellite states, to be called the Emergency High Commission for Europe.<sup>7</sup> I expected to take up this project with the President on my return from Mexico City. Ambassador Pearson of Canada presented a statement of his Government's views on Dumbarton Oaks, principally recommending that middle-sized countries should be more frequent members of the Security Council than smaller countries.<sup>8</sup>

A number of financial and economic matters involved relations with the Soviet Union. Ambassador Harriman reported on a Soviet *Aide-Mémoire* which asked a postwar credit of six billion dollars to run for thirty years at 2½ per cent a year, and which suggested that development of friendly relations would depend upon a generous credit.<sup>9</sup> But Harriman recommended that our willingness to cooperate in large-scale Russian reconstruction should depend on "Soviet international behavior". While a rising standard of living in Russia might mean increased tolerance, we should retain control of any credits, and we should reach agreement on lend-lease before putting into production additional long-life industrial equipment.

I wrote Secretary Morgenthau that we had studied the Treasury's letter of January 1 to the President,<sup>10</sup> proposing comprehensive financial aid to the U. S. S. R. during its reconstruction period. We would be glad to sit down with Mr. Morgenthau and members of his staff, I suggested, to discuss their plan and the original Soviet request. In communicating with Mr. Crowley of FEA,<sup>11</sup> we concurred that the question of long-term credits for Soviet postwar projects should be kept separate from lend-lease items on the war supply program. Our position on the long-term financing was that we could not immediately make concrete proposals for a large postwar credit because of legislative restrictions but that we were anxious to extend such a credit as soon as authorization was received from Congress. Meanwhile, details of Soviet requirements would be welcomed.

Soviet authorities were pleased that Dr. Millspaugh and the forty-five Americans comprising his mission might be withdrawn from Iran, owing to a decision to place the powers of the mission in Iranian hands. The British, on the other hand, were hoping that the mission would remain. The American representatives themselves were almost indifferent. But U.S. prestige was involved.

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, pp. 97-100.

<sup>8</sup> 500.CC/1-1345, not printed.

<sup>9</sup> *Ante*, pp. 310-315.

<sup>10</sup> *Ante*, pp. 309-310.

<sup>11</sup> *Ante*, pp. 316-317.

On my return to Washington, Wednesday, January 17th, I met with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the Capitol. I had a very friendly reception. I spoke for thirty or forty minutes and was questioned for about the same time. Nothing arose of an embarrassing or dangerous nature. Mr. Acheson talked later with four Senators who were extremely enthusiastic, and Senator Hill told Mr. MacLeish that he hoped such meetings would continue. I suggested afterward to my Staff Committee that they might hold these meetings with the Senate during my absence, but I had to caution them against disclosing anything that ought not to appear in the press. Unfortunately, forty-eight hours after the President had spoken to members of the Committee about a closely guarded secret—Russia's demand for sixteen seats in the General Assembly—it had appeared in the newspapers. . . .

#### VARIOUS DEVELOPMENTS ABROAD

*Europe.* The Polish Ambassador called on me Tuesday morning January 9th asking what the next step of our Government would be on the Polish situation. The Ambassador pressed me to say that I personally felt it would be advantageous for Mikolajczyk to be taken back into the Government. I replied that it would be unwise to stir the matter up at this time, that he would have to be patient pending the outcome of certain conversations the President hoped to have. Actually, the Department favored an arrangement regarding the Polish boundary whereby Poland would acquire most of East Prussia, German Upper Silesia, the eastern portion of Pomerania, and other former German holdings. Resulting from Soviet recognition, the Lublin Committee in Poland was gaining increasing support as a government.

The Soviet Government took an aggressive attitude toward our releasing Soviet nationals captured by our forces, regardless of retaliatory measures the Germans might take against American prisoners of war; and it appeared urgent for us to express our views emphatically as soon as we had received all necessary information from the War Department. When Secretary Stimson inquired regarding our policy and action, I told him that I had informed Ambassador Gromyko we could take no action before discussing it with the War Department. Secretary Stimson said that he would send a memorandum to the President expressing his views. . . . On January 17th I signed a wire to Ambassador Harriman authorizing him to let Marshal Voroshilov sign the Hungarian Armistice on behalf of the United States.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> 740.00119EW/1-1745, not printed.

. . . We informed Ambassador Murphy that we felt the Italian policy had been mild even for Italy and that a much more rigorous purge program should be applied to Germany. A general "post-defeat" directive for Germany was approved by the State, War and Navy Departments, although the financial sections had not been agreed to by the Treasury Department; therefore Mr. Winant had been instructed to act without waiting for the latter.<sup>13</sup> By the time I left for the trip, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee was drawing up a document to be presented to the four governments involved, proving [*providing*] for immediate activation in London of the Control Council for Germany.<sup>14</sup>

. . . . .

At my press conference on the nineteenth a correspondent inquired whether the U. S. policy was still the same regarding punishment of Hitler and other Nazi leaders as had been previously stated by Secretary Hull and the President. I answered that that was still the policy of the Department. Ambassador Joseph Davies phoned me on the twenty-second to say he had a memorandum on war crimes; I had a visit with him that noon.

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<sup>13</sup> Dated January 6, 1945; not printed. For an earlier version of this paper, see *ante*, pp. 143-154. For Winant's comments on a portion of the paper of January 6, see *ante*, pp. 132, 133.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *ante*, p. 180.

#### 4. SURVEY REPORTS ON SOVIET ATTITUDES AND POLICIES

EUR Files

##### *The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 3, 1945.

##### MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I attach a letter from General Deane to General Marshall which the Chief of Staff and I both feel is an apt presentation with sound recommendations.

General Deane has informed us that the American Ambassador in Moscow has seen this letter and concurs fully in the thoughts and recommendations and believes that they apply with equal force to political matters. Mr. Harriman, however, wished to point out the difficulty of giving an accurate picture in such a short letter and states that he would like to express his views in greater detail if consideration is to be given to a change in our policy in dealing with the Soviet Government.

I have furnished the Secretary of State with a copy of General Deane's letter.

HENRY L. STIMSON  
*Secretary of War*

[Attachment]

*The Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane), to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall)*

SECRET

Moscow, 2 December 1944.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: Now that I have been in Russia for some time and am qualified as an "expert," I think it might be of some interest to you to have my general reactions. They may be of value to you since I have served under you long enough to enable you to evaluate them. A report is always more useful if one knows the reporter.

Everyone will agree on the importance of collaboration with Russia—now and in the future. It won't be worth a hoot, however, unless it is based on mutual respect and made to work both ways. I have sat at innumerable Russian banquets and become gradually nauseated by Russian food, vodka, and protestations of friendship.

Each person high in public life proposes a toast a little sweeter than the preceding one on Soviet-British-American friendship. It is amazing how these toasts go down past the tongues in the cheeks. After the banquets we send the Soviets another thousand airplanes, and they approve a visa that has been hanging fire for months. We then scratch our heads to see what other gifts we can send, and they scratch theirs to see what else they can ask for.

This picture may be overdrawn, but not much. When the Red Army was back on its heels, it was right for us to give them all possible assistance with no questions asked. It was right to bolster their morale in every way we could. However, they are no longer back on their heels; and, if there is one thing they have plenty of, it's self-confidence. The situation has changed, but our policy has not. We still meet their requests to the limit of our ability, and they meet ours to the minimum that will keep us sweet.

The truth is that they want to have as little to do with foreigners, Americans included, as possible. We never make a request or proposal to the Soviets that is not viewed with suspicion. They simply cannot understand giving without taking, and as a result even our giving is viewed with suspicion. Gratitude cannot be banked in the Soviet Union. Each transaction is complete in itself without regard to past favors. The party of the second part is either a shrewd trader to be admired or a sucker to be despised.

We have obtained some concessions after exerting all the pressure we could assemble. These included the FRANTIC bases, improved communications, exchange of weather, trucks to China, exchange of enemy intelligence, some promises regarding the Far East, and some other inconsequential ones. The cost to the Soviet Union for any of these projects has been nil compared to the cost of our efforts in their behalf. Some will say that the Red Army has won the war for us. I can swallow all of this but the last two words. In our dealings with the Soviet authorities, the U. S. Military Mission has made every approach that has been made. Our files are bulging with letters to the Soviets and devoid of letters from them. This situation may be reversed in Washington, but I doubt it. In short, we are in the position of being at the same time the givers and the supplicants. This is neither dignified nor healthy for U. S. prestige.

The picture is not all bad. The individual Russian is a likeable person. Their racial characteristics are similar to ours. Individually I think they would be friendly if they dared to be—however, I have yet to see the inside of a Russian home. Officials dare not become too friendly with us, and others are persecuted for this offense. The Soviets have done an amazing job for their own people—both in the war and in the pre-war period. One cannot help admire their war effort and the spirit with which it has been accomplished. We have

few conflicting interests, and there is little reason why we should not be friendly now and in the foreseeable future.

In closing, I believe we should revise our present attitude along the following lines.

(1) Continue to assist the Soviet Union, provided they request such assistance, and we are satisfied that it contributes to winning the war.

(2) Insist that they justify their needs for assistance in all cases where the need is not apparent to us. If they fail to do so, we should, in such cases, refuse assistance.

(3) In all cases where our assistance does not contribute to the winning of the war, we should insist on a *quid pro quo*.

(4) We should present proposals for collaboration that would be mutually beneficial, and then leave the next move to them.

(5) When our proposals for collaboration are unanswered after a reasonable time, we should act as we think best and inform them of our action.

(6) We should stop pushing ourselves on them and make the Soviet authorities come to us. We should be friendly and cooperative when they do so.

I think there is something here worth fighting for, and it is simply a question of the tactics to be employed. If the procedure I suggest above were to be followed, there would be a period in which our interests would suffer. However, I feel certain that we must be tougher if we are to gain their respect and be able to work with them in the future.

Sincerely yours,

DEANE

761.00/1-1045

*The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the President*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 12, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Soviet Foreign Policy

While you may not have time to read in full the enclosed lengthy interpretive report from Harriman on developments in Soviet policy derived from the attitudes of the Russian press, I believe that, in view of your forthcoming meeting, you will find it worthwhile to look over at least the first two paragraphs of the report which summarize the Ambassador's conclusions in regard to the main lines of Soviet foreign policy at the present time.

JOSEPH C. GREW  
*Acting Secretary*



[Enclosure]<sup>1</sup>*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, January 10, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received January 11—4:50 p. m.]

90. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary.

Herewith my ninth interpretative report on developments in Soviet policy based on the Press for the period October 13 to December 31 for distribution as suggested in my 2215, December 14, 2 p. m., 1943.<sup>2</sup> . . .

Report begins: No. 9.

The relative lull in military activities on the Eastern Front has in effect given the Soviet Union a chance to pursue its political objectives in areas liberated by Russian Army. As a result the pattern of Soviet tactics in Eastern Europe and the Balkans has taken shape and the nature of Soviet aims has been clarified. It has become apparent that the Soviets, while eschewing direct attempts to incorporate into the Soviet Union alien peoples who were not embraced within the frontiers of June 21, 1941, are nevertheless employing the wide variety of means at their disposal—occupation troops, secret police, local communist parties, labor unions, sympathetic leftist organizations, sponsored cultural societies, and economic pressure—to assure the establishment of regimes which, while maintaining an outward appearance of independence and of broad popular support, actually depend for their existence on groups responsive to all suggestions emanating from the Kremlin. The tactics are endless in their variety and are selected to meet the situation in each particular country, dependent largely on the extent and strength of the resistance to Soviet penetration. It is particularly noteworthy that no practical distinction seems to be made in this connection between members of the United Nations whose territory is liberated by Soviet troops and ex-enemy countries which have been occupied.

The overriding consideration in Soviet foreign policy is the pre-occupation with "security", as Moscow sees it. This objective explains most of the recent Soviet actions which have roused criticism abroad: the demand for unanimity of decision in the council of the security organization; the opposition to regional blocs; the sponsorship of puppet regimes in all contiguous countries; the demand for the thorough purge of reactionary elements in all liberated areas, the constant harping at the European neutrals; the demands for vast oil and mineral concessions in Iran. The Soviet Union seeks a period of freedom from danger during which it can recover from the wounds of war and complete its industrial revolution. The Soviet conception

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<sup>1</sup> Printed from the original telegram (861.9111/1-1045).

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

of "security" does not appear cognizant of the similar needs or rights of other countries and of Russia's obligation to accept the restraints as well as the benefits of an international security system.

1. The major theme of Allied unity, dominant since the Tehran and Moscow conferences, continued to be played in all major pronouncements on foreign affairs; but it had acquired a certain perfunctory quality; and a minor chord was introduced to condition the Soviet public for differences which the approaching end of war in Europe might bring. The German offensive in the Ardennes was dispassionately portrayed to the Soviet reader as a sally with limited objectives designed to throw the grand Allied offensive off balance. Meanwhile the Soviet reader was frequently reminded that the bulk of German manpower was engaged by the Red army in the East, and the press was quick to resent any implication that the Red army was not doing its share and that the operations in Hungary served primarily political aims.

2. Keen but wary interest continued to be manifested in projects for international cooperation in various fields. No change occurred in the Soviet attitude toward participation of the great powers in voting in the security council on issues involving themselves, and the Soviet position was reiterated by Stalin in his November 6 speech. *War and the Working Class* in December advanced a proposal for continental zones within the security organization in which the great powers would be represented if their interests were involved. This scheme was patently designed to offset projects for regional blocs to which the Soviets, fearing that such blocs may sooner or later be directed against the Soviet Union, are strongly opposed.<sup>3</sup>

4. After several months of unsuccessful attempts to effect a reconciliation on Soviet terms of the Lublin Committee with the more moderate elements of the Polish Government in London, the Soviets abandoned the effort following Mikolajczyk's resignation and set in motion an intensive agitation in liberated Poland which culminated in the formation of a provisional government in Lublin on December 31. Meanwhile several of the more prominent leaders in the early stages of the life of the National Council, including Wanda Wasilewska, who was head of the union of Polish Patriots in the Soviet Union, General Berling, who commanded the Polish forces in the Soviet Union and later on the Warsaw Front, and Andrzej Witos, who was in charge of land reform, have been removed from their posts with little explanation. The tight control exercised over political parties and public opinion in Poland is manifest in the unanimity of support reported for the various measures undertaken

<sup>3</sup> Passages not relating to foreign affairs have been omitted.

by the Committee. The influence of Moscow is also evident in a law adopted by the Council providing stern penalties for the familiar crimes of treason, wrecking and sabotage. A delegation from Warsaw visited Moscow to express gratitude for aid rendered by the Soviets; meanwhile the press laid the delay in receipt of aid from the United States to the intrigues of reactionary Polish circles there.

The committee proceeded energetically with its program of land reform and by the end of the year was able to announce that the division of large estates and the distribution of the land to peasants had been practically completed in the area liberated to date. It was obvious that the parcelling up of the estates was uneconomic, since the new holdings were very small and their new owners often without draught animals and tools to work them. It appeared inevitable that some kind of cooperative or collective system would have to be introduced before the new holdings could be worked with any degree of efficiency. Meanwhile the reform doubtless served the purpose of increasing support for the Lublin Committee in an area where the Communist industrial element was small and the peasantry largely apathetic.

5. In the other United Nations countries on whose soil the Red army was fighting, the situation was apparently much less complicated than in Poland. After the entry of Soviet troops into Ruthenia a mission headed by Nemeč arrived in Moscow from London to take over the administration of the liberated territory in accordance with the Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement concluded last spring.<sup>4</sup> The mission was permitted to proceed to Ruthenia but did not take direct part in the civil administration, which was in the hands of a pro-Soviet Ruthenian National Committee of obscure origin. Messages were published in the Moscow press from mass meetings in Ruthenian towns demanding union of the province with the Ukrainian SSR, but Red army authorities on the spot were reported to have remained strictly aloof from this agitation. *War and the Working Class* on two occasions took Czech Foreign Minister Masaryk to task, once for suggesting that his country might become a bridge between the Soviet Union and the West, once for reviving the idea of a Czech-Polish federation.

The entry of Soviet troops into Belgrade was the occasion for a message of gratitude and solidarity from Tito to Stalin, but in general Yugoslavia received much less notice in the Press than normally. Subasić's Moscow visit passed almost unnoticed.

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<sup>4</sup> Agreement relating to civil administration in Czechoslovak territory upon entry of Soviet troops, signed at London May 8, 1944 (860F.01/545).

6. In the ex-enemy countries which have broken with Germany the Soviets have been interested primarily in the prompt and complete fulfillment of the armistice terms and the purge of former Fascist and Collaborationist elements. . . .

In contrast to its coolness toward Finland, the Soviet attitude toward Bulgaria was one of warmth and approbation. The abject and servile submission of the Bulgarian delegates during the Armistice negotiations, Soviet satisfaction with the Fatherland Front Government and the enthusiasm with which purge measures were adopted coupled with the traditional benevolence of the Russians for the Slav, Bulgars and the strategic position of Bulgaria adjacent to British occupied Greece, combined to create for Bulgaria a place of special privilege among the defeated powers. Suggestions for the federation of Bulgaria with Yugoslavia received the endorsement of the Soviet press.

Rumania remained the bad boy. Although Press material for the most part was light, the Russians did not conceal their dislike for the Rumanians and their dissatisfaction with Rumanian failure to cooperate fully in meeting their obligations under the Armistice. Vice Foreign Commissar Vyshinsky spent several weeks in Bucharest endeavoring to effect an improvement in the situation.

The *coup d'état* in Hungary following Horthy's armistice feelers in Moscow led to violent Press attacks on Szalasy as a Nazi stooge. Following Russian occupation of the greater part of Hungary, a Provisional Government was formed at Debrecen obviously under Soviet sponsorship but apparently with wide and respectable non-Communist participation. The new government immediately declared war on Germany and despatched a new delegation to Moscow to conclude an armistice with the United Nations.

7. The general attitude of the Press toward United Nations countries which were not liberated or in the process of liberation by Soviet troops was one of polite reserve. Soviet sympathy for the resistance forces in these countries which were frequently under Communist leadership was not concealed. . . .

De Gaulle was invited to Moscow and his visit resulted in the signature of a twenty-year alliance<sup>5</sup> which was ratified without delay by both countries. The Press interpreted the new alliance as a security measure directed against a renewal of German aggression. Thorez the French Communist leader, returned to Paris from Moscow. . . .

8. On the expressed assumption that the war was approaching its end the press published rather less than the usual amount of material against Germany. It expressed concern about efforts of leading Nazi to flee Germany and the transfer of German resources to neutral countries. . . . An appeal by 50 German generals headed by Marshal

<sup>5</sup> See *ante*, p. 292.

von Paulus, once more calling on the Germans to overthrow Hitler and submit, was a reminder that the free Germany movement in Moscow is still active. The appeal warned the Germans that they must now expect occupation and punishment but that they would subsequently be able to take their place among the free nations.

Several reports of the Extraordinary State Commission described ghastly German atrocities committed in the Baltic States and the Lwów region. Long lists of Germans charged with responsibility including Commanding Front generals formed part of the reports and in one Himmler was held to be directly responsible.

9. Those European neutrals who are without diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union namely Switzerland, Spain, and Portugal were under almost constant Press attack. . . .

11. Refusal by Iran to consider the grant of oil concessions in northern Iran to the Soviets until after the war led to a violent campaign against the Saed Government which eventually brought about its resignation. Mass meetings in Iran organized by Soviet sympathizers and attacks on Saed in the left wing papers were fully reported by the Soviet Press. It was alleged that Saed and his government were Fascist in their outlook, that they maintained contact with bandits who interfered with supply lines leading to the Soviet Union, that their continuance in office was detrimental to the prosecution of the war. At the height of the controversy *Izvestiya* asserted that there was no legal basis for the presence of American troops in Iran. Saed Xiaedden [*Seyid Zia-ed-din*] was a favored target for attack and there were frequent reports of mass meetings demanding that he be exiled. Following Saed's resignation it was urged that he and responsible members of his government be brought to trial. Pressure for immediate grant of oil concessions relaxed but the Soviets made it clear that they did not intend to drop the issue.

12. Most significant development in Soviet policy in the Far East was Stalin's definition of Japan as an aggressor nation in his November 6 speech. Foreign Press reaction to this departure was played down but the new line gradually became apparent by subsequent Press material. The sharp denunciation of Japan made at the Congress of the British Communist Party was published. A book on the siege of Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese war, publication of which had been withheld for several years appeared and was favorably reviewed in the Press. The regular reviews of the Pacific war stressed the worsening situation of Japan from the damage being caused by B-29 raids. While Press handling of Japan continued to be cautious and gingerly, Soviet dislike of the Japanese was much more clearly apparent than a year ago.

Hostility continued to be expressed toward the Chiang Kai-shek regime because of its failure to reach an accommodation with the Chinese Communists. No enthusiasm was shown for the cabinet changes which were viewed as merely a change in lineup without any fundamental modification of policy or direction.

13. . . .

Great interest was manifested in the return of all categories of Soviet Nationals or persons who could be claimed as such particularly those found among German forces captured by Allies. A special commission was established to expedite repatriation. Extreme touchiness was shown over reported reluctance of many of these people to return and over alleged encouragement being given to such sentiments by foreign authorities. Press stories of warm reception accorded repatriates did not check with reports of Embassy observers and apparently reflected a desire to disarm the suspicions of those still abroad. Population transfers along western borders continued.

Press devoted much space to the progress of reconstruction in the Baltic area while inveighing against so called "Bourgeois-Nationalist" groups both there and in the Ukraine. It seemed clear that Nationalist remnants survived in these areas and were creating difficulties for the Soviet authorities.

While occasional anti-religious articles still appear in the press the trend is increasingly toward recognition of the church as a beneficial factor in Soviet society. Metropolitan Nikolai and other churchmen were awarded defense of Moscow medals. A meeting of the Holy Synod to elect a new patriarch was announced for January. All the eastern patriarchs were invited to attend.

HARRIMAN



## II. THE MALTA CONFERENCE

January 30-February 2, 1945





## 5. THE PRESIDENT'S LOG AT MALTA

### *Editorial Note*

The document referred to in this volume as the President's Log constitutes the major portion of the 83-page booklet entitled "The President's Trip to the Crimea Conference and Great Bitter Lake, Egypt, January 22 to February 28, 1945". This booklet, which was prepared by Lieutenant J. G. Rigdon and approved by the President's Naval Aide, Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, has the following contents: List of the President's Party, Itinerary, Chart Showing Travel Across Atlantic Ocean, Chart Showing Travel in Mediterranean and Black Sea Areas, Foreword, Log of the Trip, Report of the Crimea Conference, List of Saudi Arabian Guests, Memorandum of Conversations between King Ibn Saud and President Roosevelt (2-14-45), List of the Seaman Guard at Yalta.

The Malta Conference began on January 30, 1945, but President Roosevelt did not arrive until February 2, the last day of the conference. There is reproduced below the Log for February 2. The portions of the Log covering the Yalta Conference (February 4-11) are printed *post*, pp. 549-561.

White House Files

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### *Log of the Trip*

#### *Friday, February 2nd:*

0000: In Mediterranean Sea, enroute Malta from Gibraltar, steaming on various courses and at various speeds while conforming to our prescribed routing.

0610: We sighted the island of Sicily, bearing 055, distant 50 miles.

0616: We sighted the islands of Goza<sup>1</sup> and Malta, bearing 115, distant 32 miles.

0935: We passed through the submarine net gate and entered Grand Harbor, Valetta,<sup>2</sup> Malta. The President was on deck as we entered port. From the very large crowd evident, it appeared that all Malta was out to greet him. Both sides of the channel were lined with people of Malta.

1001: The *Quincy* moored, starboard side to, at Berth 9 in Grand Harbor, Valetta. The U. S. S. *Memphis* (light cruiser and flagship of Vice Admiral H. K. Hewitt, U. S. N., Commander Eighth Fleet) was present in Malta. Prime Minister Churchill and his party were at

<sup>1</sup> Gozo, an island of the Malta group.

<sup>2</sup> Valletta, capital of Malta.

Grand Harbor and witnessed our arrival from the deck of the H. M. S. *Sirius*<sup>3</sup> (light cruiser), moored across the channel from where the *Quincy* tied up.

Total distance steamed, Newport News to Malta, 4883 miles.

Colonel Park and the following listed members of our advance party were awaiting us on the dock at Grand Harbor and joined us as soon as the *Quincy* had been moored: Mr. Reilly, Major Greer, Mr. Holmes, Mr. Wood and Mr. O'Driscoll.

A few days before our arrival at Malta we began to receive disconcerting messages from the Prime Minister about the difficulties of reaching Yalta and the unhealthy living conditions there. The first gun came from Mr. Hopkins who stated, "He (the Prime Minister) says that if we had spent ten years on research we could not have found a worse place in the world than Yalta . . .<sup>4</sup> He claims it is good for typhus and deadly lice which thrive in those parts." This was followed by other messages from the Prime Minister, who reported the drive from the airfield at Saki to Yalta as being six hours, instead of two hours as originally reported by Mr. Harriman; and that one of his people had reported the mountain part of the drive as frightening and at times impassable, and the health conditions as wholly unsanitary, as the Germans had left all buildings infested with vermin. It was, therefore, a great relief upon arriving at Malta to find from Mr. Harriman and members of our advance party (headed by Colonel Park) that although we would face a difficult drive after landing at the airport at Saki, it would not be too tiring if completed during daylight and if we had clear weather. We were also informed that the medical officers of the U. S. S. *Catoctin* had accomplished a very effective job of de-bugging at Yalta.

1020: Secretary of State Stettinius, Ambassador Harriman, and Mr. Hopkins came on board the *Quincy* to confer with the President. Sergeant Robert Hopkins came on board with his father, Mr. Harry L. Hopkins. Sergeant Hopkins had joined his father at Paris.

1042: His Excellency, the Governor-General of Malta (Lieutenant General Sir Edmond Schreiber) came on board the *Quincy* and called on the President. The President was on deck (port side, first superstructure deck) at the time, enjoying the warm sun. He received all his distinguished guests there during the forenoon.

1052: Admiral Sir John Cunningham, Allied Naval Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, came on board and called on the President.

1107: General of the Army George C. Marshall came on board and called on the President. A short time later Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King called and he and Fleet Admiral Leahy joined the President and General Marshall in a conference.

1143: Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. N. (Commander, U. S.

<sup>3</sup> According to Churchill, p. 343, the Prime Minister watched this scene from the deck of H. M. S. *Orion*, in which he had his quarters.

<sup>4</sup> Points appear in the original.

Naval Forces, Europe) and Vice Admiral Hewitt came on board and called on the President.

1148: Prime Minister Churchill and his daughter, Section Officer Sarah Oliver (WAAF), came on board the *Quincy* and called on the President.

1155: The Right Honorable Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, came on board and called on the President.

1300: The President entertained at lunch in his quarters aboard the *Quincy*. His guests included: The Prime Minister, Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius, Mrs. Oliver and Mrs. Boettiger.

1415: The Governor-General, Mrs. Schreiber and Miss Schreiber came on board and called on the President and Mrs. Boettiger.

1430: Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, U. S. N. (Ret.), Director of War Shipping Administration, came on board and called on the President.

1443: The President, the Governor-General, Mrs. Schreiber, Miss Schreiber, Mrs. Oliver and Mrs. Boettiger left the ship for a 30-mile auto drive about the Island of Malta. They visited the countryside and the towns of Medina,<sup>5</sup> Chajjn Tuffieha<sup>6</sup> and Valetta. The Prime Minister left the ship at the same time but did not accompany the President on the drive. The President rode in the car with the Governor-General, while the ladies followed in a second car. During the course of the drive Palace Square in Valetta was visited and the President was shown the stone replica of the scroll that he presented to the people of Malta on his previous visit, December 8, 1943.<sup>7</sup> The replica is mounted in the side of the Palace building, near the main entrance.

To those of us who had been with the President on his previous visit, the many signs of rebuilding were most evident all about the island.

The weather was delightful. The average temperature was 58.

1625: The President and Mrs. Boettiger returned to the ship from their drive.

1630: The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff came on board and the President met with them in his quarters. Present were: Fleet Admiral Leahy, General of the Army Marshall, Fleet Admiral King and Major General L. S. Kuter (representing General of the Army H. H. Arnold who was ill and did not attend this conference), and the President.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>5</sup> The old capital of Malta, near the center of the island, variously called Notabile, Città Vecchia, and Medina.

<sup>6</sup> Not identified.

<sup>7</sup> For an account of this presentation, see *New York Times*, December 11, 1943, pp. 1, 2.

<sup>8</sup> No minutes of such a meeting have been found. Leahy, pp. 294-295, however, refers to a meeting of the President with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the afternoon of February 2; and King, p. 586, mentions that Marshall and King called on the President that afternoon. See also *post*, plate 3 following p. 546.

1800: The Prime Minister, accompanied by the members of the British Staff, came on board. The President then met with the Prime Minister and the Combined Chiefs of Staff (American and British) in his cabin. Present were: The President, the Prime Minister, Fleet Admiral Leahy, General of the Army Marshall, Fleet Admiral King, Major General Kuter, Field Marshal H. Maitland Wilson, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles F. A. Portal, Admiral of the Fleet Sir A. B. Cunningham, General Sir Hastings L. Ismay, and Major General Jacob. Major Randolph Churchill came on board with his father but did not attend the meeting. The meeting adjourned at 1850. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had been in conference at Malta for several days prior to our arrival and this was the first plenary meeting with the President and the Prime Minister.

2000: The President was host at dinner in his quarters. His guests included: The Prime Minister, Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Byrnes, Admiral Leahy, Mrs. Oliver and Mrs. Boettiger.

2215: The Prime Minister, Mr. Eden and Mrs. Oliver left the ship.

2230: Lieutenant (jg) A. L. Conrad, USNR, special courier, left the ship with White House mail to proceed to Washington via air transportation.

2300: The President and members of his party left the *Quincy* by automobile for the Luqa Airfield, Malta. On arrival at the airfield they embarked in assigned aircraft to await scheduled departure times. The entire British and American delegations to the Conference at Yalta were on the move and departed from Malta during the night. This involved approximately 700 people, so that the Luqa airport was a very busy place throughout the night. Commencing at about 2330, huge planes took off at about 10-minute intervals all night long. The Air Transport Command aircraft specially fitted for the President's use was used by the President for all flights on this cruise. It has private quarters for the President and an elevator which lowers to ground level to facilitate his embarking and disembarking.

The President turned in at once as his plane was not scheduled to take off until 0330 tomorrow.

2330: Colonel Park, Commander Clark, Commander Tyree, Major Putnam and Chief Warrant Officer Cornelius, departed Malta for Saki, U. S. S. R. They were embarked in the State Department plane.

2345: The special cargo aircraft transporting our heavy baggage and freight departed Malta for Saki. Embarked were Agents Dorsey and Williams and Messmen Estrada, Calinao, Floresca and Sarate. Air Transport Command planes were used exclusively by the American delegation.

## 6. MINUTES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS

TUESDAY, JANUARY 30, 1945

MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JANUARY 30, 1945, 10 A. M.,  
MONTGOMERY HOUSE<sup>1</sup>

### PRESENT

General of the Army Marshall  
Fleet Admiral King  
Major General Kuter<sup>2</sup>  
Lieutenant General Somervell  
Lieutenant General Smith  
Rear Admiral Duncan  
Rear Admiral McCormick  
Major General Bull  
Major General Hull

Major General Wood  
Major General Anderson  
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser  
Brigadier General Lindsay  
Captain McDill  
Colonel Peck  
Colonel Dean  
Colonel Lincoln

### *Secretariat*

Brigadier General McFarland  
Captain Graves

J. C. S. Files

### *Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes*<sup>3</sup>

TOP SECRET

### 1. AGENDA FOR NEXT U. S.-BRITISH STAFF CONFERENCE (C. C. S. 765/8)<sup>4</sup>

GENERAL MARSHALL said that this paper set forth the British Chiefs of Staff suggestion for the agenda for the Combined Chiefs of Staff discussions at CRICKET. He drew attention to the following changes which it embodied: paragraph 1 (E), the Combined Bomber Offensive; paragraph 1 (F), Planning Date for the End of the German War; paragraph 2 (D), Planning Date for the End of the Japanese War; and paragraph 4. He recommended approval of the paper as presented.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve C. C. S. 765/8.

<sup>1</sup> Montgomery House is located in Floriana, a suburb of Valletta, Malta.

<sup>2</sup> At the Malta and Yalta Conferences Major General Kuter represented General of the Army Arnold, who was ill.

<sup>3</sup> J. C. S. 183d Meeting. The meetings of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff were numbered consecutively from the first formal meeting of that body, which took place in Washington on February 9, 1942.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 426.

## 2. OVERALL REVIEW OF CARGO SHIPPING (J. C. S. 1205/3) <sup>5</sup>

GENERAL MARSHALL said that this subject was on the agenda in order to determine the status of the study. J. C. S. 1205/3 contains the recommendation of the Joint Staff Planners.

ADMIRAL KING recommended approval of the paper as presented.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the recommendations of the Joint Staff Planners in J. C. S. 1205/3. (Memorandum subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 746/7) <sup>6</sup>

## 3. STRATEGY IN NORTHWEST EUROPE (J. C. S. 1237 (ARGONAUT)) <sup>7</sup>

GENERAL MARSHALL said this subject had been placed on the agenda for examination and discussion of Allied strategy in Northwest Europe with a view to formulating the United States stand thereon. He called upon General Smith to discuss the present intentions of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, in connection with future plans submitted in SCAF 180. <sup>8</sup>

GENERAL SMITH said that timing is the important consideration at present. As much as possible to occupy German forces should be accomplished while the Russian offensive is under way. Our present operations were making good progress, and with the withdrawal of the 15th Panzer Division, apprehension had been relieved. The plan outlined in General Eisenhower's message had envisaged the disposal of certain operations such as the elimination of the Colmar pocket while proceeding with the necessary build-up for the main effort. It was estimated that a period of one week would be required to remove U. S. divisions engaged in operations in the south after which mopping up operations could be turned over to the French.

There were three distinct phases in General Eisenhower's plan: (a) operations to the west of the Rhine, (b) operations involving the establishment of bridgeheads, and (c) operations to the east of the Rhine.

In the first place, the logistics implications of operations north of the Ruhr had been given serious study, and it had been estimated by the 21st Army Group that 20 to 21 divisions could be maintained in

<sup>5</sup> Not printed as such, but see C. C. S. 746/7, *post*, pp. 536-538.

<sup>6</sup> *Post*, pp. 536-538.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed.

<sup>8</sup> SCAF 180 was Eisenhower's appreciation and plan of operations for the winter and spring of 1945; SCAF 194 contained General Smith's rewording of certain paragraphs of the plan. In Message No. S-77211 Eisenhower agreed to the changed text. SCAF 180 and SCAF 194 are summarized in the report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister at Yalta, *post*, pp. 828-829.

the area of main effort in the north. This size force was insufficient for the main drive, and the Supreme Allied Commander had taken an arbitrary stand that a force of at least 30 divisions, ultimately increased to 36, would be used in the main effort.

In the Ruhr area of the Rhine where the main effort would take place, there were three good and two possible points for establishing bridgeheads. GENERAL SMITH desired to emphasize, however, that no matter how many divisions were employed in the effort, the crossing would be accomplished with but five, due to the restricted front. There is no foundation in the British analogy between the cross-Channel attack and the crossing of the Rhine. Our effort will obviously be met in strength behind the Ruhr, and General Eisenhower feels that if we employ everything in one effort at this point, the enemy may be able to prevent a successful operation by concentrating his forces. In order to draw off some of the strength that he will undoubtedly mass in this area, a secondary effort is necessary.

In the plan proposed by Field Marshal Montgomery, the Cologne-Bonn area had been selected for the secondary effort. The disadvantages seen in this plan were:

- a. It is too close to the main crossing of the Rhine to draw off German forces.
- b. The crossing points are not good, and
- c. Crossings having been made, operations become difficult due to the nature of the terrain.

All of SCAEF's examinations lead to the selection of the Frankfurt area for the secondary effort. This area is sufficiently separated from the main drive to attract enemy forces. From Frankfurt the drive would be directed toward Kassel, over which route the nature of the terrain would permit the relative ease of movement of armored forces. Also, the lines of communication in this southern area are better than those in the north.

The decision has not yet been made as to the area in which the secondary operation will be mounted. General Eisenhower prefers the Frankfurt-Kassel operation as the secondary effort. His great concern is to maintain flexibility, and in order to provide against the possibility of a slowing up of the main effort he is strongly in favor of this secondary drive.

In answer to a question by Admiral King, GENERAL SMITH explained that it had been planned to provide a strategic reserve of ten divisions. Our infantry divisions are completely mobile and can be moved into position rapidly. If the secondary effort is accepted, it must of course go forward rapidly and not be allowed to stop at any point short of the objective. It is felt that forward movement can be adequately maintained by the rotation of the planned reserve.



In referring again to the planned effort in the Cologne-Bonn area, GENERAL SMITH stated that SCAEF felt that a threat in this section would hold as many German forces as an actual crossing.

If it becomes impossible to accomplish the major effort before the 15th of March, the Germans could transfer divisions from the Eastern Front to the Western Front. We would then be extended west of the Rhine in a long line requiring 10 to 15 more divisions than if we were along the Rhine proper. If it becomes impossible to establish a firm bridgehead, it may be necessary to coordinate our operations with the Russians in June.

GENERAL BULL explained the effect of the spring thaw, about 1 March, on the Rhine crossings. In the lower Rhine area, crossings would not be greatly affected, but upper Rhine crossings would not be possible after the first of March until the high water and ice had receded.

In response to an inquiry by General Marshall, GENERAL SMITH explained that the operations in the Eifel area were all part of the build-up for the main effort in the north. He anticipated that General Bradley would encounter strong opposition when he approached the Rhine and would substitute operation GRENADE. He felt that if operation VERITABLE could be mounted by the 8th of February the main effort would be successful as far as timing is concerned.

GENERAL MARSHALL referred to the last sentence of the third paragraph of Appendix "A" to J. C. S. 1237 and suggested certain amendments in the light of the British position concerning the operations referred to therein.

GENERAL SMITH emphasized the necessity for maintaining flexibility in the Supreme Commander's plans. It would be dangerous to try to define in detail how the battle should be fought. Too much depends upon the seizing of opportunities as they are presented. General Montgomery is now in agreement with General Eisenhower's plan and is quite satisfied with the arrangements. General Eisenhower has committed himself to the main effort to the north and he, General Smith, as well as the rest of the Staff, felt that the main effort would not be successful unless a secondary effort were mounted.

GENERAL MARSHALL referred to the fourth paragraph of Appendix "A" to J. C. S. 1237 and suggested certain amendments affecting command arrangements for SCAEF's armies.

GENERAL SMITH said he felt that the British would not raise the question of command at the present time. They had proposed that General Alexander be appointed Deputy Supreme Commander, but due to General Montgomery's attitude on this matter, the British position was not yet firm.

After further discussion,

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Approved the memorandum in Appendix "A" of J. C. S. 1237 as amended during the discussion and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 761/4 (ARGONAUT).)<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Not printed.

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MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, JANUARY 30, 1945,  
NOON, MONTGOMERY HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

General of the Army Marshall  
Fleet Admiral King  
Major General Kuter  
Lieutenant General Somervell  
Lieutenant General Smith  
Vice Admiral Cooke  
Major General Bull  
Major General Anderson  
Major General Hull  
Rear Admiral McCormick  
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser  
Colonel Twitchell

UNITED KINGDOM

Field Marshal Brooke  
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal  
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham  
Field Marshal Wilson  
General Ismay  
Admiral Somerville  
General Riddell-Webster<sup>1</sup>  
Air Marshal Robb  
Major General Laycock

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General McFarland  
Captain Graves

Major General Jacob  
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones  
Commander Coleridge

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*<sup>2</sup>

TOP SECRET

1. PROCEDURE FOR THE CONFERENCE

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it had been suggested by the United States Chiefs of Staff that he should take the chair at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meetings in Malta and he was glad to do so. He hoped, however, that a member of the United States Chiefs of Staff would take the chair at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at MAGNETO.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed to this proposal.

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should normally take place at 1430 daily.

ADMIRAL KING, in agreeing to this proposal, stated that alterations in the timing might have to be made in the light of circumstances.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to meet daily at 1430, circumstances permitting.

<sup>1</sup> Present for items 4-8 only.

<sup>2</sup> C. C. S. 182d Meeting. The meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff were numbered consecutively from the first formal meeting of that body, which took place in Washington on January 23, 1942.

## 2. AGENDA FOR THE CONFERENCE (C. C. S. 765/8)<sup>3</sup>

SIR ALAN BROOKE tabled a note setting out proposals for the business to be transacted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on each day.<sup>4</sup>

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff agreed to these proposals. He felt, however, that one or two items should be earmarked as susceptible of earlier consideration if time allowed.

It was agreed that the U-boat threat and the planning date for the end of the Japanese war should be so earmarked.

## 3. GERMAN FLYING BOMB AND ROCKET ATTACKS

GENERAL MARSHALL referred to the data made available by the British Chiefs of Staff to enable him to show the Congress the scale of rocket and flying bomb attacks on London. He explained that in the course of his talk to the Congress<sup>5</sup> he had stressed the importance of a common understanding in order to assist the formation of combined decisions and policies. He had stressed the necessity for teamwork and the importance of understanding the other man's point of view and difficulties. The data with regard to flying bomb and rocket attacks on London had been of great value in this connection and had made a very strong impression on his audience.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff he would like to thank General Marshall for the action he had taken in this connection. Sir Alan Brooke outlined the suggestions which had been made to mitigate the German rocket attacks and the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on this matter.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL then explained the proposals for air action against the rocket attacks and the course of action which it had been decided to follow.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL then explained the difficulties which had arisen with regard to the United States proposal to use war-weary bombers against industrial targets. The possibility of retaliation against the unique target of London had been felt to outweigh the advantages of the employment of this weapon.

GENERAL MARSHALL then outlined certain discussions he had had at Allied Force Headquarters with regard to the possibility of employing small formations of fighter-bombers to attack com-

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 426.

<sup>4</sup> The proposal on order of business was annexed to the C. C. S. minutes. For the text, see *infra*.

<sup>5</sup> On January 24, 1945, at 9 a. m., at a meeting to which each Member of Congress received a formal invitation, Marshall and King gave "a confidential report on the present status of the war and related subjects" (*Congressional Record*, January 22, 1945, vol. 91, p. 365).

munications and particularly for attacks against the entrances to tunnels, possibly by skip bombing. He felt that skip bombing might also be used against the entrances to the underground production plant where the rockets were assembled.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he was not accurately informed as to the topography of the terrain above the underground factory concerned and thought it likely that baffles had been erected before the entrances. It was probably also extremely well defended by guns; however, the possibility of skip bombing the entrances to this factory was very well worth investigating. With regard to attacks on communications, he had recently discussed the possibility of further attacks on communications with General Spaatz, who was arranging that the long-range fighters of the Eighth Air Force should, as a matter of course, attack communications on their return from escorting daylight bombers.

GENERAL MARSHALL then referred to the possibility of the Germans instigating suicide attacks on vital targets, particularly in the Antwerp area in which the lock gates were a vital and vulnerable target.

Some doubt was expressed as to the suitability of the German temperament to such a form of attack.

In reply to a question, ADMIRAL KING said that the Japanese suicide attacks were, on the whole, slightly less numerous than they had been, but they were still difficult to meet and there was apparently no panacea for it. The Commander of the Pacific Fleet had recently issued explicit instructions as to the method of employing anti-aircraft gunnery against these attacks.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note with interest of the above statements.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF adjourned until 1430.

#### 4. STRATEGY IN NORTHWEST EUROPE (C. C. S. 761/3 and 761/4)<sup>6</sup>

At General Bedell Smith's suggestion GENERAL BULL outlined the projected operations in Northwest Europe. The first phase entailed a closing up to the Rhine and the destruction of the enemy forces to the west of that river; the second phase consisted of obtaining bridge-heads across the Rhine; the third phase, of advancing into the heart of Germany and defeating her armed forces. The first phase was now going on. General Bradley was endeavoring to advance on the Prüm-Bonn axis. Divisions were now being released from the southern front, and were already being moved up to the North to be available for the offensive operations VERITABLE and GRENADE, the latter of which was an alternative in the event that General Bradley's present attack did not proceed with sufficient rapidity.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed.

GENERAL BULL then outlined these two operations. Field Marshal Montgomery's forces would strike down in a southeasterly direction parallel to the Rhine while the Ninth United States Army would strike from its present position north of Aachen in the direction of Düsseldorf. A decision would shortly have to be taken as to whether it was worthwhile to continue General Bradley's operations in the Ardennes. Operations were also in progress to clear the Colmar pocket and were being undertaken by French forces to be assisted by three United States divisions. It was obviously desirable, if it proved possible, to clear the entire west bank of the Rhine since by so doing security would be improved and additional divisions released for the offensive.

Turning to the second phase—the seizure of bridgeheads across the Rhine—GENERAL BULL explained that in the North between Emmerich and Wesel there were three good and two possible positions for bridging points. In the South, in the Mainz area, there were four good bridging points and in addition two possible ones. In the center, in the Cologne-Bonn area, there were three possible bridging sites.

Field Marshal Montgomery's operation VERITABLE would be launched between the eighth and tenth of February and operation GRENADE approximately a week later if the decision was taken to mount the latter. There was therefore a reasonable chance that the area west of the Rhine from Düsseldorf northwards would be clear of the enemy by the end of February. Field Marshal Montgomery would be instructed to grasp any possibility which presented itself of seizing bridgeheads on the lower Rhine during the southerly drive.

GENERAL BULL explained that the Supreme Commander<sup>7</sup> was strongly of the opinion that a second line of advance into Germany must be available. It was for this reason that the bridgeheads in the Mainz-Mannheim area were to be seized. The line of advance of this army would be on Frankfurt and Kassel and would assist in isolating the Ruhr. In the North, Field Marshal Montgomery's drive would be directed on Munster and would swing down toward Hamm. It had been estimated that logistically it would not be possible to maintain more than 35 divisions in the northern thrust until rail bridgeheads had been established across the Rhine. In the South there were no serious logistic limitations and up to 50 divisions could be maintained before rail bridgeheads had been established.

The Supreme Commander had emphasized throughout the importance of flexibility in his planning. All forces which could be maintained would be employed in the northern thrust but the short length of the river available for the crossings, together with other limiting

<sup>7</sup> General of the Army Eisenhower.

factors, made it essential to have an alternative thrust available should the northern thrust be held up. The forces not employed in the two thrusts would be used to secure the remainder of the line and to stage diversions and threats.

GENERAL BEDELL SMITH explained that the only factor which had altered since General Eisenhower's appreciations and intentions had been communicated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in SCAF 179 and SCAF 180<sup>8</sup> (C. C. S. 761/3), was the factor of time which had now become of great importance in view of the Russian advance. It was felt that on the Western Front freedom of movement could be counted on until the 15th of March. The Sixth Panzer Army was thought to be in process of withdrawal. There was no longer believed to be any serious threat to Strasbourg and there was a good chance of clearing up the Colmar pocket quickly, thus releasing four divisions. In view of the present diminution of German offensive capabilities in the West, it was essential to get to the Rhine in the North as soon as possible and it was hoped that Field Marshal Montgomery's attack would start on 8 February.

Turning to the question of the distribution of forces, GENERAL SMITH explained that initially the Staff of 21st Army Group had said that only about 21 divisions could be maintained in the northern thrust; this strength was obviously too small a proportion to use in the main thrust out of a total of some 85 divisions available. The Supreme Commander, however, had directed that logistic arrangements be made to support initially 30 divisions in the main effort and later a total of 36 divisions. These arrangements were under way. Grave thought had been given to the area in which the secondary effort should be staged. The neighborhood of Cologne presented certain advantages in that there could be no question of an Allied dispersal of forces. On the other hand this area was so close to the area of the main effort that the Germans could quickly reinforce between these two threatened areas and little diversion of enemy strength would be achieved. To sum up, in General Eisenhower's view the thrust in the North was absolutely essential, that in the South necessary and desirable and to be undertaken if at all possible.

In reply to a question, GENERAL SMITH explained that it was obviously desirable to close the Rhine throughout its whole length but that the Supreme Commander did not intend to do this if resistance was such that the operation would delay the main attack until mid-summer or would militate against an opportunity to seize a bridgehead and effect a crossing in strength on the northern front. A discussion then ensued as to the effect of the spring thaws on the possibilities of crossing the Rhine. GENERAL SMITH and GENERAL BULL explained

<sup>8</sup> See *ante*, p. 464, footnote 8.

that the lower Rhine could, it was believed, be crossed at any date after the first of March, though certain risks were entailed. The spring thaws affected the upper Rhine but had no effect on the lower Rhine.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the British Chiefs of Staff felt that there was not sufficient strength available for two major operations, and that therefore it would be necessary to decide on one of those proposed. Of the two, the northern appeared the most promising. The base port of Antwerp was nearer, the armies were already closer to the Rhine in that area, and the advance into Germany immediately threatened the vital Ruhr area whose importance had been even further increased by the fall of Silesia to the advancing Russian Army. In the South, though the actual crossings might prove easier, our armies had further to go before being in a position to cross the Rhine and, after crossing, the country was less favorable for operations and our forces would be further from the Ruhr or the lines of communications thereto. It was therefore felt that the plan should be based on the whole effort being made in the North if this was to be certain of succeeding and that every other operation must be regarded as subsidiary to this main thrust. There was, it was felt, a danger of putting too much into the southern effort and thereby weakening the main northern attack.

Another doubt which had been felt by the British Chiefs of Staff was in regard to the closing up to the Rhine on its whole length, which it was felt would slow up the advance into Germany. This point had already been cleared up by the explanations given by General Smith and General Bull. The general impression gained from SCAF 180 was that the southern thrust was regarded to be almost as important as the northern and that it diverted too much strength from the latter, both in forces and in the available facilities such as bridging material. The present situation on the Eastern Front obviously necessitated the speeding up of operations in the West in order to engage as many Germans as soon as possible, both to prevent the withdrawal of forces to the East and to take advantage of such reduction in strength as was taking place.

GENERAL SMITH emphasized that the Supreme Commander intended to put into the northern effort every single division which could be maintained logistically. The plan called for an ultimate strength of 36 divisions in the northern thrust. There would also be about ten additional divisions in strategic reserve available to exploit success. A very strong airborne force would be used for the northern crossing. It was, however, impossible to overlook the fact that the northern attack would, of necessity, take place on a narrow four-divisional front and might bog down. The southern advance

was not intended to compete with the northern attack but must be of sufficient strength to draw off German forces to protect the important Frankfurt area and to provide an alternate line of attack if the main effort failed. He wished to make clear the Supreme Commander's view of the differentiation between the main and secondary thrusts. Everything that could be put into the main effort would be put there.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he welcomed this explanation. He had felt that the southern advance might cause the northern attack to bog down.

GENERAL MARSHALL, in referring to a point previously made by Field Marshal Brooke as to the necessity of resting and relieving divisions in the line, agreed that this was vitally important. In his view the considerations involved in the plan were as follows: the most favorable spot logistically, that is, in the North; the fact that it was not safe to rely on one line of advance only; the number of divisions required to maintain security in the non-active parts of the line; the assessment of the number of divisions which could be logistically supported in the northern thrust. He considered it essential that there should be more than one possible line of advance. The strategic reserve should be fed into either advance in the light of how well that advance was succeeding. If extremely heavy casualties were sustained in the northern attack there were the alternatives of either battling through or switching the weight of attack elsewhere. It was his view that it was essential to have some other line of advance to turn to if we bogged down in the North. It was likely that the Germans would put up a heavy resistance in the North and, with the aid of jet-propelled reconnaissance aircraft, would assess the likelihood of our attacking in that area.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that after crossing the Rhine the strength of the main thrust would be reduced by the necessity for relief and rehabilitation of tired units.

GENERAL SMITH gave the proposed general deployment of divisions. He said that while 36 would be available for the northern thrust they would not all be in the line at the same time. There would also be a strategic reserve of about ten divisions which would permit rotation. About 12 divisions would be used in the secondary attack and the remainder would be holding relatively quiet sectors of the line, where tired divisions could be rotated for rest and refit.

Turning to the employment of French divisions, GENERAL SMITH said that every effort was being made to arm the new divisions as quickly as possible. Equipment for the first three of the new divisions was already moving, and they would be ready for action together with their corps troops by the latter part of April. The French had certain



odd brigades and other units available at present and these, with the new French divisions, might be used to contain or reduce St. Nazaire and Bordeaux.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had not entirely agreed with the Supreme Commander's plan as set out in SCAF 180. This however had taken on a different complexion in the light of General Smith's explanations. The British Chiefs of Staff were loath therefore to approve SCAF 180, as at present drafted, as had been suggested by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 761/4.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL drew attention to paragraph 20 of SCAF 180 which appeared out of keeping with General Smith's explanation.

GENERAL SMITH said that as he understood it, it had never been General Eisenhower's intention to sweep the whole area west of the Rhine clear of Germans before effecting crossings.

GENERAL BULL confirmed this view and said that such action had not been intended if heavy fighting and consequent delay was thereby entailed. However, closing up to the Rhine on its whole length was obviously desirable if it could be achieved without delay.

GENERAL SMITH said that if the Germans resisted our attack in the North with their full strength it was likely that they would only have Volksgrenadier divisions available to hold the ground west of the Rhine to the south.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that the final sentence of paragraph 9 of SCAF 180 also implied equally important lines of advance.

ADMIRAL KING drew attention to paragraph 22 which he felt clarified the position.

In reply to a question by Sir Alan Brooke, GENERAL SMITH said that the southern thrust was likely to start from some position between the Siegfried Line and the Rhine. He felt that about 12 divisions could successfully achieve this thrust if the Germans concentrated to oppose the main effort and the Siegfried Line would not impose an insuperable obstacle. In general he felt that the Siegfried Line could be "nibbled through" by two or three good divisions in 15 days in almost any position.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt that rather than approve SCAF 180 at the present time, he would prefer that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should take note of it and should examine the record of General Smith's explanation at their meeting on the following day.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Deferred action on the above subject pending further consideration by the British Chiefs of Staff.

##### 5. COORDINATION OF OPERATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that as he saw it, the only point was to insure that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were still in full agreement with the

instructions which they had issued to General Deane and Admiral Archer in FAN 477.<sup>9</sup>

GENERAL MARSHALL confirmed that the United States Chiefs of Staff were still in complete agreement with the contents of this message, no answer to which had yet been received from the Russians. He felt it would be necessary to raise the issue with them during the forthcoming conference.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to press the Russians to agree at ARGONAUT to the proposals in the Appendix to C. C. S. 741/6 (FAN 477).

#### 6. THE COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE (C. C. S. 166 Series)<sup>10</sup>

SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained that his object in raising this question was to find out if the United States Chiefs of Staff had any views on the possible move of the Fifteenth Air Force from the Mediterranean to Western Europe. Such a move, involving some 1,000 heavy bombers, would, of course, have considerable effect on the potentialities in other theaters.

GENERAL KUTER explained that C. C. S. 400/2<sup>10</sup> did in effect give the commander of the United States strategic air forces the right to move such forces within the two theaters. He understood in fact that General Spaatz had been considering the possibility of moving the Fifteenth Air Force to the United Kingdom but had decided against such a course.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had directed an examination of the possibility of using the Fifteenth Air Force, or part of it, from southern France, thus avoiding the bad weather over the Po Valley. This proposal, however, had not commended itself to his staffs.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that any large move as between theaters should, he felt, be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff since it had a great effect on the strategy in the theaters concerned. The number of bombers available in Italy, for instance, very materially affected the possibility of withdrawing ground forces from that theater.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that as he remembered it, the agreement with regard to the movement of the Fifteenth Air Force was designed to permit the commander of the strategic air forces the freedom of movement and flexibility to employ his forces temporarily in whichever theater provided the best weather at that time. There was in his mind no question of a permanent move of forces.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that it had been felt that temporary moves of air units to the United Kingdom was undesirable in view

<sup>9</sup> Not printed. FAN 477, dated January 15, 1945, dealt with the bomblines in Eastern Europe and the Balkan area between the Allied and Soviet Armies.

<sup>10</sup> Not printed.

of the difficult weather and the fact that operating out of the United Kingdom was a highly specialized business.

ADMIRAL KING said that he considered the permanent allocations of forces to be the function of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. If necessary, the paper under discussion (C. C. S. 400/2) should be modified to bring it into line with this view.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he was entirely reassured by General Marshall's statement with regard to the future of the Fifteenth Air Force.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note that the United States Chiefs of Staff were not at present contemplating the transfer of any formations of the Fifteenth Air Force from the Mediterranean.

7. PLANNING DATE FOR THE END OF THE WAR WITH GERMANY  
(C. C. S. 772)<sup>11</sup>

SIR ALAN BROOKE presented a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff dealing with the planning date for the end of the war with Germany (C. C. S. 772). He explained that it had been necessary to estimate such a date or dates in order to provide a basis for production and manpower planning.

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that United States production planning was based on a bracket of the first of July and the 31st of December, 1945.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Deferred action on C. C. S. 772 pending consideration by the United States Chiefs of Staff.

8. PLANNING DATE FOR THE END OF THE WAR WITH JAPAN

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Reaffirmed the planning date for the end of the war against Japan as recommended in paragraph 32 of C. C. S. 680/2.<sup>12</sup>

9. THE U-BOAT THREAT

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM explained that at present we were in a somewhat similar position to that of 1918. The ASDIC was proving less effective against present U-boat operations in shallow water where the tide affected the efficiency of the ASDIC. The Germans had discovered this and were working their submarines close inshore around the United Kingdom. At present they were operating principally in the Channel, the Irish Sea, and one had even penetrated

<sup>11</sup> *Post*, pp. 478-480.

<sup>12</sup> The document under reference came from the Quebec Conference of 1944. Paragraph 32 recommended that the planning date for the end of the war against Japan should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany. This planning date was reaffirmed at Yalta. See *post*, pp. 830-831.

the entrance to the Clyde. Our aircraft were also hampered by the extremely small target presented by the schnorkel. This relatively small object was normally used only some three feet above the water and ASV aircraft could therefore only detect it in calm weather.

Further, the Germans were fitting a radar device on their schnorkel which enabled them to detect the ASV emissions before the aircraft contacted the schnorkel.

In the last month there had been six sinkings in the Irish Sea, an escort carrier had been torpedoed in the Clyde, and at least four ships sunk in the Channel. He hoped, however, that the position would improve, and, in fact, two submarines had been sunk in the Irish Sea in the last week and a further one south of Land's End. The object was to force the submarines back into deep water where the ASDIC would be effective, and to achieve this deep mine fields were being laid in order to shut the enemy out of the Irish Sea.

THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF explained that from the air point of view new devices were being brought into action, . . . It must be remembered, however, that with a submerged submarine using her schnorkel, the aircraft, even after it had contacted the submarine, found difficulty in sinking it since it could dive in some three seconds and left no swirl at which to aim.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM explained that the Germans were building new types of submarines which were a vast improvement over those which had been used previously. There were two new types: one of 1600 tons with a speed of up to 18 knots submerged, and carrying twenty torpedoes; the other, a small coastal type, was capable of 13 knots submerged and carried two torpedoes. The larger boat had an extremely long range. It was thought that these new boats would be coming into operation about the middle or end of February.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note with interest of the foregoing statements.

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J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff<sup>1</sup>*

TOP SECRET

#### PROPOSED PROGRAMME OF WORK

*Tuesday, 30th January*

1. A. War Against Germany
1. C. Co-ordination of Operations  
    Bomblines, etc.

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<sup>1</sup> Annexed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes of the 182d Meeting.

1. E. Combined Bomber Offensive
1. F. Planning Date for End of German War

*Wednesday, 31st January*

1. B. Strategy in Mediterranean
2. War Against Japan
  - A. South-East Asia
  - B. Allocation of Resources Between S. E. A. C. and China

*Thursday, 1st February*

2. C. Pacific Operations
2. D. Planning Date for End of Japanese War
1. D. U-Boat Threat

*Friday, 2nd February*

3. Review of Cargo Shipping
 

Additional Item. Oil Stocks
4. Basic undertakings

CASTILLE,<sup>2</sup> 30.1.45.

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<sup>2</sup> The Auberge de Castile, in Valletta, built in 1574 and altered in 1744, one of the national palaces of the Order of Malta.

J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff*

TOP SECRET  
C. C. S. 772

[MALTA,] 30 January 1945.

PLANNING DATE FOR THE END OF THE WAR WITH GERMANY

We have reviewed the planning date for the end of the war against Germany as follows:—

1. In considering German capacity to resist we have been guided by the latest study by the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee on this subject. Their conclusions are:—

*a.* If, as seems just possible, the Russians succeed in overrunning the eastern defences of Germany before the Germans can consolidate there, the effect might be to force the Germans so to denude the West as to make an Allied advance comparatively easy. As the result of such advances in the East and in the West, a German collapse might occur before mid-April, 1945.

*b.* On balance, however, we conclude that distance combined with stiffening German resistance is likely to bring the Russians to a halt on approximately the line Landsberg-Giant Mountains. This will involve the loss of industrial Silesia.

c. As the result of the loss of industrial Silesia, production of finished armaments, mainly land armaments, would fall over a period of about six months by a quarter or more.

d. If, as now appears improbable, the Germans succeed in stopping the Russian advance forward of Upper Silesia, thus retaining their two main industrial areas, in Silesia and in the Ruhr, we nevertheless consider that the over-all decline in Germany's capacity to resist will be such that an Allied offensive in the West followed by a further Russian offensive in the summer should lead to the collapse of German resistance before November.

e. The need for forces to stem the Russian advance may cause a German withdrawal in Italy, at least to the line of the River Adige.

f. Germany, at any rate until the summer of 1945 when the U-boat campaign is expected to be at its height, is likely to retain sufficient forces to hold at least southern Norway.

2. Based on the above, we have considered three cases:

a. The best case.

b. A reasonably favourable case.

c. An unfavourable case.

#### THE BEST CASE

3. It is clear from paragraph 1 a. above that there is a possibility that the result of the present Russian offensive may lead to a German collapse by mid-April. We do not consider, however, that there is sufficient likelihood of this timing being realised to justify its acceptance, for planning purposes, as the earliest date for the defeat of Germany.

#### THE REASONABLY FAVOURABLE CASE

4. *Eastern Front.* Distance and stiffening German resistance may well bring the Russians to a halt on approximately the line Landsberg-Giant Mountains. Thereafter, the Russians will have to re-establish their communications and prepare for a further major offensive as soon as weather conditions and their logistics allow. This might be in mid-May or early June.

5. *Western Front.* Preliminary operations to reach the Rhine should be completed before the end of March. An all-out Allied offensive could then be launched in the latter part of April or early May, with the object of isolating the Ruhr and advancing deep into Germany.

6. The result of these two offensives, if successful, should bring the end of organised German resistance by the end of June.

## THE UNFAVOURABLE CASE

7. *Eastern Front.* In this case, we assume that the Russian advance is stopped short of Upper Silesia. Thereafter, if all factors are unfavourable, the combination of German resistance and Russian logistic difficulties may prevent a further major Russian offensive from being launched until the late summer.

8. *Western Front.* The Allied offensive in the spring may fail to achieve any decisive result. This might be caused by too great a dispersion of effort along the whole front, together with the qualitative superiority of the German heavy tanks and jet-propelled aircraft. It would then be necessary to re-group with a view to launching another offensive. This offensive could be launched in the summer, but it might well suffer in weight and momentum as the result of a successful U-boat campaign of which the effects are likely to be felt in the third quarter of the year.

9. In these circumstances we consider that the results of these two offensives, particularly the Russian, should bring about the end of German organised resistance by the beginning of November.

## CONCLUSION

10. There is a possibility that, as a result of the present Russian offensive, Germany may be defeated by the middle of April. This, however, should be regarded as a bonus and should not influence our production or manpower planning.

For planning purposes, we consider that:—

a. The earliest date on which the war is likely to end is the 30th June, 1945.

b. The date beyond which the war is unlikely to continue is the 1st November, 1945.

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HARRIMAN-CHURCHILL DINNER MEETING, JANUARY 30, 1945, EVENING, ON BOARD H. M. S. "ORION" IN GRAND HARBOR

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Mr. Harriman

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Lieutenant General Schreiber*Editorial Note*

No record of the substance of this meeting has been found. Churchill had his quarters in H. M. S. *Orion* in Grand Harbor, Malta. The information given here as to the meeting and the participants is taken from Churchill, p. 343.

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 31, 1945

MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JANUARY 31, 1945, 10 A. M.,  
MONTGOMERY HOUSE

## PRESENT

General of the Army Marshall  
Fleet Admiral King  
Major General Kuter  
Lieutenant General Somervell  
Lieutenant General Smith <sup>1</sup>  
Rear Admiral Duncan  
Rear Admiral McCormick  
Major General Bull  
Major General Hull  
Major General Wood

Major General Anderson  
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser  
Brigadier General Lindsay  
Captain McDill  
Captain Stroop  
Colonel Peck  
Colonel Dean  
Colonel Lincoln  
Colonel Cary  
Lieutenant Colonel Woodward]

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General McFarland  
Captain Graves

J. C. S. Files

*Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes* <sup>2</sup>

TOP SECRET

1. APPROVAL OF MINUTES OF THE C. C. S. 182D MEETING <sup>3</sup>

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to recommend approval of the Conclusions of the C. C. S. 182d Meeting and approval of the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.

2. STRATEGY IN NORTHWEST EUROPE  
(C. C. S. 761/3 and 761/4) <sup>4</sup>

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 761/4 had been presented at the 182d Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (30 January 1945) and discussed at that time. He called on General Bull for any additional comments he might wish to make at this time.

GENERAL BULL said that immediately following the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, General Smith had dispatched a telegram to General Eisenhower outlining certain changes that had been recommended in his plan, and that General Eisenhower's reply was expected

<sup>1</sup> Present for items 4-7 only.<sup>2</sup> J. C. S. 184th Meeting.<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 467-477.<sup>4</sup> Not printed.



to arrive shortly. There was nothing that he could add until General Eisenhower's views had been received.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of the foregoing statement.

### 3. PLANNING DATE FOR END OF WAR WITH GERMANY (C. C. S. 772<sup>5</sup> and J. C. S. 1239<sup>6</sup>)

GENERAL MARSHALL said that C. C. S. 772, the British memorandum on this subject, had been presented at the Combined Chiefs of Staff 182d Meeting (30 January 1945). Action had been deferred pending consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Staff Planners had studied the British proposals and now recommend in J. C. S. 1239 that action on C. C. S. 772 relative to the planning date for the end of the war with Germany be deferred until the end of the tripartite conversations at ARGONAUT.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff defer action on C. C. S. 772 until the conclusion of ARGONAUT.

### 4. STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN (C. C. S. 762; J. C. S. 1236 and J. C. S. 1236/1; C. C. S. 773)<sup>7</sup>

GENERAL MARSHALL said that J. C. S. 1236 contains an examination and discussion by the Joint Staff Planners of Allied strategy in Italy in the light of recent developments, and of the issues raised by the Supreme Allied Commander in C. C. S. 762, with a view to establishing the position of the United States Chiefs of Staff as to operations in Italy. The Joint Staff Planners recommend that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note the conclusions and the proposed directive in J. C. S. 1236 as the basis for discussion with the British Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff at this point considered an advance copy of a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff containing a draft directive to SACMED, later circulated as C. C. S. 773.

GENERAL MARSHALL drew attention to the proposal to withdraw 6 British, Canadian and American divisions from Italy for use in France. It was his opinion that only British and Canadian divisions should be withdrawn, and that the number should be reduced to five.

ADMIRAL KING concurred with General Marshall. He felt that, in the event of a flare-up in the Balkans, the British would undoubtedly desire to withdraw additional British divisions for use in that area and that this contingency should not be overlooked.

GENERAL KUTER pointed out that the draft directive proposed by the British stated specifically that no tactical air forces were to be

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, pp. 478-480.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed.

<sup>7</sup> None printed. Regarding C. C. S. 773, see *post*, p. 485, footnote 5.

withdrawn. He considered it essential that a suitable proportion of the 12th Air Force should accompany the ground divisions to France.

GENERAL MARSHALL felt that before a decision was taken on the proposed directive, General McNarney's views should be sought. He proposed a telegram for this purpose.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff then discussed and agreed upon certain amendments to the British directive.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

*a.* Approved the message to General McNarney proposed by General Marshall.

*b.* Directed the Secretaries to draft a memorandum embodying the agreed amendments to the British directive with a view to its circulation after the receipt of General McNarney's views.

5. *a.* OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND  
(C. C. S. 452/35)<sup>8</sup>

*b.* ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES BETWEEN THE INDIA-BURMA AND  
CHINA THEATERS  
(J. C. S. 1238)<sup>8</sup>

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the British Chiefs of Staff had presented a memorandum on operations in Southeast Asia Command in C. C. S. 452/35, which contained a draft directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia.

In J. C. S. 1238 the Joint Staff Planners had examined strategy in the Southeast Asia Command, India-Burma and China theaters in the light of recent developments and the recommendations of General Sultan and General Wedemeyer with a view to the formulation of a policy for guidance of this Conference.

After discussion,

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the recommendations of the Joint Staff Planners in J. C. S. 1238, subject to the amendment of the memorandum in Appendix "A" as agreed during the discussion. (Appendix "A" subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 452/36).<sup>8</sup>

6. ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION—EUROPE  
(C. C. S. 660/3)<sup>8</sup>

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff take note of C. C. S. 660/3.

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<sup>8</sup> Not printed.

## 7. BOMBING OF U-BOAT ASSEMBLY YARDS AND OPERATING BASES (J. C. S. 1219/1)<sup>9</sup>

GENERAL MARSHALL said that J. C. S. 1219/1 contained a study by the Joint Staff Planners of the possible resurgence of U-boat activity against North Atlantic shipping.

ADMIRAL KING felt that the directive to Air Marshal Bottomley and General Spaatz was satisfactory but appeared to be drawn up on rather general lines.

ADMIRAL DUNCAN explained that the directive had been purposely prepared in this manner after a discussion of the present air directive under which the bomber forces were operating.

GENERAL ANDERSON explained that the present bombing directive had been drawn up to indicate certain priorities which included petroleum reserves and the installations of the German air force. Bombing of these objectives had definite bearing on the over-all effort. The destruction of petroleum reserves had the effect of cutting down the activities of the German air force, and slowing down the submarine and training programs. Certain areas were selected for each operation and at daily meetings targets were selected to take advantage of current opportunities. The general directive includes the bombing of U-boat building and assembly yards and bases.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the recommendations of the Joint Staff Planners in J. C. S. 1219/1. (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 774).<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Not printed.

## MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, JANUARY 31, 1945, 2:30 P. M., MONTGOMERY HOUSE

### PRESENT

#### UNITED STATES

General of the Army Marshall  
Fleet Admiral King  
Major General Kuter  
Lieutenant General Somervell  
Lieutenant General Smith <sup>1</sup>  
Vice Admiral Cooke  
Rear Admiral McCormick  
Major General Pull <sup>1</sup>  
Major General Hull  
Major General Anderson  
Major General Wood  
Brigadier General Cabell <sup>2</sup>  
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser

#### UNITED KINGDOM

Field Marshal Brooke  
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal  
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham  
Field Marshal Wilson  
Field Marshal Alexander <sup>2</sup>  
General Ismay  
Admiral Somerville  
General Riddell-Webster  
Air Marshal Robb <sup>1</sup>  
Major General Laycock

### Secretariat

Brigadier General McFarland  
Captain Graves  
Colonel Peck

Major General Jacob  
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones  
Commander Coleridge

<sup>1</sup> Present for items 1-4 only.

<sup>2</sup> Present for items 1 and 2 only.

J.C.S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*<sup>3</sup>

TOP SECRET

1. APPROVAL OF MINUTES OF C. C. S. 182D MEETING<sup>4</sup>

SIR ALAN BROOKE referred to the record of General Bull's statement contained in the fourth paragraph of item 4 of the minutes. He had not understood that there was any question about operation GRENADE not being launched. He had, on the other hand, understood that operation VERITABLE was dependent on operation GRENADE. Was it visualized that VERITABLE would have to await the launching of GRENADE?

GENERAL SMITH explained that General Bradley was endeavoring to advance on the Prüm-Bonn axis. If this advance succeeded in reaching Euskirchen quickly, it would be equally effective in assisting operation VERITABLE as would operation GRENADE. VERITABLE was not, however, dependent on either operation. General Eisenhower was at present at General Bradley's headquarters and was now deciding whether or not to cancel General Bradley's operations and shift forces north in order to undertake GRENADE instead.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in recent discussions General Eisenhower had explained that he would have to take a decision by 1 February as to whether to continue with General Bradley's operations or to stop them and start the movement of troops preliminary to launching GRENADE.

GENERAL SMITH said that it was his personal opinion that it would probably be necessary to stop General Bradley's operations and to launch operation GRENADE.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that if General Bradley's operations could achieve their objective in time there were certain advantages since the troops were already in position.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the conclusions of the 182d Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.

2. OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN  
(C. C. S. 773)<sup>5</sup>

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a draft directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean,<sup>6</sup> prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff (C. C. S. 773).

<sup>3</sup> C. C. S. 183d Meeting.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, pp. 467-477.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. The final version was circulated as C. C. S. 773/3, dated February 17, 1945; and its text, with variation of a few words, is appendix A (*post*, pp. 832-833) to the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister at Yalta.

<sup>6</sup> Field Marshal Alexander.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had come to the conclusion that the right course of action was to reinforce the decisive Western Front at the expense of the Mediterranean Theater which, of necessity, would then have to revert to the offensive-defensive in Italy. There was now no question of operations aimed at the Ljubljana Gap and in any event the advance of the left wing of the Russian Army made such an operation no longer necessary.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the United States Chiefs of Staff were not yet in a position to give their final views on the draft directive, particularly with reference to possible moves of part of the Twelfth Air Force. However, there were certain United States proposals which he would like to put to the British Chiefs of Staff at once. The United States Chiefs of Staff suggested the following amendments: In paragraph 2 the substitution of the word "British" for "our" wherever it occurred; in paragraph 4 the substitution of "five" for "six" divisions; in paragraph 5, first sentence, the deletion of the words "United States" and "in equal proportions."

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that it was felt wiser to leave the Fifth Army intact as a well balanced organic force, and that it would be preferable to reinforce France with British and Canadian divisions in order to increase the strength of Field Marshal Montgomery's army.

The United States Chiefs of Staff agreed to the removal of three divisions, British or Canadian, at once, and the remainder as soon as they could be released from Greece, since this was the only way of finding the additional forces required. The question of the equipment of Greek forces had also been considered, since on this depended the release of the British divisions now in that country, but this was a complicated problem which he would like to consider further. The United States proposal was therefore that five divisions, two of which should be Canadian and the remainder British, should eventually be moved to France. With regard to the transfer of these forces, a preliminary study went to show that use of air transport could expedite the transfer of at least the first two divisions. He felt that if motor transport could be provided for these divisions from the United Kingdom, the date by which they would be available for operations in France would be greatly expedited.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff originally estimated that six divisions could be spared from the theater. With regard to their nationality, there were obviously great advantages in moving the Canadian divisions to enable them to join up with the remainder of the Canadian forces in France. He was prepared to agree that the remaining divisions should be British. He felt it right

to accept five divisions as a basis and this figure could be reconsidered later in the light of the situation.

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER said that the Canadian divisions were the easiest to move quickly; one was already out of the line and could be moved at once and the other approximately a fortnight later. He pointed out, however, that it would be difficult to find suitable British divisions since all were now in the line and they had been involved in hard fighting for a long period. He had no reserve divisions. He outlined the composition of the forces available to him in the Mediterranean Theater.

SIR ALAN BROOKE felt it unwise to go into the details of the formations to be moved at this stage. He accepted the United States proposals in principle. Two Canadian and one British divisions could be moved first and the remaining two British divisions as soon as they could be released from Greece.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had in mind to propose the withdrawal from the Mediterranean of a part of the Twelfth Tactical Air Force to include five fighter groups, one light bomber group, one reconnaissance unit, and two squadrons of night fighters. These air forces would be used to assist the First French Army and the Seventh United States Army.

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER pointed out that if land formations were removed from him it was all the more desirable to keep as much air power as possible in the theater. If it was absolutely necessary to withdraw air forces from him he was most anxious that the United States medium and light bombers should not be taken, since British air forces in Italy were weak in those particular types.

GENERAL SMITH said that he was not asking for light bombers to be withdrawn from the Mediterranean Theater to Northwest Europe.

GENERAL ANDERSON pointed out that the greatest need was for fighter-bombers. The Southern Group of Armies had been robbed of these in order to strengthen the northern forces. He felt that if the Mediterranean Theater was passing to the defensive and the troops were being transferred to Northwest Europe, then the appropriate air components should, if possible, accompany them. The main deficiencies in Northwest Europe were in P-47's which could be used as either fighters or fighter-bombers.

GENERAL KUTER explained that the proposal to move the 47th Light Bomber Group from Italy had been made in view of the fact that it was trained for night intruder work which it was felt would be of more value in Northwest Europe than in Italy.

GENERAL SMITH said that he would be delighted to accept this group but only if Field Marshal Alexander could spare it. He was

as concerned as Field Marshal Alexander himself as to the security of the Italian Front.

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER said that if General Smith would give him his minimum requirements, he would do his utmost to meet them.

GENERAL SMITH said that the five fighter-bomber groups were his minimum requirement for France and the light bombers, though desirable, were not essential.

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER undertook to examine this proposal at once and to release these forces if this proved at all possible. He fully realized that if his theater was to go on the defensive it was his duty to give up all possible resources, provided only that his front remained reasonably secure.

GENERAL SMITH said that he was entirely prepared to leave the final decision to Field Marshal Alexander.

SIR ALAN BROOKE referred to NAF 841<sup>7</sup> in which Field Marshal Alexander had requested approval to the equipment of certain additional Greek forces. He (Sir Alan Brooke) was most anxious that a decision on this proposal should be reached before the Combined Chiefs of Staff left Malta since such a decision would greatly accelerate the dates at which the British divisions could be released from Greece.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Deferred action on this subject.

### 3. STRATEGY IN NORTHWEST EUROPE (C. C. S. 761/3 and 761/4)<sup>7</sup>

SIR ALAN BROOKE said the British Chiefs of Staff were prepared to accept the Supreme Commander's operations as explained by General Smith and recorded in the minutes of the 182d Meeting. This explanation, however, was not in complete accord with the proposals put forward in SCAF 180. The British Chiefs of Staff therefore were not prepared to approve SCAF 180 as at present drafted.

GENERAL SMITH then presented a redraft of the Supreme Commander's plan as contained in paragraph 21 of SCAF 180. This redraft was designed to bring the Supreme Commander's proposals into line with his previous explanation of SCAF 180.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Deferred action on this subject.

### 4. PLANNING DATE FOR THE END OF THE WAR WITH GERMANY (C. C. S. 772)<sup>8</sup>

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he felt it wiser to defer consideration of this item until after discussion with the Russian General Staff.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Deferred action on this subject until the conclusion of ARGONAUT

<sup>7</sup> Not printed.

<sup>8</sup> *Ante*, pp. 478-480.

5. *a.* OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND  
(C. C. S. 452/35 and 452/36)<sup>9</sup>

*b.* ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES BETWEEN THE INDIA-BURMA AND  
CHINA THEATERS

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the British Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 452/35 had put forward a new draft directive to the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia.<sup>10</sup>

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he felt that the question of a directive to the Supreme Commander should be linked with the problem of the allocation of resources between the India-Burma and China Theaters. He drew attention to a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C. C. S. 452/36) which, while concurring in the directive proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff, linked this directive to an understanding as to the allocation of United States resources to the Southeast Asia Command. He felt that the situation was developing to a point where the resources of the China and Burma-India Theaters would be separated. U. S. resources required for China would not be available for operations in Malaysia. It was important that Admiral Mountbatten should be in no doubt as to the circumstances under which United States forces were available to him.

General Wedemeyer had recently estimated that some three squadrons of fighters would be required to protect the air route to China and had further implied that he was prepared to accept the responsibility of protecting with Chinese or United States troops the northern part of the Burma Road. This would, of course, relieve Admiral Mountbatten of these responsibilities. The situation was developing rapidly and the Japanese might well hold out in the Rangoon area in order to deny us that port but, in a matter of weeks, the Japanese sea communications to Burma, Malaysia and the Netherlands East Indies would be cut by air operations out of the Philippines. This would materially reduce Admiral Mountbatten's problems. Further, it would soon be possible to transfer more power to China, not so much additional tonnage but the all-important transport vehicles and light and medium artillery. The striking power then available to us on the far side of the Hump would be very different from that which we now had.

Summing up, GENERAL MARSHALL said that the proposed directive to Admiral Mountbatten was acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff, provided it was communicated to Admiral Mountbatten together with the policy with regard to the employment of United States forces outlined in C. C. S. 452/36.

<sup>9</sup> Not printed.

<sup>10</sup> Admiral Mountbatten.



SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the phrase "with the forces at present at your disposal" contained in paragraph 3 of the draft directive was inserted in order to make it clear to Admiral Mountbatten that he should not undertake operations which could not be carried out without an increased allocation of resources.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL asked for clarification of the meaning of the United States Chiefs of Staff memorandum (C. C. S. 452/36). Did this memorandum imply that, although Admiral Mountbatten could use for approved operations in Burma United States forces not required in China, such forces would not be available to him for use in Malaya?

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the memorandum was meant to make it quite clear that the employment of United States forces outside Burma must be the subject of fresh agreement and that Admiral Mountbatten must not be led to assume that they would be available to him.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Deferred action on C. C. S. 452/36 pending further study by the British Chiefs of Staff.

#### 6. ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION—EUROPE (C. C. S. 660/3)<sup>11</sup>

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of C. C. S. 660/3.

#### 7. BOMBING OF U-BOAT ASSEMBLY YARDS AND OPERATING BASES (C. C. S. 774)<sup>12</sup>

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that he would prefer to consider this memorandum at the same time as the paper he was putting forward with regard to the U-boat threat.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Deferred action on C. C. S. 774 pending study by the British Chiefs of Staff.

<sup>11</sup> Not printed, but cf. C. C. S. 772, *ante*, pp. 478-480.

<sup>12</sup> Not printed, but see coverage of this subject in the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister, *post*, p. 828.

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### INTERDELEGATION DINNER MEETING, JANUARY 31, 1945, EVENING, GOVERNMENT HOUSE

#### PRESENT

UNITED STATES  
Secretary Stettinius

UNITED KINGDOM  
Prime Minister Churchill  
Foreign Secretary Eden  
Lieutenant General Schreiber

and various other members of the two Delegations

*Editorial Note*

The only record of the substance of this meeting that has been found is a summary of conversation between Stettinius and Churchill in Stettinius, pp. 60-62. The meeting was "a large formal dinner at Government House" given by the Governor and Commander in Chief of Malta, Lieutenant General Schreiber, in honor of the American and British Delegations. The information given here with respect to the meeting and the participants is taken from Stettinius, pp. 56, 60, 62.

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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1945

STETTINIUS-EDEN CONVERSATION, FEBRUARY 1, 1945, MORNING

PRESENT

UNITED STATES  
Secretary Stettinius

UNITED KINGDOM  
Foreign Secretary Eden

*Editorial Note*

No record of the substance of this meeting has been found. Stettinius and Eden, who were both quartered on board H. M. S. *Sirius* in Grand Harbor, Malta, went ashore in the early part of the morning and took a walk, during the course of which, it seems, they "discussed some of the problems to be raised at Yalta". This information is taken from Stettinius, pp. 60, 62, 63.

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MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, FEBRUARY 1, 1945, 10 A. M.,  
MONTGOMERY HOUSE

PRESENT

General of the Army Marshall  
Fleet Admiral King  
Major General Kuter  
Lieutenant General Somervell  
Lieutenant General Smith  
Vice Admiral Cooke  
Rear Admiral Duncan  
Rear Admiral McCormick  
Major General Bull  
Major General Anderson

Major General Hull  
Major General Wood  
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser  
Brigadier General Lindsay  
Captain Stroop  
Captain McDill  
Colonel Peck  
Colonel Lincoln  
Lieutenant Colonel McRae

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General McFarland  
Captain Graves

J. C. S. Files

*Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

1. *a.* APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE J. C. S. 184TH MEETING<sup>2</sup>

GENERAL KUTER requested that the last sentence of the remarks of General Anderson in Item 7 be changed to read: "The general directive includes the bombing of U-boat building and assembly yards and bases."

*b.* APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE C. C. S. 183D MEETING<sup>3</sup>

GENERAL MARSHALL requested the amendment of his remarks in the third paragraph of Item 1 to read as follows: "GENERAL MARSHALL said that in recent discussions General Eisenhower had explained that he would have to take a decision by 1 February as to whether to continue with General Bradley's operations or to stop them and start the movement of troops preliminary to launching GRENADE."

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

*a.* Approved the minutes of the J. C. S. 184th Meeting, subject to the amendment agreed during the discussion.

*b.* Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the conclusions of the C. C. S. 183d Meeting and approve the detailed record of the meeting, subject to the amendment agreed during the above discussion and to later minor amendments.

2. STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN  
(C. C. S. 773)<sup>4</sup>

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Secretaries had prepared a draft of the directive to SACMED proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff, which showed the amendments agreed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in their previous meeting. General McNarney's views, which had just been received, indicate that on balance he prefers to have British divisions rather than American divisions transferred to France. Concerning the tactical air force, General McNarney expresses satisfaction with the present air-ground ratio. He considers that a proportionate reduction in fighter-bomber strength should accompany a reduction in the number of divisions. He considers the medium bombers should stay in Italy.

In light of General McNarney's message and the discussions that have taken place, it seems that no American divisions should be taken from Italy and that the draft directive to General Alexander proposed by the British with the amendments already agreed to by

<sup>1</sup> J. C. S. 185th Meeting.<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 481-484.<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 485-490.<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, p. 485, footnote 5.

the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and agreed in part by the Combined Chiefs of Staff should now be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and dispatched to General Alexander, with an information copy to General Eisenhower.

GENERAL KUTER proposed that a new paragraph 5 should be added to the directive as follows:

“The U. S. Twelfth Air Force, less such units as may be selected by agreement between you and SCAEF, shall be made available for transfer to SCAEF, together with necessary service units.”

An appropriate sequence of paragraphs in the directive was then discussed and agreed.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the draft memorandum to the Combined Chiefs of Staff prepared by the Secretaries, as amended during the discussion. (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 773/1.<sup>5</sup>)

### 3. EQUIPMENT OF ALLIED AND LIBERATED FORCES (J. C. S. 1240<sup>6</sup> and NAF 841<sup>5</sup>)

GENERAL MARSHALL read a brief of J. C. S. 1240 and proposed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the recommendations of the Joint Logistics Committee, subject to the following amendments:

Page 5, delete the last three lines of paragraph 11 and after the word “reviewing” add “NAF 841 again.”

Page 8, line 2, insert the words “already approved in principle” between the words “provision” and “of.”

Page 8, paragraph 9, line 3, after the word “review” delete the remainder of the sentence and substitute therefor “NAF 841 again.”

GENERAL SOMERVELL said he felt certain that when the British restudy their requirements for the supply of Greek forces, they would find that they could not meet them. It might then be suggested that the agreed figure of equipment for 460,000 liberated manpower in Europe could be reduced to 400,000 and the equipment for the 60,000 remaining be applied to the requirement for the Greek Army.

After further discussion,

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the recommendations of the Joint Logistics Committee in J. C. S. 1240, subject to the amendments proposed by General Marshall. (Memorandum subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 768/1.<sup>7</sup>)

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed as such, but subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 768/1, which is printed *post*, pp. 522-524.

<sup>7</sup> *Post*, pp. 522-524.

#### 4. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND (C. C. S. 452/35, 452/36<sup>8</sup> and C. C. S. 747/7<sup>9</sup>)

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in C. C. S. 452/35 the British proposed a directive to Admiral Mountbatten. In C. C. S. 747/7 the British propose that transfer of forces from India-Burma to China be subject to C. C. S. agreements. The United States Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 452/36 set forth a policy with respect to U. S. resources in the India-Burma Theater.

The point at issue appears to be whether the United States Chiefs of Staff can order transfers of resources when they do not jeopardize British forces engaged in approved operations in Burma or whether every transfer requires agreement by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as proposed by the British. The U. S. proposal as now written appears to safeguard sufficiently the British interests. Under the British proposal the Combined Chiefs of Staff would become involved in lengthy discussions of purely operational matters and the transfer of one air squadron or one Quartermaster company would be the subject for C. C. S. decision unless acceptable to SACSEA.

No compromise should be accepted which involves C. C. S. approval of transfer or requires discussion in the Combined Chiefs of Staff except where the British Chiefs think their forces are jeopardized. The U. S. paper provides clearly for this.

GENERAL MARSHALL recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff should recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the approval of the proposals made in the U. S. memorandum in C. C. S. 452/36. By this action both the policy for the transfer of U. S. resources and the directive for Admiral Mountbatten will be approved. The British in their paper state their willingness to discuss means of reducing the time occupied in the discussion of projected moves. He recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff should listen to whatever the British may propose in this respect since these discussions will be necessary when contemplated transfers might place British forces in jeopardy.

THE SECRETARY stated that the British Chiefs of Staff are prepared to withdraw their paper, C. C. S. 747/7, if the United States Chiefs of Staff will agree to delete the words "British forces engaged in" in the eighth line of the second paragraph of C. C. S. 452/36, which paper would then be acceptable to them.

COLONEL LINCOLN said that the proposed British amendment would nullify the intentions of the United States Chiefs of Staff because it would transfer the "jeopardy" from the "forces engaged" to "operations." While the jeopardy to the forces actually engaged in opera-

<sup>8</sup> Not printed.

<sup>9</sup> *Post*, pp. 524-525.

tions was a factual matter, it would be difficult to determine from the existing circumstances the question of the jeopardy of approved operations, some of which might not yet have been initiated. This was a matter over which there could be considerable difference of opinion. Discussion of such a point was likely to be time-consuming. He recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff propose to the British, in lieu of their amendment, the substitution of the word "the" for the word "British" in the same line of the paragraph referred to above.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to adhere to the position outlined by them in C. C. S. 452/36.

#### 5. PACIFIC OPERATIONS (C. C. S. 417/11)<sup>10</sup>

ADMIRAL KING said that this paper was on the agenda for the purpose of reaffirming the position of the United States Chiefs of Staff on the operations for the defeat of Japan. He doubted the possibility of maintaining and defending a sea route to the Sea of Okhotsk from bases in Kamchatka alone, but suggested reaffirming the paper for planning purposes.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Reaffirmed their approval of C. C. S. 417/11.

#### 6. U-BOAT THREAT (C. C. S. 774 and 774/1)<sup>11</sup>

GENERAL MARSHALL said that C. C. S. 774, upon which action had been deferred at the C. C. S. 183d Meeting, was the U. S. proposal for the directive to Air Marshal Bottomley and General Spaatz for the disruption of the German U-boat program. In C. C. S. 774/1 the British have presented a paper on the U-boat threat during 1945.

ADMIRAL KING was of the opinion that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be obliged to accept the directive proposed in C. C. S. 774 in the light of the British paper which implied that immediate action was necessary. He suggested that the British paper should be noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

GENERAL MARSHALL drew attention to the fact that the British paper would provoke serious complications in the allotment of tonnage being considered in current shipping studies and would provide the British with arguments for the increase of the figure of 8 percent which had been set for estimated shipping deficiencies. He was merely examining this aspect of the problem in order to formulate some reply to the British if the point were raised.

<sup>10</sup> *Ante*, pp. 395-396.

<sup>11</sup> Not printed, but see coverage of this subject in the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister at Yalta, *post*, p. 828.

ADMIRAL KING felt that the British paper might be accepted if the acceptance was without prejudice to the shipping deficiencies established in the current studies. He advised against any attempt to revise the percentage figure of assumed losses at this time.

ADMIRAL COOKE suggested that it might be preferable to note the paper and review the deficiencies in sailings at some future date.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff take note of C. C. S. 774/1 and review the percentage of deficiencies in sailings on 1 April 1945.

#### 7. STRATEGY IN NORTHWEST EUROPE

In closed session,

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff accept SCAF 180 (Enclosure "B" to C. C. S. 761/3) as amended by SCAF 194, and take note of SCAEF's dispatch No. S-77211 of 31 January 1945.<sup>12</sup>

#### Annex

#### MESSAGE BY GENERAL KUTER TO GENERAL ARNOLD DATED 1 FEBRUARY 1945

"The following letter received this date:

'My dear Kuter. Since the British Chiefs of Staff issued CCS 691<sup>13</sup> about British participation in the very long range bombing of Japan and the United States Chiefs of Staff replied in CCS 691/1,<sup>13</sup> we have made considerable progress in the development of our VLR bombing potential.

"The bombing of the "Tirpitz" proved that it is possible to increase the all up weight of the Lancaster beyond our expectations and we now hope to achieve an effective radius of action of some 1,500 miles carrying a useful load of the order of 6,000 pounds with either the Lancaster or with its replacement the Lincoln. We are however carrying on with flight refueling experiments as an insurance.

"The rate at which we will be able to bring our Bomber Force into action against Japan cannot finally be determined until we know more about the bases that will be available for our operations and the facilities we can count on at those bases. Assuming that bases are made available I estimate that our first squadrons could be fully operational in the Pacific 7 months after Germany is defeated, and the whole force some 5 months later.

"This RAF force will be thoroughly experienced in the technique of night bombing and in sea-mining, and will be capable of dropping

<sup>12</sup> See *ante*, p. 464, footnote 8.

<sup>13</sup> Not printed.

the very effective 1,500 pound British mines. I feel that particularly in these respects the Force will be able to make a valuable contribution to our efforts against Japan.

'I am anxious to get our plans for the RAF very long range Force into more concrete form, particularly with regard to the rate of its deployment, the provision of bases, availability of common user items, local defence and the general administrative arrangements for the contingent.

'I would like to send the AOC designate of our Force together with a small number of staff officers, over to the United States at an early date in order to make contact with your Air Force authorities and the officers under whom he would be serving, to make as much progress as possible with these arrangements. It would also be helpful if he could visit the Pacific area and learn at first hand something about the operating conditions in that Theatre. Following this visit, I propose that the AOC would return to the United Kingdom to continue with the preparation of his Force. I realize the difficulties of deciding on the exact base facilities that will be available so far in advance, but I am anxious to make a definite start even on a small scale, and would be prepared to initiate planning on the assumption that you would make available to us, say, 4 bases for heavy bombers 6 months after Germany is defeated.

'I would very much like to discuss this VLR project with you during this conference, either here or at MAGNETO.

'Yours sincerely, Charles Portal.'

"Anticipating such proposal, I have cleared with JCS a reply which will infer favorable consideration after detailed presentation of desired visit to Theater at proposed conference here or at MAGNETO.

"Understand Air Marshal Hugh Pugh Lloyd is AOC designate. Expect to arrange that Lloyd and party of 8 to 10 of his elected staff will arrive Washington after March 1 to spend 2 or 3 days in Office of Assistant Chief of Air Staff Plans studying probable course of air war on Japan and then 4 or 5 days in Headquarters XX Air Force for familiarization with means and methods of command and operations of XX Air Force and then visit to XX Air Force base in Mariannas and probably to Luzon.

"Expect that 36 squadrons of VLR Lancasters or Lincolns under Lloyd will operate as a unit of XX Air Force.

"All discussions will be based on condition that RAF unit will provide own aviation engineers and all services, will build, maintain and operate own bases, will provide all echelons of aviation maintenance and in general will be absolutely and completely self-supporting.

"Will tie resurrection of WEARY WILLIE project into same conversation and hope to establish full freedom for our development and operation from French bases and freedom to develop and operate accurately controlled types from UK bases."

CRICKET 55 (1 February 1945)



MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, FEBRUARY 1, 1945,  
10:30 A.M., ON BOARD H. M. S. "SIRIUS" IN GRAND HARBOR

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES<sup>1</sup>  
Secretary Stettinius  
Mr. Matthews  
Mr. Fohlen  
Mr. Hiss

UNITED KINGDOM  
Foreign Secretary Eden  
Sir Alexander Cadogan  
Mr. Butler  
Mr. Dixon

Executive Secretariat Files

*Agreed Minutes*<sup>2</sup>

TOP SECRET

MR. EDEN asked Mr. Stettinius if there were any points which he wished to raise.

MR. STETTINIUS said that he hoped it would be possible for agreement to be reached between the British and American Delegations forthwith on the urgent question of—

1. ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY

MR. STETTINIUS thought that though there had been agreement between the Americans and British on the zones of occupation in Germany, there were still relatively minor points outstanding, notably in connexion with the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven. He thought it important to get agreement on these, particularly in view of the fact that the Russians might soon be in Berlin and have views of their own as regards the zones if our two Governments do not approve the carefully negotiated protocol.<sup>3</sup>

MR. EDEN said that he understood that there were only certain small points unsettled; he agreed that it was desirable to get these

<sup>1</sup> The agreed record of this meeting lists as present for the United States only Stettinius, Matthews, and Hiss. According to Stettinius, p. 63, however, "Matthews, the rest of my staff, and I" attended. Besides Matthews and Hiss, Stettinius' staff consisted of Bohlen, Foote, and the secretariat, Blanchard, Conn, and Graham. On August 13, 1954, Matthews wrote: "I think Bohlen was . . . present" (640.0029/8-1354).

<sup>2</sup> The source text for the minutes here printed is a mimeographed paper, slightly amended in pen and ink, and dated February 2, 1945, which states that it is the "Agreed Record" of the meeting. Authorship is not indicated, although the paper is evidently of British origin. It bears the caption "(This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government)" and the notation "Copy No. 38". Attached to this copy is an identical copy numbered 39; and covering both copies is a memorandum from Dixon to Matthews dated at Yalta February 6, 1945, which reads: "I enclose three copies of the agreed record of the Foreign Secretaries' meeting at Cricket on February 1st." On August 13, 1954, Matthews wrote of these minutes: "I think the authorship is probably British and that I personally went over them" (640.0029/8-1354).

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 118-123.

tied up forthwith and thought that these points could be cleared up by agreement with the military authorities forthwith.\*

It was agreed that it would be most important for us to get the Russians to approve the protocols on control machinery<sup>4</sup> and zones of occupation.

MR. STETTINIUS next raised the question of zones for the French. The President was disposed to give the French a zone. This might include the southern part of the British zone and the northern part of the American, said Mr. Stettinius.

SIR A. CADOGAN asked whether the Americans had had any indication from the French what zone they desired; he thought we should consult them before taking our decision. Neither the British nor the Americans had as yet had any such indication.

It was agreed that the approval of the Russians should be sought to the proposal that the Americans and British should agree on a zone with the French; it was also agreed that the French should be integrated into the control machinery.

## 2. ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN AUSTRIA

MR. EDEN raised the question of zones of occupation in Austria.

MR. MATTHEWS said that there had been general agreement as to the areas except as to exact extent of the Viennese zone.

MR. EDEN said that Sir William Strang had told the European Advisory Council<sup>5</sup> that we favoured the American view on Vienna rather than the Russian. He was not sure, however, that apart from this issue there was in fact agreement as to zones.

It was recalled that the French had also asked for a zone in Austria.

## 3. POLAND

MR. STETTINIUS said that from the point of view of American public opinion it was extremely important that some equitable solution should be reached. It was impossible for the United States Government simply to recognise the Lublin Provisional Government. What seemed to be required was some kind of Council including all the relevant sections including M. Mikolajczyk. Failure to reach a satisfactory solution of this question at the forthcoming meeting would greatly disturb public opinion in America especially among the

\*The outstanding points were cleared up at lunch with General of the Army Marshall and Field Marshal Brooke, and telegrams were despatched to the Foreign Office and the U. S. Embassy in London with a view to the European Advisory Council being informed of the approval of their Governments of the proposed zones of occupation in Germany. [Footnote in the source paper. See the Foreign Ministers—Chiefs of Staff luncheon meeting, February 1, 1945, *post*, pp. 514-515.]

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, pp. 124-127.

<sup>5</sup> European Advisory Commission. See *ante*, p. 110, footnote 1.

Catholics and might prejudice the whole question of American participation in the post war world organisation. He asked whether the British had any formula.

MR. EDEN agreed that the British too could not simply recognise the Lublin Provisional Government. M. Mikolajczyk had put forward a suggestion for a presidential council which would be chosen partly from London elements, partly from the Lublin Provisional Government and partly from elements in Poland. Of the latter he instanced the Archbishop of Cracow, M. Witos and M. Zulawski, a leader of the Socialist party. He thought that M. Bierut would be a member of the presidential council from the Lublin Provisional Government.

SIR A. CADOGAN thought the Russians might be suspicious of a proposal which might seem to them rather complicated. He suggested that we should ask them to agree to a new interim Government and that we might suggest a presidential council as one method of securing this. We should avoid suggesting a fusion between the Lublin Provisional Government and the London Government.

It was agreed, upon the proposal of Mr. Stettinius, that the two Delegations should put up notes to the President and the Prime Minister in the above sense, bringing out in particular the point of the prejudicial effect on American opinion of failure to reach a satisfactory solution, and also that this would put in an impossible position all those in Great Britain most anxious to work in with Russia.<sup>6</sup>

The possibility was discussed of the Russians refusing to play.

It was agreed that a deadlock would be bad but that a simple recognition of the Lublin Provisional Government would be even worse.

#### 4. PERSIA

MR. EDEN raised the subject of Persia. He said that the essential point was to maintain the independence of Persia which was still threatened by the pressure which the Russian Government had been maintaining for some time on the Persian Government, mainly in connexion with the oil concession which the Persian Government had declined to give them. He suggested that an offer might be made to the Russians for the withdrawal of troops gradually and *pari passu*, after the Governments had agreed that the supply route through Persia was no longer required, which might be about June. He was obliged, however, to make a reservation that our military might feel it necessary to retain certain troops for the protection of the vital oilfields in southern Persia.

<sup>6</sup> *Post*, pp. 508-511.

MR. MATTHEWS pointed out that in this case the Russians would insist on maintaining troops in the north.

It was recalled that both Americans and British had a grievance against the Russians in that British and American companies had proceeded quite far in their applications for oil concessions in South Persia and that their negotiations had been arrested by the ham-handed procedure of the Russians in demanding a concession in the north which raised political issues.

It was agreed that for the three Powers to appear to default on the specific undertakings in the Tehran Declaration<sup>7</sup> would have repercussions elsewhere, for instance in connexion with Dumbarton Oaks,<sup>8</sup> and that it was important to try to get the Russians to agree (a) to the principle of gradual *pari passu* withdrawal and (b) that the Persian Government were entitled to decline to negotiate oil concessions as long as foreign troops were in occupation of their territory.<sup>9</sup>

#### 5. WARM WATER PORT FOR RUSSIA (STRAITS AND THE FAR EAST)

MR. STETTINIUS said that the President had in mind the question of Russian interests in a warm water port. He enquired whether the British had any indication as to what the Russians wanted.

MR. EDEN said that the Russians certainly wished to revise the Montreux Convention.<sup>10</sup> We had told them that they should put their ideas on paper. We had no clear indication of what they had in mind but it might be that they would wish for a regime for the Straits similar to that of the Suez Canal which would enable their warships to pass from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean in time of war.

MR. EDEN continued that the Russians would be wanting a good many things, that we had not very much to offer them, but that we required a great deal from them. He felt, therefore, that we ought to arrange to put together all the things we wanted against what we had to give. This would apply to the Far East also. In his view if the Russians decided to enter the war against Japan they would take the decision because they considered it in their interests that the Japanese war should not be successfully finished by the U. S. and Great Britain alone. There was therefore no need for us to offer a high price for their participation, and if we were prepared to agree to their territorial demands in the Far East we should see to it that we obtained a good return in respect of the points on which we required concessions from them.

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<sup>7</sup> The text of the Declaration regarding Iran, which was signed by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin at Tehran under date of December 1, 1943, is printed *post*, pp. 748-749.

<sup>8</sup> See *ante*, pp. 340-341.

<sup>9</sup> See *ante*, pp. 330-331.

<sup>10</sup> See the section entitled "The Turkish Straits," *ante*, pp. 328-329.

In the course of discussion the views were put forward that the Russians would certainly want the lower part of Sakhalin and transit rights in southern Manchuria.

#### 6. CHINA

The desirability of unity being achieved between the Kuomintang and the Communists was raised, and reference was made to the President having some doubts as to whether the British desired this unity.

MR. EDEN could not account for this idea having arisen; we were most anxious that unity should be secured.

MR. STETTINIUS said that he had not heard the report.

It was agreed that the military situation had improved somewhat, partly through the diversion of two divisions from Burma to China, and partly through the reopening of the Burma Road.

MR. STETTINIUS urged that the British, Soviet and American Governments make every effort to bring about agreement between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists.

#### 7. EMERGENCY HIGH COMMISSION FOR EUROPE

MR. STETTINIUS referred to the two papers on this subject which Mr. Bohlen had communicated in London to Sir A. Cadogan.<sup>11</sup> He asked Mr. Hiss to explain briefly their purpose.

MR. HISS said that the essential purpose was to secure unity of approach between the three Big powers to the manifold difficulties that must arise in liberated territories in Europe. The proposed High Commission would be a temporary body functioning until the World Organisation was set up. It would not include Germany, which was handled by the European Advisory Council; but in any case the scope including the psychological approach was different.

MR. STETTINIUS stressed that the Commission would be composed of four members, i. e. by the inclusion of the French, or possibly more.

MR. EDEN made it clear that the British were much attracted by the proposal.

MR. MATTHEWS said that its presentation to the Russians would require considerable care, as the question of Poland was involved.

MR. EDEN foresaw that one difficulty would be to find members of the Council who would be able to take responsibility for decisions of importance—the Russians would find this particularly difficult. Apart from this there was the further difficulty that responsibility for such decisions vis-à-vis their own public opinion must rest with the Foreign Secretaries of each country, who could neither be permanently in session in a foreign country, nor delegate their duties beyond a certain measure.

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<sup>11</sup> See *ante*, pp. 98–100.

MR. STETTINIUS shared this view, but explained that the intention had been that the members of the proposed Council would refer to their home Governments before the Council took decisions of importance.

MR. EDEN raised the further point of the relation between the Council and quarterly meetings of the Foreign Secretaries to which he attached importance. It was felt that it should not be impossible to work [out?] an arrangement combining both plans.

There was some discussion as to the title of the body. It was felt that some title must be found which would not wound the susceptibilities of the smaller Allies and at the same time would not seem to cut across the duties of the European Advisory Council and the Allied Control Commissions in certain enemy countries. It was thought that Mr. Matthews' suggestion of "Liberated Areas Emergency Council" deserved consideration.

MR. STETTINIUS stressed that the proposal must still be regarded as informal and unofficial as the President had not yet approved it. The President had indeed some misgiving that its adoption might prejudice the prospects of the World Organisation which was the question of paramount importance.

MR. MATTHEWS pointed out that if the idea fructified some public announcement would be necessary as regards it and certain other kindred subjects.

MR. STETTINIUS said that the ideal result of ARGONAUT would be two declarations, one bringing to birth the World Organisation and the other in regard to the Emergency High Commission. American public opinion keenly anticipated a satisfactory declaration as regards the World Organisation in the course of the next week, and if this were not forthcoming its prospects would be seriously jeopardised.

It was agreed that in view of the informality of the proposal the Prime Minister should be advised not to raise the question of the Emergency High Commission with the President.

#### 8. GERMANY

Some discussion followed on the future of Germany. It was felt that both the political and economic aspects needed working out by some international body.

MR. STETTINIUS enquired whether this was not in the province of the European Advisory Council and there was agreement that it was.

MR. EDEN summed up that with the Russians so close to Berlin it was urgently necessary to reach tripartite agreement.

(a) that a common political and economic policy in Germany was required,

(b) that no individual nation should take action without the agreement of the others, and

(c) that the European Advisory Council was the body in which detailed arrangements should be worked out.

Other questions requiring study would be the transfer of population and prisoners of war.

It was agreed that a note should be drafted embodying the views of the two Governments for the use of the President and the Prime Minister at ARGONAUT.<sup>12</sup>

### 9. DUMBARTON OAKS

MR. EDEN said that he liked the President's proposal for overcoming the difficulty as regards voting by the Big Powers.<sup>13</sup>

MR. MATTHEWS stressed that its adoption was virtually essential to the creation of the World Organisation.

SIR A. CADOGAN agreed that it would hardly be possible to secure the latter with anything less.

At Mr. Stettinius' request MR. HISS briefly described the American proposal. It distinguished between cases involving Enforcement and cases dealt with by Discussion. For the former unanimity in the part of the Great Powers would be necessary, whereas for the latter parties to the dispute, whether Big Powers or small, would not be entitled to vote. He stressed that this proposal, which had been described as a compromise, in effect was not so, but was actually the preferred solution of the United States Government.

SIR A. CADOGAN endorsed this and agreed that this point should be made plain to the public.

MR. EDEN agreed.

It was agreed (1) that two types of documents were required; first, a document setting out the American proposal which would be the document to be presented to the Russians; and secondly, brief and clear explanations of it for the information of the President and the Prime Minister; and (2) that if approved it would be for the President to present the plan formally at ARGONAUT both to Marshal Stalin and to Mr. Churchill.<sup>14</sup>

*Points arising in the event of agreement being reached on Dumbarton Oaks plan.*

#### (a) Position of France and China

It was agreed that the French and Chinese Governments should be consulted as soon as agreement was reached, and if the Russians con-

<sup>12</sup> It appears that separate American and British papers were drafted pursuant to this agreement. The British paper is printed *post*, pp. 511-512. The American views on the treatment of Germany were included in a memorandum drafted at Malta on February 2 but presented to the President at Yalta on February 4. See *post*, pp. 567-569.

<sup>13</sup> *Ante*, pp. 58-60.

<sup>14</sup> See *post*, pp. 660-661.

curred that the French should be invited to be the Fifth Power sponsoring the plan. The United States Government would be responsible for communicating the documents to and obtaining the concurrence of both the French and Chinese Governments.

(b) The invitations to other States to be present at the eventual United Nations Conference should be issued jointly in the name of all five Governments and by each of them individually. It was realised that the Russian Government might raise some objection to this in connection with China.

#### 10. POLISH-GERMAN FRONTIER

MR. EDEN said that the apparent desire of the Lublin Provisional Government to secure for Poland large additional sections of Germany involving eight million persons was causing him some anxiety. He thought that Poland was entitled to East Prussia and part of Upper Silesia, and certain other territories up to the Oder.

MR. MATTHEWS said that that was the American view and referred also to the inclusion of the eastern tip of Pomerania. He stressed also the American view that the transfer of populations should be gradual and not precipitate.

SIR A. CADOGAN thought that agreement in principle between the Americans and British on this point might be registered now. This was agreed to.

#### 11. AUSTRO-YUGOSLAV FRONTIER

MR. EDEN referred to the fact that British troops under the proposed zone arrangement would be responsible for the Austrian frontier with Yugoslavia, and that one could not exclude the possibility that Marshal Tito would wish to occupy part of Austrian territory which was claimed for Yugoslavia. The position would be safeguarded if the three Big Powers were to tell Marshal Tito that the frontiers must remain as they are until the Peace Treaty, at which claims of parties concerned would be settled.

MR. STETTINIUS expressed concurrence in this procedure.

#### 12. CONDUCT OF THE RUSSIANS IN EASTERN EUROPE

It was pointed out that there were two main questions on which we had reason for complaint in regard to Russian conduct (a) in connexion with the Control Commissions and (b) in connexion with the British and American oil interest in Roumania.

It was generally felt that while the position on the Control Commission for Roumania was now more satisfactory it was important to insist with the Russians that before the Commissions took action there must be prior consultation with the Americans and British. Should the Russian Government feel obliged to take any unilateral action on



military grounds, not covered in the Armistice, this should be taken on their sole responsibility and in the name of the Soviet Government.

It was agreed that the British Delegation should draw up a paper<sup>15</sup> which would include Hungary specifying the points on which dissatisfaction was felt with the Russian conduct in Eastern Europe. This paper, if the American Delegation concurred in it, would serve for presentation by Mr. Eden to M. Molotov at some meeting between the three Foreign Secretaries.

### 13. CIVIL SUPPLIES

MR. EDEN raised this question and Mr. Stettinius said that he understood that Admiral Land had submitted a paper on the subject. It appeared that the British and American civil authorities were in agreement but it remained to persuade the American military.

It was understood that the next stage would be for the matter to be discussed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and if agreement were not reached by them, between the President and the Prime Minister.

### 14. PRISONERS OF WAR

SIR A. CADOGAN said that he understood that the Russian Delegation at ARGONAUT would include an official who would be prepared to discuss this subject. There were in effect two questions, (a) the treatment of Allied civilian and military prisoners of war who were liberated by the Russians and (b) our own treatment of Russian prisoners of war who came into our hands.

It was agreed that the procedure for handling this with the Russian expert should be discussed by the American and British experts who were present at CRICKET.

### 15. ANGLO-AMERICAN WARNING TO GERMANY ABOUT ALLIED PRISONERS OF WAR

MR. MATHEWS said that the State Department were disposed to agree with the text proposed by the Foreign Office<sup>16</sup> but that the United States War Department had some views on the subject.

It was agreed that the timing of any statement would be important and that the proper time would be when the German collapse seemed imminent or when some German outrage was threatened.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>15</sup> *Post*, pp. 513-514, 889-890.

<sup>16</sup> Not printed.

<sup>17</sup> For the warning to Germany by Truman, Churchill, and Stalin, released on April 23, 1945, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 29, 1945, vol. XII, p. 811.

## 16. TREATMENT OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

MR. EDEN said that when this was discussed at Moscow in October Marshal Stalin had disagreed with our view favouring some summary executions and had said that some form of judicial procedure was necessary.<sup>18</sup> The Prime Minister was still considering what the British attitude on this subject would be.

ON BOARD H. M. S. "SIRIUS", MALTA, 2nd February 1945.

<sup>18</sup> See *ante*, p. 400.

740.011 EW/1-2745: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State*

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 31, 1945.

1. *General information.* Winant has been instructed to act in concert with his Soviet colleague in the EAC in approving French proposals regarding equality in connection with the handling of German matters. . . . The British still insist on the desirability of a tripartite declaration on Denmark but the Department intends instead to send a secret message to the Danish Freedom Council and Danish political leaders praising their assistance to the common cause. . . . It is understood that Subasic will not leave London until the regency council appointed by the King has been recognized by Tito. The Greek situation is developing normally and it is reported that EAM has accepted the Government's proposal regarding the composition of the peace talk delegations. . . . As a result of extreme Soviet pressure the Czechoslovak Cabinet has decided to recognize the Lublin Committee. . . . Discussion in EAC of control machinery for Austria will be resumed as soon as instructions are received by the Soviet and French representatives. The British have approved in principle French participation in the occupation of Austria. . . . Bohlen has a copy of a long memorandum from Mikolajczyk<sup>1</sup> making proposals for the solution of Soviet-Polish difficulties.

2. ALLSTATE. HORSESHOE.

3. . . . (This is our fifth message.)<sup>2</sup>

. . . . .

<sup>1</sup> For a summary of this memorandum, see *post*, pp. 953-954.

<sup>2</sup> i. e., from the Acting Secretary to the Secretary since the departure of the latter from Washington, in this series of messages sent via Army channels.

Bohlen Collection

*The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

P. M. (A) 2.

*Prime Minister.*

CONVERSATIONS WITH MR. STETTINIUS

POLAND

We found that we were in broad agreement on the necessity for finding a solution and that it was impossible for our Governments to recognise the Lublin Government. Mr. Stettinius stressed that failure to find a solution would greatly disturb American public opinion, and might prejudice the whole question of American participation in the World Organisation.

2. I agreed that a "Russian" solution of the question would be very likely to produce the latter result.

3. We found that we had very similar ideas on the lines of a possible solution. We should have to stress to Marshal Stalin the unsatisfactory nature of the present state of affairs, with the Soviet recognising one Government in Lublin and ourselves another Government in London. (We, of course, ourselves have the added problem of the Polish forces, acting with ours, who owe allegiance to the London Government). There would be apparent to the world a definite divergence of view on a point of first-rate importance. This would give rise to uneasiness amongst our peoples and would afford valuable material to enemy propaganda.

4. The time has probably gone by for a "fusion" of London and Lublin, and the only remedy that we can see is the creation of a new interim Government in Poland, pledged to hold free elections as soon as conditions permit. This would be representative of all Polish political parties and would no doubt include elements from the Lublin Government, from Poles in Poland, and from Poles abroad. There are no good candidates from the Government in London, but if M. Mikolajczyk and, perhaps, M. Romer and others such as M. Grabski could be included, that would make it much easier for us to recognize the new Government, which should be far more representative of Poland as a whole than is the Lublin Government.

5. If it would facilitate the realisation of this plan, we should be ready to see the adoption of M. Mikolajczyk's idea of a "Presidential Council" consisting of such men as the former Prime Minister, M. Witos, Archbishop Sapieha, M. Zulawski and M. Bierut. Such a Council could appoint the new Government.

<sup>1</sup> Page 1 of the source paper bears the notation "Copy for Bohlen".

6. If the Russians persist in their present policy, that would only neutralise the efforts of all those in our two countries most anxious to work with Russia.

7. There remains the territorial problem. As regards Poland's eastern frontier, H. M. G. have already agreed with the Russians and announced publicly that this should be the Curzon Line, giving Lwow to the U. S. S. R. The Americans may however still wish to press the Russians to leave Lwow to Poland. As regards Poland's western frontier, we and the Americans agreed that Poland should certainly have East Prussia south and west of Königsberg, Danzig, the eastern tip of Pomerania and the whole of Upper Silesia. The Lublin Poles, no doubt with Soviet approval, are however also claiming not only the Oder line frontier, including Stettin and Breslau, but also the western Neisse frontier.

8. The cessions upon which we and the Americans are agreed would involve the transfer of some 2½ million Germans. The Oder frontier, without Breslau and Stettin would involve a further 2¼ millions. The western Neisse frontier with Breslau and Stettin would involve an additional 3¼ millions making 8 millions in all.

9. We were prepared last October in Moscow to let M. Mikolajczyk's Government have any territories they chose to claim up to the Oder, but this was conditional upon agreement then being reached between him and the Russians and there was no question of our agreeing to the western Neisse frontier. It was agreed before we left London that we should oppose the western Neisse frontier. I also think that we should keep the position fluid as regards the Oder line frontier, and take the line that H. M. G. cannot be considered as having accepted any definite line for the western frontier of Poland, since we need not make the same concessions to the Lublin Poles which we were prepared to make to M. Mikolajczyk in order to obtain a solution of the Polish problem. Even the Oder line frontier would severely tax the Polish capacity for absorption and would increase the formidable difficulties involved in the transfer of millions of Germans. We agreed with the Americans that in any event these transfers should be gradual and not precipitate.

10. If the Russians refuse to accept any solution such as that outlined above, the present deadlock must continue. That would be bad, but a simple recognition of the Lublin Government would be even worse.

[MALTA,] 1st February, 1945.

Hiss Collection

*United States Delegation Memorandum*<sup>1</sup>

## CONCRETE PROPOSALS ON THE POLISH QUESTION

*Territorial Problems*

We should make every effort to obtain agreement for a Polish frontier in the east which should run along the Curzon Line in the north and central section, and in the southern section should follow generally the eastern frontier line of the Lwow Province. This would give to Poland the Polish city of Lwow and the economically important oil fields. This frontier would correspond generally with one of the suggested frontiers proposed in 1919 to the Supreme Allied Council.

In regard to German territory to be turned over to Poland, we should make every effort to limit this compensation to East Prussia (except Koenigsberg), a small salient of Pomerania, which would include an area about one hundred miles west along the Baltic coast to the Polish Corridor and Upper Silesia.

If we are unable to obtain Lwow Province for Poland, and if efforts are made to obtain greater compensation for Poland in the west, we should make every effort to keep this compensation to a minimum particularly because of the large population transfers which would have to be carried out if these purely German areas are included in Poland. We should resist vigorously efforts to extend the Polish frontier to the Oder Line or the Oder-Neisse Line.

*Political Problems*

The problem here involves the future independence of the Polish State. The Lublin Government in its present form cannot be regarded as representative of the Polish people. For this reason without violation of our commitments to the Polish people and without causing the most serious repercussions in American public opinion, we cannot transfer our recognition from the London Government to the Lublin Government. We must make every effort to resolve the question of the creation of a new interim Polish Government of national unity which should be composed of representative members of all important Polish political parties. This new interim government should not be in the form of an amalgamation of the Polish Government in London and of the Lublin Government. The first step in the direction of such a solution might be an agreement at this meeting to set up a Presidential Council which would be charged by the three powers (four if France would be included) with appointment

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<sup>1</sup> The source paper is a carbon copy which bears no date and no indication of authorship. Its phraseology, however, reflects the outline of the proposed "note" to Roosevelt regarding Poland, to the preparation of which Stettinius agreed at the meeting of the Foreign Secretaries on February 1, 1945 (*ante*, p. 500).

of an interim Polish Government composed of the representatives of leading Polish political parties. This Presidential Council might be composed of Bierut, the present head of the Lublin Government, and a small number of Poles from inside Poland taken from the following list: Bishop Sapieha of Cracow, Vincente Witos—one of the leaders of the Polish Peasant Party and a former Prime Minister, Zulowski [Zulawski], a Socialist leader, Bishop Lukomski, Professor Buyak [Bujak], and Professor Kutzeba [Kutrzeba].

This Presidential Council would be commissioned by the three or four powers possibly acting through the medium of the proposed Emergency High Commission or by agreement among themselves to form an interim government which would be pledged to the holding of free elections when conditions inside Poland permit. The High Commission or other Allied instrument would assume responsibility for seeing that the Presidential Council selected an interim government based on a fair representation of Polish political parties and also that the interim government would carry out its pledge to hold free elections as soon as conditions permit.

Among the representatives of the Polish political parties making up this government would, of course, be certain present members of the Lublin Government as well as Poles from abroad, in particular Mikolajczyk.

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Matthews Files

*The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

P. M. (A) 4.

*Prime Minister*

#### THE FUTURE OF GERMANY

As a result of developments in the war situation, it is becoming increasingly urgent to co-ordinate the policy of the major Allied Powers in regard to the future of Germany. It is clearly of paramount importance to future unity and security that there should be no divergence of policy between the Allies in dealing with Germany.

2. The E. A. C. was set up in 1943 to "study and make joint recommendations to the three Governments upon European questions connected with the termination of hostilities". So far the Commission have agreed and referred to Governments three documents: (1) Terms of surrender for Germany,<sup>2</sup> (2) protocol on zones of occupation,<sup>3</sup> (3) control machinery for Germany.<sup>4</sup> Of these (1) has been

<sup>1</sup> Carbon copy typed in the Department of State.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 113-118.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 118-123.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, pp. 124-127.

approved by all three Governments, and (2) and (3) so far by the United States and British Governments only.

3. There are a considerable number of major questions of policy on which no decisions have been reached, though there have been exchanges of views at earlier conferences. In my view we should be wise to suspend final decisions until we see what conditions are in Germany. But there is a great deal of preparatory work which can and should be done. Governments have no doubt been studying all these questions individually; but the time has come when they could usefully be examined jointly by British, American, Soviet and French experts with a view to coordinating the individual studies. The obvious body to undertake this task is the E. A. C.

4. I would accordingly suggest that at the forthcoming conference we should try to get general agreement that the E. A. C. should be directed to examine and make joint recommendations at an early date to the member Governments regarding future political and economic policy towards Germany. In doing so, the Commission should pay particular attention to, *inter alia*, provisions for the disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany and the prevention of rearmament, dismemberment, decentralisation, measures of economic security, reparation, the future of the Rheno-Westphalian basin, the Kiel area, and transfers of population.

5. If this is agreed, it will be important that member Governments should ensure that their delegations are adequately staffed to cope with the increased work.

6. It might also be useful, in order to give the public some idea of the Commission's work, that the communiqué to be issued at the end of the Conference should announce the approval of the three Governments of the three documents so far negotiated by the E. A. C. This will, however, raise awkward problems as regards the French. While they are unlikely to propose any alterations of substance, they have not yet formally approved the documents, which will have to be recast in quadripartite form. We are telegraphing to the Foreign Office to ask (a) what effect it would be likely to have on the French if we announce the approval of the three Governments only of the three documents, and (b) whether they can devise a formula which we could use to cover the French.

[MALTA,] 2nd February, 1945.

Matthews Files

*United Kingdom Delegation Memorandum*<sup>1</sup>

## ALLIED (SOVIET) CONTROL COMMISSIONS IN BULGARIA AND HUNGARY

H. M. G. regard it as essential (a) that their representatives in Bulgaria and Hungary should enjoy reasonable freedom of movement and communication, and (b) that decisions about which they have not been consulted should not be taken in their name. In the case of Hungary, (a) has been satisfactorily dealt with in the "Statutes of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary", and H. M. G. suggest that identical Statutes should be adopted for the Control Commission in Bulgaria in order to meet the points made in the message from Mr. Eden which was delivered to M. Molotov on or about December 11th, 1944.<sup>2</sup>

H. M. G. also consider that during the first period there should be prior consultation with the British and American representatives and that, should the Soviet Government feel obliged to take any unilateral action on military grounds not covered in the Armistice, it should be taken on their sole responsibility and in the name of the Soviet Government only.

During the second period, i. e. after the conclusion of hostilities, H. M. G. wish to ensure that

(a) The British and American representatives should take their places in the Control Commissions as full members and should have the right to attend all their meetings and to participate fully in the consideration of all questions before the Commission. They should also have the right of direct access to the satellite authorities.

(b) Decisions of the Allied Control Commissions should be unanimous and its name and authority should be used only where the representatives of all three powers are in agreement. If the Soviet High Command, being in *de facto* control of the satellite countries through the presence of Soviet troops, insist upon issuing directives to the local Governments or taking action which are not approved by both the British and American representatives they should act unilaterally in their own name.

(c) The extent to which the British and the Americans will share in the actual executive and administrative work of the Control Commissions will be a matter to be settled on the spot. But they must certainly have the right to membership of any sub-committee or executive organ dealing with matters concerning British and American rights and property.

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<sup>1</sup> Undated British carbon copy which includes pen-written changes and which bears the penciled endorsement "Mr. Matthews."

<sup>2</sup> Not printed, but see *ante*, p. 241.



(d) The detailed implications of these proposals should be worked out between the Soviet chairman and the British and American representatives on the Control Commissions on the spot.

### ROUMANIA

H. M. G. have been glad to note that the Soviet authorities have now agreed to stop removing equipment from the oil fields in Roumania in which British interests are involved and have also agreed that the Ruat plant should remain *in situ*. But if the large quantities of equipment which have already been removed are not to be returned H. M. G. considers that they must be regarded as deliveries on account of reparations, and arrangements made for compensating the oil companies. Similarly the Ruat plant should be restored to its previous condition and brought into production as soon as possible. As the Soviet Government have made no attempt to refute the argument advanced by H. M. G. that any equipment which may be removed should be regarded as reparation and not as war booty, H. M. G. can only refer the Soviet Government to the statement of the case which has already been made. It should also be pointed out that these difficulties would never have arisen if the Soviet representatives in Roumania had discussed problems affecting the Roumanian oil industry with their British and American colleagues on the Control Commission instead of taking unilateral action.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> This memorandum was subsequently revised and divided into two papers, both of which were circulated by Eden at the Yalta meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 10, 1945. See *post*, pp. 889-890, 893.

### FOREIGN MINISTERS-CHIEFS OF STAFF LUNCHEON MEETING, FEBRUARY 1, 1945, ON BOARD H. M. S. "SIRIUS" IN GRAND HARBOR

#### PRESENT

##### UNITED STATES

Secretary Stettinius  
General of the Army Marshall  
Mr. Matthews

##### UNITED KINGDOM

Foreign Secretary Eden  
Field Marshal Brooke

#### *Editorial Note*

The only records of the substance of this meeting that have been found are in (a) Stettinius, p. 63, where the author states: "The two Chiefs of Staff, after a thorough discussion of the question [of zones of occupation in Germany] with us, authorized us to cable our representatives on the European Advisory Commission in London that the two governments now approved the zones"; and in (b) a telegram of Stettinius to Acting Secretary of State Grew dated February 1, 1945

(*infra*). The telegram quotes the text of the message on this subject which Stettinius cabled on the same day to Ambassador Winant.

Matthews recalls that he was present at this meeting and that he wrote the message to Winant (640.0029/8-1354).

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740.00119 Control (Germany)/2-145 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Grew)*

Nr: CRICKET 45

MALTA, 1 February 1945.

SECRET

For Acting Secretary of State *Only* from Secretary Stettinius.

Have dispatched the following to Winant after conference which Eden and I had with General Marshall and Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke.

"You are Authorized immediately to inform the European Advisory Commission of this government's approval of the protocol on zones of occupation for Germany. Eden is likewise telegraphing the British Government's approval."

Please advise McCloy.

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**MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, FEBRUARY 1, 1945,  
2:30 P. M., MONTGOMERY HOUSE**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

General of the Army Marshall  
Fleet Admiral King  
Major General Kuter  
Lieutenant General Somervell  
Lieutenant General Smith  
Vice Admiral Cooke  
Rear Admiral McCormick  
Major General Bull  
Major General Anderson  
Major General Hull  
Major General Wood  
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser  
Brigadier General Cabell <sup>1</sup>

UNITED KINGDOM

Field Marshal Brooke  
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal  
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham  
Field Marshal Wilson  
Field Marshal Alexander <sup>1</sup>  
General Ismay  
Admiral Somerville  
General Riddell-Webster  
Major General Laycock

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General McFarland  
Captain Graves

Major General Jacob  
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones  
Commander Coleridge

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<sup>1</sup> Present for items 1 and 2 only.

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*<sup>2</sup>

TOP SECRET

1. APPROVAL OF MINUTES OF C. C. S. 183D MEETING<sup>3</sup>

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he would like the first statement attributed to him in item 1 of the minutes amended to read as follows:—

“GENERAL MARSHALL said that in recent discussions General Eisenhower had explained that he would have to take a decision by 1 February as to whether to continue with General Bradley’s operations or to stop them and start the movement of troops preliminary to launching GRENADE.”

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the C. C. S. 183d Meeting, and approved the detailed record of the meeting, subject to the amendment proposed by General Marshall and to later minor amendments.

2. STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN  
(C. C. S. 773/1 and 773/2)<sup>3a</sup>

FIELD MARSHAL BROOKE referred to the amended draft directive contained in C. C. S. 773/1. He suggested that paragraph 4 *b.* of this directive should read as follows:—

“Further complete formations as the forces now in Greece are released from that country.”

It was explained that this amendment was consequent upon the reduction of the number of divisions to move to Northwest Europe from six to five. Three divisions would go from Italy and therefore it would only be necessary for two of the three divisions in Greece to follow them.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL referred to paragraph 5 of the draft directive. He felt that Field Marshal Alexander might well prefer to retain the Twelfth Air Force, since he was losing three divisions at once, in order to enable him to carry out that part of his directive contained in paragraph 7 *c.*, which instructed him to be prepared to take immediate advantage of any weakening or withdrawal of the German forces. He might also require it to maintain the security of his front, though it might well be possible to release it after the Germans had withdrawn to the Adige. A further point was that since it was proposed to move the first three divisions quickly, it might not be possible to transfer air forces at the same time.

<sup>2</sup> C. C. S. 184th Meeting.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 485–490.

<sup>3a</sup> Not printed.

In reply to a question, SIR CHARLES PORTAL confirmed that it was his view that the Twelfth Air Force should remain in the Mediterranean in the event that the German forces did not retire.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in his view it was important to transfer such air forces as was possible to the decisive theater.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL suggested that the remainder of the directive should be approved and, in lieu of paragraph 5, the Supreme Commander should be informed that the question of the transference of parts of the Twelfth Air Force was still under consideration.

GENERAL MARSHALL said he was not in favor of this proposal.

GENERAL KUTER suggested that General Eisenhower might require parts of the Twelfth Air Force before the ground troops which were being transferred to him.

GENERAL SMITH said that General Eisenhower's first requirement, before any of the land forces, was for two groups of fighter-bombers. These were urgently required in view of the lack of such types on the southern part of the front. The move of these two groups could, he believed, be very quickly accomplished.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Deferred action on this subject until their next meeting.

### 3. EQUIPMENT FOR ALLIED AND LIBERATED FORCES (C. C. S. 768/1) <sup>4</sup>

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Deferred action on C. C. S. 768/1 until their next meeting.

### 4. a. OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND (C. C. S. 452/35, C. C. S. 452/36) <sup>5</sup>

### b. ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES BETWEEN THE INDIA-BURMA AND CHINA THEATERS (C. C. S. 747/7 (ARGONAUT) <sup>6</sup>

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the wording of the final sentence of paragraph 2 of C. C. S. 452/36.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he understood that the British Chiefs of Staff wished to delete the words "British forces engaged in." This he felt fundamentally altered the sense of the sentence. It implied that operations rather than forces should not be placed in jeopardy. It might result in lengthy discussions each time the question of the possibility of moving forces to China arose.

<sup>4</sup> *Post*, pp. 522-524.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

<sup>6</sup> *Post*, pp. 524-525.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained that the British Chiefs of Staff were asking only that discussion should take place before such a move was ordered. He felt that the crowning success of an approved operation might well be jeopardized by the withdrawal of United States forces without the British Chiefs of Staff or the Supreme Commander having an opportunity of laying before the Combined Chiefs of Staff the full consequences of such a withdrawal.

After further discussion, THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF agreed on the following wording of the final sentence of paragraph 2 of C. C. S. 452/36:

“Any transfer of forces engaged in approved operations in progress in Burma which is contemplated by the United States Chiefs of Staff and which, in the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff, would jeopardize those operations, will be subject to discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.”

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that in the light of this redrafting, the British Chiefs of Staff would withdraw C. C. S. 747/7 (ARGONAUT).

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff accepted the draft directive put forward by the British Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 452/35, subject to the communication to the Supreme Commander of the policy recorded in C. C. S. 452/36 and amended in the course of discussion.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Approved the policy set out in the first and second paragraphs of C. C. S. 452/36, subject to the amendment of the last sentence of the second paragraph as agreed above. (The policy, as amended and approved, subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 452/37.)

b. Approved the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia contained in C. C. S. 452/35, subject to the addition of a paragraph drawing his attention to the policy set out in C. C. S. 452/37.

c. Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff withdraw C. C. S. 747/7 (ARGONAUT).

##### 5. PACIFIC OPERATIONS (C. C. S. 417/11)<sup>8</sup>

At the request of Sir Alan Brooke, GENERAL MARSHALL and ADMIRAL KING explained the future course of operations in the Pacific and various plans and projects which were under examination by the United States Chiefs of Staff. Plans had been prepared aiming at an attack on Kyushu in September of 1945 and the invasion of the

<sup>7</sup> Not printed. The text of this paper was incorporated in the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister at Yalta, *post*, p. 830.

<sup>8</sup> *Ante*, pp. 395–396.

Tokyo Plain in December of 1945. However, these operations involved the use of forces which would have to be redeployed from Europe after the defeat of Germany. The actual dates of these operations were therefore dependent on the date of the defeat of Germany. The length of time required for redeployment varied between four and six months, depending on whether the troops involved had actually been committed in Europe. At the present time all ground forces allocated to the Pacific were already in that theater and there would be no additional formations which could be moved there until the end of the German war. It was important, however, that during the necessary interval before the attack on the Empire itself could be carried out that the Japanese should be given no respite. It was intended to use this interval to obtain positions designed to assist in the final defeat of Japan. There were various possible courses of action after the capture of the Ryukyus and Bonins to achieve this object. The possible operations now under consideration were:—

(1) *An attack on the Island of Hainan.* This had the advantage not only of securing an air base to assist in cutting Japanese sea and land communications but also afforded a new airway into the heart of China, thereby assisting the Chinese to take a more active part in operations.

(2) *An attack on North Borneo.* The advantages of such an operation were that it secured to the United Nations the valuable oil supplies in that area. In this connection it was interesting to note that certain of these oil wells afforded fuel which required but little refinement before it was ready for use.

(3) *An operation against the Chusan-Ningpo area.* This operation was extremely valuable in broadening the base for air attack against the Island Empire. In addition, it had the great merit of throttling Japanese communications up the Yangtze River. The area concerned contained a series of islands and a peninsula and was therefore one in which operations against the Japanese could be undertaken without permitting the enemy to deploy large land forces against us.

When Okinawa had been seized a decision could be taken as to which of the courses of action outlined above was likely to afford the most valuable results. At the same time it might be found desirable to capture additional islands in the Ryukyus either to the north or south of Okinawa.

In general, future operations in the Pacific were designed to avoid full-scale land battles against Japanese forces, involving heavy casualties and slowing up the conduct of the campaign.

With regard to operations in the Philippines it was not visualized that major United States forces would be used in mopping-up operations nor that the island of Mindanao and others to the south would be assaulted by United States forces. Rather, it was hoped that

with U. S. troops holding certain key positions, the rearmed Philippine Army and guerillas would be able to carry out the necessary mopping-up operations.

In view of the above considerations it was hoped to avoid an assault on Formosa and to isolate and bomb Japanese forces in the island from positions in the Ryukyus and Luzon.

The dates on which any of the possible alternative operations could be undertaken and the choice of such operations was dependent on the results of present operations in Luzon and on the date of the termination of the war in Europe. It was unlikely that both Hainan and North Borneo could be undertaken.

The importance of adequate bases and staging points was stressed. A fleet base was being developed on the southeast tip of Samar and it was estimated that three months' work could be achieved on this base before any work could be done to render Manila available to the fleet. It might, in fact, be decided not to recondition the Manila base at all. A base had also been developed in Ulithi<sup>9</sup> which was some 1100 miles to the westward of Eniwetok<sup>10</sup> which had previously been used as a base and staging point.

The difficulties of developing the northern sea route to Russia were emphasized. The two divisions which had been earmarked for an assault on the Kuriles had now been diverted to Europe and it was unlikely that further forces would be available for this operation. Further, the sea lane to Russian ports was rendered difficult and in certain instances impossible during the winter months due to ice conditions.

The Russians had asked for some 85 additional ships to enable them to stock up their eastern armies. The provision of such ships would of course affect the course of operations elsewhere. In order to make a sea route safe and effective it would be necessary to seize an island in the Kuriles from which air cover could provide safe passage either to the north or south of it. Unless such an operational base was seized by the first of July its value would be lost due to ice conditions preventing the passage of ships. At present ships flying the Russian flag were convoying "civilian-type" supplies to the Maritime Provinces.

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<sup>9</sup> Ulithi or Mackenzie Islands, in approximately 10°6' north latitude and 139°50' east longitude, a large coral atoll with a cluster of low, sandy islands surrounding a central lagoon, toward the western extremity of the Caroline Islands in the western Pacific Ocean. Occupied by United States forces on September 20-21, 1944, Ulithi was subsequently developed into a base for the United States fleet operating against Japan.

<sup>10</sup> A large, nearly circular, coral atoll consisting of about thirty islets of varying size surrounding a lagoon, at the northwest end of the Marshall Islands, in approximately 11°21' north latitude and 162°20' east longitude. Seized by United States forces in February 1944 and converted into an air and naval base, Eniwetok has been used by the United States since 1948 as a testing ground for atomic experiments.

To sum up, it was unlikely that the operation against Kyushu could be undertaken until four months after the defeat of Germany. In the period intervening before such an operation could be undertaken, further operations would be carried out with the forces available. These operations would be designed to secure positions best calculated to assist the final attack on the Empire.

In further discussion the shortage of service troops was stressed. These forces would be the first to be redeployed from Europe. They were in short supply throughout the world and additional commitments were caused by the inability of the French to provide service forces to maintain their own troops.

With regard to the employment of Australian troops, it was explained that these forces were relieving United States divisions wherever possible. They were carrying out mopping-up operations in New Guinea and were garrisoning such points as Bougainville and the Admiralty Islands. Two Australian divisions had also been included in a plan to assault Mindanao, which might not now be used.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of the plans and operations proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 417/11.

6. *a.* U-BOAT THREAT  
(C. C. S. 774/1 and 774/2)<sup>11</sup>

*b.* BOMBING OF ASSEMBLY YARDS AND OPERATING BASES  
(C. C. S. 774)<sup>11</sup>

GENERAL MARSHALL said the United States Chiefs of Staff suggested that C. C. S. 774/1 should be noted and the situation with regard to estimated shipping losses should be reviewed on the first of April.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM agreed with General Marshall.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL, referring to C. C. S. 774, said that he felt the proposals contained in the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff would not be implemented by the suggested directive to the air forces. He felt that if persistent bombing of U-boat assembly yards was now undertaken the effect of this action on the attacks on the vital oil targets would be unacceptable. Both the oil targets and the submarine targets necessitated visual bombing and there were very few days in the month available for such operations in Northwest Europe at the present time of year. His proposal was that the "marginal effort" should be used against submarine targets and explained that such a decision would mean that, when an attack against an oil target had been ordered and it was found that the weather over the oil target prevented visual bombing, the aircraft concerned would

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<sup>11</sup> These three papers are not printed herein, but see coverage of these subjects in the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister at Yalta, *post*, p. 828.



divert their efforts to a submarine target if one existed with clear weather over it.

He felt it right to point out that the issuance of the draft directive proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff would not materially increase the weight of bombs dropped on submarine targets.

GENERAL KUTER said that some directive on the subject of the submarine menace would be valuable in focusing attention upon it.

ADMIRAL KING said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should record their views with regard to the submarine menace and issue a directive on the action to be taken to counter it.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that the Naval Staff would have liked to see some additional emphasis being placed on the bombing of submarine targets. He had, however, been convinced that the attacks on oil targets would in fact pay a more valuable dividend.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then considered the summary of countermeasures set out in C. C. S. 774 and 774/2. It was agreed that the action proposed in paragraph 10 of this paper should be communicated to the appropriate authorities in the form of a directive.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Took note of C. C. S. 774/1 and agreed to review this paper on 1 April 1945.

b. Directed the Secretaries to draft and circulate for approval a directive based on C. C. S. 774 and C. C. S. 774/2.

#### 7. STRATEGY IN NORTHWEST EUROPE (C. C. S. 761/5 and 761/6)

In closed session,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of SCAF 180, as amended by SCAF 194 of 31 January, and as amplified by Message No. S-77211 of 31 January to General Smith.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> See *ante*, p. 464, footnote 8.

J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*

TOP SECRET

[MALTA,] 1 February 1945.

C. C. S. 768/1 (ARGONAUT)

#### EQUIPMENT FOR ALLIED AND LIBERATED FORCES

1. In the 183d Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 31 January 1945 the British Chiefs of Staff indicated the urgency for implementing action during the current conference covering the

forming of a Greek Army to take over responsibility for internal security within Greece as set forth in NAF 841, 25 January 1945.<sup>1</sup>

2. It is noted that no difficulty is anticipated in meeting the phased requirements for the bulk of the items from British resources in or "due in" the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, but that all issues made for this purpose will require replacement.

3. The categories of supply required for either initial issue or replacement purposes involve many classes of equipment presently in or approaching a short supply position in the United States.

4. The Combined Administrative Committee is presently studying the problem of equipping Allied and liberated manpower in northwestern Europe. This program involves the provision of necessary matériel for:—

*a.* The French Metropolitan Rearmament Program of eight divisions and supporting troops.

*b.* The Polish 2d Division.

*c.* Six Belgium infantry brigades.

*d.* Internal security, mobile military labor, and miscellaneous units (Liberated Manpower Program) aggregating 460,000 troops.

5. The United States have assumed responsibility for supplying those requirements requested from United States resources for the French Metropolitan Rearmament Program, and initial shipments thereon are now in progress. It has been tentatively agreed that the British will accept responsibility for supplying the 2d Polish Division and the six Belgium brigades. It has been proposed on the United States side that necessary equipment for liberated manpower program be also a British responsibility with the understanding that special equipment required for labor units to perform designated projects will be provided by the United Kingdom or the United States for those projects in the sphere of their respective armies. No finalized action on this latter program has been possible on the subcommittee level because of the inability of the British members to secure advice from London.

6. Until the program covering equipment for Allied and liberated manpower in northwestern Europe is resolved, it is impracticable to make a determination of availability of United States equipment to meet any commitments necessary to implement the Greek Army proposal.

7. The subject of providing equipment for additional liberated manpower has been under study since early November. In view of the desirability of making maximum use of liberated manpower in northwestern Europe at the earliest practicable date, as emphasized

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

by General Eisenhower in SCAF 193, dated 30 January 1945,<sup>2</sup> the United States Chiefs of Staff request that the British Chiefs of Staff take such action as is necessary to insure an early solution to this problem.

8. Pending a satisfactory resolution of the program covering the equipping of Allied and liberated forces in northwestern Europe, the United States Chiefs of Staff can make no commitments of United States resources towards implementing the proposed Greek Army. They have no objection, however, to the implementation of this program provided that the British Chiefs of Staff can give assurances that such implementation will not interfere with the provision already approved in principle of equipment for Allied and liberated forces in northwestern Europe and without subsequent direct or indirect charges against United States resources.

9. Upon resolution of the problem of equipment for Allied and liberated forces of northwestern Europe, the United States Chiefs of Staff will be glad to review NAF 841 again.

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<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

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J. C. S. Files]

*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff*

TOP SECRET

[MALTA,] 31 January 1945.

C. C. S. 747/7 (ARGONAUT)

ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES BETWEEN INDIA-BURMA AND  
CHINA THEATERS

1. The British Chiefs of Staff fully recognise the importance and magnitude of the United States commitments to China, both political and military.

2. They trust that the United States Chiefs of Staff will also recognise the political and military importance of the British stake in operations in Burma.

3. The circumstances in which the British Chiefs of Staff accepted without discussion in conference the United States reservation stated in C. C. S. 308<sup>1</sup> no longer apply. A year ago, British land forces were not committed to operations in which their security was dependent to the same extent upon air transportation as it is now. Moreover, the situation in China was not such as to demand such urgent increase of the Fourteenth Air Force as to preclude prior discussion. It was more a question of taking advantage of opportunities in China rather than of warding off dangers.

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

4. In present circumstances, the British Chiefs of Staff feel bound to reopen the question and to ask that no transfer of forces to the China Theatre from the India-Burma Theatre which is not acceptable to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command should be made without the agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The British Chiefs of Staff are very ready to discuss means of reducing to an absolute minimum the time occupied in discussion of projected moves.

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**STETTINIUS-CHURCHILL-EDEN DINNER MEETING, FEBRUARY 1, 1945,  
EVENING, ON BOARD H. M. S. "ORION" IN GRAND HARBOR**

**PRESENT**

**UNITED STATES**

Secretary Stettinius  
Mr. Hopkins

**UNITED KINGDOM**

Prime Minister Churchill  
Foreign Secretary Eden  
Sir Alexander Cadogan

*Editorial Note*

The only record of the substance of this meeting that has been found is in Stettinius, pp. 67-68. The meeting lasted until "almost midnight". The information given here as to the meeting and the participants is taken from Stettinius, p. 67.

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**FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1945**

**MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, FEBRUARY 2, 1945, 10 A. M.,  
MONTGOMERY HOUSE**

**PRESENT**

General of the Army Marshall  
Fleet Admiral King  
Major General Kuter  
Lieutenant General Somervell  
Vice Admiral Cooke  
Rear Admiral Duncan  
Rear Admiral McCormick  
Major General Bull  
Major General Anderson  
Major General Hull

Major General Wood  
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser  
Brigadier General Cabell  
Brigadier General Lindsay  
Captain Stroop  
Captain McDill  
Colonel Peck  
Colonel Dean  
Colonel Lincoln  
Colonel Cary

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General McFarland  
Captain Graves

J. C. S. Files

*Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

1. *a.* APPROVAL OF MINUTES OF THE J. C. S. 185TH MEETING<sup>2</sup>

GENERAL KUTER stated that his remarks on British participation in the VLR bombing of Japan had been omitted from the minutes of the preceding Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting. Since then he had received a letter on this subject from Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the British Air Staff, which he had forwarded to General Arnold with certain comments of his own. He requested for the purpose of record, that his message to General Arnold (CRICKET 55, dated 1 February 1945), less the last sentence, be attached as an annex to the minutes of the J. C. S. 185th Meeting.<sup>3</sup>

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the minutes of the J. C. S. 185th Meeting, subject to the attachment requested by General Kuter.

*b.* APPROVAL OF MINUTES OF THE C. C. S. 184TH MEETING<sup>4</sup>

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the conclusions of the C. C. S. 184th Meeting and approve the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.

2. STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN  
(C. C. S. 773/1 and 773/2)<sup>5</sup>

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the principal issue in this item was the transfer of the Twelfth Air Force. Air Marshal Portal had stated that he was opposed to leaving the adjustments to the theater commanders. General Marshall felt that it was undesirable to allow this matter to lapse and thus delay action on the transfer of ground forces. He proposed the substitution for paragraph 5, page 3 of C. C. S. 773/1 of the following:

“5. Two fighter groups of Twelfth Air Force will be moved to France at once. Combined Chiefs of Staff intend to move to France in the near future as much of the Twelfth Air Force as can be released without hazard to the accomplishment of your mission. Your recommendations are desired at once.”

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he felt the Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide the overall strength that should be withdrawn from the Twelfth Air Force for use in France and that the details of the withdrawal should be left to negotiations between SCAEF and

<sup>1</sup> J. C. S. 186th Meeting.<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 492-496.<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 496-497.<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, pp. 516-522.<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

SACMED. He felt that it might be necessary to debate the necessity for a larger part of the air force remaining in an inactive theater.

ADMIRAL KING felt that the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean was considering the use of air in as great strength as possible in the event of a German withdrawal.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to recommend the substitution in the directive to SACMED of the new paragraph 5 proposed by General Marshall.

### 3. PROVISION OF LVT'S FOR MEDITERRANEAN

### 4. EQUIPMENT FOR ALLIED AND LIBERATED FORCES (C. C. S. 768/1) <sup>6</sup>

GENERAL MARSHALL said that this subject had been discussed in the preceding J. C. S. meeting (185th Meeting, 1 February 1945). General Smith had exhibited charts which showed that very little progress had been made in the provision of equipment for the approved figure of 460,000 liberated manpower. He recalled that a possible reduction in this figure had been mentioned and invited any further remarks on the subject.

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that General Smith had informed General Riddell-Webster that a figure of 400,000 liberated manpower instead of 460,000 would be acceptable. The British had found that certain items of equipment, particularly shoes, were in short supply. They would, however, be able to provide for the lower figure. The overall problem of supply was extremely difficult. The figure of 172,000 liberated manpower agreed at OCTAGON had gradually increased to an overall of 1,000,000. The British had increased their commitments which included the equipment of Yugoslavs, Greeks, and some of the liberated manpower. The supply can be accomplished but not in a reasonable length of time.

GENERAL BULL felt that the only satisfactory solution to the problem was to reduce the requirements to fit the supplies available. This was especially desirable in order to avoid the bad feeling which would result from the arousing of false hopes.

GENERAL SOMERVELL added that it might be possible to meet the requirements in phases starting with the figure of 300,000 and completing the remainder subject to the availability of equipment.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of the foregoing statements.

### 5. U-BOAT THREAT

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the directive before the Joint Chiefs of Staff on countermeasures to the U-boat threat had been

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, pp. 522-524.

prepared by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in accordance with Item 6, C. C. S. 184th Meeting.<sup>7</sup>

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to recommend approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the directive drafted by the Secretaries.

6. REVIEW OF CARGO SHIPPING  
(C. C. S. 746/7,<sup>8</sup> 746/8,<sup>9</sup> 746/9, and 746/10<sup>10</sup>)

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board<sup>11</sup> had on their own initiative submitted in C. C. S. 746/10 a supplementary report to C. C. S. 746/6. He recommended approval subject to the deletion of the word "other" in the fourth line of paragraph 5 *b*.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to recommend approval of C. C. S. 746/10 by the Combined Chiefs of Staff subject to the amendment proposed by General Marshall.

7. LEVELS OF SUPPLY OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN U. K. AND  
NORTHWESTERN EUROPE

. . . . .

8. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS  
(C. C. S. 775)<sup>12</sup>

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in C. C. S. 775 the British Chiefs of Staff recommend that the basic undertakings agreed upon at OCTAGON and set out in C. C. S. 680/2<sup>13</sup> be reaffirmed subject to the amendment of paragraph *h* as indicated in this paper.

ADMIRAL DUNCAN said that the Joint Staff Planners recommended the amendment of the first and last sentences of the paragraph in order to prevent the supply of liberated areas from being placed in the same category as the supply of allies such as France, Russia or China.

GENERAL SOMERVELL explained that unless the last sentence of the proposed new paragraph is altered or deleted altogether, it will if

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, pp. 521-522.

<sup>8</sup> *Post*, pp. 536-537.

<sup>9</sup> Not printed as such. For the Hopkins-Law "Memorandum of Agreement" of January 14, 1945, and the supplementary letter of Law to Hopkins of the same date, copies of which were enclosures to C. C. S. 746/8, see *ante*, pp. 420-422. See also the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President, January 30, 1945, *post*, pp. 534-538.

<sup>10</sup> Not printed.

<sup>11</sup> In January 1942 the United States and the United Kingdom formed the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board for the purpose of utilizing as effectively as possible the vessels under the control of the Allied nations. The Board consisted of two panels, one in Washington, with officials of the War Shipping Administration, under Admiral Land, primarily responsible for vessels operating in the American pool, and the other in London, with the British Ministry of War Transport, under Lord Leathers, responsible for the British pool of vessels.

<sup>12</sup> *Post*, p. 539.

<sup>13</sup> See *post*, p. 539, footnote 1.

accepted have the effect of giving first priority to shipping requirements for liberated areas. This would place shipments of civilian requirements ahead of British and American military requirements which, of course, could not be accepted. He recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff accept the substitute paragraph subject to deletion of the last sentence. If the British would not accept deletion of the last sentence, the amendments proposed by Admiral Duncan might then be put forward as a compromise.

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that the first line of the last sentence be deleted and that the phrase "without prejudice to the fulfillment of other basic undertakings" precede the words "to provide" in the remainder of the sentence.

After further discussion,

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that paragraph *h* be modified to read:

"Provide assistance to each of the forces of the liberated areas in Europe as can fulfill an active and effective role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able to apply this assistance against the enemy powers in the present war. Without prejudice to the fulfillment of the other basic undertakings to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the war-making capacity against Germany and Japan."

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MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, FEBRUARY 2, 1945,  
NOON, MONTGOMERY HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

General of the Army Marshall  
Fleet Admiral King  
Major General Kuter  
Lieutenant General Somervell  
Lieutenant General Smith  
Vice Admiral Cooke  
Rear Admiral McCormick  
Major General Bull  
Major General Anderson  
Major General Hull  
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser  
Brigadier General Cabell <sup>1</sup>

UNITED KINGDOM

Field Marshal Brooke  
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal  
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham  
Field Marshal Wilson  
Field Marshal Alexander <sup>1</sup>  
General Ismay  
Admiral Somerville  
General Riddell-Webster <sup>2</sup>  
Air Marshal Robb  
Major General Laycock

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General McFarland  
Captain Graves

Major General Jacob  
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones  
Commander Coleridge

<sup>1</sup> Present for items 1-5 only.

<sup>2</sup> Present for items 1-4 only.



J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*<sup>3</sup>

TOP SECRET

1. APPROVAL OF MINUTES OF C. C. S. 184TH MEETING<sup>4</sup>

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the C. C. S. 184th Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.

2. EQUIPMENT FOR ALLIED AND LIBERATED FORCES  
(C. C. S. 768/1)<sup>5</sup>

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he understood that the question of equipment for Allied and liberated forces had been under discussion by General Somervell and General Riddell-Webster. It was understood that the requirement for internal security for mobile military labor and miscellaneous units could be cut from a total commitment of 460,000 to 400,000 and equipped on the scale of British forces rather than a United States scale—a commitment which he believed that the British could undertake. It would however be necessary to confirm this with the War Office, which would be done as quickly as possible.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

*a.* Took note that SCAEF's requirements in liberated manpower could be reduced from 460,000 to 400,000.

*b.* Agreed to the implementation of the proposals in NAF 841<sup>6</sup> upon assurance by the British Chiefs of Staff that, subject to confirmation from London, this implementation would not:—

(1) Interfere with the provision already affirmed in principle of equipment, on the scale for British forces, for Allied and liberated forces in Northwest Europe, nor

(2) Result in subsequent direct or indirect charges against U. S. resources.

3. REVIEW OF CARGO SHIPPING  
(C. C. S. 746/8<sup>7</sup> and C. C. S. 746/10<sup>6</sup>)

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested the substitution of the word "some" for the word "present" in the first sentence of paragraph 4 of the enclosure to C. C. S. 746/10. With regard to paragraph 6 *d.*, he felt that it should be made clear that the shipping and resources annex to the final report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at ARGONAUT should

<sup>3</sup> C. C. S. 185th Meeting.<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, pp. 516-522.<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, pp. 522-524.<sup>6</sup> Not printed.<sup>7</sup> See *ante* p. 528, footnote 9.

be completed before the conference ended. To enable this to be achieved it would be necessary for the shipping team to go to MAGNETO unless it could be definitely decided that the conference would be continued at CRICKET after the MAGNETO discussions had been concluded. It was generally agreed that the shipping staffs should remain at CRICKET.

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested the deletion of the word "other" before the word "programs" in paragraph 5 *b*.

Turning to C. C. S. 746/8, SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff accepted the proposals put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff, provided that a sentence could be added to paragraph 4 to make it clear that coordination should also be effected with the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

*a.* Approved C. C. S. 746/10 subject to the substitution of "some" for "present" in the first line of paragraph 4 and the deletion of "other" in the fourth line of paragraph 5 *b*.

*b.* Approved the recommendation of the United States Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 4 of C. C. S. 746/8 subject to the addition to that paragraph of the following:

"Coordination should also be effected with the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board."

*c.* Agreed that during the absence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in ARGONAUT, the shipping staffs would continue their studies at CRICKET with a view to the submission of a report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff prior to the conclusion of ARGONAUT.<sup>8</sup>

#### 4. LEVELS OF SUPPLY OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN U. K. AND NORTHWEST EUROPE

#### 5. TRANSFER OF TACTICAL AIR FORCES FROM SACMED TO SCAEF (C. C. S. 773/1 and 773/2)<sup>9</sup>

GENERAL MARSHALL said that as he saw it the British proposal left the matter of the transfer of aircraft open for consideration later. He felt that the two commanders concerned should be allowed to negotiate direct. He considered that the Twelfth Air Force should

<sup>8</sup> Admiral Land and Lord Leathers were both present at the Malta Conference, where they discussed problems of shipping. Although no minutes or other first-hand record of their discussions has been found, Prime Minister Churchill referred to the importance and the difficulties of their negotiations in an address to the House of Commons on February 27, 1945 (*Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th ser., vol. 408, cols. 1268-1269). The final decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on shipping were set forth in the report at Yalta to the President and the Prime Minister, *post*, p. 831.

<sup>9</sup> Not printed.

move to Northwest Europe, which was the decisive theater in which additional air power would produce the most valuable results. A move of the tactical air force to the southern part of the line in France was complementary to the British Chiefs of Staff's desire to strengthen the northern thrust.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt that the offensive on the Western Front would be assisted by action on the Italian Front.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that there was considerable air strength in Italy. He agreed that the final decision on moves should be taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff but felt that the commanders should consult and put up agreed proposals.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he felt a valuable opportunity might be afforded us in Italy if the enemy started to withdraw. In such an event the United States' P-47's would be of the utmost help in cutting communications beyond the limits of the shorter ranged British fighters. He pointed out that the tactical air forces comprised 4,300 aircraft on the Western Front as opposed to 1,950 in the Mediterranean; including strategic air forces there were 9,000 aircraft on the Western Front as opposed to 3,580 in the Mediterranean.

There was another point involved: the move of the tactical air force to France might interfere with the agreed troop movement. The commander concerned must of course say which he required first, but there were also political factors involved. The public were more impressed with the number of divisions taking part in a battle than with the number of aircraft. It seemed to him that to withhold a movement of the tactical air force for the present fitted in well with this political consideration since the divisions could move to France first, thus leaving the tactical air force in Italy to exploit any opportunity which arose. However, to meet the views put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff he was prepared to accept a liberal interpretation of the words "substantial reduction" in paragraph 2 of C. C. S. 773/2. This he felt should not be allowed to rule out the immediate move of the two fighter-bomber groups particularly required by General Eisenhower. He understood that such a move was agreeable to Field Marshal Alexander and would leave three fighter-bomber groups in Italy. He understood, however, that it was important that the headquarters of the Twelfth Air Force should remain in Italy since they administered and controlled the medium bombers and troop carriers of the Twelfth Air Force.

GENERAL MARSHALL said he understood that the 6th Army Group was inadequately supplied with air staffs and that the headquarters of the Twelfth Air Force was important to them.

GENERAL KUTER said that he personally felt that the whole of the Twelfth Air Force should be transferred to France to assist in the

main effort. All this force should be made available to General Eisenhower to move when he required it.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the French forces in the South were inadequately provided with air support and the air forces in question were urgently required for the reduction of the Colmar pocket.

SIR ALAN BROOKE felt that when this pocket had been eliminated the Allied line in this sector would be very strong.

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER said he was anxious to retain the Twelfth Air Force headquarters but he had many able officers in the theater from among whom he would be glad to provide General Eisenhower a new air headquarters in southern France.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, contained in C. C. S. 773/1 subject to the substitution of the following for the existing paragraph 5:

“5. Two fighter groups of the Twelfth Air Force will be moved to France at once. The Combined Chiefs of Staff intend to move to France in the near future as much of the Twelfth Air Force as can be released without hazard to your mission. You should consult with SCAEF and submit agreed proposals for confirmation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.”

#### 6. PROVISION OF LVT'S FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN

#### 7. U-BOAT THREAT

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a draft directive prepared by the Secretariat in accordance with Conclusion 6 *b.* of the C. C. S. 184th Meeting.<sup>10</sup>

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the draft directive submitted by the Secretaries and invited the United States and British Chiefs of Staff to dispatch it to all appropriate commanders. (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 774/3.<sup>11</sup>)

#### 8. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS (C. C. S. 775)<sup>12</sup>

In reply to a question from Sir Alan Brooke, GENERAL MARSHALL outlined the strategic reasons which rendered the maintenance of Russian goodwill of such vital importance. He appreciated, however, the importance of insuring also that a state of affairs did not arise in France which would hinder our operations based on that country.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then discussed the effect of various proposals to amend the basic undertakings contained in paragraph

<sup>10</sup> *Ante*, pp. 521-522.

<sup>11</sup> Not printed.

<sup>12</sup> *Post*, p. 539.

6 *h.* of the interim report to the President and Prime Minister (C. C. S. 776<sup>13</sup>).

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that the British proposal would introduce a new category of basic undertakings which would affect the availability of shipping for military operations. He recalled the difficult decision which had been necessitated when, in considering the timing of operations against the Bonins and Ryukyus, a deficiency of some forty sailings had arisen. Simultaneously, a demand for an additional forty ships to increase the bread ration in Italy had been put forward.

GENERAL SOMERVELL pointed out that requirements to prevent disease and unrest and requirements to implement the U. S. military manufacturing programs in liberated areas were already included under the military shipping requirements.

After further discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Deferred action on this subject.

9. INTERIM REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER  
(C. C. S. 776)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF agreed that paragraph 6 *h.* of C. C. S. 776 should be left blank with a notation to the effect that it was still under discussion.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that the paragraph dealing with cargo shipping could not yet be inserted since British acceptance of C. C. S. 746/10<sup>14</sup> was conditional upon the rewording of paragraph 6 *h.* of the interim report along the lines indicated in C. C. S. 775.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the draft interim report as amended during the discussion.

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<sup>13</sup> Not printed as such. For the text as it appeared in the final report, see *post*, p. 828.

<sup>14</sup> Not printed.

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Roosevelt Papers

*The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President*

TOP SECRET

Nr: No #.

MALTA, 30 January 1945.

Top Secret memorandum for the President.

Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Law in their memorandum of agreement concerning shipping for liberated areas<sup>1</sup> made the recommendation that the military and civilian authorities of the respective govern-

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, pp. 420-422.

ments be ready to make recommendations to their heads of government at the coming conference concerning the allocation of shipping. The British Chiefs of Staff have twice been asked to reaffirm the overall objective of bringing about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan and the overall strategic concept of beating Germany first while simultaneously extending unremitting pressure against Japan, followed by concentration of full U. S.-U. K. resources on Japan. Twice the British Chiefs of Staff have conditioned their continued acceptance of these basic agreements with the statement that this acceptance is subject to any decisions concerning shipping at the coming conference.

The United States Chiefs of Staff are seriously concerned over the present determined effort to divert shipping to non-military uses, with the resulting effect on our military operations, and over the implied willingness of the British to consider qualifying our objective of ending the war at the earliest possible date. Extensive technical shipping studies show a considerable deficit in cargo shipping during the next 6 months. The United States Chiefs of Staff believe that even the present estimated deficits are optimistic. Stated requirements of the United States Theater Commanders have been carefully reviewed in Washington and it is felt they have been cut to the bone; perhaps cut further than will prove, in fact, acceptable if we are to stick to the principle of finishing the war as quickly as possible. Furthermore, the availability of shipping has been computed on a loss rate which did not allow for the Germans attaining any degree of success in the campaign they may launch with their new fast submarines.

The Chiefs of Staff consider that the issue is now clear. The decision lies between continuing unqualified priority to beating Germany and Japan or compromising this policy by diverting to non-military programs shipping essential to military operations. Any compromise almost certainly means prolongation of the war. Any unnecessary prolongation means ever-increasing pressure and demands for more diversions to non-military purposes. The overriding objection from the military standpoint to these proposals which amount to slowing down our military effort is that the price is paid directly in the unnecessary loss of the lives of many American fighting men and also in expenditure of American resources. The Chiefs of Staff know of no reason sufficiently pressing to justify the acceptance of such an extra and, what appears to them, unnecessary cost.

The military necessity for essential Civil Affairs supplies has always been recognized and these are included under the theater commander's military priorities. There is no doubt that more shipping and supplies are desirable for rehabilitation to help out the liberated peoples.

At best this could be only a trickle. The sound and quickest step toward giving the aid wanted is to end the war quickly. The Chiefs of Staff recognize that considerations other than military may dictate some small allocations of shipping to non-military purposes in a priority above everything but urgent military necessity.

Before working out the details of shipping allocations it is essential to have certain basic principles agreed. The United States Chiefs of Staff have in the attached memorandum presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff proposed recommendations to the heads of State as to what these principles should be. It is considered that material change in the spirit of these principles may well result in prolonging the war with all the costs consequent thereto.

Attachment]

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*

TOP SECRET  
C. C. S. 746/7

[MALTA,] 30 January 1945.

After considering C. C. S. 746/6 <sup>2</sup> the United States Chiefs of Staff agree that additional relief supplies and home rehabilitation for liberated areas are most desirable. They consider, however, the basic truth is that the best help we can possibly give the populations of liberated territories in Europe or elsewhere is to win the war as quickly as possible following out the over-all objective which has been agreed up to this time. The principles for allocation of shipping proposed by the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board Representatives in C. C. S. 746/6 can gravely lower our military effectiveness and may jeopardize complete victory. The vital military point involved to the United States Chiefs of Staff is the cost in American lives which would almost certainly result from placing non-military requirements in a priority where they could compete with military needs essential to ending the global war successfully at the earliest date.

A definite but secondary consideration is the cost in money and resources to the United States resulting from any prolongation of the war. The effect of any let-up in our maximum military pressure or any delay in operations is much more than the actual number of days' delay to a particular operation which would result from acceding to a demand for resources to rehabilitate liberated areas. It means we lose our momentum and give the enemy time to recoup his losses and build up his resistance with consequent unnecessary cost in American blood and resources. As to the Thesis of the British representatives of the combined military transportation committee that cuts in esti-

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<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

mates for operations can be made without adverse effects on those operations, the U. S. has already reviewed its military requirements and made a major cut below the theater commander's minimum estimates. If anything the minimum U. S. military requirements may prove to be higher than contained in the study to date.

The United States Chiefs of Staff recognize the military necessity for preventing disease and unrest among the liberated areas and continue to subscribe to a policy under which the theater commander includes essential civil affairs supplies in his military priorities.

They recognize that there may be consideration other than military so over-riding as to justify at times some small allocation of shipping for rehabilitation of liberated areas, regardless of routine military requirements, but however subject always to cancellation due to urgent military necessity.

Before the Combined Military Transportation Committee in collaboration with the Combined Shipping authorities can proceed with the allocation of shipping, made particularly difficult by the present apparent large deficit, it is essential for them to have basic principles agreed for their guidance. It is recommended that insofar as liberated areas are concerned the following principle be recommended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the heads of government:

Provision of resources for liberated areas will not be at the expense of current and projected operations to press the war to its earliest successful conclusion.

It is further recommended that the following be presented to the heads of government as guiding principles in working out the details of shipping allocation:

A. First priority to

(1) Military requirements (including civil relief) vital to the successful conduct of current and projected operations in accordance with agreed strategic concepts. This may include military lend-lease for existing forces engaged in operations.

(2) Increasing the fighting forces of the United Nations in order to apply greater pressure against the Axis powers.

(3) Civilian requirements that are vital to the maintenance of the war making capacity of the United Nations.

B. Second priority to civilian programs desirable but not essential to the war making capacity of the United Nations. This includes rehabilitation of liberated areas beyond that envisaged in civil relief under A above of direct value to the war making capacity of the United Nations.

C. Third priority to military requirements necessary for stockpiling not directly contributory to any approved or projected operation under the agreed strategic concepts.



D. Last priority to civil economy requirements which only indirectly affect the war effort.

3 [E]. Requirements in higher priorities will, in general, be filled before any in lower priorities.

F. So long as military requirements are not met in full shipping for civilian programs will not be allocated without prior consultation with the Chiefs of Staff.

G. Deficits will be absorbed on as broad a base as practicable within the above guidance in order that the incidence of limited shipping availability on programs essential to the military effort may be minimized.

H. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will decide priority classification of military requirements. Appropriate civilian agencies will decide the priority classification of civilian requirements.

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740.0011 EW/1-2745 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, February 1, 1945.]

U.S. URGENT

To the Secretary of State from Clayton.<sup>1</sup>

Reference Russian attitude towards Agreement on shipping control. On August 5, 1944 Belgium, Canada, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, United Kingdom and the United States of America signed an Agreement on Principles looking towards continued control of all merchant shipping until after the war with Japan.<sup>2</sup>

Because of its position as a maritime nation, special consideration was given to the accession of Sweden to this Agreement. In the negotiations with respect to Swedish accession, it has become apparent that Russia has intimated to Sweden that it would prefer Sweden not to adhere to the Agreement. This will probably not deter Sweden from signing, but Sweden is concerned about Russian attitude in light of general relations with the Soviet Union.

The Norwegian Government-in-Exile, a member of the shipping control, is worried also about the unfavorable Russian attitude towards the Shipping Agreement. Trygve Lie, Foreign Minister of Norway, has been to Stockholm to discuss the matter with Mr. Gunther,

<sup>1</sup> In the text of this message in the Defense Files, the words "from Grew" follow at this point, the words "This is Message 8" are at the end of the first paragraph, and the words "(ALLSTATE-HORSESHOE)" are at the end of the third paragraph.

<sup>2</sup> For the text of this agreement, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1722, or 61 Stat. (4) 3784.

Swedish Foreign Minister, and subsequent thereto went to Moscow to discuss the matter.

Those of our people who have been working on the Agreement tell us that Lord Leathers, head of Ministry of War Transport at London, has made several attempts to explain the Shipping Agreement to Russian officials in London. He believes that the full information has not been forwarded to Moscow. Ambassador Winant is reported also inclined to this view. The consensus is that the Russians are suspicious of any arrangements which look like a combine of other powers with post-war implications, and are uncertain of their ability to maintain position in negotiations relating to problems with which they have had relatively little experience. Another factor which may affect the Soviet attitude is the participation of the Polish Government-in-Exile in the Shipping Agreement.

It is believed that a joint approach by the United States and Great Britain should be made directly to Stalin to fully explain the Agreement, its intents and purposes, to clear up any misunderstandings. Through Mr. Harriman, Russia was kept informed of the preliminary negotiations and of the Agreement reached.

Admiral Land is familiar with this matter.

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J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff*

TOP SECRET  
C. C. S. 775

[MALTA,] 1 February 1945.

BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The British Chiefs of Staff recommend that the basic undertakings agreed upon at OCTAGON and set out in C. C. S. 680/2,<sup>1</sup> paragraph 6, be reaffirmed, subject to the following amendment.

For existing *h.* substitute the following:—

“*h.* Continue assistance to the forces of the liberated areas in Europe to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance against the Enemy Powers in the present war. Within the limits of our available resources to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the war-making capacity of the United Nations.”

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<sup>1</sup> This paper came from the Quebec Conference of 1944. The text as amended and reaffirmed appears in the report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister at Yalta, *post*, p. 828.

**ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, FEBRUARY 2, 1945,  
1 P. M., ON BOARD THE U. S. S. "QUINCY" IN GRAND HARBOR**

## PRESENT

## UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Mrs. Boettiger  
Secretary Stettinius  
Fleet Admiral Leahy  
Mr. Byrnes

## UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Mrs. Oliver  
Foreign Secretary Eden

*Editorial Note*

The only record of the substance of this meeting that has been found is in Stettinius, pp. 70-72, plus a few words in Byrnes, p. 22, and in Leahy, p. 294. The information given here as to the time of the meeting and the participants is taken from the Log, *ante*, p. 461, supplemented by Stettinius, p. 70. According to Byrnes, p. 22, there were "ten of us" at this luncheon; but Leahy, p. 294, and Stettinius, p. 70, both name only eight.

**MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT  
AND CHURCHILL, FEBRUARY 2, 1945, 6 P. M., ON BOARD THE  
U. S. S. "QUINCY" IN GRAND HARBOR<sup>1</sup>**

## PRESENT

## UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Fleet Admiral Leahy  
General of the Army Marshall  
Fleet Admiral King  
Major General Kuter

## UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Field Marshal Brooke  
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal  
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham  
Field Marshal Wilson  
General Ismay

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General McFarland

Major General Jacob

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

## TOP SECRET

THE MEETING had under consideration an interim report to the President and the Prime Minister by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C. C. S. 776/1<sup>2</sup>).

<sup>1</sup> According to King, p. 586, the meeting began at 5 p. m., and according to Leahy, p. 295, it began at 5:30 p. m.; but the C. C. S. minutes indicate that it began at 6 p. m., and the Log, *ante*, p. 462, states that it began at 6 p. m. and adjourned at 6:50 p. m.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed as such; but see the final report, C. C. S. 776/3, dated February 9, 1945, *post*, pp. 827-833.

THE PRESIDENT expressed his appreciation of the amount of progress which had been made in so short a time in the military discussions.

The report was then considered paragraph by paragraph.

*a. Paragraph 6 h.*

THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER were informed that discussion was proceeding upon the wording of the basic undertaking to be included in this paragraph.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the wording proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff<sup>3</sup> raised a new question which involved placing supplies for liberated areas, over and above those required for the prevention of disease and unrest, in the same category as operational requirements. This would entail a change in the general priority at the expense of essential military requirements, which the United States Chiefs of Staff were disinclined to accept.

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired whether the British import program would be affected. He pointed out that Great Britain had had less than half her pre-war imports for over five years, and he was afraid lest the requirements of liberated areas, and even certain of the military requirements, would necessitate a reduction in the tonnage which it was hoped to import into Great Britain in 1945.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the wording of the proposed basic undertaking was still under discussion, and the matter was not submitted for consideration at the present meeting.

THE PRIME MINISTER, referring to paragraph 6 *f.*, thought that great efforts should now be made to pass supplies to Russia via the Dardanelles.

ADMIRAL KING said that this was all in hand and the first convoy was expected to go through on 15 February. The delay had been caused by the fact that the port of Odessa had not previously been ready to receive the supplies.

*b. The U-Boat War (paragraphs 7 and 8)*

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed his agreement with this paragraph. He thought the time had not yet come to take drastic measures at the expense of other operations, though it might be necessary to do so if the U-boat campaign developed in the way expected.

*c. Operations in Northwest Europe (paragraphs 9 and 10)*

THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER were informed that complete agreement had been reached on this question.

THE PRIME MINISTER referred to the importance of having plenty of divisions available for the support of the main operation in the North, so that tired divisions could be replaced.

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<sup>3</sup> C. C. S. 775, *ante*, p. 539.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that this had been allowed for. Ten divisions would be in reserve and available to replace tired divisions in the battle. Other divisions could also be taken from the less active parts of the front.

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired what action had been taken on SCAF 180.<sup>4</sup>

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had taken note of this telegram. General Bedell Smith had given further explanations of General Eisenhower's proposed operations,<sup>5</sup> and two further telegrams had been received from the latter.<sup>6</sup> SCAF 180 should be read in the light of these additional explanations and telegrams.

THE PRIME MINISTER questioned the meaning of the words "to close the Rhine" which occurred in paragraph 10 of the report.

It was explained that these words were a quotation from General Eisenhower's signal, and were understood to mean making contact with, or closing up to, the Rhine.

*d. Strategy in the Mediterranean (paragraphs 11, 12, and 13)*

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether the Combined Chiefs of Staff were satisfied that if the forces proposed were withdrawn from the Italian Front, enough troops would be left behind for the task in hand.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that Field Marshal Alexander had been consulted and had agreed to the withdrawal of three divisions forthwith, and two further divisions as soon as they could be released from Greece.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that there should be no obligation to take forces away from Greece until the situation there admitted of their withdrawal. It was necessary to build up a Greek National Army under a broad-based government.

SIR ALAN BROOKE drew attention to paragraph 4 of the proposed directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (Appendix "A"<sup>7</sup> to the report), in which it was stated that further complete formations after the first three divisions would be sent as they could be released from Greece.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he expected that by the time the first three divisions had moved it would be possible to start withdrawing troops from Greece. He was in full agreement with the course proposed, and was particularly glad that General Marshall had taken the view that Canadian and British troops should be withdrawn.

<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, p. 464, footnote 8.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, pp. 471-474.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. One of these "two further telegrams" agreed to Smith's rewording of Eisenhower's plan of operations (see *ante*, p. 464, footnote 8); the other telegram has not been identified.

<sup>7</sup> See appendix A to the final report, *post*, pp. 832-833.

There were special reasons for desiring the transfer to France of the Canadian Corps. He was also anxious that the British contribution to the heavy fighting which would be taking place in Northwest Europe should be as great as possible.

In reply to an inquiry by the President, SIR HENRY MAITLAND WILSON said that he was in complete agreement with the course proposed.

With regard to the proposed withdrawal of air forces, SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained, in reply to an inquiry by the President, that the move of five groups was in question. Two were to go now, and proposals for further moves were to be made by the Supreme Commanders in consultation.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that it would be unwise to make any significant withdrawal of amphibious assault forces from Italy, as to do so would be to relieve the Germans of an ever-present anxiety.

Referring to paragraph 7 of the proposed directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, THE PRIME MINISTER said that he attached great importance to a rapid follow-up of any withdrawal or of any surrender of the German forces in Italy. He felt it was essential that we should occupy as much of Austria as possible as it was undesirable that more of Western Europe than necessary should be occupied by the Russians.

Referring to paragraph 8 of the proposed directive, dealing with support to the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation, THE PRIME MINISTER said that he presumed that the phrase "the territory of Yugoslavia" should be interpreted to mean the existing or lawful territory of Yugoslavia. There were certain territories which were claimed by both Yugoslavia and Italy and he was unwilling to give any suggestion of support to the claims of either side. For example, Trieste ought to be a valuable outlet to Southern Europe and the question of sovereignty in that area should be entirely reserved.

THE PRESIDENT agreed and said that he was unwilling to see either the Yugoslavs or the Italians in complete control.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that the phrase as used in the report applied to the present territory of Yugoslavia.

#### THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

##### *e. Operations in Southeast Asia Command (paragraphs 18 and 19)*

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the main object of the operations to clear the enemy from Burma was to liberate the important army engaged there for further operations against Japan. He inquired whether the Staffs had come to any conclusion on what these further operations should be.

SIR ALAN BROOKE referred to Appendix "C" <sup>8</sup> of the report, which contained the proposed directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command. The directive gave as the next task the liberation of Malaya and the opening of the Straits of Malacca.

THE PRIME MINISTER hoped there would be time to review this matter in accordance with developments. For example, if the Japanese forces in Java or Sumatra were greatly weakened, small detachments might be able to go in and liberate these countries. His object, however, was to go where a good opportunity would be presented of heavy fighting with the Japanese, particularly in the air, as this was the only way which the British had been able to discover of helping the main American operations in the Pacific.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that the Supreme Allied Commander was directed to submit his plans, and it would then be possible to review the matter.

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired whether paragraph 18 meant that there would be no help from United States air forces in operations in the Kra Peninsula, Malaya, et cetera.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that any such help would be the subject of a separate agreement when the plan had been received.

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired whether the President had not been somewhat disappointed at the results achieved by the Chinese, having regard to the tremendous American efforts which had been made to give them support.

THE PRESIDENT said that three generations of education and training would be required before China could become a serious factor.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the picture in China was now considerably changed. In the first place certain well-trained Chinese troops were now in China, having been transferred there from Burma. Secondly, the opening of the Burma Road had meant that the first artillery for the Chinese Army had been able to go through. Thirdly, if operations in Burma continued to go well, additional trained Chinese troops could move back to China, and it was hoped that an effective reinforced Chinese corps would soon be in existence.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that it now appeared that the American and British operations in this part of the world were diverging. The American effort was going on into China and the British effort was turning to the south. He inquired whether any consideration had been given to the move of British or Indian divisions from Burma into China to take part in the operations there.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the facilities for sending equipment and supplies into China allowed of the support of Chinese forces, who

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See appendix C to the final report, *post*, p. 833.

required a considerably lower scale than British troops. These facilities certainly could not support British troops as well.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that the maintenance of British forces in China was not a practical proposition. There was only one reinforced United States brigade in China, which would act as a spearhead for critical operations. There was the reinforced Chinese corps, which had a stiffening of United States personnel in their tanks, armored cars, tank destroyers, et cetera, and there was an effective air force. These forces should now be able to insure that the Japanese could no longer go wherever they pleased in China. The aid which could be given by these forces to the American arrival on the Chinese Pacific Coast would be important. A pincer movement against the Japanese could in this way be initiated—one arm of the pincer being represented by the forces assaulting the selected spot on the Chinese Pacific Coast. This arm would be strong. The other arm of the pincer would be the Chinese and American forces in China. This arm would be weak, but nevertheless of value. The progress of the American main operations in the Pacific and the campaign in the Philippines had changed the picture in Southeast Asia, and would make further operations by Admiral Mountbatten's forces much easier. He felt that it was important that Admiral Mountbatten should know what forces would be available to him in these operations, and that he should not plan on a false assumption. The American military authorities in Southeast Asia would know what United States forces could at any time not be supported logistically in China. These could be made available to Admiral Mountbatten in Burma. It might even be possible to bring air forces back from China for specific operations. Admiral Mountbatten should, however, be under no illusion as to what forces he could count on for his operations.

THE PRIME MINISTER repeated that if the Americans made any request for British troops to go into China he would certainly be prepared to consider it.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that all the transportation available was fully required for the forces now in China, or earmarked for China.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed, and said that he did not think it would be practicable to increase the forces in China until a port had been secured. Up to the present it had been possible to do only a very little in the way of equipping the Chinese ground army. Nearly all the transportation had had to be used for the needs of the American air forces. It would now be possible to handle the requirements of the Chinese ground forces.

Referring to paragraph 17, and Appendix "B,"<sup>9</sup> which contained an outline of the plans and operations proposed by the United States

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<sup>9</sup> Appendix B is C. C. S. 417/11, printed *ante*, pp. 395-396.



Chiefs of Staff for the Pacific, THE PRIME MINISTER inquired whether it had been decided to delay the assault on Japan until after the close of the German war.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that this delay had been necessitated by the fact that until the German war ended, shipping, air forces, and service troops, could not be made available in sufficient quantities to enable the main operations against Japan to be carried out. If the German war had ended in December of 1944, it would have been possible to operate against Kyushu in the autumn of 1945. There were also certain seasonal limitations on operations in this area.

Summing up, THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was glad to see that such a great measure of agreement had been reached. He understood that the present report was merely designed to keep the President and himself abreast of the progress of the discussions, and that a final report would be rendered later.

THE PRESIDENT agreed, and again expressed his appreciation of the work which had been accomplished.

Discussion then turned upon the conduct of future discussions, and SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that arrangements were being made to keep all the accommodations available at Malta so that the conference could be resumed there if necessary after the discussions with the Russians.

THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER expressed their agreement with this action, and said that although final plans need not be made until later, it appeared highly probable that a short meeting at Malta on the return journey would be desirable.

THE MEETING then adjourned.

**ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL DINNER MEETING, FEBRUARY 2, 1945, 8 P. M.,  
ON BOARD THE U. S. S. "QUINCY" IN GRAND HARBOR**

**PRESENT**

UNITED STATES  
President Roosevelt  
Mrs. Boettiger  
Secretary Stettinius  
Mr. Byrnes  
Fleet Admiral Leahy

UNITED KINGDOM  
Prime Minister Churchill  
Mrs. Oliver  
Foreign Secretary Eden


*Editorial Note*

The only record of the substance of this meeting that has been found is in Stettinius, pp. 74-75, plus a few words in Churchill, p. 344, and in Leahy, p. 295. The information given here as to the meeting and the participants is taken from the Log, *ante*, p. 462.



U. S. Army photograph

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Montgomery House, Malta, January 31, 1945. Left to right: Captain Graves, Rear Admiral McCormick, Vice Admiral Cooke, Fleet Admiral King, General of the Army Marshall, Brigadier General McFarland, Major General Kuter, Lieutenant General Somervell, Major General Hull, Brigadier General Loutzenheiser, Lieutenant General Smith, Major General Anderson, Major General Bull, Commander Coleridge, Major General Laycock, Field Marshal Wilson, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal, Field Marshal Brooke, Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham, Admiral Somerville, General Ismay, Major General Jacob, Brigadier Cornwall-Jones.



U. S. Army photograph

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill aboard the U. S. S. *Quincy*  
at Malta, February 2, 1945.


PLATE 2



U. S. Army photograph

President Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in conference aboard the U. S. S. *Quincy* at Malta, February 2, 1945. Left to right: Fleet Admiral King, Fleet Admiral Leahy, President Roosevelt, General of the Army Marshall, Major General Kuter.

PLATE 3



U. S. Army photograph

Meeting of President Roosevelt with his advisers in Livadia Palace, Yalta, February 4, 1945. Left to right: Secretary Stettinius, Major General Kuter, Fleet Admiral King, General of the Army Marshall, Ambassador Harriman, Fleet Admiral Leahy, President Roosevelt.

PLATE 4



U. S. Army photograph

Plenary Meeting in Livadia Palace, Yalta, February 1945. Left to right: Sir Edward Bridges, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, vacant space (Mr. Gusev), Mr. Vyshinsky, Marshal Stalin, Mr. Pavlov (behind), Mr. Maisky, Mr. Gromyko, Fleet Admiral Leahy, Mr. Matthews (behind), Secretary Stettinius, Mr. Hiss (behind), President Roosevelt, Mr. Hopkins (behind), Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Harriman (behind), Sir Alexander Cadogan, Foreign Secretary Eden, Foreign Commissar Molotov, Major Birse, Prime Minister Churchill.



U. S. Army photograph

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Yusupov Palace, Koreiz, February 7, 1945. Left to right: Mr. Maisky, Mr. Golunsky, Mr. Gusev (behind), Foreign Commissar Molotov, Mr. Vyshinsky, Mr. Novikov, Mr. Jebb, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Mr. Dixon, Foreign Secretary Eden, Mr. Harrison, Major Theakstone, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, unidentified, Mr. Harriman, Secretary Stettinius, Mr. Hiss (behind), Mr. Page, Mr. Matthews.

PLATE 6




U. S. Army photograph

Prime Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt, and Marshal Stalin in the patio of Livadia Palace, Yalta, February 10, 1945.

PLATE 7





U. S. Army photograph

Tripartite Luncheon Meeting in Livadia Palace, Yalta, February 11, 1945. Left to right: Secretary Stettinius, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Fleet Admiral Leahy, Mr. Bohlen, vacant space (Mr. Harriman), Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, Mr. Hopkins, Foreign Secretary Eden, Mr. Pavlov, Marshal Stalin, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, Foreign Commissar Molotov, Major Birse.

PLATE 8

### III. THE YALTA CONFERENCE

February 4-11, 1945



## 7. THE PRESIDENT'S LOG AT YALTA <sup>1</sup>

White House Files

### *Log of the Trip*

*Saturday, February 3rd:*

1210: The President's plane (#1), escorted by five fighters, arrived at Saki [in the Crimea]. The fighters had joined the flight at Athens. A sixth P-38 had to turn back to Athens because of engine trouble.

At the airport to meet the President were the Honorable V. M. Molotov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Secretary of State Stettinius and Ambassador Harriman. It was explained that Marshal Stalin had not yet arrived in the Crimea.

The President did not leave his plane at once but remained embarked until the Prime Minister arrived from Malta some twenty minutes later.

Distance traveled, Malta to Saki, 1375 miles.

We were met at Saki by Agents Rowley, Peterson, Deckard, Campion, Savage and Griffith, members of our advance party.

1230: The Prime Minister and his party arrived at Saki in his special aircraft escorted by six fighters. The Prime Minister disembarked and came over to the President's plane. The President then left his plane and entered a jeep. As the President and the Prime Minister approached the guard of honor, honors were rendered for them. The honors consisted of the guard presenting arms and the band playing the Star Spangled Banner, God Save the King, and the Third Internationale. Then, while in the jeep, the President drove down the ranks of the guard and made an inspection of them. Afterwards the guard of honor passed in review before the President and the Prime Minister. The President took the review while seated in the jeep.

1306: The ceremonies at the airport over, the President and members of his party left Saki by automobile for Livadia Palace, near Yalta, some 80 miles distant. Mrs. Boettiger rode with the President. All automobiles used in our caravan were furnished by the Soviet Government and were operated by Russian drivers.

The first stretch of our drive, from Saki to Simferopol, was over rolling, snow-covered country somewhat like that of our Middle-West.

<sup>1</sup> For a bibliographic note on the Log, see *ante*, p. 459.

We saw few, if any, trees and many reminders of the recent fighting there—guttled-out buildings, burned out tanks and destroyed German railroad rolling stock that had been abandoned and burned by them in their flight.

From Simferopol, the capital city of the Crimea, we went on to Alushta, a small town on the east coast of the Crimean Peninsula. From Alushta we followed the "Route Romanoff" to Yalta. This is a high and very winding road that passes around the west side of the Roman Kosh (the highest mountain in the Crimea—5,055 feet) and ascends to the Red Crag (4,760 feet). The entire distance from Saki to Yalta was guarded by Soviet troops. It was noted that a considerable number of them were young girls.

1750: We passed through the city of Yalta.

1800: We arrived at Livadia Palace, two miles south of Yalta. This was our headquarters during the Crimea Conference. Miss Kathleen Harriman (daughter of Ambassador Harriman) was at Livadia to greet the President and Mrs. Boettiger.

We were all very tired, so it was a case of bathing, dining and to bed for us this evening.

The Prime Minister's party proceeded separately from the President's and went from Saki to Vorontsov Villa (located about 12.5 miles south of Livadia), where they made their headquarters during the conference.

Commander Tyree, Major Putnam and Mr. Cornelius had arrived at Livadia several hours before us and had our map room and communications center set up and in operation when the President arrived. Commander Smith had been at Livadia for several days. He had come to the Crimea in the *Catoctin*.

2100: Lieutenant Bogue, who had remained behind at Malta to handle any last minute communications for our party and had left Malta on one of the last planes of our flight, arrived at Livadia, completing the arrival of our party.

The U. S. minesweepers *Pinnacle* and *Implicit* were moored in the harbor at Yalta. The naval auxiliary *Catoctin*, the liberty ship *William Blount* and the minesweepers *Incessant* and *Incredible* were moored in the harbor at Sevastopol, 80 miles to the southwest. The Soviet authorities had declined to permit the *Catoctin* or the *William Blount* to continue on to Yalta because of the presence of mines in that area of the Black Sea. This task group had been sailed from the Mediterranean Area some ten days previously in order to be on hand to furnish miscellaneous services to the American Delegation at Yalta. These ships were the first Allied vessels to pass through the Dardanelles since the beginning of the present war and they opened communications with Sevastopol and Yalta.

Because the *Catoctin* could not come to Yalta, or closer than Sevastopol, it was necessary for us to communicate by landline (teletype) with the *Catoctin* which vessel served as communications relay ship for our party during the conference. For the first few days we experienced "wire trouble" between Livadia and Sevastopol. Our communication engineers eventually laid an entirely new line from Livadia to Sevastopol and thereafter no further wire trouble was experienced.

#### YALTA

Yalta before the war was the center of the health resorts on the south coast of the Crimea. In 1928 it had a normal population of 29,000. It is picturesquely situated in the valley of the river Utchan-Su and is surrounded on three sides by mountains. The mountain range to the north thwarts the cold blasts headed that way and permits the warm sun to exert its full effect in and around Yalta. The mean annual temperature there is 56.65. The thermometer hovered around 40 during our visit but it was not at all uncomfortable.

#### LIVADIA PALACE

The buildings used by the American Delegation during the Crimea Conference are the former summer palace of the Czars. The main building is called the Livadia and the two auxiliary buildings the Svitski Korpus.

After the Revolution Livadia was used by the Soviet Government as a rest home for tubercular patients. During the German occupation of the Crimea it was used by their high command, who did a very thorough job of looting when they were forced to leave. The buildings were left in complete disrepair and the grounds in equally bad condition. The only original furnishings in the building (Livadia) at the time we resided there were the two pictures in the President's bedroom.

The Soviet Government had performed an amazing job, however, in completely renovating the place during the three weeks period immediately preceding the conference; amazing because of the critical shortage of materials and the very limited time available. This was because it was not until about 15 January that it was definitely decided to hold the conference at Yalta. Hotel staffs were brought in from Moscow and furniture and furnishings were obtained from Moscow and other Soviet cities or from local sanatoria and rest homes. It should be added here that in addition to everything that the Soviets did, Lieutenant Commander L. H. Backus, MC-V(S), U. S. N. R., and Lieutenant T. W. Sullivan, MC-V(S), U. S. N. R., (both from the U. S. S. *Catoctin*) did an outstanding job in transforming Livadia, an infested building since the German occupation and pillage, to a place that was completely habitable and comfortable, and prevented what might have been a most serious threat to the health of the entire party.

The New Palace (Livadia) was built from white Inkerman granite in 1911, in the style of the Italian renaissance, from plans by the architect Krasnov. It stands on the site of the former palace which, except for the church, had been entirely demolished. Situated more than 150 feet above the sea, it commands a striking panorama of the mountains and the sea to the east and north. Wings extend from the rear of the main building to form two courts, one modeled after the Convent Court of St. Mark (Florence, Italy), and the other is of Moorish design.

The first floor of the 50-room palace was used by Nicholas and his son, Alexi, for living quarters. The left wing, facing the sea, contained the Czar's study and bedroom. The room used as the President's private dining room was formerly a billiard room. The large room used as the main conference room was the ballroom-banquet hall.

The second floor was used principally by the Czarina and her four daughters. The room occupied by General Marshall was formerly the Imperial bedroom and that used by Admiral King was the Czarina's boudoir. The second floor conference hall was formerly a private reception room of the Czarina. The second floor dining room was a private sitting room used only by the Czar's family.

The parks and gardens, which stretch down to the seaside, contain fifteen miles of paths and lanes lined with cypress, cedar, yew and bay trees. There are many rare and beautiful plants and trees in the parks, brought there from all over the world by Count Potocki and the Romanov family during the Nineteenth and early part of the Twentieth Centuries.

*Sunday, February 4th:*

Marshal Stalin and his party arrived early this morning. They came down from Moscow by rail to a point in the Crimea and from there motored to Koreiz Villa, about 6 miles south of Livadia, where they made their headquarters during the Crimea Conference.

1100: The President conferred with Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Harriman, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Kuter, General McFarland, Mr. Matthews (H. Freeman Matthews, Director of Office of European Affairs, State Department), Mr. Hiss (Alger Hiss, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State) and Mr. Bohlen (Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State). The conference was held in the grand ballroom of Livadia.

1615: Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov called at Livadia and conferred with the President in his study. Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Pavlov were also present.

1630: The President conferred with Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Matthews and Mr. Bohlen in his study.

*1710:* The First Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened in the grand ballroom of Livadia. Present:

FOR THE U. S.	FOR GREAT BRITAIN	FOR THE U. S. S. R.
The President.	The Prime Minister.	Marshal Stalin.
Mr. Stettinius.	Mr. Eden.	Commissar Molotov.
Admiral Leahy.	Field Marshal Brooke.	Admiral Kuznetsov.
General Marshall.	Air Marshal Portal.	Col. General Antonov.
Admiral King.	Field Marshal Alexander.	Air Marshal Khudyakov.
Mr. Harriman.	Admiral Cunningham.	Mr. Vyshinski.
General Deane.	General Ismay.	Mr. Maisky.
General Kuter.	Major Birse.	Mr. Gousev.
General McFarland.		Mr. Gromyko.
		Mr. Pavlov.

This meeting adjourned at 1950.

*2030:* The President was host at dinner at Livadia to the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin, Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Eden, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Clark Kerr, Mr. Gromyko, Mr. Vyshinski, Justice Byrnes, Major Birse, Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Pavlov. The menu included: Vodka, five different kinds of wine, fresh caviar, bread, butter, consommé, sturgeon with tomatoes, beef and macaroni, sweet cake, tea, coffee and fruit.

*Monday, February 5th:*

*0730:* A Joint Chiefs of Staff courier arrived at Livadia with White House mail. This mail had been dispatched from Washington on January 31st.

*0800:* A Joint Chiefs of Staff courier departed Livadia with mail for the White House.

*1300:* The President had lunch at Livadia with the members of his Mess.

*1430:* The President conferred with Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Matthews, and Mr. Bohlen in his study. This conference lasted until 1600.

*1600:* The second Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened at Livadia. Present were:

FOR THE U. S.	FOR GREAT BRITAIN	FOR THE U. S. S. R.
The President.	The Prime Minister.	Marshal Stalin.
Mr. Stettinius.	Mr. Eden.	Mr. Molotov.
Admiral Leahy.	Mr. Cadogan.	Mr. Vyshinski.
Mr. Hopkins.	Mr. Clark Kerr.	Mr. Maisky.
Mr. Harriman.	Mr. Bridges.	Mr. Gousev.
Mr. Matthews.	Mr. Wilson.	Mr. Gromyko.
Mr. Bohlen.	Mr. Dixon.	Mr. Pavlov.
	Major Birse.	

The meeting adjourned at 1945.

*2030:* Dinner at Livadia.—The President, General Marshall, Admiral King, Mr. Harriman, Miss Harriman, Mr. Stettinius, Admiral Leahy, Admiral McIntire, Justice Byrnes, Mrs. Boettiger, Admiral Brown and Mr. Early.



*Tuesday, February 6th:*

0800: A Joint Chiefs of Staff courier departed Livadia for Washington with White House mail.

1300: Luncheon at Livadia.—The President, the Prime Minister, Mr. Cadogan, Justice Byrnes, Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Harriman. Discussions continued after lunch until 3 p. m. The Prime Minister did not return to Vorontsov, as he was due back at Livadia at 4 p. m. (1600) for another conference. Instead, he accepted the loan of the room occupied by Admiral Brown and General Watson and took a short nap at Livadia.

1615: The Third Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened at Livadia. Present were:

FOR THE U. S.	FOR GREAT BRITAIN	FOR THE U. S. S. R.
The President.	The Prime Minister.	Marshal Stalin.
Mr. Stettinius.	Mr. Eden.	Mr. Molotov.
Admiral Leahy.	Mr. Cadogan.	Mr. Vyshinski.
Mr. Hopkins.	Mr. Clark Kerr.	Mr. Maisky.
Justice Byrnes.	Mr. Jebb.	Mr. Gousev.
Mr. Harriman.	Mr. Bridges.	Mr. Gromyko.
Mr. Matthews.	Mr. Wilson.	Mr. Pavlov.
Mr. Hiss.	Mr. Dixon.	
Mr. Bohlen.	Major Birse.	

The following preliminary statement concerning the conference was agreed on at today's meeting for release at 1630 tomorrow (Washington time).<sup>2</sup>

Mrs. Boettiger, Mrs. Oliver, Miss Harriman and Mr. Spaman made a motor trip to Sevastopol today.

1900: A Joint Chiefs of Staff courier arrived from Washington with White House mail.

2030: Dinner at Livadia.—The President, Mrs. Boettiger, Justice Byrnes, Admiral Leahy, Mr. Harriman, Miss Harriman, Mr. Early and Mr. Flynn.

This afternoon Commander Tyree, Mr. Reilly, Major Greer, Mr. Long, Mr. Holmes and Mr. O'Driscoll left Livadia by automobile for Saki. At Saki they enplaned for Cairo to complete the advance arrangements incident to the President's forthcoming visit to Egypt.

*Wednesday, February 7th:*

1300: Lunch at Livadia.—The President, Mrs. Boettiger, Mr. Flynn and General Watson.

<sup>2</sup> At this point in the Log there appears the text of the preliminary communiqué which is printed *post*, p. 659.

1610: The Fourth Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened at Livadia. Present were:

FOR THE U. S.	FOR GREAT BRITAIN	FOR THE U. S. S. R.
The President.	The Prime Minister.	Marshal Stalin.
Mr. Stettinius.	Mr. Eden.	Mr. Molotov.
Admiral Leahy.	Mr. Cadogan.	Mr. Vyshinski.
Mr. Hopkins.	Mr. Clark Kerr.	Mr. Maisky.
Justice Byrnes.	Mr. Jebb.	Mr. Gousev.
Mr. Harriman.	Mr. Bridges.	Mr. Gromyko.
Mr. Matthews.	Mr. Wilson.	Mr. Pavlov.
Mr. Hiss.	Mr. Dixon.	
Mr. Bohlen.	Major Birse.	

This meeting adjourned at 2000.

2030: Dinner at Livadia.—The President, Mrs. Boettiger, Mr. Harriman, Miss Harriman, Justice Byrnes, Admiral Leahy and Mr. Stettinius.

*Thursday, February 8th:*

1200: The President conferred with Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Harriman, Justice Byrnes, and Mr. Bohlen. The conference was held in the President's study.

The British and American Combined Chiefs of Staff met in the grand ballroom at Livadia. Neither the President nor the Prime Minister attended this meeting.

1330: The President and Mrs. Boettiger had lunch in his study from a tray.

1500: The President signed an Executive Order authorizing the Secretary of War to take over and operate the plants and facilities of the Detroit Edison Company of Detroit, Michigan.

1545: Marshal Stalin, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Pavlov conferred with the President in the President's study.

1615: The Fifth Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened in the grand ballroom of Livadia. Present were:

FOR THE U. S.	FOR GREAT BRITAIN	FOR THE U. S. S. R.
The President.	The Prime Minister.	Marshal Stalin.
Mr. Stettinius.	Mr. Eden.	Mr. Molotov.
Admiral Leahy.	Mr. Cadogan.	Mr. Vyshinski.
Mr. Hopkins.	Mr. Clark Kerr.	Mr. Maisky.
Justice Byrnes.	Mr. Jebb.	Mr. Gousev.
Mr. Harriman.	Mr. Bridges.	Mr. Gromyko.
Mr. Matthews.	Mr. Wilson.	Mr. Pavlov.
Mr. Bohlen.	Mr. Dixon.	
Mr. Hiss.	Major Birse.	

The meeting adjourned at 1940.

2030: The President and certain members of his party left Livadia by motor for Koreiz Villa to dine as guests of Marshal Stalin. The complete guest list was:

Marshal Stalin.	The President.	The Prime Minister.
Mr. Molotov.	Mr. Stettinius.	Mr. Eden.
Mr. Vyshinski.	Admiral Leahy.	Field Marshal Brooke.
Mr. Beria.	Justice Byrnes.	Air Marshal Portal.
Admiral Kuznetsov.	Mr. Harriman.	Admiral Cunningham.
General Antonov.	Mr. Flynn.	Mr. Cadogan.
Air Marshal Khudyakov.	Mrs. Boettiger.	Field Marshal Alexander.
Mr. Gousev.	Miss Harriman.	Mr. Clark Kerr.
Mr. Gromyko.	Mr. Bohlen.	General Ismay.
Mr. Maisky.		Mrs. Oliver.
Mr. Pavlov.		Major Birse.

*Friday, February 9th:*

1230: The President attended a plenary meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Livadia. Present were:

FOR THE U. S.

The President.  
Admiral Leahy.  
General Marshall.  
Admiral King.  
General Kuter.  
General McFarland.

FOR GREAT BRITAIN

The Prime Minister.  
Field Marshal Brooke.  
Air Marshal Portal.  
General Ismay.  
Admiral Cunningham.  
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones.

1330: Lunch at Livadia.—The President, the Prime Minister, Mrs. Boettiger, Mrs. Oliver, Mr. Harriman, Miss Harriman, Admiral Leahy and Justice Byrnes.

1600: The President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin and members of the American, British and Soviet Delegations met in the courtyard of Livadia where they sat for still and motion pictures.

1615: The Sixth Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened in the grand ballroom of Livadia. Present:

FOR THE U. S.

The President.  
Mr. Stettinius.  
Admiral Leahy.  
Mr. Hopkins.  
Justice Byrnes.  
Mr. Harriman.  
Mr. Matthews.  
Mr. Hiss.  
Mr. Bohlen.

FOR GREAT BRITAIN

The Prime Minister.  
Mr. Eden.  
Mr. Cadogan.  
Mr. Clark Kerr.  
Mr. Jebb.  
Mr. Bridges.  
Mr. Wilson.  
Mr. Dixon.  
Major Birse.

FOR THE U. S. S. R.

Marshal Stalin.  
Mr. Molotov.  
Mr. Vyshinski.  
Mr. Maisky.  
Mr. Gousev.  
Mr. Gromyko.  
Mr. Pavlov.

The meeting adjourned at 1950.

1930: Lieutenant (j. g.) W. K. Kloock, U. S. N. R., White House courier, arrived at Livadia with mail from Washington. He made the journey from Washington in three days.

2030: Dinner at Livadia.—The President, Mrs. Boettiger, Major General John E. Hull, Major General Kuter, Fleet Admiral Leahy and Vice Admiral C. M. Cooke.

*Saturday, February 10th:*

0800: White House mail was dispatched to Washington via a Joint Chiefs of Staff courier who left Livadia this morning.

1300: Lunch at Livadia.—The President, Mrs. Boettiger, Miss Harriman, Admiral Leahy, Justice Byrnes and Admiral Brown.

1500: Justice Byrnes left Livadia to return to Washington. He traveled by air in company with the Joint Chiefs of Staff party.

1600: The President presented specially engraved Fourth-Term Inaugural Medallions to the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin, Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov, and a book entitled "Target Germany" to Marshal Stalin. This book had been prepared by General Arnold and contained photographs showing damage wrought in Germany as the result of bombings by our strategical air forces.

1630: Marshal Stalin and Mr. Harriman conferred with the President. The conference was held in the President's study. Mr. Bohlen was also present.

1650: The Seventh Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened at Livadia. Present:

FOR THE U. S.	FOR GREAT BRITAIN	FOR THE U. S. S. R.
The President.	The Prime Minister.	Marshal Stalin.
Mr. Stettinius.	Mr. Eden.	Mr. Molotov.
Admiral Leahy.	Mr. Cadogan.	Mr. Vyshinski.
Mr. Hopkins.	Mr. Clark Kerr.	Mr. Maisky.
Mr. Harriman.	Mr. Jebb.	Mr. Gousev.
Mr. Matthews.	Mr. Bridges.	Mr. Gromyko.
Mr. Bohlen.	Mr. Wilson.	Mr. Pavlov.
Mr. Hiss.	Major Birse.	
Mr. Foote.		

The meeting adjourned at 2000.

2030: The President, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Bohlen left Livadia for the British Headquarters (Vorontsov Villa) where they dined with the Prime Minister, Mr. Eden, Major Birse, Marshal Stalin, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Pavlov as the guests of the Prime Minister.

*Sunday, February 11th:*

1130: The President, accompanied by Mrs. Boettiger, took a jeep ride through the grounds and gardens of Livadia. Before he returned to his quarters he also inspected the U. S. Naval seaman guard which was drawn up outside the palace at the time.

*1200:* The Eighth Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened in the grand ballroom of Livadia. Present:

FOR THE U. S.	FOR GREAT BRITAIN	FOR THE U. S. S. R.
The President.	The Prime Minister.	Marshal Stalin.
Mr. Stettinius.	Mr. Eden.	Mr. Molotov.
Admiral Leahy.	Mr. Cadogan.	Mr. Vyshinski.
Mr. Hopkins.	Mr. Clark Kerr.	Mr. Maisky.
Mr. Harriman.	Mr. Jebb.	Mr. Gousev.
Mr. Matthews.	Mr. Bridges.	Mr. Gromyko.
Mr. Bohlen.	Mr. Wilson.	Mr. Pavlov.
Mr. Hiss.	Major Birse.	
Mr. Foote.	Mr. Dixon.	

The conference recessed at 1250.

*1300:* The President was host at luncheon at Livadia to the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin, Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Eden, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Clark Kerr, Mr. Cadogan, Major Birse, Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Pavlov.

Conference discussions continued at the lunch table under 1545, at which time the Crimea Conference formally adjourned.

*1555:* Marshal Stalin, after having bade the President and members of his party goodbye, left Livadia by motor for Koreiz Villa. Before the Marshal left Livadia the President presented to him for further delivery the following decorations that had been awarded by the United States to officers of the Soviet Forces:

- Legion of Merit (Degree of Chief Commander) for Marshal Vasilevsky, Chief of Staff of the Red Army;
- Legion of Merit (Degree of Chief Commander) for Marshal Novikov, Commanding General of the Red Air Force;
- Legion of Merit (Degree of Commander) for Colonel General Repin;
- Legion of Merit (Degree of Commander) for Lieutenant General Grendall;
- Legion of Merit (Degree of Commander) for Lieutenant General Krolenko;
- Legion of Merit (Degree of Commander) for Major General Levandovich;
- Legion of Merit (Degree of Commander) for Major General Slavin; and
- Legion of Merit (Degree of Commander) for Colonel Byaz.

As we were leaving Livadia the President was presented numerous gift packages by the Soviet Authorities at the palace, as also were various other members of the party. These packages contained vodka, several kinds of wine, champagne, caviar, butter, oranges and tangerines.

#### GENERAL COMMENT

The weather at Livadia was most pleasant during our visit. The average temperature was 40. The Russians accredited the good weather to the President and called it "Roosevelt weather." For

several days preceding our arrival the weather had been anything but favorable. At exactly the "right time", however, it cleared and remained so generally throughout our stay at Yalta.

During the period 4-11 February, daily meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries were held in addition to their attendance at the major conferences. Livadia, Vorontsov and Koreiz shared these Foreign Secretary meetings.

Our mail was brought to Yalta by Joint Chief of Staff couriers who used the regular Air Transport Command facilities from Washington to Cairo and the shuttle service from Cairo to Saki. The average time employed for the journey from Washington to Conference Headquarters was four days.

The British party had daily mail service. Their mail was flown directly from London to Saki in "Mosquito" type aircraft, the flights following a direct course between the two points involved.

Our radio communications were handled by a two-way high speed circuit set up between Radio Washington and the *Catoctin* (at Sevastopol), using Navy Radio Oran as an intermediate relay station. The messages were broadcast over the Washington "FOX" schedules and when necessary rebroadcast by Radio Oran. Communication between the *Catoctin* and Livadia was by a land line or by telephone.

A number of U. S. Naval personnel who speak Russian were assembled by Admiral Hewitt and sent to Yalta in the *Catoctin*. This team proved most helpful in working with the Soviets to complete the preparations for our visit and they were also very helpful to us as interpreters during our eight days at Livadia. They were:

Lieut. George Scherbatoff, U. S. N. R.  
 Lieut. Dimitri P. Keusseff, U. S. N. R.  
 Lieut. C. Norris Houghton, U. S. N. R.  
 Lieut. Michael Kimack, U. S. N. R.  
 Lt (jg) John Cheplick, U. S. N. R.  
 Lt (jg) John P. Romanov, U. S. N.  
 Andrew M. Bacha, Chief Yeoman, U. S. N. R.  
 Andrew Sawchuck, Yeoman 2/c, U. S. N. R.  
 Harry Sklenar, Yeoman 2/c, U. S. N. R.  
 Alexis Nestoruk, Yeoman 2/c, U. S. N. R.  
 Nickolas Korniloff, Yeoman 3/c, U. S. N. R.  
 Russel Koval, Yeoman 3/c, U. S. N. R.

1600: The President and members of his party left Livadia by motor for Sevastopol. Mr. Harriman and Miss Harriman accompanied the President. Mr. Early remained behind at Livadia to iron out several details concerning the joint communiqué that had been agreed to by the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin at the final meeting of the Crimea Conference. Mr. Hopkins, Sergeant Hopkins, Mr. Bohlen, Colonel Park, Major Putnam, Lieutenant Klock, Chief Warrant Officer Stoner, Agents Deckard, Hastings and Wood left Livadia by motor for Simferopol where they

spent the night on a special sleeper-train that had been parked there by the Soviets for our convenience.

The drive to Sevastopol was over high and winding mountain roads along the Black Sea coast. It took us over the battlefield, nearly a century old, where the historic Light Brigade made its famous charge in the Crimean War of 1854-1856, and for many miles led through territory bitterly contested by the Russians and Germans in the recent Crimean campaign.

1840: The President and his party arrived in Sevastopol and proceeded to the U. S. S. *Catoctin*, a naval auxiliary moored at the Soviet naval base.

It was dusk when we arrived in Sevastopol but the President saw scenes of stark destruction there wrought by the Germans. The city was virtually leveled to the ground except for the walls of homes and other buildings which the mines, bombs and shells in recent battles left standing like billboards—mute testimony of the horrible wanton Nazi vengeance. Of thousands of buildings in the city, the President was told that only six were left in useful condition when the Germans fled.

Distance traveled, Livadia to Sevastopol, 80 miles.

1855: The President and his party went on board the *Catoctin* where they spent the night. The *Catoctin* manned the rail and accorded the President full honors as he went on board.

The *Catoctin* served a delicious steak dinner to us, which was a real treat for us after eight days of Russian fare.

After dinner Admiral McIntire, Admiral Brown, Mrs. Boettiger and Miss Harriman attended a concert given in Sevastopol by the members of the band of the Black Sea Naval Base.

2130: Mr. Early arrived on board the *Catoctin* from Livadia and the encoding and radio transmission of the Conference communiqué was started. The communiqué was to be released simultaneously in Washington, London, and Moscow at 1630 tomorrow, February 12th. Lieutenant Bogue and Mr. Cornelius and the communication force of the *Catoctin* are to be commended for the expeditious manner in which this communiqué was encoded and transmitted to Washington. See Annex A for complete text of the communiqué.<sup>3</sup>

Captain C. O. Comp, U. S. N., commanded the *Catoctin*. Her Executive Officer was Lieutenant Commander W. S. Dufton, U. S. N., and her Supply Officer Lieutenant Commander E. C. Lafen, (SC), U. S. N.

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<sup>3</sup> For the text of the communiqué, see *post*, pp. 963-975.

*Monday, February 12th:*

0655: After a very comfortable night, the President and members of his party left the *Catoctin* and proceeded by automobile to the airfield at Saki. Vice Admiral Batistii [*Basisty*], U. S. S. R. Navy, was on the dock to see the President off. He was second in command at the Soviet Naval Base, Sevastopol. The Admiral commanding was on the sick list at the time and unable to appear. The night aboard the *Catoctin* had enabled our party to avoid tiring mountain driving on the same day as the long plane flight to Egypt, as most of the road from Sevastopol to Simferopol was over rolling country.



## 8. MINUTES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1945

MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, FEBRUARY 4, 1945, 10 A. M.,  
LIVADIA PALACE

### PRESENT

Fleet Admiral Leahy	Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
General of the Army Marshall	Brigadier General Lindsay
Fleet Admiral King	Brigadier General Bessell
Major General Kuter	Brigadier General Everest
Lieutenant General Somervell	Commodore Burrough
Vice Admiral Cooke	Colonel Peck
Major General Deane	Colonel Ritchie
Major General Bull	Colonel Lincoln
Major General Hull	Colonel Cary
Major General Wood	Captain Stroop
Rear Admiral Duncan	Captain McDill
Rear Admiral McCormick	Lieutenant Colonel McRae
Rear Admiral Olsen	Commander Clark
Brigadier General Roberts	

### Secretariat

Brigadier General McFarland  
Captain Graves

J. C. S. Files

### *Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

#### 1. AGENDA FOR TRIPARTITE DISCUSSIONS AT ARGONAUT (J.C.S. 1176/9, J.C.S. 1227/3 and J.C.S. Info. Memo 359)<sup>2</sup>

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that there had not been time to study the papers before the meeting and asked for a summary.

ADMIRAL COOKE explained that the Joint Staff Planners and the members of the U. S. Military Mission, Moscow, had met to bring up to date all matters dealing with negotiations with the Russians. These discussions had resulted in the circulation of J.C.S. 1176/9 and J.C.S. 1227/3. He said that the two major items to be considered were:

- (1) coordination with the Russians in the matter of operations in the field;
- (2) negotiations with the Russians concerning Far Eastern matters.

<sup>1</sup> J. C. S. 187th Meeting.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

The first item involved British, U. S. and Russian negotiations. This matter has been under discussion for a considerable length of time and little progress has been made. The second item involved only discussions between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. This matter has been the subject of examination by the special U. S. mission now in Russia. There are certain phases of the problem which are not progressing very well.

The papers before the Chiefs were presented by the Planners with the view to formulating for the President a form of approach in the forthcoming discussions. It was felt that the President should be thoroughly familiar with matters which will be the basis of the tripartite discussions.

The agenda items listed in Appendix "A" in J.C.S. 1227/3 have been presented to the Soviets and the British. To date no answer has been received from the Soviets.<sup>3</sup>

In response to a question by Admiral Leahy, GENERAL DEANE expressed the opinion that the Soviets would withhold their views on the agenda until they met in formal tripartite session. The Russian military staff would be adequately represented at such a meeting and having already received the views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff on the agenda items, they would be prepared to discuss them.

GENERAL MARSHALL said it was important to keep the consideration of military matters alive during the conference while political talks were taking place on higher levels.

ADMIRAL KING felt that the President should be advised to ask Premier Stalin to discuss the matters set out in the agenda.

ADMIRAL COOKE said that the views of the Russian military staff would probably not be discussed freely unless Premier Stalin had previously given his approval. The President should tell Premier Stalin to give his staff a rather free hand in the preliminary discussions with the British and U.S. staffs. Further, it was felt by the Planners that the President should get the consent of the Prime Minister to set up direct liaison between General Eisenhower and the U.S. and British Military Missions to Moscow. This, it was felt, was the proper approach to the desired arrangement.

GENERAL MARSHALL felt that the first and important step should be to inform the President of the subjects to be discussed in the tripartite sessions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should put before the President the agenda as outlined in Appendix "A" and "B" of J. C. S. 1227/3.<sup>4</sup>

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he would undertake to do this.

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<sup>3</sup> The agenda under reference was the agenda proposed for the tripartite military discussions at Yalta. It may be found in C. C. S. 765/1, *ante*, pp. 424-425.

<sup>4</sup> The agenda outlined in Appendix "B" of J. C. S. 1227/3 was the agenda proposed for the American-Soviet military discussions at Yalta. It may be found *ante*, pp. 393-394.

ADMIRAL KING emphasized the necessity for clearing up the matter of direct liaison between General Eisenhower and the U.S. and British Missions in Moscow and endorsed the suggestion of having the President speak to the Prime Minister on this subject.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he would attempt to have military matters presented first at the meeting with the President this morning. This would enable the President to be briefed on the subjects which are now under discussion prior to his talks on political matters.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note that Admiral Leahy would inform the President of the subjects to be discussed in the tripartite sessions.

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J. C. S. Files

*The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the First Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Soviet Army (Antonov)*

TOP SECRET

[YALTA,] 3 February 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ANTONOV

It is the desire of the American Staff to discuss with the Soviet Staff details of possible participation in the war against Japan. Can you obtain approval of this suggestion?

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MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT WITH HIS ADVISERS, FEBRUARY 4, 1945,  
10:30 A. M., LIVADIA PALACE

PRESENT

The President  
Fleet Admiral Leahy  
General of the Army Marshall  
Fleet Admiral King  
Major General Kuter  
Secretary Stettinius  
Mr. Harriman  
Mr. Matthews  
Mr. Hiss

*Secretary*

Brigadier General McFarland

J. C. S. Files

*Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

TOP SECRET

ADMIRAL LEAHY said there were two matters which the Chiefs of Staff considered it desirable to have settled at the tripartite meeting

scheduled for 1700 today. The first was to get Marshal Stalin to instruct the Red General Staff to participate in full, free and frank discussions with the U. S. and British Staffs. It was also desirable to get agreement to effect the needed coordination and exchange of information between General Eisenhower, Field Marshal Alexander and the Soviet General Staff by having them deal with each other directly through the Heads of the U. S. and British Military Missions in Moscow.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the establishment of direct liaison for day to day communication between the Allied commanders and the Russians was highly desirable. In his opinion the important thing was to obtain agreement to the general idea as early as possible and leave the detailed procedure to be worked out later. The difficulty had been, not with the Russians but with the British who wish to effect the liaison through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that with the Russians within 40 miles of Berlin there was not time enough to go through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He thought the British reluctance to agree to direct liaison was probably due to the objection which the Russians had raised to the presence of General Burrows on the proposed tripartite liaison committee and to the fear that General Eisenhower would become involved in the settlement of matters which would be more appropriate for consideration on a higher level.

MR. HARRIMAN said with reference to discussions between the Russian and Allied staffs that Marshal Stalin's formal approval of the discussions would be necessary before it would be possible to get any information of value from the Russian General Staff.

At this point, a memorandum from the President to the Prime Minister enclosing a memorandum requesting Marshal Stalin to agree to the proposed method of liaison through the Military Mission in Moscow was presented to the President, signed by him and dispatched at once to the Prime Minister.<sup>1</sup>

THE PRESIDENT considered the agendas contained in Appendices "A" and "B" of J. C. S. 1227/3.<sup>2</sup>

In answer to the President's question with reference to item e, GENERAL MARSHALL explained that MILEPOST requirements and progress was not a matter for discussion with the British but with the Russians only.

In reply to the President's question as to whether the British troops released from Burma would go into China, GENERAL MARSHALL said that the British had not raised this point. He thought it more likely that the British troops would be used in Thailand.

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 563, footnotes 3 and 4.

THE PRESIDENT asked if any material and supplies would be stockpiled in Petropavlovsk.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that the Russians wanted some of it there but the bulk of it was desired at Vladivostok.

GENERAL MARSHALL then read to the President a telegraphic report summarizing the situation on all war fronts and explained it on the map.

THE PRESIDENT stated any action in Indochina which resulted in damage to the Japanese was satisfactory to him. He had no objection to any U. S. action which it was considered desirable to take in Indochina as long as it did not involve any alignments with the French.

MR. STETTINIUS informed the President that there were seven major topics which he thought the President should be prepared to discuss with the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin. The first was the question of the post-war international organization. The matter of immediate interest was the question of who was to be invited to attend the next conference on this subject and where the conference was to be held. He indicated a number of locations which would be suitable and stated that he had options on all of the desirable places in the United States if this country should be selected as the site.

The second topic was the matter of the creation of an emergency European high commission to function during the interim period between the end of the war and the setting up of the permanent organization.

THE PRESIDENT indicated that he preferred periodic meetings between Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov to the creation of a formal commission.

The third topic was the treatment of Germany, political and economic.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that the Russians were interested in taking this up as the first subject to be discussed by the tripartite conference.

The fourth topic was the subject of Poland.

The fifth topic was the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The attitude manifested by the Russians toward the U. S. and British delegations on these commissions made necessary an early clarification of the situation.

The sixth subject was the question of Iranian relations.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that the British were willing to withdraw troops in Iran in June.

The seventh topic was China. It was desirable to seek Soviet and British assistance in composing the relations between the Chinese Government and the Communists.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that papers have been prepared by the Department of State on all of the subjects listed and would be available for the President's information.

MR. HARRIMAN stated that Marshal Stalin would very likely wish to raise the question of what the Russians would get out of the Pacific war. He stated they would want the southern half of Sakhalin, and the Kuriles. They would wish to maintain the *status quo* in Outer Mongolia and to obtain control over the railroad running to Dairen.

THE PRESIDENT said he wished to have the views of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek before discussing the *status quo* in Mongolia but was ready to go ahead on the other questions.

At this point Mr. Matthews and Mr. Hiss entered the meeting to discuss the papers prepared by the Department of State for the President.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Stettinius, pp. 84 ff.

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UNA Files

*The Secretary of State to the President*<sup>1</sup>

MEMORANDUM OF SUGGESTED ACTION ITEMS FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. *International Organization.*

We should seek adoption of United States proposal for voting formula and agreement to announce immediately calling of general United Nations Conference.

(Copies of text of United States proposal and analysis thereof are available if you wish to hand them to Churchill and Stalin.)

Argumentation: Our proposal safeguards unity of the great powers so far as is possible by any formula—enforcement action will require unanimous vote—only with respect to discussion will a party to a dispute not be able to vote. Latin American and other small powers will be disillusioned if discussion can be vetoed.

*Note:* If the voting issue is settled, additional points would have to be agreed to before a United Nations Conference could be called: International Trusteeships, France as fifth sponsoring power, list of nations to be invited, date of conference and its being held in United States, invitations to be by United States on behalf of other four sponsoring powers, United States to consult China and France on behalf of Britain and Russia, form of announcement of agreement on International Organization matters (we have available the necessary papers on these points).

<sup>1</sup> This paper is a copy of the memorandum which Stettinius said he presented to the President at the President's meeting with his advisers on February 4. Cf. Stettinius, pp. 85-87. The paper was prepared at Malta and reflects certain agreements reached there by Stettinius and Eden. See *ante*, p. 504.

## 2. *Adoption of Emergency European High Commission.*

(Copies of draft text of declaration and of accompanying protocol are available if you wish to hand them to Stalin and Churchill.)

Argumentation: Unity of great power policy with respect to liberated and Axis satellite countries is highly desirable, and France should be included as one of the great powers for this purpose.

## 3. *Treatment of Germany.*

(a) Final agreement should be reached with respect to control machinery and zones of occupation. Announcement should be made of such agreement and of the earlier agreement on surrender terms.

(b) Boundaries: It is not expected that definitive, detailed commitments will have to be made at this time. However, if it proves necessary, our detailed position has been prepared and is available.

(c) Minorities: We should oppose, so far as possible, indiscriminate mass transfer of minorities with neighboring states. Transfers should be carried out gradually under international supervision.

(d) Long range economic policies: We should favor abolition of German self-sufficiency and its position of economic domination of Europe, elimination of certain key industries, prohibition of manufacture of arms and of all types of aircraft, and continuing control to achieve these aims.

## 4. *Poland.*

(a) Boundaries: We favor the Curzon line in the north and center and, in the south, the eastern line of Lwow Province, which would correspond generally with one of the frontiers proposed in 1919 to the Supreme Allied Council. Transfer of German territory to be limited to East Prussia (except Koenigsberg to Russia), a small coastal salient of Pomerania, and Upper Silesia.

(b) We should be prepared to assist in the formation of a new representative interim government pledged to free elections when conditions permit. We should urge inclusion in a provisional government of Mikolajczyk (Peasant Party is most important in Poland) and other moderate Poles abroad. We should not agree to recognize the Lublin "government" in its present form.

## 5. *Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.*

Our representatives must be assured of: (a) freedom of movement, and (b) consultation before decisions are made by the Control Commissions.

## 6. *Iran.*

We should seek Soviet agreement not to press for oil concessions in Iran until termination of hostilities and withdrawal of Allied troops.

7. *China.*

We should seek Soviet and British support for our efforts to bring about Kuomintang-Communist agreement.

Argumentation: Cooperation between the two groups will expedite conclusion of the war in the Far East and prevent possible internal conflict and foreign intervention in China.

[MALTA,] February 2, 1945.

**INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION,  
FEBRUARY 4, 1945**

Hiss Collection

*Hiss Notes* <sup>1</sup>

2/4 Byrnes

Jebb

Jebb joined us <sup>2</sup>

Jebb said: Have paper on Dep.<sup>3</sup> areas—which has been cleared thru Dominions & is now being considered by War Cabinet

He then read rapidly a paper containing following points

1. Goal is Int. collabor. to promote well being of colonial peoples by:

- (a) develop self govt
- (b) social & econ devel.
- (c) ?

2. Majority of problems are not in dep. areas themselves

3. ∴ need something broader & more flexible than mandates

4. Proposal—regional bodies

5. Full publicity re colonial admn—desire uniformity of admn.

Proposal: Regional bodies could make recommends. to individual govts or gen. decl.

Eur H Com.<sup>4</sup>

- (a) Jebb said might continue as regional body
- (b) Wants it also to make provisional demarcations
- (c) Mix with quarterly meetings to be held at its seat.

Put temporary nature into Protocol

To assist, where conditions require, in the maintenance of internal order, such assistance to include where other means fail the joint use of force.

<sup>1</sup> Transcribed for this volume from longhand notes in pencil.

<sup>2</sup> An account of Byrnes' talk with the "State Department delegation" is given by Stettinius, pp. 88-89. Only Byrnes and Jebb of the British delegation are identified as participants by Hiss, and the Stettinius account adds nothing on this point.

<sup>3</sup> Dependent. (Throughout the Hiss notes the editors have supplied footnote explanations for a few of the more important and unusual abbreviations at the points where they first appear.)

<sup>4</sup> European High Commission.



to take, upon the unanimous decision of the Commission, action designed to accomplish the following aims:

When the emergency which has given rise to action by the Commission in any country has terminated the Commission will terminate

Justice Byrnes 2:15

(Leahy earlier meeting: get US troops out of Eur)

Pres. fears taking internal rep.

Pres. doesn't like "big" organ.

Mr. B doesn't like indep. auth. of U. S. Commissioner Would prefer decl. with auth. to Ambassadors to act as specified in protocol. Amb. are appointed with consent of Pres. & are under control of Sec.

Mr. B fears any agency would perpetuate itself

Redraft as mere decl.—ad hoc commission for any country

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ROOSEVELT-STALIN MEETING, FEBRUARY 4, 1945, 4 P. M.,  
LIVADIA PALACE <sup>1</sup>

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Mr. Bohlen

SOVIET UNION

Marshal Stalin  
Foreign Commissar Molotov  
Mr. Pavlov

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*Bohlen Minutes*

TOP SECRET

Subject: General Discussion.

After an exchange of amenities, in which the President thanked Marshal Stalin for all the successful efforts that had been made for his comfort and convenience, the President said that the military situation was considerably improved since they had last met.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that this was certainly true, and that the Soviet armies were moving very successfully onto the line of the Oder.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he had made a number of bets on board the cruiser coming over as to whether the Russians would get to Berlin before the Americans would get to Manila.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that he was certain the Americans would get to Manila before the Russians got to Berlin, since there was at present very hard fighting going on for the Oder line.

There followed a discussion about the climate and characteristics of the Crimea.

<sup>1</sup> According to Stettinius (pp. 83-84), Harriman called on Molotov at Koreiz after dinner on February 3 and arranged for this meeting of Roosevelt and Stalin.

THE PRESIDENT said that he had been very much struck by the extent of German destruction in the Crimea and therefore he was more bloodthirsty in regard to the Germans than he had been a year ago, and he hoped that Marshal Stalin would again propose a toast to the execution of 50,000 officers of the German Army.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that because of the honest blood shed in fighting the Germans, everyone was more bloodthirsty than they had been a year ago, adding that the destruction in the Crimea is nothing compared to that which occurred in the Ukraine. He said in the Crimea the Germans had been out-flanked and had had little time to carry out planned destruction, whereas in the Ukraine they had done it with method and calculation. He said the Germans were savages and seemed to hate with a sadistic hatred the creative work of human beings.

THE PRESIDENT agreed with this.

MARSHAL STALIN then inquired about the military situation on the Western Front.

THE PRESIDENT replied that General Marshall, at the five o'clock meeting, would give a detailed outline of the situation and plans, but he could say now that there was an offensive planned for the 8th of February and another on the 12th, but that the main blow of the Anglo-American armies on the Western Front would take place in March.

MARSHAL STALIN expressed gratification at this news, and said that General Antonov of the Soviet General Staff would give a detailed review of the situation on the Eastern Front at the five o'clock meeting. He added that if it were possible to capture the Ruhr and Saar regions the Germans would be deprived of all sources of coal, since the Russians had already captured the Silesia basin.

THE PRESIDENT said he felt that the armies were getting close enough to have contact between and he hoped General Eisenhower could communicate directly with the Soviet Staff rather than through the Chiefs of Staff in London and Washington as in the past.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed and thought it was very important and promised that the staffs while here would work out the details of this suggestion. He added that if the Germans were deprived of all their coal, since they were already short of bread, there was a possibility that the German collapse would come before absolute military defeat.

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether the Soviet bridgeheads across the Oder were sufficient for further offensive action.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that in regard to these bridgeheads, of which there were five or six, fierce battles were in progress on the Eastern front.

THE PRESIDENT said that one of the difficulties on the Western Front was that we had no secure bridgeheads and that on the upper

Rhine the current was so strong with floating ice that it made it very difficult for pontoon operations, but that General Eisenhower felt once he reached the Rhine he would be able to cross it, but he did not expect this before March. He added that the British had wanted to make a major crossing of the Rhine on the north sector in Holland, but since we had four times the number of men in France that the British had we felt we were entitled to have an alternative, which would be either through Holland or in the region of Mainz.

THE PRESIDENT then inquired how Marshal Stalin had gotten along with General de Gaulle.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that he had not found de Gaulle a very complicated person, but he felt he was unrealistic in the sense that France had not done very much fighting in this war and de Gaulle demanded full rights with the Americans, British and Russians who had done the burden of the fighting.

THE PRESIDENT then described his conversation with de Gaulle in Casablanca two years ago when de Gaulle compared himself with Joan of Arc as the spiritual leader of France and with Clemenceau as the political leader.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that de Gaulle does not seem to understand the situation in France and that in actual fact the French contribution at the present time to military operations on the Western Front was very small and that in 1940 they had not fought at all.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he recently decided to arm eight new French divisions composed of Frenchmen who had had previous military training.

MARSHAL STALIN said that was good insofar as it would help the American armies but at present he felt the de Gaulle army was very weak.

THE PRESIDENT said he had recently heard that the French Government did not plan to annex outright any German territory but they are willing to have it placed under international control.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that was not the story de Gaulle had told in Moscow—there he said the Rhine was the natural boundary of France and he wished to have French troops placed there in permanency.

THE PRESIDENT said he would now tell the Marshal something indiscreet, since he would not wish to say it in front of Prime Minister Churchill, namely that the British for two years have had the idea of artificially building up France into a strong power which would have 200,000 troops on the eastern border of France to hold the line for the period required to assemble a strong British army. He said the British were a peculiar people and wished to have their cake and eat it too.

THE PRESIDENT then said that he understood the tripartite zones in regard to occupation of Germany were already agreed upon, to which Marshal Stalin appeared to agree, but he went on to say that one outstanding question was that of a French zone of occupation. The President said he had had a good deal of trouble with the British in regard to zones of occupation. He said that he would of [have] preferred to have the northwest zone which would be independent of communications through France, but the British seemed to think that the Americans should restore order in France and then return political control to the British.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired whether the President thought France should have a zone of occupation, and for what reason.

THE PRESIDENT said he thought it was not a bad idea, but he added that it was only out of kindness.

Both MARSHAL STALIN and MR. MOLOTOV spoke up vigorously and said that would be the only reason to give France a zone. Marshal Stalin said that question would have to be considered further here at Yalta.

As it was then three minutes to five, the President suggested that they proceed to the conference room where the military staffs were gathered.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The Log (*ante*, p. 552) indicates that the President met with Hopkins, Matthews, and Bohlen at 4:30 p. m. on February 4. No record of such a meeting has been found, and there is no other evidence to indicate that such a meeting actually took place.

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## FIRST PLENARY MEETING, FEBRUARY 4, 1945, 5 P. M., LIVADIA PALACE

### PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Marshal Stalin
Secretary Stettinius	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy	Field Marshal Brooke	General of the Army Antonov
General of the Army Marshall	Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal	Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov
Fleet Admiral King	Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham	Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov
Major General Kuter	Field Marshal Alexander	Mr. Vvshinsky
Major General Deane	General Ismay	Mr. Gromyko
Brigadier General McFarland	Major Birse	Mr. Gusev
Mr. Harriman		Mr. Maisky
Mr. Bohlen		Mr. Pavlov

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TOP SECRET

Subject: The Military Situation.

MARSHAL STALIN said he hoped the President would again consent to opening the meeting.

THE PRESIDENT replied that his opening of this meeting, as had been the case in Tehran, was not based on any law or historic tradition but merely by chance. He said that he was honored to open this great Conference and he wished first of all to express on behalf of the American guests here their deep appreciation for the hospitality and splendid arrangements made by Marshal Stalin and his assistants for their comfort and convenience. He said that he knew that all the people he represented wished peace above all and the war to be over as soon as possible. He said that he felt that we understood each other much better now than we had in the past and that month by month our understanding was growing. For this reason, he felt safe in proposing that the talks be conducted in an informal manner in which each would speak his mind frankly and freely, since he had discovered through experience that the best way to conduct business expeditiously was through frank and free speaking. He said he knew that while they were here in Yalta they would cover the map of the world, but today he thought that military questions, particularly those on the most important front of all, the Eastern Front, should be the subject of discussion. He said he wished to add that when the Red Armies advanced into Germany 25 kilometers, it was doubtful whether the Soviet people were more thrilled than those of the United States and those of Great Britain. Here, he thought, it would be most appropriate if the Marshal would ask one of his staff officers to give a detailed report on the Eastern Front.

GENERAL ANTONOV then read a prepared paper, giving in great detail the background development of the Soviet offensive of early January, the estimate of enemy probabilities and the results of the offensive. He concluded with the statement of Soviet desires with regard to the actions of their Allies. (A copy in translation of General Antonov's report is attached hereto.<sup>1</sup>)

In regard to the part of the Soviet report where General Antonov referred to the number of divisions which were being moved to the East, the PRIME MINISTER asked if he could go into more detail as to where they were coming from.

GENERAL ANTONOV stated that they anticipated that there would be five German divisions from Norway, twelve from the Western

<sup>1</sup> For the text of General Antonov's statement, see the Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes of this meeting, *post*, pp. 531-533.

Front, eight from Italy, and eight from the interior of Germany which would be moved to the Eastern Front to reinforce the Germans.

THE PRESIDENT then inquired whether in the advance into Germany the Russians had altered the gauge of the railroads from the customary European gauge to the wide Russian gauge.

GENERAL ANTONOV replied that the majority of the locomotives and wagons which they had captured from the Germans had been so badly damaged that they had been useless and it was, therefore, necessary to widen the gauge on a few important lines of the railroads in order to accommodate Russian rolling stock to supply the troops.

THE PRESIDENT said that as our armies are now approaching each other in Germany it was important that the staffs should discuss this problem so that there would be a definite place in Germany where the different gauges would meet.

MARSHAL STALIN answered at this point that the greater part of the German railroad lines would remain of their customary gauge and that it was not for pleasure but for absolute necessity that any at all had been changed, since the Soviet Union did not have adequate resources to adopt this expedient to a greater extent than was absolutely necessary.

THE PRIME MINISTER then said that he had a number of questions in regard to General Antonov's report, that he felt that the Anglo-American and Russian staffs which were here gathered for the first time should discuss these technical military matters between themselves. He added, for example, that it was important to find out how long it would take the enemy to move these divisions from Italy and the Western Front to the Eastern Front and whether the Allies could be of more help by reinforcing the Western Front or by leaving the divisions in Italy, or by moving across the Adriatic into the Balkans. He suggested that General Marshall, with the President's approval, present a picture of the operations on the Western Front.

GENERAL MARSHALL then gave the following general summary of the situation on the Western Front:

The Ardennes bulge had now been eliminated and in certain places the Allied armies were further to the East than they had been when the German offensive began.

In the last week General Eisenhower has been regrouping his divisions for future offensive action and was engaged in eliminating enemy pockets on the southern sector of the line north of Switzerland. He was exerting pressure on the base of the Ardennes bulge for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Germans were in sufficient force to successfully oppose a movement Northeast in the direction of Bonn or whether such an operation would require special preparation. He had ascertained that the German resistance was too strong and four days ago has ceased operations in this area and begun to transfer divisions

to the North. North of Switzerland operations were being directed toward the elimination of German positions around Mulhausen and Colmar. Colmar had been taken but the First French Army was advancing very slowly north of Mulhausen.

Small German bridgeheads to the north of Strasbourg were being eliminated. When our forces have reached the Rhine a number of divisions will be released through the shortening of the line.

Field Marshal Montgomery in command of the 21st British Army Group and the United States Ninth Army is preparing offensive action in a Southeast direction north of Düsseldorf. A supporting operation is planned by the Ninth Army in a northeast direction toward the same objective. The first of these operations is expected to commence on February 8 and the second approximately a week later. These two operations are designed to drive the Germans East of the Rhine and to cross the river North of the Ruhr. This operation will be the main blow of the Anglo-American armies. Airborne divisions will be used in large numbers to land East of the Rhine.

The passage of the Rhine is considered possible after the first of March. Although a crossing would be attempted if the Rhine were reached before that date it would be a hazardous operation because of ice conditions and the strength of the current. There are three good crossings in this sector and a fourth may be attempted. Only five divisions could be accommodated on the actual front of the assault.

In the South the left wing of the United States First Army was endeavoring to carry out the capture of two dams on the Roer River. Despite air action these dams remained intact and there was a danger of imperilling our positions in that area if the Germans were to open the dams.

Plans have been made for a secondary effort in the area of Frankfurt as an alternative if the main operation in the North suffers a check.

Operations on the Western Front had been limited by the shortage of supplies due to inadequacy of shipping. The opening of the port of Antwerp has remedied this situation and the armies are now receiving adequate supplies. The utilization of the town of Rouen has facilitated the movement of supplies. It is now possible to bring in 75,000 to 80,000 tons of dry cargo and 12,000 to 15,000 tons of wet cargo a day. The Germans were endeavoring to disrupt the use of the port of Antwerp by robot bombs and rockets and sporadic air attack. The day before yesterday sixty robot bombs and six rockets fell on the city of Antwerp. One ship had been destroyed and one oil dump blown up. The chief danger was that a lucky hit might destroy the Antwerp lock gates. When weather permitted the American Air Forces had been extremely active in destroying German transport, railroad lines and troop convoys, particularly in the direction of Cologne.

MARSHAL STALIN then inquired if there was any definite estimate of the actual destruction done by the tactical air force.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that he did not have the exact estimates but the destruction had been very heavy. According to present data the German oil production had been reduced to about 20% of its former capacity as a result of Allied heavy bombing. They had also struck at tank factories, motor transport factories, rail communications and assembly yards. In these operations were included the heavy bombers from Italy which, when the weather did not permit a strike on Germany, operated in the valley of the Po and against railroad lines leading from Italy into Germany.

In reply to a question General Marshall stated that there were approximately 32 enemy divisions on the Italian front, 27 German and 5 Italian, facing an approximately equal number of Allied divisions. The Allied forces have superiority in fighter aircraft in this theater.

GENERAL MARSHALL mentioned briefly the submarine danger which was more threatening at the moment than it had been in the past, due largely to improvements in German technical methods. At the time of the African landings there had been 100 enemy submarines operating in the Atlantic. At the present time there were between 30 and 35 in the Atlantic and their threat was potential rather than actual. He said difficulty had been encountered in attacking submarines in the shallow waters around the British Isles because the tide made it difficult for ASDIC to locate them. The Allied heavy bomber force has been striking heavily at submarine pens and construction yards but first priority was still being given to enemy oil production and refining centers.

GENERAL MARSHALL concluded by saying that Field Marshal Brooke might have something to add to his report on the military situation.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he hoped that Field Marshal Brooke would have some news, but he certainly hoped that Admiral Cunningham would be able to speak on the help the Soviet Armies could give in the U-boat war, since Danzig was the principal point of construction of U-boats.

MARSHAL STALIN asked what were the other points.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM replied: Kiel and Hamburg.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that we had had great experience with the United States forces in working out the crossing of oceans for landing operations but that we hoped to benefit by the Russian experience in crossing rivers. There was an officer here especially charged with that duty and he hoped to be able to get into contact with the Russian staff on this subject.

MARSHAL STALIN then asked a number of questions particularly relating to the potentials which the Anglo-Americans would have in



the Northern area and those designated for the attacks on February 8 and February 15. He said that on the central front in Poland the Soviet Army had enjoyed a superiority of 100 divisions over the Germans as well as overwhelming artillery supremacy. He added that they had had 9,000 planes on a relatively narrow front in Eastern Poland. He said that the Red Army had had 9,000 tanks on the break-through sector on the central front.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that approximately one in three Allied divisions was armored comprising 200-300 units. There was some discussion as to the relative strength of the German and Allied divisions in which General Marshall said that a German panzer division which they had encountered on the Western Front had had a complement of 23,000 men, at which Marshal Stalin expressed surprise.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he understood that the British division was composed of 18,000 men and the American 14,000 with tank divisions of approximately 10,000 men.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL, in reply to a question from Marshal Stalin, said that we would have 8,000 to 9,000 aircraft on the section of the Western Front designated for the attack, of which 4,000 would be Anglo-American heavy bombers capable of carrying 3 to 4 tons of bombs each.

THE PRIME MINISTER said, in reply to Marshal Stalin's observations that they had 180 Soviet divisions against 80 German divisions on the central front in Poland, that the Anglo-American armies had never had a superiority in manpower but that their superiority had rested in air power and armor.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that ten days ago there had been 79 German divisions on the Western Front opposing 78 Anglo-American divisions.

MARSHAL STALIN then said that in the present offensive the Soviet armies had enjoyed artillery supremacy of four to one and gave a brief description in the manner in which the special Soviet artillery "break-through" divisions had been organized. He said that these artillery divisions had from 300 to 400 guns and in addition to offensive operations the corps artillery was added during the attack. For example, on a front from 35 to 45 kilometers, Marshal Konev had had six artillery "break-through" divisions and the corps artillery, which meant that for every kilometer there were some 230 guns of heavy calibre. The result was after a two hour bombardment a gate was opened in the front through which the Soviet forces advanced fifteen kilometers the first day. The German losses in killed and wounded were very heavy and the survivors were severely stunned and shell shocked. Marshal Stalin then said that they had explained their desires from their Allies, but that they had learned from the

discussions already undertaken that their desires had already been met, and inquired what were the wishes of the Allies in regard to the Red Army.

THE PRIME MINISTER said first of all that he wished to express the gratitude of England and he was sure of America for the massive power and successes of the Soviet offensive.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that this was not a desire. Marshal Stalin then said that the Soviet Union was not bound by any agreement at Tehran to conduct a winter offensive and despite what some people had thought no demand or request had been received from the President or the Prime Minister in regard to such an offensive. The President had asked him to receive a representative, Air Marshal Tedder, from General Eisenhower's staff to discuss the situation and he had, of course, immediately agreed. He said that he mentioned this only to emphasize the spirit of the Soviet leaders who not only fulfilled formal obligations but went farther and acted on what they conceived to be their moral duty to their Allies. He said Air Marshal Tedder had explained the desire, which he presumed was that of the President and the Prime Minister, that the Soviet army continue their offensive operations until the end of March. Marshal Stalin said that they would do it if the weather and road conditions permitted.

THE PRESIDENT said that he thoroughly agreed with Marshal Stalin's statement since at the Tehran Conference it had been merely agreed that each partner would move as quickly and as far as possible against the common enemy. He said at that time he personally was facing an election, and that it had been impossible to make detailed plans far into the future. Also at that time our armies were separated by many miles. Now, however, the President said, with our armies approaching each other it should be possible to coordinate more closely our operational plans.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that the reason no request had been made on Marshal Stalin was because of the complete confidence which the President and he felt in the Marshal, the Russian people and the efficiency of the Russian military, and therefore, there had been no attempt to strike any bargain. He had always been thoroughly confident that when an offensive was possible the Red Army would attack. The Prime Minister added that no matter what discussions Air Marshal Tedder had had in Moscow, he felt that it was of the highest importance that the three staffs which were assembled here for the first time should really work out together detailed plans for the coordination of the joint blows against Germany; so that if the Soviet offensive came to a halt because of the weather or road conditions the Allied armies could move. The best of all would be for both armies to attack simultaneously from the East and the West.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed with the Prime Minister but stated that they had to take into account what had occurred; that when the Anglo-American armies were on the offensive in the West the Soviet armies were not ready and conversely. He felt that it would be most useful for the staffs to discuss the question of a summer offensive against Germany because he was not so sure that the war would be over before summer.

MR. CHURCHILL replied that he thoroughly shared the view of the Marshal and that we should take full advantage of this gathering.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM then gave a short review of the situation in regard to German submarines. He said that the threat was more potential than actual at the present time. The Germans had kept technically ahead of the Allies although the present sinkings around the British Isles were not serious. We knew, however, that based on a prefabricated method of construction the Germans were building large submarines of a new type fitted out with the latest devices and with high underwater speed. He said that these submarines were being built primarily at Kiel, Hamburg and Danzig and that since the Marshal had asked for our desires he would give a naval desire, namely, that the Red Army should as soon as possible take Danzig where 30% of the German submarine construction was being carried out.

THE PRESIDENT asked if Danzig was within range of Soviet artillery fire.

MARSHAL STALIN replied in the negative but expressed the hope that it soon would be.

It was then agreed that the Military Staffs would meet tomorrow at 12:00 noon at the Soviet villa at Koreis and that tomorrow, February 5, there would be a meeting at the Livadia Palace at 4:00 p. m. between the President, Marshal Stalin, and the Prime Minister and the three Foreign Ministers on the political treatment of Germany.

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J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

TOP SECRET

MARSHAL STALIN asked the President to open the meeting.

THE PRESIDENT said that he was very happy to open such a historic meeting in such a lovely spot. In view of the conveniences and comforts that had been provided the visiting delegations, he wished to thank Marshal Stalin for all that he had found time to do in this regard in the midst of the prosecution of the war. He said that the United States, British and Russian delegations would understand each other better and better as we go along. We could therefore proceed informally to discuss frankly and freely among ourselves the matters necessary to the successful prosecution of the common cause in which

we all are engaged. There was much that required discussion, the whole map in Europe in fact. Today, however, the conversations by common agreement would be concerned with Germany. In this connection he felt sure that the British and American people were viewing with a satisfaction as deep as must be that of the Soviet people themselves the successful advances of the Soviet armies against the common enemy.

MARSHAL STALIN said that Colonel General Antonov, Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, would outline the situation existing on the Eastern Front.

GENERAL ANTONOV made the following statement:

Soviet forces from the 12th to the 15th of January went into attack on the front from the Niemen River to the Carpathians, a distance of 700 kilometers. Forces of General Cherniakhovsky advanced towards Koenigsberg; forces of Marshal Rokossovsky, along the north bank of the Vistula cutting off East Prussia from central Germany; forces of Marshal Zhukov, south of the Vistula against Poznan; forces of Marshal Konev, against Chenstokhov-Breslau; forces of General Petrov, in the area of the Carpathians against Novo Targ. The greatest blow was delivered by the army groups of Rokossovsky, Zhukov, and Konev on the Ostrolenka-Crakow front, 300 kilometers.

Because of the unfavorable weather conditions, this operation was to commence at the end of January when weather conditions were expected to improve. Since the operation was planned and prepared as an operation in full strength, it was hoped to carry it out under the most favorable conditions possible. Nevertheless, in view of the difficult circumstances on the Western Front in connection with the German attack in the Ardennes, the High Command of the Soviet Army gave an order to commence the attack not later than the middle of January, not waiting for improvement in weather.

The enemy grouping, after the Soviet forces reached the Narev and Vistula Rivers, was the most concentrated on the central sector of the front, since striking from this sector led our troops out along the shortest route to the vital centers of Germany. In order to create for ourselves more advantageous conditions for attack, the Supreme Soviet Command decided to extend it to the central group of the enemy. For this purpose this operation was conducted as a subsidiary against East Prussia, and the advance in Hungary toward Budapest was continued. Both of these attacks were for the Germans very painful, and they quickly reacted to our attack by a swift transfer of power onto the flank at the expense of the central sector of our front; thus, out of 24 tank divisions on our front, representing the principal German striking power, 11 tank divisions were drawn in to the Budapest sector, 6 tank divisions on the East Prussian (3 tank divisions were located in Courland), and thus on the central part of the front there

remained only 4 tank divisions. The aim of the High Command was accomplished.

On the front from Ostrolenka to Crakow, that is, in the area of our greatest attack, the enemy had up to 80 divisions. We set up a grouping calculated on having a superiority over the enemy: in infantry, more than double; in artillery, tanks and aviation, a decided superiority.

The massing of artillery on the sectors of the break-through amounted to 220-230 guns (from 75 mm. and above) on one kilometer of the front.

The advance was begun under extremely unfavorable weather conditions—low visibility and fog, which completely ruled out the possibility of air operations and limited artillery observation to several hundred meters.

Due to good preliminary reconnaissance of the enemy positions and a powerful artillery advance, the fire power of the enemy was overwhelmed and his fortifications destroyed. This situation permitted our troops during the first day of the advance to move forward 10 to 15 kilometers, that is, to completely break through the entire tactical depth of the enemy defense.

*The following results were achieved:*

a. During the 18 days of the advance, the Soviet troops moved forward up to 500 kilometers in the direction of the main offensive.

Thus the average speed of forward movement was 25-30 kilometers per day.

b. The Soviet troops came out onto the Oder River on the sector from Kyustrin (north of Frankfurt) and south and seized the Silesian industrial area.

c. They cut across the main roads and cut off enemy groups in East Prussia from central Germany; thus, in addition to the Courland group (26 divisions) isolated 27 divisions of the enemy group; a series of divisional groupings were surrounded and annihilated in the region of Lodz, Torne, Poznan, Shneidmul and others, an approximate total of up to 15 divisions.

d. Break-throughs in force of long duration of German defensive positions in East Prussia in the Koenigsberg and Latvian directions.

e. Destroyed 45 German divisions against which we sustained the following losses:

Prisoners	—about 100,000 men
Casualties	—about 300,000 men
Total	—approximately 400,000 men.

*Probable enemy action:*

a. The Germans will defend Berlin for which they will try to hold up the movement of the Soviet troops in the area of the Oder River, set-

ting up the defense here at the expense of withdrawn troops and at the expense of reserves being moved over from Germany, Western Europe and Italy.

For the defense of Pomerania they will try to use their Courland grouping, moving it over by sea beyond the Vistula.

b. The Germans will probably cover the direction leading to Vienna more strongly, strengthening this sector at the expense of troops now in action in Italy.

*The shifting of enemy troops:*

a. On our front there have already appeared:

From the central regions of Germany	—9 divisions
From the Western European Front	—6 divisions
From Italy	—1 division
Total	<u>16 divisions</u>

b. In the process of being shifted:

4 tank divisions
1 motorized division
<u>5 divisions</u>

c. It is probable that there will yet be shifted up to 30–35 divisions (at the expense of the Western European Front, Norway, Italy, and reserves located in Germany).

In this manner there can appear on our front an additional 35 to 40 divisions.

*Our wishes are:*

a. To speed up the advance of the Allied troops on the Western Front, for which the present situation is very favorable:

- (1) To defeat the Germans on the Eastern Front.
- (2) To defeat the German groupings which have advanced into the Ardennes.
- (3) The weakening of the German forces in the West in connection with the shifting of their reserves to the East.

It is desirable to begin the advance during the first half of February.

b. By air action on communications hinder the enemy from carrying out the shifting of his troops to the East from the Western Front, from Norway, and from Italy.

In particular, to paralyze the junctions of Berlin and Leipzig.

c. Not permit the enemy to remove his forces from Italy.

THE PRESIDENT asked whether the Russians proposed to change the gauge of the railroad rolling stock captured from the Germans or to widen the gauge of the lines.

GENERAL ANTONOV replied that much of the equipment was unfit for use. At present the Russians are widening the gauge of those lines

that are most vital to supply. These lines were being widened only as a matter of necessity as, manifestly, the available resources are not sufficient to widen all the railroads in Germany. The greater part of the German lines will remain intact.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that the British Delegation would have a number of questions to address to the Russians. As these were of a technical and military nature, he thought it would be more advantageous if they could be brought up between the military staffs.

THE PRIME MINISTER then suggested that General Marshall explain to Marshal Stalin the impending operations on the Western Front.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out the increasing necessity for coordinating the operations of the three Allies now that the British and American armies are getting so close to the Russians. By reason of the short distance separating the Western and Eastern Fronts the Germans are now able to transfer their reserves quickly from one front to the other.

GENERAL MARSHALL then gave a résumé of the operations planned for the Western Front. He said that the German bulge in the Ardennes had now been eliminated and the Allied forces have advanced in some areas beyond the line originally held. During the past week General Eisenhower has been regrouping his forces and conducting operations designed to eliminate enemy pockets in the southern part of the line north of Switzerland. At the same time he has been maintaining pressure in the Ardennes area in order to determine whether the Germans were present in sufficient forces to resist a movement northeast towards Bonn. Because of the resistance encountered, it was decided four days ago to cease operations and to transfer divisions further north. In the southern end of the line, operations were being directed towards the elimination of the German positions in the vicinity of Mulhausen and Colmar. Colmar has now been occupied but the advance of the First French Army north of Mulhausen has been very slow.

North of Strasbourg the small German bridgeheads across the Rhine are being eliminated. As soon as the Rhine is reached it will be possible to reduce the number of divisions in the front line and release them for other employments. Some released divisions are even now moving north in preparation for the larger operations.

Field Marshal Montgomery, in command of the 21st Army Group and Ninth U. S. Army, is preparing an operation designed to strike towards the southeast in order to reach the line of the Rhine from Düsseldorf north. A complementary operation has been planned in a northeast direction towards the same objective, which it is hoped can be launched about a week later than the first operation. By means of these two operations it is hoped to drive the Germans east of the Rhine north of Düsseldorf and then to cross the river north of the Ruhr. This crossing will constitute the main effort of the British and

American armies and into it will be put all of the divisions which it is logistically possible to support. In addition, airborne troops in large numbers will land east of the Rhine.

From the standpoint of weather, the passage of the Rhine is considered possible after 1 March. A crossing will be attempted as soon as the river is reached, but it is recognized that ice will make hazardous any crossing prior to 1 March. Three good crossing sites are available for the operation and a fourth may be attempted. However, the front of the assault will accommodate initially only five divisions.

Plans have been made for a secondary effort in the vicinity of Frankfurt which can be exploited if the main effort in the North should fail to go through. The troops composing the left of the American First Army are now conducting an operation designed to capture the two dams controlling the water in the Roer River. As long as these dams are in the hands of the Germans, there is a danger that the bridges established for the river crossing may be swept away by the release of the impounded water.

The opening of the port of Antwerp has relieved the limitation on operations on the Western Front imposed by a lack of supplies. It is now possible to bring in from 75,000 to 80,000 tons of dry cargo a day. The Germans have realized the importance of Antwerp in the Allied supply scheme and have made a continuous effort to interfere with the operations of that port through the use of robot bombs and rockets. This constitutes a danger as there is, of course, always a chance of a lucky hit being made against the Antwerp lock gates. Only scattered attacks have been made by air.

United States and British fighters and light bombers supporting the ground troops have destroyed a great deal of German transport. Considerable effort has been directed against trains operating in the vicinity of Cologne and on the east bank of the Rhine. Although definite final reports have not yet been received, there is every indication of severe damage having been done to panzer divisions withdrawing from the Ardennes.

The heavy bombers have been employed primarily against German oil supplies in order to reduce the German supply of fuel for airplanes and motor transport. Present data indicate that these operations have resulted in a reduction of German oil production to 20 percent of the former capacity. The heavy bombers have also been used against German rail communications and assembly yards and a continuous effort has been maintained to destroy German fighter forces. These planes have also struck heavily at tank factories. The air forces in these operations include United States heavy bombers operating from the Italian Front. When weather prevents profitable operations in the Po Valley, they are directed against communications leading into Germany.



There are now about 32 enemy divisions on the Italian Front, 27 German and 5 Italian. The number of Allied divisions is approximately equal. The Allied forces have great superiority in fighter airplanes and these, in good weather, are able to ravage the Po Valley. The destruction of rail lines and rolling stock has been heavy.

Indications point to a serious resumption of the German submarine war as the result of technical developments which are making the detection of the submarines increasingly difficult. The submarines have developed considerable skill in operating in shallow waters where the tide makes it difficult for ASDIC to locate them. In order to counter this submarine resurgence, heavy bombers are being employed to strike at submarine assembly points whenever these operations do not interfere with the bombing of the German oil supplies.

In concluding, GENERAL MARSHALL said he would be glad to have Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke amplify his remarks in any way he thought desirable.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated he would be very glad for Field Marshal Brooke to do this and stated that he would like for Admiral Cunningham also to say a word about the submarine operations.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that Danzig is the place where much of the assembling of the submarines is done and expressed satisfaction in the thought that the city is now not far from the Russian front lines, which are daily drawing closer.

In answer to a question from Marshal Stalin, the PRIME MINISTER said that other submarine assembling points were Kiel and Hamburg.

FIELD MARSHAL BROOKE said that General Marshall had fully covered the situation now existing on the Western Front and the operations which are contemplated for the future. He said that the British Chiefs of Staff were in full accord with the plan for the future operations which General Marshall had outlined.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that both the British and Americans have amphibious branches in their services. The officer commanding the British amphibious branch is at present in ARGONAUT and he, the Prime Minister, would like very much to have him meet with the Russian amphibious experts and obtain from them any information which the Russians would be kind enough to provide.

In reply to a question from Marshal Stalin, GENERAL MARSHALL explained that the front of the main effort in the impending operations covered three crossings over a distance of 25 or 30 miles and afforded room for not more than five divisions. The front eventually would extend all along the Rhine down as far as Düsseldorf, a total of some 50 or 60 miles. He pointed out that, as was the case in Normandy, it will be necessary to assault initially on a narrow front but this front would be expanded as rapidly as possible. He said that the Ruhr was very heavily fortified and for that reason would

be by-passed. However, troops attacking on this front would soon get into good tank country.

In answer to a question from Marshal Stalin, GENERAL MARSHALL said the reserves available for the proposed attack were believed to be ample.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he asked the question because in the Russian central campaign 9,000 tanks were used up. He would like to know how many tanks the Allies expected to employ.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that roughly one in every three divisions employed would be a tank division. He said that on March 1st General Eisenhower will have 89 divisions at his disposal to cover the front from the Mediterranean to Holland, not including Italy; nine of these were French and all the remainder were either British or American.

Through answers to his questions it was made clear to Marshal Stalin that there are nearly 10,000 Allied tanks in the European Theater. The British divisions number 18,000 men, the American divisions 14,000, and armored divisions contain 10,000. There will be available 4,000 heavy bombers, each carrying up to 3,000 pounds of bombs.

MARSHAL STALIN explained that in their attack on the central German position, the Russians employed 100 divisions, which was 20 more than the Germans had. He was interested in the preponderance that the British and Americans would have over the Germans.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that the British and American forces had overwhelming preponderance in airplanes and armored troops but not great preponderance in infantry. He stressed the necessity of exploiting to the full such superiority in strength as existed.

MARSHAL STALIN said that the British and Americans had asked the Russians to express their wishes. He would like to know now what the wishes of the British and Americans were.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that his greatest wish was to express profound gratitude and admiration as he witnessed the marvelous advance of the Russian troops. He said the British and Americans recognized the hard and difficult task lying before them in their impending operations but had full confidence in their power to execute it. All they could ask from the Russians was that the Russians continue to do as they are doing now.

MARSHAL STALIN said there had been no demand from the British and Americans for the Russian winter offensive and no pressure was exerted by them to bring it about.

THE PRESIDENT had asked that information of the offensive be given to General Eisenhower in order to assist him in his planning and Air Marshal Tedder, who came to Moscow as General Eisen-

hower's representative, had requested that the Russian offensive continue to the end of March but this was understood to be a request from the military leaders.

MARSHAL STALIN said they had staged their winter offensive because they felt it to be their duty as Allies to do it. They greatly appreciated the attitude manifested by both the President and the Prime Minister in this matter.

THE PRIME MINISTER said the reason that neither the British nor Americans had made any attempt to bargain with Marshal Stalin was because of their faith in him and in the Russian people and the realization that they could be depended on to do the right thing. It was his opinion that regardless of the discussions which had been held with Air Marshal Tedder, matters should be fully discussed now by the three Staffs in order to determine what is the best course to pursue with respect to the coordinating of the action on the Western and Eastern Fronts. It was imperative that the two offensives should be integrated so as to get the best results.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed that the offensives had not been fully synchronized at first and that action should be taken to do this now. He thought it would be well also to consider a summer offensive as he was not at all certain that the war would be over by that time.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM said that he would like to add something to General Marshall's statement on the submarine warfare. He said while the submarine threat was potentially great it was not very serious at the moment. The point is, however, that the Germans are building large numbers of new types of U-boats. As these will have high underwater speed and embody all the latest technical devices, it will be very difficult for the Allied air and surface craft to deal with them. In Bremen, Hamburg and Danzig the new submarines were being built by prefabrication methods. His greatest wish as a naval man was for the Russians to take Danzig as quickly as possible for in that city about 30 percent of the U-boats were being constructed.

In answer to a question by the President, MARSHAL STALIN stated that Danzig was not yet within artillery range of the Russian guns but it was hoped that it soon would be.

Discussion then turned upon the time and place of the next meeting. After discussion, it was agreed that the Staffs of the three nations would meet at 1200 on Monday, 5 February, at the headquarters of the Russian Delegation.

TRIPARTITE DINNER MEETING, FEBRUARY 4, 1945, 8:30 P. M.,  
LIVADIA PALACE <sup>1</sup>

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Marshal Stalin
Secretary Stettinius	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Byrnes <sup>2</sup>	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Harriman	Major Birse	Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Bohlen		Mr. Pavlov

Bohlen Collection

*Bohlen Minutes*

TOP SECRET

Subject: Voice of Smaller Powers in Postwar Peace Organization.

Before dinner and during the greater part of the dinner the conversation was general and personal in character. Marshal Stalin, the President and the Prime Minister appeared to be in very good humor throughout the dinner. No political or military subjects of any importance were discussed until the last half hour of the dinner when indirectly the subject of the responsibility and rights of the big powers as against those of the small powers came up.

MARSHAL STALIN made it quite plain on a number of occasions that he felt that the three Great Powers which had borne the brunt of the war and had liberated from German domination the small powers should have the unanimous right to preserve the peace of the world. He said that he could serve no other interest than that of the Soviet state and people but that in the international arena the Soviet Union was prepared to pay its share in the preservation of peace. He said that it was ridiculous to believe that Albania would have an equal voice with the three Great Powers who had won the war and were present at this dinner. He said some of the liberated countries seemed to believe that the Great Powers had been forced to shed their blood in order to liberate them and that they were now scolding these Great Powers for failure to take into consideration the rights of these small powers.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he was prepared in concert with the United States and Great Britain to protect the rights of the small powers but that he would never agree to having any action of any of the Great Powers submitted to the judgment of the small powers.

THE PRESIDENT said he agreed that the Great Powers bore the greater responsibility and that the peace should be written by the Three Powers represented at this table.

<sup>1</sup> The President acted as host.

<sup>2</sup> Listed in the Log, *ante*, p. 553, and by Stettinius, p. 111, as being among those present, but not so listed by Bohlen.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that there was no question of the small powers dictating to the big powers but that the great nations of the world should discharge their moral responsibility and leadership and should exercise their power with moderation and great respect for the rights of the smaller nations. (Mr. Vyshinski said to Mr. Bohlen that they would never agree to the right of the small powers to judge the acts of the Great Powers, and in reply to an observation by Mr. Bohlen concerning the opinion of American people he replied that the American people should learn to obey their leaders. Mr. Bohlen said that if Mr. Vyshinski would visit the United States he would like to see him undertake to tell that to the American people. Mr. Vyshinski replied that he would be glad to do so.)

Following a toast by the Prime Minister to the proletariat masses of the world, there was considerable discussion about the rights of people to govern themselves in relation to their leaders.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that although he was constantly being "beaten up" as a reactionary, he was the only representative present who could be thrown out at any time by the universal suffrage of his own people and that personally he gloried in that danger.

MARSHAL STALIN ironically remarked that the Prime Minister seemed to fear these elections, to which the PRIME MINISTER replied that he not only did not fear them but that he was proud of the right of the British people to change their government at any time they saw fit. He added that he felt that the three nations represented here were moving toward the same goal by different methods.

THE PRIME MINISTER, referring to the rights of the small nations, gave a quotation which said: "The eagle should permit the small birds to sing and care not wherefor they sang."

After Marshal Stalin and the President had departed the Prime Minister discussed with Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius further the voting question in the Security Council. THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was inclined to the Russian view on voting procedure because he felt that everything depended on the unity of the three Great Powers and that without that the world would be subjected to inestimable catastrophe; anything that deserved [*preserved?*] that unity would have his vote. MR. EDEN took vigorous exception to the Prime Minister and pointed out that there would be no attraction or reason for the small nations to join an organization based on that principle and that he personally believed it would find no support among the English public. THE PRIME MINISTER said that he did not agree in the slightest with Mr. Eden because he was thinking of the realities of the international situation.

In reply to an inquiry of the Prime Minister in regard to the American proposal to the solution of the voting question, MR. BOHLEN remarked that the American proposal reminded him of the story of

the Southern planter who had given a bottle of whiskey to a Negro as a present. The next day he asked the Negro how he had liked the whiskey, to which the Negro replied that it was perfect. The planter asked what he meant, and the Negro said if it had been any better it would not have been given to him, and if it had been any worse he could not have drunk it.

Soon thereafter the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden took their departure, obviously in disagreement on the voting procedure on the Security Council of the Dumbarton Oaks organization.

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MONDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1945

MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, FEBRUARY 5, 1945, 10 A. M.,  
LIVADIA PALACE

PRESENT

Fleet Admiral Leahy  
General of the Army Marshall  
Fleet Admiral King  
Major General Kuter  
Lieutenant General Somervell  
Vice Admiral Cooke  
Major General Bull  
Major General Deane  
Major General Anderson  
Major General Hull  
Major General Wood  
Major General Hill

Rear Admiral McCormick  
Rear Admiral Duncan  
Brigadier General Roberts  
Brigadier General Bessell  
Brigadier General Everest  
Brigadier General Lindsay  
Commodore Burrough  
Colonel Peck  
Colonel Lincoln  
Captain Stroop  
Captain McDill  
Commander Clark

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General McFarland  
Captain Graves

J. C. S. Files

*Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

1. APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES, 185TH MEETING OF C. C. S.<sup>2</sup>

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to recommend approval of the conclusions of the Minutes of the 185th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the approval of the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.

2. BRITISH PROPOSAL TO ABANDON THE PLAN TO RETURN TO  
"CRICKET"  
(SM-411)<sup>3</sup>

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that this was a memorandum from the British Chiefs of Staff which proposed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff com-

<sup>1</sup> J. C. S. 188th Meeting.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 530-534.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

plete all of their unfinished business at MAGNETO and abandon the plan to return to Malta. The suggestion was open to discussion.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the proposal was agreeable to him as the next best thing to do. He preferred to have the United States Shipping Representatives sent to MAGNETO to complete their studies and, if necessary, to detach the necessary number from this place to provide space.

GENERAL SOMERVELL explained that the point at issue was the agreement on a planning date for the end of the war with Germany. The dates of 1 April, 1 July, and 1 November had already been considered,<sup>4</sup> but it was necessary to settle on one date. He suggested that an agreement be reached with the British on the date of 1 July for planning purposes. The only possible complication in such an arrangement would be the introduction of some other operation which would change planning.

ADMIRAL KING said that Russian concurrence should be obtained on the planning date.

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that the course of action should be as follows:

*a.* Obtain Russian concurrence to a planning date of 1 July 1945 for the end of the war with Germany, and

*b.* Detach a suitable number of personnel from MAGNETO to make room for the shipping personnel ordered from CRICKET to complete the shipping studies at this place.

After further discussion,

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

*a.* Agreed to seek Russian concurrence on the date of 1 July 1945 as the date of the collapse of Germany.

*b.* Agreed to accept the proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff contained in their memorandum of 4 February 1945 and directed the Secretaries to take necessary action.

### 3. ALLOCATION OF ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY

(J. C. S. 577/26)<sup>5</sup>

Reference: SCAF 198<sup>5</sup>

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that this subject had been under consideration by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff in Washington. J. C. S. 577/26 was the report of the Joint Logistics Committee on its own initiative, recommending the acceptance of the British proposal subject to certain amendments set forth in Appendix "A" of this paper.

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that J. C. S. 577/26 is the last of a long series of papers pertaining to the controversy with the British

<sup>4</sup> See C. C. S. 772, January 30, 1945, under Malta Conference, *ante*, pp. 478-480.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

concerning the Bremen-Bremerhaven area. General Macready wrote a letter to Mr. McCloy on 20 January offering an agreement which is on page 223.<sup>6</sup> Mr. McCloy wrote a letter back saying that this agreement was acceptable providing its meaning was in accordance with specifications which he named.

The Joint Logistics Committee in this paper has proposed a 4¼ page memorandum to the British in which the argument is somewhat unbending and proposes an agreement which amounts to amending General Macready's proposal to include Mr. McCloy's interpretations. Mr. McCloy's letter is not attached to the paper.

Failure to reach agreement on this paper is holding up the protocol on the zones of occupation in Germany.<sup>7</sup> In an effort to make more certain that this controversy will be halted, it is recommended that the action adopted be substituted for the proposal by the Joint Logistics Committee. This action consists of a presentation to the British of a short memorandum, with the draft agreement proposed by the JLC, and General Macready's letter to Mr. McCloy.

GENERAL MARSHALL then distributed copies of the memorandum to be presented to the British in lieu of the memorandum proposed by the Joint Logistics Committee.

After further discussion,

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to present to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the memorandum proposed by General Marshall, with the draft agreement proposed by the Joint Logistics Committee and General Macready's letter to Mr. McCloy attached thereto. (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 320/35)<sup>8</sup>

#### 4. RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN (J. C. S. 1176/10, J. C. S. 1176/11)<sup>9</sup>

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that in the papers under consideration the Joint Staff Planners recommend memoranda bearing on the war against Japan to be presented to the Soviet General Staff.<sup>10</sup> He questioned whether the Russians would understand the memoranda when they received them.

ADMIRAL DUNCAN explained that the memorandum embodied in J. C. S. 1176/11 had to do with a special U. S. planning staff in Moscow and would be understood by the Russians.

GENERAL DEANE explained further that this planning group had already had one meeting with the Russian Staff in Moscow previous to this conference and this memorandum was intended to facilitate

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, pp. 199-201.

<sup>7</sup> For the text of this protocol, see *ante*, pp. 118-123.

<sup>8</sup> *Post*, pp. 637-639.

<sup>9</sup> Not printed.

<sup>10</sup> The two memoranda are printed *post*, pp. 765-766.



the work of the planning group. There has been delay in the work of the reconnaissance party mentioned therein due to the fact that some Japanese had been allowed to remain in Kamchatka. As soon as they have been removed the American planning staff would be permitted to travel in that territory. He suggested that the memorandum be approved and handed to the Russians at a bilateral meeting which he felt was necessary. He recommended further that the President should be asked to request from Marshal Stalin the Soviet answers to two questions of paramount importance. The basic question is whether the Russians will require a Pacific supply line. The next question concerns Soviet agreement to establishment of U. S. air forces in Eastern Siberia. These questions should be put to the Soviets and definite answers requested.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed and recommended approval of the memorandum for transmission to the Russians, preliminary to a meeting with them. He recommended further that a memorandum be prepared for the President to present to Marshal Stalin as follows:

"The following are two basic military questions to which the United States Chiefs of Staff would appreciate an early answer at this conference:

*a.* Once war breaks out between Russia and Japan, is it essential to you that a supply line be kept open across the Pacific to Eastern Siberia?

*b.* Will you assure us that United States air forces will be permitted to base in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk or some more suitable area providing developments show that these air forces can be operated and supplied without jeopardizing Russian operations?"

In reply to a question by General Marshall, GENERAL DEANE said that the memorandum he had proposed was entirely satisfactory. He thought that after discussion of the two basic questions with the Russian Staff we should outline the main points and request the President to ask Marshal Stalin for a flat approval or disapproval of them. The Russian Staff have already disapproved a U. S. move into Eastern Siberia and he felt that they would not change this decision without a direct approval from the highest level.

After further discussion,

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

*a.* Approved the recommendations of the Joint Staff Planners in J. C. S. 1176/10 and 1176/11.<sup>11</sup>

*b.* Agreed to send to the President the memorandum proposed by General Marshall, with a request that it be presented to Marshal Stalin.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> The two memoranda embodied in these papers were sent by Leahy to the representatives of the Soviet General Staff on February 5, 1945.

<sup>12</sup> The memorandum was sent by the President to Marshal Stalin on February 5, 1945 (Roosevelt Papers).

**FIRST TRIPARTITE MILITARY MEETING, FEBRUARY 5, 1945, NOON,  
YUSUPOV PALACE**

**PRESENT**

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
Fleet Admiral Leahy	Field Marshal Brooke	General of the Army
General of the Army	Marshal of the Royal	Antonov
Marshall	Air Force Portal	Marshal of Aviation
Fleet Admiral King	Admiral of the Fleet	Khudyakov
Major General Kuter	Cunningham	Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov
Vice Admiral Cooke	Field Marshal Alexander	Lieutenant General
Major General Deane	General Ismay	Gryzlov
Major General Bull	Rear Admiral Archer	Vice Admiral Kucherov
Major General Anderson		Commander Kostrinsky
Major General Hull		
<i>Secretariat</i>		<i>Interpreters</i>
Brigadier General McFarland		Captain Lunghi
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones		Captain Ware
Captain Graves		Lieutenant Chase
Commander Coleridge		Mr. Potrubach

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

TOP SECRET

At the suggestion of General Antonov, Field Marshal Brooke agreed to take the chair.

**COORDINATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS**

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the meeting should begin by considering the coordination of the Russian and U. S.-British offensives. At the Plenary Meeting on the previous day, General Antonov had put forward certain Russian requirements. He had asked, first, that during the month of February the Allied armies in the West should carry out offensives. As General Marshall had explained, the Allied offensive in the West would start in the North on the eighth of February and some eight days later the Ninth U. S. Army would also start an offensive. These operations would be carried out during most of February. In addition to these operations in the North, operations were now being carried out by United States and French armies to push the Germans back to the Rhine in the Colmar area. It was therefore clear that the immediate coordination of Allied and Russian offensives was already being carried out. It was necessary, however, to look into the matter of coordination of offensives in the spring and summer months. As far as operations in the West were concerned these would be more or less continuous throughout the spring. There were, of course, bound to be intervals between operations, though such intervals would not be of long duration. For instance, after clearing the western bank of the Rhine on the northern part of the front, prep-

arations would have to be made for the final crossing of the Rhine. From a study of conditions of the river it was hoped to effect a crossing during the month of March. After establishing the crossing it would have to be widened and improved before the final advance into the heart of Germany could be undertaken.

Should operations in the North aimed at the Ruhr be held up, it was the intention to carry out further operations in the South. It was safe to say, therefore, that during the months of February, March and April, active operations would be in progress during almost the entire time.

The actual crossing of the Rhine presented the greatest difficulties and it was during the period of this crossing that the Allies were anxious to prevent a concentration of German forces against the armies in the West. It was therefore hoped that during March operations on the Eastern Front would be able to continue. SIR ALAN BROOKE said he appreciated the difficulties in March and early April due to the thaw and mud which would interfere with communications. He also realized that after their present great advances the Russian armies would want to improve their communications. He would much like to hear General Antonov's views on what operations could be undertaken by the Soviet armies during March and April.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that during the Tripartite Plenary Meeting on the previous day the number of divisions, the amount of artillery, and the number of tanks on the Eastern Front had been enumerated. In considering the Western Front it was important to bear in mind that operations must be conducted to meet the special conditions existing. In the West there was no superiority in ground forces. There were delicate lines of sea communications, particularly in the Scheldt Estuary. The Allies, however, did enjoy a preponderance of air power, but in this connection the weather was an important consideration. If the Allies were unable to take full advantage of their air superiority they did not have sufficient superiority on the ground to overcome enemy opposition. Operations must therefore be conducted on this basis. Another restriction arose from the fact that there were only a small number of favorable locations for crossing the Rhine. It was therefore most important to insure that the enemy could not concentrate strongly at the point of attack.

The enemy were now operating behind the Rhine and the Siegfried line and therefore had great freedom of maneuver. We must therefore arrange to occupy the Germans as much as possible to prevent them from concentrating against us on the very narrow bridgehead area available to us.

With regard to air forces, on the Western Front some 3,000 to 4,000 fighter-bomber sorties could be undertaken each day. There was

about one-third of this strength on the Italian Front. This did not include the power of the great four-engine bombers with their escorting fighters.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that, as Marshal Stalin had pointed out, the Russians would continue the offensive in the East as long as the weather permitted. There might be interruptions during the offensive and, as Sir Alan Brooke had said, there was the need to reestablish Russian communications. The Soviet Army would, however, take measures to make such interruptions as short as possible and would continue the offensive to the limit of their capacity.

In connection with the western offensive in February, it was not believed that the Germans could transfer forces from the Eastern Front to the West in large numbers. The Soviet Staff, however, was also interested in the Italian Front, from where the Germans had the opportunity of transferring troops to the Eastern Front. In view of this, the Soviet General Staff would like to know the potentialities of the Allied armies now fighting the Germans in Italy.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the situation on the Italian Front was being carefully examined as it developed. Kesselring's forces had now been driven into northern Italy where the country was very well suited for defense or for systematic retirement. There was a series of rivers which could be used for rear-guard actions while withdrawing his forces gradually. The enemy would have to retreat through the Ljubljana Gap or the passes of the Alps. The coast in the Bay of Venice was not suitable for amphibious operations, and therefore outflanking operations in the Adriatic did not appear fruitful. So far there had been continuous offensive operations which had driven the enemy out of the Apennine line and into the Valley of the Po. Winter weather and floods had, however, brought these offensive operations almost to a standstill.

At present our troops were preparing for further offensive action when the weather improved. It had, however, been decided that it would be better to transfer some of the forces now in Italy to the Western Front, where at present we did not have sufficient superiority in ground forces. Five divisions were therefore now to be transferred from Italy to France and certain air forces would accompany them. The forces remaining in Italy had been instructed to carry out offensive operations and to seize every opportunity to inflict heavy blows on the enemy. Their object was to retain as many of Kesselring's forces as possible by offensive action. However, owing to the topography of the country, it was believed that Kesselring could carry out a partial withdrawal without the Allies being able to stop it. The rate of withdrawal was estimated at some one and one-half divisions per week. Thus, any withdrawal which he did undertake could only be gradual.

To sum up, it was proposed to take what action was possible to stop the German withdrawal in Italy, though it was not thought that this could be entirely prevented. For this reason, it had been decided to withdraw certain forces from Italy to the vital front in Northwest Europe.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he agreed with Sir Alan Brooke's summary of the position but felt that a reference should be made to the value of our air power in Italy.

GENERAL ANTONOV asked the number of German troops believed to be in Italy.

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER said that at present the German forces in Italy consisted of 27 German divisions and 5 Italian divisions.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that all these forces could not be held down in Italy by offensive action. If the Germans decided to retire to the line of the Adige, it was estimated that they would be able to withdraw some ten divisions from Italy.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that on the Western and Italian Fronts together the United States and British air forces consisted of some fourteen thousand aircraft. This figure did not include the reserve behind the front line. Should the land campaign have to halt, the war in the air would continue, so far as weather permitted, even more strongly than before. Everything possible would be done, as General Marshall had stated, to bring the greatest possible air assistance to the vital points of attack in the land offensive. Such air assistance included the operations of a number of airborne divisions, for which the necessary transport was available.

So far as the requirements of the land battle permitted, it was the intention to concentrate the strategic bomber forces on the enemy's oil supply. Evidence was available almost daily that the destruction of his oil production capacity was imposing limitations on the enemy's operations. It was believed that the destruction of enemy oil was the best contribution which the air forces could make, both to the offensive on land and in the air. Much had been done and would continue to be done to disorganize the enemy's rail communications, but it was our experience that an attempt to cut all railways in the middle of Germany to stop troop movements would produce disappointing results in view of the relative ease with which the enemy could repair such destruction.

It was known that the Germans intended to assemble a strong force of jet-propelled fighters during the course of the present year. It had therefore been decided that, in order to maintain our air superiority into the summer, a proportion of our air effort must be devoted to attacks on the German jet-propelled fighter manufacturing plants. Nevertheless, it was an agreed principle that when the land offensive

began, everything in the air that could contribute to its success should be so used.

Before the advance of the Soviet armies, Allied air power had been brought to bear as far afield as Koenigsberg, Danzig, Posen and Warsaw. The great range of our strategic air forces made it most necessary that Allied air operations should be coordinated with the advance of the Soviet armies both to prevent accidents and to obtain the best value from our bomber effort.

GENERAL MARSHALL invited Field Marshal Alexander to comment on the capability of air forces in Italy to prevent a German withdrawal.

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER said that it had been his experience in Italy that our greatly superior air forces were a most powerful weapon while the enemy was withdrawing, if it was possible to force the pace of his withdrawal. If, however, he was in a position to withdraw at his own pace the air forces were less effective since the withdrawal could be undertaken mostly under cover of darkness.

In the Valley of the Po there was a series of extremely strong holding positions and it would therefore be difficult to force the enemy to withdraw faster than he planned. Nevertheless, when the weather improved from May onwards, considerable damage could be done to the withdrawing German forces and to their lines of communication. However, in February, March and April the weather was bad, with low clouds, which hindered the air effort to a great extent. Further, the Germans had destroyed nearly all the bridges over the River Po and had replaced them with some 30 to 40 pontoon bridges which were not kept in position during the day but were hidden along the banks. The destruction of these bridges was therefore extremely difficult.

To sum up, the better the weather the more damage could be done to the enemy by air action but however successful the air action, he did not believe that it would be possible entirely to prevent a German withdrawal by this means.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that at the Tripartite Plenary Meeting on the previous day the desire had been expressed that every effort should be made to stop the movement of German forces from west to east by air action and, in particular, to paralyze the vital rail junctions of Berlin and Leipzig. In this connection a report he had received that day summarizing Allied air operations in the last few days was of interest. On Friday, the second of February, the Royal Air Force had flown 2,400 sorties, concentrating on rail and road targets in Euskirchen and Coblenz. The latter, in particular, was of vital importance in the transfer of German forces to the East. Similar destruction of rail targets had taken place east of Alsace. On the same night a thousand of our bombers had attacked Wiesbaden, Karlsruhe

and synthetic oil plants elsewhere. On the following day, Saturday, the third of February, four-engined United States bombers had attacked Marienberg railway yards and 550 RAF bombers had attacked targets in the same area.

In relation to the destruction of communications and the interference with enemy movements the following data had been received relating to the effect of air attacks carried out on the 22d and 23d of January: On these two days alone 2,500 motor cars and trucks had been destroyed and 1,500 damaged; a thousand railway cars had been destroyed and 700 damaged; 93 tanks and self-propelled guns had been destroyed and a further 93 damaged; 25 locomotives had been destroyed and 4 damaged; 50 horse-drawn vehicles had been destroyed and 88 damaged. In addition, 62 known gun positions had been wiped out and 21 marshalling yards damaged. These very large results had been obtained on the two days he had referred to, but similar attacks were carried out on almost every fine day by the Allied air forces. He had referred on the previous day to the thousand-bomber attack on Berlin carried out on the third of February. There was also ready a plan to carry out a similar attack on Leipzig.

MARSHAL KHUDYAKOV said that, as Marshal Stalin had pointed out, more than 8,000 Soviet planes were being used in the main thrust. In spite of weather conditions, between the 12th of January and the first of February 80,000 sorties had been flown in support of the Russian advance. More than a thousand enemy planes had been captured on airfields which had been overrun by the Russian troops. These aircraft had been prevented from flying away by bad weather. In addition, 560 planes had been shot down in air combat. If better weather prevailed air operations could be carried out on objectives further in the enemy rear but fog at this time of year rendered such deep operations to the west of Berlin almost impossible. He agreed with Sir Charles Portal that there were too many railroads in Germany to destroy all of them. He hoped that Field Marshal Alexander's operations could be aimed at hampering the movement of German divisions from Italy to the Eastern Front.

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER said that this object was contained in his directive.

MARSHAL KHUDYAKOV said that he was glad to hear of this. In Italy there were fewer railways to assist the enemy withdrawal.

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER explained that the Germans in Italy largely used roads for their withdrawals.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that in addition to the Soviet offensives in the North, offensives would also continue in the direction of Vienna and west of Lake Balaton. It was for this reason that Allied action in Italy was of importance to the Soviets. It seemed to him expedient

that Allied land offensives should be directed toward the Ljubljana Gap and Graz. He now understood that this was not possible.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it must be remembered that the Allies had no great superiority in land forces. They had come to the conclusion that in conjunction with the vital death blows being dealt by the Soviet armies in the East, the correct place for the western death blow was in Northwestern Europe. For this reason it had been decided to transfer divisions from Italy to the Western Front and to limit operations in Italy to holding as many German forces in that theater as possible. In the event of a German withdrawal from northern Italy, we had forces strong enough to take advantage of such a withdrawal, and possibly at a later date to be able to operate through the Ljubljana Gap. Such action, however, must remain dependent on the withdrawal of a proportion of the German forces at present in the north of Italy.

## 2. MOVEMENT OF GERMAN FORCES FROM NORWAY

GENERAL ANTONOV said that the Germans were transferring forces from Norway to Denmark. He asked if there was any way in which such a movement could be stopped.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said as far as was known, these movements were being carried out by rail and road to Oslo and not by sea. The troops were then being moved across the short sea passage to Denmark. It was not possible in view of heavy mining to operate surface forces in the Skagerrak and thus prevent the enemy making this short sea passage.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the action of the air forces in this connection could be divided into two parts: firstly, by such attacks as could be made on shipping in the Kattegat, and with four-engined bombers operated on almost every fine night in an endeavor to bomb enemy ships. Several ships had recently been set on fire in this area. The second form of air action was by mine-laying aircraft. Approximately 1,000 mines were being laid by this method each month. Each aircraft carried some six mines. Sir Andrew Cunningham had just told him that recently these mines had sunk or damaged four enemy transports. German minesweepers did endeavor of course to sweep up our mines but it was now planned to increase the number of air attacks made on these minesweepers. However, there were so many varying tasks for the air forces to carry out that all could not be undertaken equally well.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said an examination had also been made of the possibility of stopping the movement of German forces from Norway by land action in Norway itself. There were, however, insufficient forces to undertake this without weakening our main effort on the Western Front.



## 3. USE OF ARTILLERY AND AIR IN FUTURE OPERATIONS

GENERAL ANTONOV said he felt it would be interesting to exchange information with regard to the method of carrying out operations in the autumn, winter and spring when, by reason of weather, it was not always possible to make use of air power. On these occasions the role of artillery became one of particular importance. As Marshal Stalin had said on the previous day, the Russians were establishing special artillery divisions of some 300 to 400 guns each, which were used for breaking through the enemy line. This method enabled a mass of artillery of some 230 guns of 76 millimeters and upwards to be concentrated on a front of one kilometer. He would be very glad to know what degree of artillery density would be used on the Western Front when the February offensive commenced.

GENERAL BULL said that the northern army group, which would take part in the next offensive, possessed some 1,500 guns of 105 millimeters and upwards, and the United States Army group which would also take part in the offensive, had some 3,000 guns of similar calibers. The army commanders concerned, by concentrating their artillery power on a narrow front, would be able to use some 200 guns to the mile in the area of the break-through. To this offensive power should be added the power of the air forces. In the three days preceding the attack on the eighth of February, it could be expected that some 1,600 heavy bombers would be used, capable of delivering 4,500 tons of bombs on the first day. For the remaining two days before the offensive, a slightly less weight of bombs could be dropped, but closer to the point of attack. Not only would communications behind the front be bombed, but also positions known to be strongly held.

On the day of the attack itself, "carpet bombing" would be used, and some 4,000 tons could be dropped on an area two miles square. He felt the effect of the air attack and the artillery concentration should produce a break-through, thus allowing our armor to operate in the enemy's rear. A similar pattern of attack had been used on previous occasions with great success.

MARSHAL KHUDYAKOV asked what action would be taken if it was found that weather prohibited the air [forces?] from operating on the day of attack.

GENERAL BULL explained that the attack was normally timed for a day on which it was predicted that the weather would enable "carpet bombing" to be carried out. During the actual attack the bombing was carried out some 2,000 yards ahead of our own front line, but earlier bombing on targets further behind the line could be undertaken through overcast.

MARSHAL KHUDYAKOV explained that all Russian operations in winter were planned on the supposition that bad weather would exist,

and no air operations would be possible. He felt that the Allies should bear this point in mind in planning their own operations.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had endeavored to explain that the Allies did not possess the same superiority in ground forces as did the Russians. The Allies did not have 300 divisions, nor was it possible to produce them. It was therefore essential to make full use of our air superiority. He would like to point out the advance across France had, in fact, been accomplished with the same number of divisions as the enemy himself had. This was made possible by a combination of ground and air power.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that he now had a very clear picture of Allied offensive intentions. Were there any questions which the British or United States Chiefs of Staff would like to ask?

#### 4. LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that in view of the very frank discussion of plans which was taking place, he would like to bring up the question of liaison between the Eastern and Western Fronts. The distance between the two armies was now so short that direct liaison was a matter of great importance. He had been directed by the President to bring up this question of liaison before the British, Russian and United States Chiefs of Staff. It was the opinion of the United States Chiefs of Staff, who had not yet discussed it with their British colleagues, that arrangements should be made for the Allied armies in the West to deal rapidly with the Soviet commanders on the Eastern Front through the Military Missions now in Moscow. He would be glad to take back to the President the views of the Soviet and British Chiefs of Staffs on this matter.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff were equally anxious to have the necessary liaison in order that plans could be concerted. They felt that such liaison required organizing on a sound basis. Military Missions were already established in Moscow, and these should, he felt, act as a link on a high level between the United States, British, and Soviet Chiefs of Staffs. In addition to this, closer liaison was required between the commanders of Allied theaters with the commanders of the nearest Russian armies. For example, on the Italian Front, Field Marshal Alexander required direct liaison with the Russian commander concerned.

In the case of the Supreme Commander on the Western Front, he would require direct liaison with the commanders of the Russian armies in the East. Thus there would be coordination between the high commands dealing with future action and in addition, direct coordination between the Allied and Soviet armies, who were closely in contact, on such matters as the employment of air forces and the coordination of day-to-day action.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that the question of liaison between the general staffs was very important and, as had already been mentioned, could be undertaken through the Missions in Moscow. In the present state of the offensives, this should be perfectly satisfactory until the forces came closer into contact with each other. Later, as operations advanced, the question of liaison between Army commanders could be reviewed and adjusted. These proposals would be reported to Marshal Stalin.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had not entirely understood the necessity for limiting liaison.

GENERAL ANTONOV explained that his proposal was to limit liaison to that through the General Staff in Moscow and the U. S. and British Missions. Such arrangements, however, could be revised and adjusted later to meet changing conditions.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that difficulties and serious results had already occurred in air operations from Italy over the Balkans. Such operations were directed from day to day and even from hour to hour, depending on weather and other conditions. If contact had to be maintained between the armies concerned through Moscow, difficulties would be certain to arise.

If this round-about method of communications through many busy people had to be adopted, there was a risk that our powerful air weapon could not be properly used.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that the accident to which General Marshall referred had occurred not because of lack of liaison but due to the pilots concerned losing their way. They had, in fact, made a navigational mistake with regard to the correct point for bombing.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he recognized this. However, the bomblines at that time excluded roads crowded with retreating Germans who could not be bombed by the Allied forces without an approach being made through Moscow. A powerful air force was available and good weather existed but the Allied air force was unable to act and the Germans profited thereby.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he entirely agreed with General Marshall that, through lack of liaison, we are losing the full force of the air power at our disposal.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that at the present time no tactical coordination was required between Allied and Russian ground forces. We should, he believed, aim at planning the strategic requirements of our air forces. The use of all Soviet air forces was dictated by the Soviet General Staff in Moscow. It was for this reason that the coordination of the air effort should, in his view, be carried out through the Soviet General Staff in Moscow, who alone could solve the problems. It was possible to agree on the objectives for strategic bombing irrespective of a bomblines.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that in the British view there were two distinct problems with regard to liaison. The first was the necessity for the form of liaison referred to by General Antonov, i.e., the coordination of the Allied long-range bomber effort over eastern Germany and its relation to the advance of the Red Army. The Allied long-range strategic bomber force was not controlled by the Supreme Commander in the West except when it was undertaking work in close cooperation with the ground forces but was controlled by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff. It was right, therefore, that the United States and British Chiefs of Staff or their representatives should deal direct with Moscow on this matter.

The second problem was in respect to the constant air operations out from Italy in relation to Russian operations in the Balkans and Hungary. In that theater liaison was required, not so much on policy as on an interchange of information. The British Chiefs of Staff entirely agreed with the United States view that it was inefficient for liaison between Field Marshal Alexander and the Russian commanders to be effected through Moscow. It was, therefore, essential that some machinery should be set up to deal with day-to-day liaison between General Alexander and the Russian headquarters which controlled the southern front. Without such direct liaison it was impossible to take advantage of the many opportunities presented to hit the Germans from the air.

MARSHAL KHUDYAKOV said that concerning air action into Germany itself, this could be done through the General Staff in Moscow as suggested by Sir Charles Portal, using the U. S. and British Military Missions. This liaison on policy was one which took time to arrange and was not a matter for great speed. With regard to direct liaison between Field Marshal Alexander and the Russian left wing he felt this was a matter which should be reported to Marshal Stalin.

GENERAL ANTONOV asked if it could not be agreed that a bombline should be established running from Berlin to Dresden, Vienna and Zagreb, all these places being allotted to the Allied air forces. Such a line could, of course, be changed as the front changed.

ADMIRAL LEAHY and SIR ALAN BROOKE asked that this matter be deferred one day for consideration.

##### 5. NAVAL OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE LAND OFFENSIVE

ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV asked if plans had been made for any naval operations in direct assistance to the land attack which was shortly to be carried out. He referred not so much to the normal naval operations in the defense of communications and day-to-day operations of the fleet to control the seas but rather to direct operations in support of a land offensive.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM explained that projected operations were too far inland to be directly affected by any operations which could be carried out by the fleet except the routine operations of keeping open communications. He asked if Admiral Kuznetsov had any particular operations in mind.

ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV said he had no particular operation in mind but rather the possibility of some operation in the neighborhood of Denmark that would not have any direct tactical connection with the army operations but would have a strategic connection.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that possible operations to outflank the Rhine had been studied. However, landing on the coast of Holland would prove extremely difficult and the necessary land forces were not available to enable an operation against Denmark to be undertaken.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that owing to the difficulty of forcing a crossing of the Rhine when that river was in flood, a very detailed examination had been carried out of the coastline from the Scheldt to the Danish coast, but operations in this area had not been found practicable since: firstly, large areas of Holland could be flooded and, secondly, operations further to the north would be too far detached from the main thrust to be of value.

ADMIRAL KING asked if Admiral Kuznetsov would outline the successes which the Soviet Fleet had been able to obtain in amphibious operations or operations to interfere with the transport of troops from the Baltic states to Germany.

ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV said that operations of the Soviet Fleet to cut German communications in the Baltic had been undertaken by submarines and naval aircraft. When the area of Memel was reached, it became possible to transfer torpedo boats to augment Russian naval activity in that area. However, all operations were at present hampered by ice conditions and, further, the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Riga were heavily mined by the enemy, and mine clearance was hampered by weather conditions and ice.

ADMIRAL KING said that he appreciated that ice conditions were now limiting operations but had asked this question in view of earlier Soviet communiqués mentioning the damage or destruction of German shipping.

ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV said that the earlier destruction of German shipping had been carried out by naval air forces and submarines.

#### 6. DATE OF THE END OF THE WAR WITH GERMANY

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were engaged in making logistic plans for that phase of the war following the collapse of Germany. It had been suggested that such plans should now be based on a probable date of the first of July for the

earliest possible collapse of Germany. Before deciding on such a date he was anxious to have the views of the Soviet Staff on this matter.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that until the eastern and western offensives developed it was difficult if not impossible to predict the date of the collapse of Germany.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said he entirely appreciated the uncertainty but for planning purposes he would be glad to know if the Soviet Staff regarded the first of July as the earliest date as a reasonable assumption.

GENERAL ANTONOV said he regarded such assumptions as being difficult to make. He could assure Admiral Leahy that the Soviet General Staff would concentrate every effort on the earliest possible defeat of Germany.

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that a year ago it had been necessary to assume a date for the defeat of Germany on which to base calculations on such matters as production and the construction of shipping. It was necessary to revise this date from time to time, particularly in connection with the handling of shipping throughout the world. It had been proposed to take two target dates, one the earliest and one the latest likely date for the defeat of Germany. Such dates were now under consideration between the United States and British Chiefs of Staff who were in agreement that the first of July was the earliest likely date but differed by two months with regard to the latest likely date. The United States assumption in this connection was the 31st of December. Did General Antonov regard the first of July as improbable as the earliest likely date?

GENERAL ANTONOV said that he regarded the summer as the earliest date and the winter as the latest. The first of July should be a reasonably certain date for the defeat of Germany if all our efforts were applied to this end.

## 7. FUTURE BUSINESS

A brief discussion took place on future business.

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that a meeting should be held on the following day at 12 noon in the Soviet Headquarters, and that the following subjects should be discussed: (1) Coordination of Air Operations; (2) Shuttle Bombing; and (3) A Short Discussion on the War in the Far East.

ADMIRAL KING said he would be prepared to make a statement on operations taking place in the Pacific and his conception of the future development of the war in that theater. He would welcome any questions which the Soviet Staff might wish to ask on this subject.

GENERAL ANTONOV said he would be glad to listen to a description of the situation in the Far East and operations in that area, but as far

as discussion of the matter was concerned the Soviet General Staff would prefer that this should take place after the war in the Far East had been considered by the Heads of Government.

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LUNCHEON MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, FEBRUARY 5,  
1945, 1:30 P. M., YUSUPOV PALACE <sup>1</sup>

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
Secretary Stettinius	Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Byrnes	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Harriman	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Mr. Maisky
Mr. Page	Major Theakstone	Mr. Gromyko
		Mr. Gusev
		Mr. Pavlov

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*Page Minutes*

TOP SECRET

- Subjects: 1. Toasts.  
2. Name of the Conference.  
3. Treatment of Germany.  
4. Economic Matters relative to Germany.

1. *Toasts.*

MR. MOLOTOV opened the luncheon by proposing a toast to the leaders of the three countries. Upon being informed by MR. HARRIMAN that Manila had been captured, MR. MOLOTOV immediately proposed a toast to this victory of the Allied armies.

After a brief toast by MR. EDEN to Mr. Molotov as Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the 1943 Moscow Conference, MR. STETTINIUS also proposed a toast to Mr. Molotov. He said that he hoped that he would be able to carry on the fine work of his predecessor, Secretary Hull. He stated that Mr. Hull, who was now in a hospital but was recovering, had asked him to present his compliments to Mr. Molotov. He concluded by stating that he looked forward to the day when he, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden would have frequent meetings.

MR. MOLOTOV immediately rose and proposed a toast to the recovery of Secretary Hull. He requested Mr. Stettinius to convey to Mr. Hull the sympathy and best wishes of all those present at the luncheon.<sup>2</sup> He then proposed a toast to the British Ambassador, who reciprocated by toasting the "Moscow Commission" and its

<sup>1</sup> Molotov acted as host.

<sup>2</sup> Stettinius did send such a telegram to Hull; it appears to have been drafted on February 5 but not received until February 7 (Defense Files, Argonaut 53).

continued cooperation. This was followed by toasts on the part of MR. STETTINIUS to his Dumbarton Oaks colleagues (Messrs. Gromyko and Cadogan); to the health and success of his ally, Mr. Harriman, by MR. MOLOTOV, and a toast to the important head of the Drafting Committee who asserted such control over the "Moscow Commission," Mr. Vyshinski, by MR. HARRIMAN.

MR. JUSTICE BYRNES then proposed that the guests drink to the Great Armies of the Soviet Union and AMBASSADOR GROMYKO toasted Mr. Byrnes as a great American who had served in the three most important branches of the American Government.

MR. VYSHINSKI suggested that Messrs. Strang and Winant, the co-workers on the European Advisory Commission be the subject of a toast.

MR. STETTINIUS then raised his glass to Ambassador Gromyko, whom he described as an able and effective representative of the Soviet Union in Washington who had won the respect and admiration of the American people.

MR. MOLOTOV remarked that there had been enough toasts to the diplomats. He wished to raise his glass to Mr. Byrnes who held one of the most important positions in the United States Government. He said that it was hard for the average person to imagine just how important Mr. Byrnes was.

MR. EDEN then toasted the men who were fighting the war.

After a toast to the success of the present conference, MR. MAISKY was requested to make a few remarks. He raised his glass to the closest possible unity between the peoples, governments and chiefs of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union and remarked that the future of mankind depended upon this unity.

## 2. *Name of the Conference.*

During the course of the luncheon MR. MOLOTOV proposed a toast to the "Crimean Conference." After a brief discussion it was suggested that the Conference should be so-called.

## 3. *Treatment of Germany.*

MR. EDEN inquired of Mr. Molotov as to what the Russians had in mind to discuss this afternoon.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that the Russian Delegation was prepared to discuss any question the United States or the United Kingdom Delegations so desired. This included those relating to the breaking up of Germany as well as political and economic matters relative to that country.

MR. EDEN stated that the general subject needed further study before any final decisions could be made.

MR. MOLOTOV remarked that in his view the Americans and British were considerably ahead of the Russians in their studies on this question.



MR. EDEN replied that although the British had studied the matter on a technical level, there had yet been no Cabinet discussions on the question. He stated that the President, the Prime Minister, and Marshal Stalin would in all probability be unable to come to any final decisions today on the subject of the treatment of Germany and suggested that the matter be the subject of a joint study on the part of the three countries.

MR. MOLOTOV favored this idea.

MR. EDEN continued with the suggestion that the Prime Minister, the President and Marshal Stalin discuss the treatment of Germany in general terms at today's meeting, that they refer the question to the three Foreign Ministers for further study and that they instruct them to report back to the Big Three in two or three days with definite proposals.

MR. MOLOTOV indicated his approval of this proposal.

#### 4. *Economic Matters Relating to Germany.*

MR. STETTINIUS stated in an aside remark to Mr. Molotov that the United States Government believed it very important that agreement be reached on certain economic considerations with respect to Germany.

MR. MOLOTOV indicated that the Soviet Government expected to receive reparations from Germany in kind and hoped that the United States would furnish the Soviet Union with long term credits.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that his Government had studied this question and that he personally was ready to discuss it at any time with Mr. Molotov. This could be done here as well as later either in Moscow or in Washington.

MR. MOLOTOV indicated that now that the end of the war was in sight it was most important that agreement be reached on these economic questions.

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### MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT WITH CERTAIN OF HIS ADVISERS, FEBRUARY 5, 1945, 2:30 P. M., LIVADIA PALACE

#### PRESENT

President Roosevelt  
Mr. Hopkins  
Mr. Matthews  
Mr. Bohlen

#### *Editorial Note*

No record of the substance of this meeting has been found. The information given here as to the meeting and the participants is taken from the Log, *ante*, p. 553, which states that the discussions continued

until 4 p. m. On August 13, 1954, Matthews wrote of this meeting as follows: "I do not recall the subject but most such meetings were to inform the President of the results of our morning Foreign Ministers meeting and to prepare him for the afternoon agenda" (640.0029/8-1354).

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**SECOND PLENARY MEETING, FEBRUARY 5, 1945, 4 P. M.,  
LIVADIA PALACE**

**PRESENT**

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Marshal Stalin
Secretary Stettinius	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar
Fleet Admiral Leahy	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Molotov
Mr. Hopkins	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Byrnes	Sir Edward Bridges	Mr. Maisky
Mr. Harriman	Mr. Dixon	Mr. Gusev
Mr. Matthews	Mr. Wilson	Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Bohlen	Major Birse	Mr. Pavlov

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TOP SECRET

Subject: Treatment of Germany.

THE PRESIDENT opened the meeting by stating that it was his understanding that political matters affecting Germany would be discussed today. He said that they would not cover the map of the world and discuss Dakar or Indochina, but confine themselves to the political aspects of the future treatment of Germany. He said that the first question was that of the zones of occupation, which he understood had been agreed upon in the European Advisory Commission. He said there was one question still open and that was the desire of France to have a zone of occupation and French participation in the control machinery for Germany. He emphasized that the question of zones did not relate to the permanent treatment of Germany.

THE PRESIDENT then handed a map<sup>1</sup> of the agreed tripartite zones to Marshal Stalin, pointing out that although these zones had been agreed upon in the European Advisory Commission they had not yet been signed by the three governments.

MARSHAL STALIN said that in the discussion of Germany he would like to include the following points:

(1) The question of dismemberment of Germany. He said that at Tehran they had exchanged views on this subject and later at Moscow he had talked this subject over with the Prime Minister. From these informal exchanges of views he had gathered that all were in favor of dismemberment, but nothing had been decided as to the manner of

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<sup>1</sup> A reproduction of this map faces p. 612.

dismemberment. He said he wished to know first as to whether the President or Prime Minister still adhered to the principle of dismemberment.

(2) Marshal Stalin inquired whether the three governments proposed to set up a German government or not and if there was a definite decision on dismemberment whether or not the three governments would set up separate governments for the various parts of Germany.

(3) Marshal Stalin inquired as to how the principle of unconditional surrender would operate in regard to Germany; for example, if Hitler should agree to surrender unconditionally, would we deal with his government?


(4) Marshal Stalin said his last point dealt with the question of reparations.

THE PRESIDENT replied that, as he understood it, the permanent treatment of Germany might grow out of the question of the zones of occupation, although the two were not directly connected.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that what he wished to find out here was whether or not it was the joint intention to dismember Germany or not. He said that at Tehran, when the question had been discussed, the President had proposed the division of Germany into five parts. The Prime Minister, after some hesitation, had suggested the division of Germany into two parts with a separation of Prussia from the southern part of Germany. He said that he had associated himself with the views of the President, but the discussion at Tehran had only been an exchange of views. He added that at Moscow with the Prime Minister they had discussed the possibility of dividing Germany into two parts with Prussia on the one hand and Bavaria and Austria on the other, with the Ruhr and Westphalia under international control. He said that he thought that this plan was feasible but that no decision had been taken since the President was not there. He inquired whether the time had not come to make a decision on the dismemberment of Germany.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that the British Government agreed in principle to dismemberment but he felt that the actual method and a final decision as to the manner of dismemberment was too complicated to be done here in four or five days. He said it would require elaborate searchings by experienced statesmen on the historical, political, economic and sociological aspects of the problem and prolonged study by a subcommittee. He added that the informal talks at Tehran and Moscow had been very general in character and had not been intended to lay down any precise plan. In fact, he added, if he were asked to state here how Germany should be divided he would not be in a position to answer, and for this reason he couldn't commit himself to any definite plan for the dismemberment of Germany. The Prime Minister said, however, that personally he felt that the isolation of Prussia and the elimination of her might from Germany would remove the arch evil—the German war potential would be

# GERMANY: PROPOSED ZONES OF OCCUPATION



Map attached to Bohlen minutes of Second Plenary Meeting



greatly diminished. He added that a south German state with perhaps a government in Vienna might indicate the line of great division of Germany. He said that we are agreed that Germany should lose certain territories conquered by the Red Army which would form part of the Polish settlement, but he added that the question of the Rhine valley and the industrial areas of the Ruhr and Saar capable of producing armaments had not yet been decided; should they go to one country, or should they be independent, or part of Germany, or should they come under the trusteeship of the world organization which would delegate certain large powers to see to it that these areas were not used to threaten the peace of the world. All this, the Prime Minister said, required careful study, and the British Government had not yet any fixed ideas on the subject. Furthermore, he said, no decision had been reached on the question as to whether Prussia after being isolated from the rest of Germany should be further divided internally. He said that we might set up machinery which would examine the best method of studying the question. Such a body could report to the three governments before any final decision is reached. He said we are well prepared for the immediate future, both as to thought and plans concerning the surrender of Germany. All that was required was a final agreement on zones of occupation and the question of a zone for France.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that it wasn't clear to him as to the surrender. Suppose, for example, a German group had declared that they had overthrown Hitler and accepted unconditional surrender. Would the three governments then deal with such a group as with Badoglio in Italy?

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that in that case we would present the terms of surrender, but if Hitler or Himmler should offer to surrender unconditionally the answer was clear—we would not negotiate under any circumstances with any war criminals and then the war would go on. He added it was more probable they would be killed or in hiding, but another group of Germans might indicate their willingness to accept unconditional surrender. In such a case the three Allies would immediately consult together as to whether they could deal with this group, and if so terms of unconditional surrender would immediately be submitted; if not, war would continue and we would occupy the entire country under a military government.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired whether the three Allies should bring up dismemberment at the time of the presentation of the terms of unconditional surrender. In fact, he added, would it not be wise to add a clause to these terms saying that Germany would be dismembered, without going into any details?

THE PRIME MINISTER said he did not feel there was any need to discuss with any German any question about their future—that uncon-

ditional surrender gave us the right to determine the future of Germany which could perhaps best be done at the second stage after unconditional surrender. He said that we reserve under these terms all rights over the lives, property and activities of the Germans.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he did not think that the question of dismemberment was an additional question, but one of the most important.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that it was extremely important, but that it was not necessary to discuss it with the Germans but only among ourselves.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that he agreed with this view but felt a decision should be made now.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that there was not sufficient time, as it was a problem that required careful study.

THE PRESIDENT then said that it seemed to him that they were both talking about the same thing, and what Marshal Stalin meant was should we not agree in principle here and now on the principle of dismemberment of Germany. He said personally, as stated by him at Tehran, that he was in favor of dismemberment of Germany. He recalled that forty years ago, when he had been in Germany, the concept of the Reich had not really been known then, and any community dealt with the provincial government. For example, if in Bavaria you dealt with the Bavarian government and if in Hesse-Darmstadt you dealt with that government. In the last twenty years, however, everything has become centralized in Berlin. He added that he still thought the division of Germany into five states or seven states was a good idea.

THE PRIME MINISTER interrupted to say "or less", to which the President agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that there was no need, in his opinion, to inform the Germans of our future policy—that they must surrender unconditionally and then await our decision. He said we are dealing with the fate of eighty million people and that required more than eighty minutes to consider. He said it might not be fully determined until a month or so after our troops occupy Germany.<sup>2</sup>

THE PRESIDENT said he thought the Prime Minister was talking about the question of dismemberment. In his view he said he thought it would be a great mistake to have any public discussion of the dismemberment of Germany as he would certainly receive as many plans as there had been German states in the past. He suggested that the Conference ask the three Foreign Ministers to submit a recommendation as to the best method for the study of plans to dismember Germany and to report within twenty-four hours.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> It appears that the first note of Hopkins, *post*, p. 633, was passed to the President at about this point. See this portion of the Matthews minutes, *post*, p. 626.

<sup>3</sup> For a facsimile of a note on this point which Stettinius passed to Roosevelt, see Stettinius, p. 125.

THE PRIME MINISTER said the British Government was prepared to accept now the principle of dismemberment of Germany and to set up suitable machinery to determine the best method to carry this out, but he couldn't agree to any specific method here.

MARSHAL STALIN said he wished to put a question in order to ascertain exactly what the intentions of the three governments are. He said events in Germany were moving toward catastrophe for the German people and that German defeats would increase in magnitude since the Allies of the Soviet Union intend to launch an important offensive very soon on the Western Front. In addition, he said that Germany was threatened with internal collapse because of the lack of bread and coal with the loss of Silesia and the potential destruction of the Ruhr. He said that such rapid developments made it imperative that the three governments not fall behind events but be ready to deal with the question when the German collapse occurred. He said he fully understood the Prime Minister's difficulties in setting out a detailed plan, and he felt therefore that the President's suggestion might be acceptable: namely, (1) agreement in principle that Germany should be dismembered; (2) to charge a commission of the Foreign Ministers to work out the details; and, (3) to add to the surrender terms a clause stating that Germany would be dismembered without giving any details. He said he thought this latter point was important as it would definitely inform the group in power who would accept surrender unconditionally, whether generals or others, that the intention of the Allies is to dismember Germany. This group by their signature would then bind the German people to this clause. He said he thought it was very risky to follow the plan of the Prime Minister and say nothing to the German people about dismemberment by the Allies. The advantage of saying it in advance would facilitate acceptance by the whole German people of what was in store for them.

THE PRIME MINISTER then read the text of Article 12 of the surrender terms agreed on by the European Advisory Commission, in which he pointed out that the Allied governments have full power and authority over the future of Germany.<sup>4</sup>

THE PRESIDENT said that he shared Marshal Stalin's idea of the advisability of informing the German people at the time of surrender of what was in store for them.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the psychological effect on the Germans might stiffen their resistance.

Both THE PRESIDENT and MARSHAL STALIN said there was no question of making the decision public, and MARSHAL STALIN added that as far as he knew the surrender terms which Italy had accepted had not yet been made public.

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<sup>4</sup> For the text of the draft surrender terms, see *ante*, pp. 113-118.



THE PRIME MINISTER said he would find it difficult to go further than to give the assent of the British to the principle of dismemberment and the setting up of machinery to study the best method of putting it into effect.

It was agreed that the three Foreign Ministers should consider Article 12 of the surrender terms instrument in order to ascertain the best method of bringing in a reference to the intention to dismember Germany.

THE PRESIDENT then said that the question of the French zone remained to be decided. He said that he had understood from Marshal Stalin that the French definitely did not wish to annex outright the German territory up to the Rhine.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that this was not the case, since during the visit of General DeGaulle the French had made it quite plain that they intended to annex permanently the territory up to the Rhine.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he did not feel it possible to discuss possible frontiers as they were considering only the zones of temporary military occupation. He added that he was for giving the French a definite zone which could come out of the British and possibly the American zones and that all he sought here was that the Soviet Government would agree that the British and American Governments should have the right to work out with the French a zone of occupation. He added that this zone would not in any way affect the proposed Soviet zone.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired whether or not the granting of a zone to France would not serve as a precedent to other states.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that the occupation of Germany might be a long one and that the British Government was not sure that it could bear the burden alone for an extended period and that the French might be able to be of real assistance in this matter.

MARSHAL STALIN said that if the French were given a zone, would not that change the Tripartite control of Germany to a four-nation control.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that the British Government expected that if France were given a zone they would, of course, participate in the control machinery, but that in regard to other nations that might assist in the occupation, such as Belgium or Holland, there would be no question of a specific zone and thus no part in the participation of the control machinery [*sic*].

MARSHAL STALIN stated that he thought it would bring up many complications if we should have four nations instead of three participating in the determination of German matters. He thought that some method might be evolved whereby England might let the French, Belgians and Dutch assist in the occupation but without the right to

participate in the Three Power decisions for Germany. He said that if this was accepted the Soviet Government might desire to ask other states to help in the occupation of the Soviet zone without any right to participate in the decisions of the control commission.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he felt that this brought up the whole question of the future role of France in Europe and that he personally felt that France should play a very important role. He pointed out that France had had a long experience in dealing with the Germans, that they were the largest naval power, and could be of great help in the administration of Germany. He went on to say that Great Britain did not wish to bear the whole weight of an attack by Germany in the future and for this reason they would like to see France strong and in possession of a large army. He said it was problematical how long the United States forces would be able to stay in Europe, and therefore, it was essential that France be relied upon to assist in the long term control of Germany.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he did not believe that American troops would stay in Europe much more than two years. He went on to say that he felt that he could obtain support in Congress and throughout the country for any reasonable measures designed to safeguard the future peace, but he did not believe that this would extend to the maintenance of an appreciable American force in Europe.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he felt that France should have a large army since it was the only ally that Great Britain had in the West, whereas the Soviet Union in addition to their own powerful military establishment could count on the support of the Poles.

MARSHAL STALIN said he fully appreciated the necessity of a strong France, which had recently signed a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union.<sup>5</sup> He added that he had discussed this matter with Daladier before the war and recently in Moscow with General De-Gaulle.

THE PRESIDENT then remarked that he felt that France should be given a zone, but that he personally felt that it would be a mistake to bring other nations into the general question of the control of Germany.

MARSHAL STALIN observed that if France was given the right to participate in the control machinery for Germany, it would be difficult to refuse other nations. He repeated that he wished to see France a strong power but that he could not destroy the truth, which was that France had contributed little to this war and had opened the gate to the enemy. In his opinion, he said, the control commission for Germany should be run by those who have stood firmly against Germany and have made the greatest sacrifices in bringing victory.

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<sup>5</sup> For the text in translation of this Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, signed at Moscow December 10, 1944, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 7, 1945, vol. xii, pp. 39-40.

He did not believe that France should belong on the list of such powers, but that it should be limited to the three nations represented here.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that every nation had had their difficulties in the beginning of the war and had made mistakes. He said that France had gone down before the attacks of the new German tank and air units and while it was true that France had not been much help in the war, she still remained the nearest neighbor of Germany and of great importance to Great Britain. He agreed that it would be inconvenient to add France to the present group of major allies, but he felt that British public opinion would not understand why France was being excluded from a problem which was of such direct concern to her. He observed that the destiny of great nations was not decided by the temporary state of their technical apparatus. He said that sooner or later we would have to take France in. He mentioned, however, that he had been against the participation of France in the present conference, which he understood was the opinion of the President and had gathered here was also that of Marshal Stalin. He concluded by saying that we must provide for France in the future to stand guard on the left hand of Germany otherwise Great Britain might again be confronted with the specter of Germany on the Channel at the Channel ports.

MARSHAL STALIN repeated that he would not like to see France as a participant in the control machinery for Germany, although he had no objection to their being given a zone within the British and American zones.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that the control commission will be an extraordinary body under the orders of the governments concerned and that there was no reason to fear that basic policy in regard to Germany would be made by this commission.<sup>6</sup>

THE PRESIDENT pointed out at this point that France was in fact a full member of the European Advisory Commission which was the only Allied body, apart from this Conference, which was considering the German problem.

THE PRESIDENT said that he favored the acceptance of the French request for a zone, but that he agreed with Marshal Stalin that France should not take part in the control machinery, otherwise other nations would demand participation. He went on to say, for example, that as a result of the deliberate German destruction of the dikes that large sections of Dutch farm land had been inundated by salt water and that it would be necessary to give the Dutch farmers compensation for a temporary period from German territory. He said that he

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<sup>6</sup> It appears that the second note of Hopkins, *post*, p. 634, was passed to the President at about this point. See this portion of the Matthews minutes, *post*, p. 629.

understood that it would be at least five years before the flooded lands would be suitable for cultivation. If this was done, and he personally felt that it should be done, the Dutch might well claim a voice in the control machinery for Germany.<sup>7</sup>

MR. EDEN then pointed out that there was no question of any zones for any other power except France, but that France would not accept a zone of occupation within the British and American zones without participation in the control commission.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that Great Britain could speak for France in the control commission.

THE PRIME MINISTER supported Mr. Eden's theories and said that if France got a zone they must be given representation in the control commission, otherwise, the question of the administration of the French zone and its relation to the other zones would be impossible of solution. He again pointed out that the control commission would be a subordinate body similar to the European Advisory Council.

MARSHAL STALIN said that the control machinery for Germany would not be an advisory body but would be actively engaged every day in the administration of Germany. He added that he felt French participation would serve as a precedent for others.

THE PRIME MINISTER then suggested that the three Foreign Ministers be asked to study the question in relation to [*of the relationship of?*] the French zone to the control commission.

MR. MOLOTOV said that the European Advisory Commission had already worked out a definite agreement on a tripartite administration of Germany.<sup>8</sup>

MR. EDEN replied that there was no intention of reversing that decision but that he felt as a practical matter the question of the relationship of the French zone to that of the control commission should be considered.

In reply to a question from Mr. Molotov, THE PRIME MINISTER repeated that there was no intention of giving the Belgians or Dutch a zone.

MR. EDEN repeated that the case of France was different and that they would not accept a zone subordinate to British control.

MARSHAL STALIN then said that he felt that there was agreement on the fact that France should be given a zone but should not be given participation in the control commission. The three Foreign Ministers should study the question of the relationship of the French zone to that of the commission.

MARSHAL STALIN then said that he would like to discuss the question of German reparations.

<sup>7</sup> Perhaps the third note of Hopkins, *post*, p. 634, was passed to the President at about this point.

<sup>8</sup> See *ante*, pp. 124-127.

THE PRESIDENT said that in regard to reparations there was first of all the question of the desires and needs of principal allies and then subsequently that of the smaller countries, such as Belgium, Holland, Norway, etc. He said he would like to bring up the question of the Russian desires in regard to the utilization of German manpower.<sup>9</sup>

MARSHAL STALIN replied that they had a plan for reparations in kind but were not ready yet to present any plan in regard to German manpower. He then said that Mr. Maisky would present the Soviet plan.

MR. MAISKY then outlined the Soviet plan for reparations for Germany. He said that the Soviet plan for reparations in kind envisaged two categories: (1) the removal from the national wealth of Germany of plants, machine tools, rolling stock, etc. to be completed within a period of two years after the end of hostilities, (2) yearly payments in kind to last for ten years. He said that in order to restore Soviet economy which had suffered so much from German aggression, and to safeguard the future security of Europe, it would be necessary to reduce German heavy industry by 80%. By heavy industry he meant iron and steel, electrical power and chemical industries. Specialized industry useful only for military purposes should be 100% removed. In this category would fall all aviation factories, synthetic oil refineries, etc. He said that the Soviet Government felt that with 20% of her heavy industry Germany would be in position to cover the economic needs of the country. He said the list of goods to be delivered during the 10 year period could be definitely fixed later on. He further proposed that in the interests of the orderly execution of the reparations plan and for the security of Europe there should be an Anglo-Soviet-American control over German economy which would last beyond the period of the reparations payment. All German enterprises which could be utilized for war purposes should be placed under international control with representatives of the Three Powers sitting on the boards of such enterprises. Mr. Maisky went on to say that in the calculation of losses as a result of German aggression the figures had been so astronomical that a selection and the establishment of a system of priorities for compensation had been necessary. He said that even direct material losses, such as public and private property, factories, plants, railroads, houses, institutions, confiscation of materials, etc. had been so large that no reparations could cover their loss. For this reason, priorities had been established according to indices, (1) the proportional contribution of any one nation to the winning of the war, (2) the material losses suffered by each nation. He said that those countries which had made the highest contribution to the war and had suffered the

<sup>9</sup> Perhaps the fourth note of Hopkins, *post*, p. 634, was passed to the President at about this point.

highest material losses would come into the first category and all others would fall into the second. Mr. Maisky proposed that there should be set up a special reparations committee of the three governments to sit in Moscow. He concluded that the total reparations shown in withdrawals and yearly payments in kind which the Soviets required would reach a total of ten billion dollars.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that he recalled very well the end of the last war and that although he did not participate in the peace settlement he had been very fully informed of the discussions. He remembered well that there had been only two billion pounds extracted from Germany in the form of reparations by the Allies after the last war and that even this would not have been possible had not the United States given Germany credits. He said, for example, that they had taken some old Atlantic liners from the Germans, who had immediately proceeded on credit to build new and better ships. He recognized that the suffering which the Soviet Union had undergone in this war had been greater than any other power, but he felt that the Soviet Union would get nowhere near the sum which Mr. Maisky had mentioned from Germany. He said that at the end of the last war the Allies had also indulged themselves with fantastic figures of reparations but that these had turned out to be a myth. He said that the British Isles had also suffered in this war and that the British Government had disposed of the bulk of its assets abroad despite the generous help of Lend-Lease. He said that the British Isles had to export goods in order to import food, since they were dependent on imports for one-half of their food supply. He said that there would be no victorious country so burdened in an economic sense as Great Britain and that, therefore, if he could see any benefit to Great Britain in large reparations from Germany he would favor such a course but he very much doubted whether this was feasible. He added that other countries, such as Belgium, Holland and Norway also had claims against Germany. He said he was haunted by the specter of a starving Germany which would present a serious problem for the Allies since we could either say "It serves them right" or endeavor to help them. In the latter case, who would pay for the help. The Prime Minister concluded that if you wished a horse to pull a wagon that you would at least have to give it fodder.

MARSHAL STALIN observed that that was right, but care should be taken to see that the horse did not turn around and kick you.

THE PRESIDENT remarked that he had also been through the last war and that he remembered very vividly that the United States had lost a great deal of money. He said that we had lent over ten billion dollars to Germany and that this time we would not repeat our past mistakes. He said that in the United States after the last war the German property that had been sequestered during the war had been

turned back to the German owners, but that this time he would seek the necessary legislation to retain for the United States all German property in America. He said that the Germans had no capital, factories, or other equipment that the United States needed but that he did not wish to have to contemplate the necessity of helping the Germans to keep from starving. He said, however, that he would willingly support any claims for Soviet reparations since he felt that the German standard of living should not be higher than that of the Soviet Union. He added that just as we expected to help Great Britain expand her export trade, we would also help the Soviet Union retain the reparations in kind which she required, as well as German manpower to reconstruct the devastated regions, but he felt that the Germans should be allowed to live in order that they might not become a burden on the world. The President concluded, however, that despite his desire to see the devastated areas in all countries, in the Soviet Union, in Great Britain, in France, and elsewhere, restored, he felt that reparations could not possibly cover the needs. He concluded that he was in favor of extracting the maximum in reparations from Germany but not to the extent that the people would starve.

MR. MAISKY then stated that while he appreciated the Prime Minister's points concerning the experiences after the last war in the matter of reparations, he felt that the failure in this respect had been due not to the fact that the reparations had been too heavy but to the transfer problem which was the rock on which the reparations policy was founded. He said that he must add that the financial policies of the United States and Great Britain contributed to the German refusal to pay. He said that the Germans had never paid more than one-quarter of the total reparations figure and had received a great deal more in credits and loans. Mr. Maisky stated that the purpose of reparations in kind was to avoid the problem of transfer. He pointed out that the amount desired by the Soviet Union was equal only to 10% of the present United States budget and equal to about six months' of the British expenditures in the war. The Soviet demands for German reparations equaled about 1½ times the United States budget in peace and about 2½ times the British budget. He said, of course, there was no intention to force Germany into starvation but he pointed out that he did not feel that the Germans had a right to a higher standard of living than that of Central Europe. He said Germany can develop her light industry and agriculture and that since the Germans would have no military expenditures there was no reason why Germany could not give a modest but decent standard of living to her people.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the question of reparations should be examined by a sub-commission and that this commission should consider the claims of other countries who bore the facts of Nazi aggression as well.

THE PRESIDENT said that in his opinion the commission should be confined to the representatives of the Three Powers, to which STALIN agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was in agreement, that in the first instance the representatives of the three major powers should consider the question.

MARSHAL STALIN said he felt that the commission could accomplish nothing unless it was given general directives from this Conference. He said he felt that the commission composed of the representatives of the three principal Allies must work on the basis that these Powers had contributed most to the common victory and should be given priority in the matter of reparations. He said that although the United States did not need machine tools she might well need raw materials which she could receive from Germany. He mentioned that the United States would take over German property in the United States as a part of her share.

THE PRESIDENT expressed agreement with this view.

MARSHAL STALIN continued that in calculating German capabilities, Germany's post-war resources should be also taken into consideration. Then all factories and farms would work not for war but for peace. He repeated that the Three Powers who had made the most sacrifices and had been the organizers of victory should have first claim on reparations. He stated that he did not include France among these powers since she had suffered less than Belgium, Yugoslavia, or Poland.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that the Allies had done a great deal of the damage in France.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that France could not expect to get reparations from the Allies. He said that he respected France but that he could not ignore the truth and that at the present moment France only had eight divisions in the war, Yugoslavia twelve and the Lublin Government of the Poles thirteen.

It was then agreed that the question of the main directives to a commission on reparations which would sit in Moscow would be referred to the Foreign Ministers who would report back to the Conference. It was agreed that the next meeting would be 4:00 p. m. tomorrow, February 6, and that the questions of Dumbarton Oaks and Poland would be considered.



Matthews Files

*Matthews Minutes*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

The President opened the meeting and said that he thought they should talk about the general aims of peace rather than about Dakar and China. There were many things to discuss. He said that one of the first questions to discuss of immediate importance was that of zones of occupation of Germany now that the situation seemed to be coming to a head. He meant not the permanent solution of Germany but just that of occupation. It was a question of the French who want a zone. Occupation also involves control machinery. He showed a map to those at the table and said that is what he and Prime Minister Churchill discussed about at Quebec. He amended this statement when it was explained to him privately that the map had its origin in the protocol on the zones of occupation and the European Advisory Commission.

STALIN: I should also like to discuss the following questions: (1) the dismemberment of Germany. There was an exchange of views at Tehran and when Churchill came to Moscow it was further discussed that [*but?*] there were no decisions. I understand that we are all in favor of dismemberment but I would like to know definitely do we agree, and if so, what form of dismemberment. (2) Do we admit the setting up of any government in Germany or not? Or should we confine ourselves merely to establishing their administration? If we divide Germany will each part have its own government or will each part have its own administration? (3) Unconditional surrender. We are agreed on that, but if Hitler surrenders unconditionally are we to preserve his government? One thing excludes the other. Do we still adhere to unconditional surrender? We have already had experience with that in Italy. Do we not need to work out the definite terms of unconditional surrender? (4) Reparations and the amount. All these questions are in addition to those raised by the President. (It appeared that Stalin was not familiar with the EAC approved protocol on unconditional surrender.)

PRESIDENT: All these other questions are permanent and grow out of the zones of occupation.

EDEN: (nodding) That's right.

STALIN: That we shall find out. If Germany is to be partitioned, then in what parts? It is well known that we twice exchanged views. First at Tehran when the President then suggested partition into five parts. The Prime Minister hesitated but said he also favored partition. I associated myself with the President but that was only an

<sup>1</sup> For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Bohlen minutes of this meeting.

exchange of views. The second time I exchanged views with the Prime Minister in Moscow. He talked of partition in two parts; one of Prussia and one of Bavaria. He suggested that the Ruhr and Westphalia be put under international control. I replied that might be appropriate but would make no decision because the President was not there. Hasn't the time come for decision? If you think so, let us make one.

PRIME MINISTER: In principle I think we are all agreed on dismemberment, but the actual method, the tracing of lines, is much too complicated a matter to settle here in five or six days. It requires very searching examination of geography, history and economic facts and is deserving of prolonged consideration by sub-committees or committees to be set up to go into the question. The two conversations mentioned by Marshal Stalin have approached the topic in a very general way only. If asked today, "How would you divide Germany?" I would not be prepared to answer. I might make some personal suggestion but would feel free to change my views. One has in mind, first, the might of Prussia, then the [omission] of Austria. One can see that Prussia separated from other German states [would have] her power greatly reduced, and I personally myself thought establishment of another German state to the south—possibly with its capital at Vienna—would be a line of ground division between Prussia and the rest. The population would be half and half. There are other questions, in principle decided, which here present themselves for consideration: (1) We are agreed Germany should lose certain territories largely conquered by Russian arms or needed in connection with Polish settlement. (2) Also there is the question of the Rhine Valley—the Ruhr and the Saar—potent munitions areas. Should they be handed to a country like France? or made independent under Germany? or placed under some world organization for a long period of time? This obviously requires very searching study and consideration. I have no fixed ideas. (3) Finally, there is the question whether Prussia herself, having been isolated, should be subjected to internal division. I have no fixed opinion. I would like the matter explored and possibly settled in agreement with our two great allies. The French must of course be consulted. At Tehran there was some talk of an examination being made of these complex matters. We should do this quickly, mainly set up machinery for examination.

We are not ill-prepared for the immediate effect of German surrender. All details have been worked out and are well known to the three governments. There remains only formal agreement on zones of occupation and control machinery. If Germany surrenders in a few weeks or a month unconditionally we have only to march in and occupy by processes already agreed upon.

STALIN: This is not clear. How can it be carried out in practice? Suppose a group declares it has thrown out Hitler? Shall we be prepared to deal with them?

EDEN: We would set the terms agreed upon before this regime.

(I left the room at this point to get a copy of the surrender terms and missed the next few minutes.)

PRIME MINISTER: In that case we must make up our mind whether the group is worth dealing with. If so, we must make them sign the agreed terms. If they are not worth dealing with we should continue the war and occupy the whole country.

STALIN: When shall we bring up the question of dismemberment to these new people if there is no provision for dismemberment (in the surrender terms)? Shall we not add a provision to the terms of surrender for dismemberment?

PRIME MINISTER: If they sign we do not discuss with them any question about the future. There is no need to raise the question. We reserve all rights over their land, their liberty and their lives.

STALIN: This is not an additional question but it is most important.

PRIME MINISTER: I agree. But it is not necessary to discuss it with the Germans.

STALIN: No, simply to demand from them.

PRIME MINISTER: I do not think it possible to discuss the exact form of dismemberment. That would come at the peace conference.

PRESIDENT: We have not decided what the Marshal proposed. Are we going to dismember or not? He wants the matter settled in principle but not as to details. The Prime Minister says he is not yet ready to lay down the limit; that requires study. In effect, these are our terms and in addition we shall dismember. That is the only difference. Shall we all agree that Germany should be dismembered? As at Tehran, I am very much personally in favor of decentralization. Forty years ago when I was in Germany there was no word for the Reich and in Bavaria affairs were managed entirely locally. I do not know whether there should be more or less states than suggested before but shall we tell the Germans that we are going to dismember and do it our way?

PRIME MINISTER: I see no need to inform the Germans at the time of surrender whether we will dismember them or not. It is enough to tell them, "Await our decision as to your future." We might be able to tell while our troops are marching in what is needed.

PRESIDENT: If this question is discussed all over the world there will be a hundred plans for dismemberment. Therefore, I ask that we confine it to ourselves and that the three foreign secretaries bring in tomorrow a plan for dismemberment.

PRIME MINISTER: You mean a plan for the study of the question of dismemberment, not a plan for dismemberment itself?

PRESIDENT: Yes, for the study of dismemberment.

PRIME MINISTER: His Majesty's Government would be prepared now to assent [to the] principle of dismemberment and to set on foot the best body to study the method.

STALIN: I put the question so that we may be quite agreed on what we want. Events in Germany are developing rapidly toward a catastrophe for them. Their defeats shall increase because of the allied airforce attacks in the near future.

(I left the room to get a glass of water for the President and missed the following few minutes.)

STALIN: In view of such rapid events we should not be without preparation. Therefore, I put the questions and think they should be settled here. No details need be worked out now. I think the President's compromise proposal should be accepted. Is it agreed (1) to dismember Germany and empower a commission to elaborate concrete plans? (2) To add to the surrender terms that Germany is going to be dismembered though not to say into how many states? I think it important that we should say this so that the group in power should know Germany is to be dismembered. I think the Prime Minister's plan not to tell the Germans is a risky one; we should say this to them in advance. I think there are advantages to have this provision in the surrender terms so that any German group should know when they sign and bear the responsibilities.

PRIME MINISTER: The terms of unconditional surrender are terms on which the fighting stops. (He reads article 12 of surrender terms.) That is what they have got to sign.

PRESIDENT: The first paragraph on disarmament does not mention dismemberment and does not make it clear enough. The Marshal's idea, which is somewhat my own, is that it will make it easier if it be in the terms and tell them.

PRIME MINISTER: But you don't want to tell them. Eisenhower doesn't want that. That would make the Germans fight all the harder. We should not make this public.

PRESIDENT: My own feeling is that the people have suffered so much that they are now beyond questions of psychological warfare.

STALIN: No, these conditions for the moment are only for us. They should not be public until the time of surrender. We can do as we have done with Italy where the surrender terms are not yet public. I want it agreed (1) to dismember and (2) to put dismemberment into the surrender terms.

PRIME MINISTER: I find it difficult to go beyond assent to the principle of dismemberment and the setting on foot of machinery as to the best method of doing it. I agree to a most rapid examination of the question of the best means of studying a method of dismemberment.

PRESIDENT: Would you put in Article 12 in addition the word "dismemberment"?

PRIME MINISTER: Yes, I would agree.

EDEN: Or some other formula to make dismemberment possible.

STALIN: I have no objection to the proposal. It is agreed.

PRESIDENT: Now to take up the next question—a zone of occupation for France. (A portion missed here.)

STALIN: The French told me in Moscow that they would want a frontier on the Rhine.

PRIME MINISTER: I can't agree. There is a question of a condominium on the Rhine. The present question is different. It applies only to zones of occupation. We are all now agreed, are we not, on the three zones? The French want a zone and I am in favor of granting it to them. I would gladly give them part of the British zone. All we want is this: It does not affect the Soviet zone. Will our Russian allies agree that the British and Americans get together on a zone to allot to the French? The line of the Moselle seems a convenient place to let them in. They are not in a position to occupy a large zone.

STALIN: Would it not be a precedent for other states? Would it not mean that the French become a fourth power in the control machinery for Germany which, so far, is only for the three of us?

PRIME MINISTER: Our answer is that France should come in and as its army grows take a larger part in the occupation.

STALIN: I think there might be complications in our work if we have a fourth member. I suggest another method—for the British to get the help of France or Holland or Belgium in occupation but not give them rights in the control machinery. We might ask on our side to invite other states to help occupy our zone but not to sit in on control machinery.

PRIME MINISTER: The discussion is on the immediate question of France. They have had long experience in occupying Germany. They do it very well and they would not be lenient. We want to see their might grow to help keep Germany down. I do not know how long the United States will remain with us in occupation. (The President: "Two years.") Therefore the French army should grow in strength and help us share the burden. If Russia wants some other power in her zone we should not object.

STALIN: I should like to know the President's opinion.

PRESIDENT: I can get the people and Congress to cooperate fully for peace but not to keep an army in Europe a long time. Two years would be the limit.

PRIME MINISTER: I hope that would be according to circumstances. At all events we shall need the French to help us.

STALIN: France is our ally. We signed a pact with her. We want her to have a large army.

PRESIDENT: I should much rather have a small number on the control machinery. I should be just as satisfied if the French are not in on the control machinery.

STALIN: I should like to repeat that if we let the French in on control machinery it would be difficult to refuse other states. I agree that the French should be great and strong but we cannot forget that in this war France opened the gates to the enemy. This is a fact. We would not have had so many losses and destruction in this war if the French had not opened the gates to the enemy. The control and administration of Germany must be only for those powers standing firmly against her from the beginning and so far France does not belong to this group.

PRIME MINISTER: We were all in difficulties early in this war and France went down before the new tanks and I admit they were not much help in this war. But the fact remains they are the neighbor of the Germans and the most important neighbor. British public opinion would not understand if decisions vital to France are being made with regard to Germany over France's head. I hope, therefore, that we shall not decide for an indefinite exclusion of France for all time. I was very much against General de Gaulle's coming here and the President's view was very much the same. Apparently Marshal Stalin feels the same. But the fact remains that France must take her place. We will need her defence against Germany. We have suffered badly from German robot guns and should Germany again get near to the channel coast we would suffer again. After the Americans have gone home I must think seriously of the future. I propose to offer the French a zone out of present British and American zones and that technical studies be made of the French position in the control machinery.

STALIN: I am still against France taking part in the control machinery.

PRIME MINISTER: I agree. (Several sentences not understood) That France cannot be a member of this group but cannot we let her into control machinery.

PRESIDENT: (On the basis of a note from Mr. Hopkins) I think we have lost sight of the French position on the European Advisory Commission. I suggest that the French have a zone of occupation but that we postpone discussion on control machinery. Others might want to come in, such as Holland or Austria.

STALIN: I agree.

PRESIDENT: The Netherlands are in a very serious situation. Several millions of their farmers are thrown off their land by flooding and

we must set aside some land in Germany to take care of this. Their own land will not be suitable for cultivation for five years. The Netherlands might ask for a seat on the Control Commission.

EDEN: If the French are to have a zone, how can they be excluded from the control machinery? If they are, how can their operation of their zone be controlled?

STALIN: They could be controlled by the power from which they obtained the zone.

PRIME MINISTER AND EDEN: We cannot undertake to do that and the French would never submit to it.

EDEN: The French pressed us hard on this question in Paris when we visited there. Didn't they question it at Moscow?

STALIN: We talked about it but we said it could only be discussed by all the three powers.

PRIME MINISTER: Is it agreed that the Americans and British set aside a zone for France? I propose to leave the next step as to the future status of France when it may be approved as a whole. I propose that the three foreign secretaries sketch out the kind of commission for control to be set up. (After Eden has whispered to him) He (Eden) says it has all been worked out and I withdraw my question.

MAISKY: I think it is superfluous to discuss the question with the three foreign ministers.

MOLOTOV: The European Advisory Commission has already taken decisions and has set up for only the three powers. It is agreed that France is to have a zone and that the question of their relation to the control machinery shall be left for report by the three foreign ministers.

#### REPARATIONS

PRESIDENT: The three of us are involved in this question and there is also the question of what the small powers want. First, there is the question of manpower. What does Russia want? The United States and British I believe do not want reparations in manpower.

STALIN: We have a plan for reparations in kind but we are not ready to talk about manpower.

PRIME MINISTER: Could we hear about your plan for reparations in kind?

(Stalin instructs Maisky to explain the Russian plan.)

MAISKY: Reparations in kind we think should be in two forms: (1) Withdrawals from the national wealth of Germany at the end of the war. By this is meant transfer of factories, plants, machinery, machine tools, rolling stock and investments abroad. (2) Yearly payments in kind for a period of ten years.

To restore Russian economy and for the security of Europe it is necessary to cut down German heavy industry by 80%. By heavy industry is meant iron and steel, metal working, engineering, chemi-

cals, electrical engineering, etc. All military production and aviation as well as synthetic petroleum should be prohibited 100%. About 20% of German heavy industry would be left and this would be enough for the real need of German economy. Reparations in kind should be for a period of ten years and the list could be settled later on. The reparations in kind should be terminated in ten years and withdrawals of plants, factories, etc., in two years. In order to make Germany pay there must be very strict tri-partite control over Germany. The details can be settled later on but it must be established that the most important industries should be internationalized and members of the three great allies should be on the boards of directors, such representation to continue for the ten-year period. In estimating reparations we have considered the kind of losses to be covered. The figures are so astronomical that we believe that only those losses under the category of direct material losses, that is, destruction of state and private property of all sorts should be included. Even this is so large that the whole amount of reparations cannot be covered. Therefore, priorities among countries should be fixed by indices. We make two suggestions: (1) The proportion of contribution by a country to the winning of the war to its losses of material in the war. The highest should be in the first category and the others in the second category. (2) For discussion of the principles and details on reparations we suggest that a commission with its seat in Moscow should be set up. The question now comes how much would Russia want for reparations. We would want not less than ten billion dollars.

PRIME MINISTER: I remember well the last war and the sad experience in reparations that followed. It was with great difficulty that one billion pounds was finally extracted from Germany and that was due to the fact that Germany received much larger amounts in loans from the United States. I remember we took over some old Atlantic liners which permitted Germany to build better new ones. I do not want to repeat that experience. I admit that Russian losses are much greater than those of any other country. I feel that the removal of certain plants and materials from Germany is the proper step for restitution. I am sure that we will never get out of Germany anything like 250 million pounds a year. We too have suffered. Our houses have been destroyed. We are faced with an export problem. We must export in order to buy food, one half of which we must import. We have incurred very heavy debts outside lend-lease. No victorious country will come out so burdened financially as Great Britain. If I could see any benefit in reparations I would be glad to have them but I am very doubtful. Other countries also have suffered great devastation—France, Belgium, Norway. We



must also consider the phantom of a starving Germany and who is going to pay for that. If eighty millions are starving are we to say, "It serves you right." and if not, who is going to pay for feeding them?

STALIN: There will be food for them anyway.

PRIME MINISTER: I am in favor of setting up a commission to study the question.

PRESIDENT: We lent Germany far more than we got after the last war. That cannot happen again. We want no manpower. We do not want their machine tools or their factories. Therefore, what can we get? German stock and property in the United States? This has at present been taken over by the Alien Property Custodian. After the last war it was used as an off-set against our claims in Germany. I hope to get legislation this time to take it over as a trust fund.

We must think of the future of Germany. We have always been generous through our Red Cross but we can't guarantee the future of Germany. We don't want to kill the people. We want Germany to live but not to have a higher standard of living than that of the U. S. S. R. I envision a Germany that is self-sustaining but not starving. There will be no lending of money. Our objective is seeing that Germany will not starve in helping the Soviet get all it can in manpower and factories and helping the British get all they can in exports to former German markets. Therefore, the time has come to set up a reparations commission. In re-building we must get all we can but we can't get it all. Leave Germany enough industry and work to keep her from starving.

MAISKY: The experience of reparations has been bad but the reason was not because reparations were too heavy but because they were asked in monetary form and therefore the transfer question arose. There was also the question of Germany's refusal to pay. What is ten billion dollars? It is 10% of the United States budget this year. It is six months war expenditure of Great Britain. It is one and one quarter times the United States peacetime budget and two and one quarter times the British each year. Yes, we should prevent Germany from having a higher standard than the middle European standard. Germany will be able to live on this and she is free to develop her light industries and agriculture. The doubts of the Prime Minister are unfounded. Germany will be able to live a decent life and we must not forget that she will have no burden of military expenditures.

PRIME MINISTER: I agree on the setting up of a reparations commission but we must keep it secret.

STALIN: Yes, it should be kept secret.

PRIME MINISTER: The commission must also consider the claims of all the victims, the assets available, and the priorities to be assigned.

Differences arising in the commission must be referred to and settled by the three governments.

STALIN: We must take here common decisions as the guiding lines for the commission. The work must be done by the three parties to the commission. We three should have the first place on reparations claims as we bear the burden of the war. The United States should get German property in America. She doesn't want machine tools. We must take into consideration not only present German resources but her future resources when her manpower returns and goes to work. I do not include France in the first category and certainly France shall not have reparations from us. I must say, in all truth, France cannot be compared to us. She takes part in the war with eight divisions and some navy. The Yugoslavs, and I am not mentioning them, have twelve divisions; Lublin Poland has ten divisions, which is more than de Gaulle has. I propose that the three foreign ministers meet and report.

PRIME MINISTER: They should settle the heads of the directives—the guiding principles—and I hope that within one month the governments can receive their version. You must remember I have a cabinet and parliament. Also the point of the first index on damage sustained I think is enough. I do not think that the exertion in the war should be taken into consideration. Remember the saying of each according to his needs. The President agrees to the setting up of the reparations commission in Moscow; the Prime Minister agrees also.

The meeting adjourned at 8 p. m. after determining that the next meeting should be held at 4 tomorrow afternoon, and that the world organization should be taken up first and Poland second.

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Hopkins Papers

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

[YALTA, February 5, 1945.]

MR. PRESIDENT:—

I would suggest that you say this is a very important and urgent matter and that the three foreign ministers present a proposal tomorrow as to the *procedure* by which a determination as to to dismemberment can be arrived at an early date

HARRY

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<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 614. This and subsequent Hopkins notes have been transcribed literally from facsimiles of the handwritten originals.

Hopkins Papers

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

[YALTA, February 5, 1945.]

1. France is on the European Advisory committee now. That is only body considering German affairs now.
2. Promise a zone.
3. Postpone decision about Control Commission.

<sup>1</sup> The relationship of this and the two following notes to the Second Plenary Meeting appears from internal evidence and from their association in the files with a paper bearing the following words in Hopkins' handwriting: "Notes given to President by me during conference with Stalin and Churchill on Feb 5-45". See *ante*, p. 618.

Hopkins Papers

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

[YALTA, February 5, 1945.]

~~Why not agree to a French zone and consider later the question of putting them on control commission for Germany? or not—~~

Could you not add that French participation on Control Commission might be considered later?

<sup>1</sup> See preceding footnote. See also *ante*, p. 619.

Hopkins Papers

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

[YALTA, February 5, 1945.]

Could you ask him

1. Why not take all Gestapo-Storm Troopers and other Nazi criminals.

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 620.

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1945

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, FEBRUARY 6, 1945,  
10 A. M., VORONTSOV VILLA

## PRESENT

## UNITED STATES

General of the Army Marshall  
Fleet Admiral King  
Major General Kuter  
Lieutenant General Somervell  
Vice Admiral Cooke  
Rear Admiral McCormick  
Major General Bull  
Major General Anderson  
Major General Hull  
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser

## UNITED KINGDOM

Field Marshal Brooke  
Marshal of the Royal Air Force  
Portal  
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham  
Field Marshal Wilson  
Field Marshal Alexander  
General Ismay  
Admiral Somerville  
Major General Laycock

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General McFarland  
 Captain Graves

Major General Jacob  
 Brigadier Cornwall-Jones  
 Commander Coleridge

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

1. APPROVAL OF MINUTES OF THE 185TH MEETING<sup>2</sup>

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the C.C.S. 185th Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.

## 2. LEVELS OF SUPPLY OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN U. K. AND NORTH-WEST EUROPE

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3. PLANNING DATE FOR THE END OF THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY  
(C. C. S. 772)<sup>3</sup>

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to accept for planning purposes the following dates for the end of the war with Germany:—

- a. Earliest date, 1 July 1945.
- b. Date beyond which war is unlikely to continue, 31 December 1945.

## 4. PROVISION OF LVT'S FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN

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5. ALLOCATION OF ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY  
(C. C. S. 320/35)<sup>4</sup>

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff proposing the acceptance of an agreement regarding the Bremen and Bremerhaven enclave and the use of the railway from Bremen to the southwest zone, on the understanding that this agreement did not involve the question of command of the Bremen-Bremerhaven area.

GENERAL MARSHALL referred to the fact that the letter at Enclosure "B" (page 5)<sup>5</sup> visualized the necessity for making a more detailed form of agreement, covering a variety of circumstances. He felt strongly

<sup>1</sup> C. C. S. 186th Meeting.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 530-534.

<sup>3</sup> See under Malta Conference, *ante*, pp. 478-480.

<sup>4</sup> *Infra*.

<sup>5</sup> See *post*, p. 637, and *ante*, pp. 199-201.

that no such detailed agreement was necessary. The broad policy had been decided and the good will was there. Details could be left very largely to local commanders and any problems of overlapping authority which did arise could be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the time came.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then agreed to the following amendments to the Appendix to Enclosure "B" of C. C. S. 320/35:—

a. In paragraph 1 delete the words "but will be generally administered as a sub-district of a larger British controlled area."

b. In the second sentence of paragraph 1, delete the words "larger district" and substitute "British zone."

c. In the second sentence of paragraph 2, delete the word "responsible" and substitute the word "responsive."

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Endorsed the views expressed by General Marshall above and approved the Appendix to Enclosure "B" of C. C. S. 320/35 as amended in discussion. (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 320/37).<sup>6</sup>

b. Agreed to take no further action on the detailed recommendations included in the letter at Enclosure "B" to C. C. S. 320/35.

#### 6. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS (C. C. S. 775)<sup>7</sup>

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff recommending a substitution for the existing paragraph 6*h.* in C. C. S. 680/2.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff were now in a position to agree to this subparagraph *h.*, as it had been amended informally in discussion at a previous C. C. S. meeting when this had been discussed.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to the following revised subparagraph *h.*:

"*h.* Provide assistance to such of the forces of the liberated areas in Europe as can fulfill an active and effective role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance against the Enemy Powers in the present war. Having regard to the successful accomplishment of the other basic undertakings, to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the war-making capacity of the United Nations against Germany and/or Japan."

<sup>6</sup> *Post*, p. 639.

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, p. 539.

7. LIAISON WITH THE SOVIET HIGH COMMAND OVER ANGLO-AMERICAN  
STRATEGIC BOMBING IN EASTERN GERMANY  
(C. C. S. 778)<sup>8</sup>

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff suggesting a line that might be taken with the Soviet General Staff at a meeting which was to be held later the same day to discuss the matter of the bomblines.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed the desirability of putting forward this fresh memorandum in the place of the one recently submitted in FAN 477.<sup>9</sup>

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that the United States Chiefs of Staff should put forward to the Russians the views expressed in C. C. S. 778, as amended in discussion.

8. NEXT MEETING, COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to meet again, provisionally at 1000 on Thursday, 8 February 1945, to finish off any outstanding items on the ARGONAUT Agenda.

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<sup>8</sup> This paper as amended (C. C. S. 778/1) was read by Kuter at the Second Tripartite Military Meeting. See *post*, pp. 640-641.

<sup>9</sup> Not printed.

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J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*

TOP SECRET  
C. C. S. 320/35

[YALTA,] 5 February 1945.

ALLOCATION OF ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY

1. With regard to the draft agreement concerning the Bremen-Bremerhaven area proposed by General Macready in the attached letter to Mr. McCloy<sup>1</sup> (Enclosure "B"), the United States Chiefs of Staff prefer that the final agreement exist on one sheet of paper and recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve Enclosure "A."

2. As regards the numerous points proposed in General Macready's letter it appears to the United States Chiefs of Staff that such matters which cannot be agreed to by the local commanders of the Zones of Occupation should be referred at that time to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for decision. There will be undoubtedly some problems of

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, pp. 199-201.

overlapping authority and conflicting interests which will have to be resolved under the policy of coordination and cooperation.

3. It has been our understanding that the draft agreement as proposed by Lord Halifax and Mr. McCloy and as modified by the British Chiefs of Staff does not involve the question of command of the Bremen-Bremerhaven area. Such command, with the full authority that is inherent in command, must rest with the American commander of the Bremen-Bremerhaven area, as subordinate of the American commander of the Southwestern Zone. It is intended, however, that in the normal administration of the Bremen-Bremerhaven area the American commander thereof will, in accordance with the draft agreement, conform to the general policy pursued in the administration of the British Zone as qualified in the phrasing of the draft agreement.

4. If the British Chiefs of Staff prefer to retain the wording of the agreement attached to General Macready's letter it is acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff provided the British Chiefs of Staff indicate their concurrence to the above interpretation of the draft agreement.

5. The United States Chiefs of Staff urge that this matter be completed before the end of the present conference.

#### Enclosure "A"

(Paragraph numbers conform to the attachment to General Macready's letter. Underlining and *italicizing* represent amendments to that attachment.)\*

1. The Bremen *and*-Bremerhaven *enclave* Area as shown on the attached map will be under complete American control including military government and responsibility for disarmament and demilitarization *but will be generally administered as a subdistrict of a larger British controlled area*. It is understood that the American military government will conform to the general policies pursued in the administration of the *larger district* British Zone, subject always to the right of the American commander to vary the administration of the *enclave* Bremen-Bremerhaven Area in any particular that he may find necessary on military grounds.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff agree to permit necessary access by the British to offices, and necessary use of available installations, situated in the Bremen-Bremerhaven Area, which provide services essential to British administration of the British Zone of Occupation.

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\*Words underlined are proposed additions. Words italicized are proposed deletions. [Footnote in the original.]

2. 3. The U. S. interest in transit passage from the Bremen-Bremerhaven Area to the Southwestern Zone is so dominant and the British interest in possible movement through the American Zone to Austria so evident that obligation to carry stores and personnel for the one government through the zone controlled by the other is mutually recognized. To better achieve *responsible responsive* service, each military zone commander will accept a Deputy Controller for United States (or British) requirements of Movement and Transport from the other to assist in the coordination of the movement and transport involved in such essential traffic.

3. 4. The map referred to is attached is the same as that attached to C. C. S. 320/29.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> C. C. S. 320/29 is not printed, but the map in question is reproduced facing p. 200.

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J. C. S. Files

*Agreement Regarding the Bremen-Bremerhaven Enclave Approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff*

TOP SECRET

[YALTA,] 6 February 1945.

C. C. S. 320/37

THE BREMEN ENCLAVE

1. The Bremen and Bremerhaven enclave as shown on the attached map will be under complete American control including military government and responsibility for disarmament and demilitarization. It is understood that the American military government will conform to the general policies pursued in the administration of the British zone subject always to the right of the American commander to vary the administration of the enclave in any particular that he may find necessary on military grounds.

2. The U. S. interest in transit passage from the Bremen area to the southwestern zone is so dominant and the British interest in possible movement through the American zone to Austria so evident that obligation to carry stores and personnel for the one government through the zone controlled by the other is mutually recognized. To better achieve responsive service, each military zone commander will accept a Deputy Controller for (United States/British) requirements of Movement and Transport from the other to assist in the coordination of the movement and transport involved in such essential traffic.

3. The map referred to is that attached to C. C. S. 320/29.



**SECOND TRIPARTITE MILITARY MEETING, FEBRUARY 6, 1945, NOON,  
YUSUPOV PALACE**

**PRESENT**

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
Fleet Admiral Leahy	Field Marshal Brooke	General of the Army
General of the Army	Marshal of the Royal	Antonov
Marshall	Air Force Portal	Marshal of Aviation
Fleet Admiral King	Admiral of the Fleet	Khudyakov
Major General Kuter	Cunningham	Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov
Vice Admiral Cooke	Field Marshal Wilson	Lieutenant General
Major General Deane	General Ismay	Gryzlov
Major General Bull	Admiral Somerville	Vice Admiral Kucherov
Major General Anderson	Rear Admiral Archer	Commander Kostrinsky
Major General Hull		
<i>Secretariat</i>		<i>Interpreters</i>
Brigadier General McFarland		Captain Lunghi
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones		Lieutenant Chase
Captain Graves		Mr. Potrubach
Commander Coleridge		

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

TOP SECRET

*Chairmanship*

GENERAL ANTONOV requested Admiral Leahy to serve as Chairman of the 2d Tripartite Meeting.

ADMIRAL LEAHY thanked General Antonov but suggested that in the interest of continuity, Field Marshal Brooke continue to preside.

1. BOMBLINE AND LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the first item to be discussed should be General Antonov's proposal for a bombline running from Stettin through Berlin, Vienna and Zagreb. He asked the United States Chiefs of Staff to express their views on this proposal since they were most intimately concerned with it.

GENERAL KUTER said he would like to read a statement on behalf of the United States Chiefs of Staff, setting out their views on this matter. This statement read as follows:<sup>1</sup>

"1. Our wishes are:—

(a) To continue to do the greatest possible damage to the German military and economic system.

(b) To avoid interference with or danger to the Soviet forces advancing from the East.

<sup>1</sup> This statement is the text of C. C. S. 778/1, dated February 21, 1945, and entitled "Liaison with the Soviet High Command over Anglo-American Strategic Bombing in Eastern Germany".

(c) To do what is possible to assist the advance of the Soviet Army.

"2. To achieve the first wish, that is, maximum damage to the Germans, it is essential to avoid as far as possible any restriction of strategic bomber action. It is not our wish to draw a line on the map which would exclude our bombers from attacking any targets which are important to the war-making power of the enemy, whether against the Soviet or the British and American forces.

"3. To achieve the second wish, that is, avoidance of interference with Soviet land operations, we must rely upon the Soviet High Command to inform the British and United States Missions in Moscow of the positions of the Red Army from day to day. We also invite the Soviet High Command to inform the British and United States Missions if there are any particular objectives, for example, railway centers or centers of road communication close in front of their armies which they wish us *not* to attack. We should require at least 24, and preferably 48 hours' notice for action upon such requests.

"4. A regular daily meeting between the British and United States Missions in Moscow and a responsible officer of the Soviet General Staff seems to us to be essential.

"5. To achieve the third wish, that is, assistance to the Russian advance, we should be glad to receive through the British and American Missions in Moscow any suggestions from the Soviet High Command. This suggestion would have to be considered in the light of other commitments and such factors as the distance and the weather.

"6. To summarize, we suggest:—

(a) That there should be no rigid division of eastern Germany into spheres of action of the Soviet and British and American strategic bombers respectively;

(b) That day-to-day liaison should be established between a responsible officer of the Russian High Command and representatives of the British and American Missions in Moscow, in order to exchange information upon which we can regulate the action of the Anglo-U. S. strategic bombers in accordance with the development of Soviet operations on land.

"7. When the Soviet Air Force is ready to undertake strategic bombing deep into Germany from the East, the coordination of policy should be discussed by Soviet, American and British Staff representatives in London or in Moscow. Some further machinery for the closer coordination of operations would appear to be necessary at that time."

GENERAL KUTER said that he would like to add that in addition to his objection to the principle of a fixed line on the map, there was the further objection that there were valuable strategic targets to the east of the proposed line. From among some 20 such strategic targets which would be denied to Allied air power he would mention a few. These included the oil targets at Politz, the main production center of high octane gasoline and main source of fuel supply for the

German Air Force; Ruhrland, second only in importance to Politz, and one of the four major synthetic oil plants in Germany. In addition there were several other oil targets. Further the proposed line would appear to prohibit attacks on some industrial and communication targets in the neighborhood of Berlin and Dresden. The line would also prohibit attack on three tank and self-propelled gun factories; and, lastly, and of great importance, it would prevent attacks on three jet-propelled fighter engine factories where components of the Juno jet engines were made and the engines themselves were assembled. He would point out that the oil targets referred to required repeated attacks in view of the German's ability to repair them rapidly.

There was one further point he would like to make. Apart from the strategic implication of the line, it was unacceptable in view of topographical considerations. A bomblime must be clearly visible to a pilot in the air, both from high and low altitudes.

GENERAL MARSHALL said he would like to add an additional illustration of the point made by General Kuter. He had that morning received a message from the Commanding General of the United States heavy bombers operating from the United Kingdom, reporting an attack on Berlin carried out three or four days previously by a thousand heavy bombers supported by some 600 fighters. These fighters were practically over the Russian lines and, in fact, destroyed a number of German aircraft taking off from an airfield east of Berlin. The Commanding General pointed out that, with good liaison parties and proper radio communication, not only could valuable information be given to the Russians before such an attack but also that the most recent information with regard to enemy and Russian movements could be communicated to him.

With the speed of modern fighters the aircraft taking part in this raid were involved in operations only five minutes flying time from the Russian ground forces. Yet it must be remembered that these aircraft were bombing a definite point which the Russian staff had requested should be attacked. Unless better methods of handling liaison were evolved, it would mean that the most powerful weapon of the war would be denied its proper use in assisting the Russians. He asked that an immediate and really practical solution should be found to this problem.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL then explained the point of view of the British Chiefs of Staff. Owing to the fact that United States bombers operated by day while the Royal Air Force bombers operated mainly by night, this problem affected the United States forces more than it did the British. Nevertheless, the problem for both air forces was almost identical. Already complete integration of control of the

United States and British bomber effort from the West and from the South had been achieved.

Speaking for the British Air Staff, he fully supported the proposals which had been put forth by General Kuter which would entirely cover British requirements.

GENERAL ANTONOV explained that in putting forward at the previous meeting his proposal with regard to the bomblines, he had in mind the wishes expressed by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff which had been put forward by General Deane and Admiral Archer. These wishes expressed a desire that the bomblines should be as near as possible to the Soviet front. The line that he now suggested was only some 60 to 75 kilometers in front of the Soviet lines. There was no possibility of moving the bomblines further to the eastward as this would hinder the action, not only of the Soviet ground forces but also the Soviet air forces. He appreciated that there were a number of important targets to the east of the proposed line which should be bombed. In connection with the bombing of such individual targets, each one could be considered separately. He would ask also that consideration should be given to the fact that the Soviets had a large number of aircraft themselves. He had mentioned on the previous day the 8,000 aircraft now being employed on the central front. If all the targets to the east of the line were made available to the Allied air forces, then there would be nothing left for the Soviet forces to attack. The line now proposed was only a very general line drawn in the light of considerations put forward by General Deane and Admiral Archer and would have to be worked out in detail and, in particular, altered to enable Allied flyers easily to identify it. With regard to changes in the line necessitated by changes in the position of Soviet forces, full information with regard to this would be provided daily through the missions in Moscow. Through the same channel, the efforts of the Soviet air forces could also be coordinated.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that as he understood it, General Antonov's view was that if the line which he had proposed was to be moved further to the east, there would be nothing left for the Soviet Air Force to attack. He felt there had been some misunderstanding on this point since the United States and British air staffs were entirely agreeable that any strategic target should be attacked by all three air forces. This was one of the reasons why he was opposed to drawing of any line which would divide Germany into two parts from the point of view of strategic bombing.

GENERAL KUTER said he would like to comment on two points. He was glad to learn that the Soviet wishes were similar to his own, as indicated by General Antonov's reference to constant liaison to enable

coordination to be achieved. Secondly, he would like to refer to the results achieved during the advance across the western desert. In this operation, as the result of excellent air-ground liaison, it was possible to place the bomblines not at some specific distance ahead of the front line but at a point which it was expected that our own ground forces might be able to reach in eight hours.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked confirmation that General Antonov's view was that the bomblines he proposed should be altered so that it could be better defined topographically and that at the same time arrangements could be made for Allied forces to bomb critical points on the Soviet side of this line.

GENERAL ANTONOV said the line which he had indicated was a rough guide only. He felt that the Heads of the Air Staffs could work out the details of this line so as to insure its recognition from the air. This redefinition of the line could, he believed, be undertaken at the present conference. He also supported the statement made by Sir Charles Portal that there could be no line established which would entirely divide the targets of the three strategic air forces. It was for this reason that he considered that the action of the Soviet strategic air force should be coordinated with the Allied air effort through the missions in Moscow. If it was desirable for the Allied air forces to bomb targets to the east of the line, such action could be discussed in Moscow and the necessary decision taken.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he regarded the bomblines as a line of demarcation between the action of air forces and land forces and not as a line of demarcation between the action of strategic air forces. In Allied operations on the Western Front there was no line of demarcation between the action of the United States and British strategic air forces but there were bomblines on the various fronts closely connected with the action of the land forces and designed to insure close cooperation between land and air forces. He asked if it were to be assumed from General Antonov's statement that the proposed bomblines now being discussed was to be considered as the bomblines which would ensure coordination of action between land and air forces but not designed to restrict the action of the strategic air forces, which action would be regulated through the missions in Moscow on a day-to-day basis.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said he would like to put the question in a different way. Was it the intention of the Soviet Staff that the improved liaison which it had been suggested should take place through the missions in Moscow, would be in lieu of the line proposed and should be such as to safeguard the Soviet ground forces from the action of strategic bombers?

GENERAL ANTONOV said that the line he had proposed was designed to secure Soviet land forces from the possibility of accidental bombardment by the Allied air forces. Such a line could not be permanent and would be changed frequently to conform to changes in the land front. The actions of the strategic air forces, both Soviet and Allied, would not be bound by this line, however. It was drawn so close to the Soviet front that he presumed that the Allied strategic air forces would not find many targets to the east of this line though such targets might exist and in this case action against any of them could be decided upon individually. As to the Soviet strategic air force it would appear that in most cases their attacks would take place to the west of the line.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that, since there appeared to be a large measure of agreement, time would be saved if the three air staffs met together and worked out the details of the proposed bomblines.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said he would like to suggest an amendment to Admiral Leahy's proposal. He felt that instead of the air staffs trying to work out the details of the line they should work out the requirements for safeguarding the interests and security of the Soviet forces, having regard to the need for the destruction of as many important German installations as was possible. There seemed to be little difference between the various views expressed and what differences there were could, he felt sure, be settled quite easily.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he accepted Sir Charles Portal's amendment to his suggestion.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that he agreed with Admiral Leahy's view that the matter should be referred to the air staffs to work out a detailed line in accordance with the principles which had been discussed.

It was agreed that Marshal Khudyakov, General Kuter and Sir Charles Portal should meet together immediately to consider this matter.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that there was one further related question which remained unsettled. This was the question of liaison on a lower level. General Antonov had undertaken, at the previous meeting, to seek the views of Marshal Stalin on this point.

GENERAL ANTONOV said he had reported on this matter to Marshal Stalin. Marshal Stalin had pointed out that there had so far been no close contact between Soviet and Allied land forces and therefore wished that liaison should take place through the Staff of the Red Army and the Military Missions in Moscow.

## 2. COORDINATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the forthcoming offensives had been fully discussed at the previous meeting and coordination had been broadly settled. There remained, however, the question of the of-

fensives during March and April. General Antonov had mentioned also a summer offensive. Could he give any further information as to the probable date of the commencement of this summer offensive and whether it would be in great strength? Further did he foresee any long periods between the end of the present offensive and the commencement of the summer offensive?

GENERAL ANTONOV said that Soviet offensive action had started and would continue. The Soviet forces would press forward until hampered by weather. With regard to the summer offensive, it would be difficult to give exact data with regard to the interval between the end of the winter and beginning of the summer attack. The most difficult season from the point of view of weather was the second part of March and the month of April. This was the period when roads became impassable.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked, with regard to General Antonov's comment on the bad weather period between the winter and summer offensives, whether it was anticipated that it would be possible to carry out any important action until the summer offensive could be started.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that, if during this period operations in the West were carried out actively, the Soviets would take every possible action on the Eastern Front wherever this could be done.

GENERAL MARSHALL emphasized that the interval between the winter and summer offensives would probably be the period at which the Allies would be trying to cross the Rhine. He was therefore most anxious that the enemy should not be able to concentrate forces against the Allies on the Western Front at that particular time.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that he could assure General Marshall that the Soviets would do everything possible to prevent the transference of German forces from east to west during this period.

### 3. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WITH REGARD TO RIVER-CROSSING TECHNIQUE AND EQUIPMENT

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that at the first meeting between the Heads of State, the British Prime Minister had raised the question of exchanging information with regard to technique and equipment employed by the Soviet forces in river crossings. At the present time in view of the Allied proximity to the River Rhine this was a most immediate problem for the Allied forces. There were now two officers present from General Eisenhower's headquarters and it appeared highly desirable that they should meet with the appropriate Soviet experts on the subject of the technique and equipment employed by the Red Army in major river crossings which they had undertaken.

Thus the Allies on the Western Front could obtain the benefit of the experience of the Red Army in this matter. He would therefore very much appreciate if General Antonov would indicate whether this could be done and if so would make such arrangements as were practicable for the officers from General Eisenhower's headquarters to meet with the appropriate Soviet officers.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that the Soviet Army was always ready to share its battle experience with its allies. However, at the moment there were no specialists in this technique available and he would like therefore time to look into this matter. He would furnish the required information later.

ADMIRAL LEAHY thanked General Antonov for this very satisfactory reply.

#### 4. BASES FOR U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCES IN THE VIENNA-BUDAPEST AREA

GENERAL MARSHALL said that as the Soviet advance proceeded it would be found logistically possible to move U. S. strategic bomber forces now in Italy, with their protecting fighters, to bases in the Vienna-Budapest area. It was very desirable for such aircraft to operate from that vicinity. It was therefore the hope of the United States Chiefs of Staff that this could be arranged by having a staging area or zone of passage in that area so that it could be arranged for some 670 individual heavy bomber sorties to be undertaken each month. This would require the support of about 1,800 fighter missions in the same period. To effect this it would be necessary to carry out certain construction work for which some 2,000 United States personnel could be provided from Italy and 200 from elsewhere. The greatest difficulty would be the transfer of the necessary supplies and equipment. 22,000 tons would be required initially and a further 8,300 tons a month thereafter. The President of the United States was likely to present this project to Marshal Stalin with a request for his approval. It would involve the use of two airfields in the Budapest area and also agreements that the Soviet authorities should undertake the movement of the necessary stores to the Budapest area by road, rail or barge.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that the matter would probably be decided between Marshal Stalin and the President. He personally felt that it could conveniently be undertaken and suggested that the Heads of the Air Forces should consider the problem.

GENERAL MARSHALL said he would be very happy for this to be arranged.



### 5. PROVISION OF SOVIET AIRFIELDS FOR DAMAGED BRITISH NIGHT BOMBERS

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said he had one request to make. It would be extremely helpful if the Soviet General Staff could allocate air bases with night landing equipment at various points distributed along their front at which British night bombers, damaged in night combat over Germany, could land instead of having to fight their way back over the heavy defenses of Germany. If these aircraft were so badly damaged that they could not get back, and no such airfields were available, the crews had no alternative but to bail out and lose their aircraft. If the Soviet authorities could agree to this request he suggested that details could be arranged through the missions in Moscow.

MARSHAL KHUDYAKOV said that he regarded this as a technical question. Up to the present the Soviet forces had never denied assistance to Allied fliers, who had always been met and taken care of. He suggested the details of Sir Charles Portal's proposal should be worked out after the conference.

### 6. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE

GENERAL ANTONOV said that at the previous Conference he had referred to the fact that the Germans would endeavor to stop the Russian offensive on the line of the Oder. Quite possibly they would not only adopt a passive defense on this line but would try to gather together counterattack forces for a break-through. He would be glad to know if the Allied commander in the West had any intelligence with regard to the collection of such forces, their movements or the likely point for such an attack. He was particularly interested in the transference of the Sixth S. S. Panzer Army.

GENERAL BULL said that when he left General Eisenhower's headquarters a short time ago evidence existed that the Sixth Panzer Army was leaving the Western Front and possibly an additional two divisions from north of the Vosges. General Eisenhower had taken immediate action to put the maximum possible air effort on these German movements. He was not up to date with regard to the direction of these moves but he was certain that such information as was available at the Supreme Commander's headquarters could be sent to the Soviet General Staff. He would be glad to take this matter up with General Eisenhower immediately on his return.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had received a message on the previous day which gave definite information of the moves of certain divisions of the Sixth Panzer Army from the Western Front. This message had also given the new total of enemy divisions on the Western Front as 69. This morning's operational report raised this total to

70 since a newly formed parachute division had appeared on the Western Front on the right of Field Marshal Montgomery's forces, in a position somewhere east of Venlo. He would get an exact statement on this matter and give it to General Antonov.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that his information was very similar to that given by General Marshall. It was known that the Fifth Panzer Army had also been pulled out of the line but there were no indications yet of its moving to the eastward. The British experts believed that this move was unlikely to take place. If General Antonov wished, a telegram could be sent asking for the latest information.

GENERAL ANTONOV said he was very grateful for the information given him and was particularly interested in the transfer of the Sixth Panzer Army to the eastward.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said, with regard to the Italian Front, that as far as was known only one division was being withdrawn although there were indications of considerable movement.

GENERAL MARSHALL said it might be helpful, if the Soviet Staff was not already aware of them, to give details of the attack in the Ardennes. This attack had been made by the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies. Prior to the attack the Sixth Panzer Army had been out of the line for several months and had been located northeast of the Ruhr with five divisions. The Fifth Panzer Army had been in the front line or close to it. The Sixth Panzer Army had crossed to the west of the Rhine a month or six weeks before the offensive had taken place but had not been located until the attack was launched. The Sixth Panzer Army had been the first to be withdrawn from the attack and the Fifth Panzer Army was finally also withdrawn though it was not known if it had left the front.

MARSHAL KHUDYAKOV asked if the losses in the Fifth Panzer Army were known.

GENERAL MARSHALL said it was difficult to differentiate between losses incurred by the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies. At the meeting on the previous day he had given information with regard to the destruction inflicted on one or the other of these armies in the course of two days operations. It was believed that very heavy casualties had been inflicted on the motor vehicles and tanks of almost all the divisions of both the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies.

GENERAL BULL said the Fifth Panzer Army had attacked in the center and, of the two, made the most progress. The Sixth Panzer Army had attacked in the north in the direction of Malmedy-Liege. Both the Fifth and the Sixth Armies had suffered considerable losses in armor and two divisions of the Fifth Army in particular were known to have suffered heavily.

## 7. PACIFIC OPERATIONS

ADMIRAL KING said that the general principles for the conduct of the war against Germany and Japan were: firstly, the defeat of both Germany and Japan at the earliest possible date; secondly, that Germany was the principal enemy; thirdly, that continuous and unremitting pressure would be maintained against the Japanese forces. Efforts would be made to attain positions from which the final attack on Japan could be staged when the necessary forces became available from Europe. There had been no fixed schedule but endeavor had been made to go as fast and as far as the available means permitted. At the present time our operations were hampered chiefly by lack of shipping and the shortage of service and auxiliary troops. It was worthy of note that all operations in the Pacific had, of necessity, been amphibious operations and some were carried out over great distances.

In general, the forward line now held included Attu, the Marianas, and Luzon. In addition, we had control of the sea and air not only up to this line, but beyond it to China, Formosa, the Ryukyus, and even to the coast of Japan itself. The present fighting was taking place on the island of Luzon, about 1,500 sea miles from Japan itself. The Japanese appeared to prefer to keep the fighting at that distance from their homeland. What was important was that it was still possible to inflict casualties on the Japanese navy, air forces, and shipping. The British Pacific Fleet was now available, and had been reported to him as being available for operations about the 15th of March.

Regarding future operations, it was proposed to continue the liberation of the Philippines and to establish air bases in Luzon from which to interdict enemy air and shipping in the north part of the China Sea, including the China coast and the area of Formosa. On the 19th of February the United States forces would seize the Bonin Islands, which would be used chiefly as a base for fighters accompanying the heavy bombers on raids on Japan. About the first of April it was proposed to go into Okinawa in the Ryukyus for the purpose of establishing air bases and an advance naval base, and to intensify the sea and air blockade of Japan.

Though no decision had been taken, planning was proceeding on an operation to go into the Chusan Archipelago to broaden the base for intensifying the air and sea blockade of Japan. This would also assist interdiction of communications in the Shanghai-Hankow area, including the great water highway of the Yangtze.

In the North Pacific, air operations were being conducted from the Aleutians and occasional ship bombardments of the Kuriles, chiefly against the islands of Paramushiru and Shushima in the extreme north of the chain. The weather for air operations in this area was par-

ticularly bad, and consequently there had been a number of forced landings by United States aircraft in Kamchatka. He would like to express his deep appreciation for the care and assistance which had been rendered to these airmen by the Soviet authorities.

For a period of about a year examination and study had been continuing of the possibility of securing a safe sea passage through the Kuriles by seizing an island, preferably in the central part of the chain, whose topography was such as to permit the establishment of airfields. Lack of means made it unlikely that such operations would take place during 1945 unless they became so vitally important that ways and means would have to be found to do them, even though the over-all means available for the war against Japan were limited.

ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV asked if the capture of an island in the Kuriles was planned for 1945.

ADMIRAL KING said that means were not available to undertake it as well as the other operations which had been planned; however, as always, it was a question of the relative importance of the various operations under consideration.

GENERAL MARSHALL said he would like to add that from the point of view of the Army, plans were kept up to date in great detail, particularly with regard to shipping, in order to effect the most rapid possible movement of forces from Europe to the Pacific. These plans were so arranged that the movement would start one week after the termination of the war in Europe. The total transfer would, however, take a long time. Air would move first, accompanied by the service units needed to support the air forces and to prepare bases for the other troops. The necessity for these plans was one of the reasons why an estimated date for the end of the war against Germany had been required.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that, as he had mentioned on the previous day, it would be more convenient to discuss questions concerning the Far East after this matter had been considered by the Heads of State.

#### 8. VLR BOMBER OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN

GENERAL KUTER said that the B-29's, the heavy long-range United States bombers, were organized into the Twentieth Air Force commanded by General Arnold. The operations of the Twentieth Air Force had been following a plan somewhat similar to that used by the strategic air forces in Europe. The Japanese aircraft industry had been selected as the first priority target. At the present time this air force had approximately 350 operational B-29's. About a third of that number had been operating from China bases since May 1944 and the remainder had begun operating from the Marianas in July 1944. It was expected to build up a force of approximately

1,800 operational B-29's. The latest operation carried out was on the previous Sunday, when 120 B-29's had attacked Kobe. Broadly speaking, the relatively small force of B-29's which had so far been employed had exceeded the anticipated results for the number of attacks that had been carried out.

#### 9. OPERATIONS IN BURMA AND CHINA

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that during 1944 the Japanese had delivered a serious attack in north Burma. This attack was stopped and the Japanese were driven back by the British forces in north Burma, assisted by Chinese forces under United States direction which had been trained by United States officers in India. Land communications to China had now been opened through north Burma. The road was not good but motor vehicles and guns could now be delivered by that road to China. Operations in Burma were continuing southward with the object of ultimately clearing the Japanese out of Burma, which would then provide a suitable base for further operations against the Japanese in those parts. In addition, as Admiral King had mentioned, British naval forces had been dispatched to take part in operations in the Pacific. Carrier attacks had also been carried out against the oil targets in Palembang on the island of Sumatra.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that it was of interest to add that the British advanced forces operating in the Mandalay area and to the west of it, were almost entirely dependent on air supply provided by United States and British transport aircraft.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States maintained a considerable air force in China, consisting, at the present time, of some 600 planes with more to come. The sole source of supply for these forces was over the 17,000-foot mountains between northeast Burma and Kunming. These operations presented an extremely difficult proposition from every point of view. As Sir Alan Brooke had said, the Japanese had in the previous spring attacked towards the line of communication to China. This was the line of communication not only for the British forces in Burma but also for the Chinese forces in Burma, and the United States air transport force flying supplies into China. In spite of all the difficulties, 44,000 tons of supplies had been flown over the Himalayas last month. A transport plane left airfields in Burma every two minutes of the day and night. It was necessary to provide not only gasoline for the air forces operating out of China but to provide also for the ground forces in China who had little food or equipment. United States transport aircraft had moved Chinese forces to India from where, after training, they had again been transferred by air to the seat of operations where they had joined up with their equipment. More recently the Chinese forces had been flown back

over the mountains, thus providing the only really dependable well-equipped fighting force in China. They were, however, without armored fighting vehicles or medium artillery. Now that the road was open, armored fighting vehicles, trucks and artillery could be sent to them. There had been almost a complete lack of motor transport in China and what there had been was now worn out. It was under these circumstances that the United States Chiefs of Staff had asked assistance from the Soviets in order to get 500 trucks to the Chinese. He very much appreciated the efforts the Soviets had made and fully understood their difficulties. Fortunately, these vehicles could now be sent to China direct by road.

A United States general (General Wedemeyer) was now acting as chief of staff to the Generalissimo in an effort to coordinate the various activities of the Chinese forces. This was of particular importance in relation to United States action in the Pacific. Operations in China were of increasing importance now that naval forces were so close to the coast of China. General Wedemeyer was endeavoring to restore a very serious situation and, with armored cars and trucks now available, his task should prove easier. As he (General Marshall) had previously mentioned, in the face of unparalleled difficulties 44,000 tons had been flown over the Himalayas last month. He mentioned this because to him it meant the accomplishment of the greatest feat in all history. In the face of such achievements cooperation by the staffs now seated around the table should be relatively easy.

GENERAL ANTONOV asked if the operations in Burma were regarded as decisive operations or secondary operations.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that they were decisive operations aimed at the clearing of Burma of all Japanese forces.

GENERAL ANTONOV asked if it was considered that there were enough troops for decisive action on the two fronts—the Far East and Europe. Would not concentration on the main front hasten the end of the war in Europe and thus hasten the end of the war against Japan by making additional forces available?

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that mainly local forces were being used in Burma, the majority of them being from the Indian Army. Indian divisions had been taken from India and had been engaging Germans since the beginning of the war. However, it had been essential to protect India's eastern frontier and at the same time to open up a land route to China. Far greater forces were required in this theater to carry out all the desired operations. As General Marshall had mentioned, plans were ready to transfer forces as fast as possible upon the completion of the war with Germany in order to finish the war against Japan. Up to the present time Germany was regarded as the main enemy and Japan as the secondary enemy, to be taken on with full forces immediately Germany was defeated.

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that the policy of the United States Government played a great part in the decisions with regard to operations in Burma. The United States Government placed great importance on the maintenance of the present regime in China. From the military point of view it would be a very serious matter if all China passed into Japanese control. Only relatively small American forces had been used except for transport aircraft.

It was imperative, however, that operations should not stand still in the Pacific. This would enable the Japanese to build up a solid line in the occupied areas. In the first year of the war only small land and air forces had been available to assist the strong naval force in the Pacific. These forces had, however, pushed forward by by-passing Japanese positions. At present some 200,000 to 300,000 Japanese troops had been cut off in these by-passed positions and a comparable number could now be considered as cut off in Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and even Burma.

ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV asked for information with regard to the area of the United States submarine operations in the Pacific.

ADMIRAL KING said that the United States submarine force had always operated where the most Japanese shipping was to be found. The main submarine force used Hawaii as its main base and worked generally north of the latitude of 20° N. A further submarine force was based on Australia and was now supplemented by a considerable number of British submarines. This force worked in the area of the East Indies. Allied submarines in the Pacific had taken a heavy toll of Japanese shipping, which was now reduced from a maximum of some seven million tons to two million tons. These Japanese losses had been inflicted by submarines, by air forces and by naval surface vessels. United States submarine losses had remained relatively constant at about two per month. The number of United States submarines operating was still increasing. It was clear that the closer operations come to Japan the tougher would be the opposition not only for submarines but also for air and naval forces and for ground troops.

ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV asked if it was intended that United States submarines should operate in the Sea of Japan.

ADMIRAL KING said that so far they had not operated in the Sea of Japan though they operated in the Yellow Sea.

ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV suggested that the Japanese were likely to shift their sea lines of communication to the Sea of Japan.

ADMIRAL KING explained that such a line of communications already existed as did a Japanese sea line of communications to Manchuria and to the North China coast.

## 10. FUTURE BUSINESS

After a brief discussion it was agreed that all the necessary subjects had already been covered and that no further meetings were called for until such time as the Heads of State might submit additional problems to the military staffs.

In reply to a question from Sir Alan Brooke, GENERAL ANTONOV said that he felt that for the present no written report to the Heads of State was necessary, but rather that each staff should report individually to its own Head of State. Should a written report be required, this could easily be prepared later.

In conclusion, SIR ALAN BROOKE said he would like to thank General Antonov for his hospitality in receiving the United States and British Chiefs of Staff in Yalta and for his cooperative attitude during the meetings.

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MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, FEBRUARY 6, 1945, NOON,  
LIVADIA PALACE

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
Secretary Stettinius	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar
Mr. Harriman	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Molotov
Mr. Matthews	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Hiss	Mr. Jebb	Mr. Maisky
Mr. Bohlen	Mr. Dixon	Mr. Gusev
Mr. Foote	Mr. Harrison	Mr. Novikov
Mr. Page	Major Theakstone	Mr. Golunsky

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*Page Minutes*

TOP SECRET

Subjects: 1. Press Release.  
2. Procedure for Studying Dismemberment of Germany.  
3. Reference of the Question Concerning the Dismemberment of Germany to the EAC.

1. *Press Release.*

MR. STETTINIUS stated that it had been deemed advisable to issue a preliminary communiqué on the Crimean Conference. He had requested Mr. Stephen Early, the Assistant to the President on press matters, to make a few remarks on this subject. A copy of this release is attached hereto.<sup>1</sup>

During the course of the discussion MR. MOLOTOV suggested that the word "common" be inserted before the word "enemy" and Mr.

<sup>1</sup> *Post*, p. 658.



Stettinius suggested that the words "for meeting" and "immediately"<sup>2</sup> be eliminated. Mr. Molotov agreed to these delinations [*deletions*]. He stated that he would have to refer the release to Marshal Stalin and that he hoped to give an answer at the 4:00 o'clock meeting.

MR. STETTINIUS pointed out that the release would be held in strict secrecy until its simultaneous issuance in London, Moscow and Washington on Thursday.

## 2. *The Dismemberment of Germany.*

MR. STETTINIUS stated that this topic had been referred to the Foreign Secretaries for discussion. In his opinion much research and study would be necessary before agreement could be reached, but he hoped that they could come to agreement on the general principles involved. At the present session he would like to suggest that the word "dismemberment" be added after the word "demilitarization" in Article 12 of the surrender instrument for Germany.<sup>3</sup> He also wished that consideration be given to the assignment of this topic to the EAC in London for study.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that Mr. Stettinius' suggestion regarding the addition of the word "dismemberment" was entirely acceptable.

MR. EDEN stated that he had worked out another formula which included the addition of the words "and measures for the dissolution of the German unitary state" which he wished included in the second paragraph of Article 12.

MR. MOLOTOV then suggested that the paragraph commence with the words "In order to secure peace and security of Europe, they will take measures for the dismemberment of Germany." He felt that this reading would reflect the agreement reached at yesterday's plenary session.

MR. EDEN maintained that this wording would commit the three powers to too great an extent before the question had been thoroughly studied. He stated that he would prefer merely to add the words "and the dismemberment." He felt that his proposed draft would not only cover the dismemberment of Germany but also its decentralization.

MR. MOLOTOV continued to press for the Soviet draft.

MR. EDEN maintained that the British Delegation could go no further than the addition of the words "and the dismemberment."

MR. STETTINIUS suggested as a possible alternative a phrase reading to the effect that "including dismemberment to the degree necessary to safeguard the peace and security . . ."<sup>4</sup> He added, however,

<sup>2</sup> Examination of the draft release indicates that "immediately" in the minutes should have read "immediate".

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 117.

<sup>4</sup> Points appear in the original.

that his preference was his original suggestion of inserting the words "and the dismemberment."

MR. MOLOTOV was inclined to prefer the second draft submitted by Mr. Stettinius.

MR. EDEN strongly objected.

MR. MOLOTOV then suggested rephrasing the paragraph by including the words "for the future peace and security" and eliminating the words "as deemed requisite."

MR. EDEN maintained that he would be unable to accept this draft, since it was too broad. However, he would readily accept Mr. Stettinius' original proposal. The British Government could go no further.

After some discussion as to the merits of Mr. Stettinius' first and second proposals, during which Mr. Molotov mentioned that the second proposal was preferable since [it] was more definite and more closely reflected what Mr. Churchill had said at yesterday's plenary session, it was decided to sum up the discussion by stating that all three Foreign Secretaries desired the word "dismemberment" included in Article 12 and that Mr. Eden would consult with Mr. Churchill as to whether this course was preferred by him to Mr. Stettinius' second proposal.

### 3. *Reference of the Question Concerning the Dismemberment of Germany to the EAC.*

MR. STETTINIUS inquired whether it might not be agreed that the question concerning the dismemberment of Germany might not be referred to the EAC for study.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that this question be taken up at a later time. He said that since it was a specific matter it might be better to establish a special commission to study the question.

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Matthews Files

### *Matthews Notes*<sup>1</sup>

1. Communiqué<sup>2</sup>—S.<sup>3</sup> thinks wise to issue one

MOL. Preliminary One suggestion: add "common" enemy. Likes communiqué. No objection to mention Black Sea area. Must be approved by Stalin

2. S. announces 3 questions before the 3 F. M. On first point. Adding "dismemberment" to Art 12<sup>4</sup> & refer to EAC.

<sup>1</sup> Transcribed for this volume from longhand notes in pencil.

<sup>2</sup> For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Page minutes of this meeting.

<sup>3</sup> Stettinius. (Throughout the Matthews notes the editors have added footnote explanations of the more unusual contractions and abbreviations.)

<sup>4</sup> Of the draft instrument entitled "Unconditional Surrender of Germany".

MOL. Accepts addition of word.

EDEN. Another formula "and measures for the dissolution of the German unitary state" Would cover abolition of centralization of Germ. govt.

MOL: Will exercise sup.<sup>5</sup> power . . .<sup>6</sup> take measures for dismemberment of G. For peace & security of Europe necessary to dismember G.

Agreed to add: "And the dismemberment" after demilitarization.  
No agreement on Russian change.

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<sup>5</sup> supreme.

<sup>6</sup> Points appear in the original.

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*United States Delegation Draft of Preliminary Yalta Press Release*

PRESS COMMUNIQUÉ <sup>1</sup>

The President of the United States of America, the Premier of the Soviet Union and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, accompanied by their chiefs of staff, their foreign secretaries and other advisors, are now meeting in the Black Sea area.

Their purpose is to concert plans for completing the defeat of the enemy and for building, with their allies, firm foundations for a lasting peace. ~~While their discussions have not progressed as yet beyond the preliminary stages, they have been marked by most encouraging expressions of unity of purpose, frankness and friendship.~~<sup>2</sup> Meetings are continuing day and night.

The conference began with military discussions. The present situation on all the European fronts has been reviewed and the fullest information interchanged. There is complete agreement for joint military operations in the final phase of the war against Nazi Germany. The military staffs of the three Governments are now engaged in working out jointly the detailed plans.

Discussions of problems involved in establishing a secure peace have also begun. These discussions will cover joint plans for the occupation and control of Germany, for meeting the immediate political and economic problems of liberated Europe and proposals for the earliest possible establishment of a permanent international organization to maintain the peace.

A complete communiqué will be issued at the conclusion of the Conference.

[YALTA,] February 6, 1945.

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<sup>1</sup> This draft, which was attached to the Page minutes, appears to have been the one used as a basis for discussion in the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 6.

<sup>2</sup> The omission of this sentence, indicated in the source paper, was apparently made prior to the discussion of this draft by the Foreign Ministers on February 6.

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*Agreed Text of Preliminary Yalta Press Release*

## CRIMEAN CONFERENCE PRESS RELEASE

[YALTA,] February 7, 1945.

Statement for the press and radio released at 4:30 o'clock p. m., Eastern War Time Wednesday, February 7, 1945.

"The President of the United States of America, the Premier of the Soviet Union and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, accompanied by their chiefs of staff, the three foreign secretaries and other advisors, are now meeting in the Black Sea area.

"Their purpose is to concert plans for completing the defeat of the common enemy and for building, with their Allies, firm foundations for a lasting peace. Meetings are proceeding continuously.

"The conference began with military discussions. The present situation on all the European fronts has been reviewed and the fullest information interchanged. There is complete agreement for joint military operations in the final phase of the war against Nazi Germany. The military staffs of the three Governments are now engaged in working out jointly the detailed plans.

"Discussions of problems involved in establishing a secure peace have also begun. These discussions will cover joint plans for the occupation and control of Germany, the political and economic problems of liberated Europe and proposals for the earliest possible establishment of a permanent international organization to maintain Peace.

"A communiqué will be issued at the conclusion of the Conference."

Approved by Marshal Stalin, the Prime Minister and President Roosevelt. Released simultaneously in Washington, London and Moscow.

**ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, FEBRUARY 6, 1945,  
1 P. M., LIVADIA PALACE**

## PRESENT

## UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Mr. Hopkins  
Mr. Byrnes  
Mr. Harriman

## UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Sir Alexander Cadogan

*Editorial Note*

No record of the substance of this meeting has been found. The information given here as to the meeting and the participants is taken from the Log, *ante*, p. 554, which states that the discussions continued after lunch until 3 p. m.

**THIRD PLENARY MEETING, FEBRUARY 6, 1945, 4 P. M., LIVADIA PALACE****PRESENT**

<b>UNITED STATES</b>	<b>UNITED KINGDOM</b>	<b>SOVIET UNION</b>
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Marshal Stalin
Secretary Stettinius	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Hopkins	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Mr. Maisky
Mr. Byrnes	Sir Edward Bridges	Mr. Gusev
Mr. Harriman	Mr. Jebb	Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Matthews	Mr. Wilson	Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Hiss	Mr. Dixon	
Mr. Bohlen	Major Birse	

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*Bohlen Minutes*

TOP SECRET

Subjects: 1. World Security Organization.  
2. The Polish Question.

**WORLD SECURITY ORGANIZATION**

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether the committee of Foreign Ministers had anything to report to the Conference.

MR. STETTINIUS said it had been decided to insert the word "dismemberment" of Germany into Article 12 of the unconditional surrender terms, but that Mr. Molotov had had some additional phrases which he wished to see put in.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he was withdrawing his proposed additional words.

MR. STETTINIUS then said that they could report full agreement to insert the word "dismemberment" into Article 12 of the surrender terms but that they would like to have some more time before reporting on reparations and the relationship of the French zone to the control commission.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had not had an opportunity to obtain the consent of the War Cabinet to the proposed insertion but that he was glad to accept on the behalf of the British Government the decision on this point. He went on to say that in regard to the French zone he felt that the importance of France in the future had been enhanced by the limitation which the President yesterday had placed on the length of time United States forces might stay in Europe. He said that Great Britain would not be strong enough alone to guard the Western approaches to the Channel.

THE PRESIDENT said that he had spoken on the basis of present conditions and he felt public opinion in the United States would be prepared to support an international organization along the lines of Dumbarton Oaks and that this might change their attitude in regard

to the question of troops. The President then added that he felt the Conference should now proceed to the consideration of the United States proposal in regard to Dumbarton Oaks. He felt strongly that all the nations of the world shared a common desire to see the elimination of war for at least fifty years. He said he was not so optimistic as to believe in eternal peace, but he did believe fifty years of peace were feasible and possible. He said that since neither he, Marshal Stalin, nor the Prime Minister had been present at Dumbarton Oaks he would ask the Secretary of State (Mr. Stettinius) who had been chairman of that conference to explain the United States position on the question of voting in the Security Council.<sup>1</sup>

MR. STETTINIUS then read the following statement of the American position on voting in the Council:<sup>2</sup>

*"1. Review of Status of this Question.*

"It was agreed at Dumbarton Oaks that certain matters would remain under consideration for future settlement. Of these, the principal one was that of voting procedure to be followed in the Security Council.

"At Dumbarton Oaks, the three Delegations thoroughly explored the whole question. Since that time the matter has received continuing intensive study by each of the three Governments.

"On December 5, 1944, the President sent to Marshal Stalin and to Prime Minister Churchill a proposal that this matter be settled by making Section C, Chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals read substantially as follows:

*"C. Voting*

"1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

"2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

"3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting."

*"2. Analysis of the American Proposal.*

"(a) We believe that our proposal is entirely consistent with the special responsibilities of the great powers for the preservation of the peace of the world. In this respect our proposal calls for unqualified unanimity of the permanent members of the Council on all major decisions relating to the preservation of peace, including all economic and military enforcement measures.

"(b) At the same time our proposal recognizes the desirability of the permanent members frankly stating that the peaceful adjustment of any controversy which may arise is a matter of general world interest in which any sovereign member state involved should have a right to present its case.

"We believe that unless this freedom of discussion in the Council is permitted, the establishment of the World Organization which we

<sup>1</sup> For two post-Yalta statements regarding this portion of the minutes, see *post*, pp. 994-996.

<sup>2</sup> A copy of the document from which Stettinius read is printed *post*, pp. 682-683.

all so earnestly desire in order to save the world from the tragedy of another war would be seriously jeopardized. Without full and free discussion in the Council, the Organization, even if it could be established, would be vastly different from the one we have contemplated.

"The paper which we have placed before the other two delegations<sup>3</sup> sets forth the text of the provisions which I have read and lists specifically those decisions of the Council which, under our proposals, would require unqualified unanimity and, separately, those matters in the area of discussion and peaceful settlement in which any party to a dispute would abstain from casting a vote.

"3. *Reasons for the American Position.*

"From the point of view of the United States Government there are two important elements in the matter of voting procedure.

"First, there is the necessity for unanimity among the permanent members for the preservation of the peace of the world.

"Second, it is of particular importance to the people of the United States, that there be provision for a fair hearing for all members of the organization, large and small.

"We believe that the proposals submitted by the President to Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill on December 5 of last year<sup>4</sup> provide a reasonable and just solution and satisfactorily combine these two main considerations.

"It is our earnest hope that our two great Allies will find it possible to accept the President's proposal."

THE PRESIDENT suggested that the Secretary of State (Mr. Stettinius) might usefully analyze the effect of the United States proposal on the decisions in the Council.

MR. STETTINIUS reported as follows:<sup>5</sup>

"II. Analysis of effect of above formula on principal substantive decisions on which the Security Council would have to vote.

"Under the above formula the following decisions would require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members:

"I. Recommendations to the General Assembly on

- "1. Admission of new members;
- "2. Suspension of a member;
- "3. Expulsion of a member;
- "4. Election of the Secretary General.

"II. Restoration of the rights and privileges of a suspended member.

"III. Removal of threats to the peace and suppression of breaches of the peace, including the following questions:

- "1. Whether failure on the part of the parties to a dispute to settle it by means of their own choice or in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council in fact constitutes a threat to the peace;

<sup>3</sup> *Post*, pp. 684-686.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, pp. 53-59.

<sup>5</sup> A copy of the document from which Stettinius read at this point is printed *post*, pp. 684-686.

"2. Whether any other actions on the part of any country constitute a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace;

"3. What measures should be taken by the Council to maintain or restore the peace and the manner in which such measures should be carried out;

"4. Whether a regional agency should be authorized to take measures of enforcement.

"IV. Approval of special agreement or agreements for the provision of armed forces and facilities.

"V. Formulation of plans for a general system of regulation of armaments and submission of such plans to the member states.

"VI. Determination of whether the nature and the activities of a regional agency or arrangement for the maintenance of peace and security are consistent with the purposes and principles of the general organization.

"The following decisions relating to peaceful settlement of disputes would also require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members, except that a member of the Council would not cast its vote in any such decisions that concern disputes to which it is a party:

"I. Whether a dispute or a situation brought to the Council's attention is of such a nature that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace;

"II. Whether the Council should call on the parties to settle or adjust the dispute or situation by means of their own choice;

"III. Whether the Council should make a recommendation to the parties as to methods and procedures of settlement;

"IV. Whether the legal aspects of the matter before it should be referred by the Council for advice to the international court of justice;

"V. Whether, if there exists a regional agency for peaceful settlement of local disputes, such an agency should be asked to concern itself with the controversy."

MARSHAL STALIN inquired what was new in Mr. Stettinius' statement that had not been included in the President's message of December 5, 1944.

THE PRESIDENT replied that there had been no change of any significance.

MR. STETTINIUS said that there had been a minor drafting change (this minor change was explained to Mr. Molotov by Mr. Bohlen on the document).

MR. MOLOTOV said that the Soviet Government attached great importance to the question of voting in the Security Council and, therefore, he wished to study the United States proposal and in particular the effect of the drafting change and would be ready to discuss the question tomorrow.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that the British Government had given the most careful consideration to the United States proposals.



He had not agreed with the original proposals made at Dumbarton Oaks since he was anxious that the realities of the situation of the Three Great Powers should be considered, but in studying the President's latest proposal his anxieties on that score had been removed. He could thus say that on behalf of the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Empire and, he believed, the Self-Governing Dominions the President's new proposals were entirely satisfactory. He said that in the last resort world peace depended on the friendship and cooperation of the three Governments, but that the British Government would consider that they were committing an injustice if reservation were not made for free statement of their grievances by small countries. The matter looks as though the Three Great Powers were trying to rule the world, whereas, our desires are to save the world and save it from a repetition of the horrors of this war. He said he felt that the Three Major Powers should make a proud submission. He said that he had looked into the whole matter as it would affect British interests and would give an illustration of why the British Government does not think the President's proposal would bring any harm to British interests. He said, for example, if China should raise the question of the return of Hongkong under the President's proposal, both China and Great Britain would be precluded from voting in regard to the methods of settlement of this controversy, as listed in the five points of the analysis read by Mr. Stettinius. In the last analysis Great Britain would be protected against any decision adverse to her interests by the exercise of the veto power under paragraph 3 of Mr. Stettinius' analysis.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired whether or not Egypt, for example, would be on the assembly.

MR. EDEN replied "yes, but not on the Council unless elected."

MARSHAL STALIN then said suppose Egypt raised the question of the return of the Suez Canal.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he hoped that Marshal Stalin would let him finish his illustration in regard to Hongkong.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that under paragraph 3 of Mr. Stettinius' analysis Great Britain would in fact have the right by their veto to stop all action against Great Britain by the Council of the World Organization. He, therefore, felt that it would not be necessary for Great Britain to agree to any decision contrary to her own interests and, for example, Great Britain would not be required to return Hongkong unless they felt that this should be done. China should, however, have the right to speak and the same considerations would apply to Egypt if that country had a complaint in regard to the Suez Canal. He concluded that he felt that insofar as the United States was concerned the same considerations would also apply.

For example, in the event that Argentina raised a complaint against the United States.

THE PRESIDENT then said that he recalled that in the Tehran Declaration the Three Powers had stated:

“We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the nations to make a peace which will command good will from the overwhelming masses of the peoples of the world. . . .”

THE PRESIDENT added that he thought this Declaration was pertinent to the discussion in progress.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that since he saw no reason to fear the United States proposals he was glad to associate the British Government with them. He added that because of our great power, which is still protected by the veto if we do not agree, we should allow others to be heard.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he would like to have this document to study, since only hearing it orally it was impossible to catch all of the implications. He said that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals already give the right of discussion in the assembly, but he did not believe that any nation would be satisfied with expressing its opinion. They would want some decision. He said that if Mr. Churchill thought that China after raising the question of Hongkong would be satisfied with merely expressing her opinion, he was mistaken since China would want a decision. The same was true of Egypt in the possible question of the Suez Canal. He added that it was not a question of one power or three powers desiring to be masters of the world since he felt that the Dumbarton Oaks organization put a brake on that. He said that he would like to ask for further clarification on what powers Mr. Churchill had in mind when he spoke of a desire to rule the world. He said that he was sure Great Britain had no such desire, nor did the United States and that that left only the U. S. S. R.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he had spoken of the three Great Powers who could collectively place themselves so high over the others that the whole world would say these three desired to rule.

MARSHAL STALIN then said ironically that it looks as though two Great Powers have already accepted a document which would avoid any such accusation but that the third has not yet signified its assent. He then went on to say that in his opinion there was a more serious question than the voting procedure or the question of the domination of the world. They all knew that as long as the three of them lived none of them would involve their countries in aggressive actions, but after all, ten years from now none of them might be present. A new generation would come into being not knowing the horrors of the

\* Points appear in the original.

present war. He felt that there was, therefore, an obligation to create for the future generation such an organization as would secure peace for at least fifty years. He said the main thing was to prevent quarrels in the future between the three Great Powers and that the task, therefore, was to secure their unity for the future. The covenant of the new World Organization should have this as its primary task. He said the greatest danger was conflict between the three Great Powers represented here, but that if unity could be preserved there was little danger of the renewal of German aggression. He said, therefore, a covenant must be worked out which would prevent conflicts between the three Great Powers. Marshal Stalin apologized for not having had an opportunity for studying in detail the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. He said he had been busy on other matters. He said that as he understood it, there were two categories of disputes involved in Mr. Stettinius' explanation: (1) conflicts which would require the application of sanctions, economic, political or military, and (2) conflicts which could be settled by peaceful means. He said in regard to the first the permanent members had a right to vote even if they were parties to such disputes. Under the second category, however, in conflicts susceptible to settlement by peaceful means, the parties in dispute would not be allowed to vote. He added that we Russians were being accused of spending too much time on the technique of voting, which he admitted. But they attached great importance to this question since all decisions were made by votes and they were interested in the decisions, not in the discussions. He said, for example, if China or Egypt raised complaints against England they would not be without friends or protectors in the assembly.

Both the PRIME MINISTER and MR. STETTINIUS pointed out that under the United States proposal the power of the World Organization could not be directed against any of the permanent members.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he was afraid that any conflict might break the unity of our united front.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he saw the force of that argument, but he did not believe that the world organization would eliminate disputes between powers and that would remain the function of diplomacy.

MARSHAL STALIN said that his colleagues in Moscow could not forget the events of December 1939 during the Finnish war when at the instigation of England and France the League of Nations expelled the Soviet Union from the League and mobilized world opinion against the Soviet Union, even going so far as to speak of a crusade.

THE PRIME MINISTER answered that at that time the British and French Governments were very angry at the Soviet Union and in any

event any such action was impossible under the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

MARSHAL STALIN said he was not thinking of expulsion but of the question of the mobilization of opinion against one country.

THE PRIME MINISTER answered that he thought this might happen to any nation, but he doubted very much if either the President or Marshal Stalin would lead a savage attack against Great Britain and he felt this applied also to the other two countries.

THE PRESIDENT then said that he felt that the unity of the Great Powers was one of our first aims and that the United States policy promoted rather than impaired this aim. He said that should there unfortunately be any differences between the Great Powers, and there might well be, this fact would become fully known to the world no matter what voting procedure was adopted. In any event, there was no method of preventing discussions of differences in the assembly. He said that full and friendly discussions in the Council would in no sense promote disunity, but on the contrary, would serve to demonstrate the confidence which the Great Powers had in each other and in the justice of their own policies.

#### THE POLISH QUESTION

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether the Polish question should be taken up now or postponed until the next meeting.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he hoped that at least a start could be made today.

THE PRESIDENT said that the United States was farther away from Poland than anyone else here, and that there were times when a long distance point of view was useful. He said that at Tehran he had stated that he believed the American people were in general favorably inclined to the Curzon Line as the eastern frontier of Poland, but he felt that if the Soviet Government would consider a concession in regard to Lwow and the oil deposits in the Province of Lwow that would have a very salutary effect. He said that he was merely putting forth this suggestion for consideration and would not insist on it. He said that in regard to the government he wished to see the creation of a representative government which could have the support of all the great powers and which could be composed of representatives of the principal parties of Poland. He said one possibility which had been suggested was the creation of a Presidential Council composed of Polish leaders which could then create a government composed of the chiefs of the five political parties—Workers Party, Peasant Party, Socialist Party, etc. He said that one thing must be made certain and that was that Poland should maintain the most friendly and co-operative relations with the Soviet Union.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that Poland should maintain friendly relations not only with the Soviet Union but with the other Allies.

THE PRESIDENT said he had merely put forth a suggestion but he thought if we could solve the Polish question it would be a great help to all of us. He added he didn't know personally any members of the London government or Lublin government, but he had met Mr. Mikolajczyk who had made a deep impression on him as a sincere and an honest man.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had consistently declared in Parliament and elsewhere that the British Government would support the Curzon Line, even leaving Lwow to the Soviet Union. He had been criticized for this and so had Mr. Eden, but he felt that after the burdens which Russia had borne in this war the Curzon Line was not a decision of force but one of right. He said he remained in that position. Of course, he added, if the mighty Soviet Union could make some gesture to the much weaker country, such as the relinquishment of Lwow, this act of magnanimity would be acclaimed and admired. He said he was much more interested in sovereignty and independence of Poland than in the frontier line—he wanted to see the Poles have a home where they could organize their lives as they wished. That was an objective that he had often heard Marshal Stalin proclaim most firmly, and he put his trust in those declarations. He said that he therefore had not considered the question of the frontier as a question of vital importance. It must not be forgotten, however, that Great Britain had gone to war to protect Poland against German aggression at a time when that decision was most risky, and it had almost cost them their life in the world. He said Great Britain had no material interest in Poland, but the question was one of honor and that his government would therefore never be content with a solution which did not leave Poland a free and independent state. The freedom of Poland, however, did not cover any hostile designs or intrigue against the U. S. S. R., and none of us should permit this. It is the earnest desire of the British Government that Poland be mistress in her own house and captain of her soul. He said that the British Government recognized the present Polish government in London but did not have intimate contact with it. He said he had known Mr. Mikolajczyk, Mr. Grabski and Mr. Romer and had found them good and honest men. He inquired whether there might be some possibility of forming a government here for Poland which would utilize these men. If this could be done all the great powers could then recognize it as an interim government until such time as the Poland government [*Polish people?*] by free vote could select and form their own government. He concluded by saying he was interested in the President's suggestion.

At the suggestion of Marshal Stalin, there was a ten-minute intermission.

MARSHAL STALIN then gave the following summary of his views on the Polish question: Mr. Churchill had said that for Great Britain the Polish question was one of honor and that he understood, but for the Russians it was a question both of honor and security. It was one of honor because Russia had many past grievances against Poland and desired to see them eliminated. It was a question of strategic security not only because Poland was a bordering country but because throughout history Poland had been the corridor for attack on Russia. We have to mention that during the last thirty years Germany twice has passed through this corridor. The reason for this was that Poland was weak. Russia wants a strong, independent and democratic Poland. Since it was impossible by the force of Russian armies alone to close from the outside this corridor, it could be done only by Poland's own forces. It was very important, therefore, to have Poland independent, strong and democratic. It is not only a question of honor for Russia, but one of life and death. It was for this reason that there had been a great change from the policies of the Czars who had wished to suppress and assimilate Poland. In regard to the questions raised here on which we have different opinions, the following might be said:

In regard to the Curzon Line, concessions in regard to Lwow and the Lwow Province, and Mr. Churchill's reference to a magnanimous act on our part, it is necessary to remind you that not Russians but Curzon and Clemenceau fixed this line. The Russians had not been invited and the line was established against their will. Lenin had opposed giving Bialystok Province to the Poles but the Curzon Line gives it to Poland. We have already retreated from Lenin's position in regard to this province. Should we then be less Russian than Curzon and Clemenceau? We could not then return to Moscow and face the people who would say Stalin and Molotov have been less sure defenders of Russian interest than Curzon and Clemenceau. It is, therefore, impossible to agree with the proposed modification of the line. I would prefer to have the war go on although it will cost us blood in order to compensate for Poland from Germany. When he was in Moscow Mr. Mikolajczyk was delighted to hear that Poland's frontier would extend to the West Neisse River and I favor the Polish frontier on the West Neisse and ask the conference to support this proposal.

As to the question of the Polish government, Mr. Churchill has said it would be good to create a Polish government here. I am afraid that was a slip of the tongue, for without participation of the Poles it is impossible to create a Polish government. I am called a dictator and not a democrat, but I have enough democratic feeling to refuse

to create a Polish government without the Poles being consulted—the question can only be settled with the consent of the Poles. Last autumn in Moscow there was a good chance for a fusion of the various Polish elements and in the meeting between Mikolajczyk, Grabski and Lublin Poles various points of agreement were reached as Mr. Churchill will remember. Mikolajczyk left for London but did not return since he was expelled from office precisely because he wanted agreement. Artieszewski [*Arciszewski*] and Raskiewycz [*Raczkiewicz*] are not only against agreement but are hostile to any idea of an agreement. Artieszewski has characterized the Lublin Poles as bandits and criminals and they naturally pay him back in the same coin. It will be difficult to bring them together. The Warsaw Poles, Bierut and Osobka Morawski, do not even want to talk about any fusion with the London government. I asked them what concessions they might make in this respect and they said they could tolerate Jelikowski [*Żeligowski*] or Grabski but they do not even want to hear about Mikolajczyk being prime minister. I am prepared to support any attempt to reach a solution that would offer some [chance] of success. Should we ask the Warsaw Poles to come here or perhaps come to Moscow? I must say that the Warsaw government has a democratic base equal at least to that of de Gaulle.

As a military man I demand from a country liberated by the Red Army that there be no civil war in the rear. The men in the Red Army are indifferent to the type of government as long as it will maintain order and they will not be shot in the back. The Warsaw, or Lublin, government has not badly fulfilled this task. There are, however, agents of the London government who claim to be agents of the underground forces of resistance. I must say that no good and much evil comes from these forces. Up to the present time they have killed 212 of our military men. They attack our supply bases to obtain arms. Although it has been proclaimed that all radio stations must be registered and obtain permission to operate, agents of the London government are violating these regulations. We have arrested some of them and if they continue to disturb our rear we will shoot them as military law requires. When I compare what the agents of the Lublin government have done and what the agents of the London government have done I see the first are good and the second bad. We want tranquility in our rear. We will support the government which gives us peace in the rear, and as a military man I could not do otherwise. Without a secure rear there can be no more victories for the Red Army. Any military man and even the non-military man will understand this situation.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> It appears that the note of Hopkins, *post*, p. 686, was passed to the President at some point during the foregoing statement by Stalin.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he must put on record the fact that the British and Soviet Governments have different sources of information in Poland and therefore they obtain different views of the situation there. He said it is possible that their reports are mistaken as it is not always possible to believe everything that anyone tells you. He believed, he added, that with the best of all their information he could not feel that the Lublin government represents more than one third of the people and would be maintained in power if the people were free to express their opinion. One of the reasons why the British have so earnestly sought a solution had been the fear that the Polish underground army would come into collision with the Lublin government, which would lead to great bloodshed, arrests and deportations which could not fail to have a bad effect on the whole Polish question. The Prime Minister said he agreed that anyone who attacks the Red Army should be punished, but he repeated that the British Government could not agree to recognizing the Lublin government of Poland.

The Conference then adjourned until four o'clock tomorrow.

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Hiss Collection

*Hiss Notes*<sup>1</sup>

Livadia

Note to Pres  
for ERS<sup>2</sup>  
re VIII C

Tonight

Harriman	} Gromyko who else?
Page	
AH	

redraft of provision

Voting  
Plenary

Letter from  
ERS to Vish.  
for set of pictures

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<sup>1</sup> From penciled notes in longhand. For this meeting the notes appear to have been taken by Hiss only during the discussion of the question of voting in the United Nations, prior to the intermission. There is a notation by Hiss that this part of the meeting ran from 4:15 to 6:20. For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Bohlen minutes of this meeting.

A penciled diagram at the head of these notes shows the seating arrangement around the conference table clockwise as follows: Roosevelt, Bohlen, Byrnes, Harriman, Cadogan, Eden, Churchill, Birse, Bridges, Clark Kerr, Gromyko, Vyshinsky, Molotov, Stalin, Maisky, Gusev, Leahy, Stettinius.

<sup>2</sup> Stettinius.



2/6

4.15 p m—6.20  
(Then Poland)

1. Pres, ERS, Leahy, Bohlen, Byrnes, Harriman
2. P. M., Eden, Cadogan, Interpreter (military), Sir Ed. Bridges, Clark-Kerr
3. Stalin, Molotov, Maisky, Vishinsky, Gusev, Gromyko
  1. Behind: Hopkins, Matthews, A. H.
  2. " : Jebb, Dixon, Wilson
  3. " : Pavolov

ERS reported that the words "and the dismemberment" be added to Art XII of Articles of Surrender. Mr. Mol. has a further proposal which will require more discussion. Ask to submit final report tomorrow

Molotov withdraws his suggestion

ERS made final report

Church. said instrument of dismemberment had not been approved by Cabinet but he is glad agt has been reached

Church: Position of Fr. becomes of great importance to us.

Must have a strong French army

Pres: Pub. opinion in US will determine;—but in his opinion if we get D. O.<sup>3</sup> much more likely to take part in world activity

~~ERS Read analysis~~

Pres: ERS explain US proposal as he was at D. O. & none of 3 heads of deleg. were.

Feel strongly people going to insist on getting something that will ensure peace, not for all time, but say for 50 years

ERS: read statement

3 ribbon copies to each of 3 heads of deleg.

Pres. suggested ERS read types of decisions requiring unan.<sup>4</sup>

Agreed

I shall first present 6 situations in which unan. of great powers must be maintained at all times

Read I to VI of Part II our paper (analysis)

I shall now read the situations which also require etc. . . . .<sup>5</sup>  
in other words unanimity except when involved in a dispute

Read I to IV [V?]<sup>6</sup>

Pres that ends the reading & explanation of part of the procedure  
Thing we have to remember—objective of the 5 great & of all nations is same & on a q. of procedure there ought not be any real difficulty

<sup>3</sup> Dumbarton Oaks.

<sup>4</sup> Unanimity.

<sup>5</sup> Points appear in the original.

<sup>6</sup> Brackets appear in the original.

Stalin: Would like to know what is new in proposals read by ERS as compared with Dec. 5

Asked about minor phraseological change

Long discussion

Asked for more time to study the proposal made by ERS as compared with Pres. proposal

Could we put it off to tomorrow

Church. Agrees to study of this particular & to adjourn q. to tomorrow

I cannot conceal from the company that HMG that has examined the U. S. proposal—the general proposal—with very close attention. I did not feel myself wholly in agt. with the orig. proposal at DO I have been anxious to make sure that the realities of the positions of the 5 great powers have been fully faced

On studying the Pres. new proposal my anxieties have been removed so far as Brit Com of Ns & Brit Empire are concerned.

I & the self governing dominions have the feeling that of course whether world peace is achieved on a lasting found. can only depend in the last resort upon the collab of the 3 great powers

Not doing justice to our true heart felt intentions if didn't provide for the free statement of grievances by the many smaller states of the world

It might look as if we were claiming to rule the world—we 3 Whereas our desire is to serve the world & to preserve it from renewal of the frightful horrors which have fallen upon the lap of its inhabs. ∴ I feel that we great powers—3—should make what I would call a proud submission to the commun of the world. Within the limits stated. I've naturally been looking at this as to how it would affect the fortunes & ints of Brit Em & Com. I'm going to take a part. instance to illustrate why I do not feel this submission wh. we make to the whole world will be damaging to Brit. interests. The case I take is a difficult one which affects Gt. Brit. I take the case of HK <sup>7</sup> If we agree to the proposal of the US let us suppose Ch.<sup>8</sup> asks us to return HK to them. We should have a right to state our case fully ag. any case made by the Ch. But we should not be allowed to vote on the qs set out—the 5 q's set out at the end of this doc. (missed sentence—see Jebb)

St. Who is we

Church I'm speaking only of the Brit Govt

St. Will Eg.<sup>9</sup> take part in the Assembly?

Church In Ass. but not in Coun. unless elected

St. Any member of Ass. could freely express his opin.

<sup>7</sup> Hong Kong

<sup>8</sup> China.

<sup>9</sup> Egypt.

Church: Yes & so long as Brit G concerned these 5 q's the Brit Govt would not be allowed to vote. I say we agree to these procedural matters being decided without our vote—I'm only taking HK illus.—we means Brit Govt

I humbly beg to be allowed to keep to illus. I introduced & then others can follow

What his majesty's Govt could not agree to is that the other matters in ¶ III the 4 matters set out there

I consider that we are suff. safeguarding ag. being overruled in a matter affecting sovereignty because of our rights under ¶ III

We have in fact the right by our veto power to stop all further action ag. us by the world organ.

∴ I can not feel that we should have to agree to any dec. contrary to our free choice in these matters as set out. We should be protected by our rt. of veto ag. all measures of the kind in ¶ III

№ (missed more)

On other hand I feel it would be wrong that Ch. should not have oppor to state its case fully & Coun not have powers in last 5 ¶s US paper & we not vote on those

In the same way if Eg raises a q. ag the Brit affecting Suez canal—

Pres. read sentence from Tehran re good will

HMG see no danger from their own point of view in associating themselves with prop. in the US paper & we see great advantage in the 3 great powers not assuming the position of rulers of all the rest without even allowing them to state their case. In fact we feel it would not be right to take that position of denying them the rt. to state the case & we rely on ¶ III if we are not convinced by the arguments made ag. us.

(Absent see Doc <sup>10</sup>)

St. If any nation raise any import. q. will raise not only q. but will want a dec. Already have rt to express opin in Ass. Mr. Church thinks that Ch after raising q of HK would be content to express her opin. Ch. might ask for a decision.

Will demand a dec.

∴ matter is much more serious than merely to secure for each nation rt. to express its opin

Also it is not a matter of 3 powers liking to be master of world, D. O. proposals should be a break upon such a group of powers. I don't know any great power which would have intention to master world. Perhaps I am mistaken & see not everything.

I would like to ask my friend Mr Ch. to name which powers might intend domin world

<sup>10</sup> Reference here is to Matthews.

Im sure Mr Ch & Brit doesn't want domin. I'm sure US hasn't opin. of this kind. USSR hasn't There remains only 1 power. China

Church I was speaking of 3 great powers gathered here collectively lifting themselves so high that others would consider they were trying to domin world—not any 1 power but the 3 Not 1 but a trinity

(St) If 2 great powers accept provs. which excuse them from that. 1 power has not yet agreed to that

I will examine the doc. & perhaps I will understand what is the matter but at present everything is not clear to me.

Think much more serious q than rt of powers express opin or appear domin world

I fear—we are not now & will not allow that any of our gt countries—act of agg. But in 10 yrs time we will disappear—new generations will come which did not experience horrors of war & forget what we been thru

Seems we would like to secure peace at least for 50 yrs. I have such an idea. I think we have now to build up such a form which would put as many obstacles as possible to domination of world. I think that the task is to secure our unity of 3 powers in future & for this purpose must elaborate such a covenant which would in certain respects (?) The greatest danger for future is possibility of conflicts among ourselves If unity Ger danger not very great & now we have to think how to create—that our great powers & poss. Ch. & Fr. will keep united fronts in future There must be elaborated a statement which would prevent conflicts among great powers.

I must apologize I was real busy other matters & not chance study this q in detail As far as I understand what was said by Ams today all points divided in 2 categories—

In 1st cat. as I understood belong such things as sanctions econ, pol & mil & in other cat. all those conflicts which could be settled by peaceful means without sanctions

Also understood that in consid. of conflicts of both types contemplated free discussion of the Council

I understood in consid. of q's of 1st cat.

perm. members being party to dispute has rt. to vote & not be asked to withdraw

But in conflicts of 2nd cat. party in dispute not be allowed to vote.

We Rs being accused talking too much about how to vote. But Issues are being decided by vote & we are interested in the decisions & less in discussions Can discuss for 100 yrs & nothing settled, but I'm interested in decs.

Suppose Ch. suggests HK be returned or Suez Can. to Eg. I can assure Mr Church Ch & Eg. will be not alone. They will have some friends in Ass. & possibly some protectors

Church: I would say no when it came to use of Leag. powers. Powers should not be used ag. us if we remained unconvinced

St: Is it so.

Church It is as I understand it

Eden They could talk & complain but no dec. could be taken without our consent

ERS No econ. sanction or use of force without unan. of perm. members of Sec. Coun.

Maisky No recommend. could be made

Maisky These 5 points will not be decisions but only discussions?

ERS Yes

St I'm afraid these conflicts re HK might break our unity

Church See force of that but whole force of diplomacy proceeds & is not prevented by World Org. Members will always be discussing matters among themselves

St: Another picture my colleagues in Mosc cannot forget the case which occurred in Dec 39 during Rus-Fin war when Brit & Fr. used Leag. ag us & eventually expelled us, & isolated us & later mobilised all the powers ag. us in matter of crusade

Church: we were very angry, were all alone

St: How guar. such thing not occur ag.

Church We couldn't do it here

St. Couldn't we make more obstacles in way of it

Church: Expulsion must be unan. & gt. power could veto.

St. First time we have

Pres: Should emphasize action like Fin. one would be impossible as would require unan. of 5

St. Not only expulsion but mobilization of opinion

Church. I see the case which cause anxiety to any of us, agitation be worked up & lot of abuse be levelled at one of us. Might be Brit I can only say dip. would be active

Everything would be done to prevent anything that would mar our unity

I'm quite sure Mar. St. wouldn't make a harsh att on Brit Em—verbally I mean—without talking to us first We would get to some arrangement, in any event we should be very careful not to let the unity be destroyed

St: I would prob. but what of Maisky

Pres: Let's put it another way. Whole doc. is drawn up to promote not impair unity. Will be differences—will be known—will be talked in Assembly. To permit discussion in Coun. will in no sense impair

unity but will promote it & will demonstrate confid. have in each other & in justice

St tomorrow continue, meanwhile study

Poland

In intermission Gromyko indicated he had not understood from L. P.<sup>11</sup> the changes in 3rd ¶ of our proposal. I straightened him out on the score of texts but he was still not clear satisfied that the effect of the reference to VIII C was clear or desirable. He also said he would have great difficulty explaining its effect to his colleagues. He said it would be much easier for the Rs if we could drop the whole reference & asked if Pres would agree to that. I said I thought so

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<sup>11</sup> Leo Pasvolosky.

Matthews Files

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*Matthews Minutes*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

(The first part of the meeting was devoted to a discussion of the voting procedure for the world organization. This is covered in Mr. Hiss's notes.)

POLAND

PRESIDENT: I should like to bring up Poland. I come from a great distance and therefore have the advantage of a more distant point of view of the problem. There are six or seven million Poles in the United States. As I said in Tehran, in general I am in favor of the Curzon line. Most Poles, like the Chinese, want to save face.

STALIN: (interrupting) Who will save face, the Poles in Poland or the *émigré* Poles?

PRESIDENT: The Poles would like East Prussia and part of Germany. It would make it easier for me at home if the Soviet Government could give something to Poland. I raised the question of giving them Lvov at Tehran. It has now been suggested that the oil lands in the southwest of Lvov might be given them. I am not making a definite statement but I hope that Marshal Stalin can make a gesture in this direction.

But the most important matter is that of a permanent government for Poland. Opinion in the United States is against recognition of the Lublin government on the ground that it represents a small

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<sup>1</sup> For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Bohlen minutes of this meeting.

portion of the Polish people. What people want is the creation of a government of national unity to settle their internal differences. A government which would represent all five major parties (names them) is what is wanted. It may interest Marshal Stalin that I do not know any of the London or of the Lublin government. Mikolajczyk came to Washington and I was greatly impressed by him. I felt that he was an honest man.

The main suggestion I want to make is that there be created an ad interim government which will have the support of the majority of the Polish people. There are many ways of creating such a government. One of the many suggestions is the possibility of creating a presidency council made up of a small number of men who would be the controlling force ad interim to set up a more permanent government. I make this suggestion as from the distance of three thousand miles. Sometimes distance is an advantage. We want a Poland that will be thoroughly friendly to the Soviet for years to come. This is essential.

STALIN: (interrupting) Friendly not only to the Soviet but all three allies.

PRESIDENT: This is my only suggestion. If we can work out some solution of this problem it will make peace much easier.

PRIME MINISTER: I have made repeated declarations in Parliament in support of the Soviet claims to the Curzon line, that is to say, leaving Lvov with Soviet Russia. I have been much criticized and so has Mr. Eden especially by the party which I represent. But I have always considered that after all Russia has suffered in fighting Germany and after all her efforts in liberating Poland her claim is one founded not on force but on right. In that position I abide. But of course if the mighty power, the Soviet Union, made a gesture of magnanimity to a much weaker power and made the gesture suggested by the President we would heartily acclaim such action.

However, I am more interested in the question of Poland's sovereign independence and freedom than in particular frontier lines. I want the Poles to have a home in Europe and to be free to live their own life there. That is an objective which I have always heard Marshal Stalin proclaim with the utmost firmness. It is because I put my trust in his declaration about the sovereign independence and freedom of Poland that the frontier question I consider not of supreme importance. This is what is dear to the hearts of the nation of Britain. This is what we went to war against Germany for—that Poland should be free and sovereign. Everyone here knows the result it was to us unprepared as we were and that it nearly cost us our life as a nation. Great Britain had no material interest in Poland. Her interest is only one of honor because we drew the sword for Poland

against Hitler's brutal attack. Never could I be content with any solution that would not leave Poland as a free and independent state. However, I have one qualification: I do not think that the freedom of Poland could be made to cover hostile designs by any Polish government, perhaps by intrigue with Germany, against the Soviet. I cannot conceive that the world organization would ever tolerate such action or leave it only to Soviet Russia to take proper measures. Our most earnest desire which we care about as much as our lives is that Poland be mistress in her own house and in her own soul. I earnestly hope that we shall not separate without taking a practical step with this objective. At the present time there are two governments about which we differ. I have never seen any of the present London government. We recognize them but have not sought their company. But Mikolajczyk, Romer and Grabski are men of good-sense and we have confidence in them. We remain in informal but friendly contact with them. There will be great criticism against us all if we let them divide us when we have such great tasks and common hopes. Can we not make a government here in Poland. A provisional or interim government, as the President said, pending free elections so that all three of us can extend recognition as well as the other United Nations. Can we not pave the way for a free future on the future constitution and administration of Poland? If we could do that we should leave the table with one great step accomplished toward future peace and the prosperity of Central Europe. I am sure that effective guarantees can be laid down to secure the line of communications of the victorious Red Army in its battle to defeat Germany. His Majesty's Government cordially support the President's suggestion and present the question to our Russian allies.

(Stalin suggests a ten-minute intermission.)

STALIN: The Prime Minister has said that for Great Britain the question of Poland is a question of honor. For Russia it is not only a question of honor but also of security. It is a question of honor for Russia for we shall have to eliminate many things from the books. But it is also a question of security of the state not only because we are on Poland's frontier but also because throughout history Poland has always been a corridor for attack on Russia. It is sufficient that during the last thirty years our German enemy has passed through this corridor twice. This is because Poland was weak. It is in the Russian interest as well as that of Poland that Poland be strong and powerful and in a position in her own and in our interests to shut the corridor by her own forces. The corridor cannot be mechanically shut from outside by Russia. It could be shut from inside only by



Poland. It is necessary that Poland be free, independent and powerful. It is not only a question of honor but of life and death for the Soviet State. That is why Russia today is against the Czarist policy of abolition of Poland. We have completely changed this inhuman policy and started a policy of friendship and independence for Poland. This is the basis of our policy and we favor a strong independent Poland.

I refer now to our allies appeal with regard to the Curzon line. The President has suggested modification, giving Poland Lvov and Lvov Province. The Prime Minister thinks that we should make a gesture of magnanimity. But I must remind you that the Curzon line was invented not by Russians but by foreigners. The Curzon line of Curzon was made by Curzon, Clemenceau and the Americans in 1918-1919. Russia was not invited and did not participate. This line was accepted against the will of the Russians on the basis of ethnological data. Lenin opposed it. He did not want to give Bialystok and Bialystok Provinces to Poland but the Curzon line gives them to Poland. We have retreated from Lenin's position. Some want us to be less Russian than Curzon and Clemenceau. What will the Russians say at Moscow and the Ukrainians? They will say that Stalin and Molotov are far less defenders of Russia than Curzon and Clemenceau. I cannot take such a position and return to Moscow. I prefer that the war continue a little longer and give Poland compensation in the west at the expense of Germany. I asked Mikolajczyk what frontier he wanted. Mikolajczyk was delighted to hear of a western frontier to the river Neisse. I must say that I will maintain this line and ask this conference to support it. There are two Neisse rivers. The east and the west. I favor the west.

Now about the government. The Prime Minister has said that he wants to create a Polish government here. I am afraid that was a slip of the tongue. Without the participation of Poles we can create no Polish government. They all say that I am a dictator but I have enough democratic feeling not to set up a Polish government without Poles. It must be with participation of Poles. We had the opportunity in Moscow to create a Polish government with Poles. Both London and Lublin groups met in Moscow and certain points of agreement were reached. Mikolajczyk returned to London and was kicked out of the government. The present London government of Archuchuski [*Arciezewski*], which is in reality under the President Brachewicz [*Raczkiwicz*]. All these people were against the agree-

ment and hostile to the idea. They called the Lublin government "bandits" and "traitors." Naturally the Lublin government paid the same coin to the London government. It is difficult to bring them together. The principal personalities, Bierut, Osobka-Morawski, won't hear of the London government. I ask what kind of concessions can be made. They can tolerate Grabski and General Jelikowski [*Zeligowski*] but they won't hear of Mikolajczyk. Under these circumstances I am prepared to support any attempt to create unity if there is some chance of success. I am prepared to call the Warsaw Poles here or better to see them in Moscow. But frankly, the Warsaw government has as great a democratic basis in Poland as de Gaulle has in France.

Now as a military man I must say what I demand of a country liberated by the Red Army. First there should be peace and quiet in the wake of the army. The men of the Red Army are indifferent as to what kind of government there is in Poland but they do want one that will maintain order behind the lines. The Lublin Warsaw government fulfils this role not badly. There are agents of the London government connected with the so-called underground. They are called resistance forces. We have had nothing good from them but much evil. So far their agents have killed 212 Russian military men. They have attacked supply bases for arms. It was announced that all wireless stations must be registered but these forces continued to break all the laws of war and complained of being arrested. If they attack the Red Army any more they will be shot. When I compare the agents of both governments I find that the Lublin ones are useful and the others the contrary. The military must have peace and quiet. The military will support such a government and I cannot do otherwise. Such is the situation.

(The President says that it is now quarter to eight and that the meeting should adjourn.)

PRIME MINISTER: I must put on record that both the British and Soviet governments have different sources of information in Poland and get different facts. Perhaps we are mistaken but I do not feel that the Lublin government represents even one third of the Polish people. This is my honest opinion and I may be wrong. Still, I have felt that the underground might have collisions with the Lublin government. I have feared bloodshed, arrests, deportation, and I fear the effect on the whole Polish question. Anyone who attacks the Red Army should be punished but I cannot feel that the Lublin government has any right to represent the Polish nation.

Hiss Collection

*United States Delegation Memorandum*<sup>1</sup>

STATEMENT ON THE AMERICAN POSITION ON VOTING IN THE COUNCIL

1. *Review of Status of this Question.*

It was agreed at Dumbarton Oaks that certain matters would remain under consideration for future settlement. Of these, the principal one was that of voting procedure to be followed in the Security Council.

At Dumbarton Oaks, the three Delegations thoroughly explored the whole question. Since that time the matter has received continuing intensive study by each of the three Governments.

On December 5, 1944, the President sent to Marshal Stalin and to Prime Minister Churchill a proposal that this matter be settled by making Section C, Chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals read substantially as follows:

*"C. Voting*

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting."

The text I have just read contains a minor drafting change in accordance with Soviet and British comments on the original text submitted by the President.

2. *Analysis of the American Proposal.*

(a) It is entirely consonant with the special responsibilities of the great powers for the preservation of the peace of the world. In this respect our proposal calls for unqualified unanimity of the permanent members of the Council on all major decisions relating to the preservation of peace, including all economic and military enforcement measures.

(b) At the same time our proposal recognizes the desirability of the permanent members frankly stating that the peaceful adjustment of any controversy which may arise is a matter of general world interest in which the sovereign member states other than the permanent members have a right to state their case without arbitrary prohibition.

<sup>1</sup> Authorship not indicated. This is a carbon copy of one of the papers from which Stettinius spoke in the Plenary Meeting of February 6. (Cf. *ante*, pp. 661-662, and *post*, p. 994.) The copy contains penciled notes by Hiss indicating the variations made by Stettinius when speaking from this paper.

We believe that unless this freedom of discussion in the Council is permitted, the establishment of the World Organization we all desire would be seriously jeopardized, if not made impossible. Without full and free discussion in the Council, the Organization, even if it could be established, would be vastly different from that we have contemplated.

The paper which we have placed before the other two delegations sets forth the text of the provisions which I have read and lists specifically those decisions of the Council which, under our proposals, would require unqualified unanimity and, separately, those matters in the area of discussion and peaceful settlement in which any party to a dispute would abstain from casting a vote.

### 3. *Reasons for the American Position.*

From the point of view of the United States Government there are two important elements in the matter of voting procedure.

*First*, there is the necessity for unanimity among the permanent members for the preservation of the peace of the world to which I have referred.

*Second*, it is of particular importance to the people of the United States, that there be provision for justice for all members of the organization.

It is our task to reconcile these two major elements. We believe that the proposals submitted by the President to Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill on December 5, 1944, provide a reasonable and just solution and satisfactorily combine these two main considerations.

[YALTA,] February 6, 1945.

Hiss Collection

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## *United States Delegation Memorandum*<sup>1</sup>

### VOTING PROCEDURE

#### SUPPLEMENTARY ARGUMENTS FOR USE OF SECRETARY

1. Doubt as to acceptability of Organization unless our proposal is adopted. Our main concern is being able to establish the Organization.

American public opinion and the smaller nations, especially the Latin American nations, and—we believe—the British Dominions, may not accept an Organization which they believe fails to accord them a just and reasonable position.

<sup>1</sup> Carbon copy; authorship not indicated. Certain of the arguments set forth in this paper are reflected in Stettinius' statement in the Plenary Meeting on February 6. (Cf. *ante*, pp. 661-662, and *post*, p. 994.)

2. Importance of the Organization starting off with good will of all members and of world public opinion.

In the Teheran Declaration, the three powers stated:

“We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the nations to make a peace which will command good will from the overwhelming masses of the peoples of the world. . . .”

Without this good will on the part of all members of the Organization—even if it could be established—its future would<sup>2</sup> be uncertain.

To insure this good will so necessary to the effective operation of the Organization, we must avoid the charge<sup>3</sup> of great power domination.

3. Unity of the great powers is one of our major aims and is promoted rather than impaired by our proposal.

If there should unfortunately be any differences between the great powers, the fact would become fully known to the world, whatever voting procedure is adopted.

Discussion of differences cannot be prevented in the Assembly in any event.<sup>4</sup>

To permit full and free discussion in the Council will in no sense promote disunity, but will, on the contrary, demonstrate the confidence the great powers have in each other and in the justice of their own policies.

[YALTA,] February 6, 1945.

<sup>2</sup> The words “we feel” are inserted here in Hiss’ penciled handwriting.

<sup>3</sup> The words “the charge” are stricken out and the words “even giving the impression” are inserted here in Hiss’ penciled handwriting.

<sup>4</sup> The words “in any event” are transposed in pencil from the end to the beginning of this sentence.

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UNA Files

*United States Delegation Memorandum*<sup>1</sup>

PROPOSED FORMULA FOR VOTING PROCEDURE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF THAT FORMULA

I. Proposed formula as communicated on December 5, 1944 to Marshal Stalin and to Prime Minister Churchill<sup>2</sup> (with a minor clarification of the reference to Chapter VIII, Section C).

<sup>1</sup> Undated copy; authorship not indicated. This is apparently the paper copies of which were distributed to the British and Soviet Delegations at the Plenary Meeting on February 6 and of which a considerable portion was read by Stettinius. (Cf. *ante*, pp. 662-663, and *post*, p. 994.) For the drafting history of this paper, see *ante*, p. 81, footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 58-59.

The provisions of Section C. of Chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals would read as follows:

*"C. Voting*

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting."

II. Analysis of effect of above formula on principal substantive decisions on which the Security Council would have to vote.

Under the above formula the following decisions would require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members:

I. Recommendations to the General Assembly on

1. Admission of new members;
2. Suspension of a member;
3. Expulsion of a member;
4. Election of the Secretary General.

II. Restoration of the rights and privileges of a suspended member.

III. Removal of threats to the peace and suppression of breaches of the peace, including the following questions:

1. Whether failure on the part of the parties to a dispute to settle it by means of their own choice or in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council in fact constitutes a threat to the peace;
2. Whether any other actions on the part of any country constitute a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace;
3. What measures should be taken by the Council to maintain or restore the peace and the manner in which such measures should be carried out;
4. Whether a regional agency should be authorized to take measures of enforcement.

IV. Approval of special agreement or agreements for the provision of armed forces and facilities.

V. Formulation of plans for a general system of regulation of armaments and submission of such plans to the member states.

VI. Determination of whether the nature and the activities of a regional agency or arrangement for the maintenance of peace and security are consistent with the purposes and principles of the general organization.

The following decisions relating to peaceful settlement of disputes would also require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members,

except that a member of the Council would not cast its vote in any such decisions that concern disputes to which it is a party:

I. Whether a dispute or a situation brought to the Council's attention is of such a nature that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace;

II. Whether the Council should call on the parties to settle or adjust the dispute or situation by means of their own choice;

III. Whether the Council should make a recommendation to the parties as to methods and procedures of settlement;

IV. Whether the legal aspects of the matter before it should be referred by the Council for advice to the international court of justice;

V. Whether, if there exists a regional agency for peaceful settlement of local disputes, such an agency should be asked to concern itself with the controversy.

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Hopkins Papers

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

[YALTA, February 6, 1945.]

MR. PRESIDENT

Why not let this wind up today when Stalin is thru—and say we will talk it over again tomorrow. It is 7.15

HARRY

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<sup>1</sup> This note is undated, but the content indicates that it was passed to the President during Stalin's extended statement on the Polish question during the Third Plenary Meeting on February 6, 1945. See *ante*, p. 670.

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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1945

MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, FEBRUARY 7, 1945, 10 A. M.,  
LIVADIA PALACE

TOP SECRET

PRESENT

Fleet Admiral Leahy  
General of the Army Marshall  
Fleet Admiral King  
Major General Kuter  
Lieutenant General Somervell  
Vice Admiral Cooke  
Major General Bull  
Major General Deane  
Major General Anderson  
Major General Hull  
Major General Wood  
Rear Admiral McCormick  
Rear Admiral Duncan  
Real Admiral Olsen

Brigadier General Roberts  
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser  
Brigadier General Lindsay  
Brigadier General Bessell  
Brigadier General Everest  
Commodore Burrough  
Colonel Peck  
Colonel Lincoln  
Colonel Cary  
Captain Stroop  
Captain McDill  
Lieutenant Colonel McRae  
Commander Clark

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General McFarland  
Captain Graves

J. C. S. Files

*Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes*<sup>1</sup>1. APPROVAL OF MINUTES OF C. C. S. 186TH MEETING<sup>2</sup>

## THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to recommend approval of the conclusions of the Minutes of the 186th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the approval of the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.

## 2. UTILIZATION OF THE FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE IN VIENNA-BUDAPEST AREA

(J. C. S. 1241)<sup>3</sup>

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the Joint Staff Planners had in this paper reviewed the problem of basing or staging U.S. strategic air forces in the Vienna-Budapest area and recommended that a memorandum be sent to the President requesting Marshal Stalin's agreement to the staging of elements of the Fifteenth Air Force through airdromes in the Budapest area. He found no objections to the paper and recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve it.

GENERAL MARSHALL drew attention to the fact that this subject had been discussed with the Russians at the tripartite meeting on 6 February 1945,<sup>4</sup> and that the President need only to hand the memorandum to Marshal Stalin without discussion.

## THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to present to the President the memorandum in Appendix "A" of J. C. S. 1241 enclosing the draft memorandum to Marshal Stalin, prepared in English and Russian text.

## 3. RECIPROCAL AGREEMENT ON PRISONERS OF WAR

(C. C. S. 777;<sup>5</sup> J. C. S. 1266/1 (ARGONAUT);<sup>3</sup> J. C. S. 1266/1 (Wash.))<sup>6</sup>

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that J. C. S. 1266/1 (ARGONAUT) was the report of an *ad hoc* committee which expresses agreement with the

<sup>1</sup> J. C. S. 189th Meeting.<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 635-637.<sup>3</sup> Not printed.<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, p. 647.

<sup>5</sup> In C. C. S. 777, dated February 4, 1945, the British Chiefs of Staff expressed their concurrence with a draft agreement that the Secretary of State and the British Foreign Secretary had submitted for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff before pursuing further negotiations with the Russians. The draft agreement under reference appears to have been the British redraft of the Soviet draft of January 20. The Soviet draft is presented *ante*, pp. 416-418. The British redraft is *post*, pp. 694-696.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. This paper was prepared in Washington and was sent to Yalta by courier on February 2, 1945. It set forth certain objections formulated by the Washington agencies to the British redraft which was then under consideration at Yalta. These considerations are reflected in the telegram of February 7 [8], 1945, from Grew to Stettinius, *post*, p. 697.



British proposal in C. C. S. 777 and recommends a memorandum to the Combined Chiefs of Staff to this effect. He pointed out that the Acting Secretary of State in Washington had already agreed to a different method but that this problem appeared to be one for the State Department to solve and was not the concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He found no objection to the recommendations of the Joint Logistics Committee in J. C. S. 1266/1 (ARGONAUT) and recommended approval.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the memorandum in the Appendix of J. C. S. 1266/1 and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 777/1).<sup>7</sup>

4. SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT REQUESTED BY THE U.S.S.R.  
(J. C. S. 1138/3, J. C. S. Info. Memo 360—MILEPOST Summary)<sup>8</sup>

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the Joint Logistics Committee had reviewed J. C. S. 1138/2<sup>8</sup> and brought up to date the status of availability of equipment to meet the requirements for operation MILEPOST. In J. C. S. 1138/3 they recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note the facts and conclusions of the report and that a copy of the paper be furnished to the Executive, President's Soviet Protocol Committee. He recommended that J. C. S. 1138/3 be approved.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of the facts and conclusions developed in the report of the Joint Logistics Committee in J. C. S. 1138/3 and directed that a copy of the report be furnished to the Executive, President's Soviet Protocol Committee.

5. PROTOCOL ON ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY AND  
ADMINISTRATION OF "GREATER BERLIN"  
(J. C. S. 577/28)<sup>9</sup>

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the Joint Logistics Committee had recommended as the final action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the protocol on zones of occupation in Germany and administration of "Greater Berlin,"<sup>10</sup> the dispatch of the message to the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy contained in the Appendix to J.C.S. 577/28. He saw no objection to the paper and recommended approval.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to dispatch to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy the message contained in the Appendix to J.C.S. 577/28.

<sup>7</sup> As amended and approved, this document became C. C. S. 777/2, printed *post*, pp. 754-756.

<sup>8</sup> Not printed.

<sup>9</sup> The appendix to J. C. S. 577/28 is printed *ante*, p. 118, footnote 1.

<sup>10</sup> *Ante*, pp. 118-123.

## 9. ZONE OF LIMITATION FOR BRITISH AND U. S. AIR OPERATIONS IN ADVANCE OF THE SOVIET ARMIES

GENERAL MARSHALL requested General Kuter to report on the meeting of the tripartite air staffs in connection with the coordination of strategic air operations with the Soviets.

GENERAL KUTER said that the draft agreement reached had been circulated to the Chiefs of Staff informally. It had been decided not to use the term "bomblines" because of the difference between the Russian, British and American definitions but to use instead, the expression "zone of limitation." There were two items in the agreement which were not entirely satisfactory. The first was the 24-hour notice of Allied air operations required by the Soviet General Staff and second, the depth of the zone, which would be deeper than the Allied command desired. However, it was the best arrangement that could be worked out. The agreement had been changed in one respect. He had substituted the words "British and U. S." wherever the word "Allied" occurred. He requested the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In reply to a question by General Deane, GENERAL KUTER explained that the Mission in Moscow would be furnished daily information of the location of the Soviet front lines, which automatically fixed the location of the zone of limitation.

GENERAL KUTER said that the matter of Allied-Russian liaison on a lower level had also been brought up at the meeting. For the necessity of such liaison the strategic air operations to the east of Berlin which had involved bombing within an extremely short distance of the Soviet lines had been used as an example. It was suggested that the Russians consider the use of VHF communication links with the Allied planes in order that their own fighter pilots might be able quickly to receive information of German movements discovered by Allied pilots and conduct their operations accordingly. He felt that the meeting, although not entirely satisfactory on all points, would lead to further discussions in Moscow. As an additional point, no decision on the advance bomber bases in the Vienna-Budapest area had been reached.

ADMIRAL LEAHY recommended that the agreement be approved as General Kuter had requested.

After further discussion,

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the agreement for a zone of limitation for British and U. S. air operations in advance of the Soviet armies prepared by the

British-U. S.-Soviet air staffs, as amended during the discussion. (Subsequently circulated as J. C. S. 1243.<sup>11</sup>)

#### 10. MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the dispatch to General Antonov of a note requesting a meeting with the Soviet General Staff at Soviet Headquarters, Thursday, 8 February, at 1500.<sup>12</sup>

#### 11. REPORT BY COMBINED SHIPPING STAFFS

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that combined oil and shipping studies had been progressing. Eight of the ten points involved in the oil studies had been resolved and a paper would be circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible. It had been decided to defer action on the remaining two points of difference in the oil studies.

The report of the Combined Shipping Staffs would be completed and circulated sometime during the night and would be ready for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the meeting scheduled for 8 February 1945.<sup>13</sup>

Several disturbing points had arisen. The Russians had demanded additional ships, and what was of greater concern, there was the accompanying question of cargo requirements, chiefly the item of trucks. As yet it was not known how the Russian requirements could be filled. There was also the question of a cut in British requirements. The Prime Minister was intensely concerned in this matter and was reluctant to accept any reduction in imports but would do so if necessary. It was his, General Somervell's, view that the British import program should not be considered at this conference unless directed by the President.

In response to a question by Admiral Leahy, GENERAL SOMERVELL explained that the necessary military shipping would be found but he felt that the Director of War Mobilization would require complete information and would wish to discuss the matter before making any final allocation.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of General Somervell's report on the progress of cargo shipping and oil studies.

<sup>11</sup> Not printed.

<sup>12</sup> The note and reply are printed *post*, pp. 698-699.

<sup>13</sup> See *post*, pp. 750-751.

740.00114 EW/2-545

*The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

[YALTA,] 5th February, 1945.

MY DEAR SECRETARY OF STATE: As you know, one of the matters which we agreed should be discussed with the Russians during the present Conference is the question of concluding a Reciprocal Agreement with them about the treatment of Soviet citizens liberated by the Allied Armies in western and southern Europe and British and American nationals liberated by the Soviet forces in eastern Europe. The British Chiefs of Staff approved the draft text of such an agreement yesterday and I understand that the Combined Chiefs of Staff will be taking it [up] today. If, as I hope, the text is approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, we shall be in a position to take the matter up with the Russians as soon as possible.

In present circumstances where the Soviet forces are overrunning the sites of British and United States prisoners of war camps very fast, and we know that a number of British prisoners of war (though not exactly how many) are in Soviet hands, and no doubt some United States prisoners of war also, it is really urgent to reach agreement with the Soviet Government on this draft Agreement during ARGONAUT. I intend therefore to ask M. Molotov for discussions to be opened between the experts of the three parties concerned at once, in order to reach agreement upon a satisfactory text.

There is one further point, however, which I should like to mention. It is clear, as S.H.A.E.F. have already reported, that the only real solution to the problem of the Soviet citizens who are likely to fall into British and American hands shortly is to repatriate them as soon as possible. For this shipping is required and we have already sent 10,000 back from the United Kingdom and 7,500 from the Mediterranean.

It seems to me that it would materially help the proposed negotiations if we could inform the Russians at a suitable moment of our plans to repatriate their citizens. From the British point of view I can say that we have found shipping to send back from the United Kingdom a further 7,000 of these men during the latter part of this month and it is hoped that we can provide further ships to take some 4,000 a month from the Mediterranean during March, April and May, even though the Soviet citizens in the southern part of France and half of those liberated in Italy are primarily the responsibility of the United States. I am however without any information on the United States plans on this. General Eisenhower has recently pressed the Combined Chiefs of Staff once again to provide two ships to take 3,000 each from Marseilles until the present large numbers have been

cleared. No doubt your experts have been examining the position in the light of General Eisenhower's telegram, and I should be very glad if you could tell me whether you will be in a position to make any statement to the Russians about the United States plans.

Whilst it is clear that the discussions should not be delayed in order that a statement can be made on the shipping position, I would be very glad to know as soon as possible whether you can give the Russians any information on the lines I hope to give him from the British point of view, since the sooner this information can be provided the better are the chances of reaching an agreement during this Conference.

Yours sincerely,

ANTHONY EDEN

740.00114 EW/2-545

*The War Shipping Administrator (Land) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

[YALTA,] February 5, 1945.

MEMORANDUM:

To: Mr. Stettinius

From: Admiral Land

Subject: Mr. Eden's letter to State Department on O. S.<sup>1</sup> proposals to meet Russian repatriation requirements.

1. After request by British Chiefs of Staff, U. S. Chiefs of Staff agreed to use of troopships for repatriation of Russians equivalent to British assistance of 10,000 personnel lift trans-Atlantic each month, contingent upon use of overland transportation after the defeat of Germany, when redeployment will require all available trooplift.

2. Following this authorization, Eisenhower requested use of two large troopships for repatriation of large numbers of Russians on hand, this movement to be from Marseille.

3. In Washington the C.M.T.C. in the belief the British Chiefs of Staff had failed to implement the approval described in paragraph 1 above, signalled London to determine whether Eisenhower's request had been made in ignorance of C. C. S. decision on availability of lift.

4. Informal discussion with British personnel movement officers at CRICKET indicates that implementation had been intentionally held up because of these two factors:

(a) Type of ship required.

(b) Policy on Russian repatriation to be established.

5. The type of ship referred to above involves the desire to use medium size troopships which means physical assistance by U. S. transports since British trans-Atlantic shipping is primarily of large

<sup>1</sup>The reference is presumably to over-all shipping.

type. This changes U. S. conception at time of original British request referred to in Paragraph 1 above when it was understood all movement would be in British ships at cost to U. S. troop movement capabilities which it was estimated could be accepted.

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740.00114 EW/2-545

*The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the Soviet Foreign Commissar (Molotov)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[YALTA,] 5th February, 1945.

You will remember that during the Moscow conversations of last October, I discussed with you and with Marshal Stalin the question of caring for and repatriating Soviet citizens and British subjects liberated respectively by Allied forces in the south and west and by the Soviet forces in the east of Europe.

Since then our two Governments have exchanged Drafts and on 20th January our Embassy received from your Government a redraft of a Reciprocal Agreement on this matter.<sup>2</sup> We have examined this redraft and, subject to what is stated below, I am glad to say that it is generally acceptable. I understand that a similar draft was put forward to the United States Government at the same time.<sup>3</sup>

In view of the integrated character of the Allied Commands in western and southern Europe, it seems to us essential that any agreement should be tripartite and cover British and United States Combined Commands. We have accordingly prepared a redraft of the text taking as basis your Government's Draft and making some amendments to cover this point and also to cover certain other points where alterations appear to us necessary.

I have brought with me experts on this matter and I would like to suggest that it should be remitted to them and to experts of your Government and the United States Government with a view to reaching a text which is mutually satisfactory to all three Governments before this Conference breaks up.

On 20th January, your Government also presented to the British Embassy a redraft of the proposed Agreement covering the liberated Soviet citizens in the United Kingdom.<sup>4</sup> This redraft is also generally satisfactory, but there are a few points on it which require clarification and amendment. I would suggest that this Agreement should

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<sup>1</sup> Carbon copy bearing the notation: "With the Compliments of Mr. Eden."

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 416-418.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

also be remitted to the same British and Soviet experts, so that agreement can be reached upon it during the present Conference.

I hope very much that you will agree with these suggestions and will instruct your experts to meet their British and American colleagues at once. I feel that the conclusion of this Agreement would be a very happy result of the present Conference and would give the greatest satisfaction in our two countries where so many families are affected by them.

I have given a copy of this letter to Mr. Stettinius.

I enclose a copy of the British redraft of the Reciprocal Agreement.<sup>5</sup>

His Excellency Monsieur V. M. MOLOTOV.

[Enclosure]

REDRAFT OF SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S DRAFT RELATING TO PRISONERS  
OF WAR AND CIVILIANS LIBERATED BY THE SOVIET ARMIES AND  
ALLIED ARMIES

*Article 1.*

All Soviet citizens liberated by forces operating under Allied Command and British subjects and American citizens liberated by the Soviet forces will, without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet or Allied authorities, as the case may be, at places agreed upon between those authorities.

Allied and Soviet military authorities will respectively take necessary measures for protection of camps, and points of concentration from enemy bombing, artillery fire, etc.

*Article 2.*

The contracting parties shall ensure that their military authorities shall without delay inform the competent authorities of the other party regarding citizens or subjects of the other contracting party found by them, and will undertake to follow all the provisions of this agreement. Soviet and Allied repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate access into the camps and points of concentration where their citizens or subjects are located and they will have the right to appoint the internal administration and set up the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure and laws of their country.

Facilities will be given for the despatch or transfer of officers of their own nationality to camps or points of concentration where liberated members of the respective forces are located and there are

<sup>5</sup> *Infra.*

insufficient officers. The outside protection of and access to and from the camps or points of concentration will be established in accordance with the instructions of the military commander in whose zone they are located, and the military commander shall also appoint a commandant, who shall have the final responsibility for the overall administration and discipline of the camp or point concerned.

The removal of camps as well as the transfer from one camp to another of liberated citizens will be notified to the competent Soviet or Allied authorities. Hostile propaganda directed against the contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not be permitted.

*Article 3.*

Except in so far as the obligations set out in this article may be affected by obligations undertaken in connection with the use of UNRRA (or other agreed relief agencies) the competent Allied and Soviet authorities will do their utmost in the circumstances obtaining in any area, and from time to time, to supply liberated citizens and subjects of the contracting parties with adequate food, clothing, housing and medical attention both in camps or at points of concentration and en route, and with transport until they are handed over to the Soviet or Allied authorities at places agreed upon between those authorities. The standards of such food, clothing, housing and medical attention shall so far as possible be consistent with the normal practice relating to military rank.

The contracting parties will not demand compensation for these or other similar services which their authorities may supply respectively to liberated citizens or subjects of the other contracting party.

*Article 4.*

Either of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use such of its own means of transport as may be available for the repatriation of its citizens or subjects held by the other contracting party. Similarly each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use its own facilities for the delivery of supplies to its citizens or subjects held by the other contracting party.

*Article 5.*

Soviet and Allied military authorities shall make such advances on behalf of their respective governments to liberated subjects and citizens of the other contracting party citizens as the competent Soviet and Allied authorities shall agree upon beforehand.

Advances made in currency of any enemy territory or in currency of their occupation authorities shall not be liable to compensation.



In the case of advances made in currency of liberated non-enemy territory, the Soviet and Allied governments will effect, each for advances made to their citizens or subjects necessary settlements with the governments of the territory concerned, who will be informed of the amount of their currency paid out for this purpose.

*Article 6.*

Ex-prisoners of war (with the exception of officers) and civilians of each of the contracting parties may, until their repatriation, be employed on work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent Soviet and Allied authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labour shall be determined by agreement between those authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with military standards and procedure.<sup>6</sup>

*Article 7.*

The contracting parties shall, wherever necessary, use all practicable means to ensure the evacuation to the rear of these liberated citizens and subjects. They also undertake to use all practicable means to transport liberated citizens and subjects to places to be agreed upon where they can be handed over to the Soviet or Allied authorities respectively. The handing over of these liberated citizens and subjects shall in no way be delayed or impeded by the requirements of their temporary employment.

*Article 8.*

The contracting parties will give the fullest possible effect to the foregoing provisions of this Agreement, subject only to the limitations in detail and from time to time of operational, supply and transport conditions in the several theatres.

<sup>6</sup> On a second carbon copy of this "Redraft" in the Department file, article 6 is replaced by the following text (underscoring as in the source paper):

(Redrafted) ARTICLE 6

Ex-prisoners of war (with the exception of officers) and civilians of each of the contracting Parties, may until their repatriation, be employed on a voluntary basis on work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent Soviet and Allied authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labour shall be determined by agreement between those authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with the military standards and procedure and under the supervision of their own officers. Any liberated member of the respective forces or civilian who is unwilling to perform such work will be exercised under similar supervision.

740.0011 EW/1-2745 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, February 7 [8], 1945.<sup>1</sup>

War Department has just made available message dated February 7 from Marshall<sup>2</sup> which indicates that JCS on February 7 approved with certain changes British preliminary text of agreement with Soviet Union for exchange of prisoners of war and apparently also for liberated persons. (This is our message No. 27.)<sup>3</sup> While it is not definitely clear what preliminary British text is referred to, if it is the preliminary text included in JCS 1266,<sup>4</sup> the agreement would not appear to cover the following specific points which were incorporated in the United States counterproposals forwarded to JCS staff with you:

1. Protection of Geneva Convention<sup>5</sup> which we have informed Soviet Government we will accord to Soviet citizens captured in German uniform who demand such protection.

2. Soviet citizens in the United States not prisoners of war whose cases the Attorney General feels should be dealt with on basis of traditional American policy of asylum.

3. Persons liberated by United States forces no longer in their custody.

4. Question of the liberation and repatriation of other United Nations citizens.

5. Persons claimed as citizens by the Soviet authorities who were not Soviet citizens prior to outbreak of war and do not now claim Soviet citizenship.

(ALLSTATE HORSESHOE) It is felt that these questions and others referred to in JCS 1266 and 1266/1 should be brought to your attention in order that consideration may be given to them before final agreement is reached.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The text of this message in the Defense Files bears the date February 8, which is the date under which it was transmitted.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> i. e., from the Acting Secretary to the Secretary since the departure of the latter from Washington, in this series of messages sent via Army channels.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. See text agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, *post*, pp. 754-756.

<sup>5</sup> For the text of this Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, which was signed at Geneva July 27, 1929, on the part of the United States and forty-six other countries, see Department of State Treaty Series No. 846, or 47 Stat. 2021.

<sup>6</sup> For Stettinius' reply to this message, dated February 9, 1945, see *post*, pp. 756-757.

J. C. S. Files

*The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President*

TOP SECRET

[YALTA,] 6 February 1945.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Joint Chiefs of Staff find that it is necessary to obtain Marshal Stalin's approval of holding a meeting with the Soviet Staff to discuss details of possible participation in the war against Japan and suggest that you speak to Marshal Stalin with the purpose of obtaining his agreement.

(Sec J C S) <sup>1</sup>


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<sup>1</sup> An endorsement on this paper by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Executive Secretary reads: "Cdr Clark reported at 1615, 6 Feb 45 that this memo had been delivered to the President by Adm Leahy".

J. C. S. Files

*The President's Chief of Staff (Leahy) to the First Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Soviet Army (Antonov)*

TOP SECRET

[YALTA,] 7 February 1945.

MY DEAR GENERAL ANTONOV: The U. S. Chiefs of Staff desire to meet with the Soviet Chiefs for a most secret discussion tomorrow, Thursday, February 8 at 3 P. M. at the Russian headquarters. No one to be present but the Chiefs of Staff and one interpreter, your Russian interpreter being satisfactory for our purpose.

For the U. S. Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

*Fleet Admiral, U. S. Navy*

J. C. S. Files

*The First Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Soviet Army (Antonov) to the President's Chief of Staff (Leahy)*

TOP SECRET

CRIMEA, 7 February 1945.

[Translation]

DEAR ADMIRAL LEAHY: In reply to your letter of the seventh of February concerning your wish to meet with the Soviet Chiefs of Staff, I inform you that I shall be glad to meet with you on the eighth of February at three o'clock in the afternoon at the headquarters of the Russian Staff.

I hope you will be kind enough to inform me of the persons who will attend with you at this meeting.

Yours very respectfully,

ANTONOV  
*Deputy Chief of the General Staff  
of the Red Army  
General of the Army*

MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, FEBRUARY 7, 1945, NOON,  
YUSUPOV PALACE

PRESENT<sup>1</sup>

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
Secretary Stettinius	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar
Mr. Harriman	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Molotov
Mr. Matthews	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Hiss	Mr. Jebb	Mr. Maisky
Mr. Page	Mr. Dixon	Mr. Gusev
	Mr. Harrison	Mr. Novikov
	Major Theakstone	Mr. Golunsky

Bohlen Collection

*Page Minutes*

TOP SECRET

- Subject[s]:
1. Dumbarton Oaks.
  2. The Dismemberment of Germany.
  3. Creation of a Commission to Study the Procedure for the Dismemberment of Germany.
  4. The Integration of France into the German Control Machinery on Condition that France were to Receive a Zone of Occupation.
  5. Reparations.

1. *Dumbarton Oaks.*

MR. STETTINIUS inquired at the outset whether there were any questions regarding Dumbarton Oaks which the American Delegation had failed to make clear at yesterday's plenary session. He said that if so he was prepared to answer with his colleagues any questions which remained open or which needed to be expanded.

MR. MOLOTOV remarked that the World Security Organization had not been referred to the Foreign Secretaries for discussion. He continued that although he had a few questions to advance he was not prepared to go into this subject at the present time.

<sup>1</sup> The photograph which is reproduced as plate 6 following p. 546 shows one other person present at this meeting, in addition to those here listed; and the Hiss notes (*post*, p. 705) likewise show one other person present, whose name Hiss did not know.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he was always ready now or at a later date to discuss the matter. He added that he wished merely to make the offer to discuss the question; he personally had no new points to bring up.

2. *The Dismemberment of Germany.*

MR. MOLOTOV recalled that it had been agreed to limit the changes in Article 12 of the German surrender instrument<sup>2</sup> to the addition of the words "and the dismemberment" after the word "demilitarization." He suggested that a sub-committee consisting of British, American and Soviet representatives be appointed to work out the exact wording of Article 12.

It was decided to authorize Messrs. Vyshinski, Cadogan and Matthews to make a final redraft of Article 12 which would include the addition of the word "dismemberment" and to authorize a commission consisting of Messrs. Eden, Winant and Gusev to study the question of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany.

3. *Creation of a Commission to Study the Procedure for the Dismemberment of Germany.*

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that such a commission be set up in London consisting of Messrs. Eden, Winant and Gusev.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he felt the creation of this commission was a most important matter. If this question were not referred to the EAC the prestige of that body would surely be diminished. He, therefore, thought that the question of taking away this work from the EAC should be carefully considered.

MR. EDEN pointed out that if the dismemberment of Germany were included in the EAC the French would participate in this work.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that it was entirely agreeable to have these studies carried on in London and to appoint Mr. Winant as the American representative.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the subject under discussion was the study of procedure for dismembering Germany and not the actual dismemberment or detail thereof. Therefore, it could be assigned to a special committee. Later, perhaps, it might be handed over to the EAC.

MR. EDEN remarked that he thought that the body handling this question should go further than merely studying questions of procedure. He stated that he wished to make a few remarks on the terms of reference of that body. On the assumption that Germany was to be broken up into individual states, that body, he believed, should examine when this separation should take place; should look into boundary questions and measures needed to insure the proper func-

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 117.

tioning and survival of the new states. What relations should be permitted between them and foreign powers should also be studied. He stated that it might be necessary to request that a report be drawn up on the practicability of the dismemberment of Germany. He also questioned whether the commission was to undertake the type of work referred to in the afore-mentioned terms of reference or merely to decide how this work was to be done.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he did not believe that there was any need for a special commission at this stage and suggested that the question be studied through diplomatic channels in London. He expressed doubt that the foreign secretaries had received any directive to form an actual commission.

MR. EDEN stated that they had not; however they had the power to make recommendations.

MR. MOLOTOV continued that he was not insisting on a commission.

MR. EDEN stated that he felt worried about the absence of the French. They were neighbors of Germany and had certain ideas on control of the Ruhr and Rhine. He felt that it would be a mistake to keep them out.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that the question of French participation be subsequently decided by Messrs. Eden, Winant and Gusev in London.

MESSRS. STETTINIUS and EDEN stated that this would be agreeable.

MR. EDEN stated that in view of his many activities it might be impossible for him personally to participate in the London discussions.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he of course had the right to depute someone to represent him.

#### 4. *The Integration of France into the German Control Machinery on Condition that France were to receive a Zone of Occupation.*

MR. MOLOTOV submitted a statement on this matter (see attached)<sup>3</sup> and inquired whether it could be used for a basis of discussion.

MR. EDEN stated that since it had been agreed upon that France would receive a zone of occupation he hoped that it might also be agreed that France would participate on the Control Commission itself. He said that he foresaw all kinds of difficulties if the French were not to participate and expressed the opinion that de Gaulle in all probability would refuse to accept a zone if he did not have the same treatment on the Control Commission as the United States, Soviet Union and Great Britain. Even if France were to accept a zone they would always have trouble in administering it if they were not represented on the commission. He maintained that he could not see why it was any more of a departure to have France on the commission than on the EAC. He pointed out that the Prime Min-

<sup>3</sup> *Post*, p. 707.

ister opposed enlarging the present three-power conferences; however, he could not see how the participation of France on the Control Commission would affect this view.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he felt that at the present stage the question of France should be limited to the two proposals contained in the Soviet statement. If at a later date it were necessary to study French participation on the Control Commission it could be done. He felt that it was only proper that actual control should be in the hands of the three commanders-in-chief.

It was decided that the three secretaries should submit a report to the plenary session stating that: (a) it had been agreed upon to give to France a zone of occupation; and, (b) with respect to the question concerning the participation of France in the Control Commission, Messrs. Molotov and Stettinius considered it appropriate to submit this question to the consideration of the EAC, while Mr. Eden considered it appropriate to study the question at the present time and to assign to France a place on the Control Commission.

MR. EDEN stated that he believed that if France were admitted to the Control Commission the three foreign secretaries should agree that no other power should be given a zone of occupation.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that there was not sufficient time to discuss that question at the present conference.

##### 5. *Reparations.*

MR. MOLOTOV submitted a statement on this subject and summarized it in brief (copy attached).<sup>4</sup> He requested Mr. Maisky to explain the considerations which formed the basis of the Soviet statement.

MR. MAISKY stated that the Soviet authorities had come to the figure of 20 billion dollars (ten billion dollars of property to be removed immediately after the war and ten billion dollars of reparations to be paid in kind over a period of ten years) the following way. The national wealth of Germany at the beginning of the war amounted to 125 billion dollars. It was figured that this national wealth would be reduced by 40 per cent or less during the course of the war. Thus, the national wealth of Germany at the termination of the war would amount to 75 billion dollars. An analysis of the national wealths of the more highly industrialized countries had shown that the mobile part of this wealth which could be transferred abroad amounted to approximately 30 per cent or in the case of Germany to 22-23 billion dollars. The Soviet Government proposed to remove ten billion dollars of this mobile wealth. The remainder would be left to Germany which would secure for that country living standards com-

<sup>4</sup> *Post*, p. 707.

parable to those prevailing in Central Europe. These were lower than in Germany but quite decent. With respect to the second item it had been figured that the national income of Germany before the war amounted to 30 billion dollars annually. The war would lower this income by 30-35 per cent and would bring it to the neighborhood of approximately 18-20 billion. The Soviet Government proposed to take one billion dollars annually, or 5-6 per cent from the German national income. This was not a large sum and could be supported by Germany.

MR. EDEN stated that there was one point in the opening paragraph of the Soviet statement on which he wished to comment. The Prime Minister had stated that the test for reparations payments should be not only the exertion of a country in the war, but also the sufferings endured at the hands of the enemy. On either basis the Soviet Union stood well. He would like to see reference made also to the sacrifices undergone by the Allies in the first paragraph of the Soviet statement. He continued that he agreed in principle with the second paragraph of the Soviet statement. He wished, however, to give thorough study to the Soviet document before continuing discussion of it.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that there would be no objections to the addition in paragraph one of the words suggested by Mr. Eden.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he also wished to give a thorough study to the Soviet document. He recalled that the President at the plenary session had stated that the United States itself would not be interested in large reparations, except with respect to German foreign investments and perhaps raw materials. He expressed the hope that at this afternoon's plenary session the foreign secretaries could report that the reparation matter had been discussed and that it had been agreed that a commission should be established in Moscow where it would immediately commence work on the question of reparations.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that whenever the British and American representatives were prepared he would be ready to continue the discussions. With respect to the amount of reparations for the United States and Great Britain that was entirely the concern of those countries. However, in view of their losses, especially at sea, the Soviet Government felt that it was only just to make mention in the reparations statement of compensation going to the United States and Great Britain. He favored Mr. Stettinius' proposal that the foreign ministers report to the plenary session that the question of reparations had been discussed, would be discussed further, and that a reparations commission would be set up in Moscow which would immediately commence work on this question.



MR. STETTINIUS stated that it would be helpful for the American Delegation to know whether the subject of labor would be discussed at the Crimean Conference or at a later date.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that this question was very complicated, that the Soviet representatives needed time for further study on it and that they were not prepared to discuss it at the present conference. He agreed that it should be discussed by the reparations Commission in Moscow.

MR. MOLOTOV's interpreter then read a second paper on the creation of the reparations commission (see attached).<sup>5</sup> Mr. STETTINIUS stated that his Government was prepared to accept the statement on the understanding that it had not yet agreed on the principles mentioned in it.

MR. EDEN inquired whether the Moscow Reparations Commission should not also be authorized to study German industry in connection with future security and control. If this were so, he suggested that this subject be dealt with in the draft terms of reference of the commission.

MR. MOLOTOV maintained that the commission would deal with German industry only in connection with reparations. The question of security, of course, would always be kept in mind although it was not the principal task of the commission.

MR. STETTINIUS suggested that as a practical measure the German Control Commission should have the responsibility for the control of German industry for security purposes. The Reparations Commission should, of course, coordinate its work with the policy of the Control Machinery and should establish liaison with it.

MR. MOLOTOV was in agreement with this proposal.

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<sup>5</sup> *Post*, p. 708.

Matthews Files

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*Matthews Notes* <sup>1</sup>

Dumbarton—No clarification needed

Agenda

1. Dismemberment. Formula Art 12. Next=Commission to study.

MOL: suggests Eden, Winant & Gousev.

EDEN: on terms of reference

MOL. Perhaps no commission necessary.

EDEN: Worried about absence of Fr. They are neighbors The three can decide on French participation Eden has right to deputize

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<sup>1</sup> For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Page minutes of this meeting.

M: Thinks we should limit to these 2 proposals

EDEN: Zone agreed on. S.<sup>2</sup> M.<sup>3</sup> want control machinery postponed & studied in EAC Eden wants immediate admission

#### REPARATIONS

MOL. Explains paper

MAISKY: Explains how figure reached  $\frac{1}{2}$  immed  $\frac{1}{2}$  in annual 1 bil. Ge. natl wealth=125 bil. before war. Reduction 40% after war 75 bil at end of war. Mobile part of natl wealth=70%=22 or 23 bil. of this 10 bil removal. This would give G. Middle European level standard of living Before war 30 bil natl income Lower by 30% after war=18 or 19 bil Propose to take 1 bil annually not big sum.

EDEN: Whether exertion in war should be a basis or whether sufferings at hands of enemy. On either basis would stand well.

In general agreement on principles of Par. 2.

S. Prep. to study. As Pres said U. S. not interested except for invest possible raw materials. Hopes we can agree Com. to start immed.

M: Business of U. S. but they thought it fair. Our losses & Brit very great. Not ready to discuss at this conference. But would be studied by Moscow Commis.

E: Should Com. examine econ. security provisions

MOL: To extent necessary for reparations.

<sup>2</sup> Stettinius.

<sup>3</sup> Molotov.

Hiss Collection

#### *Hiss Notes*<sup>1</sup>

2/7 12.00 meeting ERS, Molotov, Eden Amb H, Doc, Page, A. H.—Cadogan, Clark-Kerr, Jebb, Theakstone, Dixon, Harrison, ? — Vishinsky, Maisky, Gusev, Galunsky, Novikof

ERS at outset asked if there were any q's re D. O. which we failed to make clear yesterday If so I am prepared to answer with my colleagues any q's that may remain open & to expand in any way

Mol. Not quite prepared to ask any q's now

ERS merely made the offer but no desire to discuss it. No new points to bring up.

Mol. Thanks

ERS Ready at any time now or later

ERS report—1 p. by 4 p. m.

2/7 For Mins Mol. Chm

<sup>1</sup> These handwritten notes cover three unnumbered pages in the Hiss Collection. Since the notes on the third page obviously pertain to the opening discussion at the meeting, they are printed here in that order, which corresponds to the sequence of topics in the Page minutes for this meeting.

For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Page minutes.

## France

→Report: We are agreed that Fr. should have a zone of occupation in Ger. for occup. by Fr. forces. Mr. Mol & ERS believe q. of particip by Fr. in Control Com. should be studied by EAC. Ed.<sup>2</sup> believes particip of Fr. in Con. Com should be agreed to now. [Ed would also be willing say 3 For Mins agree that if Fr. is admitted to Con. Com. no other power should be given zone]<sup>3</sup>

## Reparations

Mol: add 20,000,000,000 total

Principles—Eden wants add suffering to ¶ 1 Agreed by Mol. Eden in prin agrees with ¶ 2

ERS wants study memo—will do so promptly & discuss it at your pleasure. Pres. at plenary session that U S would be interested in no reparations except for. investments & perhaps raw materials Would be surprised if it would approach figure suggested. Perhaps Brit would take some of what U S gives up. Mol. up to U S & Brit.

Hopes can report we agreed Commission should be est. immediately to go to work.

Mol. ready to go on when Brit & Am. Delegs. have had time study R draft.

→Report we have discussed this q. today; Will discuss it further & agreed Com. should be est in Mos. & begin work immediately

ERS asked Mol. if wants discuss work labor here or later. Mol—may not be ready to discuss here but agreed will be discussed by Rep. Commission at Mos.

Machinery

MOL. amendment delete “on recommend. of the Allied Com. or on their own initiative” OK Ed. change “may” to “shall” OK

ERS: Approves doc. on understanding we have not yet agreed on principles

Ed. Should Rep. Com. study control of Ger. industry for security purposes.

ERS—EAC, Rep Com, & D. O. Staff Com. all may do this

Ed. Amended suggestion: We should consider whether this Com.<sup>4</sup>

ERS: Control machinery should have responsibility for control of German industry for security purposes. The Reparation Commission should, of course, coordinate its work with the policies of the Control machinery & establish liaison. Agreed.

Mol. It is bus. not only of Com but also of 3 govts

<sup>2</sup> Eden.

<sup>3</sup> Brackets appear in the original.

<sup>4</sup> In the original notes there is a blank space of about half a page at this point.

Bohlen Collection

*Soviet Proposal on French Zone of Occupation in Germany*<sup>1</sup>

REGARDING A SEPARATE ZONE OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY TO BE  
ALLOTTED TO FRANCE

1. It has been found desirable to allot to France a separate zone of occupation in Germany for occupation by French forces.

2. It has been decided that the French occupational authorities shall exercise control in their zone of occupation under the general guidance of the Control Council.

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<sup>1</sup> Undated but submitted by Molotov on February 7, 1945. See *ante*, p. 701.

Hiss Collection

*Soviet Proposal on Reparations From Germany*<sup>1</sup>

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF EXACTION OF REPARATIONS FROM GERMANY

1. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war and have organized victory over the enemy.

All other countries are to receive reparations in the second place.

2. Setting aside for the moment the use of German labour by way of reparations, this question to be considered at a later date, reparations in kind are to be exacted from Germany in the two following forms:

a) removals in a single payment at the end of the war from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport, shipping and other enterprises remaining in Germany, etc.) these removals to be carried out for the purpose of military and economic disarmament of Germany.

These removals are to be completed within two years of the end of the war.

b) Annual deliveries of commodities during 10 years after the end of the war.

3. The total sum of the German reparations in the form of removals from her national wealth as well as in the form of annual deliveries of commodities after the end of the war is fixed at 20 billion dollars.

This amount shall be distributed as follows:

- a) USSR—10 billion dollars,
- b) United Kingdom and U. S. A.—8 billion dollars,
- c) All other countries—2 billion dollars.

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<sup>1</sup> Original, undated, but endorsed to the effect that it was submitted by Molotov at the Foreign Ministers' meeting on February 7. See *ante*, p. 702. A copy in the Bohlen Collection contains certain variances of spelling and wording.

Hiss Collection

*Soviet Proposal on the Establishment of an Allied Reparation Commission*<sup>1</sup>REGARDING THE ORGANIZATION OF AN ALLIED REPARATION  
COMMITTEE

The Allied Reparation Committee shall be set up on the following basis:

1. The Committee shall consist of three representatives one from U. S. S. R., the United Kingdom and U. S. A. Each representative shall be entitled to call in to assist in the work of the Committee any number of experts.

2. The function of the Committee shall be to work out a detailed plan for exaction of reparations from Germany according to the principles adopted at the Crimean Conference of the Three Powers.

3. The Governments of USSR, USA and the United Kingdom shall<sup>2</sup> determine the moment when the representatives of other Allied Powers will be invited to participate in the Allied Committee as well as define the forms of participation of these Powers in the Committee.

4. The activities of the Committee shall proceed in strict secrecy.

5. The Allied Reparation Committee shall be established in Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> Original, undated, but endorsed to the effect that it was submitted by Molotov at the Foreign Ministers' meeting on February 7. See *ante*, p. 704. A copy in the Bohlen Collection is of the same wording as here printed.

<sup>2</sup> At this point the typewritten words "may on recommendation of the Allied Committee or on their own initiative" are stricken out in pencil and the word "shall" is inserted.

FOURTH PLENARY MEETING, FEBRUARY 7, 1945, 4 P. M.,  
LIVADIA PALACE

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Marshal Stalin
Secretary Stettinius	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Hopkins	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Mr. Maisky
Mr. Byrnes	Sir Edward Bridges	Mr. Gusev
Mr. Harriman	Mr. Jebb	Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Matthews	Mr. Wilson	Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Hiss	Mr. Dixon	
Mr. Bohlen	Major Birse	

Bohlen Collection

*Bohlen Minutes*

TOP SECRET

- Subject[s]:
1. Dismemberment of Germany.
  2. Poland.
  3. World Security Organization.
  4. Zone of Occupation in Germany for France and French Participation in the Control Commission.

THE PRESIDENT said in regard to the Polish question he wished again to emphasize that he was less interested in the tracing of the frontier lines than he was in the problem of the Polish Government. He said that he did not attach any importance to the continuity or legality of any Polish Government since he thought in some years there had in reality been no Polish Government. He added that before proceeding with the Polish question he understood that Mr. Molotov had a report on the meeting of the Foreign Ministers today.

MR. MOLOTOV then read the results of the Foreign Ministers' meeting, as follows:

"Decisions Adopted at the Meeting of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Eden

February 7, 1945.

"1. Regarding the Dismemberment of Germany.

(a) A. Y. Vyshinski, Mr. Cadogan and Mr. Matthews were entrusted with the preparation of the final draft of Article 12 of the instrument "unconditional surrender of Germany" having in view the insertion in the text of Article 12 of the word "dismemberment."

(b) The study of the question of the procedure of the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a committee consisting of Mr. Eden, Mr. Winant and F. T. Gusev.

"2. Regarding the Zone of Occupation in Germany for France.

(a) The allotment to France of a zone in Germany to be occupied by French occupational forces has been agreed upon.

(b) As regards the question of the participation of France in the Control Commission, V. M. Molotov and Mr. Stettinius feel [it] desirable to refer the question to the EAC. Mr. Eden considers it necessary to discuss this question now and to give France a place on the Control Commission.

"3. Regarding the Reparations to be Exacted from Germany.

(a) It was agreed that in the paragraph one of the Soviet proposals mention should be made of sacrifices borne.

(b) It was decided that the residence of the Reparations Committee should be in the City of Moscow. It was agreed that the Committee should begin its work immediately upon the approval of the principles of the exacting of the reparations.

(c) It was decided that the discussion of the two documents relating to the matter of the reparations which have been submitted by V. M. Molotov, first, regarding the basic principles of exacting the repara-

tions from Germany, and, second, regarding the organization of an Allied Reparations Committee, should be continued at the Crimean Conference.”<sup>1</sup>

THE PRESIDENT said that we are all grateful for the productive work of the three Foreign Ministers.

THE PRIME MINISTER added that he joined the President in thanking the Committee for their fruitful work but he said that since he had only heard their report orally he would wish to study the English translation, although, except for one point, he felt that he would be in complete agreement.

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether the document included Mr. Eden's reservation on France, to which MR. EDEN replied in the affirmative.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that the British Government was unconvinced by the argument that it would be possible to accord a zone to the French without participation in the Control Commission. If the French were given a zone without participation they would cause endless trouble. If we were strict in our zones, they might be lenient in theirs and vice versa. He felt that it was of the utmost importance that there should be uniformity in the treatment of Germany by the three or four Allies. He repeated that he felt the Control Commission for Germany would be a subordinate instrument as was the case in Italy, although we recognized that the German Commission would have more important tasks. He said he wished to make it clear that he did not consider that French participation in the Control Commission would give them any right to attend a conference such as this one, at least for the time being. He said he must state frankly that he found the arguments on the subject somewhat futile since it was obvious that France would accept no zone unless they were given participation in the Control Commission and he for one thought that they were right. He felt it was no good to refer the question to the European Advisory Commission which was a weaker body and particularly as France was represented on the Commission and only a deadlock could result with the French and British on one side and the Russians and Americans on the other. He therefore was of the opinion that the matter should be settled here, but it still required further study.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired whether the Prime Minister meant that it should be settled now or later.

THE PRIME MINISTER answered that it should be done now, but at some later stage of this Conference.

THE PRESIDENT then observed that would it not be better to postpone it for two or three weeks instead of two or three days.

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<sup>1</sup> Text of report also in the Hiss Collection.

THE PRIME MINISTER answered that he felt that once they had separated after this Conference it would be difficult to settle the question.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that the three Governments had been able to settle a good many things by correspondence. Marshal Stalin then said that in the European Advisory Commission they could at least have the benefit of the French opinion which was not represented here.

THE PRESIDENT said that he agreed that France should not join this body but he was doubtful whether this would keep them quiet. He then suggested that they go on with the Polish question.

MARSHAL STALIN stated that he had received the President's letter<sup>2</sup> containing the suggestion that they summon here from Lublin two representatives from the Lublin Government and two representatives from other elements of Polish public opinion and that in the presence of these four Poles they should endeavor to settle the question of a new interim government for Poland which would be pledged to hold free elections when conditions permitted. He said he noted that there were three personalities from London, namely, Mr. Mikolajczyk, Mr. Grabski and Mr. Romer, who had been mentioned by the President as possible members of this new government. He said he had received the President's letter only an hour and a half ago and he had endeavored to reach the Lublin Poles by telephone but had been informed that they were away in Cracow and Lutz [*Łódź?*]. He had attempted to ascertain their opinion. As to the others, he was not sure that they could be located in time for them to come to the Crimea and he mentioned in this connection especially Vicenta Witos and Sapieha.<sup>3</sup> The Marshal added that Mr. Molotov has worked out some proposals on the Polish question which appeared to approach the President's suggestions, but that these proposals were not typed out. He suggested, therefore, that they proceed to the consideration of the Dumbarton Oaks proposal and he would ask Mr. Molotov to state the views of the Soviet Government.

MR. MOLOTOV said that yesterday we have heard Mr. Stettinius give a full report and explanations of the President's proposals and that this report and explanation had been satisfactory and had made the issue clear to the Soviet Delegation. He said that they had always also followed closely Mr. Churchill's remarks on the subject. He added that after hearing Mr. Stettinius' report and Mr. Churchill's remarks, which had clarified the subject, the Soviet Government felt that these proposals fully guaranteed the unity of the Great

<sup>2</sup> For the text of this letter, see *post*, pp. 727-728.

<sup>3</sup> See *post*, p. 989.



Powers in the matter of preservation of peace. Since this had been the main Soviet purpose at Dumbarton Oaks and they felt that the new proposals fully safeguarded this principle, he could state that they were entirely acceptable and that they had no comments to offer. He felt that there was full agreement on this subject. Mr. Molotov said that there was one question raised at Dumbarton Oaks, mainly [*namely?*] that of participation of the Soviet Republics as initial members of the World Organization. He said the Soviet views were known as were those of the British and American Governments. He said the Soviet views were based on the constitutional changes which had occurred in February of last year and he did not think that this Conference should ignore this request.

It was not the Soviet intention to raise the question in the same form as had been done at Dumbarton Oaks, but they would be satisfied with the admission of three or at least two of the Soviet Republics as original members.<sup>4</sup> These three Republics were the Ukrainian, White Russian and Lithuanian and he felt that three or at any rate two should have the right to participate as original members. He said that it was superfluous to explain the size, population and importance of the Ukraine, White Russia or Lithuania or their importance in foreign affairs. He said that as these three Republics had borne the greatest sacrifices in the war and were the first to be invaded by the enemy, it was only fair, therefore, that these three or at any rate two be original members. He said that the Soviet Government put these proposals before the President and the Prime Minister and hoped that they would be accepted.

THE PRESIDENT then inquired whether Mr. Molotov meant members of the Assembly.

MR. MOLOTOV replied "yes," that they should be included among other members of that body. The Dominions of the British Commonwealth have gradually and patiently achieved their place as entities in international affairs. He said he felt that it was only right that three, or at least two, of these Soviet Republics should find a worthy place among the members of the Assembly. Their sacrifices and contributions to the war earned them this place. He said in closing that he wished to repeat that he fully agreed with the President's proposals and withdrew any objections or amendments but would request that three, or at least two, of the Soviet Republics mentioned above be given a chance to become equal members of the World Organization.

THE PRESIDENT said he was very happy to hear from Mr. Molotov the agreement of the Soviet Government to his proposals on voting

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<sup>4</sup> For a facsimile of a note which Roosevelt passed to Stettinius at this point, see Stettinius, p. 174.

in the Council. He felt that this was a great step forward which would be welcomed by all the peoples of the world. He said that he thought the next step was to consider the question of summoning a conference to organize the setting up of the World Organization. He said he thought that this conference could take place at the end of March, although it might be physically possible to do it within the next four weeks. He added that he had been greatly interested in what Mr. Molotov had said in regard to the participation of the Soviet Republics. He added that the British Empire, the USSR and the United States were very different in structure and in tradition. The British Empire, for example, had many large units, such as Canada, Australia, etc. The USSR had a different national structure. The United States had one language and one Foreign Minister. He felt, therefore, that Mr. Molotov's suggestion should be studied, particularly in the light of the possibility that if the larger nations were given more than one vote it might prejudice the thesis of one vote for each member. He mentioned that certain countries are large in area, though small in population and referred in this connection to Brazil which he said was smaller than the USSR but larger than the United States. On the other hand, there were some countries that were small in area but large in population, such as Honduras and Haiti. He also mentioned the fact that there were a number of nations associated with the United Nations, such as Chile, Peru, Paraguay, Iceland, and others, which had broken relations with Germany but which were not at war.<sup>5</sup> He concluded with the statement that he felt that the important thing was to proceed with the plans for a conference to set up the World Organization and that the question of the admission of countries not members of the United Nations could be considered either at that time or after the organization was in operation. He said he suggested, therefore, that the question raised by Mr. Molotov should be studied by the Foreign Ministers who might also make recommendations as to the time and place of the conference and as to what nations should be invited.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he would like to express his heartfelt thanks to Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov for this great step forward which he felt would bring joy and relief to the peoples of the world. On the question of membership of the Soviet Republics, he said this had been put before us for the first time. He said he must agree with the President that the United States and the British Empire were different, that during the last twenty-five years the Self-Governing Dominions have taken their place in world affairs and have worked for peace and, if he might say so, for the furtherance of Democratic

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<sup>5</sup> It appears that the note of Hopkins, *post*, p. 729, was passed to the President at about this point.

processes. The Dominions had come into the war when Great Britain declared war against Germany, knowing full well the weakness of Great Britain at that time. Great Britain had had no means of forcing them into this decision and into which [*sic*] they knew they could not often be consulted on major matters. He said that Great Britain could not agree to any organization which would reduce the status of the Dominions or exclude them from participation. That is why, Mr. President, the Prime Minister said, he had great sympathy with the Soviet request. His heart went out to mighty Russia which though bleeding was beating down the tyrants in her path. He said he could understand their point of view, as they were represented by only one voice in comparison with the British organization which had a smaller population, if only white people were considered. He was glad, therefore, that the President had made an answer to the Soviet proposal which in no way constituted a final negation. He added, however, that he could not exceed his authority and as he had just heard this proposal he would like to discuss it with the Foreign Secretary and possibly communicate it to London and he asked Marshal Stalin to excuse him as he could not give a precise answer today.

THE PRESIDENT remarked that his recommendations had been somewhat different. He had merely meant that the Foreign Ministers should study the question as well as that of the time and place of the conference and who should be invited.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he did not disagree with the President's suggestions but he felt that the Foreign Ministers had already had a good deal of work thrust upon them. He said he must speak frankly and say that he foresaw difficulties in attempting to hold a meeting as soon as March. The battle would be at its height and more soldiers would be involved than at any time of the war. British domestic problems would be very pressing and their Ministers, including the Foreign Secretary, would be greatly occupied in Parliament. He also wondered whether the state of the world and in Europe in particular was not such as to make very difficult a meeting of all of the United Nations. He doubted whether any representatives at such conference would be able to have behind them the full thought of the vital forces of their countries.<sup>6</sup>

THE PRESIDENT observed that he had only in mind a meeting to organize the setting up of the world organization, and that the world organization itself would probably not come into being for from three to six months after the conference.

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<sup>6</sup> It appears that the notes of Hopkins and Roosevelt, *post*, p. 729, were written at about this point. For a facsimile of a note regarding Stimson's views on this subject which Stettinius passed to Roosevelt at this time, see Stettinius, p. 177.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had in mind the fact that some nations in March would still be under the German yoke and would be represented by governments in exile whose authority in regard to their own people would be questionable. Other countries would be starving and in misery, such as Holland. France would be there with a loud voice. There would be other countries represented there who had not suffered at all in the war and who had not lost a man. He wondered how such a gathering could really undertake the immense task of the future organization of the world.

THE PRESIDENT repeated his proposal, namely, that the Foreign Ministers could consider (1) the Soviet proposal regarding membership, (2) the date and place of the conference, and (3) what nations should be invited.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he had no object[ion] to the Foreign Ministers discussing this point but he said he must emphasize that this was no technical question but one of great decision. With this qualification, he agreed to the President's proposal.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that the Foreign Ministers will not make decisions but merely report to the Conference.

There was a short intermission at this point.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he proposed that the Foreign Ministers should consider the question of Iran and other matters of perhaps secondary importance but which should be considered.

THE PRESIDENT and MARSHAL STALIN agreed.<sup>7</sup>

THE PRESIDENT then said, jokingly, that he hoped that forestry would be one of the points considered since he had not seen a tree in his visit last year to Tehran. He went on to say that he thought Iran was a good example of the type of economic problem that might confront the world if we are to bring about expansion of world trade and greater exchange of goods. He said that Persia did not have the purchasing power to buy foreign goods, and if expansion of world trade was to occur measures must be considered for helping those countries like Persia that did not have any purchasing power. He mentioned that before the advent of the Turks, Persia had had plenty of timber and thus plenty of water and her people had been reasonably prosperous, but that he personally had never seen a poorer country than Persia was at the present time. He therefore very much hoped that the new world organization would conduct a world-wide survey with a view to extending help to countries and areas that did not have sufficient purchasing power, either in cash or in foreign exchange.

THE PRESIDENT added that there was a parallel, he thought, in

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<sup>7</sup> For a facsimile of a note regarding a TVA for Europe which Hopkins passed to Roosevelt at this point, see Stettinius, p. 179.

Europe in that certain countries had adequate supplies of power, such as coal and water power, and those countries had cheap and abundant electric power, whereas other countries within fifty miles had neither. He felt that this situation was wrong. He mentioned that in the Soviet Union and its various republics consideration had been given to the problem of a country as a whole, and in the United States the TVA had the same idea. He mentioned that in the region of the TVA electric current was sold at the same price throughout the area. He concluded that, having said his piece, he would now refer to Mr. Molotov for his proposals in regard to the Polish question.

MR. MOLOTOV then read his proposals in regard to the Polish question, as follows:

1. It was agreed that the line of Curzon should be the Eastern frontier of Poland with a digression from it in some regions of 5-8 kilometers in favor of Poland.

2. It was decided that the Western frontier of Poland should be traced from the town of Stettin (Polish) and farther to the South along the River Oder and still farther along the River Neisse (Western).

3. It was deemed desirable to add to the Provisional Polish Government some democratic leaders from Polish *émigré* circles.<sup>8</sup>

4. It was regarded desirable that the enlarged Provisional Polish Government should be recognized by the Allied Governments.

5. It was deemed desirable that the Provisional Polish Government, enlarged as was mentioned above in paragraph 3, should as soon as possible call the population of Poland to the polls for organization by general voting of permanent organs of the Polish Government.

6. V. M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr were entrusted with the discussion of the question of enlarging the Provisional Polish Government and submitting their proposals to the consideration of the three Governments.

After reading the proposals, Mr. Molotov said he would like to add that they had attempted to reach the Poles in Poland by telephone but they had been unable to do so and it was apparent that time would not permit the carrying out of the President's suggestion to summon the Poles to the Crimea. He said he felt that the proposals he had just put forward went far toward meeting the President's wishes.<sup>9</sup>

THE PRESIDENT replied that he must say he felt progress had been made in the light of Mr. Molotov's suggestions. He said there was just one word he did not like and that was "*émigré*". He said he did not see any necessity to go to *émigrés* since you could find enough Poles in Poland for the purpose. He repeated what he had said yesterday, namely that he did not know any of the Poles in the

<sup>8</sup> The words "and from inside Poland" were added at the end of this paragraph in the subsequent discussion.

<sup>9</sup> For a facsimile of a note suggesting that the Soviet proposal on Poland be referred to the Foreign Ministers, which Hopkins passed to Roosevelt at this point, see Stettinius, p. 185.

Poland government in London and he knew only Mr. Mikolajczyk. He concluded by saying he would like to have an opportunity, with Mr. Stettinius, to study Mr. Molotov's proposals, to which Marshal Stalin agreed.<sup>10</sup>

THE PRIME MINISTER said he shared the President's dislike of the word "*émigré*". The word had originated during the French revolution and meant in England a person who had been driven out of a country by his own people. He said in the case of the Poles this wasn't true, since they had left their country as a result of the brutal German attack. He therefore preferred in place of the word "*émigré*" to refer to them as "Poles temporarily abroad". He said in regard to the second point of Mr. Molotov's proposals he would always support the movement of Polish frontiers to the west since he felt they should receive compensation, but not more than they can handle. He said it would be a pity to stuff the Polish goose so full of German food that it got indigestion. He said he felt that there was a considerable body of British public opinion that would be shocked if it were proposed to move large numbers of Germans, and although he personally would not be shocked he knew that that view existed in England. He said he felt if it were confined to East Prussia, six million Germans probably could be handled quite aside from moral grounds, but the addition of the line west of the Neisse would create quite a problem in this respect.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that most Germans in those areas had already run away from the Red Army.

THE PRIME MINISTER said this, of course, simplified the problem, and in regard to the question of space in Germany for these deported persons he felt that the fact that Germany had had six to seven million casualties in this war and would probably have a million more would simplify that problem.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that the Germans might well have one or possibly two million more casualties.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he wasn't afraid of the problem of transfer of populations provided that it was proportioned to the capacity of the Poles to handle it and the capability of the Germans to receive them. He felt, however, that it needs study, not only in principle but as a practical matter. He said he had one other comment. In the Soviet proposal some reference should be made to other democratic leaders from within Poland itself.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed and the words "and from inside Poland" were added at the end of paragraph 3 of the Soviet statement.

<sup>10</sup> For a facsimile of a note regarding boundaries, which Stettinius passed to Roosevelt during this discussion, see Stettinius, p. 183.

THE PRIME MINISTER then concluded that he agreed with the President that it would be well to sleep on this problem and take it up tomorrow, but he did feel that some progress had been made.

At the President's suggestion the meeting was adjourned until four o'clock tomorrow afternoon.

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Matthews Files

*Matthews Minutes*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

PRESIDENT: I think we should take up the Polish question. When we concluded our meeting yesterday Marshal Stalin had explained his views. I have nothing special to add to what I said yesterday. I think it is particularly important to find a solution of the governmental question. I am not so concerned with frontiers. I am likewise not so concerned on the question of the continuity of the government. There hasn't really been any Polish government since 1939. It is entirely in the province of the three of us to help set up a government—something to last until the Polish people can choose. I discard the idea of continuity. I think we want something new and drastic—like a breath of fresh air. But before we go on with Poland I think Mr. Molotov should report to us on the meeting of the three foreign ministers.

(Molotov reads his report. A copy of the text is attached.)<sup>2</sup>

PRIME MINISTER: I wish to thank the committee for their labor. I am in general agreement with the report with a single exception. However, I should like to see in writing what has been decided as I have only now been orally informed of what took place. On the question of giving the French a zone but not a place on the control commission His Majesty's Government remains quite unconvinced. No solution has been found for controlling the French while they are controlling the Germans. If the French decide to accept the task of having a zone and wish to be tiresome they could produce conditions in their zone which would cause trouble in the other zones. If we decide to be strict they could be lenient. If we decide to be lenient they could be strict. I firmly believe that there must be uniformity in treatment of Germany between the four allies or there will be endless bitter disputes. I regard the Allied Control Commission as a subordinate instrument to the will of the governments. In principle, it is no more than the Allied Commission in Italy but they have a much more important task. I do not think that giving France a

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<sup>1</sup> For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Bohlen minutes of this meeting.

<sup>2</sup> Not attached; but see the text in the Bohlen minutes, *ante*, pp. 709-710.

place on the control machinery gives any right to the French to sit in on these meetings of the three of us. But all this argument seems to me futile. I feel sure that the French will take no zone unless they are given participation on the control council. I must say I think they are right. Who would they get their directions from? For this reason I feel that the proposed plan will not work. Likewise, I feel that there is no use handing over what we cannot settle here to a weaker body such as the European Advisory Commission where the French are sitting. So why not settle it here. I suggest that we should give the question further study and settle it here.

PRESIDENT: Shall we go on with the discussion of Poland?

STALIN: I have received the President's message. It contains a proposal to call from Poland two representatives of the Lublin government and two from the opposite camp, so that in our presence these four would settle the question of the new Polish government. If this is successful, the new provisional government should in the shortest possible time organize elections in Poland. This message of the President's also proposes that some more Poles from London—Mikolajczyk, Romer and Grabski, should also take part in the new government. I received this letter an hour and a half ago. I immediately gave instructions to find Bierut and [Osóbka-]Morawski so that I could talk with them on the phone. The result was that at the moment they are outside Warsaw at Lodz or Cracow but they will be found and I must ask them how to find the representatives on the other side and what they think of the possibility of their coming. I can then tell how soon they will arrive. If Vicente Witos or Sapielha could come here it would facilitate a solution but I do not know their addresses. I am afraid we have not sufficient time. Meanwhile, Molotov has prepared a draft to meet in a certain extent the President's proposal. Let us hear it when it arrives as the translation is not yet finished. Meanwhile, we might talk of Dumbarton Oaks.

(Molotov here gave his explanation of the Russian acceptance of our voting procedure and of their request for the inclusion of three representatives in the assembly. This is being covered by Mr. Hiss's notes.)<sup>3</sup>

The President made some remarks on the low purchasing power of Persians and other nations which he stated was another reason for organizing the world organization. He likewise threw out the idea of setting up a TVA for Europe. Mr. Molotov's proposal then arrived.

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<sup>3</sup> *Infra.*



MOLOTOV: I have here the proposals which I should like to make. (He reads them. Copy is attached.<sup>4</sup>) We are still trying to telephone the Polish leaders but without success and I am afraid there will not be time for them to come to this conference. That makes it impossible to try the President's proposal. On the other hand I think these proposals meet the President's wishes.

PRESIDENT: I think we are making definite progress. I should like to wait until tomorrow to study these proposals and to talk them over with the Secretary of State and officials of the State Department. There is one word in them I do not like. That is "*émigré*." It is not necessary to take *émigrés*. There may be people who are now in Poland who are now satisfied. May we postpone discussion?

STALIN: Yes, certainly.

PRIME MINISTER: I share the President's dislike of the word "*émigré*." It was applied during the French Revolution to people driven out by their own countrymen, but the Poles were driven out by a brutal enemy. With regard to the frontier on the River Neisse I should like to say a word. I have always qualified a movement west by the Poles, but say that the Poles should be free to take territory but not more than they wish or can manage. I do not wish to stuff the Polish goose until it dies of German indigestion. I also feel conscious of the large school of thought in England which is shocked at the idea of transferring millions of people by force. Personally I am not shocked but much of the opinion in England is. However, the exchange of Greeks and Turks was a great success but that only involved two million. If the Poles take East Prussia and Silesia that means moving six millions. That is manageable but there will be big arguments against it still.

STALIN: There will be no more Germans there for when our troops come in the Germans run away and no Germans are left.

PRIME MINISTER: Then there is the problem of how to handle them in Germany. We have killed six or seven million and probably will kill another million before the end of the war.

STALIN: One or two?

PRIME MINISTER: Oh I am not proposing any limitation on them. So there should be room in Germany for some who will need to fill the vacancy. I am not afraid of the problem of the transfer of populations as long as it is in proportion to what the Poles can manage and what can be put in the place of the dead in Germany.

I have only one other comment. It is a reference in Mr. Molotov's plan to the utilization of some democratic leaders from *émigré* circles. Would Marshal Stalin be willing to add "and some within Poland itself." This was also suggested in the President's message.

<sup>4</sup> Not attached but see the text in the Bohlen minutes, *ante*, p. 716.

STALIN: Yes, that is acceptable.

PRIME MINISTER: Well, I am in agreement with the President's suggestion that we should sleep on this till tomorrow.

STALIN: I likewise find this acceptable.

The meeting is adjourned until four tomorrow.

Hiss Collection

*Hiss Notes*<sup>1</sup>

"Crimea Conf."

Plenary

2/7 4:10 p. m.

Ed Page—added to Mol. report—  
given to Chip<sup>2</sup>

D. O.

Mol.—Yesterday heard full report from ERS We are satisfied with this report & we have got some explanations (~~to ask~~). After this report & after these explanations certain q's became much clearer We paid much atten to what Church told us After report of ES & remarks of Church the q is considerably clarified for us In the light of these explanations & remarks we believe it would secure the unan. of 3 powers in guar. p. & sec. after the war. Our position in the qs of D. O. essentially was to secure max. of unity among 3 gt. powers in q of p & sec after the war. We believe the decs. taken at D. O & modifications suggested by Pres will secure collab by all nations great & small after war. ∴ we consider the proposals which were presented as acceptable to us We believe that now there is reach full agt & clarity among ourselves I have to touch upon one q. which was raised in D. O. but not decided yet. This is the q about particip of Sov. Reps in the org. of sec. You know our point of view It is based on the modifs carried out in our Const. in Feb of last yr. We explained our point of view & know the point of view of US Govt & Brit Govt We consider its fair that should not pass these qs without notice but do not raise this q now in same form as in D. O.

We would consider it fair that at least 3 of our Reps or perhaps 2 be accepted as orig members. Have in mind Ukraine, Byelo Russia & Lith. Those 3 or at any rate 2 have full rts to be considered orig. members.

Ukraine's Importance, pop., econ importance all well known I don't want to go into detail in describing also import. of B-R & Lith also from point of view of for. rels These reps made the

<sup>1</sup> From penciled notes in longhand. For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Bohlen minutes of this meeting.

<sup>2</sup> Refers to Bohlen.

greatest sacrifices in this war The peoples of U,-B-R & Lith have suffered very much in this war & were 1st to be invaded Would be fair of these 3 or at any rate 2 be accepted as orig. members. The Sov Govt requests Pres & PM these 3 or at least 2 be accepted among other Un. Ns I would like to mention in this connection that the domins of Brit crown approached int. rels gradually & showed great patience. This gives us the example & reason to withdraw our orig. proposal advanced at D. O. & propose now 3 or at least 2 be accepted as orig. members. Among members of Ass. these few reps certainly should find place due them. Their role & sacrifices in this war entitle

Pres. Much gratified at what Mol. has said in acceding to the gen. plan That is making real progress. Next thing we have consider is timing What is next step. Invitations will go out to all nations that have had a place in this war

Church—the Ger War Pres Yes

Pres No use talking much further about Un Ns We are all agreed except it has not been set up. Next we should invite all nations to assemble. Gt. sentiment in US be held soon as possible—end of Mar., 1st of April

Physically repres. of Un Ns could meet in 4 wks—1 month. Personally I think that quicker q of Un Ns meeting is determined, quicker we can take up what Mr Mol has said which is very interesting to me. But that in itself will mean the later meetings after the organ. is set up As a practical matter when we have this organizing meeting whom shall we ask? Nations in the war or those associated but not in the war. For instance shall we invite— The assoc. nations have broken rels with Ger. but have not declared war. We. Read list. We've got to decide who we're going to invite What we have heard from Mr Mol. gives me a very great int. in matter of a vote for Uk, Wh. R, Lith. We 3 M. St., P. M & I have different views because our terrs. are so very different The Brit Em has great pops like Austr, Can., S Af Sov Govt has great masses of pop. like 3 areas Mol mentioned. US is contiguous—no colonies, const. provides for 1 For Min. Those things require study, require study of q of more than 1 vote for the larger nations in the world. In same way certain nations have large terrs. Brazil smaller than S. U but larger than U. S. In same way many small countries like Haiti, Honduras & we should consider whether by giving any govt more than 1 vote we would break down prin of 1 vote for each. ∴ if we can agree on gen plan for meeting to organ. U Ns we can consider these q's by For Mins or at the meeting of the organizers

Pres: For Mins have so successful suggested q. of voting in Ass. be referred to For Mins. Also to recommend time & place of a conf.

Church: I should like to express my heartfelt thanks to Mar. St. & Sov Govt for the enormous step they have taken to put forward D. O. I'm sure the act of the 3 gt powers such as has already been expressed around this table will give joy & relief to thinking people around the world. On the q of ~~voting~~ membership of the Ass., it has been put before us in quite a new form by our R. friends & allies

Everyone I'm sure will feel that here again a very remarkable advance to gen. agt. has been made. I must fully agree with the Pres that the position of the US & of the Brit Em. are different. We have our 4 selfgoverning domins, that for nearly a quarter of a century have played a part in the organ. of p. which broke down before the present war. All these 4 doms have worked for p & for democratic purposes & all without hesitation sprang into the war when we declared it though they knew how weak we were. We had no means of compelling them & no rt. to give them any summons but they came freely in a matter in which they could only be partially consulted. We could never agree to any system which excluded them from the position they have held & justified for over  $\frac{1}{4}$  of a century. It is for this very reason that I could not listen to the proposal of the Sov Govt without a feeling of profound sympathy. My heart goes out to mighty Russia, bleeding from her wounds & conquering & beating down the tyrant in her path. I should feel that a nation so great with 180,000,000 people would perhaps have cause to look at our Brit org with a questioning eye if they had but one vote when their nos. far exceed our own, speaking of whites. I was very glad that the Pres made an answer which could in no way be considered a final neg. to the consideration of this proposal. I must not however exceed my own personal auth. We have only just heard this new proposal & I should like to discuss it with the For Sec & possibly send a tel. to the Brit. War Cab. We only want to see done what is rt & fair.  $\therefore$  I will ask the Mar. to excuse me if I do not give precise final answer on behalf of HMG here today. I will not lose time.

Pres My motion was a little different It did not call for a dec. today. Refer the study to For Mins & second where it should be held & who should be invited.

Church Very glad—we are putting great deal on them—very large & simple Re meeting suggested by Pres I shouldn't think it desirable hold it so early as March. In Mar. we shall be at the very height of the battle on both the fronts, more millions of soldiers will be engaged than ever before. Our dom. problems in Eng are very complicated with shortage of labor, housing & need of supplying fighting forces at the front. We also have a Par which is in active

life from day to day & claims large share of the atten. of the Mins. incl. For Sec.

We are now already a quarter thru Feb. I wonder also whether state of the world & Eur. particularly is such as not to make a meeting diff. of all the Un Ns. If they are charged with the most tremendous tasks of the future will they have behind them the full thought of their people. Will they have anything left over after vital needs of the war are met. I wonder what the aspect of the Ass. would wear. Could premiers be present?

Pres: This is not a meeting of the Ass.—only of the organizing conf.

Church But they would be same people. How many of the nations there will still be in the bondage of the Gers. We do not know how they will represent their people. Another group will be starving in their frightful misery amid the scenes of war. Holland will be there with her ghastly ruins. Fr. will be there with a loud voice. With all these agonized communities will also be joined a large no. of nations who have not suffered at all in the war. Ns that have not even declared war. I can not think that the meeting of such an ass. would be free from the danger of becoming chaotic. Some ns will be screaming in agony & others will be calmly weighing the problems of the future. I see particular diffs for an early meeting so far as Brit. is concerned

Church Position in Eng though perfectly calm & steady is governed by our own const. We may have a gen. election impending. May have new parliament to carry with us, may have entirely new set of ministers

Will always do our best to comply with the Pres. wishes but I feel it absolutely nec. to put on record the very great diff. which I see, practically. And I should be very disappointed if the settlement of the membership of Ass was postponed till new meeting of Un Ns can be held

Pres again propose to refer to For Mins to study membership & date & place of meeting & who should be invited

Stalin agreed

Church I said earlier no objection to it being discussed by For Mins but is not a technical matter but one of large & broad dec. Not at all sure matters will be advanced by the discussion

St. 3 Mins will meet, discuss & report

Agreed

(Intermission)

Church. proposed Iran be remitted to For Mins

→ { (Pres says to ERS he can cable Chiang & get consent re voting )  
 immediately  
 He would not consult France, merely invite Fr. to the meeting }

While waiting for Molotov's paper on Pol.

Pres. raised q. of int. economics—another reason for early estab. of Un Ns Org—should be some way of getting ns that have no purchasing power to get some—historically Persia well wooded before Turks came—no erosion, water—today poorest place I have ever seen in the world. That is why I hope new Un Ns Org. will concern itself with those countries that have no money with which to get goods While on this subject—parallel one—in Eur. some areas have coal, cheap power & light from water. Why favoritism to those who have coal & water or cheap elec. light rates when others 50 miles away have no water, no light Sov. govts. all the Soviets are all thinking in terms like that. We are thinking in terms like that—TVA

### Poland

Mol. In E. Curzon line, 5-8 Kms digression in some regions in favor of Pol.

In W. from Stettin along Oder, then along Neisse

Add some emigres to Pol. Govt

Allies recog. Pol Govt now

Prov. Govt. hold elections soon as possible

Mol, Harr., Clark-Kerr to consider & report enlarging Pol. Govt

President's proposals

Can't reach Poles by phone in time to come here

Pres. We are making real progress

Wants ERS study this tonight.

Knows one word he doesn't like—"emigre"

Not nec. take emigres Like to have S. D.<sup>3</sup> study it until tomorrow

Church Agrees with Pres re "emigre"

Re Neisse—we have always qualified movement of Pol. frontier to W that they shouldn't take much more than they wish or can take care of. Great pity to stuff Pol. goose so full of Ger. food that he died of indigestion. Large school of opin. shocked by transferring many millions of people by force. I am not. Referred to success of Gk-Turk transfers after last war—but only ½ million

If take E. Pr. Silesia up to Oder means 6,000,000 Gers. That might be managed with modern facilities

St. Says there are no more Gers there. Where our troops come in they find no Gers.

<sup>3</sup> State Department.

Church We have killed 5 or 6 mil. prob. another million before the end. There ought to be room in Ger. for people transferred They will be needed to fill vacancies So not afraid of prob. of transferring pop. so long as proportioned.

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Matthews Files

*Draft of Letter From President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*<sup>1</sup>

DRAFT

MY DEAR MARSHAL STALIN, I have been giving a great deal of thought to our meeting this afternoon, and I want to tell you in all frankness what is on my mind.

In so far as the Polish Government is concerned, I am greatly disturbed that the three great powers do not have a meeting of minds about the political setup in Poland. It seems to me that it puts all of us in a bad light throughout the world to have you recognizing one government while we and the British are recognizing another in London. I am sure this state of affairs should not continue and that if it does it can only lead our people to think there is a breach between us, which is not the case. I am determined that there shall be no breach between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Surely there is a way to reconcile our differences.

I was very much impressed with some of the things you said today, particularly your determinations that your rear must be safeguarded as your army moves into Berlin. You cannot, and we must not, tolerate any temporary government which will give your armed forces any trouble of this sort. I want you to know that I am fully mindful of this.

You must believe me when I tell you that our people at home look with a critical eye on what they consider a disagreement between us at this vital stage of the war. They, in effect, say that if we cannot get a meeting of minds now when our armies are converging on the common enemy, how can we get an understanding on even more vital things in the future.

You said today that you would be prepared to support any suggestions for the solution of this problem which offered a fair chance of success, and you also mentioned the possibility of bringing some members of the Lublin government here.

Realizing that we all have the same anxiety in getting this matter settled, I would like to develop your proposal a little and suggest

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<sup>1</sup> Undated carbon copy; authorship not indicated. Stettinius (p. 157) says that the letter as sent (*infra*) was prepared "by the Department and Hopkins." On August 13, 1954, Matthews wrote that he thought the draft was by Bohlen (640.0029/8-1354).

that we invite here to Yalta at once Mr. Bierut and Mr. Osobka Morawski from the Lublin government and also any two of the following list of Poles, which according to our information would be desirable as representatives of the other elements of the Polish people in the development of a new temporary government which all three of us could recognize and support: Bishop Sapieha of Cracow, Vincente Witos, Mr. Zurlowski [*Zulawski*], Professor Buyak [*Bujak*], and Professor Kutzeba [*Kutrzeba*]. If, as a result of the presence of these Polish leaders here, we could jointly agree with them on a provisional government in Poland, the United States Government, and I am sure the British Government as well, would then be prepared to disassociate themselves from the London government and transfer their recognition to the new provisional government.

I hope I do not have to assure you that the United States will never lend its support in any way to any provisional government in Poland that would be inimical to your interests.

It goes without saying that any interim government which could be formed as a result of our conference with the Poles here would be pledged to the holding of free elections in Poland at the earliest possible date. I know this is completely consistent with your desire to see a new free and democratic Poland emerge from the welter of this war.

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Bohlen Collection

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[YALTA,] February 6, 1945.

MY DEAR MARSHAL STALIN: I have been giving a great deal of thought to our meeting this afternoon, and I want to tell you in all frankness what is on my mind.

In so far as the Polish Government is concerned, I am greatly disturbed that the three great powers do not have a meeting of minds about the political setup in Poland. It seems to me that it puts all of us in a bad light throughout the world to have you recognizing one government while we and the British are recognizing another in London. I am sure this state of affairs should not continue and that if it does it can only lead our people to think there is a breach between us, which is not the case. I am determined that there shall be no breach between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Surely there is a way to reconcile our differences.

I was very much impressed with some of the things you said today, particularly your determination that your rear must be safeguarded as your army moves into Berlin. You cannot, and we must not,

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<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 711.



tolerate any temporary government which will give your armed forces any trouble of this sort. I want you to know that I am fully mindful of this.

You must believe me when I tell you that our people at home look with a critical eye on what they consider a disagreement between us at this vital stage of the war. They, in effect, say that if we cannot get a meeting of minds now when our armies are converging on the common enemy, how can we get an understanding on even more vital things in the future.

I have had to make it clear to you that we cannot recognize the Lublin Government as now composed, and the world would regard it as a lamentable outcome of our work here if we parted with an open and obvious divergence between us on this issue.

You said today that you would be prepared to support any suggestions for the solution of this problem which offered a fair chance of success, and you also mentioned the possibility of bringing some members of the Lublin government here.

Realizing that we all have the same anxiety in getting this matter settled, I would like to develop your proposal a little and suggest that we invite here to Yalta at once Mr. Bierut and Mr. Osobka-Morawski from the Lublin government and also two or three from the following list of Poles, which according to our information would be desirable as representatives of the other elements of the Polish people in the development of a new temporary government which all three of us could recognize and support: Bishop Sapieha of Cracow, Vincente Witos, Mr. Zurlowski, Professor Buyak, and Professor Kutzeba. If, as a result of the presence of these Polish leaders here, we could jointly agree with them on a provisional government in Poland which should no doubt include some Polish leaders from abroad such as Mr. Mikolajczyk, Mr. Grabski and Mr. Romer, the United States Government, and I feel sure the British Government as well, would then be prepared to examine with you conditions in which they would dissociate themselves from the London government and transfer their recognition to the new provisional government.

I hope I do not have to assure you that the United States will never lend its support in any way to any provisional government in Poland that would be inimical to your interests.

It goes without saying that any interim government which could be formed as a result of our conference with the Poles here would be pledged to the holding of free elections in Poland at the earliest possible date. I know this is completely consistent with your desire to see a new free and democratic Poland emerge from the welter of this war.

Most sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Hopkins Papers

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

[YALTA, February 7, 1945.]

MR. PRESIDENT I think you should try to get this referred to Foreign ministers before there is trouble.

HARRY

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<sup>1</sup> The relationship of this note to the Fourth Plenary Meeting appears from internal evidence and from Sherwood, pp. 855-856. See *ante*, p. 713.

Hopkins Papers

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President, and Reply by the President*<sup>1</sup>

[YALTA, February 7, 1945.]

All of the below refers to Churchill's opposition to early calling of conference of United Nations.

There is something behind this talk that we do not know of its basis.

Perhaps we better to wait till later tonight what is on his mind.

All this is ~~not~~ local politics<sup>2</sup>

I am quite sure now he is thinking about the next election in Britain.

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<sup>1</sup> The relationship of these notes to the Fourth Plenary Meeting appears from internal evidence and from Sherwood, pp. 862-864. See *ante*, p. 714.

<sup>2</sup> This line is in Roosevelt's handwriting.

Defense Files : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

TOP SECRET

ARGONAUT 51. Top secret and personal for Ambassador Winant from Secretary Stettinius.

In view of certain discussions here, please take no repeat no action with regard to our position on French participation in German affairs until further instructions.

War Department please furnish copy of above message to Acting Secretary of State Grew, Washington, for his information and notify him above relates to sentence fourth from end of his number 21 to Secretary Stettinius.<sup>1</sup>

ARGONAUT, February 7, 1945.

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed. The sentence in question, in Grew's telegram No. 21, dated February 6, 1945, reads as follows: "Winant has called a meeting of the EAC for February 9 when he proposes to announce American acceptance of the French request for participation in German affairs regardless of whether the Soviet representative has instructions." (740.0011 EW/1-2745.)

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1945

MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, FEBRUARY 8, 1945, 10 A. M.,  
LIVADIA PALACE

## PRESENT

Fleet Admiral Leahy  
 General of the Army Marshall  
 Fleet Admiral King  
 Major General Kuter  
 Lieutenant General Somervell  
 Vice Admiral Cooke  
 Major General Bull  
 Major General Deane  
 Major General Anderson  
 Major General Hull  
 Major General Wood  
 Major General Hill  
 Rear Admiral Smith  
 Rear Admiral McCormick  
 Rear Admiral Carter  
 Rear Admiral Duncan

Rear Admiral Olsen  
 Brigadier General Roberts  
 Brigadier General Loutzenheiser  
 Brigadier General Cabell  
 Brigadier General Lindsay  
 Brigadier General Bessell  
 Brigadier General Everest  
 Commodore Burrough  
 Colonel Peck  
 Colonel Lincoln  
 Colonel Dean  
 Colonel Bogart  
 Colonel Cary  
 Captain Stroop  
 Captain McDill  
 Commander Clark

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General McFarland  
 Captain Graves

J. C. S. Files

*Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

1. LEVELS OF SUPPLY OF ALL PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN ALL THEATERS  
 . . . . .
2. OVERALL REVIEW OF CARGO AND TROOP SHIPPING POSITION FOR  
 THE REMAINDER OF 1945  
 (C. C. S. 746/11)<sup>2</sup>

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that although the paper was an agreed report by the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board it appeared to him that the essence of the report was an agreement to reexamine the position when a need for further study arose.

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that the necessity for a revision had already arisen, particularly with reference to redeployment plans. On the other hand, he felt that the paper in its present form was entirely satisfactory. Referring to paragraph 4b (1) (d) of the paper he said that during the Committee negotiations the British had insisted upon the submission of the report referred to therein on 1 June.

<sup>1</sup> J. C. S. 190th Meeting.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that if the war ended by 1 April 1945 the combined redeployment plan and the related combined report by the Combined Military Transportation Committee and shipping authorities would be too late if submitted on 30 April 1945, as required in the paper.

GENERAL SOMERVELL felt that the date for the submission of the report might well be moved up to 1 April.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the reports could be submitted at any time prior to 30 April. The requirement as stated in the paper was that they should be ready not later than 30 April.

COLONEL LINCOLN said that as far as the U. S. side was concerned the Planners already had a redeployment paper under way and that they could make this plan available by 1 April.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that a change of the date to 1 April might not be acceptable to the British.

ADMIRAL SMITH said that the British members of the combined committees appeared to have no objection to a 1 April date. The date of 30 April had been selected to afford the U. S. Planners ample time to produce their redeployment plan.

GENERAL SOMERVELL thought there might be some objection on the part of the British to moving the date up to 1 April. He understood that the British plans for redeployment had not progressed as far as the U. S. plans.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to recommend approval of C. C. S. 746/11 subject to the change of the date in the third line on page 4 from 30 April to 1 April.

### 3. EMPLOYMENT OF WAR WEARY U. S. BOMBERS AGAINST LARGE INDUSTRIAL TARGET AREAS IN GERMANY (J. C. S. 1150/1)<sup>3</sup>

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that in this paper the representative of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, proposed that the question of the employment of war weary bombers be reopened by recommending that the President address a memorandum on the subject to the Prime Minister. He understood the Prime Minister had instructed the British Chiefs of Staff to withdraw their previous concurrence in the employment of this type of weapon and felt that to request the President to ask the Prime Minister to reverse his stand would be undesirable.

GENERAL ANDERSON explained that there was no intention of launching uncontrolled aircraft indiscriminately against the German countryside. He believed that there had been a misunderstanding on the part of the British as to the employment of this weapon. Recent developments had proved that explosive-laden aircraft could be

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

directed against military targets with considerable accuracy and therefore had a definite military value when used against heavily protected underground installations.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that as he understood it, the British Chiefs of Staff have no military objection to the project but that certain Cabinet Members had opposed it. He doubted the propriety of having the President press the Prime Minister to urge these Cabinet Members to reverse their position, for heretofore these same Members had supported the British Chiefs of Staff in war measures advocated by the U. S.

In reply to a question by Admiral King as to why this project should not be restricted entirely to France, GENERAL ANDERSON said that while the launchings were to be made in France all of the developments so far had taken place in base installations set up in England and to move these base installations to France would be a waste of effort.

GENERAL KUTER pointed out that further development of this project was highly important in view of the prospects of a very profitable employment of this type of weapon against Japanese targets.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said the discussion had given him an entirely different conception of the weapon. When this matter first came up, he understood that the aircraft would be launched in the general direction of Germany and that the explosive-laden planes would fall aimlessly when the fuel was exhausted. This he considered an inhuman and barbarous type of warfare with which the United States should not be associated; but now, since it appeared that the missiles could be controlled with a considerable degree of accuracy, he agreed that they could be usefully employed. He inquired why, since the planes employed were American and would be operated under American command, it was necessary to collaborate with the British in their use.

GENERAL KUTER said that, in view of the instructions already received on this subject by the British Chiefs of Staff and since the matter had heretofore been dealt with on a combined basis, it would be undesirable for the United States now to employ this weapon unilaterally. Moreover, the bases where the project was being developed were located in England.

ADMIRAL DUNCAN felt that it would be entirely proper for the United States Chiefs of Staff to withdraw their original proposal to use uncontrolled missiles and present the project as a development of a controlled missile.

GENERAL KUTER said that the development of the control of this type of aircraft had progressed very rapidly, and it was essential that this development continue.

In view of the foregoing, ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he felt an approach should be made to the British Chiefs of Staff for reconsideration at the next meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to bring up for discussion at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to follow, the question of the employment of radio-controlled explosive-laden bombers.<sup>4</sup>

#### 4. SUBJECTS FOR FIRST U. S.—U. S. S. R. STAFF MEETING (J.C.S. 1227/4 and 1227/5)<sup>5</sup>

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that in J.C.S. 1227/4 the Joint Staff Planners suggest certain subjects which the United States Chiefs of Staff should discuss with the Soviet General Staff. In J.C.S. 1227/5 General Deane recommends a series of questions as the basis of the discussions. The Planners' paper appears to go into considerable detail and to contain items not covered in the questions suggested by General Deane.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he entertained little hope of engaging in extended conversations with the Soviet General Staff.

GENERAL MARSHALL observed that our success in arranging a meeting with the Soviet Army Staff was a good omen as to the Soviets' willingness to discuss the matters in which we are interested.

ADMIRAL KING said that he favored the approach to the Soviets advanced by the Planners.

GENERAL DEANE said that he found no fault with the Planners' paper except that he would not recommend that the status of the MILEPOST project be discussed by the United States Chiefs of Staff unless the Soviets first brought up the matter. Moreover, he proposed that the United States Chiefs of Staff refrain from suggesting a Russian strategic air force, inasmuch as it appeared that the aircraft necessary to constitute such a force could not be provided.

GENERAL DEANE felt that it would be a mistake to bring up the matter of the exchange of weather information in view of the satisfactory progress that had been made so far. The Soviets had met every United States request for the exchange of this information.

GENERAL KUTER said that the weather information received so far did not meet the full requirements of the Twentieth Air Force in dealing with Japanese targets and suggested that there should be an increase in the number of weather stations in Siberia.

ADMIRAL OLSEN said that the Soviets had encountered considerable difficulty in setting up weather stations in Siberia because of the lack of transportation and communication facilities. They prefer to use their own personnel and equipment and therefore, if it were suggested that more stations be installed, the request should indicate willingness

<sup>4</sup> The conference record contains no further mention of this subject.

<sup>5</sup> *Post*, pp. 762-766.

to make U. S. equipment available. He confirmed General Deane's view that it would be a mistake to insist on a further exchange of weather information on a high level, since negotiations to meet United States requirements could be satisfactorily handled by the United States Mission in Moscow.

GENERAL DEANE said he had arranged his list of questions with a view to permitting the Soviets to do the talking. The questions were designed to draw out Soviet views. Whether or not the questions were proper ones is a matter for decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In reply to an inquiry by Admiral Leahy, GENERAL DEANE said that the operations referred to in Question 7 in J. C. S. 1227/5 were those to be initially undertaken by the Soviets if they entered the war against Japan. General Deane felt that the Soviet answer to the first question in his paper would undoubtedly lead to several contributory questions which would cover the points made by the Planners in their paper.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to use both J. C. S. 1227/4 and 1227/5 in their conference with the Soviet General Staff.

MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, FEBRUARY 8, 1945, NOON,  
VORONTSOV VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
Secretary Stettinius	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar
Mr. Matthews	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Molotov
Mr. Hiss	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Page	Mr. Jebb	Mr. Gusev
	Major Theakstone	Mr. Gromyko
		Mr. Pavlov
		Mr. Golunsky

Bohlen Collection

*Page Minutes*

TOP SECRET

- Subjects: 1. World Security Organization.  
2. Yugoslavian Frontiers.  
3. Control Commission in Bulgaria and Hungary.  
4. Reparations.  
5. Iran.

1. *World Security Organization*

MR. EDEN, who presided, stated that the Foreign Secretaries had been requested to consider two points vis-à-vis the World Security

Organization; first, the question of membership which included that concerning the admission of two or three of the Soviet Republics, and, second, the question of the time and place of the meeting.

MR. STETTINIUS interjected that there was also the question of exactly which nations should be invited to the initial conference.<sup>1</sup>

MR. EDEN inquired whether anyone desired to initiate the discussion on this general question.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he wished to start at the bottom. He said that he would be delighted to invite the great Allies to confer in the United States. He hoped that the President had not shocked the Foreign Secretaries yesterday by mentioning the month of March as the time for the opening of the conference, and he continued that he felt sure that the time could be arranged to fit in with the convenience of Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden. However, he was anxious to open the conference at the earliest possible date. Personally, he hoped that it could be held no later than the latter part of April. With respect to the question concerning who would be invited, he recalled that at Dumbarton Oaks there had been considerable talk of inviting the Associated Nations as well as the United Nations. He stated that he had come to the conclusion that it would probably be most satisfactory to limit the invitations to those who had signed the United Nations Declaration and declared war on the common enemy. With respect to Mr. Molotov's references to multiple membership for the Soviet Union, it was his feeling, from the standpoint of geographical area and population, that this question should be given sympathetic consideration at the opening conference. He continued that he had thus far been unable in his own mind to decide just how inclusion of these entities could be arranged. In the Dumbarton Oaks proposals there was a provision to the effect that each sovereign state had one vote. He had not thus far been able to see clearly how the Dumbarton Oaks proposals could be amended to provide for multiple participation. He concluded that he wished again to refer the matter to the President who had said that the subject was most interesting and deserved sympathetic consideration.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had expressed his views on the inclusion of two or three Soviet Republics in the World Organization at the last plenary meeting. He requested Mr. Eden to state his ideas on the other subjects on the World Security agenda.

MR. EDEN stated that he would be glad to accept the invitation of the United States Government to hold the conference in the United States. He only wished to enter one caveat. He remarked that Mr. Winant, Mr. Gusev, and himself were getting a little jealous in never

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<sup>1</sup> For a memorandum prepared for Stettinius on the items referred to the Foreign Ministers, see *post*, pp. 746-749.



having any large conferences in London. If Mr. Molotov and he were to go to the United States for this conference, he hoped that there would be an early meeting of the Foreign Secretaries in London.

MR. STETTINIUS and MR. MOLOTOV supported Mr. Eden's views with respect to a meeting of the Foreign Secretaries in London.

MR. EDEN continued that since some time would be needed to get the Chinese and possibly the French in line, and since the lawyers would need possibly two weeks before the conference opened, he would prefer to postpone the opening of the conference until the second half of April. He pointed out that he would be committed to debates in Parliament before he would be able to go to the United States. After some discussion it was agreed by MR. MOLOTOV and MR. EDEN that the conference should open on April 25.

MR. MOLOTOV had previously accepted the invitation to hold the conference in the United States.

MR. EDEN stated that he wished to make a few observations on the inclusion of Soviet Republics in the Organization. He said that he was sympathetically inclined to the Soviet position in this respect and would be ready to say so at whatever was considered to be an appropriate moment.

MR. MOLOTOV interjected "The sooner the better." Mr. Molotov then pointed out, in relation to the remarks made by Mr. Stettinius, that the President had indicated yesterday that according to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals each Government had one vote. However, Canada and Australia had individual votes and the fact that they were component parts of the British Empire did not prevent them from being individual members of the assembly. He said that amendments had been made to the Soviet constitution which gave the Soviet Republics the right to have contact with foreign states. The Soviet Union was a union of states. The constitution had now been revised to increase the rights of the Republics. The development of relations between the Republics and foreign states, which had already begun, was in this direction and was developing according to democratic principles. He continued that he believed that it would be superfluous to mention the political, economic and military importance of the Ukraine, White Russia and the Lithuanian Republic. He urged that it would be most desirable if agreement could be reached on this question today.

MR. MOLOTOV then referred to Mr. Stettinius' statement that only those nations which had signed the United Nations Declaration and declared war on Germany should be invited to the conference. This immediately gave rise to some questions. Which Polish Government, for example, should be invited.

MR. EDEN immediately interjected that this was a good reason for settling the Polish problem now.

MR. MOLOTOV continued that certain countries which did not maintain diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union would also be invited. He stated that he would like to check the exact list of states which would attend the conference.

MR. STETTINIUS gave Mr. Molotov such a list<sup>2</sup> and pointed out that although Ecuador had recently declared war on Germany it was not included on the list since it had not yet signed the United Nations Declaration.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that if agreement could not be reached on the membership of the organization it should be reported accordingly.

MR. EDEN stated that only the question of the membership of the two Soviet Republics remained open.

MR. CADOGAN pointed out that if a conference were called to complete the work of Dumbarton Oaks and to reach final agreement on a charter, he did not see how any of the original members of the organization could be excluded from the conference.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that the United Nations should meet to complete the charter. New members could be elected at this meeting. He said that he was trying to find a way to arrange for consideration of the Soviet request before the first meeting of the assembly.

MR. EDEN suggested as a possible procedure that the United Nations might meet and might draw up an order of the day which would include the question of extending foundation membership to two Soviet Republics. He said that he was quite ready to agree to this proposal.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested an amendment to Mr. Eden's proposal to the effect that the three Foreign Secretaries had agreed that it would be advisable to grant admission to the assembly to two or three Soviet Republics.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he was favorably impressed with what Mr. Eden had said. He had not had an opportunity to discuss this matter with the President this morning and it was, therefore, impossible for him to make any firm commitment. However, he would be glad to discuss the question with the President promptly and hoped and expected that the United States would be able to give a favorable reply before the end of the day. He stated that he would not bring up the question of Poland since he hoped that agreement would be reached on this matter at the present conference.

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<sup>2</sup> *Post*, pp. 747-748.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that there were a number of other details with respect to Dumbarton Oaks, such as the status of France, how China would be consulted, who would issue the invitations, etc.

MR. EDEN suggested that a sub-committee be set up to study these details and report back to the Foreign Secretaries. Messrs. Jebb, Gromyko and Hiss were appointed to study these matters.<sup>3</sup>

#### 2. *Yugoslavian Frontiers.*

MR. EDEN stated that although he did not wish to raise the question of Yugoslavian frontiers with Austria and Italy, he would like to point out that with the occupation of Austria by the Red Army there might well be administrative questions relative to the frontiers which should be handled. For this reason, the British Delegation was submitting a note to the Soviet Delegation on the question.<sup>4</sup>

#### 3. *Control Commission in Bulgaria and Hungary.*

MR. EDEN stated that he also wished to discuss the question of a Control Commission in Bulgaria in the light of the decisions reached vis-à-vis the Hungarian Control Commission. It was agreed to confine the present meeting to those matters which had been referred to the Foreign Secretaries by the Chiefs of State for consideration.

#### 4. *Reparations.*

MR. MOLOTOV inquired as to when the American and British Delegations would be prepared to discuss the question of reparations.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he would be ready tomorrow.

MR. EDEN added that he hoped that the British side would also be ready.

#### 5. *Iran.*

MR. EDEN recalled the signing of the Declaration on Iran.<sup>5</sup> He stated that the Allies had signed treaties with Iran<sup>6</sup> in which certain privileges had been granted to them for the duration of the war. In all other respects, however, he felt that the Iranian Government should be the master in its own house and free to make its own decisions. The British Government felt that it was most important to observe this principle—otherwise the Allies might find themselves in competition in Iranian affairs. No one desired that. For this reason he urged that the Allies refrain from interfering in internal Iranian matters. With respect to oil, Mr. Eden stated that the British Government did not dispute the Soviet need for Iranian oil and that it

<sup>3</sup> For a notation by Hiss regarding this subcommittee, see *post*, p. 782. For a post-conference memorandum on these negotiations, see *post*, pp. 991-992.

<sup>4</sup> See *post*, p. 887.

<sup>5</sup> For the text of this declaration, see *post*, pp. 748-749.

<sup>6</sup> For the text of the Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and Iran signed at Tehran January 29, 1942, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 21, 1942, vol. vi, pp. 249-252.

was no part of British policy to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining oil from Northern Iran. Indeed, the Soviet Union was a natural market for this oil. The British Government did not wish to put any obstacles in the way of the Soviet Union's obtaining oil concessions if and when the Iranians were prepared to negotiate. He continued that he felt that it should be made known publicly that the Allies would not press the matter concerning oil concessions any further until their troops had been withdrawn from Iran. The British Government was ready to consider at the Crimean Conference the advisability of making some statement which would indicate that the Allies were prepared to start to withdraw their troops earlier than was provided for in the Declaration on Iran. This withdrawal might commence as soon as the supply routes were closed. He believed that if agreement could be reached on this point it would have a good effect on world opinion and would show that the Allies were prepared to carry out the Tehran Declaration.

Mr. MOLOTOV maintained that there were two different questions involved, i. e. those concerning the oil concessions and the withdrawal of Allied troops. With respect to the withdrawal of the troops, this question had never been placed before the Soviet Government until today. He maintained that this was a question of fulfilling the provisions of the treaty signed by Iran. If there were any need to amend this agreement the question should be studied. This would take some time.

With respect to the oil concessions, Mr. MOLOTOV stated that he would like to make a few comments. The Soviet Government had asked Ambassador Ahi what the Iranian attitude would be to a request for concessions. Ahi's reply had been most favorable. Kavtaradze had then proceeded to Iran to negotiate. In his first conversation with Foreign Minister Saed, the Foreign Minister had taken a favorable position. This was only natural since the granting of concessions was not only to the interests of the Soviet Union, but also to Iran. It was also in compliance with the Declaration of Tehran, since the granting of concessions would assist Iranian economy. This was the first stage of the controversy.

During the second stage the situation changed. The Iranians then stated that it would not be appropriate to carry on the negotiations. Thereupon, the Medjlis had adopted a decision to the effect that there should be no concessions during the war. Subsequently, many Iranians had stated that this decision had been adopted in too great a hurry and that it was unwise.

Why could there not be a third stage? Since the Iranians had changed their minds in one direction the Soviets saw no reason why

they should not change it back to the first stage. The Soviet Government had endeavored to persuade them to do so. Kavtaradze had returned and the strong-armed methods he had used have subsided. He said that no negotiations were being carried on at the present time and that he did not believe it advisable to pay any special attention to this question now. He suggested that the matter be left alone—that it take its own course. The situation was not acute at the present time.

MR. STETTINIUS pointed out that the United States had no wartime treaty with the Iranian Government. American firms had carried on negotiations for oil concessions but these had been dropped following the Medjlis decision. The firms were consequently in the same position as the Soviets. With respect to the withdrawal of troops from Iran he wished to point out that the American troops there were serving the interests of the Soviet Union in moving Lend-Lease supplies from the Persian Gulf. The United States Government was content to leave the question of oil negotiations until the end of the war. He wished fully to support Mr. Eden's proposals regarding the withdrawal of the Allied troops.

MR. EDEN remarked that the British Government had no opposition to the granting of oil concessions to the Soviet Government.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that the United States Government took the same position.

MR. EDEN pointed out that the British had also carried on negotiations with the Iranians, even before the Soviet negotiations had started. As a result of the present attitude of the Iranian Government all of these negotiations were now held in abeyance. He said that if some statement were released, as suggested by him, it might reassure the Iranians and facilitate the recommencement of oil negotiations. With respect to the renewal [*withdrawal*] of Allied troops, there was no need to amend the Iranian treaty which stated that Allied troops would be withdrawn not later than six months after the termination of hostilities. He felt that it would be wise to withdraw these troops as soon as the supply route was no longer necessary.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he believed it might be advisable to limit the matter to an exchange of views on the subject. He offered to summon Kavtaradze to the conference to make a report on the Iranian situation.

MR. EDEN stated that he would like to think over what Mr. Molotov had said and added that he might have new suggestions to make at a forthcoming meeting.

Matthews Files

*Matthews Notes*<sup>1</sup>

1. Austria-Yugoslav. Must agree on boundary for purpose of admin. Note.
2. Bulgarian & Hungary Control: Com:
3. Reparations tomorrow
4. Iran.—

Oil—no dispute on Sov. to get oil from N. Persia. No obstacle on Rus. concession if & when Pers. are prepared to negotiate. We should all make it known we will not press matters further until Allied Troops withdrawn. We prepared to issue statement prepared to withdraw troops earlier *pari passu*—when supply route closes. Would show world prepared to carry out Teh<sup>2</sup> decl.

MOL: Eden has 2 pts—different 1. Oil 2. Troops. Troops question new. If necessary to change agreement must be studied & some time needed.

Oil—What was beginning? Negot began by asking Pers. govt attitude on concess N Persia. Answer was attitude would be most favorable Dep. Com Kav<sup>3</sup> went to Iran. Conversation with first position of Said & Shah both favorable. Seemed not only U.S.S.R. but Persia also inter. Would be econ. assistance to Pers.

Something has changed. No time for details but Govt. said would not continue discussions Persia during war. Mejlis would not discuss. Said decision was taken in a hurry. Why not now a third phase. Why can't Pers. govt change position again. Trying to persuade them that's all. Kav. has returned home & method which might seem strong has changed. No negot. now but reserve right to take. Why special attention now? Why not let things go their way. Situation not acute.

S. We have no treaty with Our oil concessions also advanced stage & were in same position. Supports Eden on troop withdrawal. Willing to wait till war's end on concess.

EDEN: Reiterates no oppo. to Soviet concession. Does believe some statement might reassure Pers who were frightened at one time and make negotiations easier.

On troop withdrawal no change in treaty necessary. Would help reassure Pers & therefore negot.

MOL: Thinks we should limit ourselves to an exchange of views Might bring in Kavtaradze—he is here in Crimea.

<sup>1</sup> For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Page minutes of this meeting.

<sup>2</sup> Tehran.

<sup>3</sup> Kavtaradze.

Hiss Collection

*Hiss Notes*<sup>1</sup>

ERS see Ed. → Wire S. Am states act  
immediately

For Mins  
2/8 Eden Chmn

Eden: 1st World Org. q. 2 q's referred to us

- 1) Q. of membership of 2 or 3 reps of SU
- 2) Time & place of conference

AH  
Note to Pres  
re Art VII<sup>2</sup>

ERS & Ns to be invited

ERS To start at bottom of list 1st I should like take this opportunity invite our great allies to conf in US

Hope Pres didn't shock you yester. by mentioning March I'm sure time can be arranged to fit in with convenience of Mr Mol & Mr Ed However we are very anxious to have the conf. at earliest poss. time Pers. hope could be held not later than latter part Apr.

As to matter of those to be invited you will recall at D. O. there was much talk as to the Assoc. Ns as well as the Un Ns We have come to the conclusion that taking everything into consid. it would prob. be most satis. to limit those to be invited to those who had signed Un Ns Decl & declared war on our common enemy.

As to Mr. Molotov's reference to multiple membership for S.U. From standpoint geog. area & pop. it is my feeling this entire q. should be given very sympathetic consid. As to how it could be done immediately at the very first meeting I have not been able to determine in my own mind

In D. O. proposals we wrote in the provision each state have 1 vote. I have not yet been able to see clearly how D. O. proposals could be amended to provide for multiple participation. I wish again to refer to the Pres' reaction yesterday to this matter when he said it was most interesting & deserved sympathetic study

Mol. Has expressed his ideas re last q. As to 1st q. like Ed. to state his views

Ed. As regards time & place. Glad to accept the invitation of the U S Govt I only want to enter 1 caveat. Mr Winant, Mr Gusev & I getting little jealous we never have anything in Lon. If Mr Mol & I go to Am for this I hope for an early meeting of For Secs in Lon

ERS Agreed

Mol Quite poss.

Ed. Invitation not ultimatum

ERS Promptly accept

<sup>1</sup> From penciled notes in longhand. For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Page minutes of this meeting.

<sup>2</sup> See *post*, p. 962.

Mol We also

Ed As to time have to get Ch. into line & possibly Fr. Lawyers want 10 days or so I rather think I am committed to debates in Par. before I go I would like myself 2nd half April

ERS around about Apr 15

Ed I would give it a wk more 20 something

Mol Agreed

ERS latter part April?

Mol Agreed

ERS Wanted calendar Suggested Wed Apr 25

Mol. Agrees to both

Ed We mildly prefer second (date) Easter 1st

Agreed April 25

Mol. We accept your invitation to Wash & the date of 25th Re 3 reps Ed. Definitely sympathetic to their inclusion in Ass. We would be ready to say that at whatever is considered the approp. moment

Mol—As soon as possible

Would like deal with this q. relation to remarks of Mr S. Mr S has reminded us Pres spoke of decs of D. O. & 1 vote. Like ask 1 q. Can & Austr part of U K.

Ed—Of Brit Em

Mol & members of Ass.

The amends to Sov Const which have been accepted Feb last yr give reps rt of immed touch with for. states S U union of states. Const Enlarges rts of reps. In this sense we must develop rels with for. states. this already begun As to their pol, econ, mil importance no use proving what impor. have such reps as U,——Would be very desirable if could arrive at agt & ~~have~~ reach dec. today

Re Proposal made by ERS that Un Ns Decl signers & decl. of war com.

Q. which Pol should be invited

Ed Another reason settle prob.

Mol. Some Ns have no dip. rels with S U

Would like to check up exact no. of states which would take place

ERS read list

Ecuador has recently declared war but has not yet declared war [*sic*]

Ed: laughed

Mol If we can not arrive at agt re membership must say so & move on to another subject

Ed: all agreed except re 2 reps.

Cad: If you call a conf. to complete D. O. work & to agree finally on the Charter I don't see how you can exclude any of members of that conf. from the Org.



ERS: The Un. Ns meet to complete a charter & all would be members They could elect new members before 1st meeting of Ass. Trying find way Sov request can be taken before 1st meeting

Ed Un Ns could meet as met last time & could agree amongst other bus. to extend foundation members to include the 2 Sov. Reps. We should be quite ready to agree to that

Mol. Suggests amend. to Ed proposal

We must formulate this q. as he proposed & add we 3 have agreed it would be advisable to give the 2 or 3 Sov. reps. a place in the Ass.

ERS asked Ed q.—Ed restated position

ERS I am favorably impressed with what Mr Ed. has said. I did not have an oppor. of discussing this with Pres this morn. . . at this time imp. make any firm commit. However delighted discuss with Pres promptly & would hope & expect U.S. be able give favorable answer before end of day

Mol. Agreed

Ed. “

Mol We leave now q of Pol.—in hope we reach agt.

Ed. Other items to consider

ERS There are a no. of details. If we could meet tomorrow Status of Fr., Ch. participant at DO. & must be consulted, form of invitation, how & by whom & when invitations be issued

Ed. We might set up subcom. to prepare this & report to us

ERS A. H., Gromyko, Jebb

Ed. Other items for agenda

1. Yugoslav frontier—Will put in a note on that
2. Control Coms., Bul & Hung.

Mol. Dec. re Hung. Con. Com just arrived at. Other q's

3. Iran

Agreed not try to list q's still to come up at plenary session

Mol. when can we go on with q. of reparations?

ERS we will be prepared tomorrow to discuss Rep. further

Ed. Hope we will

#### Iran

Ed At Teheran we signed Decl. re Persia & each made treaties with Iran<sup>3</sup>

About oil—no dispute about SU's need for oil. No part of our pol. to prevent S. U. from obtaining oil from N. Persia Indeed Sov. Un is a natural market for N. Per. oil. We do not wish to put any obstacle in way of R's obtaining concession if & when Persians prepared to neg. it. We should all of us make it known that we will not press matters further re oil concessions until Allied troops have been withdrawn from Persia

<sup>3</sup> Marginal note in Hiss' handwriting: "No".

Ready to consider making some statement indicating we would be prepared to start withdrawal Allied troops earlier than was agreed in treaty—which was conclusion of Eur war.

Mol. 2 diff. q's oil & Allied troops in Persia

Q of withdrawal of troops was not taken up until today in such a way. Here is q of carrying out the agt already signed by Iran. If there is a nec. to change this agt, some time needed to study

About oil—Negs. began by Rs asking Ir Amb what would be Ir. att. toward Sov concession Said sure answer would be most favorable. Then Dep. Com Kav— went to Iran & talked to Saed. 1st position of Saed quite favorable—same re Shah

Seemed quite natural not only SU but Persia interested In accord with Decl on Iran would be solid assistance to Iran

Second stage—something has changed in Iran. Not now dealing with details but Per. govt said not prepared go on with discussions & Majlis took dec. not give concessions during war. Since then have heard many times from Per. officials dec was unfortunate & taken in hurry

Why can't there be 3rd stage—return of Per Govt to its 1st opin. If Per. Govt has changed mind in 1 direction what [sic] cant change in other dir. What objection? May reopen negs. Brit already have concessions—no inconvenience to Rs & R concession would not be to Brit

Let things go own way. Nothing acute now

ERS Just a word. For the record US has not signed a war-time treaty with Iran. Treaty was Sov-Brit-Iranian treaty. Also certain Am. oil co's were negotiating & we too were cut short. I wish to support endorse entirely Mr. Eden's proposal re withdrawal of troops. Only reason Am. troops are in Iran is to serve S U from standpoint supply & movement of Lend-lease.

As to oil we are perfectly contented not to resume negs. till after hostilities end.

Ed: No opposition to Sov. concession

ERS Same is true of U. S.

Ed. We were negotiating another concession even before R negs began & now all that has come to an end as result of Per. Govts present attitude. Thought statement he proposed might reassure Persians, who were undoubtedly frightened at one time, & make negs easier

As to troops, no need amend treaty which says be withdrawn not later than 6 mos after end hostilities No diff. in Brit withdrawing earlier. Thought might begin when supply line no longer going.

Mol Offered to have Kavtoradge come

Mol. Would like to ~~have~~ limit selves to exch of views

Ed. to think over what Mol. said & may make new suggestions

Mol All of should think

Hiss Collection

*United States Delegation Memorandum*<sup>1</sup>

[YALTA,] February 8, 1945.

## LIST OF ITEMS REFERRED TO FOREIGN MINISTERS

1. Inclusion of Ukraine, White Russia and Lithuania among initial members of the Organization. (See attached paper)
2. Date and place of United Nations Conference.
3. Nations to be invited to United Nations Conference.  
Emphasize membership should include all signatories of United Nations Declaration—not just the specific, listed countries which have already signed.  
(See attached list)
4. The policy toward Iran. (See attached paper)

[Attachment 1]

[YALTA,] February 8, 1945.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST INCLUSION OF ANY OF THE SOVIET REPUBLICS  
AMONG THE INITIAL MEMBERS<sup>2</sup>1. *Soviet Republics not Signatories of the United Nations Declaration:*

On further thought we have become impressed with the Soviet view that the initial members of the United Nations Organization should be the signatories of the United Nations Declaration. As none of the Soviet Republics are signatories of that Declaration, Mr. Molotov's proposal that two or three of these Republics be admitted to initial membership would be contrary to that principle.

2. *The Question Should Be Postponed Until the Organization is Formed:*

The President indicated in his remarks yesterday at the plenary session that this question should not come up until after the Organization is formed.

Mr. Molotov said yesterday at the plenary session that the Soviet Government had observed the gradual development of international relations of the British dominions. In accordance with the practice followed by the dominions, it would seem to be premature to take the action proposed by Mr. Molotov at this time. We should allow a longer time to elapse and have available more experience as to the international relations of the Soviet Republics before we consider this question.

<sup>1</sup> Author not indicated but presumably Hiss. This memorandum, with attachments, was presumably prepared for Stettinius prior to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 8, 1945.

<sup>2</sup> Author not indicated but presumably Hiss.

The question is such a novel one in international relations that the other members of the Organization should have a chance to consider the question before a decision is reached.

3. *The Soviet Republics are not Sovereign States under International Practice:*

The Soviet constitution does not permit the Soviet Republics to control their own foreign policy or affairs. Other aspects of central control over the Republics are also inconsistent with the Republics being sovereign.

(*Note:* India is one of the United Nations. It, too, is not independent. The Soviet representatives will probably argue that if India can be a member so should their three Republics.)

*The answer:*

India has for some period past been gradually developing international relations, and is generally regarded as having more of the attributes of separate nationhood than the Soviet Republics.)

[Attachment 2]

LIST OF NATIONS WHICH WERE INVITED TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCES AT HOT SPRINGS, ATLANTIC CITY AND BRETTON WOODS <sup>3</sup>

UNITED NATIONS

Australia	Iran
Belgium	Iraq
Bolivia	Liberia
Brazil	Luxembourg
Canada	Mexico
China	Netherlands
Colombia	New Zealand
Costa Rica	Nicaragua
Cuba	Norway
Czechoslovakia	Panama
Dominican Republic	Philippine Commonwealth
El Salvador	Poland
Ethiopia	Union of South Africa
Greece	Union of Soviet
Guatemala	Socialist Republics
Haiti	United Kingdom
Honduras	United States
India	Yugoslavia

<sup>3</sup> This list was not attached to the covering memorandum in the Hiss Collection, but a copy was so attached in the UNA Files. The footnote on the original would indicate that the list had been prepared prior to January 1, 1945. (See *ante*, pp. 52-53.) The word "Turkey" was written in longhand beside the list of Associated States (see *post*, p. 774). Another copy of this list is an attachment to the Pasvolksy memorandum of January 23, 1945, *ante*, p. 82.

## STATES ASSOCIATED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE WAR

Chile	Iceland
Ecuador	Paraguay
Egypt	Peru
*France—Provisional Government of the French Republic	Uruguay
	Venezuela

*Observers*

Danish Minister at Washington,  
attending in a personal capacity

[Attachment 3]

[YALTA,] February 8, 1945.

POLICY ON IRAN <sup>4</sup>

At Malta we agreed with the British on two points: <sup>5</sup>

1. We should urge the Soviet Government, in accordance with the spirit of the Declaration on Iran of December 1, 1943, to respect the decision of the Iranian Government to postpone negotiations for oil concessions until the termination of hostilities and withdrawal of Allied troops from Iran.

(The Declaration on Iran, which was signed by the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin at Teheran, expressed desire for the maintenance of Iran's sovereignty and integrity.)

2. Both Governments should state that when the truck route to Russia across Iran is no longer needed, we would be prepared to begin removing our troops *pari passu* (i. e., at the same rate.)

[Attachment 4] <sup>6</sup>

## DECLARATION OF THE THREE POWERS REGARDING IRAN

The President of the United States, the Premier of the U. S. S. R., and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.

The Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union.

\* On January 1, 1945 France became a signatory of the United Nations Declaration. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>4</sup> Authorship not indicated.

<sup>5</sup> See *ante*, pp. 500-501.

<sup>6</sup> Although the covering memorandum refers to only three attachments, this paper was attached to the preceding document in both the Hiss Collection and the UNA Files.

The Three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials, and supplies for civilian consumption.

With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conferences or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.

DECEMBER 1, 1943.

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MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, FEBRUARY 8, 1945,  
NOON, LIVADIA PALACE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Fleet Admiral Leahy  
General of the Army Marshall  
Fleet Admiral King  
Major General Kuter  
Lieutenant General Somervell  
Vice Admiral Cooke  
Rear Admiral McCormick  
Major General Bull  
Major General Anderson  
Major General Hull  
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser

UNITED KINGDOM

Field Marshal Brooke  
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal  
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham  
Field Marshal Wilson  
General Ismay  
Admiral Somerville  
Major General Laycock  
Major General Holmes  
Lord Leathers <sup>1</sup>

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General McFarland  
Captain Graves

Major General Jacob  
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones  
Commander Coleridge

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<sup>1</sup> Present for items 1 and 2 only.

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*<sup>2</sup>

TOP SECRET

1. APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE 186TH MEETING OF THE  
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the C. C. S. 186th Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.

2. LEVELS OF SUPPLY OF ALL PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN ALL  
THEATERS3. OVER-ALL REVIEW OF CARGO SHIPPING  
(C. C. S. 746/11)<sup>3</sup>

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had examined this paper and it was acceptable to them with one amendment. They would like to change the date referred to in the first sentence of paragraph 4b. (1) (d) on page 4 of the enclosure from 30 April to 1 April.<sup>4</sup>

LORD LEATHERS said that this amendment would suit him personally very well if the staffs concerned could prepare the study in time.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States staffs believed this would be possible.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff were quite prepared to accept the first of April as a target date for the report concerned.

Continuing, Sir Alan Brooke suggested that paragraph 4b. (1) of the enclosure required clarification as to the order of priority in which the tasks referred to were to be undertaken. For instance, the fixing of priorities for the continuance of the war against Japan referred to in paragraph 4b. (1) (b) might well have to take place before the preparation of the combined redeployment plan or at least concurrently with it.

GENERAL SOMERVELL explained that the tasks referred to in paragraph 4b. (1) were not set out in the sequence in which they would necessarily be undertaken.

<sup>2</sup> C. C. S. 187th Meeting.<sup>3</sup> Not printed.<sup>4</sup> For previous discussion of the paragraph under consideration, see *ante*, pp. 730-731.

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide on the agencies to undertake the preparation of a combined redeployment plan, and the fixing of priority for continuance of the war against Japan. He felt that the Combined Staff Planners and the Combined Administrative Committee, in consultation, would be the best bodies to undertake this work. They would, of course, as set out in paragraph 4b. (1) (c) confer with the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the appropriate shipping authorities.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Approved C. C. S. 746/11, subject to the change of the date in the third line on page 4 from 30 April to 1 April 1945.

b. Directed the Combined Staff Planners, in collaboration with the Combined Administrative Committee, to take the action outlined in paragraph 4b. (1).

c. Invited the combined shipping authorities to take the action outlined in paragraph 4b (2).

4. RECIPROCAL AGREEMENT ON PRISONERS OF WAR  
(C. C. S. 777/1)<sup>5</sup>

SIR ALAN BROOKE said there were two points the British Chiefs of Staff would like to make. With regard to Article 6, certain of the Dominion Governments had raised objections to the conclusion of an agreement whereby their prisoners of war should work for the Russians on any but a voluntary basis. He suggested therefore the insertion of the words "on a voluntary basis" after the words "They may also be employed" in the second sentence of Article 6.

As he saw it, the proposed agreement was susceptible to alteration by the State Department or Foreign Office, and all that was required was the assurance of the Combined Chiefs of Staff that they saw no objection to it in principle.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he had understood the Combined Chiefs of Staff should agree on the wording of the document and recommend its acceptance to the State Department and Foreign Office as a basis for discussion with the Russians.

Replying to a question by General Marshall, SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained that the Dominion Governments concerned had pointed out that their forces were enrolled on a voluntary basis and were not conscripts. For political reasons, therefore, they felt it important that such troops who might be prisoners of war, should not be made to work by the Russians except on a voluntary basis.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said the proposed amendment was acceptable.

<sup>5</sup> As amended and approved, this document became C. C. S. 777/2, printed *infra*.



Continuing, SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the second point which the British Chiefs of Staff wished to put forward was with regard to Article 8. They felt that this article introduced a new subject which had not previously been considered and might not be acceptable to the Russian authorities who might well object to agreeing that their prisoners of war falling into the hands of United States or British troops should, without their consent, be transferred by one of these powers to the other.

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that such transfers might be operationally necessary.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that as he read it, there was nothing in the remainder of the agreement which prohibited such transfers but he regarded it as a matter more for mutual arrangement between the United States and British authorities concerned than for discussion with the Russians.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he was prepared to agree that paragraph 8 should be deleted.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved C. C. S. 777/1 subject to the following amendments:

*Article 6:* In the fifth line, after "employed," insert "on a voluntary basis."

*Article 8:* Delete this article and renumber the succeeding article as Article 8.

(Amended paper subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 777/2.)

#### 5. EQUIPMENT FOR GREEK FORCES

(C. C. S. 185th Mtg., Item 2; C. C. S. 768/1; <sup>6</sup> NAF 841 <sup>7</sup>)

SIR ALAN BROOKE reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff that at their 185th Meeting, 2 February 1945, it had been agreed that the British would undertake the equipment of an additional 60,000 Greek forces upon receipt from London of certain assurances. The British Chiefs of Staff were now in a position to assure the United States Chiefs of Staff that the implementation of the proposals contained in NAF 841:

*a.* Would not interfere with the equipment for Allied and liberated forces in Northwest Europe; and

*b.* Would not result in subsequent direct or indirect charges against United States resources.

The British would therefore go ahead with the equipping of the forces concerned. The British Chiefs of Staff would also formalize

<sup>6</sup> See under Malta Conference, *ante*, pp. 522-524.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed.

this matter by putting out a memorandum on the lines he had just mentioned.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that these assurances were satisfactory.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Took note of the assurance of the British Chiefs of Staff that the implementation of NAF 841 would not:

- (1) Interfere with the equipment for Allied and liberated forces in Northwest Europe;
- (2) Result in subsequent direct or indirect charges against U. S. resources.

b. Pursuant to the above, agreed to the implementation of the proposals in NAF 841.

#### 6. FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER (C. C. S. 776/1) <sup>8</sup>

ADMIRAL LEAHY raised the question of the preparation of the final report to the President and Prime Minister. He understood that such a report would be ready for consideration on the following morning. He understood also that the Prime Minister had suggested a plenary meeting at noon, on Friday, 9 February. He would seek the wishes of the President in this matter.

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that it might be well for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to meet an hour before the plenary meeting in order to clear any final points with regard to the report itself or any other matters which might arise.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Agreed to request a plenary meeting for 1200 hours on Friday, 9 February 1945.

b. Agreed to meet one hour prior to the plenary meeting, whatever the hour selected, to consider the final report.

#### 7. OPERATIONS ON THE WESTERN FRONT

GENERAL MARSHALL read out the latest information available on the course of ground and air operations on the Western Front. He felt it of particular interest to note that at the present time there were 49 Allied divisions in the line with 33 in reserve.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note with interest of the above statement.

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<sup>8</sup> As amended and approved this document became C. C. S. 776/3, which is printed *post*, pp. 827-833.

J. C. S. Files

*Draft Reciprocal Agreement on Prisoners of War as Approved by the  
Combined Chiefs of Staff on February 8, 1945*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

AGREEMENT RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIANS  
LIBERATED BY THE SOVIET ARMIES AND U. S. (BRITISH) ARMIES

*Preamble.*

The Government of the U. S. S. R. and the Government of the United States of America (the Government of His Britannic Majesty) wishing to conclude an agreement on arranging for the care and repatriation of Soviet citizens freed by Allied troops, and for American citizens (British subjects) freed by the Red Army, through their appointed representatives, acting mutually in the authority duly and fully invested in them, have agreed as follows:—

*Article 1.*

All Soviet citizens liberated by forces operating under U. S. (British) command and American citizens (British subjects) liberated by the forces operating under Soviet command will, without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet or U. S. (British) authorities, as the case may be, at places agreed upon between those authorities.

U. S. (British) and Soviet military authorities will respectively take necessary measures for protection of camps, and points of concentration from enemy bombing, artillery fire, etc.

*Article 2.*

The contracting parties shall ensure that their military authorities shall without delay inform the competent authorities of the other party regarding citizens (or subjects) of the other contracting party found by them, and will undertake to follow all the provisions of this agreement. Soviet and U. S. (British) repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate access into the camps and points of concentration where their citizens (or subjects) are located and they will have the right to appoint the internal administration and set up the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure and laws of their country.

Facilities will be given for the despatch or transfer of officers of their own nationality to camps or points of concentration where liberated members of the respective forces are located and there are

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<sup>1</sup> C. C. S. 777/2.

insufficient officers. The outside protection of and access to and from the camps or points of concentration will be established in accordance with the instructions of the military commander in whose zone they are located, and the military commander shall also appoint a commandant, who shall have the final responsibility for the over-all administration and discipline of the camp or point concerned.

The relocation of camps as well as the transfer from one camp to another of liberated citizens will be notified to the competent Soviet or U. S. (British) authorities. Hostile propaganda directed against the contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not be permitted.

#### *Article 3.*

Except in so far as the obligations set out in this article may be affected by obligations undertaken in connection with the use of UNRRA (or other agreed relief agencies) the competent U. S. (British) and Soviet authorities will do their utmost in the circumstances obtaining in any area, and from time to time, to supply liberated citizens (or subjects) of the contracting parties with adequate food, clothing, housing and medical attention both in camps or at points of concentration and en route, and with transport until they are handed over to the Soviet or U. S. (British) authorities at places agreed upon between those authorities. The standards of such food, clothing, housing and medical attention shall so far as possible be consistent with the normal practice relating to military rank.

The contracting parties will not demand compensation for these or other similar services which their authorities may supply respectively to liberated citizens (or subjects) of the other contracting party.

#### *Article 4.*

Either of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use such of its own means of transport as may be available for the repatriation of its citizens (or subjects) held by the other contracting party. Similarly each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use its own facilities for the delivery of supplies to its citizens (or subjects) held by the other contracting party.

#### *Article 5.*

Soviet and U. S. (British) military authorities shall make such advances on behalf of their respective governments to liberated citizens (and subjects) of the other contracting party as the competent Soviet and U. S. (British) authorities shall agree upon beforehand.

Advances made in currency of any enemy territory or in currency of their occupation authorities shall not be liable to compensation.

In the case of advances made in currency of liberated non-enemy territory, the Soviet and U. S. (British) Governments will effect, each for advances made to their citizens (or subjects) necessary settlements with the governments of the territory concerned, who will be informed of the amount of their currency paid out for this purpose.

*Article 6.*

Ex-prisoners of war (with the exception of officers) and civilians of each of the contracting parties may, until their repatriation, be employed in the management, maintenance and administration of the camps or billets in which they are situated. They may also be employed on a voluntary basis on other work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent Soviet and U. S. (British) authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labor shall be determined by agreement between those authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with military standards and procedure.

*Article 7.*

The contracting parties shall, wherever necessary, use all practicable means to ensure the evacuation to the rear of these liberated citizens (and subjects). They also undertake to use all practicable means to transport liberated citizens (and subjects) to places to be agreed upon where they can be handed over to the Soviet or U. S. (British) authorities respectively. The handing over of these liberated citizens (and subjects) shall in no way be delayed or impeded by the requirements of their temporary employment.

*Article 8.*

The contracting parties will give the fullest possible effect to the foregoing provisions of this Agreement, subject only to the limitations in detail and from time to time of operational, supply and transport conditions in the several theatres.

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Defense Files : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Grew)*

TOP SECRET

ARGONAUT 125. Crypto-War for Acting Secretary of State only from Secretary Stettinius.

The text referred to in your number 27, dated February 8,<sup>1</sup> is the British redraft of the Soviet redraft submitted to the British and

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 697.

American Governments on January 20.<sup>2</sup> In origin, it is a SHAEF paper. The British have subsequently made a few changes in it which I feel we can accept without reservation. The British are most anxious to present this draft to the Russians today for their consideration. JCS are in full agreement. I can see no objections to the redraft and have authorized, insofar as we are concerned, tripartite discussions based on it. It does not cover the numbered points mentioned in your reference telegram which were embodied in the Department's note of February 1 to the Soviet Embassy.<sup>3</sup> The consensus here is that it would be unwise to include questions relative to the protection of the Geneva Convention and to Soviet citizens in the U.S. in an agreement which deals primarily with the exchange of prisoners liberated by the Allied armies as they march into Germany. With respect to "claimants", notwithstanding the danger of German retaliation, we believe there will be serious delays in the release of our prisoners of war unless we reach prompt agreement on this question.

ARGONAUT, February 9, 1945.

<sup>2</sup> The British redraft here referred to is printed *ante*, pp. 694-696; the Soviet redraft submitted on January 20 is printed *ante*, pp. 416-418.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. This note dealt with the application of the Geneva Convention to certain prisoners of war of Russian origin who were in German uniform when captured by United States forces.

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MEETING OF THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET CHIEFS OF STAFF,  
FEBRUARY 8, 1945, 3 P. M., YUSUPOV PALACE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Fleet Admiral Leahy  
General of the Army Marshall  
Fleet Admiral King  
Major General Kuter

SOVIET UNION

General of the Army Antonov  
Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov  
Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov  
(aided by a 2-star admiral)

J. C. S. Files

*Kuter Minutes*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

ADMIRAL LEAHY opened the conference with the statement that we would discuss military problems in the Far East and that we required specific data on which to base the long range planning required by the great distances from the United States to the Pacific Theater.

<sup>1</sup> Note on the original: "No U. S. interpreters or secretaries were present. Three Russian secretaries or interpreters in military uniform attended meeting."

ADMIRAL LEAHY then stated that we have prepared a series of questions on which replies were desired.

GENERAL ANTONOV asked to have all of the questions presented prior to any replies or discussion.

ADMIRAL LEAHY then read the questions set forth in the memorandum by the Commanding General, U. S. Military Mission, Moscow, "Subjects for First U. S.-U. S. S. R. Staff Meeting," as stated in JCS 1227/5 (ARGONAUT), dated 7 Feb 1945.<sup>2</sup> These questions were read as written with the words "or some more suitable area" interpolated in question (3).<sup>3</sup>

After brief discussion on the side with Admiral King, ADMIRAL LEAHY posed two additional questions, the first consisting of paragraph 3 of the memorandum by the Joint Staff Planners, "Subjects for First U. S.-U. S. S. R. Staff Meetings" as set forth in JCS 1227/4 (ARGONAUT) 7 February 1945.<sup>4</sup> ADMIRAL LEAHY'S second additional question was based on paragraph 7 of the Planners' paper and asked if arrangements could be made whereby weather information could be made available to the U. S. from more stations than are now being used in Eastern Siberia.

GENERAL ANTONOV opened the period of reply and discussion with the very clear statement that he had no authority to give definite answers or promises or to make decisions on matters pertaining to the Far East. He stated that his comments represented his own personal opinion and views and further that he would refer the questions to Marshal Stalin the same day and would arrange to provide complete and authoritative answers as quickly as possible.

The following replies to questions and discussion ensued:

a. There have been no changes in the Soviet projected plan of operations in the Far East from those described to Mr. Harriman and General Deane in October.<sup>5</sup>

b. With regard to the Soviet requirement for a Pacific supply route after Soviet-Japanese hostilities start, GENERAL ANTONOV opened with the statement that the operation of the Trans-Siberian Railroad "can be hampered" by the enemy. The Soviets therefore cannot rely on that rail line to support their forces. A maximum effort will be made to keep the Trans-Siberian Railroad in operation. However, the Soviets will require that air and sea routes across the Pacific (mainly sea routes) be kept open. They will particularly require fuel (petroleum products) and foodstuffs.

c. As to basing U. S. Air Forces in Siberia, no discussion could be had until Marshal Stalin's decision was obtained.

<sup>2</sup> *Post*, pp. 762-763.

<sup>3</sup> See *post*, p. 764.

<sup>4</sup> *Post*, pp. 763-766.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, pp. 370-374.

d. U. S. Forces may be required to defend Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia. GENERAL ANTONOV's words was [were] that the Soviets "will find American help useful."

e. As to pre-hostilities preparation including construction, reception, and storage of U. S. stock piles in Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia, a rather lengthy reply was given including the following points:

The Soviets will move much larger forces to the Far East than are now there—these augmented forces will require greatly increased supplies—the Soviet problem will be great to supply their expanded forces and they cannot promise to construct and store materials for American forces. They may need American materials with which to build fuel storage for the Soviet forces. This question could be answered after detailed requirements were known and after a decision had been obtained that U. S. forces would be employed in Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia.

f. Entry into Kamchatka by the American Survey Party will be determined by Marshal Stalin.

g. The Soviets will occupy southern Sakhalin as quickly after the beginning of hostilities as possible and will do this without American help. The Soviet Navy will deny Laparousa Strait to the Japanese but it will be difficult to permit friendly surface movements through the Laparousa Strait until a Soviet Navy base and shore artillery are established.

h. This question "Are we assured that combined planning in Moscow will be vigorously pursued" is somewhat garbled in reply. GENERAL ANTONOV stated that he had planned in October to start the movement of troops in early 1945. However, all Soviet troops, including those released from Finland and Latvia are now joined in the battle on the Eastern Front. He stated that the intended troop movements will, therefore, be delayed until the necessary units can be disengaged from the present battle. Later in the conversation, GENERAL MARSHALL expanded the American requirement for firm data on which to base future plans. He explained that necessity had lead the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to relieve their Senior Planners from their global responsibilities to permit them to move to Moscow to concentrate on the Russian-American phase of the war against Japan. He made it very clear that we must have planning basis and that we are security conscious. GENERAL MARSHALL concluded with a forceful statement that specific and constructive planning in Moscow must be pursued. GENERAL ANTONOV stated that he would do his best to improve the planning situation in Moscow.

i. Weather in Siberia was discussed at some length and its relation to the initiation of hostilities. From a ground force view point the most difficult conditions would be experienced during the thaw and floods in April and May and although June is a favorable month,



July and August is also undesirable. As far as the ground forces are concerned, weather would be most favorable in September, October and November. At sea weather is favorable in July, August and September.

*j.* Authority to obtain weather stations would be discussed with Marshal Stalin.

ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV presented his desire to take over ships from the U. S. at Dutch Harbor or Kodiak but accepted Admiral King's statement that Cold Bay was more desirable and would be used. Some discussion followed and it was concluded that Russian crews could be moved from Murmansk to the east coast of the U. S. by returning convoys and then to be moved by rail to the west coast. However, the provision of American shipping to move these crews to Cold Bay was not viewed with favor by Admiral King.

Except for the immediately preceding conversation, the Russians had no questions to ask.

GENERAL MARSHALL presented a summary of recent operations—gave to General Antonov a written statement as to our views of the combat effectiveness of German divisions after the Ardennes battle and left with the Russians our estimate of Japan's strength in the Pacific.

AIR MARSHAL KHUDYAKOV presented a Russian version of the agreement to create a restricted zone for air operations on the Russian front.

Upon adjourning GENERAL ANTONOV stated that he would see Marshal Stalin forthwith and would inform the U. S. Chiefs of Staff as to when we might expect the next meeting to receive official and definite replies to our questions.

Dictated to and transcribed by T/Sgt George J. Lang. General Kuter's notes and Sgt Lang's shorthand notes have been destroyed.

L. S. KUTER,  
*Major General, U. S. A.*

Six (6) copies prepared with distribution to the individuals indicated below:

General Marshall	3 copies
General Deane	1 copy
General Hull	1 copy
General Kuter	1 copy

J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the Chief of Naval Operations (King)*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[YALTA,] 8 February 1945.

## MEMORANDUM

Subject: Questions posed by Admiral Kuznetsov at the U. S.-Russian Chiefs of Staff Meeting Thursday Afternoon, February 8th.

1. (a) *Question.* What has been determined about the transfer of ships to the Russians (presumably with reference to the MILEPOST program).

(b) *Answer.* It is difficult to be definite until we know more about the U-boat offensive in the Atlantic. However, it would seem practicable to work out a schedule of deliveries on a step-by-step basis in which the later deliveries may have to be delayed because of the U-boat situation in the Atlantic.

2. (a) *Question.* If Dutch Harbor is not a suitable place for the transfer of ships to the Russians and for the training of Russian crews, the second preference would be Kodiak. What is your view?

(b) *Answer.* After thorough review of all considerations, it has been decided that Cold Bay is the best place to effect the delivery of ships to the Russians and the training of Russian crews.

*Note:* Admiral Kuznetsov was unfamiliar with Cold Bay but when the location was pointed out to him he accepted it.

3. (a) *Question.* We wish to transfer crews from Murmansk by utilizing convoys returning from Murmansk to the United States, thence by rail across the United States to the West Coast, and thence to Cold Bay. Can you manage this?

(b) *Answer.* It would seem practicable to move Russian crews as far as the West Coast of the United States in the manner you describe, but it will be extremely difficult to move them from the West Coast to Cold Bay because of the very bad shipping situation in the Pacific. The matter will require the closest examination and the answer must be understood to be very uncertain at this time.

*Note:* Admiral Kuznetsov made no offer for the movement of the Russian crews from the West Coast to Cold Bay in Russian ships, which matter should be taken up further with the Russians.

*Note:* After the Staff meeting adjourned, I asked the Russian Admiral how many men, total, they wish to move from Murmansk to Cold

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<sup>1</sup> A copy of this memorandum was attached as Appendix A to the preceding Kuter minutes.

Bay. His reply was about 3,000. I suggested if they were moved in detachments suitable to the accommodations in the ships of the convoys returning from Murmansk, it would make the problem more easy of solution—and, as well, it would facilitate their transfer by rail across the United States and, further, their transfer from the West Coast of the United States to Cold Bay. I added that such an arrangement would fit in well with the proposed schedule of delivery of ships on a step-by-step basis.

4. Copies of this memorandum will be given to the distribution list below. All agencies that are involved are urged to pursue this matter to an acceptable solution.

E. J. KING  
*Fleet Admiral, U. S. Navy*

#### Distribution List

Chief of Staff, U. S. Army  
General Somervell  
General Kuter  
General Deane  
Admiral Olsen  
Admiral Horne  
Admiral Edwards  
Admiral Cooke  
Admiral Duncan  
Admiral McCormick  
Admiral Land

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J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane)*

TOP SECRET

(SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION)

J. C. S. 1227/5

7 FEBRUARY 1945.

(ARGONAUT)

#### JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECTS FOR FIRST U. S.—U. S. S. R. STAFF MEETING

References: *a.* J. C. S. 1176 Series <sup>1</sup>

*b.* J. C. S. Memo for Info No. 360 <sup>2</sup>

MEMORANDUM BY THE COMMANDING GENERAL, U. S. MILITARY MISSION, MOSCOW

It is recommended that in your meeting with the Soviet Staff you obtain their commitments or opinions, as appropriate, on the following subjects:

<sup>1</sup> For J. C. S. 1176/1, 1176/2, and 1176/6, see *ante*, pp. 375–378, 388–394.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

(1) Have there been any changes in Soviet projected plans of operations in the Far East from those described to Mr. Harriman and General Deane in October?

(2) Will the Soviets require a Pacific supply route after Soviet-Japanese hostilities start?

(3) Will agreement be given for operation of U. S. air forces in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area?

(4) Will U. S. forces be required for defense of Kamchatka?

(5) Will the Soviets make pre-hostility preparations including construction, and reception and storage of U. S. stockpiles in Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia?

(6) Can the Kamchatka survey party depart from Fairbanks by 15 February 1945?

(7) Will the Soviets occupy southern Sakhalin and when? If so, will they cover passage of LaPerouse Strait?

(8) Are we assured that combined planning in Moscow will be vigorously pursued?

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J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the Joint Staff Planners*

TOP SECRET  
J. C. S. 1227/4  
(ARGONAUT)

(SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION)  
7 FEBRUARY 1945.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECTS FOR FIRST U. S.-U. S. S. R. STAFF MEETING

References: *a.* J. C. S. 1176 Series <sup>1</sup>

*b.* J. C. S. Memo for Information No. 360 <sup>2</sup>

MEMORANDUM BY THE JOINT STAFF PLANNERS

1. In the following paragraphs the Joint Staff Planners have set forth the various subjects and questions which it is considered should be brought up at the meeting and in so doing have used the phraseology which might be suitable for presenting each subject to the Red General Staff. Most of these have been presented previously in various papers and are repeated here for convenience of the Chiefs of Staff.

2. The President asked Marshal Stalin two questions, saying he would appreciate an early reply at this conference.<sup>3</sup> The first was:

<sup>1</sup> For J. C. S. 1176/1, 1176/2, and 1176/6, see *ante*, pp. 375-378, 388-394.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 594.

"Once war breaks out between Russia and Japan, is it essential to you that a supply line be kept open across the Pacific to Eastern Siberia?"

The second was:

"Will you assure us that United States air forces will be permitted to base in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk or some more suitable area providing developments show that these air forces can be operated and supplied without jeopardizing Russian operations?"

If the Red Army Staff gives an encouraging reply on basing the strategic air forces, suggest they be asked for agreement to entry of a U. S. survey party in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area at an early date, details to be worked out with the Mission.

3. On the assumption Russia can be ready to enter the war against Japan three months after the end of the German war as indicated by Marshal Stalin in October, how would the weather and season of the year affect the beginning operations in Eastern Siberia?

4. Do you estimate that you are liable to need any U. S. assistance in defending Kamchatka once war breaks out with Japan?

Do you consider you will be able to develop bases in Kamchatka, particularly air bases, before the outbreak of hostilities with Japan?

In connection with the foregoing, the United States Chiefs of Staff sent you a memorandum concerning the Kamchatka survey party. We consider it most important that this survey party get under way in the very near future. Will you give us your thoughts on our memorandum? (See Appendix "A" for copy of memorandum.)<sup>4</sup>

5. In connection with your plan of operations in Eastern Siberia, do you intend to take the southern half of Sakhalin?

If so, do you think you will be able to open the La Perouse Strait to shipping?

6. The United States Chiefs of Staff have sent you a memorandum (see Appendix "B")<sup>4</sup> in which we state our feeling as to the importance of combined planning in Moscow between your representatives and our planning group. We hope you will agree with our views and would like to hear any comments or suggestions you have.

7. In connection with our operations accurate information on weather is most important. This information will be equally necessary to your air forces as well as to ours operating over Japan. The United States Chiefs feel it important that they obtain weather information from more stations than are now being used in Eastern Siberia and request that you arrange this.

<sup>4</sup> The memorandum had been sent to the representatives of the Soviet General Staff on February 5, 1945. See *ante*, p. 594.

8. Providing the Red Staff elects to discuss MILEPOST requirements, it is suggested that the substance of J. C. S. Memo for Information No. 360 be given the Red General Staff verbally.

9. The Joint Staff Planners recommend that in the discussion of the above subjects, the United States Chiefs of Staff make clear to the Russians that:

*a.* Amphibious operations in the North Pacific in 1945 are remote.

*b.* If the Russians indicate a desire for a supply route across the North Pacific, the United States Chiefs indicate they expect facilities for basing U. S. strategic air forces in Eastern Siberia in connection with the opening of any such route.

#### Appendix "A"

#### MEMORANDUM FROM THE UNITED STATES CHIEFS OF STAFF TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF

In order that there be complete understanding on the arrangements for the entrance into Kamchatka of the United States Reconnaissance Party, the composition of which by name has already been furnished the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it is requested that the Soviet General Staff indicate agreement to the following:

*a.* the reconnaissance party will have access to any part of the area.

*b.* Transportation to, from, and within the area will be furnished by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

*c.* Full information and assistance will be furnished by local Soviet authorities.

*d.* Free and rapid communication between the party and U. S. military authorities will be permitted and arranged for by the Soviets.

It is further urged that arrangements be completed in time to permit the departure of this party from Fairbanks, Alaska, not later than 15 February 1945.

#### Appendix "B"

#### MEMORANDUM FROM THE UNITED STATES CHIEFS OF STAFF TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF

The United States Chiefs of Staff have noted with satisfaction the initiation of combined planning in Moscow. The work of this combined group is of the utmost importance to the planning and coordination of our operations for the defeat of Japan.

The United States Chiefs of Staff consider that special effort should be made on both sides to expedite this combined planning by a full, free and frank exchange of information, data and ideas between

members of the combined group. Preparation of combined studies and estimates for presentation to the respective Chiefs of Staff should be pushed forward without delay.

The United States Chiefs ask for your agreement to these views and for any comments or suggestions which you may care to make.

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ROOSEVELT-STALIN MEETING, FEBRUARY 8, 1945, 3:30 P. M.,  
LIVADIA PALACE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Mr. Harriman  
Mr. Bohlen

SOVIET UNION

Marshal Stalin  
Foreign Commissar Molotov  
Mr. Pavlov

Bohlen Collection

*Bohlen Minutes*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

*Air Bases in the Far East*

THE PRESIDENT said that with the fall of Manila the war in the Pacific was entering into a new phase and that we hoped to establish bases on the Bonins and on the islands near Formosa. He said the time had come to make plans for additional bombing of Japan. He hoped that it would not be necessary actually to invade the Japanese islands and would do so only if absolutely necessary. The Japanese had 4,000,000 men in their army and he hoped by intensive bombing to be able to destroy Japan and its army and thus save American lives.

MARSHAL STALIN said he did not object to the United States having bases at Komsomolsk or at Nikolaevsk. He said the first was on the lower reaches of the Amur River and the second at its mouth. He said that in regard to the bases on Kamchatka he thought we would have to leave that until a later stage since the presence of the Japanese Consul there made it difficult at this time to make the necessary arrangements. At any rate, he added, the other two bases in the Maritime Provinces were nearer.

MARSHAL STALIN added that there had been one phrase in regard to "commercial routes" in the President's letter<sup>2</sup> on the subject which had not been clear to him.

<sup>1</sup> The first two subjects here are separate memoranda, while the last four subjects are grouped in a third memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 594.

THE PRESIDENT said he had had in mind the importance of the supply routes across the Pacific and Eastern Siberia to the Soviet Union and he felt that once war broke out between Japan and the Soviet Union it would become very important but also very difficult to get by the Japanese Islands.

MARSHAL STALIN indicated that he recognized the importance of these supply routes and again repeated that he had no objection to the establishment of American bases in the Maritime provinces.

THE PRESIDENT handed the Marshal a paper<sup>3</sup> in which it was requested that the Soviet staff be instructed to enter into planning talks with the United States staff.

MARSHAL STALIN indicated that he would give the necessary instructions.

*Use of airfields and survey of bomb damage in Eastern and Southeastern Europe*<sup>4</sup>

THE PRESIDENT said he had two questions of a military nature relating to Europe which he wished to take up with the Marshal. He then handed to Marshal Stalin two papers in English which were translated into Russian.

The first was a request that the United States Air Force be allowed to use certain airfields in the vicinity of Budapest in order to carry out bombing operations against the Germans. The President said that at the present time the American bombers based in Italy had to make a long and hazardous flight over the Alps in order to reach Germany.

The second paper contained a request that a group of United States experts be permitted to make surveys of the effects of bombing in the areas liberated or occupied by the Red Army in Eastern and South Eastern Europe, similar to the surveys that had been made at Ploesti. The paper asked that this group be permitted to proceed at once since it was important to examine the damage while the evidence was still fresh and the people who had been there during the bombing still were on the spot.

MARSHAL STALIN said he could grant both these requests and would immediately give the necessary orders.

*Sale of Ships to the Soviet Union after the War*<sup>5</sup>

MARSHAL STALIN mentioned that Mr. Stettinius had told Mr. Molotov there was a possibility that the United States would have surplus shipping property after the war which might be sold to the Soviet Union.

<sup>3</sup> See *supra*, Appendix "B".

<sup>4</sup> Discussion of this subject began at 3:40 p. m.

<sup>5</sup> Discussion of this subject began at 3:45 p. m.



THE PRESIDENT said that this would require some changes in legislation which he hoped to work out so that surplus shipping after the war not needed by the United States and Great Britain could be transferred on credit without any interest. He said after the last war the mistake had been made of attempting to charge interest for the disposal of surplus property but it had not worked. His idea was to transfer the ships for a fixed sum on credit which would include the cost of the ship less the cost of depreciation, so that in twenty years the entire credit would be extinguished. He said that the British had never sold anything without commercial interest but that he had different ideas.

MARSHAL STALIN expressed gratification at the President's statement and said this shipping would greatly ease the task of the Soviet Union in the future.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he hoped the Soviet Union would interest itself in a large way in the shipping game.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he thought the President's idea was a very good one and also that Lend-Lease was a remarkable invention, without which victory would have been delayed. He said that in former wars some allies had subsidized others but this had offended the allies receiving the subsidies and had led to difficulties. Lend-Lease, however, produced no such resentment, and he repeated his opinion of the extraordinary contribution of Lend-Lease to the winning of the war.

THE PRESIDENT replied that four years ago, when having a rest on his small yacht, he had thought and thought of a way to help the Allies and at the same time avoid the difficulties inherent in loans, and had finally hit upon the scheme of Lend-Lease.

#### *Far East: Russian Desires*

Following the discussion of certain military questions involved in the Far East, MARSHAL STALIN said that he would like to discuss the political conditions under which the USSR would enter the war against Japan. He said he had already had a conversation on this subject with Ambassador Harriman.

THE PRESIDENT said he had received a report <sup>6</sup> of this conversation, and he felt that there would be no difficulty whatsoever in regard to the southern half of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands going to Russia at the end of the war. He said that in regard to a warm water port in the Far East for the Soviet Union, the Marshal recalled that they had discussed that point at Tehran. He added that he had then suggested that the Soviet Union be given the use of a warm water port at the end of the south Manchurian railroad, at possibly Dairen on

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, pp. 378-379.

the Kwantung peninsula. The President said he had not yet had an opportunity to discuss this matter with Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, so therefore he could not speak for the Chinese. He went on to say that there are two methods for the Russians to obtain the use of this port; (1) outright leasing from the Chinese; (2) making Dairen a free port under some form of international commission. He said he preferred the latter method because of the relation to the question of Hong Kong. The President said he hoped that the British would give back the sovereignty of Hong Kong to China and that it would then become an internationalized free port. He said he knew Mr. Churchill would have strong objections to this suggestion.

MARSHAL STALIN said there was another question and that involved the use by the Russians of the Manchurian railways. He said the Czars had use of the line running from Manchouli to Harbin and from there to Dairen and Port Arthur, as well as the line from Harbin running east to Nikolsk-Ussurisk connecting there with the Khabarovsk to Vladivostok line.

THE PRESIDENT said that again, although he had not talked with Marshal Chiang Kai-shek on the subject, there were again two methods of bringing this about: (1) to lease under direct Soviet operation; (2) under a commission composed of one Chinese and one Russian.

MARSHAL STALIN said that it is clear that if these conditions are not met it would be difficult for him and Molotov to explain to the Soviet people why Russia was entering the war against Japan. They understood clearly the war against Germany which had threatened the very existence of the Soviet Union, but they would not understand why Russia would enter a war against a country with which they had no great trouble. He said, however, if these political conditions were met, the people would understand the national interest involved and it would be very much easier to explain the decision to the Supreme Soviet.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he had not had an opportunity to talk to Marshal Chiang Kai-shek and he felt that one of the difficulties in speaking to the Chinese was that anything said to them was known to the whole world in twenty-four hours.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed and said he did not think it was necessary yet to speak to the Chinese and that he could guarantee the security of the Supreme Soviet. He added that it would be well to leave here with these conditions set forth in writing agreed to by the three powers.

THE PRESIDENT indicated that he thought that this could be done.

MARSHAL STALIN went on to say that in regard to the Chinese, T. V. Soong was expected to come to Moscow at the end of April, and he said that when it was possible to free a number of Soviet troops in the west and move twenty-five divisions to the Far East he thought

it would be possible to speak to Marshal Chiang Kai-shek about these matters.

MARSHAL STALIN said that in regard to the question of a warm water port the Russians would not be difficult and he would not object to an internationalized free port.

### *Trusteeships*

THE PRESIDENT then said he wished to discuss the question of trusteeships with Marshal Stalin. He said he had in mind for Korea a trusteeship composed of a Soviet, an American and a Chinese representative. He said the only experience we had had in this matter was in the Philippines where it had taken about fifty years for the people to be prepared for self-government. He felt that in the case of Korea the period might be from twenty to thirty years.

MARSHAL STALIN said the shorter the period the better, and he inquired whether any foreign troops would be stationed in Korea.

THE PRESIDENT replied in the negative, to which Marshal Stalin expressed approval.

THE PRESIDENT then said there was one question in regard to Korea which was delicate. He personally did not feel it was necessary to invite the British to participate in the trusteeship of Korea, but he felt that they might resent this.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that they would most certainly be offended. In fact, he said, the Prime Minister might "kill us". In his opinion he felt that the British should be invited.

THE PRESIDENT then said he also had in mind a trusteeship for Indochina. He added that the British did not approve of this idea as they wished to give it back to the French since they feared the implications of a trusteeship as it might affect Burma.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that the British had lost Burma once through reliance on Indochina, and it was not his opinion that Britain was a sure country to protect this area. He added that he thought Indochina was a very important area.

THE PRESIDENT said that the Indochinese were people of small stature, like the Javanese and Burmese, and were not warlike. He added that France had done nothing to improve the natives since she had the colony. He said that General de Gaulle had asked for ships to transport French forces to Indochina.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired where de Gaulle was going to get the troops.

THE PRESIDENT replied that de Gaulle said he was going to find the troops when the President could find the ships, but the President added that up to the present he had been unable to find the ships.

*Internal Conditions in China*

THE PRESIDENT said that for some time we had been trying to keep China alive.

MARSHAL STALIN expressed the opinion that China would remain alive. He added that they needed some new leaders around Chiang Kai-shek and although there were some good people in the Kuomintang he did not understand why they were not brought forward.

THE PRESIDENT said General Wedemeyer and the new Ambassador, General Hurley, were having much more success than their predecessors and had made more progress in bringing the communists in the north together with the Chungking government. He said the fault lay more with the Kuomintang and the Chungking Government than with the so-called communists.

MARSHAL STALIN said he did not understand why they did not get together since they should have a united front against the Japanese. He thought that for this purpose Chiang Kai-shek should assume leadership. He recalled in this connection that some years ago there had been a united front and he did not understand why it had not been maintained.

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**FIFTH PLENARY MEETING, FEBRUARY 8, 1945, 4 P. M., LIVADIA PALACE**
**PRESENT**

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Marshal Stalin
Secretary Stettinius		Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy	Foreign Secretary Eden	Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Hopkins	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Mr. Maisky
Mr. Byrnes	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Mr. Gusev
Mr. Harriman	Sir Edward Bridges	Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Matthews	Mr. Jebb	Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Hiss	Mr. Wilson	
Mr. Bohlen	Mr. Dixon	
	Major Birse	

Bohlen Collection

*Bohlen Minutes*

TOP SECRET

Subjects: World Security Organization  
 Poland  
 Periodic Meetings of Foreign Ministers  
 Yugoslavia and Greece

THE PRESIDENT opened the meeting by stating that he understood the Foreign Secretaries could report complete success and he wished

to congratulate them on their work and to ask Mr. Eden to report to the Conference.

MR. EDEN then read the report of that morning's meeting of the Foreign Secretaries:

"Report by Foreign Secretaries to Plenary Meeting of Conference on World Organization questions.

1. The Foreign Secretaries met on February 8th

(a) To consider the question of membership of [in] the World Organization of two (or three) of the Republics of the Soviet Union,

(b) To recommend what states should be invited to the proposed United Nations Conference, and

(c) To recommend the time and place at which that Conference should be held.

2. It was decided to make the following recommendations to the Plenary Meeting:

(a) The United Nations Conference on the proposed World Organization should be summoned for Wednesday, 25th April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America,

(b) The United Nations, as they existed on February . . . ,\* 1945, i. e. those who had at that date signed the United Nations Declaration, would be the only states invited to the Conference on World Organization. It will be for the Conference to determine the list of original members of the Organization. At that stage the Delegates of the U. K. and U. S. A. will support the proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics.<sup>1</sup>

3. The Foreign Ministers' meeting has established a sub-committee to examine further details in connection with the proposals for a World Organization and will report shortly to the Plenary Meeting."<sup>2</sup>

MR. EDEN concluded by saying that they were glad to accept the invitation of the United States Government to hold the meeting on April 25 in the United States. He added that he hoped that the next meeting of Foreign Ministers would, therefore, take place in London. Mr. Eden stated, in commenting on the report, that the British Delegation did not think it right for others to share the status of United Nations membership merely in order to participate in the Conference, but he understood that the United States Delegation had other views. He said a sub-committee was considering the details.

MARSHAL STALIN said that among the states which would be represented at the conference there were ten who had no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. He said that it was somewhat strange for the Soviet Government to attempt to build future world

\* N. B. The blank represents the date of the end of the Conference. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>1</sup> For a subsequent memorandum on the negotiation of this decision, see *post*, pp. 991-992. See also *post*, pp. 791-792.

<sup>2</sup> Copies of the text as read by Eden were found in the UNA Files and in the Hiss Collection.

security with states which did not desire to have diplomatic relations with it. He asked what could be done about this matter.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he knew that most of these states would like to have relations with the Soviet Union but had just not gotten around to doing anything about it. There were a few, however, where the reasons were different and where the influence of the Catholic Church was very strong. He said that he would like to point out, however, that the Soviet Union had sat down with these states at Bretton Woods and UNRRA conferences.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that this was correct but that at this conference they were to consider the vital question of the establishment of world security.

THE PRESIDENT then said that he would have to go back a bit into history. Three years ago the then Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, had told these few American Republics that it was not necessary to declare war on Germany but only to break diplomatic relations.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, there were five or six South American countries who felt that they had taken the advice of the United States Government and were, therefore, in good standing. It was a fact, he added, that these states had helped us a great deal in the war effort. He said, speaking frankly, this advice had been a mistake and that a month ago the Secretary of State had brought up with him this embarrassing question. As a result he had sent letters to the presidents of these six countries urging them to declare war against the common enemy. Ecuador had already done so and Peru's declaration could be expected at any time, and he hoped the others before long.

MARSHAL STALIN then inquired about Argentina.

THE PRESIDENT said that we are considering a conference of United Nations and Associated Nations who had helped in the war effort.

MARSHAL STALIN said he had no love for Argentina but he felt that there was a contradiction in logic. He inquired what was the criteria [*sic*] for admission of states and mentioned in this connection Turkey. He said he felt there were nations who had really waged war and had suffered, and there were others who had wavered and speculated on being on the winning side.

THE PRESIDENT replied that it was his idea that only those Associated Nations who had declared war should be invited and he suggested that the time limit should be the first of March.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed with this suggestion.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he recommended the President's suggestion that only those countries who had declared war would be

<sup>3</sup> The Hopkins note, *post*, p. 791, was apparently passed to the President at about this point.

invited. He said he sympathized with the point of view of Marshal Stalin and pointed out that many countries had played a poor part. He felt, however, there would be some advantage of having a whole new group of nations declare war on Germany for the effect on German morale.

THE PRESIDENT remarked that in addition to the South American countries there was, of course, Iceland, the newest of the United Nations Republics.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that in the case of Egypt, she had on two occasions wished to declare war but had been advised against it by the British Government, who had felt that it would be more useful and convenient to have Egypt a non-belligerent in order to protect Cairo from systematic bombings. He said that the Egyptian army had rendered good service to the cause. They had maintained good order, guarded bridges, etc. He felt that if Egypt now desired to declare war she should have the opportunity. He said Iceland had rendered valuable service at a time when the United States had not entered the war and had permitted the entry of British and United States troops, thus violating her neutrality in a marked manner, at the same time assuring a vital lane of communications to the British Isles.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that this did not apply to former enemy states who had recently declared war on Germany.

THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER heartily agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he certainly did not include Eire among the possible candidates, since they still maintained German and Japanese missions. He said he would refer to a new one that would not be greeted with universal approbation, namely Turkey. Turkey, however, had made an alliance with Great Britain at a very difficult time, but after the war had been in progress she had discovered she would not be up-to-date for modern war. Her attitude had been friendly and helpful, although she had not taken the chance provided them a year ago to enter the war.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that if Turkey declared war before the end of February he agreed to her being invited to the conference.

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed gratification with the Marshal's attitude.

THE PRESIDENT then said that there remained the question of Denmark, that they had been over-run by the enemy in one night and that the King had been virtually a prisoner and that only the Danish Minister in Washington, Mr. De Kauffman had voiced the sentiments which he knew all Danes felt and had repudiated the actions of his government.

MARSHAL STALIN observed that he thought Denmark should wait.

THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER agreed and the latter added that once she was liberated she would certainly have the right to join the organization.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked, however, that Denmark had let the Germans in.

MARSHAL STALIN then said he hoped that in the recommendations of the Foreign Ministers it would be possible to name the Soviet Republics, that is, the Ukrainian and White Russian Republics. This was accepted.

MR. MOLOTOV then asked would it not facilitate the admission of these two Soviet Republics as members of the assembly if they signed the United Nations Declaration before the first of March.

THE PRESIDENT reverting to the list of countries to be invited to the conference proposed that it be the United Nations, the Associated Nations and Turkey, provided the latter declared war before the first of March and signed the United Nations Declaration.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that it would not seem quite right to him to take in small countries who had done so little, simply by the expedient of their declaring war and to exclude the two Soviet Republics from the meeting. He said he had very much in mind the martyrdom and sufferings of the Ukraine and White Russia.

MARSHAL STALIN said he also thought it was illogical and stated that although the three Powers had agreed to recommend that the Ukraine and White Russia be members of the assembly, might not the fact that they had not signed the United Nations Declaration serve as an excuse for excluding them.

THE PRESIDENT and MR. STETTINIUS assured Marshal Stalin that this would not occur.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that he had preferred confining the conference to the United Nations but if others would be added he thought the Soviet Republics should also be added.

MARSHAL STALIN said "I don't want to embarrass the President, but if he will explain his difficulties we will see what can be done."

THE PRESIDENT then said that it was a technical question but an important one. Up to the present they had been discussing the question of invitations to separate states, that is, new countries to be added to the list but that now it was not a question of a new country but of giving one of the Great Powers three votes instead of one in the assembly and that he felt that was a matter which would be put before the conference and that we had all three agreed to support the Soviet request.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired would it not be all right if the Ukraine and White Russia signed the United Nations Declaration.



THE PRESIDENT replied that he did not think this would overcome the difficulty.

MARSHAL STALIN then said he withdrew his proposal.<sup>4</sup>

THE PRESIDENT expressed gratification at the Marshal's decision.

THE PRIME MINISTER then remarked that he had had time to study yesterday's report of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers and that he could give it his approval.

THE PRESIDENT then turned to the question of the proposals which he had sent to the British and the Soviet Delegations this morning in regard to Poland.<sup>5</sup> He said he had noticed they were very close to those of Mr. Molotov but would like to have his comments.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether the last point of the President's proposal in regard to the recognition of a Government of National Unity would mean that the London Government would then disappear.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that when we recognize the new government, we would of course withdraw our recognition of the London Government.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that when we recognized the new government, what would happen then to the property and resources of the London Government. Would they remain in the possession of Arciszewski?

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he thought that the withdrawal of recognition would take care of that and, [*sic.*]

THE PRESIDENT said that in his opinion the property would go to the new government.

There was then declared a short recess.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the British had put in a paper on Poland<sup>6</sup> but that he did not know whether it had been studied by the other Delegations. He said that with some slight amendments, if a decision in principle was reached he was prepared to accept the President's proposals which have been under discussion.

MR. MOLOTOV said he had some observations to make on the President's proposals. He said that their proposals made yesterday<sup>7</sup> had been based on certain realities existing in Poland. It was impossible to ignore the existence of the present Polish government and he said that the Soviet Government had felt that it would be useful to have discussions on the basis of enlarging that government with the addition of other democratic elements from within Poland and abroad. He said that the Lublin, or Warsaw, government stands at the head of the Polish people and enjoys great prestige and popu-

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *post*, pp. 990-992.

<sup>5</sup> *Post*, pp. 792-793.

<sup>6</sup> *Post*, pp. 869-870.

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, p. 716.

larity in the country. The Poles would never agree to any solution which would greatly change the Provisional Government. We might have some success if we start from the basis that the present Provisional Government should be enlarged. The people who now compose the Polish Provisional Government have been closely connected with the great events of the liberation of Poland, but Messrs. Mikolajczyk, Grabski and Witos have not been directly connected with these events. Therefore, if we wish to achieve a practical result it should be done on the basis of the enlargement of the present government, but how many and who they should be is the subject we should talk about. He said his observations apply not only to the question of a new government but also to the proposed presidential committee. It was a difficult question, admittedly, but it stemmed from the Polish people, and he said he had grave doubts as to whether it would be feasible. He said we might be creating additional difficulty through a presidential committee since there already existed a national council, *Kawaya Rada*, which of course could be enlarged. He was sure, however, that it was better to discuss the whole question on the basis of the existing situation. It must be borne in mind that both the National Council and Provisional Government are temporary, and he had noted in all three proposals one common point of view, namely the holding of free elections in Poland, but during the temporary period pending such elections it was extremely important to insure stable rule in Poland.

MR. MOLOTOV said in regard to the question of frontiers he was glad to note the complete agreement on the eastern boundary, namely the Curzon Line with slight modifications, but he also noted that on the western boundary there was no unanimity. He said that they knew that the Provisional Government stood for the western frontier as outlined in the Soviet proposals. He added that they will have to ask the Poles about this, but he was in no doubt that they would categorically support this frontier.

MR. MOLOTOV said with reference to negotiations in Moscow between himself, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr we are all agreed it would be desirable to have these three talk with the Poles. He said that in so far as he knew, the Provisional Government always sent three persons to speak for the Government—Bierut, Osobka-Morawski, and General Rola-Zymierski. As for the Poles from the other side, it seems to him that the President's proposals yesterday<sup>8</sup> seemed more acceptable. He said he did not exclude the possibility that some Poles from abroad could be involved, but he is not a bit sure about Mikolajczyk, especially after the autumn talks in Moscow. Yesterday the President had proposed five names. He thought it

<sup>8</sup> *Ante*, pp. 727-728.

would be a good idea to invite the three members of the Provisional Government mentioned above and two from the President's list of other Poles submitted yesterday.

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether Mr. Molotov meant that the presidential committee or an interim government should be avoided.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he thought it would be better to avoid the presidential committee and to enlarge the National Council and the Provisional Government.<sup>9</sup> He and Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald could discuss the question of how to enlarge the Council and Government with three representatives from the Polish Provisional Government and two persons from the President's list of other Poles. The results of these discussions could then be submitted to the three Governments. He concluded that he had only discussed the American proposals and had not touched on the Prime Minister's ideas.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that we were now at the crucial point of this great conference. He said we would be found wanting by the world should we separate recognizing different Polish governments. This would be accepted by the world as evidence of a breach between Great Britain and the United States on one hand and the Soviet Union on the other hand, with lamentable consequences in the future. It was stamping this conference with a seal of failure, and nothing else we did here would overcome it. He admitted, on the other hand, that we take different views of the same basic facts. According to the information of the British Government, the Lublin, or Warsaw, government does not commend itself to the overwhelming masses of the Polish people, and it is certainly not accepted abroad as representative of the people. If the British Government brushed aside the London government and went over to the Lublin government there would be an angry outcry in Great Britain. There was, in addition, the problem of the Poles outside Poland. He reminded the conference that on the Western and Italian fronts there was a Polish army of about 150,000 men who had fought steadily and very bravely for our cause. He did not believe that this army would be reconciled to the transfer of the British Government's support from the government with which it had dealt since the beginning of the war. It would be regarded as an act of betrayal of Poland. As Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov knew, he had no special feeling for the Polish government in London, which in his opinion had been foolish at every stage, but a formal act of transfer of recognition would cause the very greatest consequences. He pointed out that the group forming the new provisional government was only about one year old.

<sup>9</sup> For a facsimile of a note opposing merely enlarging the Lublin Government, which Stettinius passed to Roosevelt at this point, see Stettinius, p. 215.

THE PRIME MINISTER made it clear that, speaking only for Great Britain, it would be said that the British Government had given away completely on the frontiers, had accepted the Soviet view and had championed it. To break altogether with the lawful government of Poland which had been recognized during all these five years of war would be an act subject to the most severe criticism in England. It would be said that we did not know what was going on in Poland—that we could not even get anyone in there to find out what was going on and that we had accepted in toto the view of the Lublin government. Great Britain would be charged with forsaking the cause of Poland and he was bound to say that the debates in Parliament would be most painful and he might add most dangerous to Allied unity. He added that all the above was on the supposition that they might find it possible to agree to Mr. Molotov's proposal. He said if they were to give up the London government it must be evident that a new start had been made on both sides from equal terms. Before such transfer of recognition His Majesty's Government would have to be convinced that a new government, representative of the Polish people, had been created, pledged to an election on the basis of universal suffrage by secret ballot with the participation of all democratic parties and the right to put up their candidates. When such elections were held in Poland, he said Great Britain would salute the government which emerges without regard for the Polish government in London. He concluded with the statement that it is the interval before such elections that is difficult and alarming.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that perhaps the talks in Moscow might give some result, but it was very difficult to discuss the Polish question without participation with the Poles.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked it was frightfully important that agreement should be reached on the question and that we should part over a signed agreement.

THE PRESIDENT said we were all agreed on the necessity of free elections and that the only problem was how Poland was to be governed in the interval.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he had heard complaints from the Prime Minister that he had no information in regard to the situation in Poland. Mr. Churchill could get this information and he did not see why Great Britain and the United States could not send their own people into Poland. He said in regard to the popularity of the Provisional Government he could assure the conference that the people running the government were popular. The three leaders, Bierut, Osobka-Morawski and Rola-Zymierski had not fled from Poland but had stayed on in Warsaw and had come from the underground. It is necessary to bear in mind the psychology of people

under occupation—their sympathies are with those who stayed and not with those who left the country. Marshal Stalin said that he did not claim that the men in the Provisional Government were geniuses—indeed, it is possible that there are cleverer people in the Polish government in London—he did not know. Perhaps the feeling of the Polish people in this respect was somewhat primitive, but it exists. What puzzles the Polish people is that a great event—the liberation of their country by the Red Army has occurred. This changes the mentality of the people. For many years the Poles had hated the Russians and with reason, since three times the Czarist government had participated in the partitioning of Poland. With the advance of the Soviet troops the liberation of Poland had changed the attitude of the Polish people toward Russia and old resentments had disappeared and good will had taken their place. He said it was his impression that the driving out of the Germans by the Red Army had been received by the Poles in the light of a great national holiday. The people had been surprised that the Polish government in London had not had any part in this great holiday. They inquire, “We of the National Council and Provisional Government participated in this holiday, but where are the London Poles?” These two circumstances lay at the base of the great popularity of the members of the Provisional Government, although they may not be great men. He said he did not think we could ignore these facts nor fail to take into account the feelings of the people. Mr. Churchill worries that we will leave here without an agreement. What therefore can we do? We have different information—the best method, therefore, would be to summon the Poles from the different camps and to learn from them. It would, of course, be better if free elections could be held right off, but up to now the war has prevented this, but the day is drawing near, however, when such elections could take place and the people could express their view in regard to the Provisional Government. He said he saw little difference between the position of de Gaulle and that of the Polish Provisional Government. Neither had been elected, and he could not say which one enjoyed the greatest degree of popularity—yet we all had dealt with de Gaulle and the Soviet Government concluded a treaty with him. Why should we be so different with regard to the Polish government, and why could we not deal with an enlarged Polish government. He added that de Gaulle had done nothing to arouse popular enthusiasm, whereas the Polish government had carried out a number of land reforms that had been most popular. The situation is not so tragic as Mr. Churchill pictured it. He felt the situation could be settled if we concentrated on the essential points. He said it would be better to deal with the reconstruction of the Provisional Government rather than to attempt

to set up a new one. He said he felt Mr. Molotov was right, and rather than a presidential committee we might agree on increasing the Provisional Government.

THE PRESIDENT asked how long it would be, in the Marshal's opinion, before elections could be held in Poland.

MARSHAL STALIN replied it might be possible in a month provided no catastrophes occurred on the front and the Germans began to beat them.

THE PRIME MINISTER said of course they would welcome free elections but would not ask for anything that would hamper military operations.

THE PRESIDENT proposed that the matter be referred to the Foreign Ministers for study, and this was agreed to.

THE PRIME MINISTER said there was one small matter he wished to bring up before adjournment, and that was the periodic meeting of Foreign Ministers every three months.

THE PRESIDENT said he was in favor of this idea, but he knew that Mr. Stettinius was very busy with some of the Latin American countries and he felt it would be best to say they would meet when necessary and not fix any definite period for the meetings.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he hoped that the first of these meetings could be in London, to which the President and Marshal Stalin agreed.

MARSHAL STALIN then said he had one small matter which he would like to bring up. He would like to know what is holding back the formation of a unified government in Yugoslavia. He would also like to know what was going on in Greece. He said he had no intention of criticizing British policy there but he would merely like to know what was going on.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that Greece would take a great deal of time to explain and he would reserve it for the next meeting. He said in regard to Yugoslavia that the King had been persuaded, or even forced, to agree to a regency. Subasic was leaving soon, if he had not left already, for Yugoslavia to appoint the regents and form the government. The Prime Minister said that Mr. Eden tells him that there are two slight amendments, which he will take up with Mr. Molotov, to the agreement reached between Subasic and Tito. He added that he had always made it plain, both privately and publicly, that if the King would not agree to a regency he would be by-passed. He felt that in regard to the two amendments, if Marshal Stalin had said two words to Tito the matter would be settled.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that Tito is a proud man and he now was a popular head of a regime and might resent advice.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he felt that Marshal Stalin could risk this.

MARSHAL STALIN answered that he was not afraid.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that in regard to Greece he was hopeful peace would come on the basis of amnesties except for those who committed crimes against the laws of war. He doubted that a government of all the parties could be established since they hated each other so much.

MARSHAL STALIN said that the Greeks had not yet become used to discussion and therefore they were cutting each others' throats.

THE PRIME MINISTER concluded he would be glad to give information on Greece. He said that recently Sir Walter Citrine and five members of the trades unions had gone to Greece and they might have their report. He said that they had had rather a rough time in Greece and they were very much obliged to Marshal Stalin for not having taken too great an interest in Greek affairs.

MARSHAL STALIN repeated that he had no intention of criticizing British actions there or interfering in Greece, but merely would like to know what was going on.

The conference adjourned until four p. m. tomorrow.

Hiss Collection

*Hiss Notes* <sup>1</sup>

2/8 After the noon meeting of  
For Secs, Jebb, Gromyko & A H  
met as committee to discuss Un Ns  
Conference procedure. A. H. ex-  
plained State Dept views but said Pres.  
had not approved. After lunch before  
plenary session ERS cleared all with Pres.  
& A H told Gromyko & sent word to Jebb

{Tel. to Dept re}  
{ Assoc. Ns }

2/8  
Plenary  
4.30 p m

Pres called on Eden to report for For Mins

Ed: We met to consider etc. & read his report

re place Ed. repeated his statement of this morning that next meeting of For Mins be held in Lon & that seemed to meet with a measure of approval

Ed: Reason for saying those who are members now should be invited was to prevent nations from becoming Un Ns Just to be invited Understands Am. Del. has different view

St: I have the list of states which declared war on Ger I count this no. into official members of the Ass. Among these are 10 which

<sup>1</sup> From penciled notes in longhand. For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Bohlen minutes of this meeting.

have no dip. rels with S. U. We will together with them build up world security—

Pres: I think many of them will be glad to recog & est. dip. rels with S U. Haven't got round to it yet. In few is very strong Cath. Church influence At same time we recognize most of these who have not exch. dip. rels with Sov Un. have sat with Sov Un at Bretton Woods & other dip. conferences held.

St.: That's right but on other hand is very diff. build up world sec. with countries which don't recog. Sov Un

Pres: Easiest way to est. complete dip rels. is to invite them. That involves matter of history which should be explained. 3 yrs. ago Actg Sec State Welles told number of these states not nec. to declare on Ger. but should break all rels. So there are 5 or 6 of these which expect to be invited—& are in good standing Sec. of State has embarrassed me further by bringing this to my attention 1 month ago. As a result I sent a letter to the 6 pres. of these 6 reps explaining that if they wanted to be invited they should declare war on either Japan or Ger. Ecuador has declared war but hasn't had chance sign Un Ns decl. Paraguay will soon. Peru, Venezuela etc (not Chile, soon) Will be embarrassing if not invited. In meantime in past 4 yrs. all of these nations have helped us in waging war because large part of raw materials for munitions of war came from them.

Result is I'm in a somewhat diff. position

St: Not discussed today

Pres: We have phrase Associated Ns meaning nations which have broken rels but haven't declared war.

The list of nations which Mr Stett gave to Mr Molotov at lunch today

St. asked about Argentine

Pres: Not an assoc. nation

St: If "associates" come in that would include Argentina. Would include Turkey

Pres: My idea & it would save my life would be to invite those who ~~have~~ are on the list who have helped us on condition that they declare war.

St: Before or after they declare war

Pres: Before, put a time limit, say 1st of March

St: Agreed

Church: I am glad to say these nations would be required to declare war before they would be invited to the Conf. Of course I feel like Marshall St that some of them have played a poor part, waiting to see who would win. Now it's quite safe they would like to come in Will have depressing effect on Ger to realize another batch has come in.



Might also have effect on other hostile belligerents to see how whole world is turning ag. them

Pres: I should like to add one name to list for sake of clarity—newest rep. in world Iceland

Church: re Eg. HMG feel special resp. On 2 occasions were willing to declare war It was more convenient to us to have them stay formally neutral

Pres: In other words you're in same fix I'm in

Church Also I must say on behalf of Eg that when enemy was only 30 miles from capital Egyptian Army rendered service, guarded bridges, communs & generally was more helpful than if she had declared war & made Cairo subject to air bombardment .∴ Feel if Eg. now feels she wanted to declare war she should have the opportunity

Iceland also rendered very val. services. At a time when the U. S. had not herself had entered the war she admitted Brit & US troops, violated her neutrality in a marked fashion & guarded a life line across the Atlantic. I think those two have certainly a case provided they declare war

Is it intended any nation which declares war.

Pres: no, only the Assoc Ns

(Italy, Ireland—no)

Church: I shall mention a name which I think will cause universal satisfaction—Turkey T. made an alliance with us before the war at a very dangerous time. But when the war broke out, after it had been going on little while, T's found their army was not equipped with any of weapons that decide modern battles. But att. has been friendly although they would not take the opportunity which was offered to us yr. ago

St. says all right if by end of Feb. It will declare war

Ger. is not yet defeated war & war hardly will terminate by end of Feb.

Pres: One other case—curious case.

Den.<sup>2</sup> was invaded. Has been under Ger. domination since

Only one man claimed to represent Den. was the the Dan. Min. in Wash. He could not declare war but he disowned acts of his own govt

Would be with us 100% if they could

Church: Have they agreed to the independence of Iceland?

I do not think it is of very great importance. I think Mar & Pres are quite right in letting any one come to the party who declares war by end of month

<sup>2</sup> Denmark.

St & Denmark could wait

Pres Yes

Church: She would have a perfect right to come if she is able to speak

Pres Amend Un Ns & also those of assoc. powers & T. who declare war by Mar 1

Church All who declare war

Ed. Un Ns as they exist on the 1st of Mar.

Church:

Pres Ger. or Japan

Common enemy

Mol Would it not facilitate position of Sov. Reps if they would sign Decl. of Un Ns before 1st of Mar.

Pres I think its easier to take the list we've got. San Marino & Andorra might sign, nations like that

Church. What is the position

St: But T is not fighting

Pres: read list of Assoc. Ns & T only if they declare war

Mol: If Uk & Byelo-R sign decl before 1st of Mar.

Pres. That had been settled in this formula We are prepared to support them.

St. I propose to name the Reps. which would be invited: Uk & Byelo-R. To call them by name in this protocol and secondly I propose that they should sign the Decl of Un Ns before 1st of Mar. Change the protocol

Church Delay invitations to two states of Sov. Un till we are all met If so many new ones are to be brought in now be confusing

St: I have point out that's not quite logical. 3 great powers agree to seat White R & Uk But some might say they haven't signed

Church: Two R states should be treated same as other late arrivals

St. I wouldn't like to embarrass Pres. What is his difficulty. I might withdraw my proposal

Pres: Only technical. We have been discussing admitting other people. Uk & Wh R are not other people they are here already. We & UK will support it. We change SU from 1 vote to 3 right here. Why 3, why not 4, 5, 6?

St. Withdrew his request. But names of the two republics should be in the report

Poland

Matthews Files

*Matthews Minutes*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

The President asked Mr. Eden to read the report of the meeting of the foreign ministers for today. This was followed by a lengthy discussion with respect to the world organization. Notes on this part of the session are being written by Mr. Hiss.

PRESIDENT: Has Mr. Molotov had time to read the proposal I have made with regard to Poland?

STALIN: I have received it.

PRESIDENT: Just to make it clear let me read it. (President reads the proposal. Copy attached.)<sup>2</sup>

STALIN: Does this mean that you would withdraw recognition from the London government?

PRESIDENT: Yes.

PRIME MINISTER: (Explains that with the recognition of a new interim government recognition would be transferred from the London government to that regime.)

STALIN: What about the property of the London government?

PRESIDENT: That automatically would go to the new government.

PRIME MINISTER: I had prepared an alternate suggestion but since discussion has already begun on the President's proposal I would rather continue on that.

MOLOTOV: I should like to make a few remarks on the proposal of the President and the Prime Minister. Our proposal of yesterday came from a concrete foundation. We think it would be useful to have discussions on the Polish question on the basis of the present government being extended. We cannot ignore that fact—that the present government exists at Warsaw. It is now at the head of the Polish people and has great authority. It has been enthusiastically [received] by the Polish people. If we put forward a proposal to ignore this fact we might be placed in a position where the Poles themselves could not agree. If we start on the basis that the present government could be enlarged, the basis of probable success is more secure. Those now in the provisional government are closely connected with great national events taking place in Poland. This is not true of Mikolajczyk, Grabski, Romer and Witos. Those names are not linked with decisive events in Poland. If we wish to reach a practical end we must take as the basis that the present government be enlarged. How many and who should be taken in is the question to be discussed by us. There may be differences but in any event it depends

<sup>1</sup> For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Bohlen minutes of this meeting.

<sup>2</sup> Not attached, but see *post*, pp. 792-793.

upon the Poles now working in liberated Poland. The President proposes a new thought, namely agreement not only on the government but on a presidential commission. I have some doubts on that. I am afraid instead of one we will then have two difficult problems—that of the government and that of the presidential committee. This will increase our difficulties not decrease them. There is a national council, a representative body of Poland which could also be enlarged. We could discuss how this could be done. It would be better to talk on the basis of the existing situation and then how to improve it. Therefore, my conclusions are how to enlarge and by what basis the national council. The national council and government are temporary and provisional. All three proposals have one end in view, namely to secure as soon as possible free elections. That is the best way to build up stable rule in Poland which we all consider of fundamental importance. On the frontier question with regard to the east, we are in complete agreement. On the west there is no unanimous feeling. But I know that the Poles and the Polish government are definitely in favor of a frontier on the Neisse River. Of course we can ask them but I have not the slightest doubt of their desire. Also about holding negotiations in Moscow between myself, Harriman and Clark Kerr, I think there is full agreement.

The Poles usually select three people, Bierut, Osobka-Morawski and General Yelinski [*Rola-Żymierski?*]. Usually all three take part. Then there are those to be invited from the other side whom the President proposed yesterday. With some people the provisional government would not like to talk at all, for instance Mikolajczyk. Since his visit to Moscow relations have greatly deteriorated. The President proposed to invite two of the five mentioned. I agree that two of the five should be invited. If three of the provisional government, one I have mentioned and two of those mentioned in the President's letter be invited, negotiations could be started. That is my proposal.

PRESIDENT: I should like to keep the presidential committee and then there is the question of election.

MOLOTOV: It would be better to avoid the presidential committee and to enlarge the national council. I think the two ambassadors and I could discuss how to enlarge the council. Any proposals to be finally adopted by the committee of three would of course be submitted to the three governments. My remarks have been addressed to the American proposal since the Prime Minister agreed to this.

PRIME MINISTER: Of course we are at the crucial point of this great conference. This is the question for which the world is waiting. If we accept that each recognize separate governments this will be interpreted all over the world as a sign of cleavage between the Soviet

government on the one hand and the U. S. and British governments on the other. The consequences would be most lamentable in the world and would stamp the conference as a failure. On the other hand, I take a different view about the basic facts on some of them. According to our information, the present Lublin, now Warsaw, government does not commend itself to the vast majority of the Polish people. We feel that it is not accepted abroad as representative. If we were to brush away the London government and lend all our weight to the Lublin government there would be a world outcry. As far as we can see, the Poles outside Poland would make a united protest. We have an army of 150 thousand Poles who are fighting bravely. That army would not be reconciled to Lublin. It would regard our action in transferring recognition as a betrayal. As Molotov and the Marshal know, I do not agree with the London government's action. They have been very foolish. But the formal act of transfer of recognition to a new government would cause the very gravest criticism. It would be said that the British government had given away completely on the eastern frontier and had accepted the Soviet view. It would be said that we have broken altogether with the lawful government of Poland which we have recognized during the five years of war. It would be said that we have no knowledge of conditions in Poland. We cannot enter the country and must accept the statements of the Lublin government. Therefore, it would be charged in London that we are forsaking the cause of Poland. Debates would follow in Parliament which would be most painful and embarrassing to unity of the allies if we were to agree. The proposals of Mr. Molotov do not go nearly far enough. If we give up the Poles in London it should be for a new start on both sides, more or less on equal terms. Before His Majesty's Government could leave its present position on continuing recognition of the London Government we would have to be satisfied that the new government was fairly representative of the Polish nation. I agree that this can be only a view because we do not know the facts. Our doubts would be removed by elections with full secret ballot and free candidacies to be held in Poland. But it is the transfer before then which is causing so much anxiety to us. That is all I have to say.

**MOLOTOV:** Perhaps the discussions in Moscow will have a useful result. It is difficult to consider the Polish question without the presence of Poles.

**PRIME MINISTER:** It is frightfully important that this conference separate on a note of agreement. We must struggle precisely for that.

**PRESIDENT:** From another hemisphere I should like to say that we are agreed on free elections. The only problem is how to govern in the meantime for a relatively few months.

STALIN: The Prime Minister complains that he has no real information and no means to receive it.

PRIME MINISTER: Certain information but—

STALIN: It does not coincide with ours. I think Great Britain and the United States can have their own sources of information there whenever they like. What is the basis of the popularity of the provisional government? I can assure you that these people are really very popular. Bierut and Osobka-Morawski and General Rola-Zymierski—They are the people who did not leave Poland. They have come from the underground. We should bear in mind the peculiar mentality of those who live under occupation. The Polish people consider these three as those who stayed. It may be that Arcziczkeski has in his government clever people but they are not liked in Poland because during the time of stress they did not seek the underground. Perhaps this attitude is a little primitive but it must be taken into consideration. What troubles the Polish people? It is a great consolation that their country has been liberated by the Red Army. This has completely changed their psychology. The Poles for many years have not liked Russia because Russia took part in three partitions of Poland. But the advance of the Soviet Army and the liberation of Poland from Hitler has completely changed that. The old resentment has completely disappeared. Now there is good will toward Russia. It is natural that the Polish people are delighted to see the Germans flee their country and to feel themselves liberated. My impression is that the Polish people consider this a great historic holiday. The population is surprised, even astounded, that the people of the London government do not take any part in this liberation. Members of the provisional government they see there, but where are the London Poles? These two circumstances produce the fact that the members of the Warsaw government, though they may not be great men, enjoy great popularity. Cannot we take account of this fact? We cannot ignore it—the feelings of the Polish people. You are afraid also that we may separate before agreement. We have different information and have reached different conclusions. Perhaps to begin with we should call the Poles of the two different camps to hear them and learn from them. We are agreed to the fact that the Polish government must be democratically elected. It is much better to have a government based on free elections. But until now the war has prevented elections. The day for them is near but until then we must deal with the provisional government. It is like that of de Gaulle who is also not elected. Who is more popular, de Gaulle or Bierut? We have considered it possible to deal with de Gaulle and make treaties with him. Why not deal with an enlarged Polish provisional government? We cannot demand more of Poland

than of France. So far the French government has not carried out any reforms to create enthusiasm. The Polish government has carried out a great reform which gives it great popularity. If we approve this government without prejudice we can find a solution. We will not attach too much importance to secondary matters and concentrate on the primary ones. It is better to reconstruct than to create a new government. Molotov is right. We could not talk about a presidential committee without Poles. Perhaps they would agree. But as a result of their *amour propre* and feelings, the prestige of the provisional government is greatly increased. If we do not talk to them they would accuse us of being occupiers and not liberators.

PRESIDENT: How long before elections could be held?

STALIN: In about one month unless there is a catastrophe on the front and the Germans defeat us. (smiling) I do not think this will happen.

PRIME MINISTER: Free elections would of course settle the worries of the British government at least. That would supersede at a stroke all questions of legality. Of course, we must not ask anything that would impair military operations. But if it is possible to learn the opinion of the population in Poland in one or even two months no one could object.

PRESIDENT: That is why it is worth pursuing the subject. I move that we adjourn our talks until tomorrow. I suggest that meanwhile the matter be referred to the three foreign secretaries. They are very effective.

MOLOTOV: The other two will outvote me. (laughing)

PRIME MINISTER: I have one bit of business before we separate. It would be a great advantage if we could set up permanent measures for consultation of the foreign secretaries. I think they should meet every three or four months to clear up difficulties between us.

PRESIDENT: I think the idea is O. K. but my foreign secretary has all South America to take care of too. I think we should make it as often as necessary rather than a specific period.

PRIME MINISTER: I should also like to suggest that the first meeting be held in London. (This was agreed to)

STALIN: I have two small questions to raise. First the fact that the formation of the new united government in Yugoslavia has been delayed. I should like to know why. Also there are all sorts of rumors with regard to Greece. I have no criticism to make but I should like to know what is going on.

PRIME MINISTER: It would take too long to talk about Greece now. I could talk about it for hours. As for Yugoslavia the King has been persuaded, indeed forced, to sign agreement with regard to the regency. Subasic and the other members of the government leave for

Belgrade any day now. They are merely held up by weather delays. My policy has never varied as I have stated in the House. If the King makes trouble we must take care of it. But he has signed I understand the regency act and Subasic is going out to Belgrade immediately. I am hopeful that peace will come on the basis of amnesty but they hate each other so much that they cannot keep their hands off each other in Yugoslavia.

STALIN: (Smiling) They are not yet accustomed to discussions. Instead they cut each others throats. I notice that Tito also seems to be very popular in the country.

PRIME MINISTER: I invited Sir Walter Citrine to go out with five trade unionists but I have not yet seen their report. I believe that he had a rather rough time. I thank the Marshal for his help.

STALIN: On Greece I only wanted to know for information. We have no intention of intervening there in any way.

The meeting adjourned.

Hopkins Papers

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President*

[YALTA, February 8, 1945.]<sup>1</sup>

MR. PRESIDENT:—The Joint Chiefs of Staff told Welles<sup>2</sup> that it would be difficult for us to defend their coasts against Japan. That is Welles excuse.

HARRY

<sup>1</sup> This note is undated but is assumed to have been passed to the President at the plenary session on February 8 in connection with the President's reference to Welles and the reasons why certain South American states had not declared war. See *ante*, p. 773.

<sup>2</sup> The Department of Defense states that there is no evidence in the files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to substantiate this statement.

Hiss Collection

*United States Delegation Memorandum on the Foreign Ministers' Report to the Fifth Plenary Meeting*<sup>1</sup>

The report by the Foreign Secretaries was accepted, subject to paragraph 2 (b) being amended to read as follows—"The United Nations as they exist on the 8th February, 1945, and such of the Associated Nations\* as have declared war on the common enemy by

<sup>1</sup> This is a ribbon copy, undated and uncaptioned. Authorship not indicated. On August 13, 1954, Matthews wrote that he thought the memorandum had been drafted by Hiss (640.0029/8-1354).

\* The term "Associated Nation" in this connection means the eight Associated Nations and Turkey which shall be regarded as an Associated Nation for the purpose. [Footnote in the original.]



1st March, 1945, would be the only States invited to the conference on World Organization. At that stage the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support the proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i. e. the Ukraine and White Russia."

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Hiss Collection

*United States Proposal on Poland, February 8, 1945*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

The proposals submitted by Mr. Molotov in regard to the Polish question in reply to the President's letter to Marshal Stalin dated February 6, 1945, have been given careful study.

In regard to the frontier question, no objection is perceived to point One of the Soviet proposals, namely, that the eastern boundary of Poland should be the Curzon line with modifications in favor of Poland in some areas of from five to eight kilometers.

In regard to point Two, while agreeing that compensation should be given to Poland at the expense of Germany, including that portion of East Prussia south of the Koenigsberg line, Upper Silesia, and up to the line of the Oder, there would appear to be little justification to the extension of the western boundary of Poland up to the Western Neisse River.

In regard to the proposals of the Soviet Government concerning the future Government of Poland, it is proposed that Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr be authorized on behalf of the three Governments to invite to Moscow Mr. Bierut, Mr. Osobka-Morawski, Bishop Sapieha, Mr. Vicente Witos, Mr. Mikolajczyk and Mr. Grabski to form a Polish Government of National Unity along the following lines:

1. There will be formed a Presidential Committee of three, possibly consisting of Mr. Bierut, Mr. Grabski and Bishop Sapieha, to represent the Presidential office of the Polish Republic.

2. This Presidential Committee will undertake the formation of a government consisting of representative leaders from the present Polish provisional government in Warsaw; from other democratic

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<sup>1</sup> Carbon copy, endorsed "2/8 Presented by President." See *ante*, p. 776. The copy of this paper in the Bohlen Collection has the entire text in quotation marks under the following heading: "Counter proposal circulated by the United States Delegation to the Soviet and British Delegations of February 8, 1945." The copies in the Matthews Files and the UNA Files carry no heading or quotation marks.

The Hiss Collection contains at this point, along with the other documents herein cited to that Collection for February 8, the carbon copy of the undated paper entitled "Concrete Proposals on the Polish Question" which is printed under Malta Conference, *ante*, pp. 510-511.

elements inside Poland, and from Polish democratic leaders abroad.

3. This interim government, when formed, will pledge itself to the holding of free elections in Poland as soon as conditions permit for a constituent assembly to establish a new Polish constitution under which a permanent Government would be elected.

4. When a Polish Government of National Unity is formed, the three Governments will then proceed to accord it recognition as the Provisional Government of Poland.

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Hiss Collection

*United States Delegation Memorandum* <sup>1</sup>

[YALTA,] February 8, 1945.

POINTS TO TAKE UP WITH THE PRESIDENT

1. *Location of Conference.*

(See attached papers) <sup>2</sup>

2. *Consultation of France before Invitations are Issued.*

(a) France is listed in the proposals as one of the five permanent members "in due course."

At Dumbarton Oaks, "in due course" was understood to mean recognition—which has now occurred.

(b) We need France's influence among the smaller powers in "selling" the Organization.

(c) To save time, the United States can consult France on behalf of Britain and Russia.

3. *Consultation of China before Invitations are Issued.*

(a) China is a full fledged Dumbarton Oaks participant and must be one of the sponsoring powers.

(b) We can consult China on behalf of Britain and Russia.

4. *Mr. Stimson is Opposed to Territorial Trusteeships.*

(a) Joint Chiefs have agreed to setting up the machinery of Territorial Trusteeships—without discussion of specific territories.

(b) United States public opinion has criticized Dumbarton Oaks for leaving out Territorial Trusteeships.

(c) New organization can't supersede League of Nations without disposing of Mandates System.

(d) Chinese, Russians, Latin Americans all want Territorial Trusteeships.

The British will agree.

We can't be the one objecting power.

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<sup>1</sup> Carbon copy; authorship not indicated. This was prepared presumably by Hiss for Stettinius.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

Hiss Collection

*United States Delegation Memorandum*<sup>1</sup>

[YALTA,] February 8, 1945.

ITEMS STILL REMAINING OPEN BEFORE CONFERENCE CAN BE CALLED

1. *Status of France.*

At Malta the British and we agreed that France should be a fifth sponsoring power and should be included along with China as one of the powers on whose behalf invitations will be issued.

2. *Nature of Consultation with France and China.*

At Malta we and the British agreed that the United States should consult France and China on behalf of Britain and Russia.

Mr. Grew is all prepared to initiate this consultation promptly in Washington as soon as he gets a flash.

3. *Form of Invitation.*

The invitations could most conveniently be issued by the United States on behalf of itself and the other four sponsoring powers. (We have a draft invitation.)

4. *International Trusteeships.*

We should get agreement that the subjects of international trusteeships and dependent areas will be discussed at the United Nations Conference, and that provisions on these subject will be incorporated in the Charter of the United Nations.

(We should arrange for prompt interchange of papers on these subjects after the Crimean Conference in order to try to get agreed proposals drafted before the United Nations Conference.)

5. *Communiqué of the Crimean Conference on Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.*

We have a drafted communiqué. (Wilder Foote is preparing an alternative draft for your consideration.)

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<sup>1</sup> Ribbon copy; authorship not indicated. This memorandum was prepared presumably for Stettinius. On August 13, 1954, Matthews wrote that he thought it had been drafted by Hiss (640.029/8-1354).

Defense Files : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Grew)*

TOP SECRET

[YALTA,] 8 February 1945.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ARGONAUT 92. Crypto-War for Acting Secretary of State only from Secretary Stettinius. Topsec.

1. For your urgent information only the five Latin American associated nations which have not yet declared war should be urged

Note by the Secretary of State Regarding the Composition of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference at San Francisco<sup>1</sup>

6 copies 2/8/45

(Byrnes consulted & concurs) - 44 Feb

Delegation approved - by FDR

Hull - Dem. at large  
Senior Adv.

ES - Chairman - How desired

Senate Council -  
Vanderberg

Howe Bloom  
Eaton

Stassen - Rep. at large  
(to get out Navy temporarily)

Lash of Ohio - alternate for Hull

Schildershue OK if check on Foreign  
owned is satisfactory -

No labor. No farmers - use them  
as advisors -

<sup>1</sup> The original, which is in pencil, is apparently in the handwriting of Stettinius. With regard to the words "Lash of Ohio" in this paper, Byrnes wrote on July 27, 1955: "I recall that President Roosevelt discussed with me the list of delegates for the San Francisco Conference. We discussed Governor Lausche, of Ohio. Therefore, I assume the 'Lash of Ohio' mentioned in Stettinius' memorandum has reference to Governor Lausche." (310.1/7-2755.)



to do so and adhere to the United Nations<sup>1</sup> declaration with the greatest promptness. It is absolutely essential that this be accomplished by the end of this month if their action is to be effective in their interests. Please limit knowledge of the existence of this message to yourself, Dunn, Rockefeller, Pasvolsky and Raynor.

2. I rely upon you to renew the Department's recommendations to these countries without disclosing the cause for such renewal.

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TRIPARTITE DINNER MEETING, FEBRUARY 8, 1945, 9 P. M.,  
YUSUPOV PALACE<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Secretary Stettinius  
Fleet Admiral Leahy  
Mr. Byrnes  
Mr. Harriman  
Mr. Flynn  
Mrs. Boettiger  
Miss Harriman  
Mr. Bohlen

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Foreign Secretary Eden  
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr  
Sir Alexander Cadogan  
Field Marshal Brooke  
Marshal of the Royal  
Air Force Portal  
Admiral of the Fleet  
Cunningham  
General Ismay  
Field Marshal Alexander  
Mrs. Oliver

SOVIET UNION

Marshal Stalin  
Foreign Commissar Mol-  
otov  
Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov  
General of the Army  
Antonov  
Mr. Vyshinsky  
Mr. Beriya  
Mr. Maisky  
Marshal of Aviation  
Khudyakov  
Mr. Gusev  
Mr. Gromyko  
Mr. Pavlov

Bohlen Collection

*Bohlen Minutes*

TOP SECRET

Subject: General Conversation.

The atmosphere of the dinner was most cordial, and forty-five toasts in all were drunk. Marshal Stalin was in an excellent humor and even in high spirits. Most of the toasts were routine—to the armed forces of the representative countries and the military leaders and the continuing friendship of the three great powers.

MARSHAL STALIN proposed a toast to the health of the Prime Minister, who he characterized as the bravest governmental figure in the world. He said that due in large measure to Mr. Churchill's courage and staunchness, England, when she stood alone, had divided the might of Hitlerite Germany at a time when the rest of Europe was falling flat on its face before Hitler. He said that Great Britain, under Mr. Churchill's leadership, had carried on the fight alone irrespective of existing or potential allies. The Marshal concluded

<sup>1</sup> Marshal Stalin acted as host.

that he knew of few examples in history where the courage of one man had been so important to the future history of the world. He drank a toast to Mr. Churchill, his fighting friend and a brave man.

THE PRIME MINISTER, in his reply, toasted Marshal Stalin as the mighty leader of a mighty country, which had taken the full shock of the German war machine, had broken its back and had driven the tyrants from her soil. He said he knew that in peace no less than in war Marshal Stalin would continue to lead his people from success to success.

MARSHAL STALIN then proposed the health of the President of the United States. He said that he and Mr. Churchill in their respective countries had had relatively simple decisions. They had been fighting for their very existence against Hitlerite Germany but there was a third man whose country had not been seriously threatened with invasion, but who had had perhaps a broader conception of national interest and even though his country was not directly imperilled had been the chief forger of the instruments which had lead to the mobilization of the world against Hitler. He mentioned in this connection Lend-Lease as one of the President's most remarkable and vital achievements in the formation of the Anti-Hitler combination and in keeping the Allies in the field against Hitler.

THE PRESIDENT, in reply to this toast, said he felt the atmosphere at this dinner was as that of a family, and it was in those words that he liked to characterize the relations that existed between our three countries. He said that great changes had occurred in the world during the last three years, and even greater changes were to come. He said that each of the leaders represented here were working in their own way for the interests of their people. He said that fifty years ago there were vast areas of the world where people had little opportunity and no hope, but much had been accomplished, although there were still great areas where people had little opportunity and little hope, and their objectives here were to give to every man, woman and child on this earth the possibility of security and wellbeing.

In a subsequent toast to the alliance between the three great powers, MARSHAL STALIN remarked that it was not so difficult to keep unity in time of war since there was a joint aim to defeat the common enemy which was clear to everyone. He said the difficult task came after the war when diverse interests tended to divide the allies. He said he was confident that the present alliance would meet this test also and that it was our duty to see that it would, and that our relations in peacetime should be as strong as they had been in war.

THE PRIME MINISTER then said he felt we were all standing on the crest of a hill with the glories of future possibilities stretching before us. He said that in the modern world the function of leadership was

to lead the people out from the forests into the broad sunlit plains of peace and happiness. He felt this prize was nearer our grasp than anytime before in history and it would be a tragedy for which history would never forgive us if we let this prize slip from our grasp through inertia or carelessness.

JUSTICE BYRNES proposed a toast to the common man all over the world. He said there had been many toasts to leaders and officials and while we all shared these sentiments we should never forget the common man or woman who lives on this earth.

MISS HARRIMAN, replying for the three ladies present, then proposed a toast to those who had worked so hard in the Crimea for our comfort, and having seen the destruction wrought by the Germans here she had fully realized what had been accomplished.

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FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1945

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, FEBRUARY 9,  
1945, 11 A. M., LIVADIA PALACE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Fleet Admiral Leahy  
General of the Army Marshall  
Fleet Admiral King  
Major General Kuter  
Lieutenant General Somervell  
Vice Admiral Cooke  
Rear Admiral McCormick  
Major General Hull  
Major General Deane  
Captain McDill  
Commander Clark

UNITED KINGDOM

Field Marshal Brooke  
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal  
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham  
Field Marshal Wilson  
General Ismay  
Admiral Somerville

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General McFarland  
Captain Graves

Major General Jacob  
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones  
Commander Coleridge  
Colonel Capel-Dunn

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

1. APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE 187TH MEETING OF C. C. S.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the C. C. S. 187th Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.

<sup>1</sup> C. C. S. 188th Meeting.



## 2. DRAFT FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER (C. C. S. 776/2)<sup>2</sup>

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF considered those paragraphs of the draft final report which had been added since they had approved C. C. S. 776/1.

SIR ALAN BROOKE drew attention to the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, contained in Appendix "A" of C. C. S. 776/2. He pointed out that in paragraph 4 *c.* of the directive it was stated that, "The nomination of ground formations to be withdrawn and the arrangements for their transfer will form the subject of a separate instruction." In order to avoid any possible delay in the movement of these forces he suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should send an instruction to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean repeated to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force in the following sense:

"Reference paragraph 4 *c.* of the directive issued to you . . .<sup>3</sup> The move of two Canadian and three British divisions should proceed under plans to be agreed between yourself and SCAEF, without awaiting any further instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff."

GENERAL MARSHALL said that this proposal was acceptable.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

*a.* Approved the text of the report to the President and Prime Minister on the ARGONAUT Conference (C. C. S. 776/2).

*b.* Approved the dispatch of the . . . [instruction] proposed by Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke. . . .

## 3. LIAISON WITH THE SOVIET HIGH COMMAND WITH REGARD TO STRATEGIC BOMBING IN EASTERN GERMANY (C. C. S. 778, C. C. S. 186th Mtg., Item 7, Two Tripartite Military Meetings)<sup>4</sup>

SIR CHARLES PORTAL referred to the discussions which had been taking place between himself and General Kuter and Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov. At the meeting a draft agreement<sup>5</sup> had been drawn up and agreed and submitted to the three High Commands. It was acceptable to the British and, he understood, to the United States Chiefs of Staff. However, on the previous evening identical letters had been received by General Kuter and himself from Marshal Khudyakov setting out a considerably revised draft agreement.<sup>5</sup> This was unacceptable to himself and to General Kuter.

<sup>2</sup> Following acceptance of this paper by the President and the Prime Minister at their meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff later on February 9, 1945, the report was re-circulated as C. C. S. 776/3, which is printed *post*, pp. 827-833.

<sup>3</sup> The directive embodied in Appendix "A" of the final C. C. S. report (see *post*, pp. 832-833).

<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, pp. 637, 640-641.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

GENERAL KUTER said he had redrafted the Russian proposals in such a way as to make them acceptable to the U. S. and British; he proposed putting this new draft<sup>6</sup> to the Russians. If this were not acceptable to the Russians, it would probably be wisest to inform them that we planned to continue with the previous arrangements.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained the main difference between the Russian proposals and the draft which had been agreed at the meeting of the Heads of Air Staffs. In the original draft the Allied air forces could bomb a target to the east of the line, provided 24 hours' notice was given to the Soviet High Command and no objection was raised. In the Russian proposal, however, it was necessary to obtain agreement for any Allied bombing east of the line 24 hours before the attack was to take place. It had been his understanding in conversations with Marshal Khudyakov, that the Russian Staff was more interested in preventing incidents between Allied and Soviet aircraft than they were in protecting their ground forces.

GENERAL KUTER pointed out that there was one further important change in the Russian proposals. The Soviet Staff had now proposed that a rigid line should exist which would be moved from time to time by the Soviet Staff whereas in the original agreement the bomb-line was to move forward automatically at a given distance from the Russian front line. An example of the difficulties which would arise under Marshal Khudyakov's proposals had recently occurred. Marshal Tito had asked that the town of Brod be bombed on a certain day and a request for permission to do so had been made by General Deane in Moscow. General Deane had written letters to the Staff on this subject four consecutive days without receiving any reply and in fact no answer had yet been received. In his view the present Russian proposal was an entirely unworkable procedure.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then discussed the best method of handling further action with regard to the Russian proposals.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal and General Kuter should each reply separately to Marshal of the Soviet Air Force Khudyakov, making it clear that the revised agreement proposed by the Soviet High Command differed substantially from that which it was thought had been agreed between the Heads of the three Air Forces on 6 February; that these differences made acceptance of the revised agreement impracticable; and that the British/United States High Command therefore intended to continue with the arrangements in force prior to the Crimean Conference.

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<sup>6</sup> Not printed.

## 4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

ADMIRAL LEAHY said he would like to express on behalf of the United States Chiefs of Staff their appreciation for the cooperation and assistance received from the British Chiefs of Staff during the present conference. He felt that progress had been made on the general plans of the war as a whole, and that much had been accomplished.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he would like to reciprocate on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff the feelings expressed by Admiral Leahy. He was convinced that great progress had been made during the present conference.

MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, FEBRUARY 9, 1945, NOON,  
LIVADIA PALACE

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
Secretary Stettinius	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Harriman	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Matthews	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Mr. Maisky
Mr. Hiss	Mr. Jebb	Mr. Gusev
Mr. Bohlen	Mr. Dixon	Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Page	Major Theakstone	Mr. Pavlov

Bohlen Collection

*Page Minutes*

TOP SECRET

- Subject: 1. Points Still Before the Foreign Ministers.
- (a) Dumbarton Oaks matters.
  - (b) Report by Sub-Committee on Form of Invitations and other Details of Arrangements for United Nations Conference.
  - (c) Reparations.
  - (d) Poland.
  - (e) Iran.
  - (f) Questions Relating to the Yugoslav Frontiers.
2. The Polish Question.
  3. Reparations.
  4. Dumbarton Oaks.
  5. Iran.
  6. Yugoslavia.

### 1. *Points still before the Foreign Secretaries.*

MR. STETTINIUS, who presided, stated that he thought it might be helpful to have a general review of the unfinished items. He stated these were as follows: <sup>1</sup>

(a) *The Report of the February 8 Meeting on Dumbarton Oaks Matters.*  
This report was modified in principle by general agreement at yesterday's plenary session.

(b) *Report by the Sub-Committee on the Form of Invitations and Other Details of Arrangements for the United Nations Conference.*

(c) *Reparations.*

The American Delegation desired to submit a paper on this matter today.<sup>2</sup>

(d) *Poland.*

The plenary session yesterday referred the Polish question to the Foreign Secretaries.

(e) *Iran.*

(f) *Questions Relating to the Yugoslav Frontiers.*

After a brief discussion it was decided to touch upon the Polish question first.

### 2. *The Polish Question.*

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he would like briefly to comment upon one important point which had not been previously raised. There had been quite a struggle in the United States on American participation in the World Organization. From the standpoint of psychology and public opinion the Polish situation was of great importance at this time to the United States. He hoped with all his heart that the Polish question could be settled before the Crimean Conference broke up.

MR. STETTINIUS then read the following statement: <sup>3</sup>

"After further consideration I agree with Mr. Molotov's statement that the question of the creation of a Presidential Committee should be dropped and am therefore prepared to withdraw our suggestion on that point.

"I believe that, with this change, our three positions are not far apart on the substance of the governmental question. Mr. Molotov spoke of the reorganization of the Polish Government. The British formula suggests the establishment of a fully representative 'Provisional Polish Government' and we speak of the formation of a 'Government of National Unity.' All three agree that only the Poles themselves can definitely decide this. All three agree that this government should be composed of members of the present Polish Provisional Government and in addition representatives of other democratic elements inside Poland and some Polish democratic leaders from abroad.

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<sup>1</sup> The memorandum from which Stettinius spoke at this point is printed *post*, pp. 814-815.

<sup>2</sup> See *post*, pp. 808, 816.

<sup>3</sup> *Post*, pp. 815-816.

"The following formula might therefore be considered:

"That the present Polish Provisional Government be reorganized into a fully representative government based on all democratic forces in Poland and including democratic leaders from Poland abroad, to be termed 'The Provisional Government of National Unity'; Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr to be authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This 'Government of National Unity' would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic parties would have the right to participate and to put forward candidates.

"When a 'Provisional Government of National Unity' is satisfactorily formed, the three Governments will then proceed to accord it recognition. The Ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw following such recognition would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections."

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he would like to obtain a copy of the text of the statement in the Russian language, as he did not feel prepared to reply to the oral statement.

MR. EDEN said that he had some preliminary remarks on Mr. Stettinius' proposal. He must tell his colleagues frankly of his difficulties in this matter. Many people thought that the Poles had been harshly treated by the British readiness to acquiesce in a frontier on the Curzon Line. He himself had been troubled for some time because, quite apart from the merits of the case, it might become a cause of difficulty between the Soviet Government and the British.

As regards the Lublin Provisional Government, it was possible that he might be quite wrong but he thought it was a fact that hardly anyone in Great Britain believed that the Lublin Government was representative of Poland. He should have thought that that view was widely held in the rest of Europe and in the United States of America. It was for that reason that the document<sup>4</sup> which he had put forward the previous day had avoided all mention of adding to the Lublin Government and had stressed that a new start was necessary.

If agreement were reached here, this would involve a transfer of recognition from the London Government to the new Government. The British Government should have to abandon recognition of the London Government and such abandonment would be much easier for it if it were not made in favor of the existing Lublin Government but in favor of a new Government.

The British Government had considerable Polish forces fighting with it—about 150,000 at present—and these forces would increase as

<sup>4</sup> *Post*, pp. 869-870.

more Poles were liberated or escaped from Switzerland. It naturally desired very much to carry them along in any settlement. The task would be easier if a fresh start were made.

He had one other comment which concerned a personality. It had been said that there was considerable opposition to Mr. Mikolajczyk in the Lublin Government. He was not convinced of that. But in any case the presence of Mikolajczyk in a Polish Government would do more than anything else to add to the authority of that Government, and to convince the British people of its representative character.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that while the American document was being translated he wished to make some comments. Although he could not, of course, go farther than what Marshal Stalin had said yesterday, he recalled that the President had stated that the Polish situation was temporary and could not last for a long time. In the Russian opinion the most important question was the holding as soon as practical of general elections in Poland. These elections would give a basis for a permanent Government and do away with all the difficulties that were facing the Allies at the present time. Marshal Stalin had referred to the provisional period as lasting perhaps one month, whereas the Prime Minister had mentioned two. In any event, it would be a short interval. However, at the present time it was not only a question of Poland but also the rear of the Red Army. Even for a short period, it was essential to the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom to take this military situation into consideration. If there were any obstacles in the rear of the Red Army an impossible situation would arise. That was why Mr. Molotov had suggested yesterday that the reorganization of the Polish Government should be on the basis of the present Lublin Government with democratic elements from within and without the country added to it.

With respect to Mikolajczyk, MR. MOLOTOV stated that it might be a mistake to say that he was unacceptable. The Poles themselves must decide this. Conversations must be held with the Poles in and out of Poland. Perhaps the Mikolajczyk question was not as acute as it appeared. However, it could not be cleared up in the Crimea without consulting the Poles. Furthermore, reorganization of the Polish Government could not be undertaken without speaking to the Poles. The Moscow Commission made up of the British and American Ambassadors and Mr. Molotov would have serious tasks to perform. They should discuss the entire question with the Poles and make clear to them the basis reached in the Crimea on the Polish question.

MR. EDEN said he entirely agreed with Mr. Molotov in respect to his remarks on the importance of the Polish elections. However, he

felt sure that British opinion would agree that if the elections were controlled by the Lublin Government they would not be free elections or represent the will of the Polish people.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he supported Mr. Eden's views in full in this respect.

After a brief interruption, MR. MOLOTOV, on reading a translation of the American proposal, stated that he would be unable to give a final answer to the new American considerations until he had consulted Marshal Stalin. He hoped to be able to do this by four o'clock. However, at the present time, he would like to make a few preliminary comments.

Firstly, it would be inadvisable to place too much emphasis on the formula of the question of the Polish Government before consulting the Poles themselves. He still believed that the new Polish Government should be created on the basis of the Lublin Government. If the three Foreign Ministers agreed to this in principle, it would not be difficult to find a formula.

Secondly, it might be better to leave out reference to the Allied Ambassadors in Warsaw since this reference would undoubtedly be offensive to the Poles as it would indicate that they, the Poles, were under the control of foreign diplomatic representatives. The Ambassadors would, of course, see and report as they desired. In the last analysis the question of a formula was not important—the question of an agreement on the fundamental issues was more so.

MR. EDEN stated that the three Allied Governments considered that a new situation would be created by the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army. This would call for the establishment of a fully representative provisional Polish Government which could be more broadly representative than was possible before the liberation of Poland. This Government should be comprised of members of the Lublin Government and other democratic leaders in Poland and abroad.

MR. EDEN felt that this Government should be called the Provisional Government of National Unity.

MR. MOLOTOV continued to stress the advisability of forming the new Government on the basis of the Lublin Government. Otherwise an unstable situation would be established in the rear of the Red Army. This Government would include other representatives from Poland and from without the country.

MR. STETTINIUS maintained that it would be preferable to start with an entirely new Government and stated that unless the Foreign Ministers could get away from the words "existing Polish Government", no agreement could be reached on this question. He suggested that Mr. Molotov give consideration to a formula which would state

that the Polish Government should be based upon the old and also on the democratic leaders which will be brought in.

MR. MOLOTOV maintained that it was very difficult to deal with the Poles and that a serious situation would arise if a period should be created in which there were no Government in Poland. The authority of the present Lublin Government would be undermined. He maintained that if the American or British proposals were adopted everything would be standing in the air and a period of instability would be created in Poland.

MR. STETTINIUS pointed out that the present Polish Government would continue until the new Government was formed.

MR. MOLOTOV maintained that the Poles would know that negotiations were proceeding on a change in government and that the present government would not endure. This would create a situation which might well cause difficulties for the Red Army.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that Mr. Eden's formula avoided this situation.

MR. MOLOTOV, however, adhered to his former position of insisting that the new Polish Government be formed on the basis of the Lublin Government. He maintained that the matter would have to be discussed with the Poles themselves before any decision could be reached.

MR. STETTINIUS inquired as to Mr. Molotov's reactions with respect to the name of the new Polish Government.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that this could be taken up at a later date.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that under present circumstances it would probably be best to report to the plenary session that the Foreign Ministers had discussed at length the Polish Government question on the basis of the memorandum submitted by the American Delegation and that although they had not yet reached an agreement on the matter they had decided to continue discussions at a later date.

MR. HARRIMAN asked Mr. Molotov to consider a redraft of the American formula which would contain the words "based on the old and also on other democratic elements from outside and inside Poland."

MR. MOLOTOV's reaction to this suggestion was negative. He appeared to prefer the wording "based on the old government and with the calling in of representatives . . ." <sup>5</sup>

### 3. *Reparations.*

MR. STETTINIUS stated that Mr. Molotov had presented to him through Mr. Vyshinski and Mr. Maisky a document on the principles of exacting reparations payments from Germany. He wished now

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<sup>5</sup> Points appear in the original.



to present some counter proposals which were fundamentally based on the Soviet principles. He then read the following statement:<sup>6</sup>

"1. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war and have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy.

"2. Setting aside for the moment the use of German labor by way of reparations, this question to be considered at a later date, reparations in kind are to be exacted from Germany in the two following forms:

"(a) Removal in a single payment in [*after*] the end of the war from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investment abroad, shares of industrial, transport, shipping and other enterprises in Germany, etc.) these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of military and economic disarmament of Germany.

"These removals are to be completed within two years of the end of the war.

"(b) Annual deliveries of commodities during ten years after the end of the war.

"3. The total of German reparations in the form of removal from her national wealth as well as in the form of annual deliveries of commodities after the end of the war shall be the first subject of study by the Moscow Commission. In this study the Commission will take into consideration the effect of whatever common steps ought to be taken for the elimination or reduction of output of various important German industries, from the standpoint of the total decentralization of Germany. The Commission should take into consideration in its initial studies the Soviet Government's suggested total of twenty billion dollars for all forms of reparation."

MR. MAISKY pointed out that Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the American proposals were acceptable. However paragraph 3 should be more fully clarified. In order to do so he suggested that the Moscow Commission accept the total of \$20,000,000,000 "as a basis" for its studies. The final figures arrived at by the Commission might be a little more or less than \$20,000,000,000; however, the Soviet Delegation urged that this figure be accepted as the basis.

MR. EDEN stated that the Prime Minister was strongly against stating a figure in the basic principles, even as a basis.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the Soviet Delegation was thinking only of the Soviet Union. Mr. Maisky's Commission had done good work—it had only one defect, that of minimalism.

MR. STETTINIUS urged that the question of setting a figure be left to the Commission. He continued that he of course could not commit the United States but that he felt that Mr. Maisky's figure was reasonable.

<sup>6</sup> See also *post*, p. 816.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether it would be agreeable to mention only the reparations, in the amount of ten billion dollars, which would go to the Soviet Union.

As a counter-proposal MR. STETTINIUS suggested that it merely be stated that 50% of the total sum of reparations collected which would be not specified would go to the Soviet Union.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he did not object to this suggestion; however, the exact percentage might be a little more or less than 50% of the amount collected. He again stressed the importance of including a figure in the statement.

MR. EDEN said that his Government well understood the suffering and need of the Soviet Government and would not be niggardly in the apportionment of reparations. However, he would like the Commission to do its work and ascertain the total amount of German reparations.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the Soviet delegation was not endeavoring to supersede the work of the Commission but only to give it guidance.

MR. STETTINIUS inquired as to what price levels the Soviet Government had in mind.<sup>7</sup>

MR. MOLOTOV replied that reparations should be based on 1938 prices since destruction had been in pre-war values.

MR. STETTINIUS inquired whether the Soviet Government also had in mind additions of 15% to 20%.

MR. MOLOTOV said that this was likely.

MR. STETTINIUS inquired as to the effect of the dismemberment of Germany on payment of reparations.

MR. MAISKY replied that it would not have any effect on the removal from the national wealth of Germany of German equipment located inside and outside of the country at the termination of the war. It might affect annual payments in the post war years. However, the Soviet Government had taken this into consideration in drawing up its report.

After some discussion the Soviet and American Delegations reached agreement on the wording of the third point to the effect that the Reparations Commission should consider in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparations in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the preceding paragraph should be twenty billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Soviet Union.

MR. EDEN stated that he would be obliged to await instructions from his Government.

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<sup>7</sup> See *post*, p. 816.

#### 4. *Dumbarton Oaks.*

MR. STETTINIUS presented copies of the draft invitation (see attached)<sup>8</sup> to the Dumbarton Oaks [*United Nations*] Conference and stated that it was his understanding that the United States would consult with China and France before the invitations were issued on the Dumbarton Oaks matters which had been discussed in the Crimea.

MR. MOLOTOV and MR. EDEN agreed to this.

It was pointed out that some differences existed in the invitation submitted at the meeting and a former draft.<sup>9</sup> It was suggested that the invitation be referred back to the sub-committee which would report as soon as possible to the Foreign Ministers.<sup>10</sup> He explained that he had placed the draft before the meeting in order to get the Foreign Ministers' consideration of the general principles at this stage so that time could be saved. Without decisions of the Foreign Ministers the sub-committee could not complete its work.

It was also agreed that the paragraph relative to trusteeships should be omitted from the invitation and that the five governments which would have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the conference on the subject of territorial trusteeships and independent areas. This would be done on a diplomatic level.

MR. STETTINIUS explained that he did not contemplate any detailed discussions on particular islands or territories but wished to establish the right of the organization to deal with the problem of trusteeships and to set up some machinery.

MR. MOLOTOV and MR. EDEN indicated agreement.

#### 5. *Iran.*

MR. STETTINIUS inquired whether Mr. Eden wished to bring up the subject of Iran.

MR. EDEN stated that he had submitted a paper on this question.<sup>11</sup>

MR. STETTINIUS remarked that the American Delegation was in entire agreement with the British position, as stated by Mr. Eden yesterday.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that the Soviet Delegation had not had time to give study to Mr. Eden's paper. The subject was consequently no longer discussed.

#### 6. *Yugoslavia.*

MR. MOLOTOV referred to the unstable situation in Yugoslavia and to the Subasic-Tito agreement.<sup>12</sup> He stated that he could not under-

<sup>8</sup> *Post*, p. 817.

<sup>9</sup> *Post*, p. 818.

<sup>10</sup> *Post*, p. 819.

<sup>11</sup> *Post*, pp. 819-820.

<sup>12</sup> *Ante*, pp. 251-254.

stand the British desire to supplement this agreement when steps had not been taken to put the original agreement into force. He proposed that the original agreement be executed and that following this subsequent questions be discussed.

MR. EDEN maintained that the amendments to the agreement which had been suggested by the British Government were reasonable in nature and provided for a more democratic Yugoslavia.<sup>13</sup> He could see no harm in the application.

MR. MOLOTOV continued to maintain that no useful purpose would be served by the submission of supplementary agreements until the original agreement had been effected.

MR. STETTINIUS suggested that representatives of Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden be appointed to draw up a statement on the Yugoslav situation. The British and Russian Ministers agreed to this proposal. Mr. Molotov stated that it would be desirable to state that it had been agreed at the Crimean Conference that the Subasic-Tito agreement should be fully executed.

<sup>13</sup> For the text of the British proposal, see *post*, p. 821.

Hiss Collection

*Hiss Notes* <sup>1</sup>

4th meeting 12.00 For Mins  
ERS chmn  
2/9

Poland

\* ERS: We have a hard fight in U. S. on particip. in Un. Ns Org. Polish sit. is of great importance to us from psych. point of view at this time. So hopes with all heart we can settle this Pol. matter before we break up in a manner which will be acceptable to the world.

1. Dropped Pres. Commission idea
  2. (a) Mol. spoke of reorg. of Pol. Govt
  - (b) Brit. formula suggests formation of a fully representative provisional govt
  - (c) We : govt of national unity
- All of us agree Pol. Govt should include 3 elements—Lublin, democrats in Pol. & abroad

Proposal Present Pol. Gov't be reorganized to include Pol. democrats in Pol & abroad & be called Provisional Govt of Pol. Dem. Unity Pol. Commission in Mos. to consult in first instance Lublin Govt & Polish leaders in Pol & outside

<sup>1</sup> From penciled notes in longhand. For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Page minutes of this meeting.

Be pledged hold free elections, universal suffrage & secret ballot as soon as practicable

When Pol. Govt of Nat Unity is formed 3 Govts recognize Amb. of 3 powers in Warsaw be charged report on holding of free elections

### Reparations

ERS presented proposal

Point 1 acceptable

Point 3 add should consider 20,000,000,000 as a basis—final figures to be arrived by Commission

ERS: We think that figure should be taken into consideration. We can accept it as a basis for discussion.

Eden not prepared to mention any figure

Mol Maisky wants figure for Sov. share mentioned.

ERS Can't commit U. S. to any figure but as said before personally thinks it is a reasonable figure

Mol. Could it be mentioned as a basis for discussion also

ERS: suggests 50% as basis for discussion

Mol: No objection but should not insist on 50% may be more or less, but figure would have significance. Distribution of total sum may be different.

ERS Can't go further at this time

Maisky means 1938 prices

Eden: What of effect of dismemberment

Maisky Might affect annual payments—initially lower perhaps—but not total

ERS 10% or 15% variation that applied to Hung.

M: possibly

Agreed can mention 50% applies to 20,000,000,000

### Report

ERS presented draft invitation

Understands we are agreed U S permitted to consult China & Fr before

Agreed

ERS Agreed—to sub-committee but reserved re terr. trus.

ERS: We do not contemplate any detailed discussions re particular islands or territorials but do wish to establish right of org. to deal with this & to set up machinery

Mol. Agreed

Ed. Why mention it?

ERS Agreed to eliminate it in invitation.

Understood we will take it up at Conf. & meanwhile among us at dip. level

Report

Mol.—Brit. did not object at D. O

Ed. Agrees & should be in report to plenary session

Iran

Ed. mentioned his paper ERS said we agree

Poland

ERS Can we say U S-S U agree. Brit don't

Yug.

Committee to prepare statement

Poland

New draft by Brit.

Mol. Can only give prelim. answer. Try to give final answer by 4:00. Mustn't say put too much in this formula, mustn't put in what we can't say without consulting Poles. 1st amend.: say based on Lublin Govt 2. Leave out reference to Ambs in War.<sup>2</sup>—offensive to Poles—indicate they are under control Q. of formula not important—q of agreement is

Ed: The 3 Govts consider that a new sit. has been created by the complete lib. of Pol by the Red Army. This calls for the est. of a fully repres. Provisional Govt which can now be more broadly repres. than was recently poss. This govt should comprise members of Lub Govt etc— Should be called Prov. of Nat Unity

Mol. Can't leave out statement Govt is based on present one proposes: The present Pol. Govt be reorg. into a fully repres. Govt based on the present govt & incl. etc

ERS Must be entirely new

Might say based on Lub & on etc

Mol. Will be very diff to deal with Poles Can't do that when no auth. or stability in Pol.

ERS Present gov't would go on during the negs. until new govt is formed.

Mol But Poles will know negs are going on & will know present govt won't last long—make it weak & make negs last long That impossible sit. for Red Army

Mol.: Ed. proposal incompatible with his own Must discuss this proposal with Poles

ERS What about name of new govt?

Mol. We can consider this.

<sup>2</sup> Warsaw.

Report we have discussed matter & ~~will continue it later.~~ & were unable to agree on this feature.

Harriman Asked reconsider based on Lub & other  
Mol Negative

Hiss Collection

*The Secretary of State to the Head of the Reconstruction Department of the British Foreign Office (Jebb)*<sup>1</sup>

[YALTA, February 9, 1945.]

We must be sure—no respon.—rests on us relative to Iceland, Turkey, ~~etc~~ Egypt<sup>2</sup> on joining World Organ

<sup>1</sup> This message, in Stettinius' handwriting, bears the following notation in the handwriting of Alger Hiss: "A. H. gave Jebb this message 2/9 12.30 p. m. during For. Mins. meetings".

<sup>2</sup> The word "Egypt" is inserted in Hiss' handwriting.

Hiss Collection

*United States Delegation Memorandum*<sup>1</sup>

[YALTA], February 9, 1945.

#### POINTS STILL BEFORE THE FOREIGN MINISTERS

##### 1. *Report of February 8th Meeting on Dumbarton Oaks Matters:*

The report was modified in principle by general agreement at yesterday's plenary session. Sir Edward Bridges and Sir Alexander Cadogan were preparing a re-draft which they may wish to submit to the Foreign Ministers this morning so that final text of the report can be agreed to and presented very briefly to the plenary session this afternoon.

##### 2. *Report by Sub-Committee on Form of Invitations and other Details of Arrangements for United Nations Conference:*

Jebb, Gromyko and Hiss were appointed to this Committee yesterday and are planning to meet this morning. Jebb was Chairman when we were appointed, and, as a courtesy, he might be asked to report—this report may have to be oral as we have not completed our drafting.

##### 3. *Reparations:*

Two papers on this subject presented by Mr. Molotov at the meeting over which he presided are still under consideration.

<sup>1</sup> Apparently written by Hiss for Stettinius. Stettinius followed this outline in his review of unfinished items at the opening of the Foreign Ministers' meeting at noon on February 9, 1945. See *ante*, p. 803.

#### 4. *Poland:*

The plenary session yesterday referred the Polish question to the Foreign Ministers. The status of this is that Molotov presented a paper at the plenary session the day before yesterday, and yesterday the President presented a counter proposal.

#### 5. *Iran:*

You might ask Molotov if, after thinking over the points made yesterday on Iran, he has any comments to make.

*The points were:*

(a) Respect for the Iranian decision not to grant oil concessions until after the war.

(b) Suggest for announcement now that the three powers would be prepared to begin to withdraw their troops from Iran *pari passu*, (i. e., by equal steps.)

#### 6. *Points mentioned by Mr. Eden Yesterday:*

You may wish to ask whether Mr. Eden would like to say anything further with respect to the additional points he mentioned yesterday.

*These points were:*

(a) Questions relating to the Bulgarian Control Commission;

(b) Questions relating to the Yugoslav frontier.

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Bohlen Collection

### *United States Proposal Regarding the Polish Government*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[YALTA,] February 9, 1945.

#### SUGGESTIONS IN REGARD TO THE POLISH GOVERNMENTAL QUESTION

After further consideration I agree with Mr. Molotov's statement that the question of the creation of a Presidential Committee should be dropped and am therefore prepared to withdraw our suggestion on that point.

I believe that, with this change, our three positions are not far apart on the substance of the governmental question. Mr. Molotov spoke of the reorganization of the Polish Government. The British formula suggests the establishment of a fully representative "Provisional Polish Government" and we speak of the formation of a "Government of National Unity". All three agree that only the Poles themselves can definitely decide this. All three agree that this

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<sup>1</sup> Authorship not indicated. This paper was attached to Bohlen's minutes of the Plenary Meeting on the afternoon of February 9, at which time the proposal was again discussed; see *post*, p. 842. A copy of this paper in the UNA Files bears the notation, "According to Mr. Hiss, this was proposed by 'Doc' Matthews." On August 13, 1954, however, Matthews wrote that he thought Bohlen was the author (640.0029/8-1354). Another copy of this paper is in the Hiss Collection.



government should be composed of members of the present Polish Provisional Government and in addition representatives of other democratic elements inside Poland and some Polish democratic leaders from abroad.

The following formula might therefore be considered:

That the present Polish Provisional Government be reorganized into a fully representative government based on all democratic forces in Poland and including democratic leaders from Poland abroad, to be termed "The Provisional Government of National Unity"; Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr to be authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This "Government of National Unity" would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic parties would have the right to participate and to put forward candidates.

When a "Polish Government of National Unity" is satisfactorily formed, the three Governments will then proceed to accord it recognition. The Ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw following such recognition would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections.

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Hiss Collection

*The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[YALTA,] February 9, 1945.

I attach a suggested paper to hand to Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden on reparations. It is based on the Russian proposal of basic principles. The first two sections follow the Russian proposal literally with the additional words in the first paragraph suggested by Mr. Eden.

I think you should likewise ask Mr. Molotov on what price, i. e., what year it is intended that the total reparations shall be fixed.

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<sup>1</sup> Ribbon copy. The authorship is not indicated, but a handwritten notation on the original reads: "Note: According to Mr. Hiss, this was prepared by 'Doc' Matthews"; and on August 13, 1954, Matthews wrote that he thought he was the author (640.0029/8-1354). The "suggested paper" referred to as attached has not been found; presumably it was a draft of the proposal read by Stettinius at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers at noon on February 9, 1945, *ante*, p. 808. See also Stettinius' question to Molotov, *ante*, p. 809.

Bohlen Collection

*United States Proposal for the Invitation to the United Nations Conference*<sup>1</sup>

INVITATION

The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invites the Government of \_\_\_\_\_ to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on April 25, 1945, or soon thereafter, at \_\_\_\_\_ in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The above named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, which were made public last October, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

*"C. Voting*

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting."

[The above named governments have agreed that it would, in their opinion, be desirable that consideration be given at the forthcoming Conference to the inclusion in the projected Charter of provisions relating to territorial trusteeships and dependent areas. They hope to be able to prepare and place before the Conference proposals relating to these subjects.]<sup>2</sup>

Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

In the event that the Government of \_\_\_\_\_ desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments.

<sup>1</sup> Copy also in the Hiss Collection. This draft was presented by Stettinius at the noon meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 9, 1945. See *ante*, p. 810.

<sup>2</sup> Brackets appear in the source text. It was agreed at the Foreign Ministers' meeting on February 9 that this paragraph should be omitted. See *ante*, p. 810.

Hiss Collection

*United States Delegation Draft Invitation to the United Nations Conference*<sup>1</sup>

INVITATION

The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invites the Government of \_\_\_\_\_ to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on *April 25* or soon thereafter, at \_\_\_\_\_ in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The above named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, ~~a copy of which was transmitted to you for your information on October 9, 1944 which were made public last October~~ and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI: *Insert*→

[The above named governments have agreed that it would, in their opinion, be desirable that consideration be given at the forthcoming Conference to the inclusion in the projected Charter of provisions relating to ~~International~~ *territorial trusteeships & dependent areas*. They hope to be able to *prepare and* place before the Conference proposals relating to ~~thisese~~ subjects.]<sup>2</sup>

Further information ~~as to the exact site of the Conference and~~ as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

In the event that the Government of \_\_\_\_\_ desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments.

<sup>1</sup> The source text is a carbon copy which, as typed, is of the same wording as the "Draft Invitation" attached to the memorandum of Pasvolsky of January 23, 1945 (see *ante*, p. 82, footnote 5). Marked "old" in the upper right-hand corner, this paper is presumably a copy of the "former draft" to which Stettinius referred *ante*, p. 810. The penciled modifications and insertions, which are in the handwriting of Alger Hiss and which are here printed in canceled type and in italics, presumably reflect the work of the subcommittee of which he was a member (see *ante*, p. 738, and *infra*). The modifications and insertions indicated by Hiss were incorporated in the text as presented by Stettinius, *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> The brackets appear in pencil in the source text.

Hiss Collection

*Draft Report to the Foreign Ministers by the Subcommittee on Arrangements for the United Nations Conference*<sup>1</sup>

REPORT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS

We were instructed on February 8 to prepare a report to the Foreign Ministers on the following subjects:

(a) The method of consultation with France and China in regard to the decisions taken at the present conference concerning the proposed world organization.

(b) The text of the invitation which should be issued to all the nations which will take part in the United Nations Conference.

With regard to (a) we consider that the United States on behalf of the three powers should consult the Government of China and the Provisional French Government.

With regard to (b) we attach for the approval of the Ministers a draft invitation to all the nations which will take part in the conference.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Undated ribbon copy; authorship not indicated; but Matthews wrote on August 13, 1954, that it was written by Hiss (640.0029/8-1354). Carbon copy also in Matthews Files. The report was presumably drafted early on February 9, 1945, for possible presentation at the Foreign Ministers' meeting at noon on that day. It was not then presented as such, although Stettinius had evidently seen it prior to or during that meeting. See *ante*, p. 810. The report, unchanged from this draft, was formally presented at the noon meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 10. See *post*, pp. 875, 885-886.

<sup>2</sup> The draft invitation was presumably the one presented by Stettinius to the Foreign Ministers at their noon meeting on February 9, 1945 (*ante*, p. 810). A copy of this draft is in the Hiss Collection but is not attached to this draft report of the subcommittee.

Hiss Collection

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*British Proposal on Iran*<sup>1</sup>

DRAFT CONCLUSION ON PERSIA

The remarkable progress made in the war against Germany has enabled the American, British and Russian representatives to consider the application of Article 5 of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union and Persia regarding the withdrawal of Allied forces from Persian territory. It has been agreed that a commencement of the withdrawal of forces need not await the termination of hostilities, but should begin *pari passu* in stages as military considerations, including the use of the Persian supply route, may allow. The stages of this gradual with-

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<sup>1</sup> This undated carbon copy is in the Hiss Collection with papers relating to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 11, 1945, at which time it was decided that the proposal would be eliminated in favor of the language agreed upon for the final protocol. See *ante*, p. 810, and *post*, p. 933.

drawal, beginning with the evacuation of Tehran, will be discussed and agreed on by the respective military authorities of the three countries in Moscow. The Persian Government will be kept fully informed.

Misunderstandings which have arisen in connection with applications for rights to develop oil resources in Persia were also discussed in the course of the conversations. It was agreed that in the light of the known views of the Persian Government within whose free decision the matter rests, none of the Governments involved would favour pressing any suggestions for further oil concessions upon the Persian Government pending the withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia.

(Possible addition to be held in reserve until it is seen how the discussion proceeds). After the withdrawal the whole question of the future exploitation of Persian oil resources not already covered by existing concessions should be the subject of discussions to be held within the framework of the Tehran Declaration of December 1st 1943 and to which the Persian Government would be a party.

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860H.01/2-1145

*Memorandum From the British Delegation to the Soviet Delegation  
Regarding the Yugoslav Government*<sup>1</sup>

When Dr. Subasic returns to Belgrade with his Government about February 7th, he intends to raise two outstanding points with Marshal Tito. His Majesty's Government consider it important that Marshal Tito should be in a position to give satisfactory assurances on both these points, and therefore hope that Marshal Stalin will agree to advise Marshal Tito in this sense.

2. The first of these points is that AVNOJ<sup>2</sup> should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina<sup>3</sup> who have not compromised themselves, thus forming a body to be called a temporary parliament.

3. The second point is that legislative acts passed by AVNOJ should be subject to ratification by a Constituent Assembly. This could be arranged either (1) under Article 116 of the Constitution, which lays down that all measures taken in accordance therewith should be subject to ratification, or (2) by introducing a passage in the new Government's declaration agreed between Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic. The latter would be the more satisfactory course. It

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<sup>1</sup> Notation on file copy reads: "Copy of paper handed by British to Soviet Delegation".

<sup>2</sup> Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation of Yugoslavia.

<sup>3</sup> Skupstina, the national parliament of Yugoslavia before World War II.

would also be helpful if the new Government's declaration could include a statement to the effect that the Government was only temporary, pending free expression of the will of the people.

[YALTA,] 6th February, 1945.

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Matthews Files

*British Proposal Regarding the Yugoslav Government*<sup>1</sup>

DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN  
DELEGATIONS

Message from the Soviet Government, His Majesty's Government and the United States Government to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic.

The Heads of the three Governments have met and discussed the Yugoslav question and have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic:

(a) That the Tito-Subasic Agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new Government formed on the basis of the Agreement;

(b) That the new Government as soon as formed should make a declaration that

(i) AVNOJ will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves, thus forming a body to be called a temporary Parliament:

(ii) Legislative acts passed by AVNOJ will be subject to ratification by a Constituent Assembly:

(iii) The Government is only temporary pending the free expression of the will of the people.

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<sup>1</sup> Undated carbon copy. This is apparently the paper referred to by Eden in the Foreign Ministers' meeting at noon on February 9, 1945. See *ante*, p. 811.

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Bohlen Collection

*Draft Report by the Foreign Ministers to the Sixth Plenary Meeting*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[YALTA,] February 9, 1945.

REPORT TO THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS'  
MEETING, FEBRUARY 9, 1945

1. *The Polish Question:*

The Foreign Ministers discussed at length the Polish Governmental question on the basis of a memorandum submitted by the American

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<sup>1</sup> This copy of the report was attached to the Page minutes of the Foreign Ministers' meeting at noon on February 9, 1945. A copy with slight variations is also in the Hiss Collection. The report was slightly modified before being delivered by Stettinius to the Plenary Meeting that afternoon. See *post*, pp. 858-860.

delegation. This memorandum, in accordance with Mr. Molotov's proposal, agreed to drop the question of the creation of a Presidential Committee.

With respect to reaching a formula on the question of the Polish Government, Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to present to Marshal Stalin certain new considerations advanced in the American memorandum before making a final statement. It was decided to continue discussion of this question at a later date and to report that the three Foreign Ministers thus far had not reached an agreement on the matter.

#### 2. *Reparations:*

The American Delegation submitted a draft proposal on the basic principles of exacting reparations from Germany for study and recommendation by the Moscow Reparations Commission.

Agreement was reached on the first two points relative to which countries should receive reparations, and to the type of reparations in kind Germany should pay.

The Soviet and American Delegations reached agreement on the wording of the third (final) point to the effect that the Reparations Commission should consider in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government, that the total sum of the reparations in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the preceding paragraph, should be twenty billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Soviet Union. Mr. Eden stated that he would be obliged to await instructions from his Government.

The Soviet Delegation stated that reparations payments would be based upon 1938 prices, having possibly in mind increases of 10 to 15% on the prices of the items delivered.

#### 3. *Dumbarton Oaks:*

It was agreed that the five Governments which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on the subjects of territorial trusteeship and dependent areas.


It was also agreed that these subjects should be discussed at the United Nations Conference itself.

The Sub-Committee appointed yesterday is continuing its work and will report to the Foreign Ministers today. This report will include matters pertaining to the form of the invitation to the forthcoming Conference. This subject was discussed at today's meeting, and there appears to be an identity of views thereon.

#### 4. *Iran:*


Sufficient time had not elapsed to permit the Soviet Delegation to

Notes Regarding the Site for the United Nations Conference<sup>1</sup>



<sup>1</sup>The original, which is in pencil, is apparently in Stettinius' handwriting, except for Hiss' notation at the top. See also Stettinius, pp. 203-207.





give proper study to a paper submitted by Mr. Eden on this question. The subject was consequently not discussed.

5. *Yugoslavia:*

On the proposal of the Chairman, it was agreed that representatives of Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov should be appointed to draw up a statement on the Yugoslav situation.

There was also agreement that before the termination of the Crimean Conference it would be desirable that agreement should be reached on the execution of the Subasic-Tito agreement.

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**MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT  
AND CHURCHILL, FEBRUARY 9, 1945, NOON, LIVADIA PALACE**

**PRESENT**

**UNITED STATES**

President Roosevelt  
Fleet Admiral Leahy  
General of the Army Marshall  
Fleet Admiral King  
Major General Kuter

**UNITED KINGDOM**

Prime Minister Churchill  
Field Marshal Brooke  
Marshal of the Royal Air Force  
Portal  
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham  
Field Marshal Wilson  
General Ismay  
Admiral Somerville

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General McFarland

Major General Jacob

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

TOP SECRET

**REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER  
(C.C.S. 776/2) <sup>1</sup>**

The Meeting had before them the draft of the final report to the President and the Prime Minister, containing the results of the Combined Chiefs of Staff ARGONAUT discussions (C.C.S. 776/2).

The report was accepted and approved by the President and the Prime Minister without amendment.

In the course of the ensuing discussion, the following matters were touched on briefly:

a. There was a discussion of possible developments after the defeat of Germany and the possible action of Russia at that time.

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<sup>1</sup> The text of this report, renumbered C. C. S. 776/3 after its approval by Roosevelt and Churchill, follows these minutes.

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed the opinion that it would be of great value if Russia could be persuaded to join with the United States, the British Empire, and China in the issue of a four-power ultimatum calling upon Japan to surrender unconditionally, or else be subjected to the overwhelming weight of all the forces of the four powers. Japan might ask in these circumstances what mitigation of the full rigour of unconditional surrender would be extended to her if she accepted the ultimatum. In this event it would be for the United States to judge the matter; but there was no doubt that some mitigation would be worth while if it led to the saving of a year or a year and a half of a war in which so much blood and treasure would be poured out. Great Britain would not press for any mitigation but would be content to abide by the judgment of the United States. Whatever the decision, Great Britain would see the matter through to the end.

THE PRESIDENT thought that this was a matter which might well be mentioned to Marshal Stalin. He doubted whether the ultimatum would have much effect on the Japanese, who did not seem to realize what was going on in the world outside, and still seemed to think that they might get a satisfactory compromise. They would be unlikely to wake up to the true state of affairs until all of their islands had felt the full weight of air attack.

*b.* THE PRIME MINISTER expressed his thanks to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the work which they had accomplished. He said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff was a wonderful institution which smoothed out so many difficulties, issued clear directions to the commanders in the field and would without doubt be held up in years to come as a model of cooperation between Allies. He hoped very much that the Combined Chiefs of Staff could be kept in being for three or four years more. There would be many problems affecting the security of the two nations in this period, the solution of which would be greatly facilitated if the Combined Chiefs of Staff could continue to operate.

THE PRESIDENT agreed that there would be many matters affecting the two countries, such as the use of bases, which would have to be effectively handled.

In response to an inquiry by the Prime Minister, GENERAL MARSHALL expressed his personal opinion that the continuance of the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be advantageous. Its existence had certainly simplified the solution of the problems which had confronted the two nations during the war.

*c.* There was a short discussion upon the provision of intelligence to the Russian armies, and the President and the Prime Minister were informed of certain steps which had been agreed in discussion between General Marshall and Field Marshal Brooke.

The Meeting then adjourned.

J. C. S. Files

*Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*

TOP SECRET

[YALTA,] 9 February 1945.

C. C. S. 776/3

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER OF THE AGREED SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AT THE "ARGONAUT" CONFERENCE

1. The agreed summary of the conclusions reached at ARGONAUT Conference is submitted herewith:—

I. *Over-all Objective*

2. In conjunction with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan.

II. *Over-all Strategic Concept for the Prosecution of the War*

3. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany.

4. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the over-all objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

5. Upon the defeat of Germany, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

III. *Basic Undertakings in Support of Over-all Strategic Concept*

6. Whatever operations are decided on in support of the over-all strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation:—

a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication.

d. Continue the disruption of enemy sea communications.

e. Continue the offensive against Germany.

f. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia to include coordinating the action of forces.

g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

*h.* Provide assistance to such of the forces of the liberated areas in Europe as can fulfill an active and effective role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance against the Enemy Powers in the present war. Having regard to the successful accomplishment of the other basic undertakings, to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the war-making capacity of the United Nations against Germany and/or Japan.

*i.* Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East as a matter of highest priority having regard to other agreed and/or inescapable commitments as soon as the German situation allows.

*j.* Continue operations leading to the earliest practicable invasion of Japan.

#### IV. *Execution of the Over-all Strategic Concept*

##### DEFEAT OF GERMANY

###### *The U-Boat War*

7. We are concerned with the possibility that German U-boats may again constitute a serious threat to our North Atlantic shipping lanes. It is too early yet to assess the extent to which such an offensive could achieve success, and we propose to review the matter again on 1 April 1945.

8. Meanwhile, we have agreed on the following countermeasures:—

*a.* To build up as much as is practicable the strength of surface hunting groups and anti-U-boat air squadrons.

*b.* To maintain and, if possible, increase “marginal” bomber effort on assembly yards, concentrating as far as is practicable against Hamburg and Bremen.

*c.* To maintain “marginal” effort against operating bases, being ready to increase this when bases become crowded beyond the capacity of concrete pens.

*d.* To increase, by 100% if possible, the air mining effort against U-boats, including the training areas.

*e.* To mine waters beyond range of *d.* above by using surface minelayers and carrier-borne aircraft.

*f.* To intensify operations against enemy minesweepers.

*g.* To maintain and intensify operations against the enemy shipping used to supply U-boat bases.

###### *Operations in Northwest Europe*

9. In two telegrams, SCAF 180 as amended by SCAF 194, the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, has presented his appreciation and his plan of operations for Northwest Europe. His plan is as follows:

*a.* To carry out immediately a series of operations north of the Moselle with a view to destroying the enemy and closing the Rhine north of Düsseldorf.

b. To direct our efforts to eliminating other enemy forces west of the Rhine, which still constitute an obstacle or a potential threat to our subsequent Rhine crossing operations.

c. To seize bridgeheads over the Rhine in the North and the South.

d. To deploy east of the Rhine and north of the Ruhr the maximum number of divisions which can be maintained (estimated at some 35 divisions). The initial task of this force, assisted by air action, will be to deny to the enemy the industries of the Ruhr.

e. To deploy east of the Rhine, on the axis Frankfurt-Kassel, such forces, if adequate, as may be available after providing 35 divisions for the North and essential security elsewhere. The task of this force will be to draw enemy forces away from the North by capturing Frankfurt and advancing on Kassel.

10. We have taken note of SCAF 180 as amended by SCAF 194 and of the Supreme Commander's assurance that he will seize the Rhine crossings in the North just as soon as this is a feasible operation and without waiting to close the Rhine throughout its length. Further, that he will advance across the Rhine in the North with maximum strength and complete determination, immediately the situation in the South allows him to collect the necessary forces and do this without incurring unreasonable risks.

#### *Strategy in the Mediterranean*

11. We have reviewed our strategy in the Mediterranean in the light of the development of the situation in Europe and of the fact that the enemy is at liberty at any time to make a voluntary withdrawal in Italy. We have agreed that our primary object in the war against Germany should be to build up the maximum possible strength on the Western Front and to seek a decision in that theater.

12. In accordance with this concept we have agreed to withdraw certain forces from the Mediterranean Theater and to place them at the disposal of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and to redefine the tasks of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.

13. Our proposals are contained in the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, attached as Appendix "A."

#### THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

##### *Over-All Objective in the War Against Japan*

14. We have agreed that the over-all objective in the war against Japan should be expressed as follows:

To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:—

a. Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength.

b. Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.

*Operations in the Pacific Area*

15. We have taken note of the plans and operations proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 417/11 (Appendix "B").<sup>1</sup>

*Operations in Southeast Asia Command*

16. We have agreed to the following policy in respect of employment in Southeast Asia Command of United States resources deployed in the India-Burma Theater:—

*a.* The primary military object of the United States in the China and India-Burma Theaters is the continuance of aid to China on a scale that will permit the fullest utilization of the area and resources of China for operations against the Japanese. United States resources are deployed in India-Burma to provide direct or indirect support for China. These forces and resources participate not only in operating the base and the line of communications for United States and Chinese forces in China, but also constitute a reserve immediately available to China without permanently increasing the requirements for transport of supplies to China.

*b.* The United States Chiefs of Staff contemplate no change in their agreement to SACSEA's use of resources of the U. S. India-Burma Theater in Burma when this use does not prevent the fulfillment of their primary object of rendering support to China including protection of the line of communications. Any transfer of forces engaged in approved operations in progress in Burma which is contemplated by the United States Chiefs of Staff and which, in the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff, would jeopardize those operations, will be subject to discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

17. We have reviewed the progress of the campaign in Burma and agreed upon the terms of a directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia. This directive is attached as Appendix "C."

*Planning Dates for the End of the War Against Germany and Japan*

18. We feel that it is important to agree and promulgate planning dates for the end of the war against Germany and Japan. These dates are necessary for the purpose of planning production and the allocation of manpower.

We recommend that the planning dates for the end of the war against Germany should be as follows:—

*a.* Earliest date—1 July 1945.

*b.* Date beyond which the war is unlikely to continue—31 December 1945.

We recommend that the planning date for the end of the war against Japan should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany.

<sup>1</sup> This paper, dated January 22, 1945, is printed *ante*, pp. 395-396.

All the above dates to be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.

### *Shipping*

19. We have reviewed the over-all cargo and troop shipping position for the remainder of 1945 under the assumption that Germany is defeated on 1 July 1945.

For the first half of 1945 the principal difficulty will be with cargo shipping, which will be tight and in which deficits will approach unmanageable proportions until V-E Day. We have issued instructions to theater commanders to exercise strict control of shipping and have agreed that deficits should be adjusted in accordance with the following principles:—

In the event of a deficit in shipping resources, first priority should be given to the basic undertakings in support of the over-all strategic concepts as agreed in ARGONAUT.

So long as these first priority requirements are not adequately covered, shipping for other requirements will not be allocated without prior consultation with the appropriate Chiefs of Staff.

20. For the second half of 1945 the principal difficulty will be troop shipping, which will become particularly acute in the last quarter of the year. We have agreed that the matter should be reviewed and a report submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff not later than 1 April 1945. This report will take account, from the shipping point of view, of the possibility that the war against Germany may continue beyond 1 July 1945.

### *Oil*

21. We have reviewed and agreed upon the levels of stocks of all petroleum products that should be maintained in all theaters. The text of our agreement is attached as Appendix "D." <sup>2</sup>

### *Equipment for Allied and Liberated Forces*

22. The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, has submitted proposals (NAF 841) <sup>2</sup> designed to assist the Greek Government in forming their own army and so releasing British forces for employment elsewhere.

We have agreed that the British Chiefs of Staff should proceed to implement the Supreme Commander's proposals, on the understanding that this will not interfere with the provision of equipment for Allied and liberated forces in Northwest Europe, nor result in subsequent direct or indirect charges against United States resources.

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<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



## Appendix "A"

DIRECTIVE TO SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, MEDITERRANEAN,  
REPEATED TO SCAEF

1. It is our primary intention in the war against Germany to build up the maximum possible strength on the Western Front and to seek a decision in that theater. We have, therefore, reviewed your directive and decided as follows:—

*Greece*

2. The earliest possible discharge of British obligations in Greece must be your constant aim.

The object of British presence and operations in Greece is to secure that part of Greece which is necessary for the establishment of the authority of a free Greek Government.

3. This object must always be regarded in the light of the paramount need for releasing troops from Greece for use against the Germans. You should, therefore, concentrate on building up a Greek force on a national basis as soon as possible.

*Italy*

4. In pursuance of the policy given in paragraph 1, it has been decided to withdraw from your theater to the Western Front up to five divisions (of which not more than two should be armored) as follows:—

*a.* At the earliest possible date three Allied divisions drawn from the Allied Armies in Italy.

*b.* Further complete formations as the forces now in Greece are released from that country.

*c.* It is intended to withdraw Canadian<sup>3</sup> and British divisions. The nomination of ground formations to be withdrawn and the arrangements for their transfer will form the subject of a separate instruction. The program will be agreed between you and Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before any moves take place.

*Air Forces*

5. Two fighter groups of Twelfth Air Force will be moved to France at once. Combined Chiefs of Staff intend to move to France in the near future as much of the Twelfth Air Force as can be released without hazard to the accomplishment of your mission. You should consult with SCAEF and submit agreed proposals for confirmation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

<sup>3</sup> On February 11, 1945, Roosevelt received an indication of the appreciation of the Canadian Government at the decision to transfer the Canadian Corps from Italy to northwestern Europe, thus uniting the whole Canadian Army in Europe (Roosevelt Papers).

6. There will be no significant withdrawal of amphibious assault forces.

7. We recognize that these withdrawals will affect the scope of your operations in the Italian Theater. We, therefore, redefine your objects as follows:—

*a.* Your first object should be to ensure that, subject to any minor adjustments you may find necessary, the front already reached in Italy is solidly held.

*b.* Within the limits of the forces remaining available to you after the withdrawals in paragraph 4 above have been effected, you should do your utmost, by means of such limited offensive action as may be possible and by the skillful use of cover and deception plans, to contain the German forces now in Italy and prevent their withdrawal to other fronts.

*c.* You should, in any case, remain prepared to take immediate advantage of any weakening or withdrawal of the German forces.

#### *Adriatic*

8. Subject to the requirements of the Italian Theater, you should continue to give all possible support to the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation, until the territory of Yugoslavia has been completely cleared. You will carry out such minor operations on the eastern shores of the Adriatic as your resources allow.

#### Appendix "C"<sup>4</sup>

#### DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, SOUTHEAST ASIA

1. Your first object is to liberate Burma at the earliest date. (To be known as operation LOYALIST.)

2. Subject to the accomplishment of this object, your next main task will be the liberation of Malaya and the opening of the Straits of Malacca. (To be known as operation BROADSWORD.)

3. In view of your recent success in Burma, and of the uncertainty of the date of the final defeat of Germany, you must aim at the accomplishment of your first object with the forces at present at your disposal. This does not preclude the dispatch of further reinforcements from the European Theater should circumstances make this possible.

4. You will prepare a program of operations for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

5. In transmitting the foregoing directive the Combined Chiefs of Staff direct your attention to the agreed policy in respect of the use in your theater of United States resources deployed in the India-Burma Theater (see paragraph 16 of the Report).

<sup>4</sup> Appendix "B" is printed *ante*, pp. 395-396.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, FEBRUARY 9, 1945,  
1:30 P. M., LIVADIA PALACE<sup>1</sup>

## PRESENT

## UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Mrs. Boettiger  
Miss Harriman  
Fleet Admiral Leahy  
Mr. Byrnes  
Mr. Harriman

## UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Mrs. Oliver

*Editorial Note*

For this luncheon meeting, Bohlen's record states simply, "No notes available". The information set forth above regarding the meeting and the participants is taken from the Log, *ante*, p. 556. According to Leahy, p. 312, "The conversation centered around voting procedure in the proposed assembly of the world peace organization. Churchill agreed orally to an arrangement whereby the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Republics should have equal voting power in the Assembly." A notation on the Hiss notes for the Plenary Meeting of that afternoon indicates that this subject was discussed. (See *post*, p. 857.)

<sup>1</sup> President Roosevelt acted as host.

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MEETING OF THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET CHIEFS OF STAFF,  
FEBRUARY 9, 1945, 3:30 P. M., LIVADIA PALACE

PRESENT<sup>1</sup>

## UNITED STATES

General of the Army Marshall  
Fleet Admiral King  
Major General Kuter

## SOVIET UNION

General of the Army Antonov  
Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov  
Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov  
(aided by a 2-star admiral)

J. C. S. Files

*Kuter Minutes*

## TOP SECRET

GENERAL ANTONOV opened the meeting with the statement that he had discussed all of the points raised at the previous meeting with Marshal Stalin. Whereas his comments at the first meeting represented only his personal views, he was prepared for the second meeting to give definite and official replies to each of the points. General

<sup>1</sup> A note on the original reads: "Except for Fleet Admiral Leahy, who was absent, the attendance and security considerations were exactly as arranged for the first meeting." See *ante*, p. 757.

Antonov continued then to present brief statements on each of the questions that had been raised: <sup>2</sup>

a. There is no change in intent and only minor change in the plans of operations in the Far East from those described to Mr. Harriman and General Deane in October. In October, it had been planned to begin the movement of units to the Far East in early 1945. The units which it had been proposed to move are now involved in the center of the line on the Russian front. The only change in the basic plan is therefore a delay in the movement of units eastward until they can be disengaged from the fighting now going on.

b. These Soviets will require specific supply routes after Soviet-Japanese hostilities start. Sea routes are needed to provide food and all types of gasoline and other petroleum products. Air routes also will be required.

c. Agreement is given for the operation of U. S. Air Forces in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area. Advance reconnaissance and survey parties may be sent to that area without delay.

d. Due to the great distance from the bulk of Soviet military strength "U. S. assistance will be very useful" for the defense of Kamchatka.

e. Pre-hostility preparations, including construction, reception, and storage of U. S. stock piles in Eastern Siberia (Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk) and in Kamchatka, will be prepared by the Soviets for the U. S. air units to be based in Soviet territory. Final decision must naturally await decision as to the air base requirements. Material assistance may be needed from the United States. Knocked-down fuel storage tanks (and probably pumps, pipes, etc) will be required. These requirements are in addition to all current requisitions. Supplies in the MILEPOST project have been computed as requirements for Soviet forces exclusively.

f. The departure of a survey party from Fairbanks to Kamchatka must be deferred "until the last moment." In explanation for this decision considerable discussion ensued as to the fact that the presence of an American survey party in Kamchatka could not be kept a secret from the Japs.

g. After the beginning of hostilities the Soviets will take Southern Sakhalin unassisted by the United States. Although detailed plans are not yet firm, Soviet operations against Southern Sakhalin will be one of their first operations. Admiral King stated that his discussion with Admiral Kuznetsov was an adequate reply to our question concerning the La Perouse Strait. (See Appendix "A" of the notes on the meeting held 8 February 1945)<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, pp. 758, 762-763.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 761-762.

*h.* We had asked to be assured that combined planning in Moscow would be vigorously pursued. In his reply General Antonov replied: "We shall fulfill on our side the plan which was made". General Marshall explained that we were not questioning Soviet good faith or ability to carry out plans. General Antonov then stated that combined planning in Moscow will proceed vigorously.

*i.* Our request for additional weather reporting stations in Siberia is approved. The details are to be handled by Military Mission in Moscow.

GENERAL ANTONOV then asked for a statement as to our airbase requirements in the Kamchatka-Nikolaevsk area. It was decided to have the Air Staffs (Marshal Khudyakov and General Kuter) continue with the discussion of air matters after the major meeting was completed.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked if the Soviets agreed that a high order of security was necessary in handling all Far Eastern matters because the Japs may attack if they learn of Soviet-American plans or of the movement of Soviet units. GENERAL ANTONOV agreed with this view.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked how many weeks it would be after the movement of Soviet units to the East began that the Soviets would be strong enough to meet a Jap attack. GENERAL ANTONOV replied that it would be "not less than three months."

GENERAL MARSHALL asked when these movements Eastward would begin. GENERAL ANTONOV replied that the Soviets were initiating the movements of supplies at this time and stated that "units of troops, in any size, cannot be moved without attracting notice by the Japs."

GENERAL MARSHALL asked if divisional equipment would precede the divisions. GENERAL ANTONOV stated that divisional armor and equipment would move with the divisions. However, supplies (ammunition, food, etc.) would precede the movement of divisions.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked how many divisions per week could be moved from the German to the Japanese front. GENERAL ANTONOV replied that a three month period would be required to move the necessary forces.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that Field Marshal Brooke will expedite and will extend the flow of information from London to Moscow concerning German movements and intentions.

The principal meeting was adjourned with an exchange of statements of pleasure at the free, frank, clear, and definite interchange of information achieved in these conferences between the Russian and American military staffs.

MARSHAL OF AVIATION KHUDYAKOV and MAJOR GENERAL KUTER continued to discuss the air side of the Soviet-American business for

about two hours. The principal items covered in the discussion follow:

a. GENERAL KUTER gave to Marshal Khudyakov a prepared statement of our detailed requirements in expanding the weather reporting establishment in Siberia. He explained that Admiral Olsen was equipped with the same information and that further arrangements would be made in Moscow through the Military Mission.

b. GENERAL KUTER gave to Marshal Khudyakov a detailed statement of our requirements to permit the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey to operate on strategic air objectives which have already been captured by the Russians and those which might be captured in the future. It was agreed that further details would be arranged in Moscow with the Military Mission. MARSHAL KHUDYAKOV requested that Soviet experts on bomb damage assessment would be permitted to accompany our survey parties. GENERAL KUTER stated that this was entirely acceptable, and furthermore, our reports of this survey would be made available to the Soviets on each of the targets within the Soviet area if those reports were desired.

c. GENERAL KUTER stated that our broad requirement in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area was for two large air bases, each to accommodate one group of very heavy bombers (B-29 Superfortresses). He stated the requirement for 8500 foot take-off strips with good approaches, and the heavy construction needed for landing, take-off, and dispersed parking by 150,000 pound aircraft. General discussion followed on the heavy bomb tonnages and very heavy 100-octane gasoline requirements of B-29 groups. MARSHAL KHUDYAKOV appeared somewhat shaken by the magnitude of the air base requirement to handle our very heavy bombers. He repeated the probable necessity that we provide the materials to handle aviation gasoline storage and distribution, bomb trailers, and steel planking. Marshal Khudyakov stated that it might be difficult to find sufficient personnel to do the necessary construction and asked if American aviation engineers could be provided if needed for building. GENERAL KUTER replied that American aviation engineers would be available.

d. GENERAL KUTER stated that our request for air bases asked for the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area or some more suitable area. He explained the fact that two groups of B-29's in the far North in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area could pour far fewer bombs on Japan than would be possible if much larger numbers of heavy bombers (B-17 and B-24) were based in the Vladivostok area within range of Japanese targets. General Kuter made it clear that he would not prejudice the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk decision by raising the issue of the bases in the Vladivostok area, and further that it was appreciated that supply difficulties and the requirement to base extensive

tactical air forces in the Vladivostok area would probably postpone consideration of that area until after progress had been attained in the ground battle West from Vladivostok. AIR MARSHAL KHUDYAKOV clearly understood the desire not to prejudice other decisions and that Vladivostok probably could not be used as strategic air base area until the Russian ground war with the Japs in Manchuria had progressed, but stated that he was anxious to have heavy bombers attacking Japan and that he would initiate action toward making two bases on the scale of Poltava available to U. S. strategic air units in the Vladivostok area.

*e.* MARSHAL KHUDYAKOV stated his requirement for C-54 type transport aircraft and acknowledged the reply that General Kuter could see no chance of providing that type transport. Discussion of C-47's followed and it was agreed that the Army Air Forces would cut down on proposed provision of C-47's to our troop carrier units in order to make additional C-47's available to the Red Air Force. (General Deane has been informed that we can provide an additional 100 C-47's to the Soviets during the first six months of 1945 and can provide 40 per month thereafter. This will more than double any scheduled flow of C-47's to the Red Air Force, and in my opinion, will tax their capacity to absorb transports.)

*f.* MARSHAL KHUDYAKOV stated a requirement for four to five hundred single and twin engine trainers, plus 1500—200 to 400 horsepower trainer engines. The engines are for installation in Russian trainers. This was a surprise request. GENERAL KUTER replied that single engine primary trainers could be provided if shipping is available and that sympathetic consideration would be given to the request when received in Washington.

*g.* The current tour of the Army Air Forces Band in the European Theater, and General McNarney's suggestion that this band might be available to play in Moscow and the Balkan capitals was presented. GENERAL KUTER stated that if the Soviets wished to have the band, we would make it available and would request a visit to American bases by a Russian military choral group as a reciprocal gesture. AIR MARSHAL KHUDYAKOV voiced his personal hope that such arrangements could be made and requested that General Deane initiate the matter in writing in Moscow. General Deane will take this action.

*h.* GENERAL KUTER handed to Marshal Khudyakov a formal written statement of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff rejection of the Soviet's proposal to prohibit strategic air attack on targets near the Russian front without Soviet-American agreement.<sup>4</sup> MARSHAL KHUDYAKOV

<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, p. 801.

inferred that he had pressed the adoption of the agreement reached in the Khudyakov-Portal-Kuter meeting but had been overridden by the General Staff. This matter also will be handled by the Military Mission in Moscow.

This meeting concluded in a friendly tone with the statement that the airmen can get along all right, but whatever the nationality, the airmen cannot guarantee agreement by General Staffs.

(Dictated to and transcribed by S/Sgt. Arthur Miller. General Kuter's notes and Sgt. Miller's shorthand notes have been destroyed.)

L. S. KUTER,  
Major General, U. S. A.

Three (3) copies originally prepared, with distribution made to the individuals indicated below:

Admiral Leahy—No. 1  
General Hill —No. 2  
General Kuter—No. 3

Three (3) additional copies prepared, with distribution to the individuals indicated below:

General Marshall—No. 4  
Admiral King —No. 5  
General Hull —No. 6

J. C. S. Files

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*Memorandum of Conversation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[YALTA,] 9 February 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: Conference with Russian Staff.

On the afternoon of Friday, February 9th, General Antonov orally gave the following answers to the eleven questions propounded by the United States Chiefs of Staff the previous afternoon.

To the First Question—(Changes in projected operations). No change, except for delay in transfer of troops which it had been planned to get under way the first of the year. These troops are now engaged in the Central Sector on the Eastern Front, therefore the delay.

To the Second Question—(Necessity for Pacific Supply route). Marshal Stalin stated the Pacific Sea supply route will be required particularly for the delivery of food stuffs and petroleum products.

<sup>1</sup> Authorship not indicated.



Some air transport will probably be needed but due to its small carrying capacity the sea route is of first importance.

To the Third Question—(U. S. Airbases). Aviation bases in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk region will be given the United States Air Forces. Reconnaissances can now be made.

To the Fourth Question—(U. S. Defenses Kamchatka). Because Kamchatka is very far from the mainland United States assistance there will be very helpful.

To the Fifth Question—(Soviet construction for U.S.). When it is finally decided in exactly what places and what types of construction are required for the United States Air Forces in the district mentioned in the third question, the Russians will be able to carry out this construction for the United States forces. Assistance in the way of matériel is very desirable—gasoline tankage, knock-down buildings, etc.

To the Sixth Question—(Kamchatka Survey party). With regard to the reconnaissance of the Kamchatka region we ask you to arrange for the departure of the party only at the very last moment because under present conditions it is impossible to make the reconnaissance in secrecy. This does not apply to the reconnaissance of the Amur River district.

To the Seventh Question—(Occupation of Sakhalin). The Russians will take the southern half of Sakhalin Island considering this should be one of the first operations.

(Opening of the Straits of La Perouse). Answer is the same as yesterday. The Russians will do this.

To the Eighth Question—(Moscow Planning). Marshal Stalin stated that "From our side we shall fulfill your desires to carry on the planning vigorously."

To the Ninth Question—(Effect of weather on operations). From a ground force point of view the most difficult conditions will be experienced in the thaws and floods in April and May and although June is a favorable month, July and August are undesirable. As far as the ground forces are concerned weather will be most favorable in September, October and November. At sea weather is favorable in July, August and September.

To the Tenth Question—(Additional weather stations). Arrangements will be made to open additional stations if the details will be presented to the Russian authorities.

General Antonov expressed thanks for the information already given to him regarding the movements of Divisions to the Eastern Front and requested again that the Russian Staff be provided at the earliest moment with any information we might have regarding German concentrations and planned counter-attacks.

General Marshall informed General Antonov that arrangements were being made to give General Deane a daily routine report covering all such details of information in our possession, that if the character of the information or the details regarding it were not of a character satisfactory to General Antonov he would please notify General Deane accordingly and we would endeavor to meet his wishes.

General Marshall also informed General Antonov that he had discussed this matter with Field Marshal Brooke who is undertaking the moment he returns to London arrangements amplifying the information now being transmitted and expediting it; furthermore that instructions to this end had already been dispatched.

General Marshall then asked General Antonov if the United States Chiefs of Staff estimate was correct in the opinion of the Russians that if the Japanese obtained any intimation of the Russian concentration and intention in the Far East they themselves would launch an immediate offensive. General Antonov replied in the affirmative.

General Marshall then asked General Antonov how long a period was required for the concentration of additional troops and supplies on the Eastern Front and was told that three months was the desired period. General Antonov also stated that supplies, fuel and such were already being shipped but that the divisions could only go upon the completion of hostilities in Germany and then would be rushed. He stated that the equipment of the divisions would have to accompany them. It could not be sent in advance.

General Antonov requested that we keep the Russian Staff informed as to the deployment of the Japanese forces, particularly as regards Manchuria and as to the general progress of events in the Pacific.

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**SIXTH PLENARY MEETING, FEBRUARY 9, 1945, 4 P. M.,  
LIVADIA PALACE**

**PRESENT**

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Marshal Stalin
Secretary Stettinius	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Hopkins	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Mr. Maisky
Mr. Byrnes	Sir Edward Bridges	Mr. Gusev
Mr. Harriman	Mr. Jebb	Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Matthews	Mr. Wilson	Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Hiss	Mr. Dixon	
Mr. Bohlen	Major Birse	

Bohlen Collection

*Bohlen Minutes*

## TOP SECRET

THE PRESIDENT said he understood the Foreign Ministers had another report to make, and he would ask Mr. Stettinius, who presided today, to give it.

MR. STETTINIUS then reported on the results of the discussion concerning the Polish question as follows: <sup>1</sup>

The Foreign Ministers discussed at length the Polish Governmental question on the basis of a memorandum submitted by the American Delegation.<sup>2</sup> This memorandum, in accordance with Mr. Molotov's proposal, agreed to drop the question of the creation of a Presidential Committee.

With respect to reaching a formula on the question of the Polish Government, Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to present to Marshal Stalin certain new considerations advanced in the American memorandum before making a final statement. It was decided to continue discussion of this question at a later date and to report that the three Foreign Ministers thus far had not reached an agreement on the matter.

It was decided, at Mr. Churchill's request, that the Polish question would be discussed before Mr. Stettinius proceeded with the balance of his report.

MR. MOLOTOV said that the Soviet Delegation accepted as a basis of discussion the proposal put forward this morning at the meeting by Mr. Stettinius. He said the Soviet Delegation was very anxious to come to an agreement and he believed that this could be done with certain amendments to Mr. Stettinius' proposal. First, he offered an amendment which dealt with the first sentence of the formula. He suggested that in place of the sentence in Mr. Stettinius' draft that the following be substituted:

The present Provisional Government of Poland should be reorganized on a wider democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from those living abroad, and in this connection this government would be called the National Provisional Government of Poland.

He added that the next two sentences remained unchanged, but he had a slight amendment to the last sentence, namely that the words "non-Fascist and anti-Fascist" be added before the words "democratic parties." He then said that he felt the last sentence dealing with the responsibilities of the Ambassadors of the three Governments in Warsaw to observe and report on the carrying out of the free elections should be eliminated since he felt certain this would be offensive to the

<sup>1</sup> For the text of the report which Stettinius read, see *post*, pp. 858-860.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 815-816.

Poles and would needlessly complicate the discussions. He said that it was the first duty of Ambassadors anyway to observe and report, and therefore no such statement is necessary. He concluded that with these slight amendments Mr. Stettinius' proposal made this morning was acceptable.

MR. MOLOTOV said he had one more request, and that was that the Subasic-Tito agreement<sup>3</sup> in regard to Yugoslavia would be put into effect. He said that the Prime Minister, in messages to Marshal Stalin, had urged this, that there had been a series of delays, and he felt that agreement should be reached here. He felt that agreement should be reached here at this conference to put this agreement immediately into effect irrespective of the wishes of the King.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied he thought that the Yugoslavia question was virtually settled and would take no time, but he thought it better to proceed immediately to discuss the Polish question. He said he was glad to see that an advance had been made at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers and to hear Mr. Molotov's proposal on the urgent, immediate and painful problem of Poland. He said he wished to make some general suggestions that he hoped would not affect the movements the President had in mind. He said that here, in a general atmosphere of agreement, we should not put our feet in the stirrups and ride off. He said that he felt it would be a great mistake to hurry this question—it is better to take a few days of latitude than to endanger bringing the ship into port. He said it was a great mistake to take hurried decisions on these grave matters. He felt he must study the Polish proposals before giving any opinion.

THE PRESIDENT then proposed that Mr. Stettinius should finish his report on the meeting of Foreign Ministers this morning and then the conference would adjourn for half an hour in order to study Mr. Molotov's amendments to the Polish proposals.

MARSHAL STALIN and THE PRIME MINISTER agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER repeated that he felt that this great prize should not be imperilled by too much haste, and he definitely did not want to leave this conference without an agreement on the subject, which he felt to be the most important we had before us.

MR. STETTINIUS then read the following report of the meeting of Foreign Ministers on the results of their discussions on reparations:

The American Delegation submitted a draft proposal on the basic principles of exacting reparations from Germany for study and recommendation by the Moscow Reparations Commission.

Agreement was reached on the first two points relative to which countries should receive reparations, and to the types of reparations in kind Germany should pay.

<sup>3</sup> For the text of this agreement, see *ante*, pp. 251-254.

The Soviet and American Delegations reached agreement on the wording of the third (final) point to the effect that the Reparations Commission should consider in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government, that the total sum of the reparations in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the preceding paragraph, should be twenty billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Eden reserved his position to await instructions from his Government.

The Soviet Delegation stated that reparations payments would be based upon 1938 prices, having possibly in mind increases of 10 to 15% on the prices of the items delivered.

Mr. Stettinius then reported on the results of the discussion at the meeting of Foreign Ministers on the matter of providing machinery in the World Organization for dealing with territorial trusteeships and dependent areas, as follows:

It was agreed that the five Governments which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference [on] providing machinery in the World Charter for dealing with territorial trusteeship and dependent areas.

THE PRIME MINISTER interrupted with great vigor to say that he did not agree with one single word of this report on trusteeships. He said that he had not been consulted nor had he heard of this subject up to now. He said that under no circumstances would he ever consent to forty or fifty nations thrusting interfering fingers into the life's existence of the British Empire. As long as he was Minister, he would never yield one scrap of their heritage. He continued in this vein for some minutes.<sup>4</sup>

MR. STETTINIUS explained that this reference to the creation of machinery was not intended to refer to the British Empire, but that it had in mind particularly dependent areas which would be taken out of enemy control, for example, the Japanese islands in the Pacific. He said that it was felt that provision had to be made for machinery to handle this question of trusteeship for dependent areas taken from the enemy and he repeated that this was not intended to refer to the British Empire.

THE PRIME MINISTER accepted Mr. Stettinius' explanation but remarked it would be better to say it did not refer to the British Empire. He added that Great Britain did not desire any territorial aggrandizement but had no objection if the question of trusteeship was to be considered in relation to enemy territory. He asked how Marshal Stalin would feel if the suggestion was made that the Crimea should be internationalized for use as a summer resort.

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<sup>4</sup> For a facsimile of a page of Byrnes' shorthand notes covering this portion of the meeting, together with a transcription thereof, see Byrnes, pp. ix-x.

MARSHAL STALIN said he would be glad to give the Crimea as a place to be used for meetings of the three powers.<sup>5</sup>

MR. STETTINIUS then completed reading the report of the meeting of Foreign Ministers, as follows:

*Trusteeships (continued)*

It was also agreed that this subject should be discussed at the United Nations Conference itself.

The Sub-Committee appointed yesterday is continuing its work and will report to the Foreign Ministers today. This report will include matters pertaining to the form of the invitation to the forthcoming Conference. This subject was discussed at today's meeting, and there appears to be an identity of views thereon.

*Iran*

Sufficient time had not elapsed to permit the Soviet Delegation to give proper study to a paper submitted by Mr. Eden on this question.<sup>6</sup> The subject was consequently not discussed.

*Yugoslavia*

On the proposal of the Chairman, it was agreed that representatives of Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov should be appointed to draw up a statement on the Yugoslav situation.

There was also agreement that before the termination of the Crimean Conference it would be desirable that agreement should be reached on the execution of the Subasic-Tito agreement.

THE PRIME MINISTER then asked if the Soviet Government had agreed to the two amendments proposed by Mr. Eden in regard to the Subasic-Tito agreement.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that it was a question of putting the agreement speedily into effect and that amendments meant more delays. He said that it would be better to ask Tito and Subasic concerning the amendments after the agreement had gone into effect.

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired whether it was too much to ask that legislative acts of the temporary authorities be subject to confirmation by democratic processes.

MARSHAL STALIN said that delays were very undesirable and that if the British proposed two more amendments the Soviet Government might propose some of their own. In the meantime, the government of Yugoslavia was held in the balance.

THE PRIME MINISTER said you couldn't say this, as Tito was a dictator and could do what he wants.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that Tito is not a dictator but the head of a national committee without any clear government, and this is not a good situation.

<sup>5</sup> It appears that at about this point there was a brief intermission, during which, at Stettinius' request, Alger Hiss hastily prepared a summary of the Department's views on the trusteeship issue (see Stettinius, pp. 238-239). For the text of this summary, see *post*, p. 858.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, pp. 819-820.

MR. EDEN replied that it was not a question of amendments before the agreement went into force but merely that this conference request that they be adopted. He said that Subasic was going to ask for it anyway and as Tito would agree everything would be all right.

MARSHAL STALIN said the first of the British amendments provided that any former members of the Skupshtina who had not collaborated with the Germans should be included in the anti-Fascist Vetch,<sup>7</sup> and the second suggested that all legislative acts of the anti-Fascist Vetch should be confirmed by a regularly elected body. He said that he agreed with these amendments and found them good, but first he would like the government to be formed and then propose the amendments to it.

MR. EDEN remarked that he felt if we could agree here on the amendments then we could ask Tito after the agreement was in force to adopt them.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed to this proposal. He added that he thought it would be a good idea to send a telegram stating the desires of the three powers to have the agreement put into effect irrespective of the King's wishes.

THE PRIME MINISTER and MR. EDEN explained that the question of the King had been settled and anyway wasn't important, and Subasic was on his way to Yugoslavia, unless weather had prevented him, to put the agreement into effect. The Prime Minister added that he thought we should here agree to advise the adoption of the amendments.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he had already agreed, and as a man of his word he would not go back on it.

There was then a half-hour intermission for the study of the Polish proposals.

THE PRESIDENT said that after studying Mr. Molotov's amendment we were now very near agreement and it was only a matter of drafting. He said that for those governments which still recognized the London government the use of the words "Provisional Government" was somewhat difficult, and he felt that the first words of Mr. Molotov's amendment might read "The Government now operating in Poland". He said he felt it was very important for him in the United States that there be some gesture made for the six million Poles there indicating that the United States was in some way involved with the question of freedom of elections, and he therefore felt that the last sentence concerning the reports of the Ambassadors was important. He repeated that he felt, however, that it was only a matter of words and details and the three Foreign Ministers might meet tonight to discuss it.

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<sup>7</sup> Vetch, Communist committee of local government.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he agreed with the President that progress had been made, but he felt that the draft might be tied up by the Foreign Ministers this afternoon. He said that he had two points now that he wished to emphasize. He felt it was desirable to mention in the beginning the new situation that had been created as a result of the liberation of Poland by the Red Army which called for a government more broadly based. He said this might be an ornament but nevertheless an important ornament. He said the second question was more important and related to the last sentence of the United States draft. He said he would make an appeal to Marshal Stalin in that one of the great difficulties in the Polish situation was the lack of accurate information, and we were thus called on to make a decision of great responsibility on the basis of inadequate information. He said that we know that there are bitter feelings among the Poles and fierce language had been used by Osobka-Morawski in regard to the London government, and that he understood the Lublin government had declared its intention to try as traitors the members of the Polish Home Army and the underground forces. He said these reports caused great anxiety and perplexity in England, and he hoped these two points would be considered with Marshal Stalin's usual patience and kindness.

THE PRIME MINISTER continued that he personally would welcome observers of the three powers in any area where they appeared needed. He therefore felt that the last sentence of the United States draft in regard to responsibilities of the Ambassadors was very important. He said that he understood that Tito would have no objection to foreign observers when elections were to be held in Yugoslavia, and the British would welcome observers from the United States and the Soviet Union when elections were held in Greece, and the same would apply to Italy. He said these were not idle requests, since, for example, he knew in Egypt that whatever government held the elections won. He recalled that King Farouk for this reason refused to permit Nahas Pasha to hold an election while the latter was prime minister.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that he understood the Egyptian elections where he had heard that the very greatest politicians spent their time buying each other, but this could not be compared with Poland since there was a high degree of literacy in Poland. He inquired as to the literacy in Egypt, and neither the Prime Minister or Mr. Eden had this information at hand.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that he did not mean to compare Poland with Egypt, but he had to give the House of Commons real assurance that free elections would be held. For instance, would Mikolajczyk be allowed to take part in these elections?



MARSHAL STALIN remarked that Mikolajczyk was a member of the Peasant Party which wasn't a Fascist party and therefore he could take part in the elections.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested this question be considered by the Foreign Ministers tonight.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that he thought this was a matter which should be discussed in the presence of the Poles.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he thought this was a matter which was necessary to carry through and that it was important to assure the House of Commons that free elections would be held in Poland, . . .

MARSHAL STALIN, in reply to this observation, said they were good people and in olden times many of them were scientists. He mentioned Copernicus in this connection. He admitted that they were still quarrelsome and there were still some Fascist elements in Poland, and that was why "non-Fascist, etc." had been added to the term "democratic parties".

THE PRESIDENT said he would like to add one word. He felt that the elections was the crux of the whole matter, and since it was true, as Marshal Stalin had said, that the Poles were quarrelsome people not only at home but also abroad, he would like to have some assurance for the six million Poles in the United States that these elections would be freely held, and he said he was sure if such assurance were present that elections would be held by the Poles there would be no doubt as to the sincerity of the agreement reached here.

MARSHAL STALIN then said he had before him the Declaration on Liberated Europe, and Mr. Molotov had one small change to propose.<sup>8</sup> He said that in the fourth paragraph, after the part about consulting the other United Nations, he suggested adding the following:

In this connection, support will be given to the political leaders of those countries who have taken an active part in the struggle against the German invaders.<sup>9</sup>

Marshal Stalin remarked that with this slight amendment he found the Declaration acceptable.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that the Declaration would of course apply to any areas or countries where needed as well as to Poland.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he did not dissent from the President's proposed Declaration as long as it was clearly understood that the reference to the Atlantic Charter did not apply to the British Empire. He said he had already made plain in the House of Commons that as far as the British Empire was concerned the principles already applied. He said he had given Mr. Willkie a copy of his statement on this subject.

<sup>8</sup> For the text of the declaration as proposed by Roosevelt, see *post*, pp. 862-863.

<sup>9</sup> See *post*, p. 863.

THE PRESIDENT inquired if that was what had killed Mr. Willkie.

THE PRESIDENT said that in earlier drafts France had been included but was now absent.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that three powers were better than four.

THE PRIME MINISTER said it might be possible to ask France to associate itself with the Declaration.

THE PRESIDENT suggested that this matter be considered by the three Foreign Ministers tonight.

MARSHAL STALIN said that the Prime Minister need have no anxiety that Mr. Molotov's amendment was designed to apply to Greece.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he was not anxious about Greece—that he merely desired that everybody should have a fair chance and do his duty.

MARSHAL STALIN said he thought it would have been very dangerous if he had allowed other forces than his own to go into Greece.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he would welcome a Soviet observer in Greece.

MARSHAL STALIN said he had complete confidence in British policy in Greece.

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed gratification in this statement.

THE PRIME MINISTER then said that they should touch on, at this conference, the question of war criminals—that is, those whose crimes had no geographical limitation.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether his amendment to the Declaration was acceptable.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he thought it should be considered by the Foreign Ministers.

MARSHAL STALIN said that we could then consider it agreed that the Tito-Subasic agreement should go into effect immediately.

THE PRIME MINISTER concurred.

MARSHAL STALIN made some reference to sending a telegram to Tito but the suggestion was not pursued.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he personally had drafted the Declaration on German atrocities issued by the Moscow Conference which dealt with the subject of the main criminals whose crimes had no geographical location. He said it was an egg that he had laid himself and he thought a list of the major criminals of this category should be drawn up here. He said he thought they should be shot once their identity is established.

MARSHAL STALIN asked about Hess.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he thought that events would catch up with Hess. He said he believed these men should be given a judicial trial.

MARSHAL STALIN replied in the affirmative. He then asked if the war criminal question applied to prisoners of war.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that it did if they had violated the laws of war. He said that we should merely have an exchange of views here and no publicity should be given to the matter.

MARSHAL STALIN inquired if the offensive on the Western Front had begun.

THE PRIME MINISTER said yes—about 100,000 British launched an attack yesterday morning and made an advance of about 3,000 yards over a five-mile front. He said the defense had been weak except in two villages, and were now in contact with the defenses of the Siegfried Line. He said the second wave, of the United States 9th Army, was to start tomorrow. He added that this offensive was to continue and grow in intensity.

The meeting then adjourned until four o'clock tomorrow.

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Matthews Files

*Matthews Minutes*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

The President opened the meeting by calling on Mr. Stettinius to report on the 12 o'clock meeting of the foreign ministers. Mr. Stettinius read his report. Upon the conclusion of the section on Poland Mr. Molotov interrupted and said that he would like to make a few remarks. It was decided to hear his remarks on Poland prior to the reading of the rest of Mr. Stettinius' report.

MOLOTOV: We accept as a basis the proposal put forward this morning by Mr. Stettinius. We would like to come to an agreement, adding only some amendments. The first sentence we would modify to read that the provisional government should be "reorganized on a wider democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic statesmen in Poland and Poles living abroad." I have a second amendment to suggest. In the sentence on the holding of elections, I would revise to read: "In these elections all non-Fascist and anti-Fascist democratic parties would have the right to take part and to put forward candidates." My third amendment is the omission of the last sentence of Mr. Stettinius' draft which we feel would seriously offend the sensibilities of the Poles.

I have one more request to make. The carrying out of the Yugoslav settlement has been delayed. Since Mr. Churchill agreed on this settlement we feel that it should be carried out immediately.

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<sup>1</sup> For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Bohlen minutes of this meeting.

PRIME MINISTER: We can settle that in just a few minutes but let us wait until we finish discussing Poland. (This was agreed to.) I am glad to see that there has been a great advance towards a solution of the Polish question. I should like to have more time to study the problem.

(The President suggested a half hour intermission and this was agreed to but the Prime Minister continued.)

I mean more than that. I do not feel that we should hurry away from the Crimea leaving these vital problems unsolved or reach hasty decisions. These are among the most important days that any of us shall live. Of course you could all go away and leave me in this delightful spot but I do urge that we stay a little bit longer to conclude our discussions satisfactorily.

(There was no comment by either the President or Marshal Stalin on this statement.)

On Yugoslavia there were only two amendments to the agreement which Marshal Stalin has now had an opportunity to study.

STALIN: I agree with both of the suggested amendments but after the unified government is formed we will be in a position to carry them out. I propose that we first proceed with the formation of this unified government of Tito and Subasic and then we can proceed with the amendments.

(A copy of the British proposed amendments to the Tito-Subasic government is attached.)<sup>2</sup>

EDEN: We agree to this if it is likewise agreed that both of us will support the adoption of these amendments.

STALIN: This must be finished before we separate. We must have a promise that the Tito-Subasic agreement be carried out immediately creating a new government, irrespective of what fantasies there may be in the head of King Peter. Has Subasic actually left for Belgrade?

EDEN: We telegraphed last night to find out but have not yet heard. Any delay must be due to weather.

(Here followed the intermission during which consideration was given by the Americans and British to Molotov's amendments to Mr. Stettinius' formula.)

PRESIDENT: I find that it is now largely a question of etymology—of finding the right words. We are nearer than we have ever been before. I believe there is a chance of real agreement to settle this question of the period before the Poles can hold their election. I have two examples of what I mean by the use of words. Mr. Molotov says that the present Polish government should be reorganized on a wider basis. This is difficult for those recognizing the Polish government

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<sup>2</sup> Not attached, but see *ante*, p. 821.

in London. I suggest that the words be changed to, "The Polish provisional government now functioning in Poland." I have another example. Mr. Molotov proposes the elimination of the last sentence. (He reads it.) I suggest that some gesture be made to show that there will be an honest election. Therefore, I think that a little more work by the three foreign ministers tonight—we are sufficiently close—might settle the question. They can report the results of tonight's meeting to us tomorrow.

PRIME MINISTER: I agree with the President that there has been continuous progress towards a united declaration by the three principal powers. I agree with the President that the matter should be tidied up by the three foreign secretaries and reported to us tomorrow. But there are two points which I should like to emphasize now. The first is a small one. It arises out of what Marshal Stalin said yesterday. He said that Poland has been liberated and the enemy driven away—that is a great new fact. It is a good point to make before the world that the Red Army has liberated Poland. Therefore, a new situation has been created. This calls for the establishment of a new provisional Polish government, that this now be more broad based than before liberation. That gives a good chance for what we say to be received favorably by the world. It is ornamental but it is important to us.

The other point is much more important. That is the last sentence of the United States draft. I want to make an appeal to Marshal Stalin. We are at a great disadvantage in discussing Polish affairs for we know very little but must take great responsibilities. We know there are very bitter feelings among the Poles. Very fierce language has been used by Mr. Morawski. I am informed that the Lublin government has openly declared its intentions to try as traitors all members of the Polish Home Army. This causes us great anxiety and distress. We are perplexed in forming our view. Of course, I put first the non-hampering of the operations of the Red Army against Germany. But I would ask the Marshal with patience and kindness to consider our position. We really do not know what is going on except through a few people we parachuted in and a few we brought out through the underground. I don't like to obtain information that way. How can this be remedied without hampering the movements of the Red Army, which movements are, of course, before everything else in importance? Could any facilities be granted to the British—and the United States would no doubt like to participate—in order to see how the Polish quarrels are being settled? That is why the last sentence is so important for us. Might I say if elections take place in Yugoslavia, Tito will have no objection to Russian, British and American observers to assure the world that they are

impartial. So far as Greece is concerned, when elections are held, which we hope will be soon, we would greatly welcome U. S., Russian and British observers to show the world. The same thing is true of Italy. There are vast changes in the Italian political situation. There must be elections to form a constitutional assembly or parliament. Our formula is the same. The U. S., Britain and Russia should be observers to see that they are carried out impartially. These are no idle requests. In Egypt whatever government conducts the elections wins. Nahas wanted elections when he quarreled with the King. The King said, "No, not while you are in office." When he turned Nahas out the King's people won.

STALIN: I do not believe much in Egyptian elections. It is all rotten corruption there. They buy each other.

PRIME MINISTER: Anyway, we seek this formula.

STALIN: What percentage of the people read and write in Egypt? In Poland 70% can read and write.

PRIME MINISTER: I do not know the Egyptian percentage, but I meant no comparison with Poland. I only wanted fair elections. This should be considered with the Poles. I do not want to go on any longer. We have agreed to think this over. But I must be able to tell Parliament that elections will be free and fair.

STALIN: Mikolajczyk is a representative of the Peasant Party. The Peasant Party is not Fascist and will take part in the elections. Those candidates will be allowed to stand.

PRIME MINISTER: Yes, specifically as a government is formed.

STALIN: Yes, the Peasant Party will be represented. This can be done in the presence of the Poles with various people present.

PRIME MINISTER: In Parliament I must be able to say that the elections will be held in a fair way. I do not care much about Poles myself.

STALIN: There are some very good people among the Poles. They are good fighters. Of course, they fight among themselves too. I think on both sides there are non-Fascist and anti-Fascist elements.

PRIME MINISTER: I do not like this division. Anybody can call anybody anything. We prefer the terminology democratic parties.

STALIN: I refer to the declaration on liberated areas. On the whole I approve it. I find in a certain paragraph the same expression, anti-Nazism and anti-Fascism.

PRESIDENT: This is the first example for the use of the declaration. It has the phrase to create democratic institutions of their own choice. The next paragraph contains the following: (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people.

STALIN: We accept that paragraph three.

PRESIDENT: I want this election in Poland to be the first one beyond question. It should be like Caesar's wife. I did not know her but they said she was pure.

STALIN: They said that about her but in fact she had her sins.

PRESIDENT: I don't want the Poles to be able to question the Polish elections. The matter is not only one of principle but of practical politics.

MOLOTOV: We are afraid to leave this phrase in without consulting with the Poles. They will feel that it shows a lack of confidence in them. It is better to leave it to the Poles.

PRESIDENT: Why not leave this for the foreign ministers and talk about it tomorrow?

STALIN: I think in the first place in the words "present provisional Polish government" we can delete the word "present." We can say, "the Polish government which acts in Poland."

PRESIDENT: The only thing left is this declaration on liberated areas.

PRIME MINISTER: I do not dissent from this declaration but I want to be on record that the Atlantic Charter I once interpreted as affecting the British empire. We are pursuing the Atlantic Charter. I sent a copy of this interpretation to Wendell Willkie.

PRESIDENT: Was that what killed him? (Laughter)

PRIME MINISTER: I will furnish the conference with a copy of this record. (This part was not clear.)

EDEN: I suppose it would be left open for France to associate herself with this declaration at a later date.

STALIN: Three would be better.

MOLOTOV: I should like to add at the end of the third from last paragraph the following phrase: "and there will be secured a wide measure of support to men in those countries who have taken active part in the struggle against German occupation."

PRIME MINISTER: (This seemed irrelevant) On Greece there was no question of setting up an allied commission but if Marshal Stalin wants to send in military observers they can go anywhere they like.

STALIN: I have full confidence in the way things are going.

PRIME MINISTER: I should like to discuss the treatment of war criminals. I sent a paper to the conference at Moscow. This is an egg I have laid myself. (He then discusses at some length the question of having lists prepared of principal war criminals and the question of holding trials.) There is nothing of course that would be said in public about this because I fear retaliation on our prisoners. (The President indicates that we are not ready to discuss this question at this meeting.)

PRESIDENT: I propose adjournment.

PRIME MINISTER: I should like to announce that the British troops began an attack at dawn yesterday in the Nijmegen area. They advanced about three thousand yards and are now in contact with the Siegfried Line. They were not strongly resisted. Several hundred prisoners were taken. Tomorrow the second wave will follow and the American Ninth Army comes in. The offensive will continue without cessation.

The meeting adjourned.

Hiss Collection

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*Hiss Notes*<sup>1</sup>

Get copy of Eden's report of 2/8

Q of invitation to Poland

Plenary session

2/9 4.18 p m

ERS read his report

Mol: After Polish part

New suggestions—~~postponed till conclusion of report~~

Amendments to Am. proposal re "reorg" etc & re Ambs.

Church: glad see advance

But going say something before goes on Refers to some private talks we have had about Lublin To Pres—if you will forgive me ~~Can't be hurried~~ Feels this matter can't be hurried. It may be complete meeting of minds can be achieved in the time we have in view. There are only 48 hrs left. I do not like to feel spoiling whole thing. Must say we should, if nec., take a day's latitude. If we leave here without agt about Pol whatever else we say we shall have failed on the most dangerous & tiresome matter I haven't taken it all in fully<sup>2</sup>

(1) Get copy of Eden's report of 2/8

Plenary session 2/9

4:28 p. m.

(2) Q of Poland as invited nation to Conference

(3) Add T. T.<sup>3</sup> formula to ERS report & eliminate "dependent areas"

(4) See H H<sup>4</sup> re point 2 of formula

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<sup>1</sup> From penciled notes in longhand. For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Bohlen minutes of this meeting.

<sup>2</sup> The foregoing is in Hiss' handwriting on a loose sheet found in the Matthews Files.

<sup>3</sup> Territorial trusteeship.

<sup>4</sup> Harry Hopkins.



ERS read report

\* Mol. After Pol. section, Mol. proposed amendments to U. S. paper of this morning

Re Terr trusteeship part of ERS report

I absolutely refuse to engage myself in that without consultation with the dominions. I will not have 1 scrap of the Brit Empire . . . (lost) . . . .<sup>5</sup>

after all we have done in the war

I will not consent to a repres of Brit Em. going to any conference where we will be placed in the dock & asked to defend ourselves  
Never, Never, Never

If you tell me we are not to go & be brought up before a vague tribunal & be told how to be good & proper I will not object.

Every scrap of terr. over which Brit flag flies is immune

ERS: Only plan is to provide machinery for trusteeship if org. wants set it up. We had in mind Jap. mandated islands to be taken from Jap.

We have nothing in mind in relation to Brit Empire.

Church: We desire no territory

Say it will in no way affect integrity of Brit. Em.

(In intermission a formula was agreed to)

Decl. on Lib. Eur.

Referred Pol q. back to For. Mins. for night session

Church: made speech in favor of Ambs. watching over Pol election

When in discussion of this Church said we don't like word fascist, St referred to Decl. on Lib. Eur. ¶ 2, 1st sentence & said he liked Decl.

Pres. then read ¶ 3 from (c) on.

St: We accept that

Pres: spoke of need of elections being above suspicion

Pres then brought up Decl. formally

Church I do not assent from this but I would like it on record that Atl. Ch. was interpreted by me on my return from Newfoundland in short ¶ I read to H of C. that we were pursuing these aims in Brit Em. That is a part of our interpretation. I sent it to Wendel Willkie

Pres Was that what killed him?

Church. I will furnish conf. with copy of this code (?)

Ed. Might be left open to 3 powers to associate the Fr. with them if they so desire

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<sup>5</sup> Points appear in the original.

St. Three will be better—looks better

Ed. I don't want to change it now

Mol—amendment addition: at the end—of ~~next~~ to 3rd from last comma &:

~~When the 3 Govts will consult the other Un Na~~  
give strong

& there will be executed wide measures of support to the men of these countries who ~~take~~ took active part struggle in the fight ag. Ger. occupation.

No other suggestion

Pres: I like the thought. Let For Mins look at the language

St to Church who was about to say something "Are you worried about Gr." <sup>6</sup> (laughing)

Church I should like election in Gr.

St. I don't want to control Mr Church.

Church: I don't want to control the elections

If Mar. St. wants to send in some of his resp. officers they can go where they like

St I have every conf. in the Brit. policy

Church Let Unrra come in & give food

Church: One q. we shall have to consider at—war criminals

Get Grew's statement?  
Get Ed. note to ERS re same?  
Get

Note: After Pres. made his commitment on 2/8 re Sov. Reps Justice Byrnes was very agitated & discussed it with Flynn coming home from Stalin dinner. Flynn said, with apparently some confusion of thought, that the Irish in N. Y. & other cities would never agree to Britain having 6 votes & Russia 3 with U. S. only 1. He said D. O. is dead. Byrnes then began considering giving Puerto Rico, Hawaii & Alaska votes & he & Churchill & the Pres. discussed it a [sic] lunch on 2/9. I talked to Byrnes after plenary meeting on 2/9 & argued against that. I said if Pres. could get St. to release him from his commitment that would be best course Byrnes still seemed to be worried about Brit. citing 1920 League campaign \*

\*Byrnes was particularly worried because Pres. had made a special point with Sen. For. Rels. Com. & others of the ridiculousness of Sov. proposal re republics.

<sup>6</sup> Greece.

<sup>7</sup> This item bears a check-mark on the original.

Hiss Collection

*United States Delegation Memorandum*<sup>1</sup>

[YALTA, February 9, 1945.]

Ret to AH

P. M. & President, Eden & Cadogan  
approved on 2/9 at Plenary session  
during intermission

(Insert A)

Add to ERS report of 2/9

Territorial trusteeship would apply only to:

- (1) Existing mandates of the League of Nations.
- (2) Territory to be detached from the enemy as a result of this war. ?
- (3) Any other territory that may voluntarily be placed under trusteeship.

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It would be a matter of subsequent agreement as to which territories within the above categories would actually be placed under trusteeship. No discussions<sup>\*</sup> of <sup>actual</sup> specific<sup>†</sup> territories are contemplated now or at the United Nations Conference. Only machinery & principles of trusteeship would be formulated at the Conference for inclusion in the Charter.

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<sup>1</sup> It appears that this paper, which is in the penciled handwriting of Alger Hiss, was written during a brief intermission in the plenary meeting on February 9 (see *ante*, p. 845). The paper consists of draft language which was subsequently incorporated in the report of the Foreign Ministers' meeting of the same day (see *infra*).

Hiss Collection

*Revised Report by the Foreign Ministers to the Sixth Plenary Meeting*<sup>1</sup>

[YALTA,] February 9, 1945.

REPORT TO THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS'  
MEETING, FEBRUARY 9, 19451. *The Polish Question:*

The Foreign Ministers discussed at length the Polish Governmental question on the basis of a memorandum submitted by the American Delegation. This memorandum, in accordance with Mr. Molotov's proposal, agreed to drop the question of the creation of a Presidential Committee.

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<sup>1</sup> Carbon copy which contains in the margin the following notation in Hiss' handwriting: "Corrected as result of Plenary session 2/9 & copies given to Gromyko & Jebb 2/10 at For. Mins. meeting. Correction app'd by Pres. 2/10 just before Plenary session."

With respect to reaching a formula on the question of the Polish Government, Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to present to Marshal Stalin certain new considerations advanced in the American memorandum before making a final statement. It was decided to continue discussion of this question at a later date and to report that the three Foreign Ministers thus far had not reached an agreement on the matter.

## 2. *Reparations:*

The American Delegation submitted a draft proposal on the basic principles of exacting reparations from Germany for study and recommendation by the Moscow Reparations Commission.

Agreement was reached on the first two points relative to which countries should receive reparations, and to the types of reparations in kind, Germany should pay.

The Soviet and American Delegations reached agreement on the wording of the third (final) point to the effect that the Reparations Commission should consider in its initial studies as a basis for discussion, the suggestion of the Soviet Government, that the total sum of the reparations in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the preceding paragraph, should be twenty billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Soviet Union. Mr. Eden reserved his position.

The Soviet Delegation stated that reparations payments would be based upon 1938 prices, having possibly in mind increases of 10 to 15% on the prices of the items delivered.

## 3. *Dumbarton Oaks:*

It was agreed that the five Governments which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on providing machinery in the World Charter for dealing with territorial trusteeships.

Territorial trusteeship would apply only to:

- (1) Existing mandates of the League of Nations.
- (2) Territory to be detached from the enemy as a result of this war.
- (3) Any other territory that may voluntarily be placed under trusteeship.

It would be a matter of subsequent agreement as to which territories within the above categories would actually be placed under trusteeship. No discussions of specific territories are contemplated now or at the United Nations Conference. Only machinery and principles of trusteeship would be formulated at the Conference for inclusion in the Charter.

A Sub-Committee appointed yesterday is continuing its work and will report to the Foreign Ministers. This report will include matters pertaining to the form of the invitation to the forthcoming Conference.

This subject was discussed at today's meeting, and there appears to be an identity of views thereon.

4. *Iran:*

Sufficient time had not elapsed to permit the Soviet Delegation to give proper study to a paper submitted by Mr. Eden on this question. The subject was consequently not discussed.

5. *Yugoslavia:*

On the proposal of Mr. Stettinius, it was agreed that representatives of Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov should be appointed to draw up a statement on the Yugoslav situation.

There was also agreement that before the termination of the Crimean Conference it would be desirable that agreement should be reached on the execution of the Subasic-Tito agreement.

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Hiss Collection

*United States Delegation Draft of a Declaration on Liberated Europe*<sup>1</sup>

[YALTA, February 5, 1945.]

DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

The President of the United States of America, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the President of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert the action of their four governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The retreat of the Nazi war machine and the collapse of its puppet regimes, under the relentless blows of the victorious armies and resistance forces of the United Nations, are leaving behind confusion and disorder, and incalculable distress and suffering. The agony of the liberated peoples must be relieved. Swift steps must be taken

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<sup>1</sup> Carbon copy; carries this penciled notation in Hiss' handwriting: "1st re-draft after talking to Justice Byrnes Copy given 5:15 P. M. to Jebb 2/5 at Yalta Copies to ERS, HFM, Byrnes and Hopkins 8:15 p. m." This paper was included in the Hiss Collection with other drafts on this subject following the Plenary Meeting on February 10, 1945, when the subject was also discussed (see *post*, p. 899).

during the temporary period of confusion and disorder to help them in the orderly reconstruction of their daily living.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a promise of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the four governments will take joint action in any European liberated state and any former Axis satellite state in Europe where in the judgment of the four governments conditions may make such action necessary, to assist the peoples concerned (*a*) to establish conditions of internal peace; (*b*) to carry out emergency measures for care of distressed peoples and for solution of pressing economic problems; (*c*) to set up governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (*d*) to arrange and conduct free elections held to determine the type and composition of governments.

The four governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

In carrying out this declaration the four governments will, usually, act through their respective ambassadors nearest to the area concerned, although on occasion the four governments may determine to appoint special commissions charged with responsibility for carrying out the policy of this declaration with respect to particular areas. Such ambassadors of the four governments as have been authorized jointly to take action pursuant to the declaration, and any special commission which may be established for the same purpose, shall meet quarterly with the foreign ministers of the four governments at places to be selected hereafter.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom, and general well-being of all mankind.

Bohlen Collection

*Text Proposed by the United States for a Declaration on Liberated Europe, February 9, 1945*<sup>1</sup>

DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require, (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

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<sup>1</sup>This was the draft submitted by President Roosevelt to the Plenary Meeting on February 9, 1945. See *ante*, p. 848. Carbon copies are also in the Matthews Files and the Hiss Collection.

When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately establish appropriate machinery for the carrying out of the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

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Bohlen Collection

*Soviet Amendment to the Draft Declaration on Liberated Europe*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

Amendment proposed by Mr. Molotov at Plenary Session of Feb. 9:

At the end of the fourth paragraph, omit the period, insert a comma, and add the following:

“and strong support will be given to those people in these countries who took an active part in the struggle against German occupation.”

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<sup>1</sup> Attached to the Page minutes of the Foreign Ministers' meeting on February 10, 1945. See *ante*, p. 848. Copies are also in the Matthews Files and the Hiss Collection.

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740.00114 EW/2-545

TRIPARTITE MEETING ON THE DRAFT AGREEMENT REGARDING  
LIBERATED PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIANS, FEBRUARY 9, 1945,  
4:30 P. M., VORONTSOV VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES  
General Deane  
Mr. Page

UNITED KINGDOM  
Admiral Archer

SOVIET UNION  
Mr. Novikov  
Assistant



*Memorandum of Conversation*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

Subject: Examination of the Draft Relating to Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by the Soviet and Allied Armies.<sup>2</sup>

EXAMINATION OF THE DRAFT RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIANS LIBERATED BY THE SOVIET AND ALLIED ARMIES

*Preamble.*

No comment.

*Article I.*

No comment.

*Article II, paragraph 1.*

Mr. Novikov requested that the words "undertake to follow all" be replaced by the words "at the same time take the necessary steps to implement."

*Article II, paragraph 3.*

Mr. Novikov requested that the words "notifying the competent Soviet or Allied authorities" be replaced by "effected as a rule by agreement or in any case only after notification to the competent Soviet or Allied authorities."

*Article III.*

Mr. Novikov said that he would prefer the text of Article III of the Soviet draft.<sup>3</sup> This reads as follows:

"3. The competent British and Soviet authorities will supply liberated Soviet citizens and British subjects with food, clothing, housing and medical attention both in camps or points of concentration and en route, and with transport until they are handed over to the authorities at the other side at places agreed upon between the sides on the following basis:

"(a) Ex-prisoners of war shall be provided with all forms of supply (stores and food) on a basis laid down respectively for privates, non-commissioned officers and officers.

"(b) Civilians will be supplied on a basis laid down for privates.

"The parties will not mutually demand compensation for these or other services which their authorities may respectively supply to liberated Soviet citizens or British subjects."

It will be noticed that the Soviet draft makes no mention of UNRRA or other relief agencies and makes special provision of supplies to civilians.

<sup>1</sup> Authorship not indicated, but Page has stated that this memorandum was drafted by him (telegram from Paris, September 15, 1954, 740.5/9-1554).

<sup>2</sup> The draft under discussion was the draft approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on February 8, 1945 (*ante*, pp. 754-756).

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 416-418.

In endeavoring to find a compromise the British suggested a draft omitting the first three lines of Article III (up to the parenthetical statement) and revise the last sentence of the first paragraph to read as follows:

“The standards of such food, clothing, housing and medical attention shall make distinction between military rank but shall apply to liberated civilians and liberated members of the respective forces.”

The Soviets explained that the reference to UNRRA was superfluous since there was nothing in the agreement which would bar UNRRA or any other relief agency from operating. They said they would refer the British re-draft to their Government.

*Article IV.*

The Soviets requested the insertion of the words “in agreement with the other party” twice after the words “liberty to use.”

*Article V.*

The British wish to add the words “except for the cases of payment of Lira in Italy which shall be subject to future discussions” at the end of the second paragraph.

The Russians stated that they thought this insertion should read “except for the cases of payment of Lira, \_\_\_\_\_, and \_\_\_\_\_, in Italy, Rumania, and Bulgaria which shall be the subject of future discussions.”

*Article VI.*

The British pointed out that they had added a new sentence which had not as yet been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This sentence which comes at the end of the article, reads as follows:

“Any liberated member of the respective forces who is unwilling to perform such will be exercised under similar supervision.”

*Article VII.*

No comment.

*Article VIII.*

No comment.

In addition to the above comments, it was considered advisable to include an additional article reading to the effect that “the agreement enters into force upon signature.”

The British representative also stated that his Government desired to exchange notes with the Soviet Government concerning nationals of other countries, (Belgium, Holland, Poland), in British uniform who were liberated by the Russian armies.

The question also came up as to whether a tri-lateral or two bi-lateral agreements should be signed. The Russians indicated that they were prepared to sign either document.

It was suggested that a further meeting be called tomorrow at 3:30 p. m.<sup>4</sup> and that endeavors be made to have the documents signed by Mr. Molotov, Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius no later than Sunday.

[Attachment]

REVISED BRITISH WORDING, FEB. 9.

*Article 6.*

X [*Ex-*] Prisoners of War (with the exception of officers) and civilians of each of the contracting parties may, until their repatriation, be employed in the management, maintenance and administration of the camps or billets in which they are situated. They may also be employed on a voluntary basis on other work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreement to be reached between the competent Soviet and { United States / British } authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labour shall be determined by agreement between these authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with military standards and procedure and under the supervision of their officers. Any liberated member of the respective forces who is unwilling to perform such work will be exercised under similar supervision.

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<sup>4</sup> No minutes of such a meeting have been found.

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MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, FEBRUARY 9, 1945,  
10:30 P. M., YUSUPOV PALACE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
Secretary Stettinius	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Harriman	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Matthews	Mr. Jebb	Mr. Gusev
Mr. Bohlen	Mr. Roberts	Mr. Gromyko
	Mr. Allen	Mr. Golunsky

Bohlen Collection

*Bohlen Minutes*

TOP SECRET

Subjects: Poland

## Declaration on Liberated Areas

The meeting was opened by MR. MOLOTOV announcing that we had come together to discuss formulas with regard to Poland. MR. EDEN interrupted to say that he had just had a strong cable from the War Cabinet indicating that the earlier basis of discussion had not been satisfactory. He must, therefore, frankly say if we cannot get something like his text of three days ago there seems no chance of the British Government approving a formula. (The text of Mr. Eden's earlier formula is attached)<sup>1</sup> He thereupon handed the attached draft of a "revised formula" to Mr. Molotov.<sup>2</sup> There was some lively discussion as to whether this was in fact a new formula to which MR. MOLOTOV objected, or whether it should be considered merely a modification of the American formula to which amendments could be added. This latter viewpoint was finally accepted, MR. EDEN explaining that the first two sentences were merely a reiteration of what the Prime Minister had said in the afternoon.

After a lengthy but amicable discussion, the following text was agreed to by all three:

"A new situation has been created by the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a provisional Polish government more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The provisional government now functioning in Poland should be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from those living abroad. This new government will then be called the 'Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.' Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, are authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present provisional government and with other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This 'Polish Provisional Government of National Unity' would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties would have the right to take part and to put forth candidates.

"When a 'Polish Provisional Government of National Unity' has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the three governments will then accord it recognition."

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<sup>1</sup> *Post*, pp. 869-870.

<sup>2</sup> *Post*, pp. 870-871.

The one important point on which considerable discussion failed to produce agreement was with respect to the addition of a further sentence along the following lines:

"The ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw, following such recognition, would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections."

MR. STETTINIUS and MR. EDEN emphasized the importance of the inclusion of some such sentence if recognition is to be transferred from the London Government because of its effect on public opinion in their respective countries. MR. MOLOTOV insisted that this was a point that could be discussed with the Poles by the commission of three in Moscow but could not be included without such discussion as it would offend their sensibilities. MR. STETTINIUS then proposed a variation of that sentence, reading as following:

"The three governments recognizing their responsibility as a result of the present agreement for the future right of the Polish people freely to choose the government and institutions under which they are to live, will receive reports on this subject from their ambassadors in Warsaw."

MR. MOLOTOV had the same objections to this sentence. It was left that the question would be put up to the Big Three Meeting this afternoon.

The second point discussed concerned Mr. Molotov's proposed addition to the draft declaration on liberated areas. He proposed that the following clause be added at the conclusion of the third from last paragraph:

"And in this connection support should be given to the political leaders of these countries who took an active part in the struggle against the German invaders."

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he could not accept this addition and that it did not appear pertinent to the declaration. He said that it appeared like too much interference in the affairs of these countries and involved taking decisions on who had collaborated with the enemy, which should be left to the peoples of these countries themselves. MR. EDEN expressed full concurrence with those views. It was agreed likewise to refer this to the next session of the Big Three.

Matthews Files

*Matthews Notes*<sup>1</sup>

EDEN: Done work—put together a piece of work.

MOL: Objects new text—Wants old

EDEN: Cable War Cab tonight objecting his text 3 days ago. and extent of departure from other text. Says frankly, if can't get something like this text no chance of Brit Govt approving

MOL: Cant talk from a new text

EDEN: Has had text 2½ days

MOL: Until now hasnt had text & can't judge it.

EDEN: 1st par. exactly what P. M. read out this p. m.

MOL: Differs from text this a. m. & big conference. Objects "represent" pol govt. Whether de G.<sup>2</sup> is rep. govt is a ? Mr. Churchill said his amend. not very import on first sen.

EDEN: Proposes amend. in 1st 2 sen. This in accord with P. M.s suggest.

MOL: Thinks "represent govt requires much explan. De G. Amend in Connection with prev. Govt now

EDEN: Must be frank. Wants transfer recog. to *new* govt—not reorgan. Lublin govt.

MOL: One further step

Last ¶ must be discussed

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<sup>1</sup> For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Bohlen minutes of this meeting.

<sup>2</sup> Presumably De Gaulle.

Bohlen Collection

*British Proposal on Polish Boundaries and Government*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[YALTA,] February 8, 1945.

## REVISED FORMULA FOR POLAND

1. It was agreed that the Curzon Line should be the eastern frontier of Poland with adjustments in some regions of 5 to 8 kilometers in favour of Poland.

2. It was decided that the territory of Poland in the west should include the free city of Danzig, the regions of East Prussia west and south of Königsberg, the administrative district of Oppeln in Silesia and the lands desired by Poland to the east of the line of the Oder. It was understood that the Germans in the said regions should be

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<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 867.

repatriated to Germany and that all Poles in Germany should at their wish be repatriated to Poland.

3. Having regard to the recent liberation of western Poland by the Soviet armies it was deemed desirable to facilitate the establishment of a fully representative provisional Polish Government based upon all the democratic and anti-Fascist forces in Poland and including democratic leaders from Poles abroad. That Government should be so constituted as to command recognition by the three Allied Governments.

4. It was agreed that the establishment of such a provisional Government was the primary responsibility of the Polish people, and that, pending the possibility of free elections, representative Polish leaders should consult together on the composition of this provisional Government. V. M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr were entrusted with the task of approaching such leaders and submitting their proposals to the consideration of the three Allied Governments.

5. It was deemed desirable that the provisional Polish Government, thus established, should as soon as possible hold free and unfettered elections on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot, in which all democratic parties should have the right to participate and to promote candidatures, in order to ensure the establishment of a Government truly representative of the will of the Polish people.

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Bohlen Collection

*British Revised Proposal on the Polish Government*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

BRITISH REVISED FORMULA SUBMITTED AT THE MEETING OF FOREIGN SECRETARIES AFTER THE PLENARY SESSION OF FEBRUARY 9, 1945

"A new situation has been created by the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a fully representative provisional Polish Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland. This Government should be based upon the Provisional Government now functioning in Poland and upon other democratic Polish leaders from within Poland and from abroad. This new Government should be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

"Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr should be authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of

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<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 867.

the present Provisional Government and with other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This "Provisional Government of National Unity" would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections, all democratic parties would have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

"When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been formed, which the three Governments can regard as fully representative of the Polish people, the three Governments will accord it recognition. The Ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw, following such recognition, would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections."

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SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1945

MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, FEBRUARY 10, 1945, NOON,  
VORONTSOV VILLA

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
Secretary Stettinius	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar
Mr. Harriman	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Molotov
Mr. Matthews	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Hiss	Mr. Jebb	Mr. Maisky
Mr. Page	Mr. Dixon	Mr. Gusev
	Major Theakstone	Mr. Gromyko
		Mr. Pavlov

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*Page Minutes*

TOP SECRET

- Subjects: <sup>1</sup>
1. The Polish Formula.
  2. Declaration on Liberated Europe.
  3. Yugoslavia.
  4. Reparations.
  5. Communiqué on the Crimean Conference.
  6. World Organization.
  7. Austro-Yugoslav Frontier.
  8. Yugoslav-Italian Frontier.
  9. Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations.
  10. Iran.

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<sup>1</sup> For the United States Delegation memorandum on the items still before the Foreign Ministers, see *post*, p. 882.



MR. EDEN, who presided, opened the meeting.

1. *The Polish Formula.*

MR. STETTINIUS stated that the American experts as well as the President had given serious study to the Polish formula<sup>2</sup> and that the American Delegation was prepared to withdraw the last sentence, which Mr. Molotov had objected to, on the understanding that the President would be free to make any statement he felt necessary on Poland relative to his receiving information from his Ambassador on the question.

Later in the conversation MR. EDEN stated that he did not wish to indicate during the conversation on the Polish formula that he agreed with the American proposal to drop this last sentence.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he, of course, preferred the document as it existed. The President, however, was so anxious to reach agreement that he was willing to make this concession.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had several amendments to the formula. He proposed that "as soon as practicable" be changed to "as soon as possible." He also proposed that the last part of the last paragraph be drafted to read: "the Governments of the United States of America and Great Britain will establish diplomatic relations with the Polish Government as has been done by the Soviet Union."<sup>3</sup>

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he could not agree with this second change.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that a special situation existed in Poland. The Soviet Government had accorded the Polish Government recognition, whereas, the United States and Great Britain had not.

MR. EDEN said that the Government referred to in the formula was a new government and that it was most necessary that the three Allies move together in recognizing it.

MR. STETTINIUS supported Mr. Eden and added that it was vital for public opinion in the United States to adhere to the principle of a new Polish Government.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the present situation was a different one and that the document would reflect this difference. He referred to the inadvisability of prejudicing the present situation or raising difficulties in the rear of the Red Army. He suggested that the matter be given consideration and be subsequently discussed. Mr. Molotov later suggested that Mr. Eden make a full report on last night's and

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 867.

<sup>3</sup> See the United States Delegation memorandum, *post*, p. 884.

today's discussion on the Polish situation for submission to the plenary session.<sup>4</sup>

## 2. *Declaration on Liberated Europe.*

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he had consulted with his experts and with the President on the Declaration on Liberated Areas and that he was obliged to say that the American Government found it impossible to accept the amendment proposed by Mr. Molotov at the Plenary Session of February 9. To do so would cause untold difficulties in United States domestic affairs. The text of this Declaration, with Mr. Molotov's amendment is attached hereto.<sup>5</sup>

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he wished to submit a second amendment. He suggested that in the fifth paragraph the words "they will immediately establish appropriate machinery for the carrying out of the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration," be replaced by the words "they will immediately take measures for the carrying out of mutual consultation."

MR. STETTINIUS and MR. EDEN agreed to this formula.

MR. STETTINIUS inquired as to the status of Mr. Molotov's amendment of February 9.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed that it should be dropped, though he remarked that he thought it very useful in that it might prevent recurrences similar to those in Greece.

MR. EDEN inquired whether the British proposals<sup>6</sup> regarding French association were acceptable.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he had not had sufficient time to give full consideration to this proposal. He suggested that it be discussed at the four o'clock meeting.

MR. STETTINIUS observed that he approved highly the British proposal and recommended that it be included in the Declaration.

## 3. *Yugoslavia.*

MR. EDEN stated that he had been informed that Subasic was due to leave today or tomorrow for Belgrade. The principal question under dispute, as he understood it, has been about the names of the Regents. However, in the British view, there was no reason why this should hold up the execution of the agreement. If Mr. Molotov so desired, Mr. Eden stated that Marshal Stalin's proposal might be accepted to the effect that a telegram be sent setting forth the views of the Foreign Ministers on the Yugoslav situation.

<sup>4</sup> For the formula on Poland as amended by the Foreign Ministers, see the United States Delegation memorandum, *post*, pp. 883-884, and Eden's report to the Seventh Plenary Meeting, *post*, p. 898.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, pp. 862-863.

<sup>6</sup> *Post*, p. 884.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether any mention should be made of Yugoslavia in the Crimea Conference Communiqué.

MR. EDEN suggested that both courses might be advisable.

MR. MOLOTOV recalled that Marshal Stalin had suggested that a telegram be sent to Tito and Subasic suggesting that they expedite the coming into force of the agreement.

MR. EDEN stated that he would submit such a draft telegram to the Foreign Ministers for consideration.<sup>7</sup>

#### 4. *Reparations.*

MR. EDEN stated that he wished to reserve the position of the British Government with respect to pre-war debts and claims. He was in favor of setting up the Reparations Commission as soon as possible.

MR. MAISKY interjected that unless the British agreed to the American draft submitted February 9,<sup>8</sup> the Commission would have no basis, no directives for its work.

MR. EDEN stated that he agreed on the principles involved in the American proposals concerning the immediate withdrawal of property from Germany and the annual contributions. However, he wished to submit a redraft of the proposals.<sup>9</sup>

MR. EDEN stated that reparations should be considered in connection with the dismemberment of Germany. There seemed to be two Russian objectives which were difficult to reconcile—the depletion of German manufacturing capacity and the insuring of German ability to make large payments at a later date. The British were most anxious to avoid conditions in which it would be necessary for them to finance and feed Germany at a later date as a result of reparations. Furthermore, the British would like France on the Moscow Commission from the start. The British Government also felt that the question of labor should be considered by the Moscow Commission and that it would be inadvisable to name any figure for deliveries until the Moscow Commission had started its work. In addition, reparations arrangements should be made without prejudices to the restitution of looted property.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed to this last statement.

MR. MAISKY stated that Mr. Eden's reply was very disappointing. Its whole spirit was to take from Germany as little as possible.

MR. EDEN interjected that this was not the case; however, he could say that the Prime Minister did not believe that the Russians would receive anywhere near as much as they hoped for.

<sup>7</sup> *Post*, pp. 919-920.

<sup>8</sup> *Ante*, p. 808.

<sup>9</sup> *Post*, p. 885.

MR. MAISKY stated that naturally when the dismemberment of Germany had been decided in a practical form the reparations plan must be adjusted. This problem was considered from its initiation. There was no contradiction. The amount of annual payments were quite possible after the contemplated removals. If Mr. Eden had any doubts the easiest way out was to accept the formula agreed upon by the Americans and Russians yesterday as the basis for discussion and to raise the British proposals in Moscow on this basis. He stated that the question of labor would certainly come up for discussion of the plan during the Commission studies of Germany. He pointed out that the formula did not commit the Allies to the exact figure. Taking into account all considerations advanced by Mr. Eden, MR. MAISKY maintained that the British could easily agree to the formula.

MR. EDEN maintained that the British wished a period shorter than ten years for the reparations payments. They preferred five years.

MR. STETTINIUS pointed out that the ten-year period was merely mentioned as a basis for discussion. It might result that all the capital movements could be effected in seven years. He added that the Soviet Government was not committing itself to ten years or twenty billion dollars.

MR. EDEN inquired why this time limit should then be put in the formula.

MR. MAISKY replied that it was desired as a basis for discussion.

MR. EDEN stated that he would submit an alternative draft and that he hoped that the subject might be discussed at the 4:00 o'clock meeting.

##### 5. *Communiqué on the Crimean Conference.*

MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether any thought had been given to the communiqué on the Conference.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that the American Delegation was drafting something for the consideration of the Foreign Ministers. He suggested that the first item on the afternoon's agenda be the question of a communiqué and that the drafting of a communiqué be assigned to the Foreign Ministers.

MR. MOLOTOV and MR. EDEN agreed to this suggestion.

##### 6. *World Organization.*

MR. EDEN stated that he wished to submit a report of the sub-committee.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> *Post*, pp. 885-886.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he agreed to both points contained in the report, i. e., regarding the method of consulting France and China and the text of the invitation to the Conference.

MR. EDEN and MR. STETTINIUS also agreed.

#### 7. *Austro-Yugoslav Frontier.*

MR. EDEN stated that this problem would surely arise and that he did not wish a repetition of "Athens". He wished to submit a small paper on the question.<sup>11</sup>

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he would wish to study this paper before discussing it.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he felt that paragraph (b) on page two went beyond the period of occupation and that it might be improved by redrafting.

#### 8. *Yugoslav-Italian Frontier.*

MR. EDEN stated that he wished to submit a paper on this question. He added that he did not expect to discuss it at the present meeting. A copy of this document is attached.<sup>12</sup>

#### 9. *Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations.*

In accordance with Mr. Eden's suggestion, Mr. MOLOTOV stated that he wished to make a few remarks on the Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty of alliance. The British Embassy in Moscow had transmitted to the Narkomindel a note on the Balkan Federation in which it was stressed that such a Federation might include Turkey. This was not an urgent matter at the present time; however there were conversations in progress between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on a treaty of friendship and alliance. The Soviet Government entertained favorable views on this treaty and had informed the British accordingly. The Bulgarians and Yugoslavs were collaborating militarily against the Germans in Yugoslavia. There should, consequently, be no objections to such a treaty.

MR. EDEN stated that this treaty raised the important question of principle. The British held the view that former enemy states should be debarred from entering into treaty relations with other states when they were under an occupational regime and certainly not without the permission of the Allies. Apart from this principle, the British were somewhat anxious concerning the effect of the treaty on reparations which Greece should obtain from Bulgaria. He wished to submit a separate memorandum on this matter.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> *Post*, p. 887.

<sup>12</sup> *Post*, pp. 888-889.

<sup>13</sup> *Post*, pp. 891-893.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the Soviet Foreign Office had received a note from the British to the effect that former enemies under an armistice regime should not have treaty relations with other enemy states. But now it was a question of an ex-enemy and a friendly state. He maintained that the British had stated that they had no objections to treaties between ex-enemy and friendly states.

MR. EDEN questioned this.

MR. MOLOTOV continued that this principle was also implied in the British proposal concerning a Balkan Federation in which former enemy and friendly states would enter.

MR. EDEN maintained that he did not believe that states under an armistice regime should be permitted to make peace treaties without the permission of the Allies. Furthermore, the British never had in mind a Balkan Federation until the armistice period had terminated.

MR. STETTINIUS stated that he was completely in accord with Mr. Eden's views.

MR. EDEN inquired whether it would not be preferable for the states in question to wait.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had no power to speak for them.

MR. EDEN reminded him that Bulgaria had signed an armistice<sup>14</sup> and was not free to do what it wished.

MR. STETTINIUS suggested that this question be discussed by the Ambassadors and Mr. Molotov in Moscow promptly.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that it might be preferable to postpone discussion of this matter until tomorrow and then to seek agreement.

#### 10. *Iran.*

MR. EDEN inquired whether Mr. Molotov had considered the British document on Iran.<sup>15</sup>

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had nothing to add to what he had said several days ago on the subject.

MR. EDEN inquired whether it would not be advisable to issue a communiqué on Iran.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that this would be inadvisable.

MR. STETTINIUS urged that some reference be made that Iranian problems had been discussed and clarified during the Crimean Conference.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he opposed this idea.

MR. EDEN suggested that it be stated that the declaration on Iran had been reaffirmed and re-examined during the present meeting.

MR. MOLOTOV opposed this suggestion.

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<sup>14</sup> For the text of the armistice with Bulgaria, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 437, pp. 1-4, 17, or 58 Stat. 1498.

<sup>15</sup> *Ante*, pp. 819-820.

Hiss Collection

*Hiss Notes*<sup>1</sup>

Ed. chmn  
2/10  
For Mins  
12.10 p m

ERS asked make statement

We are prepared to withdraw our insistence on the final sentence in the Polish memo, which Mr. Mol. objected to with the understanding that the Pres would be perfectly free to make any statement to the Am. people he might think he had to relative to receiving inform. from his Amb.

Mol. Would like to make a small amend. to yesterday's text: one cond: as soon as possible

of U. S. & Gt Brit will est. dip. rels. with it as has been done by the Soviet Un

Ed. objected—It's to be a new govt

Mol we can leave out "as has been done by the Soviet Un"

Ed. But we would all have to recognize it.

Mol. our sit. is diff. from that of U. S. We have already given recog. to present govt

Ed: Yes but this will be a new gov't

ERS: Advisable that we all move together

Mol: Present sit. being different the doc. must reflect this diff. We quite agree on the future. Let us think about it.

ERS Decl. on Lib. Areas Have discussed Mr. Mol's proposal Impossible for us to consider amend. Would create untold diffs. for us with respect to our dom. situation

Mol: Then I will propose another amend:

2nd ¶ from the end "they would immed. take measures for carrying out mutual consultation"

Suggests one or other amend;

Ed: An improvement

ERS I'm very favorably impressed

Mol. As to the former amend. Thinks it would be very useless because we don't wish shots which have occurred in Athens to take place elsewhere

ERS. Sorry, I'm not authorized to consider this amend. any further.

New amend. agreed to

→Mol Withdraws his former amend.

<sup>1</sup> From penciled notes in longhand. For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Page minutes of this meeting.

Ed: One other point. About Fr. sit. Proposed addition of a last ¶

Mol Hasn't had time to study it, perhaps at 4.00

ERS As stated yesterday, thinks it most desirable

Ed. Little further inform. Re Yug. Sub.<sup>2</sup> due leave today or tomorrow for Bel.<sup>3</sup> Argument, as I as [*sic*] understand, has been about names of regents. But in our view no reason this should hold up coming into force of agt. We can send tel. setting forth our views as Mar. St. suggested

Mol. and communique?

Ed Can do that, too

Mol. Tel. telling them to hurry up That the agt. come into force immed.

Ed. Will show other 2 delegs. draft of tel.

Ed. Re Pol.—I didn't mean to indicate agt. with Am. proposal to drop last sentence

ERS We would of course still prefer doc. as it exists but Pres so anxious reach agt, he is willing to make this concession

Mol. Thanks ~~him~~ Mr. Stett. very much

### Reparations

Ed:

1. ~~1st~~ reps should be considered in connection with dismemberment

2. Two R objects—depletion Ger. mfg. capacity & ensuring ability make large payments later—are difficult to reconcile We are very anxious to avoid conditions making it nec. finance or feed Ger later as result reparations

3. Would like Fr. on Mos. Commission from start

4. Labor should be considered too

5. Can't name any figure for deliveries until Commission has studied matter

Mol: Any points Mr Ed. agrees on?

Ed. Add: These arrangements are without prejudice to restitution of looted property

Mol. Of course

Ed. reserve position re pre-war claims We are in favor of Com. being set up in Mos as soon as possible

Mol: No basis for work of Com. We don't give it any directives or principles on which to work.

Ed. We agree on principles: immediate withdrawal of machinery, etc—quicker the better—& annual payments Has a redraft

<sup>2</sup> Šubašić.  
<sup>3</sup> Belgrade.



Maisky: Mr. Ed's reply is very disappointing—Whole spirit of reply Spirit apparently is to take from Ger little as poss.

Ed: Never said anything of kind but can say my P. M. doesn't think you'll get anything like as much as you think.

Re Ed's points

1. Naturally when dismemberment decided in practical form, plan be adjusted

2. Problem was considered from beginning. No contradiction. Am't of annual payments quite possible after contemplated removals. If you have doubts, shortest cut to accept our formula of yesterday—to take our proposals as basis for discussion & then bring up your points Never expected support Ger.

Nothing on 3

4. Labor certainly will come in in elaboration of whole plan, but as Com. studies q.

5. Our formula doesn't commit you to the figures. Taking into account all your points, you can easily agree to formula agreed on by Sov & Am. delegs

Ed. We consider \$20 billion equals 500,000,000£ a yr.

Maisky No in ten yrs

Ed: We wanted a shorter period

Mol. Let us write down 10 yrs

Ed: We prefer 5 yrs

ERS Its all a basis of discussion Might end up all these capital movements possible in 7 yrs Sov. Gov't isn't committing itself to 10 yrs or \$20 billion

Maisky Certainly. In end might be 5 or 6

Ed Then why put in 10 yrs

Maisky: As basis for discussion

Ed. Let each put in its own plan Will give alternate draft & discuss at 4.00 p m

Agreed

Mol. re communique

ERS We are hard at work drafting something for your consid.

Mol: You take initiative?

ERS There will be a draft, we would be glad to take initiative I would suggest 1st order bus. this afternoon that drafting of commun. be assigned to For Mins

Mol. Good

Ed. all right

World Org. report of subcommittee

Mol. I agree to both points—consultation of Ch & Fr. & the invitation

Ed We all agree then

#### Austria-Yug. frontiers

Ed: presented proposal

Mol. Translate & study

ERS: we feel (b) on p 2 should be pretty carefully considered. We feel that as phrased this goes beyond period of occupation

Ed: That is all that is meant Drafting may need to be made clearer

#### Yug-It frontier

Ed: proposal to be studied

#### Yug-Bul. relations

Mol. Mentioned treaty of alliance between Yug & Bul.

1. Recently For. Commissariat rec'd a note re federation, stressing federation might include Turkey. This is not an urgent q.

2. There are conversations between Yug & Bul about a treaty of friendship & alliance Sov. Govt holds a favorable view. They are collaborating militarily ag. Gers in Yug. There should be no objections to it.

Ed: Glad to hear treaty is not actual (?) Anxious about effect of this treaty on reparations we are anxious & all agreed Gr.<sup>4</sup> should receive from Bul. Has separate memo on this.

Mol All obligs. of Bul. have been enforced. No one can change them without consent of 3 powers Bul & Rum. cannot have a treaty between them Now is q. of treaty between 1 friendly country & an ex-enemy There was a direct agt by Brit Govt to it. Q by Eden?

Mol. There were objections to treaty between 2 former enemies but not friendly & enemy

Ed. We do not think a country under armistice terms can make a treaty without consent of 3 powers. I never had it in mind a country under armistice would come into a federation until armistice over

ERS I'm completely in accord with Ed's views

Ed: Can't they wait?

Mol: Has no power to speak for them.

Ed. Bul. has signed armistice. Isn't free to do as she wants. Although has threatened to shoot our planes coming here.

Mol. Our planes have been shot at in Yug but was mistake & our troops shot at by Am planes

Ed. I don't know why Bul. can shoot at any planes Can we ask this wait awhile

Mol Can go on with discussions

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<sup>4</sup> Greece.

ERS Suggest our Ambs discuss with Mol. in Mos. promptly  
 Mol. Would wait until tomorrow

### Iran

Mol. Has nothing to add

Ed: Would Mol like to put out communique

Mol: Undesirable. Can discuss this later

ERS I would urge some reference that Iranian problems have been discussed & clarified. Very troublesome q.

Mol Against that

Ed: Say re-examined & reaffirmed Teheran Decl.

Mol Against that

ERS status of Pol. Agreed Ed. to report on yesterday's & today's progress.

### Reparations:

Mol.: mention in document just 2 figures as basis for discussion

Hiss Collection

### *United States Delegation Memorandum* <sup>1</sup>

[YALTA,] February 10, 1945.

#### ITEMS STILL BEFORE THE FOREIGN MINISTERS

##### 1. *Poland:*

There is probably no reason to discuss this until the plenary meeting.

##### 2. *Declaration of Liberated Europe:*

Same status as Number 1.

##### 3. *Iran:*

The British may propose adoption of their paper—Mr. Matthews has a copy of it.

##### 4. *Reparations:*

The British have not yet agreed to Soviet-American paper. The British or Russians may want to bring this up.

##### 5. *Mr. Eden Wants:*

(a) To have the provisions relating to the Hungarian Control Commission apply also in Bulgaria;

(b) To get an agreement for Bulgarian reparations to Greece;

(c) To express opposition to Russian proposal favoring an alliance between Tito and Bulgaria.

<sup>1</sup> Carbon copy; authorship not indicated. Presumably prepared by Hiss for Stettinius just prior to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 10, 1945.

Matthews Files

*United States Delegation Memorandum on the Polish Government*<sup>1</sup>

[YALTA, February 10, 1945.]

TEXT OF FORMULA ON POLAND SO FAR AGREED BY THE THREE  
FOREIGN MINISTERS

"A new situation has been created by the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a provisional Polish government<sup>2</sup> more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The provisional government<sup>3</sup> now functioning in Poland should be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland<sup>4</sup> itself and from those living abroad. This new government will then be called the 'Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.' Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr,<sup>5</sup> are authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present provisional government and with other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This 'Polish Provisional Government of National Unity' would<sup>6</sup> be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties would<sup>7</sup> have the right to take part and to put forth candidates.

"When a 'Polish Provisional Government of National Unity' has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the three governments will then accord it recognition."<sup>8</sup>

In lieu of the following sentence: "When a 'Polish Provisional Government of National Unity' has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the three governments will then accord it recognition." Mr. Molotov suggests the following rewording:

"When a 'Polish Provisional Government of National Unity' has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Governments of the United States and of Great Britain will establish diplomatic relations with it as has been done by the Soviet Union."

This sentence was not accepted by Mr. Stettinius or Mr. Eden.

He said he would bring it up again at the four o'clock meeting this afternoon.

<sup>1</sup> Undated carbon copy. On August 13, 1954, Matthews wrote that he thought this memorandum had been drafted by him (640.0029/8-1354). It was presumably prepared after the Foreign Ministers' meeting on February 10, 1945. The notations in Matthews' handwriting, indicated in footnotes, reflect some of the changes incorporated in the text as reported by Eden to the Plenary Meeting that afternoon (*post*, p. 898).

<sup>2</sup> "which can be"

<sup>3</sup> "which is"

<sup>4</sup> "Poles"

<sup>5</sup> Sir "A." Clark Kerr

<sup>6</sup> "shall"

<sup>7</sup> "shall"

<sup>8</sup> The last seven words are crossed out and the words "Mol. formula" are written in the margin.

The British still advocate inclusion of the following sentence:

"The ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw, following such recognition, would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections."

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Matthews Files

*United States Delegation Memorandum on the Soviet Proposal for the Final Paragraph of the Formula on Poland*<sup>1</sup>

[YALTA, February 10, 1945.]

Mr. Molotov's latest draft proposal for the end of the last sentence of the Polish formula:

". . .<sup>2</sup> the Government of the USSR, which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland and the Governments of Great Britain and the United States will establish diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity." *and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.*<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> This undated carbon copy reflects the proposal that Molotov made evidently after the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 10, 1945. It was apparently accepted by Stettinius and Eden, since it was incorporated into Eden's report to the Plenary Meeting that afternoon (*post*, p. 898).

<sup>2</sup> Points appear in the original.

<sup>3</sup> The last clause (printed in italics) was added in Matthews' handwriting.

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Bohlen Collection

*British Amendment to the Draft Declaration on Liberated Europe*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[YALTA, February 10, 1945.]

BRITISH DRAFT OF LAST PARAGRAPH OF DECLARATION ON  
LIBERATED EUROPE

In issuing this Declaration the three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the action and the procedure suggested.

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<sup>1</sup> Copy attached to the Page minutes of the Foreign Ministers' meeting on February 10, 1945. See *ante*, p. 873.

Bohlen Collection

*British Proposal on Reparations*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[YALTA, February 10, 1945.]

## BASIC PRINCIPLES OF EXACTION OF REPARATION FROM GERMANY

1. The proportions in reparation allotted to the claimant countries shall be determined according to their respective contributions to the winning of the war and the degree of the material loss which they have suffered. Account shall be taken of deliveries made to the claimant countries by other enemy countries.

2. Reparation is to be exacted from Germany in the three following forms:

(a) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory. These removals to be carried out chiefly for purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany. Subject to the fulfilment of these aims Germany's industrial capacity will not be reduced to a point which would endanger the economic existence of Germany and the execution of such obligations as may be imposed on her.

(b) Annual deliveries from current production for a period to be considered.

(c) Use of German labor and lorry service.

3. In fixing the amount of reparation to be exacted under paragraph two above account shall be taken of any arrangements made for the dismemberment of Germany, the requirements of the occupying forces, and Germany's need to acquire from time to time sufficient foreign currency from her exports to pay for her current imports and the pre-war claims of the United Nations on Germany.

<sup>1</sup> Attached to the Page minutes of the Foreign Ministers' meeting on February 10, 1945. See *ante*, p. 874.

Bohlen Collection

*Report to the Foreign Ministers by the Subcommittee on Arrangements for the United Nations Conference*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[YALTA, February 10, 1945.]

## REPORT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS

We were instructed on February 8 to prepare a report to the Foreign Ministers on the following subjects:

(a) The method of consultation with France and China in regard to the decisions taken at the present conference concerning the proposed world organization.

<sup>1</sup> Attached to the Page minutes of the Foreign Ministers' meeting of February 10, 1945. See *ante*, p. 875.

(b) The text of the invitation which should be issued to all the nations which will take part in the United Nations Conference.

With regard to (a) we consider that the United States on behalf of the three powers should consult the Government of China and the Provisional French Government.

With regard to (b) we attach for the approval of the Ministers a draft invitation to all the nations which will take part in the conference.

[Attachment]<sup>2</sup>

#### INVITATION

The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invites the Government of \_\_\_\_\_ to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on April 25, 1945, or soon thereafter, at \_\_\_\_\_ in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The above named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

#### *"C. Voting*

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting."

Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

In the event that the Government of \_\_\_\_\_ desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments.

<sup>2</sup> A ribbon copy of this attachment in the Hiss Collection bears the notation in pencil "OK FDR".

Bohlen Collection

*British Proposal Regarding the Austrian-Yugoslav Frontier*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[YALTA, February 10, 1945.]

## BRITISH STATEMENT ON AUSTRO-YUGOSLAV FRONTIER

If the British proposals for the allocation of zones of occupation in Austria are approved, the whole length of the Austro-Yugoslav frontier will be a British responsibility. This may involve us in difficulties with Yugoslavia because though the Yugoslav Government have not so far asked for any alteration of the Styrian portion of this frontier they have advanced claims to Klagenfurt and those parts of Carinthia which they failed to obtain under the plebiscite held in 1919. Action may be required to resist Yugoslav efforts to assert these claims and to secure the withdrawal of Yugoslav partisans who in the course of operations may well advance into Carinthia and establish control over it. It would be invidious for H. M. G. to be solely responsible for such action and after our experiences in Greece we must try to prevent British troops from becoming involved in fighting with Allied partisans. We hope, therefore that an agreement might be reached between the three powers for the maintenance of the 1937 Austro-Yugoslav frontier pending the final territorial settlement and for joint measures to ensure its maintenance and observance by Yugoslavia.

It is therefore suggested we should agree at the present conference:

(a) that pending the final peace settlement the 1937 frontier between Austria and Yugoslavia shall be restored.

(b) that the integrity of this frontier is the joint interest of the three powers, and that the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A. will support any action which H. M. G. may see fit to take to preserve its integrity.

(c) that the three powers should jointly inform the Yugoslav Government of decisions (a) and (b) above and request the Yugoslav Government to give an undertaking to preserve this frontier.

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<sup>1</sup> Attached to the Page minutes of the Foreign Ministers' meeting of February 10, 1945. See *ante*, p. 876. A carbon copy of this document is in the Department files, numbered 760H.6315/2-1145.



Bohlen Collection

*British Proposal Regarding Venezia Giulia*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[YALTA, February 10, 1945.]

NOTES FOR THE SECRETARIES OF STATE IN REGARD TO  
VENEZIA GIULIA

I should like to draw the attention of my colleagues to the fact that the province of Venezia Giulia in the northeast of Italy is a potential powder magazine. It is therefore likely that there will, as the war draws to a close, be clashes in this area between the Yugoslavs and the Italians, and we must prevent these outbursts to the best of our ability.

We had originally intended to set up Allied Military Government over the whole province up to the 1937 frontier but we now have doubts whether this would be a very satisfactory course for the following reasons. Tito has not yet put his views in writing but he has made it pretty clear that he will not agree to such a proposal. He certainly intends to administer himself the considerable areas which he claims for Yugoslavia and part of which are already controlled by his Partisans. Even if under extreme pressure he was forced to accept Allied (British) Military Government his Partisans would remain in arms throughout the district and it would be a miracle if sooner or later they did not obstruct our Military administration. We should then have to take forceful measures to assert our authority and fighting might begin. Alternatively there might be clashes between the Yugoslav Partisans and the Italian Partisans, both trying to hold as much territory as they could. In that case also we should have to intervene to keep the peace by force. I would therefore ask my colleagues to agree to establish some body for the purpose of working out a provisional line of demarcation in the Venezia Giulia between the area to be controlled by Tito and the area over which we should establish Allied Military Government. We have made an attempt ourselves to draw up such a line based for the most part of ethnic considerations. But obviously we cannot jointly agree on a line now, all we can do is agree to the principle that there should be such a line and that some body of technicians should be established for the purpose of determining it. After that it would no doubt be for His Majesty's Government to obtain Tito's acceptance of it. But if they do this His Majesty's Government would like to be able to say that both their Allies agree with the proposal.

<sup>1</sup> Attached to the Page minutes of the Foreign Ministers' meeting of February 10, 1945. See *ante*, p. 876. A carbon copy of this document is in the Department files, numbered 740.00119 Control (Italy)/2-1145.

Finally I would point out that in any case, even if the area west of my suggested provisional line is allotted to Tito, it will be necessary, in the early stages at any rate, for our Supreme Commander to make use of the communications from Trieste northwards in which case he would have to take suitable measures to that end. It might later be possible for him to arrange for his communications to Austria to pass further to the west.

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Bohlen Collection

*British Proposal Regarding the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[YALTA, February 10, 1945.]

ALLIED (SOVIET) CONTROL COMMISSION IN BULGARIA

His Majesty's Government regard it as essential (a) that their representatives in Bulgaria should enjoy reasonable freedom of movement and communication, and (b) that decisions about which they have not been consulted should not be taken in their name. In the case of Hungary, (a) has been satisfactorily dealt with in the "Statutes of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary", and His Majesty's Government suggest that identical Statutes should be adopted for the Control Commission in Bulgaria in order to meet the points made in the message from Mr. Eden which was delivered to M. Molotov on or about December 11th, 1944.<sup>2</sup>

His Majesty's Government also consider that during the first period there should be prior consultation with the British and American representatives and that, should the Soviet Government feel obliged to take any unilateral action on military grounds not covered in the Armistice, it should be taken on their sole responsibility and in the name of the Soviet Government only.

During the second period, i. e. after the conclusion of hostilities with Germany, His Majesty's Government wish to ensure that

(a) The British and American representatives should take their places in the Control Commissions as full members and should have the right to attend all their meetings and to participate fully in the consideration of all questions before the Commissions. They should also have the right of direct access to the Bulgarian authorities.

(b) Decisions of the Allied Control Commission should be unanimous and its name and authority should be used only where the

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<sup>1</sup> Attached to the Page minutes of the Foreign Ministers' meeting of February 10, 1945. Copy also in Matthews Files. Although the date of this memorandum is not indicated, copies were apparently circulated on February 10 in connection with the discussion, *ante*, pp. 876-877.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 241.

representatives of all three powers are in agreement. If the Soviet High Command, being in *de facto* control of Bulgaria through the presence of Soviet troops, insist upon issuing directives to the local Government or taking action which has not been approved by both the British and American representatives they should act unilaterally in their own name.

(c) The extent to which the British and Americans will share in the actual executive and administrative work of the Control Commission will be a matter to be settled on the spot. But they must certainly have the right to membership of any subcommittee or executive organ dealing with matters concerning British and American rights and property.

(d) The detailed implications of these proposals should be worked out between the Soviet chairman and the British and American representatives on the Control Commission on the spot.

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Bohlen Collection

*British Proposal on Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[YALTA, February 10, 1945.]

YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS

His Majesty's Government recently communicated to the Soviet Government an expression of their views regarding a possible Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation. In replying to this communication, the Soviet Government informed His Majesty's Government that they were aware that negotiations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for the conclusion of a pact of alliance and mutual assistance were proceeding and added that their attitude towards this was favourable. The Soviet Government, however, considered that the question of a Balkan federation, and in particular of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation, was not at present actual and was of no practical importance.

While His Majesty's Government are glad to learn that the Soviet Government do not consider the question of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation to be actual at present and that they regard the matter as of no practical importance, they are disturbed to learn that a pact of alliance and mutual assistance between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria is under negotiation and that the attitude of the Soviet Government towards these negotiations is favourable.

His Majesty's Government cannot but regard the pact now under negotiation as open to the same objections which they felt in regard to a possible federation. In their view an enemy state whose status is still regulated by an armistice regime must be debarred from enter-

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<sup>1</sup> Attached to the Page minutes of the Foreign Ministers' meeting on February 10, 1945. A copy of this document is in the Department files, numbered 760H.74/-2-1145. Although this paper was not specifically referred to in the minutes, it was apparently circulated in connection with the discussion, *ante*, pp. 876-877.

ing into special treaty relations with another state, more particularly with another state with which she is still technically in a state of war except with the explicit permission of all the victorious Powers with whom the armistice was concluded.

Quite apart from the important question of principle involved, His Majesty's Government are also anxious regarding the effect of the pact now under negotiation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria upon the interests of Greece which has hitherto not received from Bulgaria the full reparation to which she is entitled under the terms of the armistice. This aspect of the matter is treated in greater detail in a separate *aide-mémoire*.

His Majesty's Government accordingly consider that a communication should be made to the Bulgarian Government by all the victorious Powers with whom she recently concluded an armistice, stating that they cannot agree to her entering into special treaty relations with Yugoslavia at this stage and that full reparation must be made to Greece before there can be any question of such negotiations being resumed. His Majesty's Government consider that Marshal Tito should simultaneously be informed of the objections seen by the victorious Powers to the conclusion of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact. His Majesty's Government would be glad to learn the views of the Soviet Government upon this matter as soon as possible.

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Bohlen Collection

*British Proposal Regarding Greek Claims on Bulgaria*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

[YALTA, February 10, 1945.]

GREEK CLAIMS UPON BULGARIA, MORE PARTICULARLY IN REGARD  
TO REPARATIONS

His Majesty's Government are concerned regarding the position in regard to Greek claims against Bulgaria. On the occasion of the signature of the Armistice with Hungary,<sup>2</sup> the Soviet Government informed the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Governments that they might send representatives to be accredited to the Hungarian Control Commission for the purpose of dealing with all questions affecting their particular government.

On January 23rd the Greek Government, with the support of His Majesty's Embassy in Moscow, approached the Soviet Government

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<sup>1</sup> Attached to the Page minutes of the Foreign Ministers' meeting on February 10, 1945. See *ante*, p. 876. A copy of this document is in the Department files, numbered 740.00119EW/2-1145.

<sup>2</sup> For the text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 456, or 59 Stat. 1321.

with a request for facilities in Bulgaria similar to those granted to the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Governments in Hungary. No reply has, however, yet been vouchsafed to this request by the Soviet Government.

The Greek people have suffered very seriously from Bulgarian depredations and are in the view of His Majesty's Government entitled to early satisfaction and to immediate reparation deliveries of which Greece stands in urgent need. The Greek Government have already presented to the Bulgarian Control Commission a list of commodities necessary to the Greek economy and due to them in virtue of the Bulgarian Armistice Agreement, the delivery of which to Greece in the immediate future is essential to the maintenance of Greek economy. Deliveries which are more urgently required comprise, *inter alia*, food stuffs, locomotives, agricultural implements and live-stock. Furthermore, in view of the decision incorporated in the Hungarian armistice terms allotting to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia fixed sums payable in commodities as reparations over a period of six years, it is in the view of His Majesty's Government equitable that similar arrangements should be made to fix a lump sum due to Greece by Bulgaria to be paid similarly in commodities over a period of six years. In the view of His Majesty's Government a corresponding sum should be allocated to Yugoslavia which has also suffered from Bulgarian occupation. In this connection his Majesty's Government desire to make it clear that, while they are in general opposed to the fixing of lump sums for reparations to be exacted from enemy countries, they consider it only equitable, in view of the fact that lump sums have been allocated to the Soviet, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Governments under the Rumanian, Finnish<sup>3</sup> and Hungarian Armistices, that a similar lump sum should now be allocated to Greece and Yugoslavia under the Bulgarian Armistice.

His Majesty's Government accordingly trust that the Soviet Government will accede to the proposals put to them on January 23rd with the support of His Majesty's Government concerning Greek representation on the Control Commission in Bulgaria. They further trust that the Soviet Government will agree to give explicit instructions

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<sup>3</sup> For the text of the Rumanian armistice, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 490, or 59 Stat. 1712; for the text of the Finnish armistice, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 18, 1945, vol. XII, pp. 261-268.

to the head of the Control Commission in Bulgaria that immediate deliveries must be made to Greece in accordance with the terms of the armistice and that the list already presented by the Greek Government to the Soviet Government is to be taken as the basis for determining the nature and amounts of commodities to be delivered. Finally His Majesty's Government are of the opinion that immediate consideration should be given to the question of fixing the total Bulgarian reparation liability to Greece and Yugoslavia, if necessary in terms of money.

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Matthews Files

*British Memorandum on Oil Equipment in Roumania*<sup>1</sup>

[YALTA, February 10, 1945.]

OIL EQUIPMENT IN ROUMANIA

His Majesty's Government have been glad to note that the Soviet authorities have now agreed to stop removing equipment from the oil fields in Roumania in which British interests are involved and have also agreed that the Ruat plant should remain *in situ*. But if the large quantities of equipment which have already been removed are not to be returned, His Majesty's Government considers that they must be regarded as deliveries on account of reparations, and arrangements made for compensating the oil companies. Similarly the Ruat plant should be restored to its previous condition and brought into production as soon as possible. As the Soviet Government have made no attempt to refute the argument advanced by His Majesty's Government that any equipment which may be removed should be regarded as reparation and not as war booty, His Majesty's Government can only refer the Soviet Government to the statement of the case which has already been made. It should also be pointed out that these difficulties would never have arisen if the Soviet representatives in Roumania had discussed problems affecting the Roumanian oil industry with their British and American colleagues on the Control Commission instead of taking unilateral action.

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<sup>1</sup> This paper, an undated British carbon copy, was not attached to the Page minutes, nor do those minutes indicate that the subject was discussed at the Foreign Ministers' meeting on February 10, 1945. A note from Eden to Molotov, however (*post*, p. 965), states that this paper was circulated at the Foreign Ministers' meeting of February 10.

CONVERSATIONS REGARDING THE ENTRY OF THE SOVIET UNION  
INTO THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN, FEBRUARY 10, 1945, AFTERNOON

Bohlen Collection

*Harriman Memorandum of Conversations*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

## 1st Conversation

Present:	Mr. Harriman	Date:	February 10, 1945
	Mr. Molotov	Time:	2:00 PM
	Mr. Pavlov	Place:	Koreis

## 2nd Conversation

Present:	The President	Date:	February 10, 1945
	Mr. Harriman	Time:	[blank]
		Place:	Livadia Palace

## 3rd Conversation

Present:	The President	Date:	February 10, 1945
	Mr. Harriman	Time:	4:30 PM
	Marshal Stalin	Place:	Livadia Palace

Subject: The Far East—Political

At Mr. Molotov's request I called on him at Koreis<sup>2</sup> at 2:00 p. m. He handed me in English translation the draft of Marshal Stalin's political conditions for Russia's entry in the war against Japan as discussed with the President on February 8.<sup>3</sup>

I explained to Molotov that there were three amendments I believed the President would wish to make before accepting:

2. b) should indicate Stalin's readiness to accept the President's proposal that Port Arthur and Dairen should be free ports and 2. c) should cover the alternative of the railways being operated by a Chinese-Soviet Commission, both of which Marshal Stalin had agreed to. In addition I said I felt sure that the President would not wish to dispose finally of these two matters in which China was interested without the concurrence of the Generalissimo.

MR. MOLOTOV indicated that Marshal Stalin had agreed to the first two points but it took me some time to explain to Molotov the reasons for the last. I agreed to submit to Molotov the President's suggested revisions.

On my return to Livadia I showed the President the proposed draft (copy attached) with the amendments covering the points mentioned

<sup>1</sup> The document is labeled "copy", and a typewritten note at the bottom of the first page says: "Dictated by Mr. Harriman".

<sup>2</sup> Yusupov Palace.

<sup>3</sup> For this discussion, see *ante*, pp. 768-770.

(copy of amendments attached). The President approved and authorized me to resubmit them to Mr. Molotov, which I did.

After the formal Conference meeting in the afternoon between the President, the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin and their associates, Marshal Stalin came to me to explain the further changes he had in mind for the Agreement. He said that he was entirely willing to have Dairen a free port under international control, but that Port Arthur was different, it was to be a Russian naval base and therefore Russia required a lease.

I suggested to Marshal Stalin that he take the opportunity to discuss this matter at once with the President, which he thereupon did.

THE PRESIDENT agreed to Marshal Stalin's revised proposal regarding the ports as above.

MARSHAL STALIN then explained that he agreed it would be more appropriate for the Manchurian Railroads to be operated by a Chinese-Soviet Commission. He further agreed in the need for concurrence of the Generalissimo on these matters but stated that the Generalissimo should also give his concurrence to *status quo* in Outer Mongolia.

THE PRESIDENT asked Marshal Stalin whether he (Stalin) wished to take these matters up with T. V. Soong when he came to Moscow or whether Stalin wished the President to take them up with the Generalissimo.<sup>4</sup>

MARSHAL STALIN replied that as he was an interested party he would prefer to have the President do it.

THE PRESIDENT then asked when the subject should be discussed with the Generalissimo having in mind the question of secrecy.

MARSHAL STALIN said he would let the President know when he was prepared to have this done.

THE PRESIDENT said that he would send an army officer from Washington through Moscow to Chungking with a letter of instructions to Ambassador Hurley in order to insure secrecy.

At that moment the Prime Minister interrupted the discussion. I had an opportunity later, however, to ask Marshal Stalin whether he would undertake to draft the further revisions, to which he replied in the affirmative.

W. A. HARRIMAN

### 3 Attachments <sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> See *post*, pp. 952-953.

<sup>5</sup> The third attachment was a typewritten copy of the final agreement. For the text of the agreement as signed on February 11, 1945, see *post*, p. 984.



[Attachment 1—Translation]

DRAFT OF MARSHAL STALIN'S POLITICAL CONDITIONS FOR RUSSIA'S  
ENTRY IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

The leaders of the three Great Powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has ended the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. *Status quo* in the Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian Peoples Republic) should be preserved;
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 should be restored viz:
  - a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to this part of Sakhalin should be returned to the Soviet Union,
  - b) possession of Port Arthur and Dairen on lease should be restored.
  - c) the rights possessed by Russia before the Russo-Japanese war to the operation of the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian railroad providing an outlet to Dairen should be restored on the understanding that China should continue to possess full sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kurile islands should be handed over to the Soviet Union. The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union should be unquestionably satisfied after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its willingness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

[Attachment 2]

MR. HARRIMAN'S SUGGESTED CHANGES IN MARSHAL STALIN'S DRAFT  
OF RUSSIA'S POLITICAL CONDITIONS FOR RUSSIA'S ENTRY IN THE  
WAR AGAINST JAPAN

*Item 2. b):*

possession lease of the port areas of Port Arthur and Dairen on lease should be restored, or these areas should become free ports under international control.

*Item 2. c):*

Add the following after the word "Manchuria;" at the end of the paragraph "or these railroads should be placed under the operational control of a Chinese-Soviet Commission."

*Item 3.:*

Add final paragraph:

"It is understood that the agreement concerning the ports and railroads referred to above requires the concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek."

Note: Portions crossed out are deletions and portions underlined are additions to original document.

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SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING, FEBRUARY 10, 1945, 4 P. M.,  
LIVADIA PALACE

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Marshal Stalin
Secretary Stettinius	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Hopkins	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Mr. Maisky
Mr. Harriman	Sir Edward Bridges	Mr. Gusev
Mr. Matthews	Mr. Jebb	Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Hiss	Mr. Wilson	Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Bohlen	Mr. Dixon	
Mr. Foote	Major Birse	
Mr. Early	Mr. Roberts	
	Mr. Allen	

Bohlen Collection

*Bohlen Minutes*

TOP SECRET

Subjects: Poland  
French Participation in Control Commission for Germany  
Yugoslavia  
World Security Organization  
Reparations from Germany  
The Dardanelles

THE PRESIDENT said that he thought that Mr. Eden had a report to make on the progress achieved at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers this morning.

MR. EDEN said that he had to report agreement on the future Government of Poland, that there had been two questions involved

which he would refer to later but in the meantime he would read the new formula. He read the new formula with one correction which he admitted to have been made by Mr. Molotov. The new formula was as follows:

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the re-organisation of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U. S. S. R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the U. S. A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the document made no mention of frontiers. He said we are all agreed on the Eastern frontier of Poland and he agreed that Poland should receive compensation in the West, up to the line of the Oder if the Poles so desired. He said that the British Government was very doubtful about going any further or mentioning any such possibility at this stage, since he did not believe that the War Cabinet would accept the line of the Western Neisse. He said he felt, however, that some mention should be made of the territorial settlement otherwise the whole world would wonder what had been decided on this question. There would be some criticism, but nevertheless, it would be better than no mention at all.<sup>1</sup>

THE PRESIDENT said that the Polish Government should be consulted before any statement was made in regard to the Western frontier.

<sup>1</sup> For a facsimile of Hopkins' note to Roosevelt at this point regarding boundary questions, see Stettinius, p. 261.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that he thought that there should be some statement on the Eastern frontier on which all present had agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER concurred with this statement of Marshal Stalin and repeated the people would wish to know what we had decided on this question.

MR. MOLOTOV remarked that it would be a good thing if something definite could be said about the Eastern frontier, since it would clarify and quiet the whole situation insofar as the Poles were concerned. He said that it was certain that there would be criticisms, but he felt it would in general be beneficial. He suggested that the matter be referred to the three Foreign Ministers to draft some statement on this point. He added that it was perhaps not necessary to be as specific in regard to the Western frontier as in regard to the Eastern frontier.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had already gone on record to the effect that Poland would receive a good slice of territory in the North and in the West but that the opinion of the New Polish Government of National Unity would be sought.

THE PRESIDENT said he had no objection in principle to such a statement but he thought the Prime Minister should draft it.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested that it should form a last sentence of the Polish statement.

MR. EDEN, continuing his report, said that in regard to his [*the*] declaration on liberated Europe the Soviet Delegation had proposed an amendment in regard to the last sentence of the fifth paragraph to the effect that the three Governments should immediately take measures for the carrying out of mutual consultations. Mr. Eden said that he proposed a draft that the three Governments should immediately consult together upon the measures to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

After some discussion as to what had been agreed upon at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers this morning, Marshal Stalin said he accepted the British suggestion.<sup>2</sup>

MR. EDEN then said there was a note which he wished to attach to this declaration, namely, that the French should be invited to associate themselves with the declaration and that his note would merely state that in issuing this declaration the three heads of Governments expressed the hope that the Provisional Government of France would associate themselves in the actions and procedures envisaged therein.<sup>3</sup>

THE PRESIDENT then said that he had changed his mind in regard to the question of the French participation in the Control Commission.

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<sup>2</sup> See the Matthews minutes, *post*, p. 908, for the agreed wording of this proposal.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 884.

He now agreed with the views of the Prime Minister that it would be impossible to give France an area to administer in Germany unless they were members of the Control Commission. He said he thought it would be easier to deal with the French if they were on the Commission than if they were not.

MARSHAL STALIN said he had no objections and that he agreed to this.<sup>4</sup>

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that there should be a joint telegram sent to De Gaulle informing him of these decisions to which there was general agreement.<sup>5</sup>

MR. EDEN said the next subject was that of Yugoslavia and read the text of a telegram to be sent to Marshal Tito and Subasic suggesting that the agreement which they had reached be immediately put into effect as the basis for the formation of a unified Government of Yugoslavia.<sup>6</sup>

THE PRESIDENT said he was not sure whether he would be able to join in the statement on Yugoslavia but when it had been read to him he agreed that it was satisfactory and that he could associate himself with it.

After some discussion MARSHAL STALIN suggested that the telegram to Marshal Tito and Subasic should say that the heads of the three Governments have agreed that the agreement between Tito and Subasic should be put immediately into effect and that as soon as a new Government was formed the two amendments proposed by the British should be put into effect.<sup>7</sup> He said he thought it was inconsistent to put more in the communiqué than there was in the telegram.<sup>8</sup>

THE PRIME MINISTER said he hoped that both of the two amendments proposed by the British could be in the communiqué.

MR. MOLOTOV said he thought it would be better to confine the telegram and reference in the communiqué to the entry into force of the Tito-Subasic agreement.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he thought the British people would be more reconciled to the Government and it would have a better reception if the two amendments were included.

After some discussion with the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden, MARSHAL STALIN said he thought that three points could be included in the telegram: (1) that the Tito-Subasic agreement should go immediately into force, (2) that the members of the Skupschina who had not collaborated with the Germans could be included into the Vetch,

<sup>4</sup> For the text as amended, see *post*, pp. 936-937.

<sup>5</sup> For the texts of the two telegrams to De Gaulle, see *post*, p. 948.

<sup>6</sup> For a copy of the British telegram as sent, see *post*, pp. 919-920.

<sup>7</sup> For two amendments proposed by the British, see *ante*, pp. 820-821.

<sup>8</sup> For the language of the communiqué on this subject, see *post*, p. 974.

and (3) that the actions of the anti-fascist Vetch would be subject to the confirmation by the Constituent Assembly. He added that he thought these three points could go into the communiqué.

MR. EDEN said that the sub-committee in regard to Dumbarton Oaks had reported on the matter of informing the French and Chinese Governments and on the form of the invitations,<sup>9</sup> but he did not feel that it was necessary to bother the Conference with these small matters. He went on to say that in regard to reparations the British Government still had reservations in regard to the Soviet proposals.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he had received instructions from the War Cabinet not to mention figures and that that should be left to the reparations committee to determine.

THE PRESIDENT said that he was afraid that if reparations and especially if any figures were mentioned that the American people would believe that it involved money.<sup>10</sup>

MARSHAL STALIN explained that the sum mentioned was only the expression of the value of the reparations in kind.

THE PRIME MINISTER added that nothing would be published, as he understood it, in regard to reparations but that he could not agree to the inclusion of a definite sum.

MARSHAL STALIN said he wished to discuss the circumstances of the matter. He did not understand why there should be any confusion in regard to payment in money since the Soviet Union had concluded three treaties with Finland, Rumania and Hungary<sup>11</sup> in which the value of reparations in kind were definitely stated and that there had been no confusion as far as he knew on this subject. He said that if the British felt that the Russians should receive no reparations at all, it would be better to say so frankly. He said he had heard a great deal of talk at the Conference that the Russians would receive reparations in kind in the form of factories and plants but that no decision had been reached. He said he thought that two decisions might be taken by the Conference: (1) that it was agreed in principle that Germany should pay reparations and (2) that the Reparations Commission to sit in Moscow should fix the amount and should take into consideration the American-Soviet proposal that there should be twenty billion dollars of reparations, with fifty per cent to the Soviet Union.

<sup>9</sup> *Ante*, pp. 885-886.

<sup>10</sup> For a facsimile of Hopkins' note to Roosevelt at this point on reparations, see Stettinius, p. 265.

<sup>11</sup> Presumably the armistice agreements of September 19, 1944, with Finland; of September 12, 1944, with Rumania; and of January 20, 1945, with Hungary. For the respective texts, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 18, 1945, vol. xii, pp. 261-268; Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 490, or 59 Stat. 1712; and Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 456, or 59 Stat. 1321.

THE PRESIDENT said he feared the word "reparations" somewhat since he thought the people in America would think it meant reparations in cash.

Someone replied that this could be easily avoided by using the term "compensation for damages caused by Germany during the war" instead of "reparations."

MR. MOLOTOV said that the Moscow commission would have the duty of finding out the total of reparations to be paid, taking as a basis of discussion the American-Soviet formula.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that the British Government could not commit itself to any figure.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that there was no commitment involved but it might be said that the Commission might take as material for discussion the American-Soviet formula.

THE PRIME MINISTER then read a telegram from the War Cabinet which said that they considered it inadmissible to state any figure until an investigation had been completed on the spot and that at any rate the figure of twenty billion dollars was too great. It was equal to Germany's export trade in times of peace and it was beyond the capacity of Germany to pay. It was true that some of these reparations would come from Germany's capital assets but that in turn would make it more difficult for Germany to pay her bills. The payments would more than cover German imports and if these imports were not given a priority ahead of reparations it would mean that the other countries would be paying for German reparations to those countries receiving them.

MARSHAL STALIN said he did not want to go into the circumstances of the telegram the Prime Minister had just read. The experts may be right, but that all they were preparing was a figure to be used as a basis for discussions—it could be reduced or increased by the Commission in Moscow.

THE PRESIDENT then suggested that the whole matter be left to the Commission in Moscow.<sup>12</sup>

MARSHAL STALIN said that he felt in principle that Germany should pay reparations which would be stated by the three Governments here.

MR. MOLOTOV said that yesterday Mr. Stettinius had analyzed the results of the meeting and had reported full agreement on the first two points of the Soviet proposal. Now the question was what countries should receive reparations and the type of reparations and differences only appeared between the United States and the Soviet Delegation on the one hand and the British on the other in regard to the naming of a sum.

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<sup>12</sup> It appears that the note of Hopkins, *post*, p. 920, was passed to the President at about this point.

MR. EDEN said that rightly or wrongly, the British Government felt that even the naming of a sum as the basis of discussions would commit them. He said he proposed that the Moscow Commission be instructed to examine the report of Mr. Maisky, made at the Crimean Conference.

MR. MOLOTOV and MR. MAISKY both replied that to refer a question put by the Crimean Conference to a lesser body would be utterly illogical.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that no agreement had been reached as to the mention of a sum.

MR. EDEN added that the first two points referred to by Mr. Molotov were agreed upon but not the last which related to the sum.

MARSHAL STALIN repeated that he was willing to propose the following formula: (1) that the heads of the Governments had agreed that Germany must pay compensation for the damages caused to the Allied nations as a result of the war, and (2) that the Moscow Commission be instructed to consider the amount of reparations. This was agreed to by the Conference.

There was then a short intermission.

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether they could discuss the British text of the paragraph on frontiers to be added to the Polish statement.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he had not yet received the Russian translation.

MARSHAL STALIN then said that he would like to say a few words about the Montreux Convention regarding the Dardanelles.<sup>13</sup> He said the treaty was now outmoded. As he recalled, the Japanese Emperor played a big part in the treaty, even greater than that of the Soviet Union. The treaty was linked with the League which does not exist just as the Japanese Emperor was not present at this Conference. Under the Montreux Convention the Turks have the right to close the Straits not only in time of war but if they feel that there is a threat of war. He said that the treaty was made at a time when the relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union were not perfect, but he did not think now that Great Britain would wish to strangle Russia with the help of the Japanese. The treaty needed revision. He thought that there would be no objection to a consideration of the revision of that treaty. He said in what manner the treaty should be revised he did not know and he did not wish to prejudge any decisions, but he felt that the interests of Russia should be considered. He said that it was impossible to accept a situation in which Turkey had a hand on Russia's throat. He added, however, that it should be done in such a manner as not to harm the legitimate interests of Turkey. This was a question which an appropriate organization

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<sup>13</sup> See *ante*, pp. 328-329.



could consider and he thought that the three Foreign Ministers who were to meet periodically—every two or three months—might well consider this matter at their first meeting and report to their respective cabinets.

THE PRESIDENT said he had one general observation to make and that was that in the United States we had a frontier of over 3,000 miles with Canada and there was no fort and no armed forces. This situation had existed over a hundred years and it was his hope that other frontiers in the World would eventually be without forts or armed forces on any part of their national boundaries.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that Marshal Stalin had reminded them of the question of the Straits when they were in Moscow last autumn.<sup>14</sup> They had said then that they were in sympathy with the revision of the treaty and had suggested to the Soviet Government that a note be sent on the subject but none has as yet been received. He said that he thought that the method proposed by Marshal Stalin was a wise one. The British certainly felt that the present position of Russia with their great interests in the Black Sea should not be dependent on the narrow exit. He said if the matter is brought up at the meeting with the Foreign Ministers he hoped the Russians would make their proposals known. In the meantime, it might be well to inform the Turks that the matter of revision of the Montreux Convention would be under consideration. This was particularly true if the Allies desired them to come into the war on their side. Mr. Eden reminded him that he had mentioned the matter several times to the Turkish Ambassador in London. He said it might be advisable to give the Turks at the same time some assurance that their independence and integrity will be guaranteed.

MARSHAL STALIN replied it was impossible to keep anything secret from the Turks and that such assurance should be expressed.

THE PRESIDENT agreed to this.

MARSHAL STALIN said the Foreign Ministers could meet at the United Nations Conference and discuss the question of the Straits.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he thought that this matter affected the position of Great Britain in the Mediterranean more than it did that of the United States and that he felt that if the Foreign Ministers had a meeting in London that that would be the proper place to discuss this question. He went on to say that some years ago he had tried very hard to get through the Dardanelles and then the Russian Government had made available an armed force to help but it did not succeed.

MARSHAL STALIN said that the Prime Minister had been in too much of a hurry in withdrawing his troops since the Germans and Turks were on the verge of surrender.

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<sup>14</sup> See *ante*, p. 328.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that by that time he was out of the government because of the Dardanelles campaign and had had nothing to do with that decision.

MARSHAL STALIN then inquired who was taking down decisions reached at this conference.

MR. EDEN replied there would be an agreed upon communiqué as well as a list of the decisions taken.

THE PRESIDENT then said he wished to propose some small amendments in the paragraph regarding frontiers in the Polish statement. He said these amendments were necessary for American Constitutional reasons.<sup>15</sup> He suggested that instead of the first words "The three powers" he would like to substitute "The three heads of government" and that in the second sentence the words "three powers" be eliminated, and in the last sentence the word "feel" instead of "agree" should be used.

These amendments were accepted by the conference, and the following text approved:

"The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. It is recognized that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference."<sup>16</sup>

MR. MOLOTOV said he had one suggestion and that was to add to the second sentence "with the return to Poland of her ancient frontiers in East Prussia and on the Oder".

THE PRESIDENT inquired how long ago these lands had been Polish.

MR. MOLOTOV said very long ago, but they had in fact been Polish.

THE PRESIDENT said this might lead the British to ask for the return of the United States to Great Britain.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that the ocean prevented this. He added that at the present the draft said nothing specific about frontiers, which he thought was very important for the Poles.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he would prefer not to mention the frontier in the west since he shared the same difficulties the President had spoken of.

<sup>15</sup> For facsimiles of notes from Stettinius and Hopkins to Roosevelt in this connection, see Stettinius, pp. 183, 270.

<sup>16</sup> For a facsimile of a note which Hopkins passed to Roosevelt at this point, see Stettinius, p. 273.

MR. EDEN said that they had always said that they would accept any line up to the Oder that the Poles desired.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that there was no stopping place between what we proposed to do and the line of the Oder, and if the question is asked about ancient territories there would be no answer. He said that he was not against the line of the Oder in principle if the Poles so desired.

MR. MOLOTOV said he thought it might be worthwhile considering this wording.

MARSHAL STALIN said he would withdraw the Soviet amendment and leave the British draft as it had been.

The draft of the last paragraph regarding Polish frontiers was accepted.

THE PRESIDENT then remarked he would have to leave Yalta tomorrow at three o'clock in the afternoon.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that he doubted if it would be possible to get all the work done by then, particularly the communiqué and the final text of the documents.

There followed a discussion between the President, the Prime Minister, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Eden concerning the possibility of preparing the communiqué before the time set for the President's departure.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that there was very little time and he felt it was impossible to complete the work in view of the dinner. He suggested that the dinner might be cancelled.

After some discussion it was decided that a drafting committee for the communiqué should come to the Villa and report at ten o'clock to the Foreign Ministers and heads of government.

The meeting then adjourned.

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Matthews Files

*Matthews Minutes*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

The President opened the meeting (which was delayed owing to an earlier discussion between Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin)<sup>2</sup> by asking Mr. Eden to render a report on the foreign secretaries' meetings of last night and this morning.

<sup>1</sup> For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Bohlen minutes of this meeting.

<sup>2</sup> According to Churchill's account of this private meeting with Stalin, which was held at the Soviet headquarters, the subject of "Russian wishes in the Far East" was discussed, as was also the question of British representation in Poland (Churchill, pp. 385, 389-390).

EDEN: I should like to report that with the exception of two points outstanding we have reached a decision on the Polish question. I believe that we have since worked out an agreement with regard to these two points. (He reads the Polish formula,<sup>3</sup> which after some discussion as to wording was finally agreed to.)

PRIME MINISTER: There is no reference in this formula to the frontier question. The world at large will ask about that. We are all agreed I believe about the eastern frontier. We are all agreed in principle about the western frontier. The only question is where the line is to be drawn and how much to say about it in our communiqué. We are doubtful about going further in mentioning frontiers at this stage. I have received a telegram from the War Cabinet deprecating any frontier going as far west as the Neisse. They feel that the population problem is too large to handle.

PRESIDENT: My position is that I would rather hear from the new government of national unity what they think about it. Therefore, I think we had better leave out all references to frontiers.

PRIME MINISTER: On the west?

STALIN: It is important to say something.

PRIME MINISTER: I agree. People will immediately ask what is the settlement on the question of the frontiers. We think that the eastern frontier is settled. On the west the wishes of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity must be consulted.

PRESIDENT: I do not believe we should say anything in the communiqué. I have no right to make an agreement on boundaries at this time. That must be done by the Senate later. Let the Prime Minister make some public statement when he returns if that is necessary.

MOLOTOV: I think it would be very good if something could be said about full agreement of the three heads of government on the eastern frontier. We could say that the Curzon line is generally representative of the opinion of all present. It is possible that there might be criticism of this for some time but that would be better in the long run. We should either agree or leave to the three foreign ministers to find a formula. I agree that we need say nothing about the western frontier.

PRIME MINISTER: I agree we must say something.

MOLOTOV: Yes, but less specific if you wish.

PRIME MINISTER: We must say that Poland is to get compensation in the west; also that there is to be left for discussion with the Polish government before the line is drawn.

MOLOTOV: Very good.

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<sup>3</sup> The text of the formula is in the Bohlen minutes, *ante*, p. 898.

PRIME MINISTER: We must go out now with the rest of our communiqué on Poland. (Matter is referred to the three foreign ministers.)

STALIN: That could be done during our intermission.

EDEN: I shall next report on the declaration on liberated areas. Mr. Molotov kindly withdrew his amendment of last night with regard to the third from last paragraph but has proposed the following wording at the end of the penultimate paragraph. (There followed considerable discussion as to the exact wording that was agreed upon and finally Marshal Stalin accepted the following:

“. . .<sup>4</sup> shall consult together on the measures to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.” In this form it was approved.)

I should like to add a sentence with regard to the French which we proposed last evening to clear up the ambiguous situation in regard to France. (The following was approved:

“In issuing this declaration the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of France will associate itself with them.”)

PRESIDENT: I should like to say that I have changed my mind with regard to the position of the French on the Control Council for Germany. The more I think of it the more I think that the Prime Minister is right and that a nation with a zone of occupation must sit in on the control machinery. I think it would be easier if France is on the commission to get de Gaulle to agree to join the liberated areas declaration and many other things.

STALIN: I have no objection. (It is agreed upon.)

PRIME MINISTER: Of course France may say that she will have no part in the declaration and reserve all rights for the future. (laughing) We must face that.

MOLOTOV: We must be ready to receive a rough answer.

EDEN: Next is the question of Yugoslavia. We prepared a draft on this which is still under discussion. (After some discussion between the British and Russians a draft telegram to Yugoslavia is agreed upon. Copy attached.<sup>5</sup>[]) Molotov insisted that the telegram should be short and should be sent today. The Prime Minister wanted the joint telegram to contain not only the exhortation that the Tito-Subasic agreement be put into effect immediately and the new united government formed but also the additional points which the new government would be asked to accept (Subasic recommendations). First that the Avnoj be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves, thus forming a body to be called a temporary parliament, and, two, that legislative acts passed

<sup>4</sup> Points appear in the original.

<sup>5</sup> The draft telegram was not attached to these minutes, but see *post*, pp. 919-920.

by the Avnoj would be subject to ratification by a constituent assembly. The British also wanted a third provision to the effect that the government is only temporary pending the free expression of the will of the people but dropped this at the Russian request as offensive to Yugoslav sensibilities. On that basis the telegram was agreed upon by all three after considerable discussion by the Prime Minister and Stalin, the latter wanting originally to confine the telegram to the question of the execution of the Tito-Subasic agreement and await till the government was formed before taking up the other point.

There followed a lengthy and at times somewhat heated discussion between Marshal Stalin and Churchill on the question of reparations. This was the only time during the conference that Stalin showed some annoyance. He obviously felt suspicious of the British opposing Russian reparations as part of a program to build up a strong Germany. At one stage in the discussion he asked point blank if the British did not want the Russians to receive reparations they should say so frankly. This of course Mr. Churchill emphatically denied. Stalin proposed that the three governments accept the principle of reparations in goods. (The President made it clear that what he feared was a system of reparations paid in money.) And second that the Moscow commission should be asked to find out the total or total possible reparations and report to the respective governments. He also asked that the three governments agree that Germany must pay in kind for losses suffered in the course of the war.

**MOLOTOV:** We must give the Moscow commission on reparations the task of finding out the total of reparations to be paid, taking as a basis of discussion the American-Soviet formula. The commission need only take that as the basis.

**PRIME MINISTER:** We have had a very important communication from our government on this question. We cannot accept any specific figures in any formula.

**STALIN:** I propose first that the three heads of government agree that Germany must pay compensation in kind for losses caused during the war. Two, the heads of the three governments agree that Germany must pay for losses to the allied nations. Three, the Moscow reparations commission is given the task to consider the amount to be paid. We bring our figures before the commission and you bring yours. (to Churchill)

(This was followed by an intermission during which the formula to be used on Polish frontiers for inclusion in the communiqué was largely worked out.)

**PRESIDENT:** Marshal Stalin said that he wanted to talk a little on some question after our intermission and I now invite him to do so.

**STALIN:** I should like to say a few words on the Montreux Con-

vention. We believe that it is now out of date. The Japanese Emperor was one of the parties to it. In fact, he plays a greater role in it than the Soviet Union. The treaty was made at a time when relations between Britain and Russia were not very good. Now that is all changed. I do not think that Great Britain would with the help of the Japanese want to strangle Russia. Now the convention should be seriously modified. I do not wish to pre-judge future decisions. The interests of Russia should be taken into account and observed. The legitimate interests of Turkey must not be infringed. The question is how to do it. We can of course ask a certain organism to discuss this question. We have agreed that the three foreign ministers should meet from time to time. Perhaps they could discuss this question at their first meeting and report to the three governments. This would be a preparatory step to settling the question.

PRESIDENT: I only want to say that we have three thousand miles of natural boundary with Canada. There is no fort and no armed ship on this entire distance. If other parts of the world would do the same it would be a wonderful thing.

PRIME MINISTER: Marshal Stalin mentioned this question to me and to Eden in Moscow. We viewed it with sympathy. We agreed with the Soviets that the Montreux Convention should be revised or reconstructed. We asked the Soviet Government for a note with their ideas. This has not yet been received. The suggestion of Marshal Stalin is a wise one. I certainly feel that the present position of Russia—her Black Sea dependent on the narrow exit—is not satisfactory. I hope our Russian allies will make their proposal. Meanwhile, if Turkey wanted to declare war we should tell her beforehand that this matter is to be brought under consideration. They should know that fact before going into the war. I believe we are obligated to tell them. (After conferring with Mr. Eden) Eden tells me that he did mention that matter to the Turkish ambassador in London in general terms following our Moscow visit, so we have kept our engagement. It is worth considering whether when changes are made some assurances should be given Turkey that her independence will not be affected.

STALIN: Certainly we should give such assurance. When the foreign ministers meet in April in the United States at the end of the conference could they not discuss the question of the straits?

PRIME MINISTER: Well, I think this question affects Britain with her Mediterranean interests more than the United States. Therefore, I believe that the meeting should be in London.

I tried some time ago to get through the Dardanelles (smiling) and the former Russian government had two army corps ready to help me

at the other end. However, we did not succeed in joining hands. I consequently have some feeling on this question.

STALIN: You were in too much of a hurry to take away your troops. Perhaps in another week you would have won as the Germans and Turks were getting ready to withdraw.

PRIME MINISTER: I had nothing to do with that decision. I was already out of the government. (It was decided that the question would be discussed by the three foreign ministers in London.)

PRESIDENT: The only thing left now is the amended text on the frontiers of Poland. (The text is then read for consideration by the Russians who had received the Russian text.)<sup>6</sup>

STALIN: I should like to suggest an amendment in the phraseology to indicate that Poland should receive the return of her ancient frontier of East Prussia and the Oder.

PRESIDENT: (Laughing to Prime Minister) Perhaps you would want us back?

PRIME MINISTER: Well you might be as indigestible for us as it might be for the Poles if they took too much German territory.

MOLOTOV: This change would give great encouragement to the Poles.

PRIME MINISTER: I prefer to leave it as it is.

MOLOTOV: But there is no mention of frontiers in the west. What about the Oder? No exchange was mentioned.

PRIME MINISTER: Well, between what we propose and the question of specifying ancient territories up to the Oder there seems to be no stopping place.

STALIN: I withdraw my suggestion and agree to leave it as drawn. The President suggested changes (change "agreed" to "consider" in the first sentence and change "the three powers" to "the three heads of government" in the third sentence) are accepted. This I believe is our last point of decision.

PRESIDENT: There only remains the question of the communiqué. I must leave tomorrow at 3 p. m. I hope we can get the communiqué done and I suggest that if we meet at eleven tomorrow we can finish it by lunch. (This suggestion is vigorously opposed by Churchill and to a lesser degree by Stalin, both of whom insist that the communiqué is most important and should not be drawn too hastily. The matter was left indefinite with the representatives of the three governments assigned the task of concluding their drafts—an American and British draft had already been prepared—for submission to the Big Three.)

The meeting then adjourned.

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<sup>6</sup> For the text as approved, see the Bohlen minutes, *ante*, p. 905.



Hiss Collection

*Hiss Notes*<sup>1</sup>Plenary 2/10  
4.55Ed. reported on meeting For Mins

We reached agt re Pol—there were two outstanding q's Perhaps I may come to that in a moment. Read draft as it now stands (included some changes app. agreed to by Church & St. in their private meeting before plenary session) included Mol. amend of noon. and new amend:

“and will exchange Ambs. by whose reports the respective govts will be kept informed about the situation in Poland”

Church: We have made no reference to frontiers but of course people will ask at once about frontiers, what we have agreed. We are all agreed about the E. frontier, we are all agreed in prin. about W. frontier. The only q is where it is to be exactly drawn & how much we should say about it. We all agreed that the Poles are to have E. Pr. & be free to go to the line of the Oder if they so desire. We are very doubtful indeed about going further or mentioning at this stage—we have had a tel. from our War Cab. strongly deprecating frontier going as far as W. Neisse because they think the problem is larger than we could manage

Pres. We should rather hear from the Pol. Govt of Nat. Unity we had better leave out all references to boundaries

Church: on West?

Maisky on East we should say something

Church. agreed.

Church people will immediately say what is the position about the frontier. We think E. frontier is settled. We think on W. frontier wishes of Pol Govt Nat Un be first consulted & matter finally settled at peace settlements

Pres: I cannot agree on Pol boundaries at this time. It must be done by the Sen later

Mol It would be very good if something could be said about full agt of 3 heads about E. frontier. Would clarify that important q. It would be good to say gen. opin of all sides represented. Prob. would provoke criticism for a time but in end would be good. Proposes leave it to 3 Mins. to find nec. formula. Not nec. to say anything about W frontier

Church: Something

Mol Yes, much less def.

<sup>1</sup> From penciled notes in longhand. For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding Bohlen minutes of this meeting.

Church: Say recog. by 3 powers Pol should receive substantial accession of terr both to the N. & to the W. . . .<sup>2</sup> Thereafter final line be determined

St: That would be very good That would correspond to wish of public opin. all around

Pres: 3 For Secs

Church: Along lines we have suggested

~~Ma~~ St.: As a last ¶

Ed Decl. on Lib Areas (continuing his report)

Read & Church amended the Mol. amend. to include "responsibilities" etc.

Mol: Wants his amend. to stand

Pres read it as agreed this morning

Church how can you carry out measure.

St. accepted Church. formula

Agreed To be put in language

Document approved

Ed sug. amend. re Fr.

"In issuing this decl. the 3 powers express the hope that the French Prov. Govt will be associated with them in the action & procedures contemplated"

Pres: I have rather changed my opin. I was opposed to Fr. sitting in on the Com. of 3, Control Machinery The more I think of it the more I think the PM's contention that a country which has an area to control can not do so without sitting in on the Con. Com. I think it would be easier if Fr. is on that Con Com to get DeG to agree to this Decl. & other things. Like St. think about it

Pres agreed to ~~add~~ ~~also~~ Ed. addition

St agreed

Ed. Yug.

Agreed For Mins. prepare first draft final communique

Pres Should communique contain Yug statement Will leave to Ed in Conf. with For Mins whether we join in on that or not.

Church These are very respectable issues

Pres I'm not trying to protect my purity

Mol What is agreed re Yug.

Ed We've agreed to send a message & we've agreed to draft a communique

Read d

Message for 3 Govts to Tito & Sub<sup>3</sup>

agreed to recommend Tito-Sub be immed. formed & put into effect plus Brit amends.

<sup>2</sup> Points appear in the original.

<sup>3</sup> Marginal notation: "Get copy".

Pres: All right

Mol: Tel was to be very short & without last 2 ¶s

Ed Yes then later ~~then~~ the ~~amends~~ second part.

Church. Hope commun. can mention both parts

Mol. We just had com. when agreed only 1st part be in tel.; 2nd part to be put off until United govt formed

Church But world will give more attention to immed. enforcement of agt if other part were mentioned, too. Would have effect of getting better reception for what we say.

St. It would be inconvenient if tel. & communique different & we agreed a second tel. will be sent

Church We have complex pub. opin. Want favorable reception of agt Believes it would help (include in commun)

Ed Might say: It was further agreed that when the agt is put into force, 3 govts would recommend to new govt to make a decl. of the 3 points

St. Without 3rd point, which is very objectionable

Ed. & Church: all right leave it out.

Church Besides it's understood in Tito-Sub agt.

St. In any case change Tel—3 parts 1st Put agt in force immed-2nd members Vojnoj be later included 3rd all acts be confirmed later

Church Very good & very helpful

St & all 3 also be in communique

Ed World Org. Report of subcom re<sup>n</sup> consultation Fr & China & Invitation was accepted by For Mins & need not be discussed in plenary session.

→Pres OK'd invitation

### Reparations

Church We were practically instructed by our gov't not to mention figures. Let Com. do that

Pres goes along my idea not to mention money, not make reps an am't of money Let Com. do Talk about the equiv.

St. That's only a monetary expression of what the goods cost. It is not money

Pres so many people at home will think of it in terms of \$ & cents

Church I don't understand what is to be published

Pres Nothing

Church not even subject

St. There is objection to mention dollars because someone will think will take reparations in money But we have already 3 treaties on reps. where reps in kind are expressed in dollars. Why in this case should there be a misunderstanding?

Church. I was going to suggest Mos. Com. be auth. to issue an interim report & not have to issue whole report before authorization is given to taking reps. For ex. factories would be taken at once by Sov Govt

St. I think we can be quite frank How compare goods we should take from Ger. with our losses If we accept them we should say we accept as reparation. R could take factories & lands but better have a dec. I propose simple prin.: 1. Ger must pay reps. for losses caused to Allies. 2. To ask Rep. Com to find out am't of reps. which would be nec. to take & to report to govts Am. side agreed with us to take as basis \$20 million [sic] dollars. Does it mean Am side withdraws its agt

Pres: No I am completely in agt. Only one word. Reparations mean to so many people money. Add parenthesis (in kind)

St. We won't publish

Pres U S entirely prepared discuss sum & principles. Only q I raise is use of word reps

St. We can use another word. Compensation of losses

Church "Compensation in kind for losses"

St: 3 govts agree Ger. must pay in kind losses caused by her to Allies in course of war. To give to Mos Com the task to find out the figures of the reps. to be paid taking as basis ~~To give Com to~~ for discussion the Am-Sov formula

Church We can not commit ourselves to fig. of \$20 billion or any other figures until Com has studied

St. No commitment

Ed What is value of the figure

St. Com. could change figures & modify them in any way.

Church You could propose that when the Com. meets Read excerpt from "communication from our govt" £500,000,000 a yr.= Ger's pre-war exports This could not be paid by Ger. True some of it capital but that make it harder for Ger. to supply rest. Attach importance to some statement re paying for Ger imports. Unless priority at least equal to reps. we shall pay by exports (?) for reps.

St: Suppose experts say figure is wrong Then can fix new one. Our fig. not sacrosanct. We propose to discuss. It is nec. that things move forward.

Pres. suggest whole thing be left to Com at Mos.

Mol: Only yesterday ERS announced results of 3 For Mins consids. ~~Text of~~ Read ERS report

Ed. We think putting fig. in report might commit us to the figures. If desired would be willing say:

Mos Rep Com will be instructed: 1st To take into exam the report presented by Mr M. to the Crimean Conf

Mol. The 3 Mins considered this q. Eden's proposal ignores fact this q has been discussed at Crimean Conf

Ed. we didn't want say how many yrs

St. 1. The heads of 3 govts agree Ger must pay ~~compensation~~ in Kind for losses caused to Allied Govts

2. & agree Ger must pay in Kind

2. To the Mos. Rep Com has been given task to consider the am't of reps. to be paid

3. In the Com. we will bring in our fig & you will bring yours

Church: I agree

#### Intermission

St. Montreux Agt

I think this treaty is now out of date. In this treaty Jap. Emperor plays a very important role as one of the parties. He plays perhaps more impor. role than S. U. The whole treaty is framed in such a way as to be linked up with Leag of Ns. But Leag doesn't exist any more, just as Jap Emperor is not in our ranks. According to this Treaty T. has rt to close Straits not only in case of war but also if T considers sit. dangerous. This also is difficult from modern point of view

The treaty was made when our rels with Gt Brit were not very tight but now G Bt wouldn't want strangle R. ∴ I think this treaty should be very seriously modified. Now nearly indecent to say we observe the treaty of Montreux. I think there could be no objection to consideration of a revision of the treaty. In what sense I won't go on to prejudice future decs. But I should like ints. of R to be taken account of. It is impossible to put up with a sit. where a small country will keep her hand at the throat of R. Ints of R must be taken into acct without infringing legit. ints of T. How to do it must be considered. I now propose the organ to study it. Is agreed 3 Mins will meet every few months. Perhaps would be possible at 1st meeting to discuss so mins could report to their govts. That would be the preparatory stage for settlement of q. of the Straits

Pres. We have over 3,000 miles of natural boundary bet. US & Can. No fort or armed ship on that boundary, Has existed for over 100 yrs. If we could get other govts do that would be wonderful thing

Church. Marshall mentioned this to Mr Ed & me when we were last in Mos. We viewed with sympathy the Sov. proposal that the treaty be revised. We suggested that Sov Govt give us a note of what their ideas were on the Convention but this has not yet been done. We think proposal of Mar. is a wise one. We certainly feel present position of R with its great Black Sea being dependent upon this

narrow exit is not satisfactory. If the matter is brought up at the next For Secs meeting we hope the Rs will make their proposal. Meanwhile I think it would be nec if T became minded to declare war on Ger for any reason, it would be to tell T the matter would be brought under consid. Shouldn't like her to come in to war with out knowing of it. Indeed I think we have some promise to T that before anything is decided affecting her she would be informed. Mr Ed reminds me that after we came back from Mos he mentioned the matter to the T. Amb. in general terms, so we have Kept our engagements. It is worth considering whether at the time changes are made to meet the wishes & needs of R in the Straits whether some undertaking might be made to T that her indep. would in no way be affected. That would make it easy for her.

St. We can hide nothing from T & we should give her some assurances

Church Then we are agreed

St. So For Mins will meet at the end of the Conf in US

Church I think it affects Brit position in the Med. more than U.S. so conference might be in Lon. I tried hard some time ago to get thru the Dardanelles. The R. Govt of that day sent 2 army corps to help from the other end. However we did not succeed

St. They were in a hurry to take away the troops. If had waited another wk. Gers & Ts all ready to capitulate. Mr. Pres you would not object to conf. in Eur.

Pres No

St. No secretary of the Conf. Who is taking notes of the decs.

Ed. Will put before you a commun & a note of decisions taken

Church In addition to commun.

Pres re Amended statement on Pol line. For const. reasons I have made a few changes. Only 2 changes. Orig text was "The 3 Powers are agreed" etc. Const. q of whether I have a rt to say the 3 powers can change a boundary. ∴ the new lang: "The 3 heads of gov't consider" omit "3 powers" & change "agree" to "feel"

Mol Add Return her ancient terrs in E. Pr. & westerly

Pres Depends how long back you go

Mol Quite a long time ago. It is of great importance to Poles from a national point of view.

Church I feel it would be better not to draw the frontiers in the W. at the present time & not to mention localities

Mol There is no mention of the frontiers & with regard to the line of the Oder there was no objection

Church Never in pub.

Mol But at the Conf

Ed On contrary, we have always said as far toward Oder as Poles want to go.

Church: If you talk of restoring the ancient terrs. I shall be asked what they are & there will be no satis. answer We're not ag. it

St Withdrew his suggestions & "your suggestion Mr Pres (to Pres) is accepted"

That will be the last point of paper on Pol

Pres we have only commun

Church: D.O. (i. e. terr. trusteeships) [Then his advisers talked him out of it Prob. told him of revised copy of ERS report. He said "I haven't seen it" but then matter was app. settled OK]<sup>4</sup>

Pres suggested draft commun. be given to heads of govt tonight & then have 11.00 a.m. meeting tomorrow

Church Then said something about multiple membership in communique

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<sup>4</sup> Brackets appear in the original.

Hiss Collection

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*Amended Draft of the Declaration on Liberated Europe*<sup>1</sup>

[YALTA, February 10, 1945.]

DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

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<sup>1</sup> Carbon copy in the Hiss Collection bears the notation: "As agreed to by For Mins 2/10 & at Plenary 2/10". An identical carbon copy without notations is in the Matthews Files.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require, (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately (establish appropriate machinery for the carrying out of the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration) take measures for carrying out mutual consultation.<sup>2</sup>

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The words after "immediately" are crossed out in pencil and the following substitution is indicated: "consult together on the measures to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration."

<sup>3</sup> This penciled notation follows: "add Fr. amend. of Eden's".

860H.01/2-1145: Telegram

*The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the Foreign Office*<sup>1</sup>

MOST IMMEDIATE

[YALTA, February 10, 1945.]

Following for Foreign Office from Foreign Secretary. Please repeat to Belgrade.

At plenary session of Crimea Conference on February 10th the Heads of the three Governments discussed the Yugoslav question and agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Subasic:

(a) that the Tito-Subasic Agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new Government formed on the basis of the Agreement.

<sup>1</sup> This text is from an undated British copy evidently brought back to the Department from Yalta. A copy of the corresponding American telegram has not been found.



(b) that as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare:

(i) that Avnoj will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament and

(ii) that legislative acts passed by Avnoj will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly.

2. Please arrange for a communication to be made at once on above lines to Dr. Subasic and to Marshal Tito.

3. Similar instructions are being sent by Soviet and United States Governments to their representatives with Dr. Subasic and Marshal Tito and action should be concerted between the representatives of the three allied Governments.

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Hopkins Papers

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

[YALTA, February 10, 1945.]

MR. PRESIDENT The Russians have given in so much at this conference that I don't think we should let them down. Let the British disagree if they want to—and continue their disagreement at Moscow. Simply say it is all referred to the Reparations Commission with the minutes to show the British disagree about any mention of the 10 billion.

HARRY

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<sup>1</sup> The relationship of this note to the Seventh Plenary Meeting appears from internal evidence and from Sherwood, pp. 860, 861-862. See *ante*, p. 902.

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Hiss Collection

*The Secretary of State to the President*<sup>1</sup>

[YALTA,] February 10, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Recommendation that the three powers encourage Kuomintang-Communist unity in the war effort against Japan.

As this is likely to be the final plenary session, I suggest that some time during today's meeting you find occasion to urge the Marshal and the Prime Minister to see that full encouragement is given by

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<sup>1</sup> Ribbon copy, bearing the initials of Stettinius as drafter and the following penciled notation in Hiss' handwriting: "Bohlen says 'the President has already taken this up with Stalin with satisfactory results' (AH)." See *ante*, p. 771.

their Governments to Kuomintang-Communist unity in the war effort against Japan.

The importance of encouraging united Chinese efforts at this time must be apparent to all three Governments.

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**TRIPARTITE DINNER MEETING, FEBRUARY 10, 1945, 9 P. M.,  
VORONTSOV VILLA<sup>1</sup>**

**PRESENT**

**UNITED STATES**  
President Roosevelt  
Secretary Stettinius  
Mr. Bohlen

**UNITED KINGDOM**  
Prime Minister Churchill  
Foreign Secretary Eden  
Major Birse

**SOVIET UNION**  
Marshal Stalin  
Foreign Commissar Molotov  
Mr. Pavlov

Bohlen Collection

*Bohlen Minutes*

TOP SECRET

Subjects: Reparations from Germany  
Communiqué  
British and American Politics  
Jewish problems

At the beginning of dinner the conversation was general.

THE PRIME MINISTER then proposed a toast to the King of England, the President of the United States, and to Mr. Kalinin, President of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, and he asked the President as the only Head of State present to reply to this toast.

THE PRESIDENT replied that the Prime Minister's toast brought back many memories—that he recalled the first year as President of the United States in the summer of 1933. His wife had gone down in the country to open a school, and on the wall there had been a map on which there had been a great blank space. He said the teacher had told his wife that it was forbidden to speak about this place, and this place had been the Soviet Union. He said he had then decided to write a letter to Mr. Kalinin asking him to send someone to the United States to open negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic relations.

MARSHAL STALIN, in his conversation with Prime Minister Churchill, emphasized the unsatisfactory nature of the reparations question at the conference. He said he feared to have to go back to the Soviet Union and tell the Soviet people they were not going to get any reparations because the British were opposed to it.

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<sup>1</sup> Churchill acted as host.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that, on the contrary, he very much hoped that Russia would receive reparations in large quantities, but he remembered the last war when they had placed the figure at more than the capacity of Germany to pay.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that he thought it would be a good idea to put some mention of the intention to make Germany pay for the damage it had caused the Allied Nations, and also some reference to the Reparations Commission, in the communiqué.

THE PRIME MINISTER and THE PRESIDENT agreed to the inclusion of these statements in the communiqué.

THE PRIME MINISTER then proposed a toast to the health of Marshal Stalin. He said he hoped that the Marshal had a warmer feeling for the British than he had had, and that he felt that the great victories which his armies had achieved had made him more mellow and friendly than he had been during the hard times of the war. He said he hoped that the Marshal realized that he had good and strong friends in those British and American representatives assembled here. We all hoped, he continued, that the future of Russia would be bright, and he said he knew Great Britain, and he was sure the President, would do all they could to bring this about. He said he felt that the common danger of war had removed impediments to understanding and the fires of war had wiped out old animosities. He said he envisaged a Russia which had already been glorious in war as a happy and smiling nation in times of peace.

MR. STETTINIUS then proposed a toast to his predecessor, Mr. Cordell Hull, who he said had been an inspiration to us all in his labors for the creation of a peaceful and orderly world. He concluded by saying that Mr. Hull was a great American and great statesman.<sup>2</sup>

THE PRESIDENT then said that he recalled that there had been an organization in the United States called the Ku Klux Klan that had hated the Catholics and the Jews, and once when he had been on a visit in a small town in the South he had been the guest of the president of the local Chamber of Commerce. He had sat next to an Italian on one side and a Jew on the other and had asked the president of the Chamber of Commerce whether they were members of the Ku Klux Klan, to which the president had replied that they were, but that they were considered all right since everyone in the community knew them. The President remarked that it was a good illustration

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<sup>2</sup> The following morning Stettinius sent this message to Hull (Defense Files, Argonaut 143, February 11, 1945):

“We have missed you at our Conference and send you our affectionate greetings and wish for you a speedy recovery in order that we may all have the benefit of association with you again. Signed: Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill, Molotov, Eden and Stettinius.”

“I was instructed to send the above message to you on behalf of the above who were guests of the Prime Minister at dinner this [last] evening.”

of how difficult it was to have any prejudices—racial, religious or otherwise—if you really knew people.

MARSHAL STALIN said he felt that this was very true.

After considerable discussion between the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin as to English politics, in which the latter said he did not believe the Labor Party would ever be successful in forming a government in England, THE PRESIDENT said that in his opinion any leader of a people must take care of their primary needs. He said he remembered when he first became President the United States was close to revolution because the people lacked food, clothing and shelter, but he had said, "If you elect me President I will give you these things", and since then there was little problem in regard to social disorder in the United States.

THE PRESIDENT then said he desired to propose a toast to the Prime Minister. He said that he personally had been twenty-eight years old when he entered political life, but even at that time Mr. Churchill had had long experience in the service of his country. Mr. Churchill had been in and out of the government for many, many years, and it was difficult to say whether he had been of more service to his country within the government or without. The President said that he personally felt that Mr. Churchill had been perhaps of even greater service when he was not in the government since he had forced the people to think.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he would face difficult elections in the near future in England since he did not know what the Left would do.

MARSHAL STALIN said that he felt that Left and Right now were parliamentary terms. For example, under classical political concepts, Daladier, who was a radical socialist, had been more to the left than Mr. Churchill, yet Daladier had dissolved the trade unions in France, whereas Mr. Churchill had never molested them in England. He inquired who, then, could be considered more to the left?

THE PRESIDENT said that in 1940 there had been eighteen political parties in France and that within one week he had had to deal with three different prime ministers in France. He said that when he had seen de Gaulle last summer he had asked him how this had happened in French political life, and de Gaulle replied that it was based on a series of combinations and compromises, but he intended to change all that.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that Marshal Stalin had a much easier political task since he only had one party to deal with.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that experience had shown one party was of great convenience to a leader of a state.

THE PRIME MINISTER said if he could get full agreement of all the British people it would greatly facilitate his task, but he must say that during the Greek crisis he had lost two votes in Parliament and the opposition had consisted of only eleven votes against him. He said he had accosted those Members of Parliament who had deserted him and had asked them to have the courage of their convictions. He added that they had been very unhappy because they had had this stand against the government. He concluded that he didn't know what would be the result of the election in England but he knew he and Mr. Eden would continue to support the interests of Russia and the United States no matter who was in power.

THE PRIME MINISTER then remarked that although he had had great difficulty with Mr. Gallacher, the Communist member in the House of Commons, he nevertheless had written him a letter of sympathy when he lost his two foster children in the war. He added that he felt that British opposition to Communism was not based on any attachment to private property but to the old question of the individual versus the state. He said that in war the individual of necessity is subordinate to the state and that in England any man or woman between the ages of eighteen and sixty was subject to the government.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that he did not believe the Labor Party could ever form a government in England. He asked the President whether there was any labor party in a political sense in the United States.

THE PRESIDENT replied that labor was extremely powerful in the United States but there was no one specific party.

MARSHAL STALIN then said he thought more time was needed to consider and finish the business of the conference.

THE PRESIDENT answered that he had three Kings waiting for him in the Near East, including Ibn Saud.

MARSHAL STALIN said the Jewish problem was a very difficult one—that they had tried to establish a national home for the Jews in Virovidzhan but that they had only stayed there two or three years and then scattered to the cities. He said the Jews were natural traders but much had been accomplished by putting small groups in some agricultural areas.

THE PRESIDENT said he was a Zionist and asked if Marshal Stalin was one.

MARSHAL STALIN said he was one in principle but he recognized the difficulty.

During the course of the conversation, MARSHAL STALIN remarked that the Soviet Government would never have signed a treaty with the Germans in 1939<sup>3</sup> had it not been for Munich and the Polish-German treaty of 1934.<sup>4</sup>

MARSHAL STALIN came over and spoke to the President and said he did not think they could complete the work of the conference by three o'clock tomorrow.

THE PRESIDENT replied that if necessary he would wait over until Monday, to which Marshal Stalin expressed gratification.

It was tentatively agreed that there would be a plenary session tomorrow at twelve noon, after which the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin would lunch with the President.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> For the text, in English translation, of the treaty of non-aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union signed at Moscow August 23, 1939, see *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*, Department of State publication 3023, pp. 76-78.

<sup>4</sup> Presumably the declaration of non-aggression and understanding between Germany and Poland which was signed at Berlin January 26, 1934. For the text, in English translation, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXXXVII, pp. 495-496.

<sup>5</sup> Stettinius (p. 206) says that it was during this dinner meeting that he informed Molotov and Eden of the choice of San Francisco as the site of the United Nations Conference scheduled to open on April 25, 1945.

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## SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1945

### EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING, FEBRUARY 11, 1945, NOON, LIVADIA PALACE

#### PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Marshal Stalin
Secretary Stettinius	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Hopkins	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Mr. Maisky
Mr. Harriman	Sir Edward Bridges	Mr. Gusev
Mr. Matthews	Mr. Jebb	Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Hiss	Mr. Wilson	Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Bohlen	Mr. Dixon	
Mr. Foote	Major Birse	

#### *Editorial Note*

There are no full minutes of this meeting in the Bohlen Collection. There is a list of those present and of subjects of discussion, indicated as (1) communiqué on close of conference, (2) reparations, and (3) Japan, but these are followed by the notation: "No report was written up on this Conference." There is, however, a subsequent page in the Bohlen Collection, entitled "Report of Last Day's Proceedings", the

first paragraph of which bears the sub-heading "Last Plenary Session". This is the paragraph reproduced below. For references to documents, see the Hiss notes which follow the Bohlen note on this meeting.

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Bohlen Collection

*Bohlen Note*

SECRET

At the last Plenary Session, the communiqué was discussed and most of the conversation dealt with the details of language, the results of which are apparent in the final communiqué agreed upon. The Soviet suggested that in the part on voting procedure no reference be made to the fact that the proposal accepted was put forward by the President. Marshal Stalin stated that there would be no objection to the President, or any other American Official, making it public that the United States' proposal had been adopted, but he felt such a reference did not properly belong in a communiqué. The Soviet suggestion was adopted.

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Hiss Collection

*Hiss Notes*<sup>1</sup>

2/11 12.15 p. m.  
Plenary

Communique

PM likes draft but too many "joints".<sup>2</sup> Also make separate ¶ re reparations

Mol. We have an amendment that does that

The 1st part: prefer more detail, naming personalities who took part

Church: At end

St: Better at beginning. Was at Teheran

Pres & PM: OK

St. no other remarks on opening

Church put in generals as well?

St. Yes

Church I agree with that

St name whomever you like

---

<sup>1</sup> From penciled notes in longhand.

<sup>2</sup> See Stettinius, p. 279.

I Defeat of Ger.

Mol amends

Church: Is point of substance in introducing word "Hitlerite"  
It narrows it. We would prefer "Nazi" Germany

Mol. Withdraws amend. (re Hitlerite Ger)

Church. leave out "joint", goes without saying  
various Church amendments

## II OK with St.

Ed: Ought make it clear how zone is to be given

Shouldn't indicate we have accepted the Fr. demand.

"Limits of the Fr. zone will be agreed by the 4 Govts thru their  
repres. on the EAC"

~~Wire to Winant~~

Mol: After II a new chap. on reparations.

We consider the q. on the costs by Ger of ~~Allied~~ loss to Allied Govt  
in this war it is fair to exact from Ger reparations in Kind in the  
greatest poss. amt. to the greatest possible extent possible A Com-  
mission is created on Reps which will have as its task determining the  
amt. of reps.

The Com. will sit in Mos.

Pres Only q is whether it is worthwhile to have sep. Chapter or  
work it in. I can't find a good place.

## III

Mol After 1st 2 ¶s add:

It has been also resolved to recommend to the Conf. to invite Uk.  
& Wh. R as orig. member

Pres very embarrassing to me

Church If brought out pub. now without any explanation of US  
position will cause trouble.

3 members of the War Cab. are objecting to the prin. of more than  
1 vote. This only shows controversies it will raise We are all  
pledged to it in the draft conclusions

I should have to ask for adjournment to consult dominions. It  
might take several days But we put it all down in the conclusions

St.: Withdrew it But in

Mol ¶s 4 & 5

These ¶s should read as follows:

Concerning voting proc. in the Sec. Coun. of the projected org.  
Confused with our early draft Say they have no copy of last draft  
omit "put forward by the Pres."

Mol If the text which we rec'd last night is united draft of Brit  
& Ams we didn't know it. It is agreed



ERS asked Pres if it would affect him politically back home if "put forward by the Pres" is retained & Pres said it would not. Pres preferred to leave the phrase in

P M wants to eliminate 1st sentence of Chap. V on Pol.

Chap IV agreed to

Ed: insert after inherent: "we were impressed by the dangers of any divergence of policy between the major allies toward Poland"

St leave it out altogether

Church: Would prefer Ed's amended form

St: This is only a statement about proceedings of various representatives. Some may have been impressed, others not.

Pres read our proposed new sentence

Agreed

Church wants to say dec. re Pol. will be very heavily attacked in Eng. It will be said we have yielded completely on the frontiers & the whole matter to R.

St: Is it in earnest I doubt it

Church I assure you it is. Lon<sup>3</sup> Poles will raise a dreadful outcry

St: But the other Poles will predominate

Church I hope you're right. We're not going back on it It's not a q. of nos. of Poles but of the cause for which Brit drew the sword Will say you have completely swept away the only const. govt of Pol. However I will defend it to the best of my ability

#### VI Yug

Church translate Avnoj

St That's right. Not every one will understand

#### VII Agreed

#### VIII Prisoners of war

St suggests mention of prisoners of war should be deleted. This is a q. among ourselves. We can take dec. but not nec to pub

Mol Says he & Ed agreed will come up in meeting For Mins

Church But can be published?

Agreed be published separately when text completed this afternoon

#### IX Unity O K with St.

Summary was dropped O K

IX Church what does "want" mean "It means privation & not desire"

Mol Will this communique be signed by the heads of govts

Pres Just as at Teheran

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<sup>3</sup> London.

Should be signed first by St. because has been such a wonderful host  
St I object

Church. If take alphabet I'll be first

St—Am. bloc

“ If you take age I also come first

St If St. 1st signature will say he leads. Insists he be in last  
place

Who will take charge of final text

Church: Bridges

St. perhaps to the For Mins for final checking

Pres. Early

St ~~Mol~~ & Vishinsky. He is not interested in lunch

Pres: For Mins then to read it over in place of P. M, Mar. & me.

St. Who will make list of decs.<sup>4</sup> Assign this task to someone else

Pres On summary of conclusions re reps. (i e Sov. protocol)  
entirely satis to us with few changes

Church Not for publication

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<sup>4</sup> For list of decisions prepared in the United States Delegation, see *post*, pp. 947-948. The final list of decisions became the Protocol of Proceedings, *post*, pp. 975-982.

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Roosevelt Paper

*List of Amendments to the Draft Communiqué*<sup>1</sup>

[YALTA, February 11, 1945.]

PRIME MINISTER'S AMENDMENTS TO DRAFT COMMUNIQUÉ

*Defeat of Germany*

Line 8: For “co-ordination”

Read: “concert”

Line 9: After “launched”

Insert: “continuously”.

Three lines lower down, instead of “our joint military plans”, read “our combined military plans”.

The word “joint” appears twice in the next three lines, and the Prime Minister would omit it in these two places.

*Occupation and Control of Germany*

In the second line for the word “jointly” substitute the word “together”.

Line 7—the word “co-ordinated” should be struck out and “united” substituted.

Line 10—the last sentence of the paragraph should read as follows:—

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<sup>1</sup> Authorship not indicated.

"It has been agreed that France should be invited by the Three Powers if she should so desire to take over a fourth zone of occupation, and to participate as a fourth member of the Control Commission."

In the first line of the next paragraph for "it is our joint purpose" read "It is our inflexible purpose".

In the third line of this paragraph for "threaten" read "disturb".

Six lines from the bottom of the paragraph, instead of "to take jointly such other measures" read "to take in harmony such other measures".

The last sentence of the paragraph on this page should read as follows:—

"It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when Nazism and Militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for the Germans and a place for them in the comity of nations".

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TRIPARTITE LUNCHEON MEETING, FEBRUARY 11, 1945, 1 P. M.,  
LIVADIA PALACE<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Marshal Stalin
Fleet Admiral Leahy <sup>2</sup>	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar Molotov
Secretary Stettinius	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Hopkins <sup>2</sup>	Sir Alexander Cadogan	
Mr. Harriman	Major Birse	
Mr. Bohlen		

Bohlen Collection

*Bohlen Note*

At the luncheon, which was attended by the President, the Prime Minister, and Marshal Stalin; the three Foreign Secretaries, Ambassador Harriman, Clark Kerr, and Sir Alexander Cadogan, and three interpreters, the conversation was general and personal. At one point, however, Marshal Stalin made an obvious reference to Iran, and stated in his opinion, any nation which kept its oil in the ground and would not let it be exploited, was, in fact, "working against peace."

<sup>1</sup> Roosevelt acted as host.

<sup>2</sup> Leahy and Hopkins are not listed as present in the Bohlen note, but they are shown in the photograph which is reproduced as plate 8 following p. 546.

## MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, FEBRUARY 11, 1945, 4:20 P. M.

PRESENT <sup>1</sup>

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
Secretary Stettinius Mr. Hiss	Foreign Secretary Eden Sir Edward Bridges	Foreign Commissar Molotov

Bohlen Collection

*Bohlen Note*

## MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS TO APPROVE THE "SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE"

At this meeting, the discussion was almost entirely related to language and drafting problems. Mr. Eden, supported by Mr. Stettinius, proposed that Saudi Arabia be included among those countries which, if they declared war on the common enemy before March 1st, would be invited to attend the United Nations Conference at San Francisco. Mr. Molotov said that he could not accept that proposal without reference to Marshal Stalin, and suggested that, since time was so short, that it would be reserved for possible future consideration. Mr. Molotov's suggestion was accepted.

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<sup>1</sup> Neither the Bohlen record nor Stettinius (p. 279) mentions any participants in this meeting other than the three Foreign Ministers. It appears, however, that Bohlen may have been present and that Hiss was certainly there. The Hiss notes indicate that Sir Edward Bridges also attended. The meeting presumably took place in Livadia Palace.

Hiss Collection

*Hiss Notes* <sup>1</sup>

2/11 4.20 p m

ERS Chmn

Final meeting of For Mins

ERS: 1st subject is approval of communique  
Sir Edward Bridges ~~to report on~~ read communique

Re D. O.

Mol. Marshal Stalin said should say what is said in conclusions that was agreed on voting & not that President's proposal had been adopted

No objection if Mr. S. or anyone else should say this was the proposal of the Pres.

In no other place is it said on whose initiative it has been done

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<sup>1</sup> From penciled notes in longhand.

ERS This was discussed this morning in presence of Mar & Pres & I discussed it at length with Pres. Would be very diff. for me to agree

Mol Was no agt on this special point

We said we had another q on this par.

Simultaneously with the pub. of com. you or someone say this was the proposal put forward by the Pres. We don't want to hush-hush this fact.

ERS: agreed to eliminate the reference to Pres.

Re consultation

Ed on procedure—US is to approach Ch. & Fr. Desirable that consultation be done as soon as possible—48 hours if possible as will be great interest in the subject <sup>2</sup>

2/11

ERS Chmn

For. Mins.

(After intermission)

#### Summary of Conclusions

p. 1 Mol. what would be the title: "Decisions"?

Agreed: Protocol of the proceedings of the Crimea Conference

Mol. First phrase

The Crimean Conf. of the 3 heads of the Govts of USSR, US & Gt Brit which took place in the Crimea from Feb 4 to Feb 11 ~~took~~ came to the following conclusions:

Ed. Would like to add Saudi Arabia before Turkey

Mol. Why

Ed They did want to declare war & we discouraged them

Mol. This q. was not discussed. There would then come others (i e new suggestions)

Ed. Good to have Moslem or two Ibn Saud is having cup of coffee with Pres.

ERS I have no objection. They have assisted in the prosecution of the war to some extent

Mol I don't know if Saudi Arabia will be much help. Think it over & consider at end of protocol

p. 2

San Francisco inserted

Mol. I want to be there

p. 3 ERS "or in the preliminary consultations"

<sup>2</sup> See the telegram from Stettinius to Grew, *post*, pp. 793-795.

Agreed

p 5 Insert protocol in place of reparations section

Agreed

p 9 ERS agreed re Yug.

p 10 ERS suggests insert "among the For. Secs"

Suggests eliminate last sentence

Mol: "Mr. Mol. agreed to this proposal"

Eden: should not say views will be conveyed "aint any views"  
instead say: could not be approved

Persia

Mol: Suggests instead:

"Mr Ed, Mr S & Mr Mol exchanged views on the sit. in Iran"

Otherwise eliminate altogether

Ed add "It was ~~decided~~ agreed that the matter would be pursued  
~~further~~ through the dip. channel."

Montreux

Mol. after "Convention": which ceased to correspond to the  
contemporary sit."

It's a hint in regard to change

ERS we should consider sit. before ~~suggest~~ give a hint

Ed. Alternative: ~~the changes~~ proposals which it was understood  
the Sov. Govt would put forward ~~with reference~~ in relation to the  
Montreux Con.

Agreed to Ed. alternative with last sentence omitted

Ed. We will inform the Turks

Mol About the fact that this q. will be raised

Ed insert informed "at the appropriate moment"

Mol. Insists on his amend

Ed. willing to stop there & leave out assurance point.

Transmit to Pres. copy of what ~~ERS signs~~ Protocol & of 2 tels to

Ed. submitted the draft cable to de G. re zone of occup & Control

Com<sup>3</sup>

ERS agreed

Mol. hadn't had time to read

Mol. Gave his prelim. consent. Mar. St. has not seen them. Will  
give his answer tonight

Saudi Arabia—Mol. to let Ed. know

<sup>3</sup> *Post*, p. 948.

Hiss Collection

*Working Draft of the Protocol of Proceedings Revised by the Foreign Ministers on February 11, 1945*<sup>1</sup>CRIMEA CONFERENCE  
Summary of Conclusions:*Protocol of Proceedings of Crimea Conference*

The following conclusions were arrived at—

## I. WORLD ORGANISATION

It was decided:

(1) that a United Nations Conference on the proposed world organisation should be summoned for Wednesday, 25th April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America.

(2) the Nations to be invited to this Conference should be:

(a) the United Nations as they existed on the 8th February, 1945; and

(b) such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1st March, 1945. (For this purpose by the term "Associated Nation" was meant the eight Associated Nations and Turkey<sup>2</sup>). When the Conference on World Organisation is held, the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i. e. the Ukraine and White Russia.

(3) that the United States Government on behalf of the Three Powers should consult the Government of China and the French Provisional Government in regard to the decisions taken at the present Conference concerning the proposed World Organisation.

(4) that the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part in the United Nations Conference should be as follows:

## INVITATION

"The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invite the Government of \_\_\_\_\_ to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on 25th April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at *San Francisco* in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organisation for the maintenance of international peace and security.

<sup>1</sup> The source text is a mimeographed document which has the penciled initials "A. H." in the upper right-hand corner of the first page. The document contains various penciled alterations, most if not all of which appear to have been made by the hand of Alger Hiss. The insertions are here printed in italics. For the text as signed, see *post*, pp. 975-982.

<sup>2</sup> Marginal notation: "& *Saudi Arabia?*"

The above named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organisation, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

**"c. voting**

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting".

Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

In the event that the Government of \_\_\_\_\_ desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments".

**TERRITORIAL TRUSTEESHIP**

It was agreed that the five Nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.

The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to (a) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war; (c) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and (d) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations Conference, *or in the preliminary consultations* and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be placed under trusteeship.

**II. DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE**

The following declaration has been approved:

"The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the re-building of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the



liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in co-operation with other peace-loving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested."

### III. DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender Terms for Germany should be amended to read as follows:

"The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete disarmament, demilitarisation and the dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security."

The study of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a Committee, consisting of Mr. Eden (Chairman), Mr. Winant and Mr. Gousev. This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative.

### IV. ZONE OF OCCUPATION FOR THE FRENCH AND CONTROL COMMISSION FOR GERMANY

It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French Forces, should be allocated to France. This zone would be formed

out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government.

It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Commission for Germany.

#### V. REPARATION

*The following protocol has been approved:*<sup>3</sup>

It was agreed that a Reparations Commission should be set up in Moscow. This Commission will comprise one representative from the U. S. A., U. S. S. R., and U. K., each representative being assisted by such expert advisers as may be necessary. The Commission should begin its work as soon as possible.

It was agreed that the following should be the basic principles of exaction of reparations from Germany for study and recommendation by the Moscow Reparations Commission.

1. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war and have suffered the heaviest losses and have organised victory over the enemy.

2. Setting aside for the moment the use of German labour by way of reparations, this question to be considered at a later date, reparations in kind are to be exacted from Germany in the two following forms:

(a) Removal in a single payment in the end of the war from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investment abroad, shares of industrial, transport, shipping and other enterprises in Germany, etc.) these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of military and economic disarmament of Germany.

These removals are to be completed within two years of the end of the war.

(b) Annual deliveries of commodities during 10 years after the end of the war.

3. Germany is to pay compensation in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied Nations during the war and the Moscow Reparations Commission shall have the task of considering the amount of reparations to be paid.

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<sup>3</sup> In the source text the following paragraphs of this section are crossed out, in line with the decision (see *ante*, p. 933) to substitute therefor the reparations protocol (*post*, pp. 973-979).

## VI. MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

The Conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of enquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the Conference.

## VII. POLAND

The following Declaration on Poland was agreed by the Conference:

"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganised on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorised *as a Commission* to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganisation of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U. S. S. R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the U. S. A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. It is *They* recognised that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference."

## VIII. YUGOSLAVIA

It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Subasic:

(a) that the Tito-Subasic Agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new Government formed on the basis of the Agreement.

(b) that as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare:

(i) that the National Liberation Committee will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament and

(ii) that legislative acts passed by the National Liberation Committee will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly;

and that this statement should be published in the communique of the Conference.

#### IX. ITALO-YUGOSLAV FRONTIER

##### ITALO-AUSTRIA FRONTIER

Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation and the American and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later.

#### X. YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS

There was an exchange of views *among the Foreign Ministers Secretaries* on the question of the desirability of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance. The question at issue was whether a state still under an armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with another state. Mr. Eden suggested that the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments should be informed of the views of the Three Powers ~~that this could not be approved~~. Mr. Stettinius suggested that the British and American Ambassadors should discuss the matter further with M. Molotov in Moscow. M. Molotov ~~promised to consider the matter and to give his views on the following day~~ *agreed with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius*.

#### XI. SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE

The British Delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the following subjects:

- (a) the Control Commission in Bulgaria
- (b) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference to reparations.
- (c) Oil equipment in Roumania.

#### XII. PERSIA

Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius drew attention to the importance of observing the Tripartite Treaty and the Tehran Declaration of 1st December, 1943, particularly in so far as concerned requests for oil concessions in Persia.

## XIII. MEETINGS OF THE THREE FOREIGN SECRETARIES

The Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries; they should meet as often as necessary, probably about every three or four months.

These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London.

## XIV. THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE STRAITS

It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider ~~what changes should be made in the arrangements for the Straits laid down in proposals which Sov Govt will make in regard~~ the Montreux Convention and report *thereon* to the three Governments. The Turkish Government should be informed ~~that this matter is under consideration and should be given an assurance that their independence and integrity is in no way affected.~~ *at the proper moment.*

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Hiss Collection

*United States Delegation Draft of Announcement Regarding the United Nations Conference*<sup>1</sup>

## JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

The proposals for a general international organization resulting from the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks have been considered, and agreed proposals have been worked out on the major points left open at those conversations. Our views are being transmitted to the Government of China and to the Provisional Government of the French Republic for their consideration. As soon as these consultations have been completed, the proposals agreed upon will be made public and invitations will be issued to a United Nations Conference to be held in the United States about April 15. This conference will prepare the charter of the general international organization.

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<sup>1</sup> Undated carbon copy; authorship not indicated. For an earlier draft of this paper, see *ante*, p. 85. That draft was revised to the wording here printed in the handwriting of Alger Hiss (UNA Files). See Section IV of the communiqué, *post*, p. 971, for the announcement as issued.

The President's Secretary. (Early) to the President's Administrative Assistant (Daniels)<sup>1</sup>

[YALTA, February 11, 1945.]

*Jonathan Daniels*

DRAFT TELEGRAM TO BE SENT TO THE WHITE HOUSE AT THE TIME OF THE RELEASE OF THE COMMUNIQUE ANNOUNCING TIME AND PLACE OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE.

Please release the following ~~two days after receipt~~, as a White House statement

*48 hours after the final Communique of the Conference is released.*

The President today announced that he will invite the following to be the members of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference on April 25, 1945, at San Francisco:

Secretary of State Stettinius, Chairman;  
*The Honorable Cordell Hull*  
Former Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who will also serve as Senior Advisor to the Chairman;

- Senator Connally;
- Senator Vandenberg;
- Representative Bloom;
- Representative Eaton;
- Commander Harold Stassen, USN;
- Dean Virginia Gildersleeve.

The names of advisers will be announced later.

*Early*  
*OK*  
*OK*  
*OK*


*Mr. Hull also will serve as Senior Advisor to the U.S. delegation.*

<sup>1</sup> Authorship not indicated. A copy of this document in the Hiss Collection, which embodies the alterations written on the copy reproduced above, bears the following handwritten notations:

"Mr. Early took original 2/11 10.30 a. m. & said he would send it."

"Map room informed us about 1.30 p. m. that it had been sent."

A copy of the same telegram obtained from the Roosevelt Papers indicates that the time of release was to be twenty-four, rather than forty-eight, hours after publication of the communiqué.



500.CC/2-1145: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Grew)*

TOP SECRET

[YALTA,] 11 February 1945.

ARGONAUT 147 Top Secret. For Acting Secretary of State from Secretary Stettinius. To be delivered immediately.

1. The conference has agreed upon our proposal on voting procedure and we are to consult China and France on behalf of the other two powers. The date of the United Nations Conference has been fixed for April 25, 1945, and the location at San Francisco. The substance of the foregoing will be announced in the communiqué to be issued Monday night for Tuesday morning's papers although the communiqué will not itself state that the voting procedure agreed upon was proposed by the United States. It is however understood that we are at liberty, simultaneously with the release of the communiqué, to state that our proposal on voting procedure was the one that was adopted.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Early is separately taking care of this latter statement but if there is any slip up in his communications you will wish to make that fact public at the time the communiqué is issued.

2. It is of the utmost urgency that our consultations with China and France be as brief as possible because of the intense interest which will be aroused throughout the world as to the substance of the voting provisions which are not to be made public until the consultation is completed. Mr. Eden said at this afternoon's final meeting that he hoped the consultation could be completed within forty-eight hours. This will give you an indication of the urgency with which this matter must be treated.

3. The text of the invitation as agreed upon reads as follows:—

“The government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invites the Government of blank to send representatives to a conference of the United Nations to be held on April 25, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco in the United States of America to prepare a charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

---

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, pp. 927–928.



"The above named governments suggest that the conference consider as affording a basis for such a charter the proposals for the establishment of a general international organization, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:—

"C. Voting:—1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote. 2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members. 3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of Paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, party to a dispute should abstain from voting."

"Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently. In the event that the government of blank desires in advance of the conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating governments."

4. It was also agreed that the nations to be invited to the United Nations Conference should be the United Nations as they existed on February 8th, 1945, and such of the associated nations and Turkey as have declared war on the common enemy by March 1, 1945. This explains my recent urgent wire to you about the Latin American associated nations.<sup>2</sup>

5. It was also agreed that the five governments with permanent seats in the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on providing machinery in the World Charter for dealing with territorial trusteeships which could apply only to (a) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b) territory to be detached from the enemy as a result of this war; and (c) any other territory that may voluntarily be placed under trusteeship.

It was further agreed that no discussions of specific territories will take place during the preliminary consultations on trusteeships or at the United Nations Conference itself. Only machinery and principles of trusteeship will be formulated at the Conference for inclusion in

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 794, 797. A notation concerning the preparation of this telegram may be found *ante*, p. 782. As early as January 10, 1945, a memorandum (740.0011EW/1-1045) had been sent by the Executive Secretary of the Secretary's Staff Committee (Rothwell) to Assistant Secretary Rockefeller, containing the following paragraph:

"The Secretary urged that immediate action be taken to have our Embassies inform the six Latin American 'Associated Nations' of the possibility that they may be excluded from initial participation in the forthcoming United Nations Conference, unless they declare war on Germany or Japan, or both."

the Charter and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories within the categories specified above will actually be placed under trusteeship. I think that this subject should also be covered in your consultations with China and France.

6. We are relying on you to conduct the consultation with France and China in such manner as seems to you most effective and most expeditious and thereafter to publish the text of the voting provisions in concert with the other four powers.

7. I am leaving tonight for Moscow for a visit of only one or two days and can be reached through the Embassy. Please cable me summary of press and other public reaction to the communiqué as soon as it is available.

8. ALLSTATE HORSESHOE.

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Hiss Collection

*United States Delegation Draft Memorandum Regarding Invitation to Saudi Arabia to Attend the United Nations Conference*<sup>1</sup>

(Copy)

[YALTA,] Feb. 11

R's<sup>2</sup> refused to agree

MR. EARLY: Please inform the President on behalf of Mr. Stettinius that at today's final meeting of the Foreign Ministers held shortly after the President left, Mr. Eden proposed and Mr. Molotov and Mr. Stettinius<sup>3</sup> agreed that Saudi Arabia be added to the eight associated nations and Turkey as entitled to be invited to the United Nations Conference on April 25 at San Francisco if they declare war by March 1.

We consider this as a desirable move and suggest that the President should inform Ibn Saud of this when the two meet in the next few days.

In any event Colonel Eddy, our Minister who will accompany Ibn Saud to the Quincy, should be informed of this and should inform Ibn.

Will you please give the above information also to Admiral Leahy & to Admiral Brown

---

<sup>1</sup> Handwritten in pencil; authorship not indicated. Text is crossed out, apparently in view of the notation at the top. Saudi Arabia, however, did adhere to the Declaration by United Nations on March 1, 1945, and was represented at the San Francisco Conference.

<sup>2</sup> Russians.

<sup>3</sup> The handwriting to this point is that of Hiss; the handwriting of the remainder has not been identified.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President's Secretary (Early) to the President's Administrative Assistant (Daniels)*

TOP SECRET

[YALTA,] 11 February 1945.

From Secretary Early to Jonathan Daniels, White House. Communiqué text will be dispatched tonight. Sent you two declarations today, one on Poland and the second on liberated Europe. Disregard previous instructions and insert these texts where indicated in communiqué. Kill title "Declaration on Poland" and insert without title in text of communiqué according to instructions to come. About one hundred words from beginning make read "are authorized as a commission to consult" instead "are authorized to consult." About fifty four words from end make read "they recognized that Poland" instead "it is recognized".<sup>1</sup>

The following statement should be prepared for release simultaneous with communiqué but should be given out as a separate story,<sup>2</sup> not even as an annex: A comprehensive agreement was reached at the Crimea Conference providing detailed arrangements for the protection, maintenance and repatriation of prisoners of war and civilians of the British Commonwealth, Soviet Union and United States liberated by the Allied forces now invading Germany.

Under these arrangements each ally will provide food, clothing, medical attention and other needs for the nationals of the others until transport is available for their repatriation. In caring for British subjects and American citizens the Soviet Government will be assisted by British and American officers. Soviet officers will assist British and American authorities in their task of caring for Soviet citizens liberated by the British and American forces during such time as they are on the continent of Europe or in the United Kingdom, awaiting transport to take them home.

We are pledged to give every assistance consistent with operational requirements to help to ensure that all these prisoners of war and civilians are speedily repatriated.

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<sup>1</sup> The insertions and revisions indicated were incorporated in the final text as released. See *post*, pp. 968-975.

<sup>2</sup> This statement was released by the White House, without change, on February 12, 1945.

Bohlen Collection

*United States Delegation List of Tripartite Decisions at Yalta*<sup>1</sup>

LIST OF DECISIONS ARRIVED AT BY THE THREE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AT THE CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

1. To include the word "dismemberment" in the German terms of surrender.

2. To appoint a committee composed of Mr. Eden, Ambassador Winant and Ambassador Gousev to study the question of dismemberment.

3. To adopt proposal of the United States with respect to the voting procedure in the Security Council of the proposed world organization.

4. To hold a United Nations Conference on April 25, 1945, in the United States, to prepare the charter of the proposed world organization.

5. To authorize the United States, on behalf of the three powers, to consult the Government of China and the Provisional Government of France, with respect to decisions 3 and 4.

6. That the five Governments which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on providing machinery in the world charter for dealing with territorial trusteeships which would apply only to (a) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b) territory to be detached from the enemy as a result of this war; (c) any other territory that may voluntarily be placed under trusteeship.

It was agreed it would be a matter of subsequent agreement as to which territories within the preceding categories would actually be placed under trusteeship and that no discussions of specific territories are contemplated now or at the United Nations Conference.

7. The United States and the United Kingdom to support at the United Nations Conference, the Soviet request that the Ukraine and White Russia be admitted as initial members of the world organization.

8. To issue the statement on Poland agreed to at the Conference.

9. That there should be immediately established in Moscow a Commission on German reparations composed of Mr. Molotov, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr and Mr. Harriman, which would be guided by the following agreed principles: (a) Germany must pay in kind for losses caused by it to the Allied Governments; (b) the amount of the reparations to be paid by Germany should be considered by the Moscow Reparations Commission and reported by it to the three Governments; (c) the three Governments will submit to the Commission their proposals and data relating to the question of German reparations.

<sup>1</sup> Undated, but presumably February 11; authorship not indicated. Copies are also in the Matthews Files and the Hiss Collection. The list is obviously not complete (cf. texts of signed agreements, *post*, Chapter 10).

10. To issue the Declaration on Liberated Europe agreed to at the Conference.

11. To accord to the Provisional Government of France a German zone of occupation, and representation on the German Control Commission.

12. To send a joint telegram to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic, the text of which was agreed to at the Conference.

13. To hold periodic meetings of the three Foreign Ministers, the first meeting to be held in London in June, 1945.

14. That, at their first meeting, the three Foreign Ministers will consider revision of the Montreux Convention.

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Defense Files : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)*

TOP SECRET

ARGONAUT 149. Secret and personal for the Ambassador from Secretary of State Stettinius.

You should concert with your British and Soviet colleagues and arrange to deliver to General de Gaulle the following two telegrams from the three heads of Government as soon as possible after 8:30 p. m. Paris time, Monday, February 12.

1. Quote: You will observe that the communiqué which we are issuing the end of this Conference contains a Declaration on Liberated Europe. You will also see that, in the last paragraph of the Declaration, we express the hope that your Government may be associated with us in the action and procedure suggested. Had circumstances permitted we should have greatly welcomed discussion with you of the terms of this Declaration. The terms are, however, less important than the joint obligation to take action in certain eventualities; and we feel that it is of the highest importance, in the interests of Europe, that the Provisional Government of the French Republic should agree, jointly with her three allies, to accept such an obligation. Signed Winston S. Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt and I. V. Stalin. Unquote and end of first telegram.

2. Quote: We have been considering the question of the control of Germany after her defeat and have come to the conclusion that it will be highly desirable for the Provisional Government of the French Republic, if they will, to accept responsibility for a zone of occupation and to be represented on the Central Machinery of Control. We should be glad to learn that the French Government are prepared to accept these responsibilities. Signed Winston S. Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt and I. V. Stalin. Unquote and end of second telegram.<sup>1</sup>

ARGONAUT, February 11, 1945.

<sup>1</sup> British drafts of these telegrams in the form of undated and unsigned carbon copies are in the Hiss Collection, among a group of working papers pertaining to the Foreign Ministers' meeting on February 11, 1945. See *ante*, p. 933.

Ambassador Caffery reported in telegram No. 798 from Paris, dated February 21, 1945 (740.00119 Control (Germany)/2-2145) that the two messages were delivered to De Gaulle on February 12.

## 9. OTHER CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS

740.0011 EW/1-2745 : Telegram

### *The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State*

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 2 [3], 1945.<sup>1</sup>

1. *General information.* In view of our lukewarm attitude on the proposed tripartite statement recognizing the Danes as Allies, and probable Soviet refusal to participate in it, the British may refer the matter to the Big Three for decision. Meanwhile we are sending through our own channels, with copies to London and Moscow for the information of the British and Soviet Governments, a secret message to the Freedom Council and the Danish political party leaders, acknowledging their communication and lauding the contributions being made by the Danish resistance movement in the common cause. (This is eleventh message.)<sup>2</sup> . . . Kennan reports that the British Chargé under instructions has expressed the hope to Molotov that arrangements worked out for the Hungarian Control Commission would apply in Bulgaria as well. Molotov's reaction was highly negative and he maintained that the matters had no connection. ALLSTATE. HORSESHOE. Subasic and his government do not intend leaving London until February 7. . . . It is understood that the Mikolajczyk memorandum shown to Bohlen did not reach Rome in time. Would you like a summary sent along to you?<sup>3</sup>

In reply to Ambassador Hurley's telegrams to you<sup>4</sup> I said that his fuller report on the efforts he has made to bring about unification of Chinese military forces through agreement between Communists and the Kuomintang was welcomed; that for a long time we have recognized the importance of such unification in the prosecution of the war; that it was gratifying to know that both sides apparently desired to avail themselves of his good offices; and that in such cordial atmosphere we felt he could continue to be helpful in this matter. I

<sup>1</sup> The text of this message in the Defense Files bears the date February 3, which is the date under which it was transmitted.

<sup>2</sup> i. e., from the Acting Secretary to the Secretary since the departure of the latter from Washington, in this series of messages sent via Army channels.

<sup>3</sup> For the summary in question, see *post*, pp. 953-954.

<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, p. 346, footnote 1.

added that in the light of present circumstances I agreed with him that if any aid is to be given to the Communists by us this should be done only through the National Government.

860C.01/2-345: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

LONDON, February 3, 1945.

US URGENT

[Received February 3—11:30 a. m.]

NIACT POLES 11. From Schoenfeld.

Polish Foreign Office has sent me by hand, with the request that it be urgently telegraphed, following letter dated February 3, 1945 for the President from Prime Minister Arciszewski:

"Mr. President.

At this time the fate of many nations rests in your hands and in the hands of Prime Minister Churchill. The whole world expects that these important discussions in which you and the Prime Minister of Great Britain are taking part will result in the creation of foundations for a future peace, a peace which should bring to nations the freedom of conscience and speech and secure for them freedom from fear and want. I trust that these essential freedoms will also be granted to our nation which has been fighting unflinchingly for their realization at the side of the great American and British democracies.

In particular I trust you will not permit any decisions to be taken which might jeopardize the legitimate rights of Poland or her independence and that you will not recognize any *faits accomplis* with regard to Poland. If peace in Europe is to be durable it must be based on principles of justice, on respect of law, on good neighbourly relations as well as honesty in international life.

While I am writing these words, the lives of many thousands of Poland's best sons are in danger. The so-called provisional govern-

<sup>1</sup> This telegram is endorsed "Text sent to President through Map Room Feb. 3". The telegram from Grew to the President, dated February 4, embodying the text of Arciszewski's letter, is among the Roosevelt Papers; and a chit with it reads as follows:

"6 February:

Shown to Mr. Hiss who took it to show to Doc Matthews. Returned and said that no action was necessary that they were working on Polish problem then, and that perhaps later acknowledgment might be in order.

R[obert] W B[ogue]

Roosevelt acknowledged Arciszewski's message by a telegram of February 15, 1945, in which he stated: "You may be assured that Poland's problems received most careful and sympathetic consideration at our recent Conference. I hope we may all work together harmoniously to find the correct solution in due time." (Roosevelt Papers.)

ment of Lublin has openly declared its intention to try as traitors all soldiers of the Polish home army and members of the Polish underground movement. Mass arrests and deportations have already taken place. You are well aware that they have fought the Germans gallantly and regardless of sacrifice throughout the five years of occupation. You assisted them yourself with your aid and in the memorable days of the Warsaw rising the American and British Governments recognized the home army as part of the regular Polish forces fighting alongside the United Nations. Today the lives of these soldiers are in danger because they recognize the independent, legal Polish Government and because they firmly insist on their rights as men and citizens. Therefore I beg of you to urge upon the Soviet Government whose armies are at present in occupation of the territory of Poland to give proof that they genuinely desire understanding with Poland and to prevent the execution of the criminal plans of the Lublin men.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed). Tomasz Arciszewski."

WINANT

740.0011 EW/1-2745: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State*

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 3 [4], 1945.<sup>1</sup>

Telegram to the Secretary of State from the Acting Secretary.

1. . . . (This is message no. 13.)
2. . . . Winant has informed the Soviet representative on EAC of our acceptance in principle of the five French proposals regarding French participation in the surrender, occupation and control of Germany.<sup>2</sup> The Soviet representative stated appreciation of our advance notice and is endeavoring to obtain early instructions from his government. Winant has also informed the Soviet and British representatives on the Commission of American approval of the protocol on German zones of occupation. . . .

4. *Associated Nations.* . . .

Medina in Venezuela somewhat taken aback by President's letter<sup>3</sup> but appreciates the situation and will consult Cabinet and reply to us promptly. . . .

5. *Poland.* We are repeating to the President a message to him from Prime Minister Arciszewski<sup>4</sup> which contains the following

<sup>1</sup> The text of this message in the Defense Files bears the date February 4, which is the date under which it was transmitted.

<sup>2</sup> For the five French proposals, see *ante*, p. 293.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed, but see *ante*, pp. 794, 797.

<sup>4</sup> *Supra*.



major points: It is hoped that no decisions will be taken in present conversations which might jeopardize legitimate Polish rights or Polish independence. The President is requested to urge on the Soviet Government that they should give some proof of their genuine desire for an understanding with Poland and should also take steps to prevent the destruction of the Polish home army and the Polish underground by the "so-called Provisional Government of Lublin."

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Defense Files: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Grew)*

[Excerpt]

SECRET

ARGONAUT 12. Crypto-War for Acting Secretary of State only from Secretary Stettinius. Reference your message No. 11 of February 3.<sup>1</sup> We would like summary of the Mikolajczyk memorandum shown to Bohlen.

Please continue to keep us promptly informed of developments with respect to the associated nations. What is your estimate of the present status and time at which future action may be taken by each of the five Latin American countries other than Ecuador?

Reference your message No. 9 of February 1.<sup>2</sup> Please forward to us here at least a summary of Department's cable from [to] Moscow referred to in paragraph 4. ALLSTATE HORSESHOE.

ARGONAUT, February 4, 1945.

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, pp. 949-950.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. The paragraph in question reads as follows (Defense Files, CM-in-130):

"4. Hiss is familiar with our cable to Moscow commenting on the Malinin article in War and Working Classes referring to regional security arrangements. This missed Harriman and our Moscow Embassy suggests that Hiss explain the matter to him."

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740.0011EW/1-2745 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State*

[Excerpt]

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1945.

1. *Soviet-Chinese Conversations.* Chiang Kai-Shek and Soong have informed Hurley that the Soviet Government has agreed to receive Soong as a personal representative of the Generalissimo either late in February or early in March. Discussions will cover establishment of closer relations, Soviet participation in the War against Japan, Soviet-Chinese relations in Korea and Manchuria, post-war economic

matters and the Sino-Soviet border. Hurley invites suggestions regarding this agenda for Chiang who desires full cooperation. Hurley points out that in September conversations, Molotov stated to him that Russians are not supporting Chinese communists who are not communists at all and desires closer relations with China. Molotov also stated that Russia does not want dissention in China. Chiang is anxious to learn whether this still represents Soviet attitude. (This is sixteenth message).

. . . . .

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740.0011 EW/1-2745 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 5 [6], 1945.<sup>1</sup>

Telegram to the Secretary of State from the Acting Secretary

In answer to first request in your cable of the 4th,<sup>2</sup> summary of Mikolajczyk Memorandum<sup>3</sup> follows:

The Polish people in the homeland desire to regulate Polish-Soviet relations; they fear Poland will be forced into Communism; they pin their hopes of independence on Great Britain and the United States and advocate a guarantee by all the three great powers; frontier changes should embrace all frontiers simultaneously; delineation of the eastern frontiers should be effected by compromise, not unilateral dictation; the eastern frontier should be more favorable to Poland than the Curzon Line and should be arrived at only in conjunction with the guaranteeing of restitution to Poland of Danzig, East Prussia and western lands taken from Poland by Germany.

Mikolajczyk states that question of frontiers and independence closely intertwine. If Poland loses territory, it must not lose the Polish population living in it. Plan for the eviction of Germans as well as transfer of Poles in Russia must be prepared in advance and coupled with plan of credits. Mikolajczyk supports plans for modification of Curzon Line in Poland's favor and states that in the west the new frontier should include East Prussia, Danzig, the region of Oppeln, the region of Gruenberg on the left bank of the Oder and, northward, the whole right bank of the Oder including Stettin. (This is message 17.)

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<sup>1</sup> The text of this message in the Defense Files bears the date February 6, which is the date under which it was transmitted.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 952.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed as such. The text of this memorandum, without date, was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Polish Series No. 8 from Schoenfeld in London, signed by Winant and dated January 27, 1945. Mikolajczyk provided the British Government with a similar memorandum (860C.01/1-2745.)

He presents following alternative solutions of problem of government and administration during transition period:

1. Return of Polish President to Poland where he would appoint new government.
2. President to resign in favor of a person in Poland who would appoint new government.
3. Representatives of Council of National Unity and the Lublin Committee to choose a new government in presence of representatives of three great powers.
4. Creation in Poland of Presidential Council composed of widely-known leaders which would summon conference of the political parties only or, alternatively, of the political parties and the Lublin National Council and Provisional Government, the Council of National Unity in Poland and Polish Ministers who lived in Poland throughout the war. (ALLSTATE. HORSESHOE.)

Memorandum concludes that the prompt establishment of government based on all democratic political movements is decisive for independence of Poland. Schoenfeld adds list of persons whom Mikolajczyk considers as possible candidates for the Presidential Council.

GREW

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740.0011 EW/1-2745: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 5 [6], 1945.<sup>1</sup>

Telegram to the Secretary of State from the Acting Secretary

In response to the second request in yours of the fourth,<sup>2</sup> the Associated Nations question stands as follows:

1. *Ecuador* has declared the existence of a state of war with Japan since December 7, 1941.
2. *Paraguay*—We are expecting action momentarily. This is message No. eighteen. ALLSTATE. HORSESHOE.
3. *Peru* indicates that action may be taken soon by the Executive.
4. *Venezuela*—No change since our message No. thirteen.<sup>3</sup> Ambassador Escalante is on his way to Venezuela to press this matter.
5. *Uruguay*—The Government is looking for a justification for acting.
6. *Chile*—No change since you left.
7. It looks as though favorable action may be expected by all except Chile within a reasonably short time.

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<sup>1</sup> The text of this message in the Defense Files bears the date February 6, which is the date under which it was transmitted.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 952.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 951-952.

On February 14 we are planning a ceremony when Ecuador and any other nations which have qualified will affix their signatures to the United Nations Declaration. We are advising our Embassies in the other five countries of this ceremony with the thought that several may wish to hasten their action so that they may participate as signers on that day.

In answer to your third inquiry, following is summary Department's reaction to Malinin article on Regional Arrangements. First, this section of Dumbarton proposals needs further elaboration and definition. Second, regional blocs or spheres of influence potentially or actually directed against other groupings of states are not favored. Third, security zones as proposed by Malinin would require close scrutiny to see if consistent with purposes of the organization. Fourth, such zones should in no case interfere with independence of states within the zones and should have primary purpose of maintaining security within region subject to provisions Chapter Eight Section C. Fifth, seriously question Malinin's proposed method for establishing security zones by demarkation of frontiers and areas through agreement between chief powers of particular Continent. Believe all states concerned should agree not only leading ones and Security Council should be kept fully informed regarding security aspects. Sixth, no regional security arrangement or understanding should be permitted undertake enforcement action without authorization Security Council and latter should have power take cognizance of any situation within any region. Seventh, believe Malinin suggestion to divide General Assembly into four regional sections unwise and premature as need is for strong overall organization rather than for decentralized structure which would probably decrease general security.

GREW

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 6 February 1945.

French Embassy on February 3 presented formal note stating that French Government intends to address solemn warning to German Government cautioning latter against maltreatment or reprisal measures against French prisoners of war and deportees in violation of international law. French Government believes such warning would be more likely to be effective and might save thousands of lives if issued by Governments of the United Nations as a whole. Embassy is seeking clarification to ascertain whether warning will be worded to

apply to all United Nations nationals instead of only to French nationals if suggestion is approved.

Above is for your information in event matter is raised at Conference. If matter is not dealt with at conference, I will take it up here with War and Navy Departments.

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Defense Files : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

LONDON, 6 February 1945.

To Secretary of State from Ambassador Winant London serial number 2072.

Soviet acting representative on the European Advisory Commission has informed me that his government has approved the Protocol on zones of occupation and the control machinery agreement for Germany. All 3 governments have now approved without reservation the 3 basic documents for the control of Germany—the instrument of unconditional surrender, the Protocol on zones of occupation and the agreement on control machinery.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President's Secretary (Early) to the President's Administrative Assistant (Daniels)*

[YALTA,] 7 February 1945.

From Mr. Early for Mr. Jonathan Daniels

Pouch with letter, press conference transcript and so forth received. Exceedingly regret troubles you are facing but can honestly assure you our headaches are none the less severe. Situation here much too involved to explain. All we can do is carry on best we can. Regards.

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740.0011 EW/1-2745 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State*

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 7, 1945

Telegram to the Secretary of State from the Acting Secretary

2. *French Developments.* Following are French developments which Caffery asks be shown to Hopkins. Bidault has showed Caffery

the preliminary reports of the French Dumbarton Oaks Committee which are in general accord with our ideas. Bidault stressed that our ideas are so similar "that it would be wicked if we allowed anything to come between us." Although Stalin had informed DeGaulle in Moscow that he would not support any Free German movements Bidault is still disturbed over recent activities of Von Paulus, which he fears may have some bearing on the Big Three Conference. Bidault indicated clearly that the idea of a Soviet dominated government on their frontiers fill[s] the French with terror. Bidault has stated to Caffery that he is trying very hard to get along with the French Communists, particularly with Thorez, who "is the best of the lot." Alastair Forbes in the February 4 continental edition of the *Daily Mail* stated that it should be made perfectly clear that U.S. and not Britain or Russia is responsible for the failure to invite France to the Big Three conference. Kirk has learned that plans are now under consideration for moving the French Corps Leger d'Intervention to Ceylon. This group would be used originally in clandestine operations in Indochina. Chungking reports that the Japanese are concentrating forces in Indochina and are assuming a more exacting attitude. The French Military Attaché feels that French troops may be forced into guerilla activity and would then need supplies and assistance. Wedemeyer has consistently maintained attitude that this situation is probably well known to heads of American and French Governments and must be dealt with by them.<sup>1</sup>

3. *General Information.* (This is message No. 23.) The departure of the Subasic Government has been postponed for several days. King Peter has been informed by Subasic that Simovich and Sutej are unacceptable to Tito as regents and must be replaced. The King will insist on having Sutej and will not permit his government to leave until the regents are appointed and approved. Otherwise, there will be no regency and the King will publish his White Paper. . . .

GREW

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<sup>1</sup> This paragraph was quoted in a memorandum dated February 8, 1945, from Stettinius to Hopkins (Roosevelt Papers).

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the President*

[LONDON,] 7 February 1945.

2073. It has come to my attention that Mr. Eden, who directs Sir William Strang in representing Great Britain on the European Advisory Commission, and Ambassador Gousev, who represents

Russia on the Advisory Commission, are both attending the three-power conference. Since you and Secretary Stettinius and Mr. Hopkins decided to exclude me from the conference, I wish to make the following brief report to you.

The United States Government, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have approved without reservation the Unconditional Surrender Instrument, the Protocol on Zones of Occupation in Germany and the Agreement on Control Machinery.<sup>1</sup> If the control machinery is to be made an effective implement, it will be necessary to obtain overall agreements between the three Governments on directives to the three Commanders-in-Chief, which are in fact agreements between the three powers on basic policies. The directives are on broad lines without detailing and provide a groundwork for Allied cooperation in dealing with overall problems that affect Germany. I hope these directives will have your support.

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, pp. 113-123, 124-127.

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740.00119 Control (Italy)/2-745 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Grew)*

TOP SECRET

YALTA, 7 February 1945.

Nr: ARGONAUT 45. Ref your No. 14.<sup>1</sup>

As so clearly stated in the comments of the American members on the CCAC, the recent directive which was finally agreed to on Italy falls so far short of what we believe it should contain and has in it so little of substance for the Italians, that I feel it would have a disappointing and unfortunate effect both in the U. S. and in Italy. Our original tentative acceptance of the idea of issuing such a statement was made on the assumption that measures of real help both moral and material to Italy would result from the discussions on the Macmillan proposal.<sup>2</sup> This has not proved to be the case and there seems therefore no reason to issue any public statement at this time. Matthews and I discussed this matter with Ambassador Kirk and he emphatically shares our view. ALLSTATE HORSESHOE.

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> For the *aide-mémoire* of February 24, 1945, from the Acting President of the Allied Commission in Italy (Macmillan) to the Italian Government, see *United States and Italy 1938-1946: Documentary Record*, Department of State Publication 2669 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946).

Defense Files : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Grew)*

TOP SECRET

ARGONAUT 71A. Crypto-War for Acting Secretary of State only from Secretary Stettinius.

The British are disturbed over our having entered into an aviation agreement with Ireland<sup>1</sup> without consulting or informing them. Please send us promptly an appropriate explanation for us to present to the British on this matter.

ARGONAUT, February 7, 1945.

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<sup>1</sup> For the text of this agreement relating to air-transport service, which was signed at Washington February 3, 1945, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 460, or 59 Stat. 1402.

Defense Files : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 8 February 1945.

No. 24. For Secretary of State Stettinius from the Acting Secretary of State.

ALLSTATE HORSESHOE. Your ARGONAUT 71-A. During the later part of the Chicago conference<sup>1</sup> when it became increasingly doubtful that full agreement would be reached on a multi-lateral basis, we held preliminary discussions looking toward bilateral agreements with representatives of a number of countries. When the Spanish agreement<sup>2</sup> was signed Berle stated publicly that we intended to conclude similar agreements with a number of other countries. Ireland was naturally one of these in view of its obvious geographic importance to American air routes. We saw no reason to consult the United Kingdom particularly since the agreement followed the standard form drawn up with British participation at Chicago. We nevertheless authorized our Minister in Dublin to advise his British colleagues of the matter before the agreement was signed. The agreement in no way prejudices the British right to effect similar arrangements.

Signature of agreement with Ireland does not indicate approval by the United States of that country's war attitude any more than in

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<sup>1</sup> The International Civil Aviation Conference held at Chicago November 1-December 7, 1944.

<sup>2</sup> For the text of this agreement relating to the operation of international air-transport services, which was signed at Madrid December 2, 1944, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 432, or 58 Stat. 1473.



the case of the Spanish agreement. Our views in regard to Spain are well known and our attitude toward Ireland's war policy is we think abundantly clear.

Upon receipt from Halifax of copy of Prime Minister's message of January 27 to the President<sup>3</sup> requesting postponement of signature until they could discuss it personally, we advised the President<sup>3</sup> that we were postponing signature until February 3 but that British objections might possibly have ulterior motives and that further delay might expose us to Irish charges of bad faith and a domestic storm over British intervention in an Irish-American matter. He replied<sup>3</sup> approving postponement until February 3 but sent no later instructions asking further delay.

You can obtain from the President's Naval Aide the text of the messages exchanged with him but you will wish to consider carefully how much of the substance of this paragraph can be disclosed to Eden.

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<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the President*

TOP SECRET

[CHUNGKING?] 8 February 1945.

(Top Secret. From Hurley for the eyes of the President alone. Information eyes alone Secretary of State)

NCR 4051. It has been suggested that if the President and his staff and Prime Minister Churchill and his staff could visit Delhi and invite the Generalissimo and his staff to meet them there it would be a great morale builder in this theater. It would also afford an opportunity to clarify policies and strategy. Delhi is suggested rather than any place in China for two reasons: (1) Security and (2) accommodations. A meeting at Delhi would probably make unnecessary Wedemeyer's proposed conference at Washington. If there is possibility of such arrangement please advise me earliest convenience.

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740.0011 EW/1-2745 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State*

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 9, 1945.

Telegram to the Secretary of State, From the Acting Secretary.

1. *General information.* Observers in Athens consider that trial and sentencing of EAM members during peace talks was mistake,

particularly since no action has yet been taken against collaborationists. Perhaps to offset this reaction Athens press announces that nine leading collaborationists held by British are being returned for trial. . . . Chiang Kai-shek has been informed by the Soviet Government that Soong's visit to Moscow should be postponed until the end of March or beginning of April because of the present status of the war in Europe. . . . Tito believes that the King is playing for time in belief that he will receive American support but that if he does not agree quickly he will lose the throne and his estates. Material is being collected to try Peter for his "crimes" even though American recognition might be lost thereby. . . . Summary of surrender terms to Germany has been communicated by EAC to representatives of Greek and Czechoslovak Governments. . . . (This is thirtieth message). It is assumed that you have received from Winant through military channels the substance of Massigli's proposals regarding French zones of occupation.<sup>1</sup>

GREW

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 293.

740.0011 EW/1-2745 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State*

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 10, 1945.

Telegram to the Secretary of State, From the Acting Secretary.

1. . . . (This is thirty-third message). . . . British Foreign Office states that Subasic rather than Tito has opposed Simovic. Foreign Office believes that Subasic will leave shortly for Belgrade even though agreement has not been reached on the regents, but feels that the King's approval is essential, particularly in connection with air and naval forces which will serve under the government only with the sanction of King Peter. . . . The Embassy in Moscow has been instructed to express gratification over the decision to cease removal of oil equipment from Rumania in order to rehabilitate the industry but is to reaffirm this Government's unwillingness to accept the Soviet contention that this material can properly be described as war booty. . . .

GREW

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President's Secretary (Early) to the President's Administrative Assistant (Daniels)*

[YALTA,] 10 February 1945.

From Mr. Early to Mr. Daniels.

Justice Byrnes should arrive Washington early next week. The Press undoubtedly will want a conference with him. He and I have talked and he understands. Suggest you and Walter Brown arrange conference for him if Press wants one. Final communiqué should be published, however, before Justice Byrnes says anything.

Roosevelt Papers

*The Secretary of State to the President*

[YALTA,] February 10, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Article VII of the Lend-Lease Agreement.<sup>1</sup>

Before I left Washington, Mr. Clayton told me that the British have said that you have never mentioned Article VII to Churchill. For this reason, Churchill has obtained the impression that you are not very much interested in this subject.

This mistaken impression on the part of the Prime Minister has tended to encourage the British to take an unyielding attitude on the matter of their Empire preferences and trade barriers.

I think it would be helpful, in this connection, if you could send to the Prime Minister the attached letter <sup>2</sup> on this subject before you leave Yalta.

STETTINIUS

<sup>1</sup> For the text of this agreement, signed at Washington February 23, 1942, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 241, or 56 Stat. 1433.

<sup>2</sup> *Infra*.

Roosevelt Papers

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*

[YALTA,] February 10, 1945.

DEAR WINSTON: I have been hoping to find an opportunity in the course of the present conferences to have a brief word with you on the

importance which I attach to a prompt resumption at a high level of conversation between our two Governments on the implementation of Article VII of the Lend-Lease agreement. As the opportunity for a quiet discussion between us on this matter may still not develop, I do not wish this meeting to close without sending you a brief word on this matter.

Discussion on commercial policies, pursuant to Article VII have been carried on from time to time between our two Governments ever since the Fall of 1943. I think it most important that these talks be re-invigorated and I should like to suggest the prompt naming of full delegations on both sides, to be headed by a Chairman with the rank of Minister. I hope you will find it possible to take the necessary steps to bring this about insofar as your Government is concerned.

Most sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

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Bohlen Collection

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*

[YALTA,] February 11, 1945.

DEAR WINSTON: You have expressed some concern with regard to our different viewpoints concerning the policy to be pursued about Italy. I am happy to tell you that Mr. Matthews on behalf of the Department of State went over the ground on this matter with Alec Cadogan yesterday afternoon. As a result of their conversation, Matthews reports that although there are naturally some differences in emphasis in our respective viewpoints, there seems to be no basic reason for any quarrel between us. I find that we are both in accord with the important fact that whatever the Italian attitude and action have been in the past few years, we are faced with a real problem of the future. Italy is and will remain an important factor in Europe whatever we may think of the prospect. It is surely in our joint interest for us to do whatever we properly can to foster her gradual recuperation by developing a return to normal democratic processes, the development of a sense of her own responsibilities and the other steps so necessary in preparing the long hard road of Italy's return to the community of peace-loving democratic states. To this end I believe we are both agreed that we must give her both spiritual and material food. I am impressed with the dangers for us both in Italy's present condition of semi-servitude and of the fact that those who fish in troubled waters will be the only ones to gain from her present conditions approaching despair. I know that our soldiers share this view and feel that there is definite inherent danger in the situation to our joint military operations.

I believe that some constructive steps should be taken to move away from the present anomalous situation of onerous and obsolete surrender terms which are no longer pertinent to the situation today. I hope the Foreign Office and the State Department will be able to work out some mutually satisfactory procedure to remedy this situation. As you know, we accepted the Combined Chiefs of Staff's directive to General Alexander along the lines suggested by Mr. MacMillan [*Macmillan*].<sup>1</sup> Although we felt that the directive was greatly watered down and much of its substance lost, we went along with you in the hope that we may reach some agreement on further steps in the near future.

At any rate, I want you to know that we are determined to pull together with you in Italy as we are in other areas, and that we believe that by full and continuous consultation and goodwill on both sides there is no danger of any serious split between us on this important question.

Most sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

760H.6315/2-1145

*The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the Soviet Foreign  
Commissar (Molotov)*<sup>1</sup>

ALUPKA, 11th February, 1945.

Owing to lack of time there are a few questions on which we were not able to conclude our discussions during the Crimea Conference. These were

- (a) the Austro-Yugoslav frontier,
- (b) the Italo-Yugoslav frontier (Venezia Giulia)

You kindly undertook to study the suggestions on these questions contained in the papers<sup>2</sup> which I circulated at the Foreign Secretaries meeting on February 10. With regard to (a) you will remember that the United States Delegation experienced certain doubts regarding the phraseology of our proposal. I therefore attach a redraft<sup>3</sup> of my note which I would ask you to substitute for the one in your possession.

(c) At our meeting on February 10 I mentioned our attitude towards a pact between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and suggested that an indication of our views might be conveyed to the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments.<sup>4</sup> You said that you would consider my suggestion.

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<sup>1</sup> Copy bears notation: "Mr. Stettinius with Mr. Eden's compliments".

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 887-889.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, pp. 876-877.

I also circulated at our meeting on February 10 papers on the subject of

(d) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly in regard to reparations;<sup>5</sup>

(e) the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission in Bulgaria;<sup>6</sup>

(f) Oil equipment in Roumania.<sup>7</sup>

I should be grateful if you would consider the points raised in the foregoing three papers.

May I also ask you to give favourable consideration to the proposals regarding

(g) Relief Supplies for Europe, contained in a paper which I enclosed in a separate letter today,<sup>8</sup> and

(h) the despatch of personnel to the Soviet component of the Control Commission for Germany in London, in regard to which I attach a memorandum.<sup>8</sup>

On all these matters I suggest that, after the close of the Crimea Conference, discussion should proceed through the diplomatic channel.<sup>9</sup>

Monsieur V. M. MOLOTOV.

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<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, pp. 891-893.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, pp. 889-890.

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, p. 893.

<sup>8</sup> Not found.

<sup>9</sup> See the protocol, *post*, p. 981.

## 10. SIGNED AGREEMENTS EXCHANGE OF NOTES<sup>1</sup>

Bohlen Collection

### *President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*

TOP SECRET

[YALTA,] February 10, 1945.

MY DEAR MARSHAL STALIN: I have been thinking, as I must, of possible political difficulties which I might encounter in the United States in connection with the number of votes which the Big Powers will enjoy in the Assembly of the World Organization. We have agreed, and I shall certainly carry out that agreement, to support at the forthcoming United Nations Conference the admission of the Ukrainian and White Russian Republics as members of the Assembly of the World Organization. I am somewhat concerned lest it be pointed out that the United States will have only one vote in the Assembly. It may be necessary for me, therefore, if I am to insure whole hearted acceptance by the Congress and people of the United States of our participation in the World Organization, to ask for additional votes in the Assembly in order to give parity to the United States.

I would like to know, before I face this problem, that you would perceive no objection and would support a proposal along this line if it is necessary for me to make it at the forthcoming conference. I would greatly appreciate your letting me have your views in reply to this letter.

Most sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> A summary of the agreement embodied in this exchange of notes was released to the press by the White House on March 29, 1945 (Department of State *Bulletin*, April 1, 1945, vol. XII, p. 530). The texts of the notes here printed are from the copies in the Bohlen Collection. For information concerning the decision by the United States to request no more than one vote in the United Nations Assembly, see *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation*, p. 422, and Department of State *Bulletin*, April 1, 1945, vol. XII, pp. 600-601.

Bohlen Collection

### *President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*

TOP SECRET

[YALTA,] February 10, 1945.

DEAR WINSTON: As I said the other day, I am somewhat concerned over the political difficulties I am apt to encounter in the United

States in connection with the ratification by the Senate of the Dumbarton Oaks agreement because of the fact that the United States alone among the three great powers will have only a single vote in the Assembly. I understand from our conversation that you would have no objection if I found it necessary to work out some way of giving the United States additional votes in order to insure parity. I am writing you this letter since I know you understand so well our political situation in the United States and I hope in reply to this letter you can give me your agreement to this suggestion if I find it necessary for our public opinion to make some proposal along those lines at the forthcoming United Nations Conference.

I am enclosing a copy of the letter which I have written to Marshal Stalin on the same subject.

Most sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

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Bohlen Collection

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*

[YALTA,] February 11, 1945.

MY DEAR FRANKLIN, I have given consideration to your letter of February 10 about the political difficulties which might arise in the United States in connection with the ratification by the Senate of the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement because of the fact that the United States alone among the three Great Powers will have only one vote in the Assembly.

Our position is that we maintained the long-established representation of the British Empire and Commonwealth; that the Soviet Government are represented by its chief member, and the two republics of the Ukraine and White Russia; and that the United States should propose the form in which their undisputed equality with every other Member State should be expressed.

I need hardly assure you that I should do everything possible to assist you in this matter.

Yours very sincerely,

WINSTON CHURCHILL

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Bohlen Collection

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt*

Translation <sup>1</sup>

KOREIS, February 11, 1945.

DEAR MR. ROOSEVELT: I have received your letter of February 10. I entirely agree with you that, since the number of votes for the

<sup>1</sup> Appears on the source text.



Soviet Union is increased to three in connection with the inclusion of the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet White Russia among the members of the assembly, the number of votes for the USA should also be increased.

I think that the number of votes for the USA might be increased to three as in the case of the Soviet Union and its two basic Republics. If it is necessary I am prepared officially to support this proposal.

With sincere respects

I. STALIN

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## TRILATERAL DOCUMENTS

740.0011 EW/2-1145

### *Communiqué Issued at the End of the Conference*<sup>1</sup>

#### REPORT OF THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE

For the past eight days, Winston S. Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, and Marshal J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have met with the Foreign Secretaries, Chiefs of Staff and other advisors in the Crimea.

In addition to the three Heads of Government, the following took part in the Conference:

#### *For the United States of America:*

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Secretary of State  
 Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, U. S. N., Chief of Staff to the President;  
 Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to the President;  
 Justice James F. Byrnes, Director, Office of War Mobilization;  
 General of the Army George C. Marshall, U. S. A., Chief of Staff, U. S. Army;  
 Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet;  
 Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces;  
 Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator  
 Major General L. S. Kuter, U. S. A., Staff of Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces;  
 W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador to the U. S. S. R.  
 H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs, State Department;  
 Alger Hiss, Deputy Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State;  
 Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, together with political, military and technical advisors.

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<sup>1</sup> Released to the press Monday, February 12, 1945. The text here printed is from the original signed document in the files of the Department.

*For the Soviet Union:*

V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Admiral Kuznetsov, People's Commissar for the Navy  
Army General Antonov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army

A. Ya. Vyshinski, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR

I. M. Maisky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Marshal of Aviation Khydyakov

F. T. Gousev, Ambassador in Great Britain

A. A. Gromyko, Ambassador in U. S. A.

*For the United Kingdom:*

Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport

Sir A. Clark Kerr, H. M. Ambassador at Moscow

Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary of the War Cabinet

Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord

General Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense,

together with

Field Marshal Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Field Marshal Wilson, Head of the British Joint Staff Mission at Washington

Admiral Somerville, Joint Staff Mission at Washington

together with military and diplomatic advisors.

The following statement is made by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the President of the United States of America, and the Chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the results of the Crimean Conference:

## I

## THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY

We have considered and determined the military plans of the three allied powers for the final defeat of the common enemy. The military staffs of the three allied nations have met in daily meetings throughout the Conference. These meetings have been most satisfactory from every point of view and have resulted in closer coordination of the military effort of the three Allies than ever before. The fullest

information has been inter-changed. The timing, scope and co-ordination of new and even more powerful blows to be launched by our armies and air forces into the heart of Germany from the East, West, North and South have been fully agreed and planned in detail.

Our combined military plans will be made known only as we execute them, but we believe that the very close working partnership among the three staffs attained at this Conference will result in shortening the war. Meetings of the three staffs will be continued in the future whenever the need arises.

Nazi Germany is doomed. The German people will only make the cost of their defeat heavier to themselves by attempting to continue a hopeless resistance.

## II

### THE OCCUPATION AND CONTROL OF GERMANY

We have agreed on common policies and plans for enforcing the unconditional surrender terms which we shall impose together on Nazi Germany after German armed resistance has been finally crushed. These terms will not be made known until the final defeat of Germany has been accomplished. Under the agreed plan, the forces of the Three Powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany. Coordinated administration and control has been provided for under the plan through a central Control Commission consisting of the Supreme Commanders of the Three Powers with headquarters in Berlin. It has been agreed that France should be invited by the Three Powers, if she should so desire, to take over a zone of occupation, and to participate as a fourth member of the Control Commission. The limits of the French zone will be agreed by the four governments concerned through their representatives on the European Advisory Commission.

It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the German General Staff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German militarism; remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production; bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment and exact reparation in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans; wipe out the Nazi party, Nazi laws, organizations and institutions, remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people;

and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the world. It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when Nazism and Militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans, and a place for them in the comity of nations.

### III

#### REPARATION BY GERMANY

We have considered the question of the damage caused by Germany to the Allied Nations in this war and recognized it as just that Germany be obliged to make compensation for this damage in kind to the greatest extent possible. A Commission for the Compensation of Damage will be established. The Commission will be instructed to consider the question of the extent and methods for compensating damage caused by Germany to the Allied Countries. The Commission will work in Moscow.

### IV

#### UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE

We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our allies of a general international organization to maintain peace and security. We believe that this is essential, both to prevent aggression and to remove the political, economic and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving peoples.

The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. On the important question of voting procedure, however, agreement was not there reached. The present conference has been able to resolve this difficulty.

We have agreed that a Conference of United Nations should be called to meet at San Francisco in the United States on April 25th, 1945, to prepare the charter of such an organization, along the lines proposed in the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks.

The Government of China and the Provisional Government of France will be immediately consulted and invited to sponsor invitations to the Conference jointly with the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As soon as the consultation with China and France has been completed, the text of the proposals on voting procedure will be made public.

### V

#### DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

We have drawn up and subscribed to a Declaration on liberated Europe. This Declaration provides for concerting the policies of the

three Powers and for joint action by them in meeting the political and economic problems of liberated Europe in accordance with democratic principles. The text of the Declaration is as follows:

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to creat[e] democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed people; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and the general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

## VI

## POLAND

We came to the Crimea Conference resolved to settle our differences about Poland. We discussed fully all aspects of the question. We reaffirm our common desire to see established a strong, free, independent and democratic Poland. As a result of our discussions we have agreed on the conditions in which a new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity may be formed in such a manner as to command recognition by the three major powers.

The agreement reached is as follows:

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a Commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U. S. S. R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three Heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference.

## VII

## YUGOSLAVIA

We have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic that the Agreement<sup>2</sup> between them should be put into effect immediately, and that a new Government should be formed on the basis of that Agreement.

We also recommend that as soon as the new Government has been formed, it should declare that:<sup>3</sup>

(i) The Anti-fascist Assembly of National Liberation (Avnoj) should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament (Skupschina) who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament; and

(ii) legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AUNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly.<sup>4</sup>

There was also a general review of other Balkan question[s].

## VIII

## MEETINGS OF FOREIGN SECRETARIES

Throughout the Conference, besides the daily meetings of the Heads of Governments and the Foreign Secretaries, separate meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries, and their advisers have also been held daily.

These meetings have proved of the utmost value and the Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for regular consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries. They will, therefore,

<sup>2</sup> For the text of this agreement, see *ante*, pp. 251-254.

<sup>3</sup> The portion reading "it should declare that:" is handwritten on the original and initialed in the margin by Bohlen.

<sup>4</sup> The words "Anti-Fascist Assembly of" are handwritten on the original, as is also "(AUNOJ)", the latter replacing the word "Committee" as typed. These changes are initialed in the margin, as in the case mentioned in the previous footnote.

meet as often as may be necessary, probably about every three or four months. These meetings will be held in rotation in the three Capitals, the first meeting being held in London, after the United Nations Conference on world organization.

## IX

### UNITY FOR PEACE AS FOR WAR

Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe that this is a sacred obligation which our Governments owe to our peoples and to all the peoples of the world.

Only with continuing and growing co-operation and understanding among our three countries and among all the peace-loving nations can the highest aspiration of humanity be realized—a secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, “afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want”.

Victory in this war and establishment of the proposed international organization will provide the greatest opportunity in all history to create in the years to come the essential conditions of such a peace.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL  
FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT  
И. СТАЛИН<sup>5</sup>

FEBRUARY 11, 1945

<sup>5</sup> I. Stalin.

L/T Files

### *Protocol of Proceedings*<sup>1</sup>

#### PROTOCOL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE

The Crimea Conference of the Heads of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which took place from February 4th to 11th came to the following conclusions.

#### I. WORLD ORGANISATION

It was decided:

(1) that a United Nations Conference on the proposed world organisation should be summoned for Wednesday, 25th April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America.

<sup>1</sup> Released to the press by the Department of State March 24, 1947.



(2) the Nations to be invited to this Conference should be:

(a) the United Nations as they existed on the 8th February, 1945 and

(b) such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1st March, 1945. (For this purpose by the term "Associated Nation" was meant the eight Associated Nations and Turkey). When the Conference on World Organization is held, the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i. e. the Ukraine and White Russia.

(3) that the United States Government on behalf of the Three Powers should consult the Government of China and the French Provisional Government in regard to the decisions taken at the present Conference concerning the proposed World Organisation.

(4) that the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part in the United Nations Conference should be as follows:

#### INVITATION

"The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invite the Government of \_\_\_\_\_ to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on 25th April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organisation for the maintenance of international peace and security.

"The above named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organisation, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

#### "C. Voting

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting'.

"Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

"In the event that the Government of \_\_\_\_\_ desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments".

## TERRITORIAL TRUSTEESHIP

It was agreed that the five Nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.

The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to (a) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war; (c) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and (d) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations Conference or in the preliminary consultations,<sup>2</sup> and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be placed under trusteeship.

## II. DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

The following declaration has been approved:

"The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

"The establishment of order in Europe and the re-building of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

"To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

"The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

<sup>2</sup> The final s of "consultations" was added with pen and ink. The change is not initialed in the margin.

"When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

"By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in co-operation with other peace-loving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

"In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested."

### III. DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender Terms for Germany should be amended to read as follows:

"The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete disarmament, demilitarisation and the dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security."

The study of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a Committee, consisting of Mr. Eden (Chairman), Mr. Winant and Mr. Gousev. This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative.

### IV. ZONE OF OCCUPATION FOR THE FRENCH AND CONTROL COUNCIL<sup>3</sup> FOR GERMANY.

It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French Forces, should be allocated to France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government.

It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Council<sup>3</sup> for Germany.

### V. REPARATION

The following protocol has been approved:<sup>4</sup>

1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparations are to be received

<sup>3</sup> The word "Council" is a substitution with pen and ink for "Commission" as typed. In the margin opposite the change is a small panned question mark. The change is not initialed.

<sup>4</sup> The original bears the notation in handwriting at this point: "Title to be added as in protocol." The title was not added, but the following was inserted in handwriting: "The Heads of the three Governments have agreed as follows:" The change is not initialed in the margin.

in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organised victory over the enemy.

2. Reparation in kind is <sup>5</sup> to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:

a) Removals within 2 years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organised resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.

b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed.

c) Use of German labour.

3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied Reparation Commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives—one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America.

4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:

“The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the paragraph 2 should be 20 billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.”

The British delegation was of the opinion that pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow Reparation Commission no figures of reparation should be mentioned.

The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow Reparation Commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the Commission.

#### VI. MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

The Conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of enquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the Conference.

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<sup>5</sup> The word “is” is handwritten, replacing “are” as typed. The change is not initialed in the margin.

## VII. POLAND

The following Declaration on Poland was agreed by the Conference:

"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of the Western part of Poland.<sup>6</sup> The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganised on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

"M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorised as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganisation of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

"When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U. S. S. R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the U. S. A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

"The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. They recognise that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference."

## VIII. YUGOSLAVIA

It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Subasic:

(a) that the Tito-Subasic Agreement<sup>7</sup> should immediately be put into effect and a new Government formed on the basis of the Agreement.

<sup>6</sup> The phrase "of the Western part of Poland" read "of Western Poland" as typed, but was revised by hand on the original, with no initials in the margin.

<sup>7</sup> For the text of this agreement, see *ante*, pp. 251-254.

(b) that as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare:

(i) that the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AUNOJ) will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament and<sup>8</sup>

(ii) that legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AUNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly;<sup>9</sup>

and that this statement should be published in the communique of the Conference.

#### IX. ITALO-YUGOSLAV FRONTIER ITALO-AUSTRIA FRONTIER<sup>10</sup>

Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation and the American and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later.

#### X. YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS

There was an exchange of views between the Foreign Secretaries on the question of the desirability of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance. The question at issue was whether a state still under an armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with another state. Mr. Eden suggested that the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments should be informed that this could not be approved. Mr. Stettinius suggested that the British and American Ambassadors should discuss the matter further with M. Molotov in Moscow. M. Molotov agreed with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius.

#### XI. SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE

The British Delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the following subjects:

- (a) the Control Commission in Bulgaria
- (b) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference to reparations.
- (c) Oil equipment in Roumania.

<sup>8</sup> As typed, this sub-paragraph began "that the National Liberation Committee". The changes were made in handwriting, with the initials of Bohlen in the margin.

<sup>9</sup> As typed, this sub-paragraph began "that legislative acts passed by the National Liberation Committee". The changes were made in handwriting, with the initials of Bohlen in the margin.

<sup>10</sup> No paper on the Italian-Austrian frontier has been found. Examination of the minutes of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 10 (*ante*, p. 876), of the British proposals attached thereto (*ante*, p. 887), and of the British note of February 11 (*ante*, p. 965) suggests that the heading "Italo-Austria Frontier" should read "Austro-Yugoslav Frontier".

XII. IRAN.<sup>11</sup>

Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius and M. Molotov exchanged views on the situation in Iran.<sup>11</sup> It was agreed that this matter should be pursued through the diplomatic channel.

## XIII. MEETINGS OF THE THREE FOREIGN SECRETARIES

The Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries; they should meet as often as necessary, probably about every three or four months.

These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London.

## XIV. THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE STRAITS

It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider proposals which it was understood the Soviet Government would put forward in relation to the Montreux Convention and report to their Governments.<sup>12</sup> The Turkish Government should be informed at the appropriate moment.

The foregoing Protocol was approved and signed by the three Foreign Secretaries at the Crimean Conference, February 11, 1945.

E R STETTINIUS, JR  
B. МОЛОТОВ.<sup>13</sup>  
ANTHONY EDEN

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<sup>11</sup> Changed by hand from "Persia" as typed in the original. No initials in the margin.

<sup>12</sup> In the original as typed the phrase at the end of this sentence read "to the three Governments." The change was made by hand, with no initials in the margin.

<sup>13</sup> V. Molotov.

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L/T Files

*Protocol on German Reparation*<sup>1</sup>

PROTOCOL ON THE TALKS BETWEEN THE HEADS OF THE THREE GOVERNMENTS AT THE CRIMEAN CONFERENCE ON THE QUESTION OF THE GERMAN REPARATION IN KIND

The Heads of the three governments agreed as follows:

1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparation are<sup>2</sup> to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organised victory over the enemy.

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<sup>1</sup> Released to the press by the Department of State March 24, 1947.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *ante*, pp. 978-979.

2. Reparation in kind are<sup>3</sup> to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:

a) Removals within 2 years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organised resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.

b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed.

c) Use of German labour.

3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied Reparation Commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives—one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America.

4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:

“The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the paragraph 2 should be 20 billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.”

The British delegation was of the opinion that pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow Reparation Commission no figures of reparation should be mentioned.

The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow Reparation Commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the Commission.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL  
FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT  
И. СТАЛИН<sup>4</sup>

FEBRUARY 11, 1945.

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. *ante*, pp. 978–979.

<sup>4</sup> I. Stalin.



L/T Files

*Agreement Regarding Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War  
Against Japan*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

AGREEMENT

The leaders of the three Great Powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain—have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The *status quo* in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:

(a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union,

(b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR restored,

(c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company it being understood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kuril islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood, that the agreement concerning Outer-Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

И. СТАЛИН<sup>2</sup>

FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

FEBRUARY 11, 1945.

<sup>1</sup> Released to the press by the Department of State on February 11, 1946; printed as Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 498; also in 59 Stat. 1823.

<sup>2</sup> I. Stalin.

## BILATERAL DOCUMENT

L/T Files

*Agreement Between the United States and the Soviet Union Concerning Liberated Prisoners of War and Civilians*<sup>1</sup>

## AGREEMENT RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIANS LIBERATED BY FORCES OPERATING UNDER SOVIET COMMAND AND FORCES OPERATING UNDER UNITED STATES OF AMERICA COMMAND

The Government of the United States of America on the one hand and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the other hand, wishing to make arrangements for the care and repatriation of United States citizens freed by forces operating under Soviet command and for Soviet citizens freed by forces operating under United States command, have agreed as follows:—

*Article 1.*

All Soviet citizens liberated by the forces operating under United States command and all United States citizens liberated by the forces operating under Soviet command will, without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet or United States authorities, as the case may be, at places agreed upon between those authorities.

United States and Soviet military authorities will respectively take the necessary measures for protection of camps, and points of concentration from enemy bombing, artillery fire, etc.

*Article 2.*

The contracting parties shall ensure that their military authorities shall without delay inform the competent authorities of the other party regarding citizens of the other contracting party found by them, and will at the same time take the necessary steps to implement the provisions of this agreement. Soviet and United States repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate access into the camps and points of concentration where their citizens are located and they will have the right to appoint the internal administration and set up the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure and laws of their country.

Facilities will be given for the despatch or transfer of officers of their own nationality to camps or points of concentration where liberated members of the respective forces are located and there are insufficient officers. The outside protection of and access to and from

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<sup>1</sup> Released to the press by the Department of State March 8, 1946; printed as Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 505; also in 59 Stat. 1874.

the camps or points of concentration will be established in accordance with the instructions of the military commander in whose zone they are located, and the military commander shall also appoint a commandant, who shall have the final responsibility for the overall administration and discipline of the camp or point concerned.

The removal of camps as well as the transfer from one camp to another of liberated citizens will be effected by agreement with the competent Soviet or United States authorities. The removal of camps and transfer of liberated citizens may, in exceptional circumstances, also be effected without preliminary agreement provided the competent authorities are immediately notified of such removal or transfer with a statement of the reasons. Hostile propaganda directed against the contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not be permitted.

*Article 3.*

The competent United States and Soviet authorities will supply liberated citizens with adequate food, clothing, housing and medical attention both in camps or at points of concentration and en route, and with transport until they are handed over to the Soviet or United States authorities at places agreed upon between those authorities. The standards of such food, clothing, housing and medical attention shall, subject to the provisions of Article 8, be fixed on a basis for privates, non-commissioned officers and officers. The basis fixed for civilians shall as far as possible be the same as that fixed for privates.

The contracting parties will not demand compensation for these or other similar services which their authorities may supply respectively to liberated citizens of the other contracting party.

*Article 4.*

Each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use in agreement with the other party such of its own means of transport as may be available for the repatriation of its citizens held by the other contracting party. Similarly each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use in agreement with the other party its own facilities for the delivery of supplies to its citizens held by the other contracting party.

*Article 5.*

Soviet and United States military authorities shall make such advances on behalf of their respective governments to liberated citizens of the other contracting party as the competent Soviet and United States authorities shall agree upon beforehand.

Advances made in currency of any enemy territory or in currency of their occupation authorities shall not be liable to compensation.

In the case of advances made in currency of liberated non-enemy territory, the Soviet and United States Governments will effect, each for advances made to their citizens necessary settlements with the Governments of the territory concerned, who will be informed of the amount of their currency paid out for this purpose.

*Article 6.*

Ex-prisoners of war and civilians of each of the contracting parties may, until their repatriation, be employed in the management, maintenance and administration of the camps or billets in which they are situated. They may also be employed on a voluntary basis on other work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent Soviet and United States authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labour shall be determined by agreement between these authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with military standards and procedure and under the supervision of their own officers.

*Article 7.*

The contracting parties shall, wherever necessary, use all practicable means to ensure the evacuation to the rear of these liberated citizens. They also undertake to use all practicable means to transport liberated citizens to places to be agreed upon where they can be handed over to the Soviet or United States authorities respectively. The handing over of these liberated citizens shall in no way be delayed or impeded by the requirements of their temporary employment.

*Article 8.*

The contracting parties will give the fullest possible effect to the foregoing provisions of this Agreement, subject only to the limitations in detail and from time to time of operational, supply and transport conditions in the several theatres.

*Article 9.*

This Agreement shall come into force on signature.

Done at the Crimea in duplicate and in the English and Russian languages, both being equally authentic, this eleventh day of February, 1945.

For the Government of the United  
States of America

JOHN R DEANE  
*Major General, U. S. A.*

For the Government of the Union  
of Soviet Socialist Republics

ГЕНЕРАЛ-ЛЕЙТЕНАНТ ГРЫЗЛОВ <sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup>Lieutenant General Gryzlov.

## 11. POST-CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS

### *Editorial Note*

In the course of compiling the present volume a few hitherto unpublished documents were found in which important participants at the Yalta Conference made authoritative statements on the proceedings, or portions of the proceedings, at the conference itself. Since these statements supplement the contemporary conference record, they have been reproduced at this point.

For previously published statements by participants regarding the proceedings at Yalta, the reader may wish to consult the following:

Message of President Roosevelt to the Congress, March 1, 1945, Department of State *Bulletin*, March 4, 1945, volume XII, pages 321-326, 361; *Congressional Record*, 79th Congress, 1st session, volume 91, pages 1618-1622.

Report by Prime Minister Churchill to the House of Commons, February 27, 1945, *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th series, volume 408, columns 1267-1295.

Press conference of President Roosevelt, April 5, 1945, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, compiled by Samuel I. Rosenman, 1944-45 volume, pages 610-611.

Statement by Secretary of State Stettinius, Department of State *Bulletin*, April 8, 1945, volume XII, pages 600-601.

Testimony of Alger Hiss, *Communist Espionage in the United States Government*, Hearings before the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, 80th Congress, 2d session, pages 656-657.

Testimony of George C. Marshall, *Military Situation in the Far East*, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82d Congress, 1st session, part 1, pages 559-565.

Statement of W. Averell Harriman, *Military Situation in the Far East*, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82d Congress, 1st session, part 5, pages 3328-3342.

Testimony of Charles E. Bohlen, *Nomination of Charles E. Bohlen To Be United States Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 83d Congress, 1st session, *passim*.

860C.01/3-645 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

[Excerpts]

SECRET  
PRIORITY

Moscow, March 6, 1945—2 a. m.

636. We had three more unproductive hours of discussion at the meeting of the commission on Poland this evening, going over much the same ground as last time.

Every argument Clark Kerr and I advanced was brushed aside. For example I told him that I knew the President would be shocked to learn of Molotov's obstruction to the progress of the work of the commission in objecting to our calling representative Polish democratic leaders to Moscow. I pointed out that Marshal Stalin had agreed to the inviting of Sapieha and Witos to Yalta<sup>1</sup> and I failed to understand why Molotov now went back on this position. In reply he said that the communique was the "anchor" for the commission's work and that no other conversations at Yalta had a bearing.

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<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 711.

Roosevelt Papers

*The Director, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (Byrnes), to the President*

[Excerpt]

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: James F. Byrnes

At Yalta, the Prime Minister wished to discuss shipping and the British Import Program. Hopkins and I advised Lord Leathers that the problem was too complicated to be discussed so far away from basic data and that it would have to be resolved in Washington. Leathers accepted this viewpoint and said on several occasions that he would come to the United States at an early date to discuss the shipping situation.

Hiss Collection

*The Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 19, 1945.

1. Attached is a draft message from the President to Marshal Stalin along the lines you indicated to Mr. Raynor over the telephone Saturday. Mr. Dunn and Mr. Pasvolsky strongly recommend that the President should not at this time send a message to Stalin on this subject for the reason that there are three or four other urgent matters of great importance which will require messages of this nature. (One of these has already been sent.) Mr. Dunn feels that it will rob this method of communication of its true importance when so many messages are sent at once. Mr. Dunn and Mr. Pasvolsky feel that you should take this matter up yourself with Ambassador Gromyko along the lines of the attached outline of points to be made.

2. Mr. Dunn and Mr. Pasvolsky also feel strongly that we should not attempt, at least at this time, to get out of the commitment on this subject which was made at the Crimea. They therefore think that any message from the President that might be sent despite their recommendation should not go into that subject and should be limited simply to the precise issue raised by Gromyko last Saturday.<sup>2</sup>

[Attachment 1]

SECRET

## DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MARSHAL STALIN

Last Saturday Ambassador Gromyko informed the State Department that a party of thirty representatives of the Ukraine and White Russian Soviet Republics would arrive at San Francisco to attend the Conference. I feel certain that there must be some misunderstanding about this communication. During the Crimean Conference it was very clearly settled that these two republics would not be invited to send representatives to San Francisco and would not be separately represented there. It was agreed that the United States and the United Kingdom would support at San Francisco a Soviet proposal, to be presented at the Conference when the question of initial membership is under discussion there, that the two republics be included among the initial members of the United Nations Organization when

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<sup>1</sup> Carbon copy.

<sup>2</sup> It appears that the proposed telegram from Roosevelt to Stalin was not sent but that a note was sent by Stettinius to Gromyko on March 29, 1945, indicating that at Yalta "no obligation whatsoever was assumed in regard to the question of the presence of representatives of these republics at San Francisco" (500.CC/3-2545). See also *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation*, p. 396, footnote 11.

created. I want you to know that since my return to Washington I have been giving this matter very considerable thought. I have in particular been considering how the objectives you have in mind could be carried out most effectively. Quite frankly the difficulties, both in relation to the effect on American public support for the proposed organization and to the attitude of other governments, seem to be far greater than I had realized. I expect to communicate further with you on that aspect of the matter later but in the meantime I should appreciate it if you would take steps to clear up the misunderstanding which has led to Ambassador Gromyko's communication of Saturday.

[Attachment 2]

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS TO BE MADE BY THE SECRETARY IN TALKING TO AMBASSADOR GROMYKO

1. I am very much disturbed about the statement made to Mr. Dunn last Saturday.
2. It was clearly settled at the Crimean Conference that the two republics would not be invited to San Francisco and would not be separately represented there.
3. In accordance with this decision no invitations have been issued to them.
4. It would be most embarrassing and contrary to the Crimean arrangements if their representatives should come to San Francisco.
5. Ambassador Gromyko should take this up with his Government immediately and have any misunderstanding eliminated.

[Attachment 3]

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF DECISIONS REACHED AT THE CRIMEAN CONFERENCE IN THE MATTER OF THE TWO SOVIET REPUBLICS<sup>3</sup>

The Soviet Representatives proposed that two or three of the Soviet Republics should be invited to the San Francisco Conference and should become initial members of the organization.<sup>4</sup>

This matter was referred to the Foreign Ministers for consideration. At the Foreign Ministers' meeting Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden jointly agreed that in the course of the San Francisco Conference the Soviet Representatives would propose that the Ukraine and White Russian Republics be named as initial members of the organization and that this proposal would be supported by the British Representatives.

<sup>3</sup> Although this memorandum is not referred to as an attachment in the covering memorandum, it appears to have been prepared as an accompaniment to the memorandum of March 19. The author was presumably Hiss.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 712.



Mr. Stettinius said that he would have to reserve his position.<sup>5</sup> This meeting was held at the British Delegation's headquarters with Mr. Eden presiding. A drafting committee composed of Mr. Jebb, Ambassador Gromyko and Mr. Hiss was appointed to draft the report of this meeting, to be read at the next plenary session by Mr. Eden as Chairman of that day's meeting of the Foreign Ministers. The draft agreed upon by the drafting committee was in the foregoing sense. Subsequently, without clearing with or informing Mr. Hiss or, presumably, Ambassador Gromyko, the British Representatives changed the report<sup>6</sup> so that it stated that representatives of both the United Kingdom and the United States will support the proposal to admit the Soviet Republics to original membership. The British Representatives said that they had cleared this change with Mr. Stettinius but this was not the case as he did not understand that any such issue was presented to him. At the afternoon plenary session<sup>7</sup> Mr. Eden read the revised report and before the matter could be clarified the President expressed his agreement as a matter of policy.

The question of whether or not the two Soviet Republics should adhere to the United Nations Declaration prior to April 25 and the question of whether they should be invited to the Conference were both discussed fully at the plenary session and a negative decision was reached on each point.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, p. 737.

<sup>6</sup> It appears from Stettinius, pp. 196-197, that between the adjournment of the drafting committee and the convening of the Fifth Plenary Meeting the President had had a private talk with members of the British Delegation and had agreed to this change.

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, pp. 772, 775.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET

Moscow, April 2, 1945.

(Personal and Top Secret for the President from Harriman)

Aside from the major questions which are causing concern in our relations with the Soviet Union there has been an accumulation of minor incidents which started some six weeks ago. The following are only examples: . . . Little or no progress has been made in getting Soviet approval for our air teams to visit Soviet controlled territory for appraisal of bomb damage or for our naval team to [visit] Gdynia. Both proposals were agreed to at Yalta.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

Roosevelt Papers

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>Translation<sup>2</sup>

SECRET AND PERSONAL

[Moscow,] April 7, 1945.

In connection with your message of April 1<sup>3</sup> I consider it necessary to make the following remarks on the question of Poland.

Matters on the Polish question have really reached a dead end.

Where are the reasons for it? The reasons for it are that the Ambassadors of the United States and England in Moscow—members of the Moscow Commission—have departed from the principles of the Crimea Conference and have introduced into the matter new elements not provided by the Crimea Conference.

Namely: a) At the Crimea Conference all three of us considered the Provisional Government of Poland as the government functioning in Poland at the present time which is subject to reconstruction and which should serve as kernel of the new government of national unity. But the Ambassadors of the United States and England in Moscow depart from this principle. . . .

b) At the Crimea Conference all three of us agreed that not more than five persons from Poland and three persons from London should be called for consultation. But the Ambassadors of the United States and England in Moscow have departed from this position and demand that each member of the Moscow Commission be given the right to invite an unlimited number of people from Poland and from London.

Naturally, the Soviet Government could not agree with this as the summons of people should be carried out according to decisions of the Crimea Conference, not by individual members of the Commission, but by the Commission as a whole, namely by the Commission as such. But the request of an unlimited number of persons summoned for consultation contradicts the plans of the Crimea Conference.

c) The Soviet Government proceeds from the fact that in accordance with the meaning of the decisions of the Crimea Conference such Polish leaders should be invited for consultations who, firstly, recognize the decisions of the Crimea Conference, including the decision on the Curzon Line, and, secondly, are really striving to establish friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union.

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<sup>1</sup> Transmitted by the Soviet Embassy, Washington.

<sup>2</sup> Appears on the original.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

Hiss Collection

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political  
Affairs (Hiss)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

EXCERPTS FROM HANDWRITTEN NOTES OF PLENARY SESSION OF  
FEBRUARY 6, 1945

Dictated at San Francisco, June 3, 1945 on the basis of longhand notes made during the meeting of February 6, held at Livadia Palace, Yalta.

President Roosevelt asked Mr. Stettinius to explain the United States' proposal on the voting formula as Mr. Stettinius was at Dumbarton Oaks and none of the three heads of delegation was. The President said that he felt strongly that people are going to insist on getting something that will insure peace, not for all time, but say for fifty years.

Mr. Stettinius then read "Statement on the American Position on Voting in the Council"<sup>2</sup> and concluded by making further remarks based upon the memorandum entitled "Supplementary Arguments for Use of Secretary".<sup>3</sup> He concluded by expressing the hope that America's two great allies would be able to agree with the American proposal.

The President then suggested that Mr. Stettinius read the types of decisions which would require unanimity of the permanent members under the American proposal. The President's suggestion was agreed to and Mr. Stettinius then read the bottom half of page 1 and all of pages 2 and 3 of the memorandum entitled "Formula for Voting Procedure in the Security Council of the United Nations Organization and the Analysis of the Effects of that Formula."<sup>4</sup> (He did not read again the actual proposed voting formula which is set forth in the first half of page 1 in the memorandum under reference. Before he read from this Mr. Stettinius distributed copies of it to the British and Soviet Delegations.)

In reading from this memorandum Mr. Stettinius specifically distinguished between the two categories of questions. In reading the first group of topics he said, "I shall first present six situations in which the unanimity of the great powers must be maintained at all times". Before reading the second list of items he said, "I shall now

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<sup>1</sup> The copy is unsigned, but the author was presumably Hiss:

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 682-683.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 683-684.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, pp. 684-686.

read the situation[s] which also require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members, except that a member of the Council would not cast its vote in any such decisions that concern disputes to which it is a party, in other words unanimity except when involved in a dispute".

The President then stated that that ended the reading and the explanation of the procedure involved in the American proposal. He said then that we have to remember that the objectives of the five great nations and of all nations is the same and that on the question of procedure there ought not to be any real difficulty.

There then ensued a lengthy discussion brought about by Stalin's question as to in what respect the voting formula as read by Mr. Stettinius differed from the texts submitted by the President in his telegrams of December 5. <sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, pp. 58-60.

500.CC/6-345: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Grew)*

RESTRICTED

SAN FRANCISCO, June 3, 1945.

[Received June 3—7 p. m.]

5. Please transmit the following to the President as from me:

"Referring to our telephone conversation yesterday on the veto aspects of the voting procedure, the precise issue at present, as to which there has been a great deal of confusion especially in the press, is whether the veto power applies on the part of a great power not involved in a dispute so as to enable that great power to prevent having a situation discussed in the Council where such discussion is merely for the purpose of enabling the Council to decide what of [if] any action it should take or recommend. We are all in agreement that the unanimity of those great powers not involved in a dispute should apply to substantive decisions which the Council is called upon to make. The question of whether such a great power can prevent a situation from even being placed on the agenda and discussed in a preliminary way prior to the taking of substantive decisions was not covered either at Dumbarton Oaks or at Yalta. However, the British and we have always assumed and we have so stated publicly that any determination as to whether or not the Council itself undertake any such preliminary discussion should if a vote is required at all, be decided by not more than a procedural vote, i. e. without any of the great powers as such being able to exercise a veto. We are still hopeful that we will be able to reach agreement with the Soviet delegation on the interpretation of this question which is of course one on which we feel we cannot retreat.

You may be interested to know that in the course of the statement on voting procedure which I made to the February 6 Plenary Session at Yalta, I emphasized the importance which we ascribe to full and

free discussion. That conference addressed itself only to the issue of a great power abstaining from voting in a dispute. However, my statement was in such broad terms that, especially when taken in conjunction with later interpretative public statements issued by the Department on the precise issue now under consideration, there can be no possible basis for any contention that our present position could be considered to be in violation of the Yalta agreements. According to the best records available to us here the exact language of the two paragraphs in my Yalta statement which referred to freedom of discussion was as follows:<sup>1</sup>

“ Our proposal recognizes the desirability of the permanent members frankly stating that the peaceful adjustment of any controversy which may arise is a matter of general world interest in which any sovereign member state involved should have a right to present its case.

We believe that unless this freedom of discussion in the council is permitted, the establishment of the world organization which we all so earnestly desire in order to save the world from the tragedy of another war would be seriously jeopardized. Without full and free discussion in the Council, the organization, even if it could be established, would be vastly different from the one we have contemplated.”<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, pp. 661-662.

<sup>2</sup> Notation on file copy reads: “Message sent to the White House 6/4/45 8:30 a. m.”

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