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Report No: ICR00005443

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

IBRD-85210

ON A

LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF EUR €29.3 MILLION

(US $32 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

Republic of Albania

FOR A

Citizen-Centric Service Delivery Project
June 21, 2021

Governance Global Practice
Europe And Central Asia Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective April 1, 2021)

Currency Unit =	Albanian Lek ALL
ALL 104.8 =	US$1
ALL 123.3 =	EUR1
EUR 0.852 =	US$1

FISCAL YEAR
January 1 – December 31

Regional Vice President:	Anna M. Bjerde
Country Director:	Linda Van Gelder
Regional Director:	Lalita M. Moorty
Practice Manager:	Roberto Adrian Senderowitsch
Task Team Leader(s):	Simon Carl O'Meally, Zahid Hasnain
ICR Main Contributor:	Emoke Anita Sobjak (with inputs from Ermal Vila and Adrienne Hathaway-Nuton)

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADISA	Agency for Delivery of Integrated Services in Albania
AM	Aide Memoire
BPR	Business Process Re-engineering
CFM	Citizen Feedback Mechanism
CMU	Country Management Unit
CoM	Council of Ministers
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease
CPF	Country Partnership Framework
CSC	Citizen Service Center
DLI	Disbursement-Linked Indicators
DU	Delivery Unit (at the Prime Minister's Office)
EU	European Union
FM	Financial Management
GoA	Government of Albania
ICR	Implementation Completion and Results Report
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IFO	Integrated Front Office
IPA	Instrument for Pre-Accession (at the EU)
IPF	Investment Project Financing
IPSC	Inter-Ministerial Public Services Committee
IRI	Intermediate Result Indicators
ISR	Implementation Status and Results
IT	Information Technology
MIPA	Ministry of Innovation and Public Administration
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NAIS	National Agency for Information Society
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PDO	Project Development Objective
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PM	Prime Minister
PPF	Project Preparation Facility
RBF	Results-Based Financing
RF	Results Framework
SCD	Systematic Country Diagnostic
TA	Technical Assistance
ToC	Theory of Change
TPV	Third-Party Validation
WB	World Bank

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DATA SHEET

BASIC INFORMATION

Product Information

Project ID	Project Name
P151972	Citizen-Centric Service Delivery Project
Country	Financing Instrument
Albania	Investment Project Financing
Original EA Category	Revised EA Category
Partial Assessment (B)	Partial Assessment (B)

Organizations

Borrower	Implementing Agency
Republic of Albania	Agency for Delivery of Integrated Services in Albania (ADISA)

Project Development Objective (PDO)

Original PDO

The development objective of the project is to improve the efficiency of delivery and access to selected administrative services in Albania.

FINANCING

	Original Amount (US$)	Revised Amount (US$)	Actual Disbursed (US$)
World Bank Financing			
IBRD-85210	32,000,000	32,000,000	32,191,740
Total	**32,000,000**	**32,000,000**	**32,191,740**
Non-World Bank Financing			
Borrower/Recipient	42,100,000	0	0
Total	**42,100,000**	**0**	**0**
Total Project Cost	**74,100,000**	**32,000,000**	**32,191,740**

KEY DATES

Approval	Effectiveness	MTR Review	Original Closing	Actual Closing
25-Aug-2015	22-Mar-2016	23-Apr-2018	31-Dec-2020	31-Dec-2020

RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING

Date(s)	Amount Disbursed (US$M)	Key Revisions
28-Sep-2018	13.57	Reallocation between Disbursement Categories

KEY RATINGS

Outcome	Bank Performance	M&E Quality
Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Substantial

RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO Rating	IP Rating	Actual Disbursements (US$M)
01	08-Mar-2016	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	1.00
02	19-Jul-2016	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	5.62

03	19-Jan-2017	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	6.54
04	02-Mar-2017	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	7.93
05	20-Sep-2017	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	8.62
06	11-Apr-2018	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	13.57
07	11-Jun-2018	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	13.57
08	09-Jan-2019	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	22.30
09	26-Aug-2019	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	24.89
10	02-Apr-2020	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	25.66
11	18-Dec-2020	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	26.50

SECTORS AND THEMES

Sectors

Major Sector/Sector	(%)
Public Administration	**100**
Other Public Administration	100

Themes

Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3)	(%)
Public Sector Management	**83**
Public Administration	83
Administrative and Civil Service Reform	24
Transparency, Accountability and Good Governance	18
E-Government, incl. e-services	41
Social Development and Protection	**18**
Social Inclusion	18
Indigenous People and Ethnic Minorities	6
Other Excluded Groups	6
Participation and Civic Engagement	6

ADM STAFF		
Role	**At Approval**	**At ICR**
Regional Vice President:	Cyril E Muller	Anna M. Bjerde
Country Director:	Ellen A. Goldstein	Linda Van Gelder
Director:	Mario Marcel Cullell	Lalita M. Moorty
Practice Manager:	Adrian Fozzard	Roberto Adrian Senderowitsch
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I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL

Context

1.   **Despite Albania's considerable progress in development since the early 1990s, in 2015 the delivery of basic public services still constrained sustainable and equitable growth.** Having attained middle-income status by 2008, Albania faced slowing growth after the global financial crisis. The World Bank (WB)'s 2015 Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) found that, among the major obstacles to the accumulation and efficient use of assets needed for growth, was inefficient service delivery, which was characterized by corruption and fragmented institutional arrangements. Citizens viewed corruption as a significant problem, especially in health, police, customs, and property registration services. While business process and e-governance reform efforts had improved business services, such measures had not yet been applied to administrative services for citizens. Beyond the quality of public services, the SCD also pointed to socio-economic and spatial inequalities in access to services affecting the less well-off and vulnerable population sub-groups, such as rural residents, women, and the Roma. Like elsewhere in the Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region, Albanian citizens' expectations from the state were growing. Citizens were increasingly vocal about the discrepancy between economic growth and the low quality and access to service delivery.

Sectoral and Institutional Context

2.   **The project was designed to support the Government of Albania's (GoA) reform program entitled "Innovation against Corruption**." Under this program, the GoA aimed to reduce the scope for corruption, foster a citizen-focused ethos for provision of public services, and reduce the time of service delivery both for citizens and businesses. As part of Phase 1 of this program, which began in 2014, ministerial and agency Working Groups (WGs) prepared a legal inventory and mapping of the processes underpinning the delivery of selected services and the regulatory approvals needed for licenses and permits. In Phase 2, the Government aimed to implement the recommendations arising from a regulatory review and process re-engineering led by the Inter-Ministerial Public Services Committee (IPSC), automate some of the re-engineered services to be provided online, and establish monitoring and evaluation (M&E) processes. Phase 3 envisaged expansion and improvement of the delivery of services. The project aimed to contribute to all three phases of the Government program.

3.   **At the time of appraisal, there were other complementary public service delivery automation initiatives underway in Albania that the project intended to build on.** Among the most important were online procurement, the digitization of 20 percent of property records and the launch of the e-Albania portal (www.e-albania.al), which offered over 500 services as of June 2015. The National Agency for Information Society (NAIS) was the coordinating and regulatory authority for state databases responsible for the Government Interoperability Platform.[1]

4.   **Parallel to increasing online service provision, the GoA intended to improve physical access to services through the construction of a user-focused, one-stop-shop citizen service center (CSC) in Tirana.** Given the modest levels of internet penetration,[2] the GoA acknowledged that the NAIS' efforts to automate services were not enough

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[1] The Council of Ministers' (CoM) Decision no. 961, dated November 24, 2010.

[2] In 2013 there were only 60 internet users per 100 people. By 2019 this rose to 70/100 (WB). Source:

to cater to the entire population. As such, it was decided that there was a need for service access points where citizens could access services *in person* and that the Agency for Delivery of Integrated Services in Albania (ADISA) would be established for this purpose. In this context, the CSC was envisioned as an integrated user-centric physical access point for over 300 services which had previously been provided by a multitude of agencies and ministries. A key aspect of the project was communication, accountability and transparency, including the development of a call center and information points for services, and a proactive communication mechanism for citizens to report on the quality of services delivered. This was expected to help improve citizens' perceptions of state responsiveness.

Rationale for Bank Support

5.   Through this project, the WB aimed to contribute to the service delivery aspects of the Government program while complementing related support from other development partners. In the context of Albania's European Union (EU) integration process, the EU's Instrument for Pre-Accession for 2014-2020 (IPA II) aimed to strengthen democratic institutions and to support the public administration reform process. IPA II also supported improvements in public service delivery and the preparation and implementation of national legislation in line with European standards and best practice. While the WB had been working with the EU and other development partners to coordinate support towards these goals, it had a comparative advantage in supporting service delivery aspects of the institutional reforms due to its previous engagements with the GoA in sectoral service provision (namely, social assistance, health, and land management).[3] Complementary to the previous engagements, the project helped focus on improving the quality and access of the administrative portion of these services.

Higher Level Objectives to which the Project Contributed

6.   The project was designed to contribute to the Government program and priority objectives of the WB's FY15–FY20 Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for Albania. It would contribute to the Government program "Innovation against Corruption", as well as to the *service delivery by CSCs* reform which was one of the top six priorities identified by the Prime Minister (PM) and Cabinet. Further, the project objectives aligned closely to the GoA's Open Government Partnership Second Action Plan for 2014-2016. The project would also contribute to achieving outcomes under the CPF Focus Area 3 entitled "Strengthening public sector management and service delivery," in particular the CPF objective "increased efficiency of public service delivery" for which the project was the WB instrument identified to deliver on the desired outcome.[4]

Theory of Change (Results Chain)

7.   The project did not present an explicit Theory of Change (ToC),[5] yet its underlying ToC for achievement of the PDO was apparent through its narrative description. The project activities supported achievement of the intermediate and development outcomes through a results chain that can be visualized in Figure 1. Here is a summary of this ToC. Activities under Component 1 *Enhancing Backend Systems* would result in re-engineered business-processes of services, improved backend IT systems and digitalized services. These outputs were to lay the foundations and set up the tools for a reduction in time to obtain services and a higher level of automation of service

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https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS?end=2019&locations=AL&start=2019&view=bar.

[3] Social Assistance Modernization Project (P122233); Additional Financing Social Assistance Modernization project (P162079); Health Systems Improvement Project (P144688); Project for Integrated Urban and Tourism Development (P155875).

[4] World Bank (2015), Albania. Country Partnership Framework FY2015-FY2019, Report No. 98254, p.18.

[5] The Project Appraisal Document (PAD) template at the time of preparation did not require the ToC.

delivery, and result in overall improved efficiency of service delivery (PDO Objective 1). In parallel, activities under Component 2 *Enhancing Front-Office Interface* would focus on the establishment of the new CSCs, the provision of information on services on multiple platforms, and the establishment of the Citizen Feedback Mechanism (CFM). These outputs would primarily contribute to an improved interface at physical one-stop-shop access points, more and improved online services and citizen feedback on how to make services both more accessible and efficient, enabling the achievement of both PDO Objective 1 and 2 on improved access to services. Finally, interventions under Component 3 would *Build Capacity to Deliver* improvements in services through strengthening strategic planning, performance management and capacity building, enabling the achievement of all the intermediary and final outcomes of the project. Overall, all components contributed to the PDO, but the focus in the representation of the ToC below is on the main activities contributing to the main results.

Figure 1: Theory of Change

Project Development Objectives (PDOs)

8.   **The project had a clearly defined PDO which was unchanged throughout project implementation.** The PDO as stated in the Loan Agreement was *to improve the efficiency of delivery and access to selected administrative services in Albania*.

Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators

9.   **The PDO can be unpacked into two main outcomes.** The two PDO outcomes (or PDO objectives) and their associated indicators are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. PDO and associated indicators

Outcomes	PDO Indicators
To improve the efficiency of the delivery of selected administrative services	Reduction in days to: • obtain motor vehicle registration • process old age pension application • obtain health insurance card
To improve citizen's access to selected administrative services	Increased access to services for the vulnerable and poor

Components

10.   The project had three components:

- *Component 1 supported enhancements of the backend systems*, which included business process reengineering of services, building of new IT systems and automation of services.
- *Component 2 supported enhancements to the citizen interface with service delivery*, by reforming front offices in existing agencies, improving citizen convenience with one stop shops, improving online delivery of services, implementing beneficiary feedback mechanisms, and providing information on services.
- *Component 3 built capacity to deliver improvements in services*, by improving strategic planning and performance management, building the capacity of the PM's Delivery Unit (DU) and the Ministry of Innovation and Public Administration (MIPA) and other implementing agencies, and by supporting a communications strategy and outreach campaign.

11.   The lending instrument was an Investment Project Financing (IPF) with Disbursement Linked Indicators (DLI) and the lending was separated into three portions. The three portions are briefly detailed below:

1) *Project Preparation Facility (US$2 million).* The objective of this portion was to strengthen design and implementation readiness. It financed consultants, goods, training, and other inputs required to implement preparatory activities, such as support for business process re-engineering (BPR), building design, establishing the CFM, gathering baseline data for the PDO indicators, as well as building implementation capacity of ADISA by establishing the Project Implementation Unit (PIU).

2) *Results-Based Financing (RBF) (US$25 million).* The objective of this portion, captured through the DLIs, was to provide incentives for undertaking critical reforms and achieving results along the two result areas: efficiency and access. The majority of the loan (78 percent of the total loan amount) would disburse upon achievement of agreed targets of the DLIs. The DLIs supported the achievement of results related to each project component, as summarized in Table 2.

3) *Technical Assistance (TA) (US$5 million).* The objective of this portion was to build capacity and strengthen institutions related to the achievement of key results. Areas for support by component included upgrading information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure, developing communication mechanisms and campaign, as well as building capacity for performance management at the center of government.[6]

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[6] The PPF and TA parts followed the WB procurement guidelines and disbursed against eligible expenditures upon submission of documentation with Statements of Expenditures. The RBF reimbursed the GoA based on the submitted Eligible Expenditure Programs (EEPs) upon achievement of agreed results, captured in the DLIs.

Table 2: Project components and associated DLIs

Component	DLI
1) Back-end systems	• Development of online services with level 3 automation (DLI#1) • Re-engineering of administrative processes to reduce the time to citizens of obtaining approvals (DLI#2);
2) Front office interface	• Improved citizen interface for service provision (DLI#3) • Improved provision of information on government services on multiple platforms (DLI#4)
3) Capacity to deliver	• Institutional prerequisites of the reform process: Policy Reform Document outlining strategic plan for the reform and PDO baseline survey (DLI#5). This was a "global" DLI, which meant that no disbursements under the RBF component could be made until DLI#5 was met.

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE)

Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets

12. The PDO remained unchanged, while the second PDO indicator and some of the intermediate result indicators (IRIs) were further refined after the baseline survey, as stipulated in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD). The results of the baseline survey completed in May 2016 allowed to unpack the second PDO indicator to track progress on specific target groups – the poor, female and Roma. Along with the adjustments to this PDO indicator, there were revisions to the results framework (RF) in March 2017 to improve the effectiveness of the M&E and correct one minor flaw in the initial RF (for more details, see the "Quality of Monitoring and Evaluation" section and Annex 1). The changes were agreed with the client, explained in the Implementation Status and Results (ISR) archived on January 19, 2017 and documented in a dedicated ISR archived on March 2, 2017. The ISR also clarified that the changes did not require a formal project restructuring or any amendments to the Loan Agreement, as advised by LEGLE. Instead, they were formalized through a letter from the Ministry of Finance and Economy to the Country Director dated February 20, 2017.[7] None of these changes had implications for the ToC. From then onwards, targets remained unchanged for the duration of the project.

Revised PDO Indicators

13. No revisions to the components took place**.**

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[7] When consulted by the Task Team, LEGLE argued that the Supplemental Letter with the performance indicators, signed at the same time as the Legal Agreement, was a unilateral document and not part of the agreement. Hence, modifications in the RF did not require amendment/restructuring. The letter from the Government is filed in WBdocs here: https://wbdocs.worldbank.org/wbdocs/drl/objectId/090224b0884d4fe1.

Other Changes

14. In 2018 the project was restructured to reallocate funds.[8] Unused funds in the amount of EUR 1,894,492.02 were reallocated from the Project Preparation Facility (PPF) (category 3) to category 2 to support core project activities under the TA component – primarily the development of an information system to manage the integrated service delivery through the CSCs.[9]

15. Following the change in government administration in 2017/2018, certain *de facto* changes also occurred in the project's implementation arrangements. The most important of these changes was that the Project Steering Committee ceased to function (for more on the changes and their implications, see the "Key Factors During Implementation" section).

Rationale for Changes and Their Implication on the Original Theory of Change
16. The changes did not have any implications for the ToC or for the achievement of the desired outcomes.

II. OUTCOME

A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs

Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating

Rating: High

17. **At the time of the Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR), the PDO remains consistent with WB priorities in Albania as reflected in the most recent CPF and SCD.** Looking at the FY15–FY20 CPF, which was extended by one year to FY21 through the Performance and Learning Review,[10] this project was and is most relevant to achieving outcomes under Focus Area 3, entitled "Strengthening public sector management and service delivery," in particular to the CPF objective 3a "Support increased efficiency of public service delivery."[11] The project delivered on this CPF objective specifically by facilitating improved citizen access to administrative services and greater efficiency in the delivery of these services. Moreover, the project delivered on the target set for the CPF indicator and supplemental indicators for the CPF objective 3a. It exceeded the CPF indicator target of 15 percent reduction in time required for citizens to obtain targeted administrative services as evidenced by an average 37 percent reduction in processing times in 70[12] services supported under the project where data was available for calculation. With respect to the supplemental indicators, it not only met the target of 100 key services with BPRs as validated by the TPV, but at exit the project's spill-over effect led to 400 services having BPRs; and 75 key services with level 3 automation, of which 11 are now at level 4. The 2019 Update to the SCD also maintains a focus on the importance of improving service

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[8] Level 2 Restructuring approved on September 28, 2018.
[9] World Bank, Citizen-Centric Service Delivery Project – Restructuring Paper, RES26487, 2018, p.3.
[10] World Bank (2019), Albania - Performance and Learning Review of the Country Partnership Framework for the Period FY15-FY19, 131038-AL.
[11] World Bank (2015), Albania. Country Partnership Framework 2015-2019, 98254, p.18.
[12] The DLI 2 validation exercise focused on 70 selected services provided by 7 institutions. As the institutions handle a group of similar services in a uniform or unified way, some services have been merged in this validation analysis – with a total count of 56.

delivery. It identifies the need for "Strengthening the capacity of local government to raise revenues and deliver services" (under Strategic Objective 2 – "Making local governments more effective").[13]

18. **The PDO also remains relevant and consistent with the GoA's reform priorities.** The National Strategy of Public Administration Reform extended until 2022 has two objectives related to citizen centric service delivery: Objective 4 on strengthening public administration structures in order to improve public service delivery; and Objective 5 on providing improved, accessible, and integrated public services by reducing opportunities for corruption and strengthening ethics in public service delivery.[14] Interviews with a range of government counterparts confirmed that the project objectives remain highly relevant in the current Albanian context.

19. **Moreover, the WB's implementation support has been responsive to changing needs.** This is demonstrated by the fact that the CSC model was also expanded to certain municipalities, where needs for higher quality and more easily accessible services through one-stop-shops have proved more pressing. This was particularly important for vulnerable groups, such as the Roma and the poor – as indicated by the baseline survey and the *Long-term Policy Document* on provision of citizen-centric administrative services by central state institutions by the GoA[15] completed under Component 3 of this project. Furthermore, as of May 2021, the Country Management Unit (CMU) has endorsed further Bank support for Albania to improve service delivery, notably via local governments.

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)

Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome

20. **The efficacy assessment is based on the PDO and on the indicators in the project RF, as well as additional evidence that provides external validation for the achievement of outcomes.** The PDO was clear and the related results indicators were adequately chosen to measure its achievement, although the indicators were not designed to cover all of the results achieved on the project's 169 focal services and 9 focal institutions[16] (as noted in the section "M&E Design"). The PDO had two main outcomes, efficiency and access, so the efficacy assessment is organized around these two outcomes. Efficacy is assessed in relation to the expected outcomes, supported by evidence provided by PDO indicators, IRIs/DLIs, as well as additional information and data (including 'triangulation' with various sources) on the project's additional results and spill-over effects.[17]

PDO Outcome 1: Increased efficiency in delivering administrative services through reduction in processing times

Rating: High

21. **The project significantly exceeded the expected outcomes related to the efficiency of service delivery.** The overall efficiency of services was measured by the time taken (from submission of application to delivery of the

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[13] World Bank (2020), Albania. Systemic Country Diagnostic – 2019 Update, 147451-AL, p.8.

[14] National Strategy of Public Administration Reform, Activity Plan and Indicators for the period 2018-2020, http://dap.gov.al/images/DokumentaStrategjik/Plani_aktiviteteve_2018_2022.pdf.

[15] Approved by a CoM Decision No. 384, date 25.5.2016.

[16] Initially there were 10 institutions, but two of them got merged during project implementation. The 9 institutions were the following: Central Technical Archive of Construction, Compulsory Health Insurance Fund, General Directorate of Civil Status, General Directorate of Road Transport Service, General Maritime Directorate, Immovable Property Registration Office, Ministry of Education and Sports, National Business Center and Social Insurance Institute.

[17] Note: As neither the loan agreement nor the PAD indicate the relative importance of different objectives within the PDO, equal importance and weight has been given to each of the objectives. This is also consistent with the guidance provided in the World Bank on ICRs for IPFs.

service) for services offered by the 9 focal institutions. The PDO indicators on efficiency focused only on three selected services and the time to obtain these services declined substantially: from 5.3 days in 2016 to 30 minutes in 2020 for registering a vehicle; from 53 days in 2016 to 29 days in 2020 for processing the old age pensions application; and from 5 days in 2016 to a few minutes in 2020 for the health card, as the process is now fully on-line and automated.

22.   **In addition to the three services selected as PDO indicators, the project also contributed to service delivery times going down for 41 percent of the 169 focal services.** TPV confirmed that for 70 of the services supported by the project the average reduction in service delivery time was 37 percent (for more, see the "Efficiency" section). The main reasons for these improvements were the regulatory reforms supported by the project that reduced the number of documents that citizens and businesses needed to submit, the reduction of the number of steps in the back-office work-flow to process the service, and on-line application and electronic exchange of information between the different government databases.[18]

23.   **The below sub-sections, in addition, show how PDO 1 was achieved by improving back-end systems (Component 1).** This happened through: (i) development of online services; (ii) enhancing Information Technology (IT) systems in service provider agencies; and, (iii) re-engineering business processes covering a much wider range of services than the three services selected to measure progress on PDO 1.

Online Services Developed (IRI/DLI 1)

24.   **The project exceeded its expected results in automating services both in terms of the level of automation and the number of services covered.** The higher level of automation a service achieves, the less time it takes to obtain it.[19] The IRI/DLI 1 on increasing the number of services with level 3 automation fully achieved its end target of 75 services as validated by TPV. This means that these services have a completely paperless transaction at the citizen end. But the benefits were broader. For instance, out of the 75 e-services that reached the target level 3 automation, 11 went beyond this and achieved level 4 automation.[20] Moreover, beyond the DLI 1 target of 75 e-services, the project supported the automation of all 169 focal services. At the outset of the project, 62 of these 169 services had no information at all available online (not even level 1 automation). By project closure, the remaining 94 project focal services were all automated to some degree: 32 at level 1, 33 at level 3 and 29 at level 4. (these did not undergo TPV, which was only commissioned for the 75 services under DLI 1).

Back-End IT Systems Enhanced (IRI)

25.   **Except for one institution, the project nearly met its target of enhancing back-end IT systems in the focal institutions and in fact a wider pool of institutions benefitted from such upgrades.** To increase service efficiency and the level of automation of services, the project supported the enhancement of existing back-end IT systems or the establishment of new ones. Out of the 9 institutions covered by the project, 7 institutions enhanced their existing IT systems or developed a new one, falling slightly short of the target of 8 agencies. Beyond what was measured by the indicator, parallel to the project, the Government funded 9 further institutions to develop new or enhance existing

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[18] ISR, Dec. 2020, p.4

[19] According to the UN definition of e-service maturity, level 2 automation of services means that these are offered online for interactivity, level 3 means paperless transaction at the citizen end (e-filing, e-payment, and related citizen authentication), while level 4 entails full paperless decision making (all relevant databases are integrated and decisions are made online).

[20] These 75 services include some in particularly high demand, such as the ones related to social security benefits, property registration, motor vehicle registration and business licensing.

back-end IT systems during the project duration. These additional activities can be understood as a "spill-over" effect insofar as government representatives reported that the skills and capacity built under this project enabled them to expand, more effectively, their activities to other institutions and IT projects that were not within the project remit.

Business Processes Re-engineered (IRI/DLI 2)

26.   The re-engineering of business processes critical for increased efficiency of service delivery not only significantly exceeded its target, but also inspired scaling up of the reform. The IRI/DLI 2 end target of new business processes (To-Be maps) produced for 100 services was achieved ahead of time by mid-2017. By project closure, the target was significantly exceeded as these were prepared for 400 public services (including all 169 services covered by the project). This was a positive spill-over of this project, as inspired by the initial progress with BPR, the GoA initiated a new government-wide reform to scale up BPR. 100 of the 400 To-Be maps were validated through TPV and the TPV report concluded that the re-engineering simplified and sped up the administrative business processes and reduced the time for citizens to obtain the public services.

PDO Outcome 2: Increased access of the poor and vulnerable

Rating: Substantial

27.   The PDO of improving access to services of the poor and vulnerable was substantially achieved thanks to the project providing new channels for service delivery access, in particular at the local level.[21] Per the end line survey results, access improved between 2016 and 2020 by 19 percentage points for the poor (from 50 percent to 69 percent against an end target of 70), 20 percentage points for women (from 50 percent to 70 percent against an end target of 71), and 13 percentage points for the Roma (from 52 percent to 65 percent against an end target of 72). The GoA, notably, has suggested that these results may have been even greater, were it not for the impacts of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) pandemic during the last year of the project which curbed access to CSCs due to pandemic-related health measures and slowed progress on this indicator. While the use of on-line services increased significantly during the pandemic, it was likely not sufficient to compensate for the constraints to physical service delivery during the lockdown, particularly for the elderly, the poor, and the Roma populations that rely more on these physical channels.[22]

28.   While the PDO indicators focused on certain vulnerable groups, access to services improved for all service users thanks to the presence of more, and varied, service delivery channels put in place and supported by the project. As a result of project activities, citizens can now choose to access services on-line, through the ADISA CSCs, or from the institutions directly. The number of the CSCs increased from 2 in 2016 to 20 by project closure in 2020, and the NAIS has been increasing the number and level of automation of on-line services available in the e-Albania portal. Usage of the e-Albania portal has increased considerably, particularly during COVID-19, as measured by the number of registered users of the portal. The CSCs are a necessary complement to on-line services as many citizens, particularly the poor and elderly, do not have the necessary digital skills and require the physical service delivery channels. Focus group discussions conducted at the end of the project found that there was a perceived difference in

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[21] Access to services was measured by the ease with which the poor, females, and the Roma could receive the services that were within the scope of the project as evidenced by the findings of the baseline, mid-line, and end-line household surveys conducted in 2016, 2018, and 2020 respectively. The specific question in the survey used to measure this indicator was "percentage of respondents who stated that receiving the service from the institution was 'easy' or 'very easy'."
[22] ISR, 2020 Dec, p.9.

ease of access between citizens who have an ADISA office close to their residence and citizens who do not.[23] Citizens from areas where there is CSC have information on public services, more application channels to choose from, and a better-connected government.

29.   The second PDO objective was achieved through a range of activities aimed at improving citizens' interaction with public institutions for service delivery and making services more citizen-centric, as measured by a series of IRIs/DLIs. Achievement of these indicators is presented in the following sub-sections.

Citizen Service Centers (CSC) Established with Improved Customer Service (IRI / DLI 3)

30.   Going beyond the initially planned single CSC, the project supported the establishment of 20 CSCs across the country. While the project did not originally envision supporting CSCs beyond the one center planned in Tirana, this was an important additional result of the project. CSCs were first established in the main cities at the district level, then later on at the municipality level through establishing co-locations with local governments. By the end of 2020, there were 8 CSCs and 12 co-locations with local governments established throughout the country. Furthermore, ADISA runs vans that serve citizens in locations with no CSCs. The decentralization of CSCs is likely to have contributed to the increased access to services, in particular for the Roma and the poor, many of which reside outside the capital. As mentioned above, this was also the result of the project's ability to adapt to emerging needs to improve services country-wide, including those provided by sub-national governments.

31.   The project also exceeded the objectives in terms of the number of *Services offered with improved customer service front office interface* (IRI /DLI 3). The end target of 130 services was achieved well ahead of time and by project closure it was exceeded by 10 further services (actual achievement: 140 services). However, beyond these 140 services, which were validated as part of the project scope of 169 services, the CSCs established with project support ended up providing a much wider number of services with improved customer service: about 750 services for around 20 central institutions, as well as about 70 local government provided services. This is a notable positive spill-over effect.

Information on Services Provided (IRI / DLI 4)

32.   As a result of redesigning the way information on public services was provided, an increased number of services with information are now available on multiple platforms (IRI / DLI 4). Thanks to the new standardized "information cards" prepared for all project focal services (as well as additional services), the end target of 130 services for this IRI/DLI was achieved well ahead of schedule in 2018 and was exceeded by project closure (actual result: 132 services), as demonstrated by the TPV. The validation exercise examined the availability, quality, ease of obtaining, relevance, and completeness of the information. While TPV was only conducted on those services, which had "information cards" available on all platforms – physical front-offices, call centers, and online channels such as the e-Albania portal and ADISA website –, in reality far more services benefited from the creation of new "information cards" (1134 services in 63 institutions by project closure) which were made available on several platforms.

Online Service Delivery Improved (two IRIs)

33.   Through efforts to make online service applications quicker and easier, there has been a significant increase in citizens' access to e-services through e-Albania. Thanks to the backend integration of IT systems, the amount of

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[23] IDRA Research and Consulting, Citizen-centric Service Delivery Model for Albania. Final Assessment National Household Survey, October 15, 2020, p. 56.

data pre-filled in the online service application forms increased from 58.4 percent in 2016 to 63 percent by the end of 2020). This fell short of achieving the target 71 percent because improving the backend IT systems and integrating them cannot keep up with the automation of services which has been progressing at a much higher speed than envisaged at project appraisal (by the end of 2019 e-Albania offered 1792 e-services at various levels of automation, up from 787 e-services at the end of 2015). However, the IRI on the *Number of registered users accessing e-government services* exceeded expectations, going from about 50,000 in 2016 to 1,493,516 as of October 2020, compared to an end target of 80,525. There were two factors that sped up access to online services beyond expectations: the PM's Order No. 158 from November 2015 mandating that all service applications be made online (for more information, see the section on "Key Factors During Implementation"); and COVID-19.

Citizen Feedback Mechanism Implemented (IRI)

34.   In the vein of making service provision more citizen-centric, a new CFM was developed, but its rollout fell short. To measure citizen satisfaction with services, the project developed and implemented an SMS-based citizen survey platform – the CFM. The tool also aimed to help monitor service delivery. Even though the project put in place a fully functional CFM, this has been under-utilized. While the end target of the IRI on *Institutions with proactive CFM* was 8 institutions, the system was only implemented in 4 institutions (for more, see the section on "Key Factors Affecting Implementation".

35.   However, the under-use of CFM had only a minor impact on the achievement of the PDO, as ADISA used alternative feedback channels supported by the project. In addition to the CFM, citizen satisfaction and complaints were also measured every six months in the ADISA CSCs through interviews and through three rounds of national household surveys. These were conducted to provide the baseline, mid-term, and end-line PDO indicators on access to services, but they also measured citizen perceptions of service quality.

Improved capacity to deliver both PDO 1 and 2 (DLI 5 and IRI)

36.   Under Component 3 the project provided institution and capacity building, which was a critical intermediate result towards the achievement of both PDOs, as well as their sustainability. Project activities were key to establishing and building up the capacity of ADISA, but also contributed to the capacity and strategic planning coordination of a wider range of institutional stakeholders (e.g. ADISA, the PM's DU, MIPA, and the implementing agencies) (for more, see the "Institutional Strengthening" section). Furthermore, the component supported M&E and the IRI on *Institutions with key performance indicators reported and quarterly performance reports circulated* was nearly met at 7 institutions (against an end target of 8). These 7 institutions are from the 9 institutions covered by the project, but during the project's timespan, monthly monitoring reports were prepared for an overall 12 institutions – another positive spillover effect of the project. The M&E tools and capacity developed through the project are expected to help ADISA and service providers manage their performance beyond the project timespan. A further project output helped lay the ground for the institutional aspects of the overall reform, and constituted part of DLI 5 on *Institutional prerequisites of the reform process: Policy Reform Document approved and PDO indicators baseline survey completed*. This DLI was met in June 2016 upon the approval of the *Long-term Policy Document* on the provision of citizen-centric administrative services by central state institutions by the GoA.[24]

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[24] Approved by a CoM Decision No. 384, date 25.5.2016.

Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating

Rating: Substantial

37.   The project's efficacy is rated as Substantial. Efficacy could be considered high given the significant achievements in the efficiency of and access to services beyond the results indicators, which only measured outcomes on a sub-set of the projects' 169 focal services and 9 focal institutions, and did not capture additional results beyond the project's original scope (e.g. benefits from the decentralization of ADISA or the accelerated digitalization of services). However, while the project had significant additional results, as well as positive spillovers (see Table 3 below), there were also some minor shortcomings in a few of the results indicators which per the WB's ICR Guidance[25] merits a substantial rating.

Table 3: The status of all project indicators at project closure

Indicator Name	Indicator Type	Baseline	End Target	Actual Achieved	Status	Additional results
PDO Objective 1 – High						
Time taken to obtain motor vehicle registration (days)	PDO	5.3	4	0.02	Exceeded	Average time reduction of 37 percent was measured for 70 services (for more, see the "Efficiency" section)
Time taken to process old age pension application (days)	PDO	53	40	29	Exceeded	
Time taken to obtain health insurance card (hours)	PDO	5.5	4	0.01	Exceeded	
Agencies with new or enhanced backend IT systems to improve service delivery (Number)	IRI	0	8	7	Almost fully achieved (87.5 percent)	9 further institutions, which were not within the project scope
New services with level 3 automation (Number)	IRI / DLI 1	0	75	75	Achieved	11 of the validated 75 services achieved level 4 automation; the remaining 94 project focal services were also all automated to some degree: 32 at level 1, 33 at level 3 and 29 at level 4
Priority services with business process reengineered (Number)	IRI / DLI 2	0	100	100	Achieved	300 further services, including the projects' 69 other focal services
PDO Objective 2 – Substantial						
Access to services for	PDO	50	70	69	Almost fully	Access to services

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[25] WB Guidance for Implementation Completion and Results Reports for IPF Operations, issued on March 2, 2020, pp. 12-13.

					achieved (95 percent)	improved for all citizens, not only these vulnerable groups
the poor and vulnerable: Percentage of the poor who stated that receiving services from institutions contacted was "easy" or "very easy" (Percentage)						
Access to the poor and vulnerable: Percentage of the Roma who stated that receiving services from institutions contacted was "easy" or "very easy" (Percentage)	PDO	52	72	65	65 percent achieved	
Access to services for the poor and vulnerable: Percentage of females who stated that receiving services from institutions contacted was "easy" or "very easy" (Percentage)	PDO	50	71	71	Achieved	
Services offered with improved front office interface (Number)	IRI / DLI 3	0	130	140	Exceeded	20 CSCs established instead of 1; going beyond the validated 140 services, CSCs are providing about 750 services for about 20 central institutions, as well as about 70 local government provided services
Services with information available on multiple platforms (Number)	IRI / DLI 4	0	130	132	Exceeded	1134 services in 63 institutions have information cards available on multiple platforms, although not on all platforms that counted towards TPV
Number of registered users accessing e-government services	IRI	2.25	3.6	13.7	Exceeded	

(as percentage of adult population)					
The amount of data prefilled in public services' online forms (Percentage)	IRI	58.4	71	63	36.5 percent achieved	
Number of institutions with proactive citizen feedback mechanisms implemented (Number)	IRI	1	8	4	57.1 percent achieved	
Improved capacity to deliver both Outcomes 1 and 2					
Institutional pre-requisites of Citizen Centric Service Delivery Program (Yes/No)	IRI / DLI 5	No	Yes	Yes	Achieved	
Institutions with key performance indicators reported and quarterly performance reports circulated (Number)	IRI	0	8	7	Almost fully achieved (87.5 percent)	Additional 5 institutions not in the project scope

C. EFFICIENCY

Assessment of Efficiency and Rating

Rating: Substantial

38. Project efficiency is assessed to be Substantial. All available and relevant data was assessed to reach the conclusions presented in this section. The project's contributions to the reduction in compliance costs and processing times for service delivery are significant and translate into the generation of sustainable benefits for both the public and the Government, as discussed below and in Annex 4.

39. The project led to efficiency gains in services both for service providers and users which are expected to outlast the project lifetime. In particular, the establishment of the CSCs, improvements in their Front Offices as well as ADISA vans mean that citizens and businesses now need to spend less time to access services, obtain information, stay in queue, apply, etc., freeing up productive time that they can use for other purposes. The new "information cards" have also played an important role in drastically reducing the time to receive information on services. By the end of 2020, "information cards" were made available for 1,134 public services of 63 institutions (including all 169 project focal services) and are available on multiple platforms, which translates in almost zero cost and time spent to obtain information.[26] By the end of 2020, online application was possible for about 750 services through the e-Albania portal

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[26] Including all the relevant information on a service (required documents, associated costs, place of application, etc.). This

(which can also be accessed with assistance in the CSCs). Thanks to this digitalization and the accompanying back-end integration of IT systems, the amount of data already pre-filled in the application forms has increased yearly, required documents can be uploaded at the time of application, and applicants can now track the status of their applications through their online account, resulting in important time savings for citizens and businesses. These advances have also resulted in time savings for the Government, which is now able to provide administrative services more quickly, as evidenced by the average 37 percent reduction in the processing times of the 70 services for which the time reduction was calculated.

40. **Quantifiable benefits at project closing – while different than those which were estimated at design and which represent only a portion of the project's total benefits – are significant.** At project appraisal, the net present value of benefits stemming from reduced compliance costs for citizens (thanks to reduced time to obtain information and application forms, prepare and submit applications and necessary documentation, and follow up on applications for 380 services) – was estimated to be US$117.4 million over the five years of project implementation (US$558.5 over ten years). While not possible to replicate these calculations at closing due to data availability limitations, benefits accruing to the Government from business process improvements associated with 46 services that reduced service delivery time by 90 percent of the verified time reduction (a conservative scenario) (therefore allowing staff hours to be spent on other tasks) are estimated to have a net present value of US$51.7 million over five years (US$246 million over ten years). (See Annex 4 for additional details on the calculations.) Although it is not currently possible to calculate how these improvements in service delivery translated into the citizens' time savings as estimated in the PAD, the fact that such benefits would be additional to the internal benefits accruing to Government (calculated here) suggests that actual benefits are much higher.

41. **The significant efficiency gains in services (both within the project scope and well beyond) points to positive spillovers and is indicative of the project's internal efficiency**. Other signs of its internal efficiency include the project's: (a) eight month preparation timeline; (b) efficient project preparation/supervision costs relative to the project amount; (c) implementation within approximately five years, including an on time closing and minimal restructuring (55 percent of IPFs in Albania between 2011-2019 required extension and/or restructuring);[27] and (d) close to full disbursement, which at 95.9 percent is above the 92 percent average for Governance projects exited in FY2018-2020 and evaluated by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) unit within the World Bank Group.

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING

 Rating: Satisfactory

42. **The overall outcome rating for the project is Satisfactory. This rating is based on assessments of PDO relevance, average efficacy of the two PDO objectives, and efficiency.**[28]

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information is readily available on several platforms, including online at e-Albania or the ADISA website, through the Call Center services, or by visiting the ADISA CSCs or vans.

[27] Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), *Albania Country Program Evaluation*, World Bank Group, April 9, 2021, p. 21. *https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/Evaluation/files/Albania_CPE.pdf*.

[28] The final rating noted in Table 3 is based on the methodology provided in Appendix H of the updated WB Guidance for Implementation Completion and Results Reports for IPF Operations, issued on March 2, 2020. It is noted that the outcome rating in the ICR is higher than the last ISR rating for PDO due to immediate concerns on CFM deployment and sustainability concerns at the time of the last ISR.

Table 4: Calculation of the Overall Project Outcome Rating

OUTCOME	RATING
Relevance	High
Overall Project Efficacy	**Substantial**
Objective 1 - Increased efficiency in delivering administrative services through reduction in processing times	High
Objective 2 - Increased access of the poor and vulnerable	Substantial
Efficiency	**Substantial**
Overall Outcome Rating	**Satisfactory**

E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY)

Gender

43. The project helped improve access to services for women, as measured by the relevant PDO indicator. The percentage of females who stated that receiving services from institutions contacted was "easy" or "very easy" increased from a baseline of 50 percent to 70 percent. Moreover, the baseline, midline and endline surveys provided disaggregated data by gender for all but one PDO indicator (motor vehicle registration is done almost exclusively by males). These surveys showed consistently that the satisfaction with service delivery had been higher for the female respondents than for male respondents (70 percent and 66 percent, respectively, during the final assessment).

Institutional Strengthening

44. Most of the achievements and outcomes described in the earlier section were realized through the strengthening of processes and capacities in a wide range of institutions. The project supported the establishment of ADISA, which is today renowned across the country for its role in modern, integrated and citizen-centric service delivery. Project activities aimed at building ADISA's capacity included trainings (e.g. on project management, customer service, use of the CFM tool and process re-engineering) and a study tour to Malaysia. Furthermore, project activities under Component 3 included improvements in coordination, strategic planning and capacity building for a wide range of institutional stakeholders beyond ADISA (e.g. the PM's DU, MIPA, and the implementing agencies). The results-based portion of the instrument facilitated institutional strengthening by: (i) incentivizing results via reforms to, and the strengthening of, country institutional systems; and, (ii) incentivizing the institutional pre-requisites of citizen-centric service delivery. Moreover, specific indicators within the RF focused on institutional strengthening, notably the IRI on "Institutions with key performance indicators reported and quarterly performance reports circulated".

Mobilizing Private Sector Financing

45. Not applicable.

Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity

46. The project improved access to services for the poor, as measured by the relevant PDO indicator, though the project did not intend to directly achieve poverty reduction. Throughout project implementation, access to services for the poor[29] improved from a baseline of 50 percent to 69 percent, as measured through responses in a household survey. Such an increase in access was ensured through the new CSCs and vans.

Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts

47. The project delivered additional impacts, beyond what was envisioned in the project design, as discussed in the sub-sections on efficacy and efficiency and summarized in Table 3. This includes the establishment of 20 ADISA CSCs instead of one and BPR and automation of a far wider range of services than those covered by the project and measured by the RF. Additionally, the use of DLIs led to institutional system strengthening and know-how, which contributed to the automation and improvement of additional services/institutions that were not subject to formal validation for disbursement processes.

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION

48. Due to high-level political support from the PM in the preparation phase, as well as close engagement by the Bank, project preparation was time efficient. "Good governance" with a strong focus on public service delivery was one of the six priorities articulated by the GoA following the June 2013 elections. The WB was able to capitalize on such a momentum for the reform through close cooperation between the Bank's technical teams and CMU. The Task Team pooled together key expertise and the CMU supported innovation and led intensive engagement with the counterparts. As a result of the combined efforts of the client and the Bank, the project preparation had a quick turn-around with eight months from the official request to Board Approval.

49. The decision to use a lending instrument with a results-based component led to a greater focus on results, than that which was originally envisaged. Initially the client intended to focus borrowing on the construction of a new building to host a single one-stop shop in Tirana. At the time, IPF with DLIs was a relatively new Bank instrument, but intense dialogue eventually led to a more results-oriented project design with the majority being RBF and with no investment financing for the construction of a new building. Instead, WB financing was used in a more efficient way to refurbish existing government buildings and to support less visible but impactful aspects of the reform, such as the re-engineering of business processes and improved access for vulnerable groups.

50. The project had a coherent design conducive to achieving results. The project had a comprehensive scope and ambitious objectives, which reflected the transformational drive of the GoA's reform agenda. There was a clear

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[29] The poor were identified on the basis of a wealth index (bottom 40 percent).

definition of objectives and expected results. The five DLIs provided a coherent approach and incentives for the achievement of each of the project objectives. The M&E design was solid and conducive to the monitoring of expected results.

51.   **Another important factor leading to a strong project design was the availability of additional resources for project preparation, although the client would have benefitted from more timely funding.** The Task Team received adequate and additional budget for project preparation, which allowed for valuable just-in-time TA for preparing the reform and capacity-building during the setting up of ADISA. For instance, two Task Team members spent a month in Tirana working day-to-day with the first ADISA employees on BPR and designing the one-stop-shop model and the CFM. However, approval of the PPF for the client's preparatory activities only became available after Board Approval.[30] In the meantime, the Bank found alternative ways to support the GoA with project preparation through a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MFTF),[31] mainly by building capacity of the PM's DU (including through a study tour) in charge of monitoring results on service delivery. However, some project design activities (e.g. the selection of the focal services and institutions) were complemented by GoA resources and by other donors, such as UNDP. Close donor coordination and collaboration mitigated some of these challenges and complemented Bank efforts.

B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION

52.   **Project implementation was relatively smooth, as shown in the ISRs, with all the technical components implemented as planned until late 2019.** Satisfactory progress and the achievement of most project results over the first four years of project implementation were a result of combined efforts and strong collaboration between the WB and the GoA. The three main factors affecting implementation are discussed below.

53.   **Overall, the counterparts were dedicated, of high technical capacity and capitalized on high-level political support.** In spite of the initial challenges, typical for a newly established agency (lack of resources and technical capacity), ADISA and its PIU were dedicated and ambitious from the outset. Until 2017, the DU provided important support in monitoring project results. Consistent political buy-in was also an important factor, both at the central and local government levels (e.g. many mayors were interested in having ADISA CSCs and offered free space to host them).

54.   **The first factor affecting the project was the alteration of the implementation arrangements after 2017, which also weakened inter-institutional coordination.** Following the change in administration in 2017/2018, the PM played a less active role in the reform. The IPSC chaired by the PM with the responsibility of providing strategic guidance to the reform ceased to function. The MIPA, the project's counterpart ministry and an important driver of the reform, was dissolved. With this, the project SC chaired by the Minister also ceased to operate. The same applies to the DU in the PM's Office. The public administration reform was taken over by the Deputy PM's Office and a new Inter-ministerial Committee that it chaired. While the new Government maintained public service delivery high on its agenda, the PIU lost its regular communication channels at a Cabinet level through the DU and SC. Inter-institutional collaboration between ADISA and NAIS also became more challenging. Project-level decisions that required coordination between ADISA and NAIS became protracted, as there was no institutional mechanism above these two

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[30] The reason for this delay was that by the time the newly established ADISA was fully assessed and ready for PPF approval, the project itself was already prepared, given the high-paced project preparation.
[31] Second MDTF for Capacity Building Support to Implement the Integrated Planning System (IPS 2) (P129332).

entities that could quickly resolve matters [e.g. delayed decision on the Integrated Front Office (IFO) procurement and implementation].[32]

55.   **The second factor was a policy change in late 2019, whereby the new Government shifted its emphasis from the dual approach of one-stop shops and e-services aided by the project towards accelerated transition to "online only" service applications.** The Prime Minister's Order No. 158 of November 25, 2019 mandated that as of January 1, 2020 applications to all services had to be done online via e-Albania. This changed the inter-institutional dynamics, as NAIS emerged as the lead agency in service delivery. As in-person applications through the one-stop-shops are no longer possible, ADISA's role became limited to providing information to citizens and assisting them in applying online through e-Albania in the ADISA CSCs. The Bank team repeatedly highlighted the importance of maintaining multiple secure and reliable service delivery channels allowing applications both through online platforms (e-Albania) and in CSCs. The Bank also maintained dialogue with NAIS throughout the project and raised coordination issues in the Aide Memoires (AMs) and ISRs, yet NAIS involvement in the project remained limited and there were some difficulties in aligning the objectives of ADISA and NAIS after 2019.

56.   **The above policy change contributed to the early termination of the contract for the IFO system,[33] although this had only a minor impact on the project's overall disbursement rate.** With e-Albania taking over all e-service applications, ADISA's need of the new IFO system became questionable. The WB and ADISA were of the view that after necessary revisions most of the existing IFO modules were still needed to support ADISA's functions. However, ADISA and NAIS did not agree on the future use of the IFO and ADISA ended up terminating the contract. Given the advanced work, approximately 67 percent of the contract (roughly EUR 866,000) was disbursed to the vendor. Hence the overall disbursement rate of the project (95.9 percent) was only slightly affected. NAIS uses the hardware put in place under the IFO contract and the partially completed IFO system can still be a resource for the Government if it decides to reverse this policy and implement the IFO to support the management of the CSCs and for monitoring service delivery.

57.   **Finally, the third factor affecting some project results was the combined effect of the earthquake in November 2019 and of the COVID-19 pandemic, although the project still closed on time and with close to full disbursement.** Like everywhere else, the pandemic temporarily shifted the Government's priorities away from structural reforms to emergency response. In Albania, COVID-19 came on top of an earthquake. In some sense, COVID-19 contributed to project objectives by speeding up the uptake of e-services. At the same time, it affected the achievement of some project results (e.g. the IRI on the CFM) and of the PDO indicator on access to services in particular for the poor and Roma who have more limited access to e-services.[34] The timing of the end-line survey in June 2020 just after the lockdown also helps explain missing the final targets by a few percentage points. Even though respondents were asked

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[32] This decision was very delayed, because NAIS responded to ADISA and the WB late, despite ADISA officially raising this issue with the Deputy PM on several occasions.

[33] The purpose of the IFO system was to create an integrated platform for ADISA's operations in CSCs to support online service delivery. Additionally, the IFO would be connected to e-Albania and the back-office systems of service providers through the Government Gateway Platform for monitoring the service quality, delivery performance, and processing and response times.

[34] As a result of the damages caused by the 2019 earthquake, the IPRO office in Tirana receiving applications for immovable property registration was closed for about 5 months. During the initial lockdown in spring 2020 all physical service points had to be closed on average for about two months.

about their experience with services over the previous 12 months, their responses were likely influenced by their latest experience (*recency bias*).[35]

58.   The project result affected by all three above outlined factors was the rollout of the CFM (measured by an IRI), which also met privacy concerns. This SMS-based survey platform to monitor citizen satisfaction with services provided valuable data in the first four institutions where it was implemented. However, in 2018 the Data Protection Authority raised privacy concerns, as the CFM required obtaining the mobile phone numbers of applicants. In response, ADISA included a consent clause in the new standardized service application forms, but its implementation would require multi-institutional coordination.[36] However, beyond these technical challenges, the main reason for the underuse of the CFM was a general loss of interest in it after the dissolution of the DU in the PM's Office (originally in charge of the CFM), and after the PM's Decision No. 158. The earthquake in November 2019 and the onset of COVID-19 further diverted attention and capacity form the implementation of the CFM.

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

M&E Design

Rating: Substantial

59.   The M&E framework of the project was in large part appropriately designed and adequate to accurately measure results, thus the rating for design is judged to be Substantial. The implicit ToC was clear and reflected in the RF. The two PDO objectives were well defined and the PDO-level indicators adequately chosen to measure their achievement. The PDO indicators encompassed all aspects of the PDO statement and the IRIs captured a significant part of the contribution of the project activities toward achieving PDO-level outcomes. All indicators were specific and measurable. The DLIs provided a greater emphasis on results and were well aligned with the PDO. They had clear protocols and methodology for monitoring and verification. To complement ADISA's initially limited M&E capacity, the project design also placed special emphasis on TPV, which filled capacity gaps and led to a more rigorous M&E design.

60.   There were minor shortcomings in the M&E design, yet they did not compromise the integrity of the overall M&E framework and were remedied early during project implementation. These shortcomings were: (i) the absence of a baseline: the PAD noted that the RF should be revised, and all baselines established, once a baseline survey would be completed as part of the global DLI 5;[37] (ii) certain indicators needed to be refined, as described in the below section; and (iii) due to limitations in data availability, the RF was restricted to measuring progress on a subset of the project's focal services thereby not fully capturing all the project outcomes.

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[35] A cognitive bias that favors recent events over historic ones.

[36] According to the PIU and ADISA, integrating the consent clause at the time of application should be solved between NAIS and the service providing institutions. Collected data should then be regularly provided to ADISA for monitoring purposes. The cancelled IFO system would have enabled ADISA to pool this data by linking the CFM to it.

[37] No disbursements under the RBF component could be made until this DLI was fully met.

M&E Implementation

Rating: Substantial

61. **The data sources and methodology chosen allowed for robust measurement of the indicators.** Overall improvements in efficiency of delivery and access to services were assessed using indicators generated from administrative data, data voluntarily provided by service users, and through periodic user surveys. PDO indicators were measured by the service user survey for selected key services repeated every two years. The choice for a perception-based measurement of the PDO indicators through user surveys allowed to go beyond objective information from administrative data and capture also the more subjective aspects of service delivery, as experienced by users themselves. For instance, administrative data on processing applications for property registration does not account for the time that the citizen spent gathering all required documentation, which is often measured in months rather than days. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier above, the user surveys also had certain perception biases.

62. **As planned at project appraisal, the Results Framework was proactively revised and strengthened upon the completion of a baseline survey.** The survey was of high quality and it delivered robust baseline indicators against which progress of the project could be tracked. Along with these changes, a few further modifications were made to the RF to improve the effectiveness of M&E. The main modification was correcting a methodological error in the proposed measurement of the PDO indicator on access to services (i.e. the indicator, as originally formulated, measured transparency instead of access). Two IRIs were dropped for streamlining purposes, while some others were slightly amended, e.g. to make monitoring easier by using institutions as units of analysis instead of services (for the detailed changes in the RF, see comments on the indicators in Annex 1). No changes were made to the DLIs. All these modifications to the RF were agreed with the client and documented in the ISRs (for more, see the section "Significant Changes During Implementation").

63. **M&E data were collected and analyzed in a methodologically sound manner.** Initially, the DU in the PM's Office played a significant role in M&E by measuring progress on several indicators. Upon its dissolution in 2017, the Analytical Unit in the PM's Office together with the PIU overtook this role thanks to the significant capacity built in the meantime in the PIU and the additional M&E expert hired. Indicators included in the RF were measured and consistently reported in the ISRs. The data was reliable and of good quality. In order to ensure a sound methodology and independence of the evaluation, M&E included a robust TPV system which was implemented as planned. The verification protocol for the DLIs was effective. While ADISA is now well placed to effectively continue M&E of service delivery beyond project closure, continued implementation of the CFM would provide richer data for this purpose. This sustained overall focus on the M&E during implementation – particularly on ensuring achievement of DLIs – allowed an almost full disbursement of the loan, demonstrating the incentivizing effect and an increased focus on results of an IPF with DLIs.

M&E Utilization
Rating: Modest

64. **M&E utilization is rated as Modest because of two identified shortcomings.** First, M&E data could have been used more clearly to inform important policy decisions by the Borrower. Second, the M&E indicators could have been further modified during implementation to better capture all project results, as well as additional results that were linked to the project. Each is briefly explained.

65.   **While the M&E was utilized by the Bank team, it did not feed into policy decisions by the Borrower.** From the ISRs and AMs it is clear that M&E data on performance and results progress were used to inform project management and decision-making on several occasions (e.g. to increase the intensity of communication with the counterparts). Thanks to the solid M&E design and the abundance of data collected through various methods, the M&E data was used to provide evidence of achievement of outcomes and additional project results, as opposed to only documenting outputs. However, when deciding about the major shifts in the project (i.e. the PM's Order No. 158 on online only service applications) the GoA did not seem to have taken M&E data into consideration, as it reduced the role of the CSCs despite evidence from the RF on their relevance and effectiveness.

66.   **The M&E could have more amply captured project results as well as some of the significant additional outcomes of the project.** Due to limitations in data availability, most indicators were restricted to measuring progress only on a subset of the project's 169 focal services and 9 focal institutions (e.g. the PDO indicator on efficiency only looked at three selected services). As such, while the RF measured progress towards the PDO itself, it did not fully capture all project results. Moreover, as the project evolved, results were produced well beyond the project's initial scope, such as those emanating from expanding ADISA to 20 localities instead of the initially envisioned single one-stop-shop in Tirana. CSCs also ended up providing a much wider pool of services than the project's 169 focal services. To some extent, these additional benefits were captured in PDO indicator 2 on access to services, as well as in the IRI on *Number of registered users accessing e-government services*, the results of which significantly exceeded the target (13,7 percent achieved compared to an end target of 3,6 percent). Similarly, additional results on online service delivery after the PM's Decision No. 158 were also reported, where possible, in the PIU's progress reports, even if not captured in the RF. However, such important additional results attributable to the project could have been more clearly claimed by integrating dedicated indicators in the RF**.**

Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E

Rating: Substantial

67.   **The overall quality of M&E was Substantial,** with moderate shortcomings. In general, the project had a strong M&E system in place to support the results-based approach of the instrument and to monitor the achievement of intended project outcomes at the PDO level. The M&E design was robust. The methodological shortcomings in the original RF were identified and addressed early on at the time of the revision of the RF and these changes improved the effectiveness of the M&E to capture project outcomes. Implementation, relevance, and effective use of the RF during the entire life of the project was substantial. While the M&E effectively measured the achievement of the PDO, it did not fully capture all project results, including additional results emanating from policy-level changes during project implementation (such as the decision to decentralize ADISA and the shift towards increased digitalization of services). Satisfactory implementation of the M&E was enabled by capacity building in performance monitoring of both ADISA and the service provider agencies, which also contributes to the sustainability of this function. While M&E data informed project management on the Bank side, the GoA did not always consider it in its own policy decisions in the service delivery agenda.

B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE

68.   **Environmental and Social Safeguards.** At the time of appraisal operational policy OP 4.01 was triggered and the project was categorized as a WB Category B because a new building was planned to be constructed for ADISA. However,

due to public concerns about the planned construction of the building near the entrance to the city park in Tirana, the original plan was replaced by renovations to existing buildings to establish the CSCs. The associated impacts, such as dust, noise, and waste management, were mitigated through the application of the Checklist Environmental Management Plan (EMP) prepared with support of the WB. No issues have been noted and no complaints were received. In terms of potential social risks, the project did not comprise activities that could cause social risk or negatively affect the population, require land acquisition or cause any physical or economic displacement. Overall safeguards and the environmental assessment were rated as Moderately Satisfactory until the ISR archived on January 9, 2019, and Satisfactory from then onwards. The environmental and social risks were rated consistently low from project appraisal to completion.

69.   **Financial Management (FM).** Project FM performance was periodically reviewed by the Bank team in accordance with consistently Substantial fiduciary risk until the last ISR. In general, the FM, funds flow and disbursement arrangements for the project, for both the TA part (including PPF) and RBF part, have been adequate and in compliance with Bank requirements throughout the project term. The FM function was supported by experienced and qualified FM experts and high compliance was observed with respect to financial reporting and disbursement requirements. For the RBF part, the project relied on the country systems around the payroll cycle established in participating public sector entities. Overall, such systems and internal controls have been functioning appropriately, as confirmed by the external audits and PEFA 2017. At the same time, the alternative funds flow and control arrangements, adopted for the TA part, have been generally effective, except for the delays experienced in handling the acceptance process for the terminated IFO contract**.** Finally, the FM ratings were affected mostly by the delays and quality of the audits, due to factors beyond the control of the implementing agencies. The FM rating was restored from Moderately Satisfactory to Satisfactory by project closure, as those concerns were resolved. No significant issues and reporting conditions were revealed by the external audits.

70.   **Procurement.** The procurement risk was consistently Substantial from project preparation until closure. Procurement was carried out by the PIU with additional quality assurance provided by the Central Financing and Contracting Unit (CFCU) in the Ministry of Finance and Economy. Procurement performance rating was Moderately Satisfactory throughout implementation (upgraded to Satisfactory in the last ISR) due to the initially weak procurement capacity of the PIU and delays in launching some procurements. All procurement packages for goods and works were conducted following competitive bidding process (included either International Competitive Bidding – ICB or National Competitive Bidding - NCB), while the main consulting services contracts were selected following mostly Consultant Qualification (CQ) and Individual Consultant selection (IC). The PIU carried out procurement in accordance with the procurement and consultant guidelines, and in line with the procurement plan agreed with the WB. For prior review contracts, all documents were reviewed and submitted by the PIU and reviewed by to the Bank team in a timely manner.

C. BANK PERFORMANCE

Quality at Entry

Rating: Satisfactory

71.   **The Bank responded, quickly and holistically, to high-level demand and pressure from the GoA during project preparation, bringing the operation to the Board within 8 months.** The Bank undertook extensive preparatory work

to understand the policy, institutional and technical needs to achieve the desired results within a short timeframe. In recognition of the complexity of the reform, the Bank made an effective case for the use of a results-based instrument. This proved to be important to go beyond upgrading services at the front offices, as increased quality and efficiency of services also required the enhancement of the back-end systems and processes. To maximize the effectiveness of what was still a relatively new Bank instrument, the project design also built on lessons learnt from other IPFs with DLIs in the Governance Practice, as well as from two earlier DLI-based projects in Albania in different sectors.[38]

72.   **The overall project design was robust and conducive to the achievement of the PDO, as the Section on Efficacy demonstrates.** The project proposed a clear RF that served as a road map to advance the reforms with a "Substantial" M&E design, as explained above. The project was consistent with the WB's fiduciary role. The project activities had no negative environmental implications and only positive social impacts through increasing access to services among the poor, Roma, and females. The design of the implementation arrangements covered strategic, policy and operational coordination among key stakeholders.

73.   **While the overall risk assessment was adequate, some of the proposed mitigation measures did not prove enough during implementation.** Risk associated with the lack of institutional capacity, fiduciary risk, and bureaucratic resistance to enhanced transparency were effectively reduced/managed through the mitigation measures proposed in the project design. However, the foreseen mitigation measures for political cycle risks and stakeholder risks (namely risks related to policy/political shifts and inter-agency coordination) were not sufficient to mitigate such risks and this led to some shortcomings in project implementation (see discussion in the sections "Key Factors During Implementation" above and "Quality of Supervision" below).

Quality of Supervision

Rating: Satisfactory

74.   **The Bank ensured high-quality supervision inputs and processes throughout project implementation.** The CMU provided strong support throughout, both at the managerial and operational level, including after the change of the Country Director in early 2017. There were four Task/Co- Team Leaders throughout the project, but one of them led the project from effectiveness until project closure, hence this posed no implementation disruptions. Moreover, the team composition ensured continuity and project memory from project preparation to completion. Supervision missions took place regularly, as planned, twice a year. The only exception to this was in the aftermath of the April 2017 elections, when the CMU did not authorize any missions before the establishment of the new Government. Hence no mission took place between January and December 2017. During COVID-19 related travel restrictions in 2020 and 2021, the last three missions were carried out virtually. All the missions were complemented by regular liaison by the Tirana-based staff to respond to upcoming demands by the Government. The team reported on project performance in detail through AMs, ISRs and exchange of letters between the Country Manager and the client (e.g. on concerns related to the IFO and CFM). In the aftermath of the November 2019 earthquake and throughout COVID-19, the Bank

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[38] These lessons pertained to the need for a limited number of highly relevant DLIs, the need for TA to enhance program quality and facilitate achievements of results, and the need to include supporting "non-digital" reform elements necessary for an e-governance reform (policy level work to ensure a whole-of-government approach, business-process re-engineering, ensuring citizen engagement through multiple channels, a focus on vulnerable beneficiaries, extensive capacity building and performance management).

team and PIU continued close collaboration virtually. The supervision of fiduciary and environmental and social aspects was also satisfactory.

75. **The Bank proactively identified and resolved threats to the achievement of the PDO, but some issues remained challenging to resolve.** Originally the project design put strong implementation arrangements in place. However, once some of these mechanisms ceased to function after the change of administration in 2017/2018, inter-agency collaboration weakened posing a threat to project implementation (e.g. to the implementation of the IFO). Moreover, while the change of Government did not result in deprioritizing the reform agenda, it did shift its focus towards accelerated digitalization thus giving NAIS a more leading role in the reform. The Bank proactively attempted to mitigate these challenges to the extent that its position allowed. It consistently raised all of these issues in its dialogue, as reflected in the ISRs and AMs, and regularly attempted to establish stronger working relationship with the new Deputy PM. The WB team decided not to trigger any legal remedies to restore previously-agreed implementation arrangements, as: (i) project implementation was still progressing at a positive rate and largely achieving project results; and, (ii) the triggering of legal remedies could have potentially worsened the situation given the sensitivities regarding inter-institutional relations.

76. **The Bank proactively handled implementation challenges related to the IFO (cancellation of contract) and CFM (underuse), but it was also constrained by the authorizing environment.** As explained in the "Key Factors During Implementation Section", these challenges arose due to policy-level shifts in the reform agenda, ownership issues around the CFM, and COVID-19 related limitations in client capacity – most of which was beyond the control of the Bank. It is also important to note that neither of these implementation challenges endangered the achievement of the project outcomes and the broader positive impact of the project. Rather, they can potentially affect the sustainability of the project's results as mentioned in the section "Risk to Development Outcome"**.**

Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance

Rating: Satisfactory

77. **The WB's overall performance is rated Satisfactory given that the identified shortcomings were relatively minor and they did not impede on the substantial achievement of project results.** This is thanks to the Bank's close and effective involvement during the preparation and implementation of the reform program supported and its proactivity in responding to implementation issues. Moreover, the WB's support under this project to what is widely seen as a transformational reform was recognized by all stakeholders in the GoA, as well as by other donors. Despite minor shortcomings in Quality at Entry and Supervision, overall, the substantial achievement of the project results was not negatively impacted.

D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

Rating: Modest

78. **A risk to the sustainability of the development outcome is the potential loss of high-level support for the physical delivery of services in the face of growing emphasis on on-line only approach – a high impact, yet low to medium likelihood risk.** On the one hand, the PM's Order No. 158 shifted the reforms' focus away from the physical delivery of services through the CSCs towards online only approach. COVID-19 seems to be reinforcing this trend and

the GoA is expected to continue its steady progress in digitalizing all of its administrative services. On the other hand, there still appears to be a momentum and Government support for physical service delivery. The continued need for physical service access points is underlined in the National Strategy of Public Administration Reform 2015-2022[39] and continues to be supported by several donors [e.g. the EU and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)]. As such, according to the various interviews conducted by the ICR team with institutional stakeholders, at least in the near-term, CSCs are likely to continue their important role. Their added value is not only ensuring inclusivity, but also assistance to service users, especially with obtaining more complex services (e.g. property registration, social benefits).

79. **A further potential risk is COVID-19 and its macroeconomic implications – a medium impact and medium likelihood risk.** Due to the GoA's tightening fiscal space, resources for further investments in the service agenda may be temporarily diverted to more urgent needs in the shorter term. However, this would not risk the development outcome achieved so far, and after the economic recovery, service delivery (in particular e-services) are likely to remain a priority for the GoA.

80. **The continued efficiency of the reform may also be at risk from insufficient collaboration of the main Government stakeholders – a medium impact and medium likelihood risk.** Reform execution mechanisms are important, as the apparent reduction of inter-institutional collaboration and coordination between NAIS and ADISA have impacted project implementation, especially over the last year of project implementation. Going forward, heightened coordination and clearer roles and responsibilities between these agencies could ensure that both the physical and digital service delivery channels are adequately maintained to continue the improvements in service access and efficiency.

81. **The sustainability of the CFM is also unclear in the short term, although this is a low impact and medium likelihood risk and it does not threaten the project outcome per se (efficiency of and access to services).** While the CFM is now in place, along with the necessary technical capacity to operate it, it is not being used. Even though the lack of adequate citizen feedback collection does not impede continued delivery of services with efficiency and sufficient access, it does impact on whether citizen feedback is integrated into service delivery planning and reform. It also limits the quality of the monitoring of service delivery and accountability. User surveys by ADISA or individual institutions can also deliver such information, but will come at a higher transaction cost and reduced periodicity, provide a less systemic and integrated feedback framework, and may duplicate the investment already made in the establishment of the CFM. E-Albania also has other ways to measure service efficiency, yet this data is not as comprehensive as the one provided by the CFM. In spite of the current reluctance to use CFM, the GoA may at any time decide to make better use of it, as citizens' expectations towards their Government will continue to rise.

82. **In sum, the risk to development outcome is deemed Modest**. The likelihood of the various risks materializing and their impact on the outcomes achieved are low-to-medium. The agenda to continue pursuing digitalization is in place and will continue to enhance efficiencies. Ensuring continued access to the disadvantaged (e.g., the poor and Roma) through physical channels is likely to continue, but will need monitoring.

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[39] National Strategy of Public Administration Reform, Activity Plan and Indicators for the period 2018-2020, http://dap.gov.al/images/DokumentaStrategjik/Plani_aktiviteteve_2018_2022.pdf.

V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

83. **The project provides important lessons, many of which also resonate with some of the latest global evidence in the field of Digital Government and GovTech.** Below are four key lessons.

84. **High-level political support, underpinned by a clear purpose and delivery model, strengthened the design and implementation of the project.** One of the success factors was that this reform was championed by the PM, who had a clear vision, and who proactively followed the design of the project. This helped facilitate inter-departmental coordination and accelerated the mobilization of relevant resources. On the Bank side, this provided increased impetus to bring together a high-quality multi-sectoral team, to "think outside the box" and to go beyond a one-size-fits-all approach to the identified problems.[40] The delivery model also presents important lessons: (i) the building of physical CSCs provided "quicker wins" and tangible changes, which created the space for more ambitious institutional reforms; and, (ii) the "customer-orientation" of the CSCs – including their professionalism – progressively changed the service delivery culture in the country. In sum, the creation of high-quality physical access points, alongside efforts to be more citizen-centric (via feedback and service standards), created a new culture, which raised citizens' expectations and, in turn, sustained the momentum and demand for more complex institutional service delivery reforms.[41] Indeed, two core recommendations flow from this. First, it is important to ensure that digitalization efforts are underpinned by a clear vision and purpose. Global evidence shows the critical importance of "digitizing with a purpose".[42] Second, the combination of physical infrastructure investments – combined with institutional reforms, a results-based culture and sustained demand from users – can create a virtuous cycle to improve service delivery.

85. **The results-based portion of the loan facilitated a more transformational approach, but it also presented challenges that need to be mitigated.** The IPF with DLIs helped the Government and Bank to combine physical investments with complex institutional reforms, and also sustained the incentives to focus on key results *throughout* project implementation. This lending instrument, along with a strong M&E system and capacity-building in performance monitoring, also fostered a results-based culture in the involved public institutions which is likely to outlive the project timeline. On the other hand, the use of DLIs threw up two challenges. First, it is important to provide sufficient TA and capacity-building to enable the Government to achieve the intended results. Second, the DLI instrument does not allow for the *direct* financing of implementing agencies which may reduce the incentives for certain agencies to participate in a lending operation. For example, in the case of NAIS, it is reported that the Agency may have been more interested in Additional Financing if it could have benefitted from direct financing.[43] Two key recommendations flow from this overall lesson. First, digitalization projects should include a results-based portion, so the focus goes beyond ICT inputs to the types of results that are needed for tangible impacts on the users. Second, sustained and informative dialogue with the client regarding the instrument is critical to ensure that that there is strong alignment between the incentives it provides and the incentives of the relevant implementing agencies.

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[40] This was a key lesson mentioned by the former Country Manager in Albania who was heavily involved in the design of the project.

[41] Indeed, the project included a range of important activities on institutional strengthening, business-process re-engineering, enhancing back-end IT systems, citizen engagement, a focus on vulnerable beneficiaries, extensive capacity building and performance management. It was the combination of these different elements that led a strong project.

[42] World Bank (2020), "GovTech: The New Frontier in Digital. Government Transformation.

[43] For example, according to the Task Team, when discussing potential Additional Financing for the project, NAIS was reported as more interested in WB support if it could benefit from direct financing.

86.   **Such projects need to invest more in change management processes and be proactive in responding to political economy changes.**[44] The change in the political administration (2017/2018) and adoption of the PM's Order No. 158 (2019) contributed to a weakening in inter-institutional coordination, a reduction in the emphasis on the physical channel of service delivery and a decreased focus on certain project activities, such as the CFM or the IFO. The project team – on the Bank and PIU side – made significant efforts to respond to this changing environment, but there was no systematic and sustained approach to change management. The main recommendation, therefore, is that these types of digitalization projects would benefit from a dedicated sub-component focused on change management, that draws on the latest experience and tools in this domain,[45] and that deploys such tools to build and re-build ownership and accountability for results across multi-agency teams and in the face of shifting political and policy dynamics.

87.   **It is important to strike the right balance between physical, human-assisted service delivery and digital service delivery channels to ensure that *all* user groups are served.** The GoA made the important decision to place greater emphasis on e-services and e-Albania, which reaped important benefits. At the same time, results from this project illustrate the continued relevance and importance of physical channels of service delivery, especially for the vulnerable groups. This leads to the following recommendations. First, further financing and investment should be encouraged to support the GoA (and other governments) in scaling up their e-service ambitions to ensure more resilient, citizen-centric and transparent service delivery. Second, at the same time, this should go hand-in-hand with continued improvement of service delivery at necessary physical access points and with a well-resourced strategy for ensuring that marginalized groups can access all relevant services. In order to strike the "right" balance, it is important to take into account the local context, the characteristics of service users and the characteristics of the services that are provided.

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[44] Given the political salience of GovTech reforms, political economy changes can markedly impact on project design and/or implementation.

[45] For more on the need for change management and flexibility in GovTech projects and the relevant tools, see: World Bank (2021), GovTech Launch Report and Short-Term Action Plan, p. 23.

ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS

A. RESULTS INDICATORS

A.1 PDO Indicators

Objective/Outcome: To improve the efficiency of the delivery of selected administrative services

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Time taken to obtain motor vehicle registration	Days	5.30 31-May-2016	4.00 31-Dec-2020		0.02 30-Oct-2020

Comments (achievements against targets):
Exceeded. The indicator measures reduction in processing time of the most widely used and widely criticized service of the General Directorate of Roads and Transport Services. The baseline and end target were determined based on the results of the baseline survey completed in May 2016. At project closure, administrative data from the Department of Motor Vehicles from registrations issued showed that it took on average 30 minutes to issue a new motor vehicle registration.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Time taken to process old age	Days	53.00	40.00		29.00

| pension application | | 31-May-2016 | 31-Dec-2020 | | 30-Oct-2020 |

Comments (achievements against targets):
Exceeded. The indicator measures reduction in processing time of the most widely used and the most challenging service of the Social Security Institute. The baseline and end target were determined based on the results of the baseline survey completed in May 2016. At the time of project closure, administrative data from the Social Insurance Institute on approximately 16,000 applications showed that the average time to process an old age pensions application was 29 days.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Time taken to obtain health insurance card	Days	5.50	4.00		0.01
		31-May-2016	31-Dec-2020		30-Oct-2020

Comments (achievements against targets):
Exceeded. The baseline and end target were determined based on the results of the baseline survey completed in May 2016. The baseline was already a post-reform value, as there had been recent progress with automation of obtaining these cards and at the time of the baseline survey the whole process only took a few hours (5 hours and 33 minutes). As such, the unit of measure for this indicator was also changed from "days" (as per the PAD) to "hours". Although all ISRs after the formal revision of the RF had "hours" as a unit of measure, the last ISR used "days" by mistake. Hence the unit of measure cannot be modified in the portal for the ISR (it would require re-submitting the last ISR in the portal).

By project closure, the process for obtaining the Health Insurance was fully digitized with citizens not required to submit any documentation when applying for the card. The necessary information is now digitally exchanged between the relevant government institutions. As a result, this service is delivered in a very short time (a few minutes).

Objective/Outcome: To improve citizen's access to selected administrative services

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Access to services for the poor and vulnerable: Percentage of the poor who stated that receiving services from institutions contacted was "easy" or "very easy"	Percentage	50.00 31-May-2016	70.00 31-Dec-2020		69.00 30-Oct-2020

Comments (achievements against targets):
Almost fully achieved (95 percent). At the time of the revision of the RF, as documented in the ISRs, the methodology for measuring this indicator was amended. The original PDO indicator as per the PAD proposed to measure access to services incorrectly as "the availability of service information to citizens on multiple platforms". The availability of information via different channels is a measure of transparency to the general population and not of access to the poor and vulnerable. Hence the methodology was changed to a household survey.

The baseline survey completed in May 2016 provided the baseline values for this indicator and allowed for unpacking it into three different indicators to measure access to services separately for the poor, Roma and females. The poor were identified on the basis of a wealth index (bottom 40 percent).

From the baseline survey, 45 percent of the poor households stated that the process of receiving services was easy or very easy. However, the baseline value was later modified to 50 percent (documented in the ISR archived on August 26, 2019) to limit the indicator to the 10 institutions within the scope of the project and to enable more accurate comparison with the mid-term assessment (which is also limited to these 10 institutions). The original baseline indicators had 5 additional institutions that were not in the project scope – an oversight of the team. only noticed when comparative data from the mid-term assessment was available.

The target was nearly achieved, and these results may have been even greater, were it not for the impacts of the earthquake and COVID-19 as these constrained access to physical service delivery, particularly for the elderly, the poor, and the Roma populations that rely more on these physical channels.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Access to the poor and vulnerable: Percentage of the Roma who stated that receiving services from institutions contacted was "easy" or "very easy"	Percentage	52.00 31-May-2016	72.00 31-Dec-2020		65.00 30-Oct-2020

Comments (achievements against targets):

65 percent achieved. At the time of the revision of the RF, as documented in the ISRs, the methodology for measuring this indicator was amended. The original PDO indicator as per the PAD proposed to measure access to services incorrectly as "the availability of service information to citizens on multiple platforms". The availability of information via different channels is a measure of transparency to the general population and not of access to the poor and vulnerable. Hence the methodology was changed to a household survey with a separate survey module for the Roma.

The baseline survey completed in May 2016 provided the baseline values for this indicator and allowed for unpacking it into three different indicators to measure access to services separately for the poor, Roma and females.

From the baseline survey, 47 percent of the Roma households stated that the process of receiving services was easy or very easy. However, the baseline value was later modified to 52 percent (documented in the ISR archived on August 26, 2019) to limit the indicator to the 10 institutions within the scope of the project and to enable more accurate comparison with the mid-term assessment (which is also limited to these 10 institutions). The original baseline indicators had 5 additional institutions that were not in the project scope – an oversight of the team. only noticed when comparative data from the mid-term assessment was available.

The target was achieved, and these results may have been even greater, were it not for the impacts of the earthquake and COVID-19, as these constrained access to physical service delivery.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised	Actual Achieved at

				Target	Completion
Access to services for the poor and vulnerable: Percentage of females who stated that receiving services from institutions contacted was "easy" or "very easy"	Percentage	50.00 31-May-2016	71.00 31-Dec-2020		71.00 30-Oct-2020

Comments (achievements against targets):

Achieved. At the time of the revision of the RF, as documented in the ISRs, the methodology for measuring this indicator was amended. The original PDO indicator as per the PAD proposed to measure access to services incorrectly as "the availability of service information to citizens on multiple platforms". The availability of information via different channels is a measure of transparency to the general population and not of access to the poor and vulnerable. Hence the methodology was changed to a household survey with a separate survey module for the Roma.

The baseline survey completed in May 2016 provided the baseline values for this indicator and allowed for unpacking it into three different indicators to measure access to services separately for the poor, Roma and females.

From the baseline survey, 46 percent of females stated that the process of receiving services was easy or very easy. However, the baseline value was later modified to 50 percent (documented in the ISR archived on August 26, 2019) to limit the indicator to the 10 institutions within the scope of the project and to enable more accurate comparison with the mid-term assessment (which is also limited to these 10 institutions). The original baseline indicators had 5 additional institutions that were not in the project scope – an oversight of the team. only noticed when comparative data from the mid-term assessment was available.

In spite of initial steady progress, the access for the Roma feel in the end line survey and hence the target was not achieved. This was most likely due to the impacts of the earthquake and COVID-19, as these constrained access to physical service delivery, particularly for the elderly, the poor, and the Roma populations that rely more on these physical channels.

A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators

Component: Enhancing the back-end systems

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Agencies with new or enhanced backend IT systems to improve service delivery	Number	0.00 29-Apr-2015	8.00 31-Dec-2020		7.00 30-Nov-2020

Comments (achievements against targets):

Almost fully achieved (87.5 percent). This indicator was revised from "Agencies with new and enhanced IT systems" to "Agencies with new and enhanced backend IT systems to improve service delivery", because the focus of the project is on service delivery so only IT systems that are used in the delivery of services are relevant.

There were an overall 14 projects to enhance existing IT systems or develop new ones in 7 different institutions of focus for the project. The last ISR mistakenly documented this as 13 under actual achieved.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Priority services with business process reengineered	Number	0.00 29-Apr-2015	100.00 31-Dec-2020		100.00 30-Nov-2020

Comments (achievements against targets):

Achieved. The end target of "To-Be maps" produced for 100 services was achieved early by mid-2017). By project closure, "To-Be maps" were prepared for 400 public services, although TPV was conducted only for 100 of them, as this was the official end target. The TPV also reveals that 70 of the 100 have been approved and are under implementation.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
New services with level 3 automation	Number	0.00 15-Jun-2015	75.00 31-Dec-2020		75.00 30-Nov-2020

Comments (achievements against targets):

Achieved. While 75 services from the list of 169 services within the project's scope have been validated by TPV, the number of total transactional e-services offered on the e-Albania portal is 759 (though not validated). Out of the 75 services validated by TPV, 40 went beyond the target level 3 automation and achieved level 4 of automation.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of registered users accessing e-government services (as percentage of adult population)	Percentage	2.25 31-Dec-2015	3.60 31-Dec-2020		13.70 30-Oct-2020

Comments (achievements against targets):

Exceeded. This indicator was amended from "Users accessing e-government services online" to "Number of registered users accessing e-government services (as percentage of adult population)". This also allowed for harmonization with the EU DESI 5a1 and to provide a more precise definition of "users" of e-government services as "the percentage of individuals (aged 16-74) who have sent filled forms to public authorities over the internet in last 12 months".

The end target was significantly exceeded, as the number of those who used e-Albania portal for accessing e-gov services automated at level 3 or 4 grew from about 50,000 in 2016 to 1,493,516 as of October 2020.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
The amount of data prefilled in public services' online forms	Percentage	58.40 30-Dec-2016	71.00 31-Dec-2020		63.00 30-Oct-2020

Comments (achievements against targets):

36.5 percent achieved. This indicator was introduced at the time of the revision of the RF.

Component: Enhancing citizen interface with service delivery

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Services offered with improved customer service	Number	0.00 29-Apr-2015	130.00 31-Dec-2020		140.00 30-Jun-2020

front office interface				

Comments (achievements against targets):
Exceeded. This result exceeded the end target (as validated by a TPV report).

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Services with information available on multiple platforms	Number	0.00 29-Apr-2015	130.00 31-Dec-2020		132.00 30-Nov-2020

Comments (achievements against targets):
Exceeded. The end target was achieved well ahead of schedule in 2018 and eventually exceeded by project closure (as validated by a TPV report). The new standardized "information cards" prepared for all 169 services of focus for the project (and many more) were all placed on multiple platforms, but only those 132 were validated which were placed on all platforms –physical Front-Offices (FOs), call centers, and online channels such as the e-Albania portal and Agency for Delivery of Integrated Services in Albania (ADISA) website.

Component: Building capacity to deliver

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of institutions with	Number	1.00	8.00		4.00

proactive citizen feedback mechanisms implemented		29-Apr-2015	31-Dec-2020		30-Nov-2020

Comments (achievements against targets):

57.1 percent achieved. This indicator was amended from "Number of services with proactive citizen feedback mechanisms implemented" to "Number of institutions with proactive citizen feedback mechanisms implemented". The reason for the amendment was that citizen feedback needed to be aggregated for the variety of services offered by each institution. Hence the institution, and not the service, was the unit of analysis.

The end target was only half achieved, as the CFM was only implemented in 4 institutions. Its further roll-out was hampered by privacy concerns, ownership issues, and eventually a shift of government priorities during Covid-19. However, the CFM is in place and functional and can be used at any time.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Institutional pre-requisites of Citizen Centric Service Delivery Program	Yes/No	No 29-Apr-2015	Y 31-Dec-2020		Yes 30-Nov-2020

Comments (achievements against targets):

Achieved. This target was met in June 2016 by the approval of the Policy Reform Document and the completion of baseline survey.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Institutions with key	Number	0.00	8.00		7.00

performance indicators reported and quarterly performance reports circulated		29-Apr-2015	31-Dec-2020		30-Nov-2020

Comments (achievements against targets):

Almost fully achieved (87.5 percent). This indicator was revised from "Services with key performance indicators reported and quarterly performance reports circulated" to "Institutions with key performance indicators reported and quarterly performance reports circulated". The reason for the amendment was that every institution had multiple services and reporting KPIs at the service level would result in hundreds of indicators. Instead, it was more feasible to report at the institutional level and focus on a few key indicators.

The monthly performance reports were prepared for a total of 12 service providing institutions. But the target was not fully achieved, because only 7 of these were among the institutions in the scope of the project.

B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT

Objective/Outcome 1: To improve the efficiency of the delivery of selected administrative services	
Outcome Indicators	1. Time taken to obtain motor vehicle registration 2. Time taken to process old age pension application 3. Time taken to obtain health insurance card
Intermediate Results Indicators	1. Agencies with new or enhanced backend IT systems to improve service delivery 2. Priority services with business process reengineered 3. New services with level 3 automation 4. Number of registered users accessing e-government services (as percentage of adult population) 5. The amount of data prefilled in public services' online forms
Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1)	1. Back-end IT systems enhanced in agencies 2. Business processes re-engineered for priority services 3. Online services developed with level 3 automation 3. Citizens' access to e-services increased 4. The use of online service application forms increased
Objective/Outcome 2: To improve citizen's access to selected administrative services	
Outcome Indicators	1. Access to services for the poor and vulnerable: Percentage of the poor who stated that receiving services from institutions contacted was "easy" or "very easy" 2. Access to the poor and vulnerable: Percentage of the Roma who stated that receiving services from institutions contacted was "easy" or "very easy" 3. Access to services for the poor and vulnerable: Percentage of females who stated that receiving services from institutions contacted was "easy" or "very easy"

Intermediate Results Indicators	1. Services offered with improved customer service front office interface 2. Services with information available on multiple platforms 3. Number of institutions with proactive citizen feedback mechanisms implemented
Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 2)	1. Integrated Service Centers (ISC) with improved customer service established 2. Information on services available on multiple platforms 3. Citizen Feedback Mechanism Implemented
Objective: To improve capacity to deliver Objectives 1 and 2	
Outcome Indicators	-
Intermediate Results Indicators	1. Institutional pre-requisites of Citizen Centric Service Delivery Program 2. Institutions with key performance indicators reported and quarterly performance reports circulated
Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective)	1. Policy Reform Document prepared and approved; baseline survey conducted and the Results Framework completed 2. Monthly monitoring reports prepared by institutions

ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION

A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS

Name	Role
Preparation	
Jana Kunicova	Task Team Leader(s)
Benedicta T. Oliveros	Procurement Specialist(s)
Jonida Myftiu	Financial Management Specialist
Maria Eugenia Davalos	Team Member
Esma Kreso Beslagic	Social Specialist
Stephen Rimmer	Team Member
Kimberly D. Johns	Team Member
Evis Sulko	Team Member
Bekim Imeri	Social Specialist
Cem Dener	Team Member
Zubair Khurshid Bhatti	Team Member
Jose C. Janeiro	Team Member
Nightingale Rukuba-Ngaiza	Counsel
Supervision/ICR	
Simon Carl O'Meally, Zahid Hasnain	Task Team Leader(s)
Orjana Ibrahimi, Arben Maho	Procurement Specialist(s)
Jonida Myftiu	Financial Management Specialist
Maribel M. Cherres Wedemeyer	Team Member
Cem Dener	Team Member
Bekim Imeri	Social Specialist

Evis Sulko	Team Member
Stephen Rimmer	Team Member
Shpresa Kastrati	Environmental Specialist
Gabriela Grinsteins	Counsel
Ermal Vila	Team Member
Emoke Anita Sobjak	Team Member
Eranda Troqe	Team Member

B. STAFF TIME AND COST

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost	
	No. of staff weeks	US$ (including travel and consultant costs)
Preparation		
FY15	65.173	366,028.01
FY16	5.661	18,839.66
Total	**70.83**	**384,867.67**
Supervision/ICR		
FY16	26.461	121,312.84
FY17	25.604	120,016.99
FY18	28.436	163,138.45
FY19	19.756	102,132.89
FY20	34.786	184,876.90
FY21	0	83.27
Total	**135.04**	**691,561.34**

ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT

Components	Amount at Approval (US$M)	Actual at Project Closing (US$M)	Percentage of Approval (US$M)
Enhancing the back-end systems	0	15.59	0
Enhancing citizen interface with service delivery	0	10.79	0
Building capacity to deliver	0	5.62	0
Total	**0.00**	**32.00**	**0.00**

ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

1.   **As discussed in the main text, quantifiable benefits at project closing – while different than those which were estimated at design and which represent only a portion of the project's total benefits – are significant**. The methodology used to estimate the value of these benefits, together with a more detailed discussion of non-quantifiable benefits owing to project interventions are presented below.

2.   **At project appraisal, as discussed in the PAD, the net present value of benefits stemming from reduced compliance costs for citizens (thanks to reduced time to obtain information and application forms, prepare and submit applications and necessary documentation, and follow up on applications for 380 services) – was estimated to be US$117.4 million over the five years of project implementation (US$558.5 over ten years).** These calculations assumed a 25 percent time reduction across all services, with benefits accruing in the fifth year of project implementation, and that the number of users of each public service would remain constant over time. Average monthly wages of 41,963 Lek in 2015 were converted to a daily rate (22 working days per month), with an assumed annual growth rate for real wages of 1.5 percent which would remain constant over time, as was also assumed about the exchange rate, which was taken to be 130.65 Lek/US$ in April 2015.

3.   **While not possible to replicate these calculations at closing due to data availability limitations, benefits accruing to the Government due to BPR associated with 46 services that reduced service delivery time by 90 percent of the verified time reduction (a conservative scenario) – thereby allowing staff time to be used for other productive tasks – are estimated to have a net present value of US$51.7 million over the five years of project implementation (US$246 million over ten years).** These calculations are based on data on the time reductions associated with the set of services which's business process improvements were tracked and verified in 2020. 90 percent of verified time reductions were recognized in benefits calculations in order to account for the possibility that a fraction of the baseline processing duration may have included inactive time waiting to proceed to the next step of manual processing. Information on the volume of uses per service by citizens reflects data reported by NAIS (where the number of uses indicates the number of times users requested the e-service, i.e., clicked the 'use' button in the main page of the e-service, regardless of whether or not they ultimately completed the application in the end). While a total of 56 services were verified, only 46 are included within the benefits calculations due to instances where (a) there is not corresponding transaction volume information (6 services) or (b) information on time reductions is based on instances where users can pay a fee to expedite processing to be completed within 24 hours (4 services), which are excluded given that it is not possible to know how many of the transactions were processed on the accelerated timeline. As in the PAD, these benefits are assumed to have started accruing only in the fifth year of project implementation (2020) – the year in which time reductions were verified. Average monthly wages for 2020 are taken to be 48,875 Lek calculated based on actual real wage growth between 2015 and 2019 and assumed to grow 1.5 percent (the average annual real growth rate of wages in 2017-2019) per year in every subsequent year (converted to a daily rate using 22 working days per month). The exchange rate (period average, as reported in the IMF's International Financial Statistics for 2020) is assumed to remain constant at 108.65 Lek/US$ over time. To maintain consistency with the assumptions at the time of appraisal, a 12 percent discount rate is used to calculate the net present value of benefits; however, it is worth noting that more recent WB projects in Albania (e.g. Regional and Local Roads Connectivity Project, P163239; Additional Financing for the Water Resources and Irrigation Project, P162786) used 8 percent and 6 percent discount rates, respectively, suggesting that the 12 percent rate used for the present project may be quite conservative.

4. **Notable efficiency improvements and time reduction were achieved in the case of several categories of property registration services – a service for which the PAD expected significant cost savings.** Several surveys conducted leading up to the project indicated that property registration was one of the public services most affected by delays and bribery.[46] All the 24 property registration services covered by the project saw efficiency gains. Since 2016 these have been provided with improved Front Office interface at CSCs and by 2018 they all achieved level 3 automation. Starting with 2020, applications for these services could be done online on e-Albania. Time savings for some of these property registartion services are presented in Table 5 below.

Table 5: Time savings from BPR for selected services under the project scope

Name of service after services were merged	Baseline (2016)	Revised Actual (2020) calculated by the PIU based on explanations provided in the validation report of DLI 2	Revised time reduction (% change)
Issue of ownership certificate	5 days	1 day	80%
Issue copies of property files	2 days	1 day	50%
Registration donation contract	2 days	1 day	50%
The registration of the mortgage contract to guarantee loans by banks or other credit providing institutions, for loans amounting to 1,000,000 Lek as well as issue a copy of the file within this deadline	2 days	1 day	50%
Registration of sales contracts	2 days	1 day	50%
Issuance of the certificates of minimum for the shippers of freight and fisheries	2,63 hours	60 mins	62%
Issuance of the certificate of competence / CKP	2,63 hours	60 mins	62%
Registration and the equipment with navigation passport for commercial fleet sailor	2,63 hours	60 mins	62%
Final registration, provisional registration and deregistration of ships bareboat contract	2,63 hours	60 mins	62%
Registration of Small Sailing Vessels	2,63 hours	60 mins	62%
Final Registration of Sea Motors	2,63 hours	60 mins	62%
Family certificate	15 min	0 min	100%
Act of birth registration	20 min	10 min	50%
Act of death registration	20 min	15 min	25%
Personal Certificate	5 min	0 min	100%

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[46] 2011 UNODC Corruption Survey; citizen feedback monitoring led by the Minister of State for Anti-Corruption.

Issuing international driving license	20 min	18 min	10%
Permanent deregistration of vehicle	30 min	15 min	50%
Temporary deregistration of vehicle	30 min	15 min	50%
Change of license plate in case of lost, stolen or damaged vehicle	60 min	30 min	50%
Change of vehicle circulation license (lost, stolen or damaged)	60 min	20 min	66,6%
Change of the vehicle's ownership	60 min	30 min	50%
Constructive change of the vehicle	8 hours	0,7 hours	92%
End of pension and death pay-out	43 days	30 days	30,2%
Early pension for the seniority service/law No. 10142, dated 15.03.2009, amended	43 days	30 days	30,2%
Old age pension	43 days	30 days	30,2%
Family pension	43 days	30 days	30,2%
Pension review	43 days	30 days	30,2%
Pension Transfer	43 days	0 days	100%
Attestation for period of work before 01.01.1994	35 days	30 days	14,2%
Attestation for the contributions payment for employees/self-employed after 2012	30 days	0 days	100%
Application for attestation of pension amount	3 days	0 days	100%
Recognition of foreign qualifications for the first and second cycle	45-90 days	20 days	55%
		Average	**37%**

5.   Beyond time savings from BPR – which benefits both service providers and users – several other project interventions contributed to efficiency gains for service users (even if these savings are not measurable). These are the following:

- **Improved citizen interface for service provision:** Out of the project's 169 focal services CSCs provided 140 services with improved Front Office (10 more than the end target). However, the actual number of services benefitting from the improved user interface is much larger, as the CSCs provided a total of 429 services by the end of 2019, and 750 by the end of 2020 as online-only application procedures were put in place at all CSCs. Improvements in the citizen interface at CSCs for all these services means less time for users to access the center, obtain information on the service, stay in queue, apply, etc.

- **Quicker and easier submission and tracking of online applications:** By the end of 2020, online application was possible for about 750 services through the e-Albania portal or CSCs. In addition, thanks to backend integration of IT systems, the amount of data pre-filled in the application forms increased (from 58.4 percent in 2016 to 63 percent by the end of 2020). This allows for filling in the application form quicker for those who

apply online by themselves or with ADISA staff assistance in a CSC. The required documents can be uploaded at the time of application, at least for services related to property registration or social security. Otherwise, postal service was also made available at several of the CSCs allowing not only to mail these documents, but also to pay the application fee. Lastly, applicants can now track the status of the application online through their personal account on e-Albania.

- **Digitization of services beyond the initial expectations:** Out of the 75 e-services that reached the target level 3 automation, 11 actually reached level 4. This means that these services can be obtained much quicker, as they are provided with a digital seal and the final document is shared with the applicant online through their personal account on e-Albania (by contrast, in the case of level 3 services the final document is mailed to the applicant). The 75 services with digital seals include some which are in particularly high demand, such as the ones related to social security benefits, property registration, motor vehicle registration and business licensing.

ANNEX 6. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS)

Borrower comments were integrated in the ICR. The PIU reviewed the draft ICR and sent written comments and edits on May 28, 2021. All comments were of a clarifying nature and were incorporated in the ICR. Overall, the Borrower agreed with the analysis and findings of the ICR.

ANNEX 7. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY)

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